COHA Espanol: La Tierra de lo Bizarro: El Cartel Del Golfo Ayuda A Damnificados De Tamaulipas

La Tierra de lo Bizarro: El Cartel Del Golfo Ayuda A Damnificados De Tamaulipas
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Council on Hemispheric Affairs - Espanol
September 30, 2013
Originally published: http://cohistas.wordpress.com/2013/09/30/la-tierra-de-lo-bizarro-el-cartel-del-golfo-ayuda-a-damnificados-de-tamaulipas/

El Huracán Ingrid, que azotó a varias comunidades del noreste mexicano particularmente en la región de Tamaulipas, ha pasado a segundo plano. Lo bizarro, a falta de una mejor palabra, es quienes han prestado ayuda a los damnificados de esa región. Usualmente cuando hay un desastre natural, los primeros en responder son las agencias de un gobierno: por ejemplo en Estados Unidos las agencias federales y la sociedad civil prestaron ayuda a los miles de damnificados luego del Huracán Katrina de 2005 y en Perú, el gobierno se movilizó luego que un gran terremoto destruyera extensas áreas en la Región Ica en el 2007. Sin embargo en el antes mencionado estado de México, los primeros en ayudar a varias comunidades han sido bandas criminales. Específicamente, el Cartel del Golfo (CDG) ha dado víveres y medicamentos a los damnificados   en esta región a causa de Ingrid. Esta iniciativa no hace sino incrementar la popularidad y legitimidad de este cartel entre la sociedad civil mexicana, algo que debería ser visto como muy alarmante para el futuro del gobierno de ese país.

Ingrid y el CDG

El Huracán Ingrid, de Categoría 1, golpeó al Valle del Rio Grande a mediados del mes de Septiembre, seguido por la Tormenta Tropical Manuel. Varias comunidades de la región, tanto de Tamaulipas como del Estado de Texas en Estados Unidos, han sido particularmente afectadas. Se han perdido alrededor de 100 vidas en México y hay más de 60 desaparecidos de acuerdo a los últimos reportes.[1]

La devastación fue tan masiva que varias comunidades quedaron muy golpeadas, con efectos poco predecibles. Por ejemplo, las fuertes tormentas provocaron la inundación de pantanos cerca a las comunidades urbanas de Tampico, Madero y Altamira. El resultado del paso de los fenómenos naturales es que los cocodrilos de pantano que habitan las zonas antes mencionadas fueron desplazados de su ecosistema por las lluvias, que los empujaron a zonas urbanas. Entre los tres municipios antes mencionados, ya se han capturado 25 cocodrilos, de 0.5 a 3 metros de longitud.[2]

Sin embargo no ha sido la devastación de esta región (que en algunos medios periodísticos abrió un debate del cambio climático y el calentamiento global y como afectan a Latino América) ni los cocodrilos, los que han hecho noticia.[3] Ni siquiera la falta de ayuda inmediata de parte del gobierno mexicano y las fuerzas de seguridad es lo más saltante de esta trágica historia. Más bien, lo más destacado de Ingrid y Manuel es que el Cartel del Golfo ha dado víveres y medicinas a los ciudadanos mexicanos afectados en Tamaulipas. Según se ha reportado en varios medios periodísticos, “varias toneladas de víveres a cientos de habitantes de Aldama y municipios del sur del Estado.”[4] De acuerdo a las imágenes del video en YouTube y reportes periodísticos, varias camionetas entraron al centro comercial de Andama y repartieron víveres necesarios como agua, arroz, harina de maíz, leche, jugos y galletas.[5]

Es más, el Cartel del Golfo está usando como un medio publicitario, tanto la devastación como la ayuda que ha proporcionado a los afectados en la región. Específicamente un video ha aparecido en YouTube, aparentemente creado por miembros del CDG, en donde se muestra “el lado humano” de la organización, que ayuda a los pobladores de Tamaulipas. Es más, los famosos memes (fotos con una leyenda pequeña), no se han hecho esperar. En uno, se aprecia una foto de miembros del CDG repartiendo víveres a personas que usan paraguas para protegerse de la lluvia – la leyenda de la foto dice “Si ayudan es porque tienen corazón.”[6]

El hecho que un grupo criminal como el CDG pueda llevar a cabo este tipo de iniciativas es preocupante. Algunas de las varias preguntas que uno se tiene que hacer incluyen: ¿En donde estaban las autoridades estatales y federales? ¿Es que conocían de esta iniciativa y la aprobaron o es que ocurrió sin su conocimiento? ¿Cómo adquirió el CDG los víveres que repartió?

Latino América: Entre El Terror y Ganar Adeptos

Sería erróneo declarar que este tipo de iniciativas son nuevas en la realidad Latino Americana. La verdad es que, a la par que existen grupos violentos en la región, también hay otros grupos que son violentos, pero que llevan a cabo obras e iniciativas para ganar el apoyo de la población local donde operan.

Ejemplos de movimientos armados y extremamente violentos en Latino América abundan, uno de ellos es el grupo insurgente Maoísta-Socialista del Perú, llamado Sendero Luminoso. Este movimiento terrorista sembró el terror en el país andino durante la década de los ochenta y principios de los noventa, con el objetivo de traer abajo al gobierno y crear uno nuevo con su líder, Abimael Guzmán, como nuevo jefe de estado (el nombre de guerra de Guzmán era Presidente Gonzalo). Varios especialistas y académicos peruanos que han estudiado a Sendero lo describen como un grupo “mesiánico.” Es decir, Sendero vio a cualquier individuo o entidad como el enemigo, si es que este no aceptada la ideología senderista/maoísta. No es sorpresa cuando se lee reportes de como Sendero llevó a cabo una guerra contra el gobierno peruano y las fuerzas del orden. Pero estos insurgentes también atacaron repetidamente a entidades civiles, como federaciones de trabajadores. Además, Sendero fue particularmente brutal contra los miembros de la Iglesia Cristiana (sin importar su denominación) ya que el mando senderista veía a la religión como el enemigo. Dado estos actos de extrema violencia, Sendero perdió adeptos y seguidores entre la población peruana, lo que ayudó a que se debilite militarmente.

Por otro lado, han habido entidades criminales cuyos líderes han querido mantener un apoyo entre una población, ya sea por razones personales (por ejemplo, el ego de un líder) o por razones operacionales (para tener seguidores que sirvan como informantes o que den ayuda a miembros de una organización criminal). Un ejemplo de un líder criminal que quería ser adorado es Pablo Escobar, líder del Cartel de Medellín en Colombia hasta que fue eliminado por agentes de seguridad en 1993. Como bien lo describió Mark Bowden en su famoso libro “Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw,” Escobar no quería ser simplemente poderoso y rico, quería ser amado por el pueblo como un “Robin Hood” colombiano. Esta ambición se evidencia en  todas las obras sociales que el colombiano llevó a cabo en su natal Antioquia para ganar el apoyo de la población local, como la construcción de campos de futbol, torres eléctricas y  donaciones a las parroquias locales, entre otras.

