Showing posts with label oil. Show all posts
Showing posts with label oil. Show all posts

Friday, September 11, 2026

Geopolitical Monitor: "Understanding the US-Venezuela Oil Deal"

 



"Understanding the US-Venezuela Oil Deal"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Geopolitical Monitor

11 September 2026

Published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/us-venezuela-oil-deal-explained/ 

 US-Venezuela relations have continued to evolve since the removal of then-President Nicolás Maduro in early January through Operation Absolute Resolve. Recently, President Donald Trump announced a historic deal to exploit Venezuela’s oil reserves. That deal and its ramifications require more discussion, given its potential repercussions for the United States, Venezuela (including the future of interim President Delcy Rodríguez), and even other relevant actors like China.

Thursday, April 9, 2026

Geopolitical Monitor: Oil Dependency in Wartime: Malaysia and the Iran War

 

 


"Oil Dependency in Wartime: Malaysia and the Iran War"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Geopolitical Monitor 

9 April 2026 

Published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/oil-dependency-in-wartime-malaysia-and-the-iran-war/ 

 

The war in Iran appears to be paused, for now, as the United States and the Islamic Republic have announced a two-week ceasefire. It is unclear whether this ceasefire will hold or if hostilities will resume. In the meantime, countries that rely on energy and other resources from the Middle East will be quick to send their tankers and cargo ships across the Strait of Hormuz to replenish their much-needed energy reserves at home.

Curiously, just prior to the announcement of the ceasefire (and US President Trump’s threat of annihilating Iran as a country), when the Strait was still closed, the government of Malaysia announced an agreement with Tehran to allow the safe passage of Malaysia-bound ships through the contested Strait. This development warrants discussion to understand how governments have navigated this tense situation and the importance of energy diversification.

Friday, February 17, 2023

IPD: "Curacao to Reopen its Borders with Venezuela"

 

"Curacao to Reopen its Borders with Venezuela"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

World News

International Policy Digest

17 February, 2023

Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/curacao-to-reopen-its-borders-with-venezuela/

Curacao has announced plans to reopen its borders with neighboring Venezuela in April. The Caribbean island, an autonomous country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, has a complex relationship with Venezuela, which includes trade, the migration of Venezuelans, and the future of Curacao’s vital Isla refinery. Hence, this decision will significantly affect the future relations between Curacao and Venezuela.

Relations between Venezuela and the Dutch Caribbean are not straightforward. It is essential to remember that Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao (the ABC islands) are autonomous nations within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. While the three islands can create their own domestic policies, The Hague remains in charge of defense and foreign policy. With that said, reopening the borders is a significant development and will have wider ramifications.

Continue Reading... 

Tuesday, January 25, 2022

Book chapter: "A Frontier Market in the COVID-19 Era: Kazakhstan’s Economic Diversification in the 2020s"

 


"A Frontier Market in the COVID-19 Era: Kazakhstan’s Economic Diversification in the 2020s"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

 Chapter published in: 

Jean-François Caron and Hélène Thibault (Eds), Central Asia and the Covid-19 Pandemic, Springer Link, 2022: 139-170
 
 

Abstract

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government of Kazakhstan was carrying out a strategy of economic diversification in order to decrease the country’s dependence on its profitable energy industry which constitute the bulk of Kazakhstan’s exports. As part of the diversification of its economy and trading partners, Kazakhstan has a long-term objective: become one of the world’s 30 most developed economics by 2050. The Central Asian nation is classified as a frontier market by global indexes, which means that it is viewed as having less developed political and economic structures, which makes them more volatile. However this label can be misleading as it does not properly demonstrate what Kazakhstan has accomplished in recent years in its quest to attract new trade partners and investors. New entities like the Astana International Financial Centre; the government's plans to become a trilingual nation; and recent initiatives to develop industries like agriculture, banking, manufacturing and tourism; demonstrate what good planning can accomplish. How will the pandemic affect Kazakhstan’s plans and objectives? This essay seeks to demonstrate that the country has handled COVID-19 generally well from an economic point of view. While the informal sector and lack of development in the periphery remain problematic issues, Nur-Sultan has achieved much in its three decades of independence as a frontier market, transforming from a Soviet-style to a Western-style economy. Kazakhstan, thus, is an example of how a global pandemic does not necessarily have to cripple the development plans of a frontier market, if said country has clear short-term as well as long-term goals.

