La Politica: "El doble problema de Kazajistán con Rusia"

"El doble problema de Kazajistán con Rusia"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Editorial

La Política​

11 Agosto, 2023

Originally published: https://www.lapoliticaonline.com/espana/wilder-alejandro-sanchez/doble-problema-rusia-alejandro-wilder

El desafío de los kazajos para mantener la relación estratégica con Moscú, los oligarcas y escaparle a los impactos de la guerra y las sanciones a Rusia.

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The Nationa Interest: Can ‘Kazakhstan 2.0’ Win the Fight Against Corruption?

 

 

"Can ‘Kazakhstan 2.0’ Win the Fight Against Corruption?"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

 The Buzz

The National Interest

24 June, 2022

Originally published: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-%E2%80%98kazakhstan-20%E2%80%99-win-fight-against-corruption-203173

Developments in Italy have given Kazakhstan’s government a public relations win in its fight against corruption, but problems stemming from Mukhtar Ablyazov will persist

On June 5, Kazakhstan held a referendum to end super-presidencies and limit the powers of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Kazakhstan, which experienced massive protests in January of this year, will hopefully be a more transparent and fair nation after the referendum. However, one thorn remains in the country’s side: Mukhtar Ablyazov.

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Providence: How Should the US Deal with the Congo’s President Tshisekedi?

"How Should the US Deal with the Congo’s President Tshisekedi?"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Providence Magazine
1 February, 2019
Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2019/02/how-should-the-us-deal-with-the-congos-president-tshisekedi/

President Félix Tshisekedi was sworn in as the new president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on January 24, days after the country’s Constitutional Court rejected an appeal against the results of the controversial December 30 elections. Though not free of controversy, this marks the first peaceful transfer of power in the DRC and should also mark the end of the Kabila dynasty.

While originally silent about the electoral results, the US government ultimately congratulated the new Congolese government. It will be important to monitor the future of Kinshasa-Washington relations in the post-Kabila era.

Results and Responses

After many delays, the DRC held elections on December 30—they were originally supposed to occur in 2016 and most recently on December 23, 2018. According to the Independent National Election Commission, Tshisekedi received 38.5 percent of the vote, compared with Martin Fayulu’s 34.7 percent and ruling coalition candidate Emmanuel Shadary’s 23.8 percent, the BBC explains. Fayulu protested the results, stating that he is the rightful winner and that President Tshisekedi’s victory was the result of an agreement between him and now former-President Joseph Kabila so that the latter can maintain his influence over the Congolese government.

Fayulu appealed against the election’s results, claiming that they were rigged, while the influential Catholic Church in the DRC stated that its own electoral observers made it clear that Tshisekedi was not the winner. There were also protests against President Tshisekedi’s victory, though not as widespread and violent as in previous years. In any case, the protests, accusations, and allegations did not stop the swear-in ceremony, and President Tshisekedi is now in control of the massive and resource-rich African nation.

What Should Washington Do Now?

A US State Department press release published on January 23 congratulated President Tshisekedi’s victory, saluting a peaceful and democratic transfer of power and even congratulated former-President Kabila for ceding power. Nevertheless, there was a small caveat to the statement, as the communiqué encouraged “the government to include a broad representation of Congo’s political stakeholders and to address reports of electoral irregularities.” This sentence can be regarded as a continuation of a January 16 press release, which declared that “the United States will hold accountable those who perpetrate election violence or undermine democratic processes.” It goes without saying that the government has little interest to review the results of the elections.

With President Tshisekedi now in power, the question is what will Washington’s policy be toward the new regime. Trade between the two countries is quite limited: according to the US Office of the Trade Representative, US goods exports to the DRC in 2017 were $76 million, while US goods imports from the country totaled $86 million. Foreign direct investment is similarly low, at around $76 million.

The real problem was that the lengthy Kabila regime was well known for its corrupt practices. This prompted the US Department of the Treasury and its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to impose sanctions on various Congolese individuals, ranging from policymakers to senior security officers. Of course, these sanctions did not deter the Kabila regime from staying in power for over a decade and a half.

Thus, the election of a new president gives Washington and Kinshasa an opportunity to restart. The Congolese leader has promised to release all political prisoners, which would be a positive first step at improving relations. Also important is that any cabinet members in the Tshisekedi administration are not under OFAC sanctions. Experts on the DRC whom the author interviewed highlighted that they are hopeful Washington will get along well with the new government, particularly as the new president is from the opposition and was not the Kabila-supported candidate. While this is true, we will have to see how President Tshisekedi deals with the former regime, particularly as Kabila’s Common Front for Congo (FCC) coalition has a parliamentary majority, meaning the next prime minister will come from the pro-Kabila coalition, as AfricaNews explains.