Hasta el Sendero Luminoso del 2013, aun debilitado, está intentando ganar seguidores y simpatía entre las nuevas generaciones ya sea vía la palabra o el dólar, en vez de la violencia. Por ejemplo, una ONG peruana llamada MOVADEF (Movimiento por Aministia y Derechos Fundamentales) tiene como secretario general a Alfredo Crespo, el abogado de Abimael Guzmán.[7] El objetivo de esta organización es enseñar a las nuevas generaciones de peruanos una versión distorsionada de la historia del Perú, donde Abimael Guzmán y sus seguidores son perseguidos políticos, no terroristas, y los crímenes que se les imputan (como las masacres en los Andes peruanos) son o invenciones del Estado o crímenes llevados a cabo por el Estado pero que fueron atribuidos a Sendero. En la Amazonía peruana, es sabido que el nuevo Sendero paga en dólares a los campesinos pobres a cambio de víveres, el cultivo de coca (la base de la cocaína) y otros tipos de ayudas.

Finalmente, los carteles mexicanos no se quedan atrás en cuanto a ganar adeptos vía obras sociales, a mediados del 2012, hubo una controversia grande en México cuando se hizo conocido que una inmensa capilla en Pachuca, en el centro del país, había sido construida con dinero de sangre. Es decir, los fondos para construirla habían provenido del entonces líder del cartel de los Zetas, conocido como “El Lazca.” [8] Aunque la iglesia fue bautizada como el “Centro de Evangelización Juan Pablo II,” rápidamente se le re-bautizó popularmente como una “narcocapilla.”[9]

Un año después, en Julio del 2013, ha habido nuevas acusaciones de que la Iglesia católica en México está recibiendo donaciones de los carteles. Debido a esto, el Monseñor de Hermosillo, José Ulises Macías Salcedo, declaró a la prensa que “He sido cuidadoso en ese aspecto. Cuando alguien ofrece ciertas cantidades de dinero pregunto de donde proviene. Y si cuando reconocen con humildad, les digo que no puedo aceptárselo.”[10] Es difícil pensar que, dado las millonarias cantidades de dinero que los carteles mexicanos manejan hoy en día, los miembros de la Iglesia católica en México (o de cualquier otra fe) sean impunes a la corrupción y otros actos ilegales.

Conclusión

La destrucción en el Estado mexicano causada por el Huracán Ingrid es una gran tragedia, por el lado que se le vea. Pero más preocupante es que fue el Cartel del Golfo y no el gobierno mexicano quien  prestara ayuda el  a los damnificados de las comunidades de este estado. El mismo cartel al que se le acusa de haber botado 49 cuerpos mutilados por una carretera en Nuevo León en el 2012; es el mismo que ahora quiere demostrar que tiene un corazón y quiere ayudar a sus compatriotas de Tamaulipas.[11]

Esta una situación irónica, bizarra, pero no única. Grupos violentos como el Cartel de Medellín de Pablo Escobar durante la década de los ochenta, o el Cartel de los Zetas y Sendero Luminoso en años recientes, también han intentado ganar simpatía entre sus respectivas poblaciones. Esperaremos conocer la respuesta que llevará a cabo el gobierno mexicano.

W. Alejandro Sánchez, Analista de Seguridad y Research Fellow en el Consejo de Asuntos Hemisféricos

Ésta es una contribución gratuita producida por el Consejo de Asuntos Hemisféricos. Si desea republicarla, por favor ponga nuestra información institucional. Los derechos exclusivos pueden ser negociados.

Si desea obtener más información sobre los asuntos interamericanos, les sugerimos que visite la página de Latin News, haciendo un clic aquí.

Citaciones 

[1] “Ciclones ‘Ingrid’ y ‘Manuel’ dejan 101 muertos y 68 desaparecidos en Mexico.” El Comercio (Peru). September 21, 2012. Accessed September 27, 2013 http://elcomercio.pe/actualidad/1633984/noticia-ciclonesingrid-ymanuel-dejan-101-muertos-68-desaparecidos-mexico

[2] “Capturan 25 cocodrilos en Tamaulipas tras paso de ‘Ingrid.’” El Universal (Mexico). Estados. September 22, 2013. Accessed September 26, 2013   http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/2013/capturan-cocodrilos-tamaulipas-tras-paso-ingrid-952706.html

[3] Whitney Eulich. “Mexico’s Storms: Should governments put emphasis on climate change prevention?” The Christian Science Monitor. Latin America Monitor. September 24, 2013.  Accessed September 27, 2013  http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2013/0924/Mexico-s-storms-Should-governments-put-emphasis-on-climate-change-prevention

[4] “Cartel del Golfo repartee toneladas de despensas a afectador por ‘Ingrid’ en Tamaulipas.” Proceso (Mexico). September 22, 2013. Accessed September 26, 2013   http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=353468

[5] “Cartel del Golfo repartee toneladas de despensas a afectador por ‘Ingrid’ en Tamaulipas.” Proceso (Mexico). September 22, 2013. Accessed September 26, 2013   http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=353468 Also see: Ildefonso Ortiz. “Tamaulipas floods Twitter with Ingrid alerts; video appears to show Gulf Cartel dabbling in disaster relief.”The Monitor. September 23, 2013. Accessed September 27, 2013  http://www.themonitor.com/news/local/article_e18ec87e-24a8-11e3-8605-0019bb30f31a.html

[6] “Cartel del Golfo repartee toneladas de despensas a afectador por ‘Ingrid’ en Tamaulipas.” Proceso (Mexico). September 22, 2013. Accessed September 26, 2013   http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=353468

[7] “Denuncian a dirigente del MOVADEF Alfredo Crespo.” La Republica (Peru). Politica. January 2, 2013. Accessed September 25, 2013  http://www.larepublica.pe/02-01-2013/denuncian-dirigente-del-movadef-alfredo-crespo

[8] Ignacio de los Reyes. “Iglesia y narco en Mexico: entre la amenaza y la complicidad.” BBC Mundo. March 22, 2013. Accessed September 27, 2013  http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/noticias/2012/03/120322_mexico_iglesia_narco_visita_papa_aw.shtml

[9] Ignacio de los Reyes. “Iglesia y narco en Mexico: entre la amenaza y la complicidad.” BBC Mundo. March 22, 2013. Accessed September 27, 2013  http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/noticias/2012/03/120322_mexico_iglesia_narco_visita_papa_aw.shtml