 

 

 

Sunday, April 5, 2020

The National Interest: The Western Hemisphere’s Latest Slow-Motion Catastrophe Isn't the Pandemic


"The Western Hemisphere’s Latest Slow-Motion Catastrophe Isn't the Pandemic"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez & Ryan Berg
The National Interest
April 5, 2020
Originally published: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/western-hemisphere%E2%80%99s-latest-slow-motion-catastrophe-isnt-pandemic-140692


A slow-motion catastrophe is playing out in the Western Hemisphere. No, it’s not the coronavirus pandemic or the alarming collapse of Venezuela’s healthcare system, which will be overrun by coronavirus victims. It’s the world’s newest oil power, Guyana, and its still-disputed results from the country’s general elections in early March.  
 

Continue Reading...

Friday, June 1, 2018

IPD: Curacao’s Other Problem (And an Opportunity for Development)

"Curacao’s Other Problem (And an Opportunity for Development)"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
2 June 2018
International Policy Digest
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/06/02/curacao-s-other-problem-and-an-opportunity-for-development/

The Caribbean island of Curacao made international headlines in May due to the situation of its oil refinery, Isla Curaçao B.V., which is operated by the Venezuelan state-run oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela SA ( PDVSA). PDVSA has a contract to operate the refinery until 2019 and unfortunately Venezuela’s crisis has hit PDVSA and, naturally, Isla. The situation reached a boiling point in May when ConocoPhillips “seized products” that belonged to PDVSA after the company (Conoco) won court orders allowing it to do so.

Isla is critically important to Curacao’s economy and population, however, there are two ongoing developments that also deserve greater analysis, both for positive and negative reasons. Namely, the well-known international shipyard group Damen Group is currently upgrading and expanding the island’s shipyard. That’s the good news. On the other hand, Curacao, like the rest of the region, is receiving a steady influx of Venezuelan citizens, which is upsetting the very delicate socio-economic balance of an island with around 160 thousand citizens.

While it is part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Curacao enjoys a high degree of autonomy over its domestic politics, and the leadership in Willemstad will need plenty of statesmanship and forward thinking to successfully address the island’s mounting challenges.

The Good News: An Expanding Port

Damen took control of Curacao’s port in September 2016 via a concession agreement with Curaçaose Dok Maatschappij N.V. (C.D.M.). The facilities, renamed Damen Shiprepair Curaçao (DSCu) on February 2017, are currently able to repair and provide maintenance to vessels, but Damen wants to further improve and develop the infrastructure to become a default stop for vessels traveling the Caribbean Sea and also for regional navies and coast guards. The island’s location is helpful towards achieving this goal as it is located just north of Venezuela and not far from Panama – then again, even an upgraded DSCu will have to compete with other more established port facilities in the region, particularly the Cartagena port in Colombia.

In order to expand the DSCu’s capabilities, Damen sent two floating docks that arrived to the island in late April. According to Maritime Executive, “the larger of the two is a Panamax-class dock measuring 230 meters by 45 meters for tankers, box ships and other large vessels, while the smaller dock measures 108 meters by 23 meters and is ideal for all kinds of tugs, work boats and offshore support and anchor handling vessels.” The article also quotes DSCu’s managing director, who explained that “even now our sales team is in discussions with a number of companies regarding a wide variety of vessels ranging from a local research vessel to tugs, small cruise ships and OSVs. We also plan to support regional naval vessels including those of the Royal Dutch Navy and with the support of a Damen Services team the yard will provide maintenance and repair services to Damen-built tugs and workboats operating in the region.”

