Thursday, May 31, 2018

Report: Addressing Non-State Actors: Multiple Approaches

Addressing Non-State Actors: Multiple Approaches




Executive Summary

While the attacks of September 11, 2001 focused many in the United States on the dangers posed by non-state actors, challenges to state authority and international order by such groups are not new. With the global community now more aware of conflicts other than those between states, there is a need to better understand approaches that do—or do not—work when addressing non-state actors. Taking a wide view of what they see in their respective work and an expansive definition of “non-state,” experts in this report offer an array of recommendations, in many instances based on working with or engaging nonstate groups.

Drawing upon his experience in directly reaching out to armed non-state actors, primarily but not exclusively around landmine research and anti-landmine advocacy, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan offers advice to those who would approach such groups. Recognizing that there is danger in doing so, but also a need from a humanitarian perspective, he recommends being well aware of one’s own goals and the likely expectations of any engaged group as just two of many steps in outreach to non-state actors.

Noting the important achievements of the Mine Ban Treaty, especially in the context of Colombia where former FARC rebels are now engaging in mine clearance efforts, Maria Pia Devoto and Camilo Serna Villegas use developments in the country as an example of how it is possible for non-state perpetrators of armed violence to become agents of reconciliation. After briefly describing a group of 20 former combatants, now part of the “Humanicemos DH” effort, they argue that this work could be a model for other non-state armed groups still in the country.

Matthew Bolton
turns to another part of the world to discuss the roots of increased armed violence in Kenya by and against pastoral communities, initially around wildlife “poaching” but now linked to regional and global networks. Drawing upon insights from Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Academy meetings in the region and other scholarship, he concludes that when agreed by Kenya and properly implemented, the ATT could provide paths to improved community security, in part through increased transparency and better risk assessment in the arms trade.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
explores the troubling reality that weapons used by armed non-state actors in Latin America often come from the stockpiles of police or national armed forces. While recognizing that there are other sources of weapons and that there have been some successful cases of arms recovery, he argues that much more can and should be done to stem this flow of weaponry. Recommendations include tackling corruption more directly, possibly through stronger training and stiffer legal penalties, and also better sharing of records across jurisdictions.

Seth Binder
and Robert Watson tackle the ongoing practice of U.S. arming of non-state actors, noting both recent and historic examples. They argue that the lack of institutional capacity of many non-state actors, as well as the long life of various weapons, contributes to risk associated with such practices. They find that despite claimed goals— often short-term ones—, U.S. aid to non-state actors has typically not proven successful, resulting in unintended consequences and long-term instability.

Jeff Abramson
turns the issue around by looking for ways that civil society-led initiatives have an impact upon non-state actors, whether armed or arms producing. Using examples that broadly fall under the “humanitarian disarmament” umbrella, he identifies efforts to convince armed non-state groups to commit to the norms of the Mine Ban Treaty, actions to stop weapons production by stigmatizing financial investment in their manufacturers, and calls by scientists and artificial intelligence experts to prohibit killer robots. He concludes that such efforts focused on human security have a track record of success that merit ongoing support.

Authorship

Experts listed by the Forum on the Arms Trade were invited to participate in this publication, bringing in other colleagues if desired, to author short essays about how their work provides insights into challenges posed by non-state actors (broadly defined). Rather than create an exhaustive report, the intention is to gather diverse perspectives from those working on arms trade, security assistance, and weapons use, often in different regions of the world and focused on distinct issues. Each essay was reviewed by at least one peer, but each should be considered the independent work of the author(s).

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list, and inclusion in this publication, does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. Institutional affiliation of authors, when detailed, is indicated for identification purposes only.

Forum on the Arms Trade: A Worrisome Conundrum: Latin American Defense and Security Forces and Weapons Trafficking

"A Worrisome Conundrum: Latin American Defense and Security Forces and Weapons Trafficking"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
18 May 2018
Forum on the Arms Trade
Originally published: https://www.forumarmstrade.org/looking-ahead-blog/a-worrisome-conundrum-latin-american-defense-and-security-forces-and-weapons-trafficking 

This is one of six essays in the May 2018 report "Addressing Non-State Actors: Multiple Approaches" (see full report). Each essay is the independent work of its author. 

