Federatsia: La Geopolítica Mundial y La Posibilidad de Bases Rusas en Latinoamérica

"La Geopolítica Mundial y La Posibilidad de Bases Rusas en Latinoamérica"

Por: El Analista W. Alejandro Sanchez

Federatsia

Octubre 30, 2016

Publicado:

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A principios de Octubre, el vice-ministro de Defensa de la Federación Rusa, Nikolai Pankov, declaró que su gobierno está considerando abrir, o re-abrir en algunos casos, bases militares en países como Cuba, Nicaragua y Venezuela en Latinoamérica, al igual que Vietnam en Asia. Estas declaraciones causaron furor en los medios periodísticos internacionales, particularmente en lo que se refiere a Cuba debido a que durante los dos últimos años, los gobiernos en Washington y La Habana han mejorado sus relaciones diplomáticas. Hoy en día hay un nuevo régimen geopolítico multipolar, con potencias mundiales y regionales, y como en otrora, las bases militares en naciones amigas son parte de la proyección del poder político y militar de un gobierno.

Después de la Guerra Fría, Estados Unidos y sus aliados de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN) extendieron su presencia a Europa Central y a Europa del Este. En la actualidad, este bloque tiene miembros que en su momento fueron, o parte de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas o parte del Pacto de Varsovia, como los países bálticos o los que bordean al Mar Negro (Bulgaria y Rumania). Hasta hace poco tiempo, aproximadamente en los últimos ocho años, se especulaba que Georgia, en el Cáucaso, o Ucrania en algún momento también serían miembros de la OTAN; sin embargo la guerra entre Rusia y Georgia en el 2008 y el conflicto interno en Ucrania evaporaron estas posibilidades.

Por su parte, Estados Unidos también incrementó su presencia en Asia Central luego de los ataques del 11 de Septiembre del 2011 y la operación multinacional en Afganistán, al igual que en el Mundo Árabe luego de la guerra del 2003 en Iraq. En cuanto a bases militares se refieren, se necesitaría un ensayo solo para enumerarlas, no obstante vale mencionar que Estados Unidos tiene a sus fuerzas armadas en países como Alemania, Corea del Sur y Japón mientras que en el continente americano están en Cuba, El Salvador y Honduras entre otros. Algunos países europeos poseen también bases en otras naciones, como la presencia militar francesa en Mali. Mientras tanto la República Popular China ha abierto su primera base naval en otro país, en Djibouti, un pequeño país africano muy importante por su posición geográfica, está situado frente al Golfo de Adén.

En cuanto a la Federación Rusa, Moscú tiene una presencia militar en los países que lo bordean, incluyendo la Región del Cáucaso. También está presente en Ucrania, de manera muy controversial, dado el rol ruso en el conflicto interno de dicho país y en Transnistria, una región separatista de Moldova. Sin embargo la base rusa que hoy en día hace noticia está en Siria, ya que Moscú está apoyando militarmente al gobierno de Bashar al Assad contra el Estado Islámico y otros grupos insurgentes. Precisamente en estos días, una flota rusa, encabezada por el portaviaones Kurznetsov ha atravesado el Canal de la Mancha, con dirección a Siria. Vale mencionar que esta flota causó preocupación en el Reino Unido, ya que Londres desplegó dos buques de guerra, el destructor HMS Duncan y la fragata HMS Richmond, para que monitoreen las actividades de la flota rusa.

La simbología de esta flota rusa ha sido analizada en extenso. Por ejemplo, Steve Rosenberg de la BBC escribió que Rusia no quiere solo incrementar su poderío en Siria, ya que para hacerlo, sería más rápido enviar aviones directamente a la base rusa aérea cercana a Latakia, en Siria. Rosenberg argumenta que “mandar una flotilla rusa por el Mar del Norte y el Canal de la Mancha envía un mensaje claro al Oeste: todo lo que ustedes pueden hacer, también lo podemos hacer nosotros, hasta mejor.”