[10] Jose Trinidad Mendez. “Iglesia niega dadivas de carteles.” Periodico AM (Mexico). Local. July 17, 2013.  Accessed September 26, 2013 http://www.am.com.mx/leon/local/iglesia-niega-recibir-dadivas-de-carteles-32630.html

[11] Geoffrey Ramsey. “Mexico arrests 8 ‘Gulf Cartel Members’ over Nuevo Leon Massacre.” InSight Crime. May 18, 2012. Accessed September 27, 2013   http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/mexico-arrests-8-gulf-cartel-members-over-nuevo-leon-massacre

YaleJournal.org: The Clash of Civilizations and Latin America: Twenty Years Later

The Clash of Civilizations and Latin America: Twenty Years Later
W. Alejandro Sanchez
YaleJournal.org
April 29, 2013
Originally published: http://yalejournal.org/2013/04/29/the-clash-of-civilizations-and-latin-america-twenty-years-later/

In 1993, political scientist Samuel Huntington published a provocative article entitled “The Clash of Civilizations?” in Foreign Affairs.[i] Written shortly after the end of the Cold War, Huntington speculated on the future of global conflict. Huntington argued that, in the future, nations across the world would unite along rough cultural lines, and future conflicts would occur mainly between these unified “civilizations,” such as the Western world (i.e. the United States, Canada and Western Europe) and the Muslim world. Huntington argued that Latin America would unite, from Mexico (which he labeled a “torn country”) to Argentina, along with Cuba and the Dominican Republic.[ii] For Huntington, the unifying denominator among these states was their legacy of Spanish colonialism (along with Brazil, a former Portuguese colony, which he also placed in the group). Twenty years after Huntington put forward his famous theory, is Latin America any closer to being a “unified civilization” than it was in 1993?

Over the past two decades, new Latin American organizations have appeared with the goal of promoting regional integration. The Western Hemisphere now has an alphabet soup of such entities, with overlapping membership. This includes South American blocs such as the Common Market of the South, the Andean Community, and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Created in 2008, UNASUR stands as an interesting experiment of regional integration as its membership includes all twelve South American states, including Guyana and Suriname (which traditionally have aligned themselves with the Caribbean). There are other similar entities farther north, including the Central American Integration System, the Association of Caribbean States, and the Caribbean Community. These three entities also share overlapping membership and integration objectives.

But it was the appearance of heads of state in the past decade such as Bolivia’s Evo Morales, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, and the late President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela that raised the question about the ideological turn that the region was taking. These leaders constituted the most vociferous of a new wave of anti-Washington and ideologically left-leaning governments. Chávez and his allies even created their own organization, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), a loose alliance whose ideological pillars primarily include distancing themselves from the United States’ historical influence over the Western Hemisphere and promoting regional integration. ALBA was founded in part as a response to the U.S.-proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas; however, this agency has had a mixed record of success. Its axis revolved around Venezuela’s petro-dollars, which Chávez utilized as a foreign policy weapon. With the Venezuelan leader’s passing, the fate of ALBA as a united alliance remains unclear.

The 2010 creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) is the closest example of the Western Hemisphere’s attempt to unite as a single entity, following Huntington’s theory. It is noteworthy     that CELAC is an ambitious organization in that it combines both Latin American and Caribbean members. For Huntington, the Anglophone Caribbean constitutes a different “civilization,” distinct from that of Latin America. Nevertheless, we are far from witnessing the appearance of a unified “civilization” in the region. Even CELAC’s future success as an integration mechanism is questionable given that Latin American governments are historically reluctant to give up their sovereignty to supranational entities.

Huntington theorized that the world’s “civilizations” will ultimately enter into conflict with each other. As previously mentioned, a critical determinant leading up to CELAC’s and ALBA’s creation was to distance its members from Washington’s historical influence over the inter-American system and to create alternatives to the Organization of American States. Neither the United States nor Canada were invited to join CELAC. However, in spite of inflammatory declarations by Chávez, Latin America and the Caribbean are hardly on a collision course with Washington or other global regions. The 2012 Arab World-South America summit in Peru and the 2013 CELAC-European Union summit in Chile exemplify Latin America’s general desire to improve commercial ties with other global regions. Latin American nations have also continued to promote close relations with the United States, as exemplified by the 2011 ratification of trade agreement between Washington with Panama and Colombia.  Moreover, countries with Washington-friendly governments like Chile, Mexico and Peru are parts of the U.S.-inspired Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Additionally, President Barack Obama traveled to Mexico and Costa Rica in May 2013 where he attended a meeting of Central American heads of state (members of the Central American Integration System). During the summit, Central American leaders asked for greater U.S. involvement in the fight against drug trafficking in the region, while the Mexican leadership supported President Obama’s proposed changes to the U.S. immigration system that would allow undocumented citizens to legally stay in that country. While no high-profile agreements were made, such diplomatic trips additionally demonstrate how most Latin American governments want to expand ties with Washington, rather than seek confrontation, as Huntington theorized.

In his conclusions, Huntington acknowledged that “civilizations” will not “become a single coherent political entity” and that conflict between states of the same “civilization” could occur.[iii] Indeed, a simple desire to distance themselves from Washington is hardly enough to make over 30 countries in the Americas enter into an alliance that could unify the “civilization” while forgetting historical animosities. (Also, most Western Hemisphere governments do not have the same anti-Washington stance as say, Venezuela’s government under Chávez). Additionally, there remains a plethora of territorial disputes and occasional tensions among regional states (i.e. between Peru and Chile, Nicaragua and Costa Rica or Colombia and Venezuela).

Latin American and Caribbean nations are divided over how to shape their relations with Washington, as countries such as Mexico, Peru, and Colombia seek closer commercial and security ties, while the governments of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador seek to further distance themselves from the United States’ influence. These different foreign policy objectives and national interests demonstrate that there are plenty of issues to be resolved before we might see Huntington’s vision of a “Latin American and Caribbean civilization” emerge.[iv]

*W. Alejandro Sánchez Nieto is a Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) where he focuses on geopolitics, military and cyber security issues, particularly regarding Latin America and the Caribbean. His commentaries on Latin American-related issues appear in VOXXI and he is a regular blogger for Blouin News. His analyses have been published in numerous refereed journals including Small Wars and Insurgencies, Defence Studies, the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, European Security, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Globalizations.

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[i] Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, 72 (3), Summer 1993, 22-49. The article was then expanded into a book: Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011).

[ii] Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” 42.

[iii] Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” 48.

[iv] W. Alejandro Sanchez, "Whatever happened to South America's splendid little wars?," Small Wars & Insurgencies 22 (2), 2011, 322–351.