Latin America continues to face internal and transnational security threats that include drug cartels, transnational gangs, insurgent movements, as well as street crime. Naturally, preventing criminals and terrorists from obtaining weapons is an objective for any government. This goal becomes even more complicated when the weapons in question are obtained from the very institutions that are tasked with combating criminal and violent organizations.

Tragically, in recent years there have been a number of incidents in which weapons were taken from military bases and police stations across Latin America; this suggests a lack of adequate security measures in such facilities at best, or collusion between corrupt defense personnel and criminal enterprises at worst. When it comes to preventing violent non-state actors in Latin America from obtaining weapons to commit crimes, step one should be, unsurprisingly, that they do not come from military and police depots.

Recent Cases from Regional Armed Forces

There are a number of recent cases of the theft of weapons from military depots across Latin America. For example, in early January 2016, two rifles were robbed from the Uruguayan Army's battalion “Florida”.[i] One soldier was accused of helping criminals sneak into the facilities to steal the weapons. Unfortunately, these crimes have occurred before in the small South American state: in 2011 the Uruguayan daily El Observador reported that throughout the 2009-2011 period, as many as 19 weapons (15 FAL rifles, two submachine gun, and two Browning 9mm guns) were stolen from the Uruguayan air force and navy. Uruguayan sailors were found to have traded their weapons for recreational drugs.[ii]

Similar thefts have also occurred in Peru: in early April 2017 as many as 130 grenades were stolen from the Peruvian Air Force’s Punta Lobos base.[iii] A year earlier, 18 Galil rifles were reported missing from the arsenal of the 115th ordnance battalion in Loreto region (in the Peruvian Amazon).[iv] The hypothesis was that the weapons were delivered to FARC insurgents in Colombia or Brazilian criminals - the theft likely took place sometime in late 2015 but the weapons were only reported missing in January 2016.[v]

As for Bolivia, a group of Brazilian criminals, in cahoots with a Bolivian citizen, stole equipment from a Bolivian naval base in 2015.[vi] The weapons taken included 11 rifles, five guns as well as ammunition.

One particularly troubling incident occurred in Colombia in 2015, as some 400 weapons (109 rifles, 87 pistols, among others, according to the Colombian media) were stolen from the artillery battalion “San Mateo de Pereira.”[vii]  One sergeant and one soldier were reportedly charged for the theft.

Finally, in August 2017 there was a violent incident in Venezuela when a group of individuals (who apparently were anti-government, former military personnel) attempted to steal weapons from the Venezuelan Army’s Paramacay base, where the 41st armored brigade is headquartered.[viii] A firefight that reportedly lasted three hours between the military and the thieves, ensued, with several of the latter killed. It is unclear if any weapons were stolen.

Recent Cases from Regional Police Forces

As for weapons taken from police bases, there have been similar incidents, particularly in Mexico. For example, in October 2016, unidentified individuals entered a police station in Nezahualcóyotl, State of Mexico, overpowering the police officers. According to the local media, the criminals left with three handguns, one carbine and one shotgun.[ix] That same month, 20 long-range and 10 short-range weapons disappeared from a different police station in Morelos region.[x]

Meanwhile, in late October 2017, 28 guns disappeared from a police base in Iquique, Chile.[xi] The media reports on the incident stressed that the weaponry was not part of the local police’s own depot, but rather that they were delivered there for safekeeping. The origin of the weapons aside, such a crime is very problematic.

Other recent thefts have been reported across police stations in Colombia, Costa Rica and Peru.[xii]

Successful Recoveries

It is worth noting that there have been several successes when it comes to stopping these crimes and retrieving the lost weapons. Case in point, Uruguayan authorities foiled an attempt to rob an army base in Chuy in early July 2017 – according to Uruguay’s El Pais, one of the criminals was a former soldier.[xiii]

Additionally, many lost weapons have been retrieved. For example, in 2015, several individuals were detained in Brazil, and security forces retrieved the 11 AK-47 rifles that had been stolen from the aforementioned Bolivian naval base.[xiv] That same year the Chilean police (Policía de Investigaciones de Chile) recovered one Ingram Mac-10 machine pistol and one FN/FAMAE Norinco pistol, which had been stolen from a military base in Arica.[xv] Also in 2015, the Colombian army reported that it had retrieved some 12 weapons out of the 400 that were stolen from a military base in Pereira.[xvi]