Las tensiones entre las potencias mundiales han llevado al Primer Ministro ruso Dmitry Medvédev a declarar, en Febrero del presente año, que el mundo está viviendo una nueva Guerra Fría.  Dado este punto de vista, de un alto oficial ruso, son de esperar los rumores o declaraciones respecto a que Moscú tiene la intención de abrir bases en diferentes naciones amigas, ya que esta sería una forma mediante la cual, la Federación Rusa incremente su presencia militar y política más allá de sus fronteras. Curiosamente, en el 2015, el vice ministro de defensa Anatoly Antonov declaró que Moscú no tiene planes de crear bases en Latinoamérica, mientras que ahora, otro vice ministro dice lo contrario.

Por el momento, la intención rusa de establecer bases en Latinoamérica, no ha progresado. Ciertamente, Rusia mantiene buenas relaciones de defensa con varios países de la región y ha vendido material bélico a los gobiernos de Nicaragua y Venezuela, entre otros. Sin embargo, Rusia no tiene una base militar en Latinoamérica, lo más cercano es el centro de entrenamiento “Mariscal Zukhov” en Nicaragua. Vale aclarar que este centro no es una base militar en el sentido tradicional de la palabra, con tropas armadas y armamento pesado, sino más bien un centro académico y de entrenamiento.

Cuando el vice ministro Pankov declaró que Rusia planea tener “bases militares” en países latinoamericanos y en Vietnam, no es claro a qué tipo de instalaciones se refiere. ¿En verdad tendrá la intención Moscú de abrir bases con un alto número de tropas al estilo de Siria, Transnistria o Ucrania? Aunque esto probablemente no ocurra, hasta una presencia militar simbólica, como los instructores en Nicaragua, sirven para incrementar las relaciones de defensa entre Moscú y otras naciones, algunas de las cuales se encuentran geográficamente cerca a Estados Unidos.

La geopolítica mundial hoy en día es rara. La utopía de crear paz mundial se ha evaporado y ahora tenemos un orden multipolar,es decir, con varios potencias mundiales y regionales.  Hasta pareciera que el mundo está retornando a la geopolítica de otrora, es decir a la época donde las potencias establecen instalaciones militares fuera de sus fronteras para demostrar el alcance de sus fuerzas políticas y de defensa.

Sin lugar a dudas, una hipotética base militar rusa (ya sea con tropas como la base en Siria, o solo con instructores como el centro en Nicaragua) en Latinoamérica tendría fuertes repercusiones a nivel regional, al igual que efectos en el “Gran Juego” geopolítico de las potencias mundiales que se vive en la actualidad.

E-IR: Suicide Squad, Atrocity Crimes and the International Criminal Court

"Suicide Squad: Atrocity Crimes and the International Criminal Court"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
E-International Relations
October 19, 2016
Originally published: http://www.e-ir.info/2016/10/19/suicide-squad-atrocity-crimes-and-the-international-criminal-court/

DC Comics has published a one-issue story of its popular comic book franchise, Suicide Squad. Suicide Squad: War Crimes has the fictional team of “worst superheroes ever” undertake a mission in which they will have to deal with a very real organization: the International Criminal Court (ICC).

A Brief Plot

Given that the ICC has a prominent role in War Crimes, it is necessary to briefly summarize the comic’s plot as this will help our analysis when we discuss what the ICC can and cannot do.  In War Crimes, a European mercenary team, Strikeforce Europa, abducts the fictional George Carmody, a former U.S. Secretary of Defense (SecDef), in New York City. The goal is to take him to the ICC’s headquarters in The Hague so he can be tried for ‘alleged war crimes during the last Gulf action.’ It is revealed that the team decided to kidnap Carmody on their own, without receiving orders from a government or the ICC. The ruthless Amanda Waller deploys Task Force X (popularly known to readers as the Suicide Squad) to The Netherlands to rescue Carmody while he is transported from the ICC’s detention centre to its main facilities, both located in Scheveningen.