El Comercio (Peru): Promesas y Ausencias

Promesas y Ausencias
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Analyst
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
El Comercio (Peru)
September 8, 2012

My Two Cents on Blogs /Mis Dos Centavos sobre los Blogs

I’ve noticed that the way I use this blog and other researchers use theirs is somewhat different. I usually repost new articles that I’ve published elsewhere (i.e. websites or journals) or outlets where I’ve been interviewed/quoted. Sometimes I put brief blog posts, but not often, as I write such pieces for other places (like Latin American Thought) and republish them here. I don’t have a “blog roll” nor an option to subscribe for some e-newsletter nor do I update this blog daily with brief analyses like others do or reposting links of analyses that I find interesting; I use my Twitter account for that. I figured I might as well just write this and see if I get any feedback on that.
PS. I have an account on Delicious and I used to have an extension on my blog to show articles I had run across that I bookmarked, but whoever owns Delicious now got rid of that option.
January 22, 2012

He notado que la forma como uso este blog y como lo usan otros analistas es un poco diferente. Usualmente pongo nuevos articulos que he publicado en otros lugares o donde he sido citado/entrevistado. A veces pongo pequenos comentarios tipo blog pero no a menudo ya que publico este tipo de articulos en otros lugares (como Latin American Thought) y luego los republico aqui. No tengo un “blog roll” o una opcion para suscribirse a algun tipo de e-boletin; tampoco pongo pequenos analises/comentarios como lo hacen otros o reposteo links de analyses que pienso que son interesantes; para eso uso mi cuenta en Twitter. Pense en escribir estas ideas aqui y ver si recibo algun comentario.
PS. Tambien tengo una cuenta en Delicious conectada a mi blog donde marcaba articulos que me interesan pero quiensea que es dueno de Delicious ahora borro esa opcion.
Enero 22, 2012

Latin America and State Recognition: Palestine, the Caucasus, Kosovo, and Taiwan

by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sanchez
COHA Commentary
December 13, 2010
http://bit.ly/hY0vyZ


• Venezuela and Nicaragua recognize breakaway South Ossetia and Abkhazia

• Taiwan and Kosovo, recognized by a number of Latin American states more likely due to national economic interest rather than abstract concepts of goodwill and friendship

• Recognition of Palestine seen as latest example of Latin American divergence from U.S. influence

In 2008, Russia fought a five-day war with Georgia, an independent nation in the southern Caucasus, which gained its independence following the breakup of the Soviet Union. While the details of the incident remain controversial, it is generally agreed that Georgia was the aggressor. One critical consequence of the conflict was that two Georgian separatist regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, were recognized relatively quickly as independent states by four countries: Russia, the Pacific island of Nauru and the Latin American countries of Venezuela and Nicaragua.

Why were Venezuela and Nicaragua persuaded to recognize the two separatist states and what is the likelihood of a subsequent Latin American wave of recognition taking place? The experience of South Ossetia and Abkhazia may help highlight two distinct factors involved in the recognition process:

1. Although there is no recognition policy in effect, Latin American states tend to extend recognition to states outside the hemisphere principally based on a closely-felt geopolitical sense of national interest as opposed to a clear understanding of the merits and facts of a given conflict or transition; and
2. Due to forces of globalization, Latin American countries are now extending ties to areas of previously little interest.

Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay decided to recognize Palestine as an independent state based on its 1967 borders, much to the distress of U.S. and Israeli policy makers. Paraguay is now expected to follow in the wake of its fellow MERCOSUR members. Reasons for this decision are largely economic in nature. Nevertheless, the decision to recognize Palestine is somewhat surprising in Argentina’s case, given its foreign minister, Hector Timerman’s, Jewish background.

Latin America and the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia

That two of the four countries recognizing the breakaway regions are Latin American may reflect a growing trend in the region’s diplomacy. Recognition seems to be in the air: Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay have likewise recognized Palestine. Delegations from South Ossetia and Abkhazia have recently visited several Latin America countries in order to attract more attention, particularly focusing on Russia-friendly states like Cuba, Ecuador, and Bolivia. It would not be inconceivable if, in the coming months, other Latin American states recognize the two separatist entities.

It could be argued that recognition of the two tiny territories by Venezuela and Nicaragua was due less to any particular sympathy for their cause (or even some fundamental understanding of the conflict’s roots), than to Caracas and Managua wanting to court Moscow as a possible source of weapons sales and client for their commodity exports. In the past several years, Venezuela has purchased several billions of dollars worth of Russian armaments, with President Hugo Chávez becoming a frequent flier to Moscow. In 2008, a visit to Caracas by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was arranged to coincide with the arrival of Russian naval units to carry out naval exercises with their Venezuelan counterparts. This marked the first time since the advent of the Cold War that the Russian navy had entered Latin American waters. As for Nicaragua, President Daniel Ortega has been an ally of Moscow dating back to the 1970s when the Cold War was in its ascendency. While its current policies have not included a particularly effusive rapprochement with Moscow, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Bolivia are among the three hemispheric countries that today are committed to being in Russia’s good graces in order to receive trade benefits, market access, and privileged financial and military sales opportunities.

Will an upcoming change in the Peruvian Presidency signal important shifts in Lima’s recognition policies?

Peruvian Presidential candidate Ollanta Humala is known to be close to Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez. During Peru’s 2006 presidential race, the Venezuelan leader made no effort to conceal his support for the retired Peruvian army officer and left-leaning political figure. If Ollanta Humala is elected to the presidency in 2011, he may well decide to recognize the independence of the separatist states, thereby emulating Chávez’ example. Though this could give Washington dyspepsia, it could put the Andean country in line to obtain some military aid from Russia on concessionary terms. It should be recalled that during the period of military rule, the Peruvian Armed Forces depended upon Moscow as an important supplier of aircraft and tanks.

As a retired army officer, Humala knows very well that much of Peru’s current military equipment obtained from the Soviet Union is now over 30 years old. This includes Mi helicopters, and T-type tanks, as well as MiGs and Sukhois aircraft. Peru is now in the process of refurbishing or replacing them with updated weaponry. For example, in recent years Russian engineers have been upgrading Peru’s Mi helicopter fleet. Ollanta Humala would certainly want to ensure Peru’s access to top of the line and affordable Russian military equipment. Bolivia, Peru’s southeastern neighbor, has in fact received credit lines from Moscow to buy new weaponry and a new presidential plane; since La Paz has not recognized the South Caucasus states, this certainly looks like a dangling carrot. Military aid from Russia could prove to be of great importance to Lima in view of Peru’s recently revived encounters with the narco-terrorist movement Shining Path, as well as its ongoing maritime border` dispute with its historical nemesis, Chile.