Indeed, several Greater Caribbean states utilize Damen naval platforms, like The Bahamas, which purchased a number of Damen vessels as part of Nassau’s Sandy Bottom Project to improve the capabilities of the Royal Bahamas Defence Force. Additionally, regional shipyards have constructed vessels based on Damen models, like Mexico’s ASTIMAR for the Mexican Navy. Hence, DSCu could very well become a major maintenance and repair shipyard for regional warships, coast guard boats, not to mention civilian vessels that cross the Caribbean on any given day.

The Bad News: A Growing Migration of Venezuelans
An ever-growing number of Venezuelan citizens have migrated to countries like Brazil, Colombia, Peru and the U.S., in the past couple of years as the situation in their country worsens, and the Caribbean island has also received a number of them.

Unfortunately, there is no exact number of how many Venezuelans have arrived on the island, as the Curacao government has not issued statistics to give an idea of how big (or small) the problem is. An article in a Dutch newspaper stated that “between five and ten thousand Venezuelans” may be on the island, but a reliable source in Curacao explained to the author that this estimation sounds exaggerated. (Then again, according to a 19 May article by the Curacao Chronicle, Aruban Prime Minister Evelyn Wever-Croes similarly said that “there are already about 5,000 refugees who reached the island [Aruba] via plane or boat.”) Thus a problem that hinders this analysis is understanding how many Venezuelans are on the island nowadays, though it is safe to argue that just a few thousand individuals can drastically alter the social and economic fabric given Curacao’s small area (171 square miles) and its population of around 159 thousand as of 2016, according to the World Bank.

A major concern is how will Curacao bear the cost for providing refugees and migrants with basic assistance. According to Lesley Fer, Risk Management & Disaster Policy Director for Curaçao, “the government will have to pay about 250 guilders per day per refugee. This is for basic costs such as food and housing, which also includes medical care, education and employment.” Willemstad is looking to external donors, namely The Hague, for financial support to expand infrastructure and be able to help the accepted refugees – this will probably strain relations between the island and the kingdom.

Unfortunately, people have perished as they tried to reach Curacao, as a boat carrying refugees capsized in January, killing at least four. Since they do not have legal documentation to stay on the island, Venezuelans could also be abused, and there are many reports that Venezuelan women are working in the island’s brothels. Finally, as we have witnessed in Europe with the flow of North African and Middle Eastern refugees, this sudden influx of Venezuelans may promote hate crimes in the island.


As the economic and political crisis in Venezuela continues, we can expect more Venezuelans to go abroad in search of a better life. Curacao will likely remain an objective, thus it is critically important for Willemstad and The Hague to come up with a humane and comprehensive immigration policy.

Final Thoughts
While the international media focus is, understandably, on the future of PDVSA and its impact on the Isla Refinery, the two other issues discussed in this commentary are important because of their potential consequences, both positive and negative.

For example, if Damen can upgrade and expand the infrastructure of DSCu, the shipyard could become a new source of income for the island. On the other hand, we can expect a greater number of Venezuelans risking their lives to reach the island in the near future as the situation in their homeland continues to deteriorate. These individuals must be treated in a humane and respectful manner while also taking into account Curacao’s limitations.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Tuesday, February 20, 2018

Interviewed / entrevista: EEUU compra gas a Rusia: "Es una de las grandes ironías de la geopolítica mundial"


"EEUU compra gas a Rusia: "Es una de las grandes ironías de la geopolítica mundial"


Telescopio
Sputnik Mundo
¿Por qué, a pesar de las sanciones, Estados Unidos mantiene los lazos comerciales con los gobiernos de Nicolás Maduro en Venezuela o Vladimir Putin en Rusia? La pregunta alude a la reciente compra de gas ruso ordenada por la administración Trump para paliar la ola de frío en su país. El analista Alejandro Sánchez nos explica por qué.
 