The objective is to prevent Carmody from having to stand trial since, as Waller puts it, ‘he’s guilty as sin.’ She then briefly explains to the task force how Carmody headed a security company called Black Mountain Ltd, before becoming SecDef and ‘some say he never stopped working for them. Carmody threw them a lot of work during the Gulf action. Big-time war profiteers.’

The Workings of the ICC

Typically comic book storylines create fictional characters and agencies, though there are cases when they mention real-world entities. War Crimes, correctly states that the ICC’s detention center and main facilities are located in Scheveningen; however there are a couple of facts that deserve clarification.

The main plot problem with War Crimes is that the ICC must first open a case against an individual in order to subsequently order his/her arrest. Hence, even if the fictional Carmody was guilty of whatever crimes he allegedly committed, the ICC cannot arrest him and put him on trial if he happened to appear at its offices (e.g. after being kidnapped by the fictional Strikeforce Europa mercenaries).

The ICC’s charter is quite clear on the reasons via which it can prosecute individuals. There are three possible routes:

1. ‘A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed;’ (ICC Treaty, Art. 14)
2. The United Nations Security Council can request that the ICC investigates an incident;
3. Or ’the Prosecutor may initiate investigations propriomotu on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.’ (ICC Treaty, Art. 15)

According to the comic book, the Strikeforce Europa mercenaries were acting out of their own accord, without orders from a government or the ICC, when they took Carmody. This would not be acceptable for the Court, particularly if there was no case against him to begin with.

Additionally, even if theoretically the case against the fictional Carmody in War Crimes was not dismissed outright by the ICC, given that he was kidnapped from the U.S. without an order for his arrest, the U.S. could veto any judicial procedure against him.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), of which the U.S. is a permanent member, has the power to veto cases that could be brought to the ICC. According to Article 16 of the Rome Statute, ‘no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect.’ This power has been recently utilized. For example, in 2014 Moscow and Beijing, also UNSC permanent members, vetoed a resolution for the ICC to open a case for war crimes in Syria. Hence, the fictional Amanda Waller need not have worried about sending her team of criminals to The Hague to rescue the former U.S. SecDef, as Washington could have vetoed a judicial procedure against him.

Finally, there is the issue of nomenclature. The crimes prosecuted by the ICC are known as ‘atrocity crimes;’ this agency is not a ‘war crimes tribunal’ or ‘genocide court.’ The term ‘atrocity’ encompasses genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes (namely the crimes the ICC investigates). Hence, theSuicide Squad issue should have been called ‘Suicide Squad: Atrocity Crimes.’ (For further info, see theFramework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention, published by the United Nations).

Setting Precedents

War Crimes does bring up an interesting scenario: the possibility of a government official from a developed nation being brought to stand trial at the ICC. While there is significant international support among governments and civic society for the court (after all, the Rome Statute was adopted in 1998 and the 60 ratifications needed to enter it into force were reached by 2002, and today it has 124 State Parties), there has been criticism that the ICC has focused on investigating atrocity crimes perpetrated by citizens of the developing world, particularly Africa, without investigating crimes committed by, for example, military personnel from a global power in another country. For example, Chad’s president, Idriss Déby, has declared that ‘elsewhere in the world, many things happen, many flagrant violations of human rights, but nobody cares.’

Currently there are nine cases that the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor is investigating, which are all located in the developing world: the Central African Republic (two cases), the Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Sudan (Darfur), and Uganda. Even more, the ICC has two arrest warrants (issued in 2009 and 2010) for Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, which have not been implemented, as the Sudanese leader has travelled abroad, including to South Africa in 2015, and has not been arrested. (The South African Supreme Court of Appeal reprimanded the government for not arresting the Sudanese head of state, hence it is unlikely that he will be able to enter the country again).