Final Thoughts

The Democratic Republic of Congo is a complicated country, not just because of the recent elections but also due to the nation’s other challenges, such as violence in the eastern provinces and a deadly outbreak of Ebola, not to mention the ever-present poverty and corruption.

After delayed and controversial elections and a less than ideal inauguration ceremony, there is a head of state in the DRC whose last name is not Kabila. This is a historic milestone in itself. The international community, in particular the US government, which has placed many sanctions on Congolese officials, will be closely monitoring whether this change of the guard in the African nation is anything to be hopeful about.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military. and cybersecurity issues. @W_Alex_Sanchez. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

VOXXI: Former president’s sentencing could usher optimism for Guatemala

"Former President's sentencing could usher Optimism for Guatemala"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
May 23, 2014
Originally published: http://voxxi.com/2014/05/23/alfonso-portillo-sentencing-us/

New York judge Robert Patterson has sentenced former Guatemalan President Alfonso Portillo (2000-2004) to five years in prison on charges of accepting bribes while he was in office. This landmark ruling is the first time a former Latin American head of state has been sentenced to jail in the U.S. judiciary system.

This important verdict also raises several questions, such as whether Portillo will spend time in a U.S. prison or if he will be sent back to Guatemala. Moreover, it’s unclear whether the former head of state will actually serve all five years of his sentence. It seems likely that some sort of settlement will be reached.

SEE ALSO: Rios Montt found guilty of genocide

In any case, the ruling constitutes a significant milestone for the issue of presidential impunity, a cancer that has long plagued Latin American governments. Ideally, the New York ruling would motivate Guatemala to reach a final verdict for General Rios Montt, another former president on trial in the Central American state. However, we should not hold our breaths as the verdict regarding Portillo is not solely good news.

The Portillo verdict

Aside from spending five years and ten months in prison, Portillo will also have to pay a fine of $2.5 million. The BBC explains that a New York judge was able to rule on the case, which would seemingly fall under Guatemalan jurisdiction, because “the bribes came from an accountant in New York City.”

The disgraced president was accused of taking bribes from the government of Taiwan, so that Taipei would not lose Guatemala’s recognition. Several Central American and Caribbean states recognize Taiwan instead of China, so it is in Taiwan’s national interest not to lose its remaining allies.

The last few years have brought a blur of trials for Portillo. He was first arrested in his homeland in 2010 and later faced trial in May 2011 for embezzling funds that belonged to the Ministry of Defense, though he was declared innocent. He was eventually extradited to the United States in May 2013, where he was indicted for a variety of crimes, including embezzling money from Taiwan and “misappropriating funds from the publicly financed reserves of Credito Hipotecario Nacional,” among others.

At the time of his extradition, many analysts speculated that Portillo could face up to 20 years in prison and fines totaling $500,000. The final sentence is significantly less harsh since he pleaded guilty.

Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how much time Portillo will actually spend in jail. Some observers expect that, since he has already served time, his five-year sentence could be reduced to 18 months or even just 11 months.

Reasons for Optimism?

Understandably, the Guatemalan media has covered this issue extensively, and it shares the belief that Portillo will only spend 18 months in prison, which means that he will be free by November 2015. Still, he will probably be released sooner due to “good behavior.”

The Central American state is particularly interested in how Portillo’s sentence and eventual return will affect the country’s political system. An article in the Guatemalan daily “El Periodico” explains that Portillo’s return will change Guatemala’s “electoral forces” in the country’s upcoming September 2015 elections.

As for the Guatemalan government, President Otto Perez Molina has declared that he respects the New York judge’s decision. Nevertheless, Portillo is not without allies, as members of the Union del Cambio Nacional (UCN) political party in his homeland have declared that they continue to support the former head of state. It is too early to say whether Portillo could run for office, but stranger things tend to occur in Latin American politics.

Hopefully the Guatemalan judiciary will follow Judge Patterson’s precedent to pursue and sentence former heads of state and other high-level individuals that have carried out crimes while in office, particularly General Rios Montt, who ruled the Central American country during its bloody civil war. Guatemalan courts finally tried and sentenced the retired general in 2013, but the verdict was essentially canceled due to an obscure legal technicality. Many fear that Rios Montt may eventually go free when his trial resumes in 2015.

As for Portillo, his defense lawyers will try to have him sent back to Guatemala, arguing that he can serve the remaining time there. A worst case scenario would be that, if Portillo returns to Guatemala, his lawyers could find a way to keep him out of prison altogether.