"Es una de las grandes ironías de la geopolítica mundial que Estados Unidos siga comprando gas ruso, a pesar de las tensiones y de las investigaciones que el Gobierno estadounidense lleva a cabo con respecto a (NdR: la supuesta injerencia rusa) las elecciones de 2016, a pesar de los conflictos por Siria y Ucrania, y de las sanciones que impuso a oficiales del Gobierno ruso", apuntó el analista internacional Alejandro Sánchez.

Se refería a la primera de dos compras de gas ruso por parte de la administración de Donald Trump, con el objetivo de mantener el flujo del producto ante una ola de frío que ha llevado las temperaturas por debajo de los 20 grados centígrados en algunas zonas del país. La compra se realizó mediante triangulaciones de barcos y de empresas de terceros países para evitar la relación directa con el país sancionado, además de tocar varios puertos antes que el de Boston.

"Se vería muy mal para el gobierno de Trump que un buque con bandera rusa atraque en la ciudad de Boston trayendo gas licuado", señaló Sánchez y agregó: "Por eso tuvo que haber triangulación por Europa… hubiera sido un arma política para los demócratas, que sostienen que su Gobierno está en colusión con el de Rusia", señaló Sánchez.
 
En este mismo sentido, el experto comparó esta situación con lo que ocurre entorno a la construcción del gasoducto Nord Stream 2 desde Rusia hasta Alemania.

"Hay algo de falta de concordancia con las sanciones que Europa y EEUU han impuesto a Rusia y la propia política energética europea, porque tanto Europa como Alemania necesitan del gas ruso para satisfacer el creciente consumo de energía. Mas ahora que Europa está dejando de usar el carbón y en 2022 Alemania cerrará su última central nuclear".

Wednesday, October 12, 2016

CIMSEC: The UNCLCS Ruling and the Future of the Uruguayan Navy


"The UNCLCS Ruling and the Future of the Uruguayan Navy"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
October 12, 2016
The Southern Tide
Center for International Maritime Security
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/unclcs-ruling-future-uruguayan-navy/28738


The Southern Tide
Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.
“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.
By W. Alejandro Sanchez
Uruguay’s continental shelf control has been extended to 350 nautical miles. On 30 August, the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) ruled in favor of the South American nation’s request to extend its maritime territory by83,000 square kilometers. While this is a major diplomatic victory for the Uruguayan government, the new territory will need to be properly patrolled, which means additional pressure on theUruguayan Navy that currently operates with an aging fleet.
The author of this commentary argues that Uruguay’s new maritime territory should be a starting point for a greater discussion about the future of its Navy, both in terms of its future fleet composition and missions.  
A Brief History
It is important to stress that the Uruguayan military has not been in an inter-state conflict in over a century. Its last major confrontation was the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870). In the 20th century, Uruguay supported the Allies in World War II (the 1939 Admiral Graf Spee incident occurred in Uruguayan waters). The only other major challenge to Uruguayan sovereignty occurred in the late 1960s to early 1970s when Uruguayan security forces battled the Tupamaros, a local insurgent movement.
In the 21st century, Uruguay has only had one small international incident. Between 2005-2010, the Uruguayan and Argentine governments had a diplomatic and legal dispute regarding the construction of a pulp mill in the Uruguay River, which serves as a border between the two states. Even though no conflict ever occurred, former Uruguayan President José Mujica famously declared in 2011 that he had contemplated the possibility of a war with Argentina over the pulp mill and had met with his military’s commanders about possible scenarios.
The Navy’s Current Platforms
Nowadays the Uruguayan military, and the Navy in particular, is in a dire state given limited budgets which prevent the acquisition of new heavy platforms.
In August, Admiral Leonardo Alonso, commander of the Uruguayan Navy, declared that the fleet has 12 operational sea platforms. The fleet composition includes a Joao Belo-class frigate, the ROU Uruguay; two Kondor II-class minesweepers, the ROUTemerario and the ROU Audaz (the ROU Fortuna was retired in 2014); the oceanic patrol vessel ROU Maldonado the support vessels ROU General Artigas and ROU Vanguardia. Additional vessels include the tugboat ROU Banco Ortiz; the oceanographic ship ROU Oyarvide; the ROU Sirius; and the patrol boats ROUColonia, ROU Rio Negro, and the ROU Paysandu. According toUruguayan media, the average age of the fleet is 50 years (e.g. the Joao Belo frigate was constructed in the late 1960s).