In an e-mail interview with the author, Kip Hale, an international atrocity law expert and former UN prosecuting attorney, argues that ‘all cases at the ICC but Sudan and Libya were either expressly requested by the country in question, or in the case of Kenya, given every chance to handle the atrocities domestically (and in that case, the ICC was given little choice but to intervene in the face of impunity).’ In other words, the aforementioned cases have followed the ICC’s bureaucratic procedure as established by the Rome Statute, which over a hundred nations to date (including many Africa governments) have ratified and must adhere to. (There is also the issue of whether certain heads of state are attempting to undermine and delegitimize the ICC in order to prevent the Court from opening a case against them at some point).

Without a doubt, the ICC should not engage in the circus-type trial of the citizen of a global power or developed nation for the sole sake of appeasing governments from the developing world that would like to see more variety in the suspects that the court investigates. Moreover, the fact that most cases that the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is currently investigating originate in Africa is influenced by the number of conflicts taking place in said continent as well the inadequate local judicial systems that cannot necessarily assure a competent and impartial judicial process, particularly when the defendant is, or was, a government official. As an analysis in the International Policy Digest explains, ‘by limiting the role of the ICC to complementary [justice], the Rome Statute and the states that are party to the treaty created a last resort institution that will only be utilized if the country is unable or unwilling to prosecute their war criminals.’ In other words, the ICC is supposed to be a ‘last resort’ option for justice, if domestic judicial systems are either inadequate or unwilling to process war criminals. The ongoing ICC case in Kenya is an example of this situation.

Even more, the ICC is starting to be active in areas outside of continental Africa. As Mr. Hale explains, ‘the ICC is currently conducting preliminary investigations in Afghanistan (in part looking at US alleged abuses), Iraq (in part looking at UK alleged abuses) and Palestine (in part looking at Israel’s alleged crimes),’ apart from the ongoing case in Georgia vis-à-vis, alleged crimes committed by Russia during the 2008 conflict. Hence, the ICC is actually starting to investigate alleged crimes by the global powers.

Other regions of the world plagued by internal conflict have created their own courts as well as truth and reconciliation commissions to expose crimes and, if needed, prosecute individuals accused of atrocity crimes. For example, the Guatemalan government is currently prosecuting a former soldier, Santos López Alonzo, accused of ordering the death of over 200 individuals in 1982 during that Central American country’s civil war. The judicial systems in these countries are far for perfect, but justice is (slowly) being served.

An Evolving Mandate?

It is important to note that in mid-September, the ICC decided to start investigating environmental crimes in addition to the four categories of crimes already under its jurisdiction (crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and crimes of aggression). A Reuters report explains that ‘company executives or politicians could now be held responsible under international law for illegal land deals which violently displace residents following the shift.’ Even more, the recent case of The Prosecutor vs. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi is another landmark as ‘this is the first international trial focusing on the destruction of historical and religious monuments, and the first ICC case where the defendant made an admission of guilt.’ On 27 September, Mr. Al Faqi was sentenced to nine years in prison.

This issue deserves an important clarification. As Mr. Hale explains, ‘the ICC can only charge individuals for the three core atrocity crimes (until the crimes of aggression one day becomes available to it): war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.’ Hence, when the ICC charges individuals for environmental crimes or crimes against cultural property, ‘these are not crimes separate from war crimes, crimes against humanity, etc. They are crimes being charges AS war crimes, crimes against humanity, and/or genocide. Specifically as it relates to war crimes, destruction of the environment and cultural property are already widely recognized war crimes and listed in the Rome Statute,’ Mr. Hale explains.

The question then becomes if the ICC could try the citizen of a developed nation for environmental or cultural crimes if these fall under the provision of the ICC. Discussing such a scenario is beyond the scope of this analysis, but it is clear that if a government from the developed world agrees to have one of its citizens prosecuted by the ICC, this would set a monumental precedent and would give the Court further credibility as a global judicial body.