An Issue that Hinders An In-depth Analysis

Before we continue with our analysis, one disclaimer is necessary: The author has not been able to find reliable governmental statistics that detail how many weapons are missing from military and police depots. There have been sporadic reports that have tried to keep track of the data. For instance, a March 2015 article in the Argentine daily La Nacion explains that a preliminary report by the Comisión Provincial por la Memoria (provincial commission for remembrance) stated that, at that time, in  Buenos Aires region alone, some 900 weapons were believed to be missing from local police stations, although that was a conservative estimate.[xvii]  Similarly, a 2015 report in Peru’s daily La Republica explains how, at the time, 86 members of the country’s police and military were charged with stealing weapons from their respective units and police bases.[xviii] Colombia’s renowned Semana has also reported on this problem.[xix]

Similarly, research centers such as FLACSO and the Small Arms Survey have drafted occasional case studies about weapons trafficking in different Latin American states (Ecuador and Honduras, respectively).[xx]

Nevertheless this problem requires constant monitoring not only by governmental offices, but also by non-governmental organizations in order to ensure transparency.[xxi]

Discussion

The objective of this essay is not to imply that Latin American criminals are exclusively obtaining weapons from military or police depots; in reality that number is probably minuscule when compared to other sources – many U.S. media reports consistently point out that most of the weapons Mexican cartels utilize come from the United States.[xxii] Nevertheless, this analysis has demonstrated that this is a recurring issue in the region, with missing weaponry that includes pistols, rifles, and grenades. It is a problem that should be addressed.

In many cases, weapons were taken from military bases or police stations because corrupt police or military personnel willfully cooperated with criminal organizations, begging the question: what convinces a Latin American police or military officer to provide criminals with weapons that will be most likely utilized against security forces?

When it comes to discussing the best practices to combat weapons trafficking, some suggestions are self-evident. Case in point, having a database with the model and serial numbers of missing weapons is necessary, so that when a gun is retrieved from criminal organizations, the authorities can track where said weapon came from. A problem with this proposal is that, as aforementioned, many weapons are smuggled across border lines so that crime syndicate “X” in country “Y” uses a weapon that was taken from country “Z” – as was probably the case for the Galil rifles stolen in Peru. This is a particular problem for Ecuador, which serves as a corridor for weapons smuggled from Peru to Colombia (known as “ant-type smuggling” or tráfico hormiga).[xxiii] Ideally, cooperation initiatives between regional police and armed forces should include greater sharing of information regarding the weapons that are seized from criminals.

There are already several agreements in place to promote record sharing between regional governments, such as the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Material (CIFTA) [xxiv] Additionally there are a number of bilateral agreements among hemispheric governments to combat crimes related to weapons trafficking – for example the governments of Ecuador and the United States signed an agreement to improve cooperation to combat crimes such as drug and weapons trafficking in late April 2018.[xxv]

Furthermore, there is something particularly disappointing about finding out that the individuals tasked with protecting a country and its citizens from criminals and insurgents are precisely those providing the latter with weapons to attack the former. Is there a “best practice” that can be suggested for those specific crimes? Harsher prison sentences for those found guilty is an obvious option. In fact, several military and police personnel have been prosecuted (fairly or unfairly depends on how one interprets the evidence) for some of the aforementioned incidents: as a result of the missing Galil rifles, four army officers were given six-month prison sentences.[xxvi] Similarly, in Chile, four ex police officers have been prosecuted for the missing guns in Iquique.[xxvii]

Another suggestion would simply be, as naive as it may sound, stronger indoctrination courses in military and police academies, so that new recruits do not forget the pledge they are making to protect their country and fellow citizens, and how helping criminals obtain weapons is the polar opposite of said oath. A Latin American military officer interviewed by the author argued in favor of this proposal, arguing that “you can put five more guards, four more security cameras and three more locks at weapons arsenals, but such incidents will continue to occur… you have to train soldiers better, educate them better, pay them better.”[xxviii] On the other hand, another Latin American army officer explained to the author, that such incidents should prompt armed forces to “take security measures of the weapons depots to the extreme.”[xxix] There is certainly no one-stop-solution to address the issue of weaponry theft.