It should be noted that Ollanta Humala has already expressed an interest in recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia. During an April 2009 visit to Russia, he declared to the local media that since Lima had recognized Kosovo’s independence, it had no major justification not to do so with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. He explained that the reason behind President García’s delay in recognizing them appeared to be the position that due to Washington’s engagement with Iraq and Afghanistan, the Caucasus is now one of the United States’ key areas of interest. Later, on November 11, 2009, seven Peruvian deputies (all members of Humala’s Nationalist Party) presented a motion (#08928) to recognize the two states, though, ultimately, the initiative did not make it to the floor of Congress.

Latin America and recognizing “controversial” states

Within the hemisphere, recognition regarding the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has been driven by Nicaraguan and Venezuelan self-interests as much as by anything else. This would be nothing new for Latin America. Neither would it be a strange phenomenon that a Latin American state would move quickly to recognize a country that has declared independence, even if most areas were holding their decision in obeisance. Latin America’s recognition of Kosovo and Taiwan, as well as the more recent action on Palestine, are all cases in point that the recognition process is in ferment.

The recognition of Palestine

In recent days Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay have recognized Palestine as an independent state. Paraguay is expected to follow suit. Both Washington and Tel Aviv have expressed their disappointment, if not to say their consternation. The State Department was quick to call the move “counter-productive.” This development highlights a number of recent trends. First, Latin America continues to ease out of Washington’s sphere of influence, with Bolivia and Venezuela pursuing a growing relationship with Iran, while Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay have just recognized Palestine. State Department officials as well as both Republican and Democratic members of Congress have openly criticized the move. Second, the direction of Latin America’s recognition policy is not that surprising since Latin America has a growing commercial and political link with the Muslim world, hence recognizing Palestine is as much a political gesture an economic move aimed to please Islamic leaders in order to cement strong trade relations. President Mahmoud Abbas of Palestine, visited Brazil in 2005 and 2009, and outgoing Brazilian president Lula da Silva made the first-ever trip by a Brazilian head of state to Palestine and Israel in March of this year. The Council on Hemispheric Affairs’ director, Larry Birns, has stated that “in a way this move isn’t surprising; the Arab world is big but there is only one Israel.” In terms of policy, Latin America apparently feels free to thumb its nose at Israel, regardless of U.S. pressure to the contrary.

Nevertheless, it is surprising that Buenos Aires decided to recognize Palestine. In June, the country named its first foreign minister of Jewish origin, Hector Timerman, who replaced Jorge Taiana in the post. Argentina has had a mixed relationship with Israel and its own large and prosperous Jewish community, in great part due to the 1994 terrorist attacks against the Israeli-Argentine Mutual Associate building. A van filled with explosives drove into the complex, killing 89 and injuring more than 200. The Lebanese militant group Hezbollah and Iran have been implicated in perpetrating the attack. Buenos Aires has carried out several initiatives with the Arab world in recent years, including an agreement with Algeria over nuclear cooperation. An August 2010 article by the Global Arab Network quotes Egyptian Minister of Trade and Industry Rasheed Mohamed Rasheed, as maintaining that Cairo wants to strengthen its ties with Argentina, especially in the fields of medicine, textiles, and IT. The article explains that “the volume of trade exchange between Egypt and Argentina rose from 616 million dollars in 2007 to 1.2 billion dollars in 2008, but receded to 643 million dollars in 2009 due to the financial crisis.” Argentina is Egypt’s second largest trade partner in Latin America. The region’s growing ties with the Arab world comes at a time when Washington seems to be increasingly frustrated by developments with the West Bank settlement standoff (the Obama administration has decided to end its efforts to achieve direct talks between the sides).

The recognition of Kosovo

Kosovo gained its independence from Serbia in 2008 and so far it has been recognized by approximately 70 states, including most of Europe as well as the U.S. and Canada. Countries that are threatened by the possible flare-up of separatist issues of their own, like the Russian Federation, China, Turkey, and Spain, understandably have been slow to move on the issue. Two of Washington’s major allies, Colombia and Peru, have recognized Kosovo. Other Latin states that have recognized Kosovo are Panama, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Belize. Honduras is the latest Latin American state to recognize the country, doing so last September. The Central American state has been a regional pariah since the 2009 coup in which the democratically-elected president, Manuel Zelaya, was taken from his bed in pajamas and flown out of the country. It is unclear if the recognition of Kosovo is an attempt by Porfirio Lobo, (Honduras’ de facto president elected to office under cloudy circumstances after Zelaya’s ousting) did this in order to be appreciated by Washington. In March of this year, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton carried out a five-day tour of Latin America in which she tried to persuade regional states to recognize the Lobo government. Matters were not helped when WikiLeaks made public that U.S. ambassador to Honduras, Hugo Llorens, acknowledged in a cable to the State Department that “there is no doubt that the military, Supreme Court, and National Congress conspired on June 28 in what constituted an illegal and unconstitutional coup against the Executive Branch.” Clinton’s trip was not very successful, as exemplified by the recently concluded IX conference of defense ministers in Bolivia, to which Honduras was not invited. Lacking substantial regional allies, Lobo may very well have concluded that the otherwise improbable recognition of Kosovo would strengthen his ties to Washington and its vote in regional forums.

The recognition of Taiwan

Taiwan is becoming increasingly perturbed that Chinese economic assistance to Latin America will erode some of the support it has found in regional leaders. Just over 20 states worldwide currently recognize Taiwan as an independent state, separate from mainland China. Besides Vatican City, most of these countries are located in relatively underdeveloped regions like Africa, the Caribbean, and Central America.

Regarding the Western Hemisphere, the countries that recognize Taiwan are: El Salvador, Belize, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, as well as Paraguay. While some of these states may have genuine sympathy for Taiwan, others have switched from recognition of the island to now recognizing the mainland as the official Chinese state. Currently, there are deep concerns emanating from Taipei after Beijing announced in October that it will give USD 462 million in financing to construct a tourism complex in the eastern resort of Punta Cana, Dominican Republic. Dominican tourism minister, Francisco Javier Garcia, visited Shanghai in October, and he was quoted by the BBC as saying that his country was hoping for “complete” relations with China “sooner [rather] than later.”

Latin America meets the rest of the world

The recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as Muslims from these aspirant nations to Latin America, may produce one additional consequence. The Caucasus is one of the world’s last regions with which Latin America has not established close contacts; the recognition of these separatist states may actually be the catalyst that could bring them into a more regularized relationship with the previously neglected region.