The U.S. and the ICC

Given that War Crimes focuses on the fictional scenario of a former U.S. official being tried at the ICC, it is important to note that the U.S. government has yet to ratify the Rome Statute. Some U.S.-based research centers argue that Washington should not do so. For example, the Heritage Foundation, published an issue brief in 2014 that advices the U.S. government  to ‘reaffirm its intent not to ratify the Rome Statute; reject ICC claims of jurisdiction over U.S. persons; [and] maintain and expand America’s bilateral Article 98 agreements and exercise available options to protect U.S. persons from the ICC.’

Even though the U.S has not ratified the Rome Statute, Washington has been heavily involved in helping prosecute atrocity crimes for decades. The desire to promote international justice is found in Washington’s support for the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC); the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East after World War II; and the international criminal tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s. Washington was also involved in the establishment of the ICC itself.

Nowadays, while some official U.S. documents praise the Court, it is unclear if there is a significant official interest in joining it. For example, the 2010 National Security Strategy explains that ‘although the United States is not at present a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and will always protect U.S. personnel, we are engaging with State Parties to the Rome Statute on issues of concern and are supporting the ICC’s prosecution of those cases that advance U.S. interests and values, consistent with the requirements of U.S. law.’ Meanwhile, the 2015 National Security Strategy has a briefer mention of the ICC, simply stating that the U.S. ‘will work with the international community to prevent and call to account those responsible for the worst human rights abuses, including through support to the International Criminal Court, consistent with U.S. law and our commitment to protecting our personnel.’

While the Obama administration recently made headlines by agreeing to ratify the Paris climate change agreement, we will probably have to wait until the next administration to see if the U.S. becomes a state party of the Rome Statute.

Final Thoughts

While Suicide Squad: War Crimes has a number of factual flaws regarding how the ICC, and the OTP in particular, operates, it nevertheless serves as an interesting point of departure to have a debate about the fairness the ICC so far in investigating atrocity crimes since it was established in 2002. The fact that a fictional U.S. SecDef is taken to The Hague to stand trial brings up the issue of which crimes and which countries the ICC has investigated so far, and which it has not, for one reason or other. While War Crimes is a fictional story, prosecuting atrocity crimes in the real world remains a complex, and sometimes infuriatingly slow, process.

*The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated. The author would like to thank Kip Hale, Christian Maisch and Lucia Scripcari for their helpful suggestions.

Quoted: El papel de Brasil en la cumbre de los BRICS está en duda

"El Papel de Brasil en la Cumbre de los BRICS esta en duda"
Por: Ana Maria Palacios
Sputnik Mundo
14 October, 2016
Originally published: https://mundo.sputniknews.com/politica/201610141064105618-brics-brasil-politica/


BUENOS AIRES (Sputnik) — Es incierta la actitud que tomará el nuevo Gobierno brasileño de Michel Temer en la cumbre del grupo BRICS que se celebra en la ciudad india de Goa, indicó a Sputnik Nóvosti el experto en asuntos rusos Alejandro Sánchez.

"Veremos qué interés tiene el nuevo presidente Michel Temer en este bloque, que fue una prioridad para la expresidenta Dilma Rousseff", indicó Sánchez, integrante del Observatorio de Rusia en el Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales. 

La cumbre de los países que conforman el bloque de los BRICS (Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica) "ocurre en un momento muy importante para uno de ellos, Brasil", a pocas semanas de la destitución de la anterior jefa de Estado. "Por el momento veo a este nuevo Gobierno brasileño con más interés en Washington que en Moscú", explicó Sánchez, también analista para el Consejo de Asuntos Hemisféricos. En una entrevista con Sputnik y con la agencia india IANS, el presidente ruso Vladímir Putin manifestó su voluntad de "crear nuevos formatos y mecanismos de cooperación con los socios" del BRICS. Lea más: Los BRICS no planean admitir nuevos miembros Los cinco países están "firmemente decididos a cooperar en la lucha contra el terrorismo, las amenazas provenientes del tráfico de drogas, la corrupción, así como a contribuir juntos al arreglo de los conflictos y a la seguridad internacional en materia de información", aseguró Putin.