Portillo’s sentence sends an important message to corrupt officials that their crimes will not go unpunished. Unfortunately, there is a high likelihood that Portillo will soon go free and continue to influence his home country. Unfortunately for Guatemala, politics will likely remain business as usual.

Blouin: Security strategy in the Caribbean should go beyond drug war

Security Strategy in the Caribbean should go beyond the Drug War
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin News: World
July 3, 2013
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatworld/2013/07/03/security-strategy-in-the-caribbean-should-go-beyond-drug-war/

Wednesday’s news of the massive drug haul netted by Operation Lionfish — 30 metric tons of cocaine, heroin and marijuana, with a street value of $822 million — highlights yet again the thorny problem of drug trafficking in the Caribbean and Central America. Indeed,Assistant Secretary of State William Brownfield declared late in June that the amount of drugs coming into the U.S. via the Caribbean has increased in the past year. His claim is supported by the U.S. 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), which similarly states that “approximately 5 percent of all drugs destined for United States are estimated to pass through the major list countries of The Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica.”

Brownsfield’s statements as well as the INCSR report portray drug trafficking activities as the major security threat for Caribbean states. The problem is that Washington is looking at this region with a focus on U.S. interests, which only provides a partial picture of the multiple challenges Caribbean governments are facing.

In Brownfield’s recent testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, he argued that “whether measured by citizens demanding that their governments take action, numbers of law enforcement and prosecutors trained and deployed, drops in homicide rates, or youth enrolled in after-school programs, the United States and our partners in Central America and the Caribbean are making progress.” But this progress is limited by constricted U.S. military budgets, particularly because the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is under pressure to tighten its belt. Nevertheless, the U.S. Navy continues to use state of the art military technology, including drones, to look for suspicious vessels and aircraft around the Caribbean.

The INSCR report also highlights specific developments that the U.S. regards as worrisome. For example, regarding Jamaica, the report states that “despite competent leadership and political will, their efforts [to fight drug trafficking] were only moderately effective in 2012 because of a lack of sufficient resources, corruption, and an inefficient criminal justice system.”

It is fair to critique regional partners for corruption, but it should also be noted that Caribbean nations are trying to enhance their security and defense capacities, both via training and acquisition of badly needed, new equipment, as demonstrated by The Bahamas’ recent contract with the Dutch company Damen Shipyards Group to construct nine vessels. The country’s goal is to modernize its naval fleet to better protect its territorial waters from drug trafficking and other criminal operations.

Moreover, there are important joint initiatives by Caribbean nations, via its flagship regional organization, CARICOM, to find a multilateral approach to transnational crime. One of CARICOM’s security agencies, known as the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) is bringing member nations together to construct a comprehensive approach to transnational threats. For example, at a CARICOM summit in Port au Prince this past February, IMPACS presented an ambitious security doctrine entitled: “CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy 2013: Securing the Region.” The report articulates the region’s security challenges other than drug trafficking, such as human trafficking, illegal weapons trafficking, and the rise of cybercrime. For example, a major source of insecurity for Jamaica has been the illegal entrance of weapons from Haiti in exchange for drugs.

Clearly, the security priorities of Caribbean governments differ from their U.S. counterparts. A request to “do more” by officials in Washington is understandable, but Caribbean states corruption is just one of many challenges that these states have to deal with, along with limited budgets and trained personnel.

Furthermore, besides well-trained, uncorrupt security personnel and equipment, a comprehensive regional strategy is needed. Hopefully, SOUTHCOM and State Department officials have read the 2013 IMPACS strategy report in order to get a better sense of what friendly Caribbean governments consider the most pressing security breaches and the solutions these governments would like to implement. For example, the IMPACS report recommends that member States “attack the financial underpinnings of organized criminal syndicates; strip criminals of their illicit wealth; remove their access to the financial system.” In other words, security officers must not just focus on seizing cocaine shipments, but targeting the financial assets of known criminals. The report states (rather hopefully) that “an aggressive and successful programme of asset forfeiture could cripple organized crime in the Region,” and recommends the “establishment of National Asset Recovery Offices (AROs).”

Considering the expansive territory (particularly maritime) of the 15 countries of CARICOM, the IMPACS report strongly suggests greater intelligence sharing among the security agencies of its members. These proposals include the creation of “a network of Liaison Officers and National Points of Contact (NPCs)” between member states and the expansion of the “CARICOM Integrated Border Security System” (CARIBSEC).” The U.S. must continue to support the commitment of CARICOM nations to fight drug trafficking in the Caribbean. However, Washington should also recognize the importance that CARICOM governments give to addressing other regional security concerns. With that said, if agencies like SOUTHCOM are unable to provide that support due to budgetary constraints, Washington should turn to other partner nations, such as the U.K. and The Netherlands (which have overseas territories in the Caribbean), or regional states like Mexico and Brazil, to support IMPACS’ policy suggestions.