Today, Latin America participates in conferences with parts on the globe that have historically not been in its political or economic focus, such as the Middle East and Africa. This development would become even more fixed if a given Latin American country develops a strong economic relationship with the Caucasus states. For example, the now increasingly effective rapprochement between Latin America and the African continent has Brazil as its principle catalyst, since that country already has strong political links with South Africa, as well as historical and ethnic ties with Portuguese-speaking nations such as Angola. Gilberto Carvalho, a close advisor to Brazilian President Lula da Silva, has observed that after the President steps down from power, “Lula da Silva’s task will be to help with the political reforms the country needs. Overseas, his target is helping Africa.”

With respect to Latin America and the Muslim world, Brazil and Venezuela are building strong ties with countries like Libya and Iran. Additionally, Argentina has signed a nuclear agreement with Algeria. Another emerging trend is the growing friendship between Bolivia and Iran, with Tehran offering La Paz technical expertise to help construct nuclear energy power plants in the Andean state. Most recently, the two states have formed a partnership to exploit Bolivia’s lithium deposits. South America and Arab countries have held two summits so far, in 2005 and 2009.

It’s a small world after all

The recognition by four states of the separatist regions of Ossetia and Abkhazia is regarded by some regional specialists as a threat to the national integrity of Georgia. General parallels can be made with Kosovo and Taiwan, two other comparable separatist states carved out of Serbia and China respectively, which may prove instructive. Certainly, the issues in Georgia, the Middle East, Serbia, and China are complex and have their own unique arguing points. Most likely, while some Latin American states may hold out some sympathy towards the separatist areas, recognition has, and will continue to be, extended in accordance with their own national interests.

This article is an expanded version of an interview given by the author to The Caucasus Times regarding the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Latin American states. The full interview, in Russian, can be found via this link: Caucasus Times

Netherlands Antilles’ Break Up Continues as Its Geopolitical Importance Mounts

by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sanchez
07 Apr 2009
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
http://www.coha.org/netherlands-antilles%E2%80%99-break-up-continues-as-its-geopolitical-importance-mounts/

- May 15 referendum in Curaçao crucial for future of the Antilles’ dismantling process
- U.S. military and DEA presence in Curaçao and Aruba likely to grow
- Caracas’ motivations include Chavez’s populism and business interests
- Combating drug trafficking and changing tax-haven laws show improvement
- If dismantling is a success, will independence follow in the near future?
- Even with The Hague’s help, Curaçao and Sint Maarten should be wary of sharks

The upcoming May 15 referendum in Curaçao is sure to have important repercussions for the political future of the Netherlands Antilles, a group of islands located in the southern Caribbean, which make up part of the Kingdom of Holland. One of the last remnants of overseas colonial territories in the Caribbean, the population of each island making up the Netherlands Antilles has divergent perspectives regarding what future ties their home-islands should maintain vis-à-vis Holland: autonomy within the Kingdom, or maintaining the status quo.

Devoid of ample natural resources and heavily dependent on tourism, the option of independence for many of these islands represents a paramount challenge. Within an international context, the autonomy of Curaçao and Sint Maarten (which could eventually lead up to full independence), may serve as a catalyst for other overseas territories to also pursue self-rule. Furthermore, the Netherlands Antilles are known for being tax havens and offshore financial centers by international organizations, hence a new political status may, ostensibly, prompt local leaders to agree to disclose the financial secrets of their clients. Finally, the geographical location of Curaçao, the Netherlands Antilles most populous island, makes the island’s politics important vis-à-vis Washington and Caracas, as both are know to have interests there.

Leading up to Today
The Netherlands Antilles consist of the “Leeward” islands, including Bonaire and Curaçao, and the “Windward Islands” which include Saba, Sint Maarten and Sint Eustatius. The islands are self-governing, with Holland overseeing defense and foreign policy matters, (according to the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands Dec 15th 1954, Article 3).

In 1993, a referendum confirmed the status of all islands within the union, despite earlier talks that debated their constitutional basis. Subsequently, the population of the islands realized that the idea of being semi-autonomous territories within the Kingdom was no longer plausible, especially from a political and economic viewpoint. In June 2000, Sint Maarten held a non-binding referendum in which 69 percent of the population voted for status aparte; meaning autonomy from the federation within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In late 2004, the citizens of Bonaire (59.5 percent) and Saba (86 percent), voted to remain part of the Netherlands.

Moreover, nonbinding referendums were held in 2005, in which, 68 percent of voters in Curaçao chose status aparte, and 76.6 percent in St. Eustatius voted to remain a part of the Netherlands Antilles. The referenda were thus interpreted as the final move necessary for the government of the Antilles to negotiate with the Kingdom. On December 15, 2008, Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende met in a round table discussion with the delegates representing every island.

Mixed Feelings and Objectives
In June 2008 Curaçao residents protested The Hague’s plan to oversee the finances of the island after more than 50 years of financial autonomy. Compared to neighboring dependencies making up the Netherlands Antilles, Curaçao, an island of 140,000 inhabitants, seems to be most positioned to seek full autonomy from Holland.

The BES islands (Bonaire, St Eustatuis and Saba) have voted to integrate with the Kingdom. The major reason for this decision is that they believe they would be hard pressed to survive as independent political entities. In turn, they will receive Dutch assistance and the U.S. dollar will be adopted as the national currency.

The question then revolves around what will be the fate of Curaçao and Sint Maarten, both of which are leaning towards autonomy. Holland has essentially propagated an all-or-nothing plan for the aforementioned islands, in which each must be ready to either accept or forgo autonomy. The demands articulated by the Dutch government stipulate that both islands must improve their local economies and have functioning political institutions that will address corruption and other crimes, including human rights violations.

The citizens of Curaçao have protested being “tied up” with Sint Maarten, arguing that this is how The Hague aspires to keep both islands under its control. Curaçao officials argue that their island would, in effect, have to assume the role of Sint Maarten’s chief financial guarantor.

The May 15 Election
As part of the autonomy process Holland has negotiated an economic aid package with the Netherlands Antilles to ensure that any island that chooses autonomy will be in sound financial condition. The aid includes financial supervision and a solution to the Antilles’ national debt, estimated at around $2 billion. Other changes include a native police force and amendments to the Constitution and charter. Holland also seems keen to maintain some kind of oversight over Curaçao’s and Sint Maarten’s judicial system.

A referendum will be held in Curaçao on May 15. A “yes” vote will mean relieving the debt and accepting Dutch assistance in helping the island communities; a “no” vote will prompt Holland to demand repayment of the funds which were sent last January as part of the financing to begin assisting the Antilles repay its national debt. Furthermore, The Hague has hinted that, should the “no” vote prevail, there will never again be an opportunity to mitigate the islands’ debt, and that the autonomy discussions that have dated back to 1993 will cease. This is particularly troubling since investors, anxious about the political and economic future of the islands, go about assessing the island’s investment viability. The results of the referendum will, therefore, undoubtedly influence such relatively major decisions. “Only in Curaçao is there some resistance to the autonomy process, Sint Maarten will say yes to almost anything,” explained journalist Miriam Sluis to COHA.