En sus declaraciones, Putin lamentó que los problemas de la economía internacional se intenten resolver a través de alianzas cerradas como el Acuerdo Transpacífico de Cooperación Económica (TPP) o la Asociación Transatlántica para el Comercio y la Inversión (TTIP). "Hay un ángulo político" en esa observación del mandatario ruso, afirmó Sánchez, "ya que todos los países" que están interesados en esos acuerdos "son países aliados o amigos de Washington". "No me sorprende que el Gobierno ruso critique la TTIP, dado que las relaciones entre las dos potencias mundiales, Rusia y Estados Unidos, están muy deterioradas", manifestó Sánchez. Lea más: Todo lo que tienes que saber sobre el TTP Moscú también tiene su propio bloque de integración político-económica por medio de la Unión Económica Euroasiática, recordó.

En su entrevista con las agencias rusa y china, Putin se refirió a la situación que padece Afganistán, país acosado por problemas de "terrorismo, extremismo y tráfico ilícito de drogas". El jefe de Estado ruso busca así "cambiar un poco la atención mundial de Siria a Afganistán", ante las críticas que ha recibido Rusia por los bombardeos en la ciudad siria de Alepo y por rechazar una propuesta de armisticio para la zona, presentada por Francia en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. Tanto Estados Unidos como la Unión Europea acusan a Rusia de apoyar la ofensiva del Ejército de Siria contra los terroristas del Frente Fatah al Sham (antes conocido como Frente al Nusra, proscrito en Rusia y otros países) y los grupos insurgentes en la parte oriental de esa ciudad siria.

La escalada de hostilidades en el este de Alepo, donde permanecen atrapados hasta 275.000 civiles, provocó en las últimas semanas centenares de muertos y heridos, según Naciones Unidas. En cuanto a Afganistán, "ningún país del BRICS ni de otras partes del mundo (incluyendo EEUU y Europa) quiere que los talibanes retomen el control de Afganistán, por lo que no sería difícil pasar alguna resolución del bloque ensalzando la cooperación de Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica contra el terrorismo", reflexionó Sánchez. Más allá de las declaraciones conjuntas de apoyo, "habrá que ver si los países geográficamente más cercanos a Afganistán (Rusia, China e India), promueven una mayor cooperación en temas de seguridad y defensa contra el terrorismo", opinó. 

Para Sánchez, el foro más apropiado para discutir estos asuntos sería la Organización de Cooperación Shanghái, de la que Rusia y China son miembros mientras India está en proceso de adhesión.

Más: https://mundo.sputniknews.com/politica/201610141064105618-brics-brasil-politica/

CIMSEC: The UNCLCS Ruling and the Future of the Uruguayan Navy

"The UNCLCS Ruling and the Future of the Uruguayan Navy"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
October 12, 2016
The Southern Tide
Center for International Maritime Security
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/unclcs-ruling-future-uruguayan-navy/28738

The Southern Tide

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.

By W. Alejandro Sanchez

Uruguay’s continental shelf control has been extended to 350 nautical miles. On 30 August, the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) ruled in favor of the South American nation’s request to extend its maritime territory by83,000 square kilometers. While this is a major diplomatic victory for the Uruguayan government, the new territory will need to be properly patrolled, which means additional pressure on theUruguayan Navy that currently operates with an aging fleet.

The author of this commentary argues that Uruguay’s new maritime territory should be a starting point for a greater discussion about the future of its Navy, both in terms of its future fleet composition and missions.  

A Brief History

It is important to stress that the Uruguayan military has not been in an inter-state conflict in over a century. Its last major confrontation was the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870). In the 20th century, Uruguay supported the Allies in World War II (the 1939 Admiral Graf Spee incident occurred in Uruguayan waters). The only other major challenge to Uruguayan sovereignty occurred in the late 1960s to early 1970s when Uruguayan security forces battled the Tupamaros, a local insurgent movement.