As a final point, it is important to highlight that the theft of weaponry from military bases is not a problem solely relegated to Latin America. In the U.S. “more than $1 million in weapons parts and sensitive military equipment was stolen out of Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and sold in a vast black market,” according to an August 2017 report by the Associated Press.[xxx] Another theft occurred in the U.S. Army’s facilities in Stuttgart, Germany, in 2016.[xxxi] Without a doubt, “rotten apples” exist in defense and security forces across the world.

Final Thoughts

Weapons trafficking is a major crime across the world, as it adds the proverbial wood to the destructive fire that is crime and terrorism. Latin America is no exception to this problem as it is not difficult to find at least one incident within the last decade of wicked  personnel who have helped criminals obtain weapons from military or police arsenals. To the credit of regional defense forces, several weapons have been successfully retrieved, but the lack of open-source data that shows how many weapons are missing from depots makes it difficult to figure out what quantities we are talking about.

In any organization, including those tasked with security and defense, it is inevitable that there will be bad personnel that will seek to profit by committing criminal acts, which apparently include providing weapons to criminal entities. But while avoiding such incidents may be a utopia, it is important for Latin American police and military forces to constantly come up with new preemptive strategies not only to prevent robberies from happening – like better salaries and stricter security protocols– but, when they do occur, to be able to quickly track them, particularly across borders. Weapons trafficking is a complex and very profitable crime, and Latin American security and defense forces should be combating it, not be involved in it.


Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues.
 
The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

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[i]Militar sospechoso de robo de armas en Uruguay,” Ecos – Latinoamerica, Actualidad, January 30, 2016.

[ii]Militares procesados por robo y tráfico de armas,” El Observador (Uruguay), April 11, 2011

[iii]Roban 130 granadas de una base de la Fuerza Aérea del Perú,” Perú21, April 6, 2017.

[iv]Loreto: Roban 18 fusiles de guerra de base militar en Iquitos,” Perú21, January 5, 2016.

[v]Ministro inspecciona base militar tras robo de 18 fusiles,” RPP Noticias (Peru), January 4, 2016.

[vi] Alonaca, Jesus, “Un imputado por el robo de armas en base militar,” El Deber (Bolivia), December 11, 2015.

[vii]Capturan a dos militares por robo de armamento en batallón de Pereira,” El Espectador, Judicial, February 2, 2015; “Ejército recupera 12 armas que fueron robadas del batallón San Mateo de Pereira,” El Espectador, Nacional, July 9, 2015.

[viii]De base militar de Carabobo habrían robado más de 100 fusiles y lanzagranadas,” RCN Noticias, August 7, 2017; “Dos muertos dejó enfrentamiento en la 41 Brigada Blindada del Ejército en Carabobo,” La Patilla, August 6, 2017.

[ix]Comando irrumpe en cuartel y roba armas de la Policía Estatal en Neza,” Proceso (Mexico), October 18, 2016.

[x] Pedro Tonantzin, “’Madrugan’ a policias, les roban 30 armas en cuartel de Morelos,” Excelsior (Mexico). October 5, 2017.

[xi]Desaparecieron 28 armas que custodiaba Carabineros en la Primera Comisaría de Iquique,” SoyChile.cl, October 30, 2017.

[xii]Un policía estaría detrás de robo de armas en Estación de Carabineros,” Noticias RCN (Colombia), December 23, 2014; “Policía sin pistas sobre responsables de robo de armas en Jicaral,” La Nacion (Costa Rica), Crimenes, May 5, 2017; “Policía incautó más de mil armas y municiones en megaoperativo,” El Comercio (Peru). April 27, 2017.

[xiii]Detuvieron a delincuentes que planeaban asaltar cuartel en Rocha,” Radio Montecarlo, July 7, 2017.

[xiv]Operativo en Brasil recupera 11 fusiles AK47 robados de un puesto militar boliviano,” La Razon (Bolivia), December 17, 2015.

[xv]PDI recupera armas robadas al Ejército en Arica,” Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Publica (Chile). August 28, 2015.