A strongly worded op-ed in the daily El Observador op-edpublished on 20 August, provocatively titled “Who Needs the Armed Forces?” stresses how the Navy is “bankrupt, not only because of its aging fleet, its lackluster training and small budget, but due to corruption scandals in recent years that have affected the morale.”
For the past couple of years, the Uruguayan military has attempted to purchase modern offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), which will be the cornerstone of the future fleet. The Navy has apparently selected Lurssen’s OPV 80 model and reportedly plans to procure three platforms in a deal which will cost an estimated USD $250 million. To date, no contract has been signed yet as the government appears to lack sufficient funds to purchase the vessels. 
The Uruguayan Navy has been lobbying the government for new funds and the approval of the OPV-deals in order to properly monitor the country’s growing sea. Admiral Leonardo Alonso has declared to the Senate that on any given day the Navy detects around 350 ships in Uruguayan waters “but we only see the ones that wish to be detected, which have their equipment on and are identified by our sensors,” which means that the country is vulnerable to “piracy, maritime accidents, pollution, drug trafficking, smuggling, and illegal fishing.” In an e-mail interview with the author, an Uruguayan naval officer explained that “in Uruguayan waters there is an average of 200 vessels (cruising or anchored) carrying out different tasks. This volume means that without proper control of maritime traffic, the probability of accidents and incidents escalates.” The officer also highlighted the necessity of a coastal surveillance network for Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) to aid the activities of the (yet to be acquired) OPVs and their support helicopters.
While this analysis is focusing on the Uruguayan Navy’s platforms and equipment, it is necessary to briefly mention personnel woes. The Uruguayan officer explained to the author that it is also vitally important “to retain our personnel and prevent a migration to the private sector as they seek salary improvements.” The problem of preventing qualified military personnel from migrating to better paid (and less dangerous) positions in the private sector is an issue that affects many militaries across the world.
The UNCLCS Ruling
It is in this problematic situation that the UNCLCS’s ruling enters the equation. Montevideo first requested the UNCLCS to expand its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in 2009. “Uruguay has a special interest in expanding its continental shelf rights since it is currently involved in the search for oil and gas in the so called Punta del Este basin,” explained a September 2009 report byMercoPress.
According to Uruguayan media, a Uruguayan delegation met with a UNCLCS commission 21 times to argue its case between 2011 and 2015. The aforementioned naval officer also highlighted the role of the oceanographic vessel Oyarvide and the Navy’s Oceanographic, Hydrographic, and Meteorological Service in contributing to the case made to the UNCLCS.
In 2016, Uruguay presented its case to the plenary of the UNCLCS and the Commission decided in favor of Montevideo’s request to expand its continental shelf to a total of 350 nautical miles on 30 August. According to IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, “the new territory grants mineral and resource rights over the continental shelf (sea floor) but it does not grant fishing rights over the new area.” Meanwhile, the Uruguayan daily El Observador explains that the country now has more maritime territory than dry land.
The UNCLCS’s decision has been a massive victory for the administration of President Tabaré Vázquez. In fact, the Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rodolfo Nin Novoa, has declared “nobody can do anything [in these waters] without Uruguay’s authorization.” The minister’s statement was perhaps too bold as the aforementioned Admiral Alonso has highlighted the problematic situation of the Navy while Defense Minister Jorge Menendez has stressed the need for USD $250 million to upgrade the fleet (namely to acquire the OPVs).
One Possible Way Forward
The expansion of Uruguay’s continental shelf should serve as a starting point for a discussion about the future of its Navy. Given the lack of an external security threat (the author has discussed South Atlantic geopolitics in a 17 February commentary for CIMSEC, “How Peaceful is the South Atlantic?”), particularly as the pulp mill diferendum with Argentina appears to have been solved, the Uruguayan armed forces have had to reinvent themselves in recent decades to justify their existence. Case in point, the country is a major supplier of peacekeepers to the United Nations – as of 31 August, Uruguay has a contingent of 1,457 troops participating in UN peacekeeping missions.
Regarding the Navy, its current and future challenges are transnational and irregular in nature. Rather than worrying about the Brazilian nuclear or Scorpene submarines appearing on its coast, the major maritime security threats include drug trafficking, illegal fishing, maritime pollution, as well as search and rescue operations.
Illegal fishing is a major problem for governments around the world, and the South Atlantic already has the precedent of the March incident between the Argentine Coast Guard and an illegal Chinese fishing fleet that highlights the need for a well-equipped and modern fleet that can chase and detain (or sink, if violence is necessary) illegal fishing vessels. To this point, the Uruguayan dailyEl Pais has noted that the country’s waters have fish species like merluza (a cod-like fish), the pescadilla (whiting) and the corvina, which must be protected from illegal fishing.
Another task for the Navy’s future will be to protect future oil platforms that may be constructed in Uruguay’s maritime waters. As a matter of fact, France’s Total company (with U.S. ExxonMobil and Norway’s Statoil as partners) has been looking for oil in Uruguayan and South Atlantic waters, though unsuccessfully so far. The South Atlantic does not have a piracy problem in the sense of oil platforms being at risk of criminal attack. However, if aDeepwater Horizon-type accident were to occur in one of these new wells, the Navy must have capable vessels able to rescue workers in peril and contain potential oil spills and other destruction. It is worth noting that just in late September the aforementioned Audazand Artigas had to assist the Fortune Harmony, a tanker that had a fire aboard while 20 miles off Piriapolis, Uruguay.