In the 21st century, Uruguay has only had one small international incident. Between 2005-2010, the Uruguayan and Argentine governments had a diplomatic and legal dispute regarding the construction of a pulp mill in the Uruguay River, which serves as a border between the two states. Even though no conflict ever occurred, former Uruguayan President José Mujica famously declared in 2011 that he had contemplated the possibility of a war with Argentina over the pulp mill and had met with his military’s commanders about possible scenarios.

The Navy’s Current Platforms

Nowadays the Uruguayan military, and the Navy in particular, is in a dire state given limited budgets which prevent the acquisition of new heavy platforms.

In August, Admiral Leonardo Alonso, commander of the Uruguayan Navy, declared that the fleet has 12 operational sea platforms. The fleet composition includes a Joao Belo-class frigate, the ROU Uruguay; two Kondor II-class minesweepers, the ROUTemerario and the ROU Audaz (the ROU Fortuna was retired in 2014); the oceanic patrol vessel ROU Maldonado the support vessels ROU General Artigas and ROU Vanguardia. Additional vessels include the tugboat ROU Banco Ortiz; the oceanographic ship ROU Oyarvide; the ROU Sirius; and the patrol boats ROUColonia, ROU Rio Negro, and the ROU Paysandu. According toUruguayan media, the average age of the fleet is 50 years (e.g. the Joao Belo frigate was constructed in the late 1960s).

A strongly worded op-ed in the daily El Observador op-edpublished on 20 August, provocatively titled “Who Needs the Armed Forces?” stresses how the Navy is “bankrupt, not only because of its aging fleet, its lackluster training and small budget, but due to corruption scandals in recent years that have affected the morale.”

For the past couple of years, the Uruguayan military has attempted to purchase modern offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), which will be the cornerstone of the future fleet. The Navy has apparently selected Lurssen’s OPV 80 model and reportedly plans to procure three platforms in a deal which will cost an estimated USD $250 million. To date, no contract has been signed yet as the government appears to lack sufficient funds to purchase the vessels. 

The Uruguayan Navy has been lobbying the government for new funds and the approval of the OPV-deals in order to properly monitor the country’s growing sea. Admiral Leonardo Alonso has declared to the Senate that on any given day the Navy detects around 350 ships in Uruguayan waters “but we only see the ones that wish to be detected, which have their equipment on and are identified by our sensors,” which means that the country is vulnerable to “piracy, maritime accidents, pollution, drug trafficking, smuggling, and illegal fishing.” In an e-mail interview with the author, an Uruguayan naval officer explained that “in Uruguayan waters there is an average of 200 vessels (cruising or anchored) carrying out different tasks. This volume means that without proper control of maritime traffic, the probability of accidents and incidents escalates.” The officer also highlighted the necessity of a coastal surveillance network for Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) to aid the activities of the (yet to be acquired) OPVs and their support helicopters.

While this analysis is focusing on the Uruguayan Navy’s platforms and equipment, it is necessary to briefly mention personnel woes. The Uruguayan officer explained to the author that it is also vitally important “to retain our personnel and prevent a migration to the private sector as they seek salary improvements.” The problem of preventing qualified military personnel from migrating to better paid (and less dangerous) positions in the private sector is an issue that affects many militaries across the world.

The UNCLCS Ruling

It is in this problematic situation that the UNCLCS’s ruling enters the equation. Montevideo first requested the UNCLCS to expand its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in 2009. “Uruguay has a special interest in expanding its continental shelf rights since it is currently involved in the search for oil and gas in the so called Punta del Este basin,” explained a September 2009 report byMercoPress.

According to Uruguayan media, a Uruguayan delegation met with a UNCLCS commission 21 times to argue its case between 2011 and 2015. The aforementioned naval officer also highlighted the role of the oceanographic vessel Oyarvide and the Navy’s Oceanographic, Hydrographic, and Meteorological Service in contributing to the case made to the UNCLCS.