[xvi]Ejército recupera 12 armas que fueron robadas del batallón San Mateo de Pereira,” El Espectador, Nacional, July 9, 2015.

[xvii] Jesus Cornejo, “Los policías bonaerenses pierden un arma cada 48 horas,” La Nacion (Argentina), March 9, 2015.

[xviii]86 militares y policías enjuiciados y condenados por robo de armas y granadas,” La Republica (Peru), September 29, 2015.

[xix]Escándalo: mil armas perdidas en guarniciones militares,” Semana,  June 13, 2015.

[xx] Carlos Valdivieso, “Armas de fuego en Ecuador, ”FLACSO (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales), Perfil Criminológico, No.17, July 2015; “Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Honduras,” Small Arms Survey, Research Notes, No. 62, November 2016.

[xxi] This would also serve to understand better not only how many weapons are lost or stolen, but how many are also found. The author has relied on open-source news articles and reports for this analysis. Sources consulted by the author explained that a person can request ministries and specific government agencies for information regarding the incidents discussed in this analysis, but it would take time for these petitions to be processed.

[xxii] Analyzing weapon sales and weapons trafficking in Mexico is complicated due to its proximity to the United States. For example, see: German Lopez, “Where do Mexican drug cartels get their guns? The US,” VOX, January 14, 2016. Also see: Bill Chappell, “In Mexico, Tens Of Thousands Of Illegal Guns Come From The U.S.,” NPR, International, January 12, 2016. And see: John-Lindsay Poland, “How U.S. Guns Sold to Mexico End Up With Security Forces Accused of Crime and Human Rights Abuses,” The Intercept, April 16, 2018.

[xxiii]El tráfico de armas permea la frontera norte de Ecuador,” El Comercio (Ecuador), February 19, 2018; Autoridades ecuatorianas identifican rutas para el tráfico de armas hacia Colombia, Centroamérica y México,” Andes, June 5, 2015.

[xxiv] The Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Material (CIFTA), 1997, http://www.weaponslaw.org/instruments/1997-oas-convention-cifta.

[xxv]Ecuador y EEUU firman convenio de cooperación en lucha contra crimen y drogas.” EFE/El Espectador, April 16, 2018.

[xxvi]Iquitos: Dictan 6 meses de prisión preventiva para implicados en robo de fusiles | VIDEO,” La Republica (Peru), January 22, 2016.

[xxvii]Ex carabinero procesado por extravío de armas en Iquique dijo que se matará ‘para que ese fiscal se pudra en la cárcel,’" SoyChile.cl,  November 30, 2017; “Nueva polémica en Carabineros: acusan ‘montaje’ del Labocar Temuco por el Caso Armas en Iquique,” Soychile.cl, February 1, 2018.

[xxviii] Telephone conversation between the author and a Latin American military officer, March 2018, off-the-record.

[xxix] Telephone conversation between the author and a Latin American military officer, March 2018, off-the-record.

[xxx] Kristin M. Hall. “'Easy Money' Made Selling Army Weapons Stolen by US Soldiers,” Associated Press, August 31, 2017.

[xxxi] John Vandiver, “Army offering $25K reward in search for weapons stolen from Stuttgart arms room,” Stars and Stripes, January 30, 2018.

Wednesday, May 9, 2018

CIMSEC: Taiwanese Navy Friendship Flotilla Visits Latin American and Caribbean Allies


"Taiwanese Navy Friendship Flotilla Visits Latin American and Caribbean Allies"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
"The Southern Tide"
Center for International Maritime Security
9 May, 2018
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/taiwanese-navy-friendship-flotilla-visits-latin-american-caribbean-allies/36438

Written by W. Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.

By W. Alejandro Sanchez

A three-ship training flotilla belonging to the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan visited Central American and Caribbean states as Taipei strives to maintain close ties with regional allies. Taiwan regularly sends high-ranking defense officials and flotillas as part of goodwill initiatives in the Western Hemisphere, these initiatives will be even more important as the Dominican Republic announced at the end of April that it would sever relations with Taiwan and establish them with the People’s Republic of China.