VOXXI: A bad omen for Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff?

A Bad Omen for Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff?
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
June 19, 2013
Originally published: http://www.voxxi.com/bad-omen-for-brazil-dilma-rousseff/

It certainly was not the start of the sports season that President Dilma Rousseff was expecting. Since the start of the FIFA Confederations Cup — the first of three major sports tournaments that Brazil will host over the next few years — Brazilian citizens have taken to the streets to protest.

The head of state was even severely booed during her opening speech before the Brazil-Japan football match that kicked off the Confederations tournament.

Besides this championship, Brazil will also host the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro.

Currently, the economic situation in the South American state is not particularly dire. In fact, the country has enjoyed growth over the past decade. Nevertheless, Brazilians decided to air their disgust for several of the government’s recent financial decisions, primarily the rising costs of public transportation and the costs of numerous construction projects that have been planned to prepare the country for the aforementioned events.

Interpreting the situation

As with anything that has to do with economics, interpreting Brazil’s economic status, both at the macro and micro level, depends on what data is analyzed.

For example, a May 31 article in The Washington Post has the provocative — and very optimistic — title of how Brazil and other emerging economies “could save the world economy.” The article goes on to explain that, even if the growth of Brazil, India and China is slowing down, it is “not necessarily a bad thing in a world that is trying to cultivate a more sustainable and less combustible era of economic expansion.”

On the other hand, the financial agency Standard & Poor’s recently changed Brazil’s economic outlook from “stable” to “negative.” Moreover, it seems that many Brazilian citizens have a different way of interpreting Brazil’s slowing pace and recent financial actions than the author of the aforementioned Washington Post commentary.

According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, the country’s GDP grew 1.9% in the first quarter of 2013 relative to the same period last year. The country’s economy grew at an impressive 7.5% in 2010, so the current slow pace is troubling to some analysts and the general population alike.

As previously mentioned, economic performance is interpreted differently depending on whether you are an analyst for a major financial institution in New York or a low-income citizen in a favela (a shantytown). Recent polls indicate that Brazilian citizens fear their economy is taking a turn for the worse. In one case, most respondents to a recent poll believe that they “expected health and education not to improve or worsen,” in the coming months.

The raise in the price of transportation fares has been enough to jumpstart protests across the country. Several protests recently took place in major Brazilian cities like Sao Paulo, Porto Alegre and Curitiba. These public manifestations seemed to have worked, as several cities have declared that they will reduce the price of local transportation fares.

Unsurprisingly, a less-than-ideal financial situation has hit President Rousseff’s popularity, which has slipped from 57% in July 2012 to 54% currently. At first sight, this is not a great loss, as most Brazilians still approve of the president’s mandate. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that Brazil will have presidential elections on October 2014, not long after the end of the FIFA World Cup.

Rousseff is still a favorite to be re-elected, but if the economic situation worsens — and if more corruption scandals regarding the construction projects for the sporting events explode in the coming months — her re-election bid could be in jeopardy.

Justified protests?

Besides the outrage over the increasing price of public transportation, another reason for the Brazilian protests is the concern regarding the costs of the major construction initiatives the Brazilian government has been carrying out in recent years in preparation for the international sporting events. These include the renovation of football stadiums and the construction of roads.

Unsurprisingly, there is the well-founded worry that the government is spending too much for these events, which could promote bribes and corruption among government officials who decide on which company gets these expensive contracts. In October 2011, then-Sports Minister Orlando Silva quit after been accused of accepting kickbacks for sports projects.

Certainly, the Brazilian citizenry is right to voice their outrage about the construction contracts that have been handed out and are worth millions of dollars. Moreover, yours truly would add that, as much international pedigree and good PR as these events will bring to Brazil, the aforementioned new sports venues may end up being abandoned as soon as the sports events are over.

Other cities that have hosted Olympic Games spent millions on expensive sports venues only to see that the buildings that were built specifically for them go to waste. A similar situation has already occurred in Athens.

Hopefully, the Brazilian sports ministry has a long term plan for using these new and state-of-the-art sports venues.

Possible Solutions

The Rousseff administration would be well-advised to revise their decision on the transportation price increases, as it seems clear that such an unpopular move will only promote more protests in the near future. Meanwhile, it is arguably too late to cancel major renovation or construction projects for the upcoming sports events, and doing so would just bring further criticism of governmental incompetency.