For these operations, the Navy requires new sea platforms, namely OPVs, to support and eventually replace the antiquated vessels it currently operates,  as well as a coastal monitoring network. While this author is not qualified to properly discuss the training of Uruguayan naval officers as well as the budgetary issues, the problem of preventing well-trained personnel from migrating to the private sector affects the Uruguayan Navy like in other defense forces across the world.
Final Thoughts
Proper surveillance of the extended continental shelf is a critical task for the Uruguayan Navy and will be the cornerstone of its maritime strategy going forward. Incidents like the March clash between Argentina and illegal Chinese fishing vessels (illegal fishing), or the recent Fortune Harmony incident (disasters at sea and possible pollution) are reminders of why it is a priority for a nation with a large continental shelf to have a modern fleet capable of adapting to different scenarios.
With that said, Uruguay’s history and current South Atlantic geopolitics argue that the possibility of inter-state warfare is minimal. Hence, Uruguay must upgrade its Navy, not just in terms of new platforms, radars and helicopters, but also its mission in the 21st century.
Alejandro Sanchez Nieto is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.
The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Wednesday, February 17, 2016

CIMSEC: How Peaceful is the South Atlantic?


"How Peaceful is the South Atlantic?"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Center for International Maritime Security
February 17, 2016
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/21903-2/21903