Key Point: Drug Trade flowing through the Caribbean
For the prospective nations (most likely Curaçao and Sint Maarten) a key issue prompting autonomy will be the combating of the drug trafficking passing through the Netherlands Antilles en route to European and American markets. This will also test the relationship that The Netherlands will maintain with its by-then, possibly, former semi-autonomous overseas territories. The worst-case scenario is that either Curaçao or Sint Maarten could emulate Suriname, a former Dutch colony ruled for many years by strongman Desire Bouterse, who repeatedly has been accused of being heavily involved in drug trafficking.

In 2007 there was a minor controversy when it was revealed that then Governor of the Netherlands Antilles, Frits, Goedgedrag, had signed a federal decree approving the amnesty of drug couriers on the islands. Instead of jail time, the convicted felons would have their passports revoked for different periods of time, with only individuals who had been awarded prison terms of 30 months or more actually having to serve jail time. Transporting more than 300 grams of drugs seems to be the determining factor as to whether or not a felony would be considered “lite”.

The reason for the decision is that the overcrowded prisons found on these islands have no room for all of the drug “mules” or those found guilty of drug trafficking in the island. Poverty, as well as drug consumption, is pervasive in Curaçao, hence locking up minor offenders would ultimately prove counterproductive. Accordingly, only the island’s most egregious criminals actually receive prison time. The problem is that, if this situation is transpiring while the Netherlands Antilles are still part of Holland and while it is still receiving major financial aid for infrastructure and other projects, it is unclear if islands like Curaçao and Sint Maarten will be able to improve detention centers to any extent after they attain autonomy. “This is a reason why Holland is not keen on dismantling the Antilles,” said Sluis. “Even with autonomy, the Kingdom will want to continue having a say in judicial issues and law enforcement to keep the successful momentum going,” she added.

In an interview with COHA, Dr. Michiel van der Veur, professor of international relations at the University of the Netherland Antilles, explained that “recent figures show that the crime rate is, in fact, decreasing; however, individual crimes committed, have become more violent. As a result of a new radar system, fewer drugs are entering the islands. The Antillean Coast Guard also has stepped up its activity and is patrolling daily and working closely together with the US Coast Guard.” Washington has a presence in Curaçao as it leases part of the airport for anti-drug operations. The detachment stationed there includes U.S. military personnel as well as DEA agents. AWAC aircraft are utilized for monitoring suspicious air and sea traffic in Caribbean waters. Sluis explains that thanks to this anti-drug task force of American, Dutch and Antillean forces battling drug trafficking, “it is still possible to get drugs into Curaçao, but getting them from the island to the markets has become very difficult, hence drugs are being re-routed to the Dominican Republic and other islands.” According to November 2008 article in the daily NRC Handelsblad, in that year 214 tons of cocaine, 166 tons of heroin and five tons of marijuana were intercepted by U.S. patrols taking off from the airbase on Curaçao.

Key Point: Venezuela’s Presence at Different Levels
Another important issue regarding the future of the islands and their impact on regional factors entails relations between Curaçao and Venezuela. Venezuela has claimed ownership of the Netherlands Antilles, with President Hugo Chavez making provocative remarks in recent years over the political status of the islands. According to a 2006 IPS report, then-Dutch Defense Minister Henk Kamp labeled Chavez as a “fanatic populist who has his sights set on Aruba, Bonaire and Curaçao.” Chavez in turn described Kamp as Washington’s “pawn.” The Venezuelan leader added that there is a “natural relationship, perhaps more direct than with the kingdom [of the Netherlands] itself” between Venezuela and the Netherlands Antilles. This relationship has been interpreted by many as an explicit denigration of the island’s sovereignty as long as the status quo is allowed to exist. Chavez has also blamed Washington for spreading rumors that Caracas has military plans for the Antilles. In an effort to increase regional security, Venezuela held naval exercises with Holland in September 2008. Later that year, Venezuela and Russia held naval exercises, which included the Russian nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great, traversing the Caribbean.

Talking to COHA, Dr. van der Veur asserted that “Chavez makes these comments now and then. I believe they are made only for internal consumption,” particularly during periods of tension between Chavez and then-U.S. President Bush. The general belief is that, while the U.S. continues to be a military superpower with a military presence in Curaçao and Aruba, any Venezuelan security threat posed by Caracas remains unlikely. Even upon autonomy, Holland would continue to be in charge of the defense of the islands. Van der Veur concludes that none of the islands (Aruba, Bonaire or Curaçao) possess significant natural resources (there may be underwater oil deposits, but exploration is considered too expensive) to make a military invasion cost-effective. Perhaps more importantly, should Caracas ply its claims to some of the Antillean islands more aggressively, it would most certainly alienate other Caribbean island nations that it’s attempting to woo. It would also strain cordialities between Venezuela and Holland, both of which hope to maintain existing strategic trade relations.

Venezuela’s Already Established Presence
Curaçao is situated less than 100 miles from Venezuelan territory and the South American power already has a big presence on the island, particularly through the Venezuelan state-oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela SA – PDVSA, which leases the island’s Isla refinery. The refinery was sold by Shell to Curaçao for a symbolic $1 and the local government was quick to re-sell it in order to make a profit. PDVSA processes around 220,000 barrels per day of oil in the facility, and it is under pressure to maintain current production-levels in light of the global fiscal crisis. The problem is that ever since the refinery’s construction decades ago, the facility has been an environmental and health hazard for local residents. A July 2008 Reuters dispatch quotes a professor at a nearby school complaining that smoke and stench emissions from the plant have reached such intense levels that classes regularly had to be suspended. Industrial emissions are also suspected to create an influx of health issues ranging from chronic coughing to cancer.

Venezuela is an important presence for the Netherlands Antilles, particularly for Curaçao, because of tourism. After Dutch nationals, Venezuelans make up the second largest source of tourists visiting the island. Therefore, keeping a continuous stream of tourists is critical to Curaçao’s economic sustainability. Island officials project that the number of visitors to the island in 2008 grew by 30 percent to about 390,000 people, a December 2008 AP article reported. Sluis added that many wealthy Venezuelans in recent years have moved to Curaçao in order to distance themselves from the Chavez administration.

Key Point: Washington’s Interests
Washington has maintained a military presence at Curaçao’s Hato airport in order to service multinational counter-drug missions operating in the Caribbean. American officials say the operation contributes around $25 million to the local economy. DEA agents are also based in the airport’s facilities. There’s a smaller U.S. military presence at Aruba’s airport as well. Both bases, as well as the American facility in Manta, Ecuador, are categorized as Forward Operations Locations (FOL).