In 2016, Uruguay presented its case to the plenary of the UNCLCS and the Commission decided in favor of Montevideo’s request to expand its continental shelf to a total of 350 nautical miles on 30 August. According to IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, “the new territory grants mineral and resource rights over the continental shelf (sea floor) but it does not grant fishing rights over the new area.” Meanwhile, the Uruguayan daily El Observador explains that the country now has more maritime territory than dry land.

The UNCLCS’s decision has been a massive victory for the administration of President Tabaré Vázquez. In fact, the Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rodolfo Nin Novoa, has declared “nobody can do anything [in these waters] without Uruguay’s authorization.” The minister’s statement was perhaps too bold as the aforementioned Admiral Alonso has highlighted the problematic situation of the Navy while Defense Minister Jorge Menendez has stressed the need for USD $250 million to upgrade the fleet (namely to acquire the OPVs).

One Possible Way Forward

The expansion of Uruguay’s continental shelf should serve as a starting point for a discussion about the future of its Navy. Given the lack of an external security threat (the author has discussed South Atlantic geopolitics in a 17 February commentary for CIMSEC, “How Peaceful is the South Atlantic?”), particularly as the pulp mill diferendum with Argentina appears to have been solved, the Uruguayan armed forces have had to reinvent themselves in recent decades to justify their existence. Case in point, the country is a major supplier of peacekeepers to the United Nations – as of 31 August, Uruguay has a contingent of 1,457 troops participating in UN peacekeeping missions.

Regarding the Navy, its current and future challenges are transnational and irregular in nature. Rather than worrying about the Brazilian nuclear or Scorpene submarines appearing on its coast, the major maritime security threats include drug trafficking, illegal fishing, maritime pollution, as well as search and rescue operations.

Illegal fishing is a major problem for governments around the world, and the South Atlantic already has the precedent of the March incident between the Argentine Coast Guard and an illegal Chinese fishing fleet that highlights the need for a well-equipped and modern fleet that can chase and detain (or sink, if violence is necessary) illegal fishing vessels. To this point, the Uruguayan dailyEl Pais has noted that the country’s waters have fish species like merluza (a cod-like fish), the pescadilla (whiting) and the corvina, which must be protected from illegal fishing.

Another task for the Navy’s future will be to protect future oil platforms that may be constructed in Uruguay’s maritime waters. As a matter of fact, France’s Total company (with U.S. ExxonMobil and Norway’s Statoil as partners) has been looking for oil in Uruguayan and South Atlantic waters, though unsuccessfully so far. The South Atlantic does not have a piracy problem in the sense of oil platforms being at risk of criminal attack. However, if aDeepwater Horizon-type accident were to occur in one of these new wells, the Navy must have capable vessels able to rescue workers in peril and contain potential oil spills and other destruction. It is worth noting that just in late September the aforementioned Audazand Artigas had to assist the Fortune Harmony, a tanker that had a fire aboard while 20 miles off Piriapolis, Uruguay.

For these operations, the Navy requires new sea platforms, namely OPVs, to support and eventually replace the antiquated vessels it currently operates,  as well as a coastal monitoring network. While this author is not qualified to properly discuss the training of Uruguayan naval officers as well as the budgetary issues, the problem of preventing well-trained personnel from migrating to the private sector affects the Uruguayan Navy like in other defense forces across the world.

Final Thoughts

Proper surveillance of the extended continental shelf is a critical task for the Uruguayan Navy and will be the cornerstone of its maritime strategy going forward. Incidents like the March clash between Argentina and illegal Chinese fishing vessels (illegal fishing), or the recent Fortune Harmony incident (disasters at sea and possible pollution) are reminders of why it is a priority for a nation with a large continental shelf to have a modern fleet capable of adapting to different scenarios.

With that said, Uruguay’s history and current South Atlantic geopolitics argue that the possibility of inter-state warfare is minimal. Hence, Uruguay must upgrade its Navy, not just in terms of new platforms, radars and helicopters, but also its mission in the 21st century.

Alejandro Sanchez Nieto is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.