 Friendship Flotilla 2018
Taiwan’s friendship flotilla No. 107 (Flotilla de la Amistad in Spanish), is comprised of “Pan Shi, a modern and sleek Fast Combat Support Ship, Pan Chao, an older, U.S.-designed frigate, and Kuen Wing, a more recent, French-made stealth frigate,” according to AFP. There are around 800 personnel on board in total, including an unspecified number of cadets from the ROC Naval Academy who are utilizing the voyage to learn how to operate in the high seas.
The flotilla commenced its training voyage by first visiting the Marshall Islands; while in the Western Hemisphere it visited the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. The local and Taiwanese media have covered the visit during each port call. For example, the  Nicaraguan newspaper El Nuevo Diario has noted that the last time a Taiwanese flotilla visited the Central American country was in 2016 while other outlets mentioned that this is the sixth time that such a visit has occurred.
Meanwhile the Minister of Defense of El Salvador, Munguía Payés, reportedly praised bilateral relations, stating that “the armed forces of El Salvador and of Taiwan are and will always be an important factor not only when it comes to the internal security of our respective nations but also supporters of development and guarantors of democracy.”

Taiwan, China, and Latin America
Even with recent advances in naval technology and the ability to resupply at sea, it is still necessary for vessels traveling far from their nation’s territorial waters to be allowed to dock at friendly ports and conduct exercises with friendly naval forces from other nations. The problem is that Taiwan is running out of ports in the Western Hemisphere to dock its naval platforms and engage in constructive naval initiatives with friendly forces as regional governments switch from recognizing Taipei to Beijing. As previously mentioned the DR switched at the end of April, Panama switched in 2017, while Costa Rica did the same a decade ago, in 2007. The DR’s switch is somewhat embarrassing to Taipei, as the flotilla docked in Santo Domingo in mid-April, only to have the Dominican government switch to Beijing two weeks later.

While Beijing is gaining new allies in the Western Hemisphere, Chinese naval presence in Latin America and the Caribbean is pretty limited: a destroyer Shijiazhuang and the supply ship Hongzehu visited Chile in 2009; four years later, destroyer Lanzhou and frigate Liuzhou visited Argentina in 2013. Additionally, China’s Peace Ark (866 Daishan Dao), a Type 920 hospital ship that is operated by the People’s Liberation Army Navy, has visited the Western Hemisphere as part of “Harmonious Mission 2011” and “Harmonious Mission 2015.” Nevertheless, if more regional governments recognize Beijing (and there are constant rumors about which will be the next country to do so), and as Beijing seeks to project its naval presence well past its borders, there may be a larger Chinese naval presence in the Western Hemisphere in the coming years.

The Flotilla in Context

The visit of the three-vessel Taiwanese flotilla in itself is not meaningful as Taiwan does not have bases in the Western Hemisphere, nor does Taipei have some kind of collective security-type defense treaty with regional countries. In other words, this visit does not signify that Taiwan would come to the aid of one of its regional partners, should one of them be attacked by a third party. Hence, the international media has placed the visit in the context of Taipei-Beijing and Taipei-Washington relations; for example Reuters published a piece titled “Taiwan warships drop anchor in Nicaragua amid sinking ties with China,” while the Strait Times titled its own report on the subject, “China demands halt of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, as island stresses Central America ties with navy visit.”

Additionally, given ongoing tensions with China, there have been a number of reports about the Taiwanese Navy undergoing  a modernization process to obtain new platforms. There have been similar discussions in Washington regarding what kind of weaponry should the U.S. sell Taiwan. It is worth noting that in 2017 the Taiwanese Navy received two decommissioned Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates but ongoing Washington-Beijing tensions seem to hint that more modern equipment (including submarine technology) could be sold to Taipei as part of ever-changing geopolitics in Asia.

While the recent visit of a Taiwanese flotilla will not affect Central American or Caribbean geopolitics, its use is more symbolic, as it demonstrates that the Asian nation strives to maintain diplomatic relations with its remaining friends in the Western Hemisphere. Taiwan’s naval diplomacy, unlike similar initiatives by other countries, is not so much about maintaining cordial defense relations, but maintaining diplomatic relations. Countries like El Salvador and Nicaragua still recognize Taiwan, but the recent loss of DR, which occurred right after the flotilla visited the country, is an example that such initiatives, defense and others, must be constant.

W. Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.