Under the contract’s terms, the personnel are only authorized to launch flights to gather intelligence about drug smuggling, while the DEA agents are the only ones stationed there who are authorized to make arrests. The American presence has largely been accepted by the local population, though the question remains if these planes are solely used to monitor anti-drug operations, or to spy on Venezuela and engage in other operations such as like aerial fumigation in Colombia.

A recent AP story explains that “Nelson Pierre, a member of the 21-member governing council, believes that the U.S. military should no longer be allowed to use the airport in order to ensure good relations with Chavez, albeit, he acknowledges that only one other council member shares his opinion and the lease is therefore likely to be extended after it expires in 2011.” In a November 2008 Christian Science Monitor article, US Southern Command spokesman Jose Ruiz is quoted as saying that “Curaçao is strategically located to be able to monitor the Caribbean basin […] it’s an effective position with which to conduct monitor flights and to track traffic that we suspect may have contraband.”

As the U.S. will soon be forced to withdraw from the military facilities it now leases from Ecuador at Manta, and Caracas-Washington relations continue to be strained, Washington and SOUTHCOM are looking to alternative locations to continue operations. Maintaining a presence in Curaçao and Aruba would provide Washington with friendly ports and airports (specially as plans for the reconstituted Fourth Fleet are advanced) as well as an operations base to monitor both drug trafficking activity as well as, if necessary, carry on operations involving Venezuela. Recent news that Russia may consider using Cuban and Venezuelan airports as landing pads for their strategic bombers carrying out long-distance patrols only heighten the importance for Washington to be able to have a continuous presence in different quadrants of the Caribbean basin.

In September 2008, the USS Farragut, a guided-missile destroyer, visited Curaçao on a humanitarian mission. “The Americans are keen in making sure their community outreach projects are publicized to maintain a good image,” says Sluis. Nevertheless, she adds that there is little interaction between the American personnel and the people of Curaçao, as the former usually remain on their bases and have strict rules about which areas of the island they can travel.

Key Point: New Allies for Whom?
The outcome of the upcoming referendum aimed at dictating the status of the Netherlands Antilles is bound to affect regional arrangements. Curaçao already has taken steps to join the regional agency, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

In 2008 CARICOM and the European Union signed an Economic Partnership Agreement. As a result, Curaçao businessmen have viewed trading with CARICOM countries as considerably more beneficial than in previous years. A May 2008 article in the Caribbean Media Corporation quoted the president of the Antillean Industrial Association (AIA), Donald Henrietta, as saying, “In the past with CARICOM very little has been done, not only from our side but from the side of CARICOM, to include us, but lately we noticed with the development of the EPA and with the intention of the European Union of having a unified Caribbean, that there is opportunity for us to embrace this development using the skills that we have at home.”

In a January 2009 interview with CMC, Curaçao’s Economic Affairs Minister, Eugene Rhuggenaath, avowed, that, “as a country, Curaçao will be more empowered to pursue its own direction and we are constantly choosing to become more involved in the Caribbean community.” The senior official went on to add that “we have already made several agreements with the ministries and institutions, like the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), to take the steps in pursuing that Associate Member status, in order to become a fully participating member with our neighboring Caribbean states.” It is unclear if Curaçao can legally join CARICOM, if it is still part of a European state. Perhaps it can become an associated member of some level, but full membership would bring up a legal issue.

Key Point: Illegal Financial Flows
In the case of the achievement of political autonomy by one or more of these islands from Holland, a critical task that will have to be addressed by the international community is that these islands are known to be tax havens for international companies. A tax haven country suspects that local authorities will not inquire about the amount, or means, or how their clients derive their income. International companies as well as crime syndicates and criminals exploit these financial launching pads to lay away their wealth, as such financial transactions are treated with impunity. Specifically, the Netherlands Antilles are classified as a tax haven by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and as an offshore financial center by the International Monetary Fund.

In general, there is optimism that the tax haven-label will soon be removed from the Netherlands Antilles. Regional specialists agree that the current situation is nothing like it was in the 1980s. According to van der Veur, “the tax laws have already changed.” For instance, in September 2008, the New Zealand government announced that it had signed a tax information treaty with Holland regarding the Netherlands Antilles. This represents that the Netherlands are working to get the Antilles off the black list,” explains van der Veur. The Antilles have entered bilateral tax agreements with different countries to combat subversion of tax haven regulations. The U.S. signed a similar agreement with Holland regarding the Antilles in 2007.

Nevertheless, an April 2009 report by the OECD labels the Netherlands Antilles in the section of “jurisdictions that have committed to the internationally agreed tax standard, but have not yet substantially implemented it.” Other areas in the same group include well-known tax havens like Liechtenstein, Panama and the Cayman islands. In an interview with COHA, a former senior IMF official explained that “I would believe the OECD more than I would believe the Netherland Antilles” regarding changes in tax regulations. “If the OECD is continuing to list the Antilles as a jurisdiction that has not yet substantially implemented the internationally agreed tax standard, then that is what it is,” the expert concluded.

A better tomorrow… for everyone
When asked if the pro-autonomy movement is the first step for the eventual independence of Curaçao and Sint Maarten from the Kingdom of Holland, reporter Miriam Sluis explained that “there is such a sentiment but some individuals argue that Curaçao and Sint Maarten could become failed states like Haiti or ruled by a strongman like Suriname’s Desire Bouterse; but this is not a reason to dismiss the idea right off the bat. Independence should be talked about, it may work for us.” When asked the same question by COHA, a source close to the process of state structure in the Antilles (structura estatal) who asked to remain anonymous, explained that “Haiti and Suriname are independent countries, if they fail no one will help them; as autonomous entities Curaçao and Sint Maarten are guaranteed that Holland will help us if we fail.” The source added that “the islands’ income per capita is one of the highest in the Caribbean, while Haiti has the lowest, we really would have to hit rock bottom to become like Haiti.”

Even if full independence appears elusive, both islands are in the process of taking firm steps towards becoming fully responsible for the lives of their citizens, should the May 15 referendum affirm a “yes” vote for ongoing negotiations with Holland. Events outside of the Antilles’ control, namely Washington-Caracas security questions and political tensions and the return of Russia as a player to the Western Hemisphere, have made the political inclinations of these islands important to the future of Caribbean security and diplomacy. Drug trafficking and foreign companies attempting to take advantage of the island’s tax laws will continue to be issues that demand attention. Even with continued protection by the Netherlands, Curaçao and Sint Maarten are going to have to be wary of the sharks in the water.