The best option the president and her cabinet has is to explain to the population that the sports-related contracts were conducted in a transparent and corruption-free way (the Silva scandal notwithstanding).

In addition, a publicly available master plan for the future uses of the new venues would also help to show that the Brazilian government has not placed short-term business contracts over long-term vision for national economic growth.

This may not be enough to appease the protesters and their (numerous) demands and concerns, but it’s a start.

Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/bad-omen-for-brazil-dilma-rousseff/#ixzz2WxUpv2mB

BLOUIN: “Baby Doc”, Haiti and the endurance of corruption

"Baby Doc," Haiti and the endurance of corruption
W. Alex Sanchez
Blouin Beat: Politics
February 18, 2013
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatpolitics/2013/02/18/baby-doc-haiti-and-the-endurance-of-corruption/

Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier has failed to show up for a court hearing in his native Haiti at the beginning of February, prompting the judge to postpone. A frustrating event indeed for Haiti’s citizenry — and for the international community. Both are anxious for the former dictator to stand trial for crimes he committed in the Caribbean nation during his rule from 1971 to 1986. Justice has yet to arrive.

The Duvalier family ruled Haiti for decades, starting with Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier, Jean-Claude’s father, who ruled from the late 1950s until his death in 1971. Jean-Claude then inherited the presidency, in which he quickly earned a reputation for corruption and ruthlessness. The Institute for Democracy and Justice in Haiti explains that during Jean Claude’s rule a curtailment of civil and political rights in the island indeed took place, as well as the “arbi­trary deten­tion, exile, forced dis­ap­pear­ances, tor­ture, and extra-judicial killing of oppo­nents of the regime.”

Duvalier was deposed in 1986 and went into exile. His absence did not, however, prove beneficial to the Caribbean island, as Haiti has been unable to improve socio-economic conditions and remains, arguably, the Western Hemisphere’s most impoverished state. This situation stems from endemic corruption and continuous governmental instability, exemplified by the 1991 military coup that unseated President Jean Bertrand Aristide. (It took the controversial deployment of U.S. troops in 1994 to return the deposed president to power.) A decade later, a second coup removed Aristide for the second time and, once again, the country entered into further turmoil. Ironically, Aristide blamed Washington for being behind his second violent overthrow in 2004.

The situation of the impoverished state sank to a new low in January 2010, when a devastating earthquake hit, killing over 300,000 and prompting an effective collapse of the Haitian government. A combination of governmental institutions and organizations, such as U.S. military deployment, MINUSTAH (the U.N. mission to the island) and the Red Cross  took over major duties, including providing medical assistance as well as maintaining citizen security. Due to the collapse of internal order scheduled presidential elections were postponed until November 2010, and a runoff occurred in March 2011, in which former musician Michel Martelly was elected as the new Haitian head of state.

In mid-January 2011, Duvalier returned to Haiti and has since lived a care-free and lavish lifestyle – even giving in December 2011 gave a commencement address at the Robert Blanc School of Law and Economic Sciences in Gonaïves (the irony is rich).  All of which attests to the fact that that the government is unable, or unwilling, to detain him. This is as much evidence of its feebleness as is the former dictator’s nonchalant non-appearance in court.  Also worrisome are the reports by different Haitian media and NGOs regarding links between President Martelly and Duvalier, specifically around the concern that Martelly had granted individuals with familial ties to Duvalier’s government key political positions (the father of Martelly’s former Prime Minister, Garry Conille, for example was a minister of sports and youth for the Duvalier dictatorship).

This may explain the government’s lukewarm attempts to prosecute the former dictator. And should the trial proceed, the consequences of a guilty verdict may not be that severe for the former dictator. He is charged solely with financial crimes, rather than human-rights abuses, and if he is convicted on these charges — an outcome looking unlikelier by the day — he would face a maximum of five years in prison. This complicated situation has provoked an outcry from both the international community as well as Haitian citizens, who repeatedly suffered under his rule and wants to see more serious charges brought forth. Duvalier’s lawyers are furiously trying to keep him out of prison, arguing that he has already been trialed before in Haiti, as well as in France and Switzerland.

Since it is likely that Duvalier will avoid jail time, the question of whether he will seek a renewed role in Haitian politics remains open. My colleague Larry Birns, the director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, argued that Duvalier certainly has the funds to buy his way into a prominent role after robbing the Haitian treasury during his rule. In addition, Duvalier has already been accused of building a paramilitary squad in Haiti, known as the Pink Army (Le Police/Lame Woz). While it is debatable whether Duvalier will seek to hold political office once again, it’s beyond question that he has the financial funds, support and connections to continue being an influential — and negative –force in Haitian politics.