Admiral Eduardo Bacellar Leal Ferreira, commander of the Brazilian Navy, gave an interview to the Uruguayan daily El Paísthis past December 2015. The Admiral optimistically declared that “today there is no ocean more peaceful than the South Atlantic, there are no tensions that cannot be solved. We have problems in the Malvinas [Falklands] or in the Gulf of Guinea, but there are no wars. This is the only ocean where the major powers do not have warships.” This statement is an ideal starting point for an in-depth discussion of South Atlantic geopolitics.
A Conflict-Less Ocean?
Due to space issues, we cannot discuss in detail every South Atlantic maritime conflict. Nevertheless, the Brazilian Admiral is incorrect to declare that the only regional disputes are the Falklands/Malvinas and the Gulf of Guinea. A total list includes:
  • The Falklands/Malvinas: Argentina claims these islands, currently controlled by the United Kingdom (the two countries had a brief war in 1982). In 2013, the inhabitants of theFalklands held a referendum in which they voted to remain part of the UK – Argentina does not recognize the ballot.
  • Ghana and Ivory Coast: The two countries have a dispute over offshore oil drilling along their border. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) gave an interim ruling in 2015 but a final decision is not expected until 2017.
  • Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo: In 2014, the Angolan government attempted to redraw the maritime border with the DRC in order to gain control of some 200 additional miles. The two countries have contested their border since the 1970s.
  • Equatorial Guinea and Gabon: The two countries claim theMbanie, Cocotiers and Congas islands since the early 1970s. It is believed that there are underwater oil reserves around those islands.
Preventing War
In spite of the aforementioned maritime disputes, Admiral Ferreira is generally correct when he praises the peacefulness of the South Atlantic. After all, the last confrontation in the region was the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War.
Even more, war has been successfully prevented in other disputes: in 1978 Papal mediation helped avoid a war between Argentina and Chile in the Beagle Channel, where the Pacific and Atlantic oceans meet. Moreover, the dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula was solved via international ruling – in 2006 the two governments signed the “UN-backed Greentree Agreement[which set] the terms and timeframe for the implementation of the 2002 ruling of the [International Court of Justice], which transferred the Bakassi Peninsula from Nigeria to Cameroon.” The list of successfully mediated disputes could grow if ITLOS manages to resolve the Ghana-Ivory Coast issue or if the UN’s current mediation efforts between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are fruitful. In other words there are plenty of examples that highlight the peacefulness of the South Atlantic.
Certainly, there is always the possibility of an unforeseen “X factor” that could jump-start a war. The battle over precious resources like oil is a likely reason as most of these conflicts have to do with control of maritime areas where large deposits of oil are believed to be located. In the case of Argentina, there is a high degree of patriotism over the Falklands/Malvinas themselves, but the recent discovery of new oil deposits by Rockhopper is another reason for Buenos Aires to desire control over them. This scenario is also plausible on the African side of the Atlantic. An October 2015 report by the Institute for Security Studies entitled “Why Africa must resolve its Maritime Boundary Disputes,” argues that “the location of oil fields and natural resources deposits can result in considerable complications when states unilaterally determine and apportion exploration blocks that infringe upon areas of disputed ownership by a neighboring state.”
Should other sources of state-revenue dry up, governments may become more willing to engage in a war, or at least aggressively push for negotiations, over any of the aforementioned maritime disputes.
New Navies But For What?
In a 2011 essay for Small Wars & Insurgencies, I argued that South America was involved in an arms race. The situation has changed in 2016, particularly among the South Atlantic states. For example, the Brazilian Navy continues with its ambitious programs, in spite of its economic woes, which include the construction of a nuclear-powered submarine, four Scorpene subs, and repairing its Sao Paulo carrier. Furthermore, in late 2015 Brazil purchased the multipurpose vessel TCD Siroco from France – it has been renamed the G-40 Bahia. Nevertheless, these purchases have not made Brazil’s neighbors perceive it as a security threat, as Uruguay’s Navy has not carried out major purchases in years while Argentina has only repaired the submarine ARA San Juan and purchased four Russian vessels that will be utilized for search and rescue operations and Antarctic research. Neither Montevideo nor Buenos Aires appear to expect an invasion from the Portuguese-speaking giant.

As for the African South Atlantic states, Equatorial Guinea commissioned a frigate, the Wle Nzas, in June 2014. “This warship is the flagship of the Equatorial Guinea Navy and it will [help] to ensure security in the Gulf of Guinea,” said President Teodoro Obiang Nguema. Meanwhile Gabon has ordered two offshore patrol vessels from KERSHIP, a joint-initiatives of PIRIOU and DCNS (though a January report by DefenceWeb argues that the contract may have been deferred). As for Nigeria, it constructed the NNS Andoni in 2012; “with a speed of up to 25 knots (46km/h), this can quickly go to intercept the pirates,” said Commanding Officer Adepegba. The country also acquired a patrol vessel from China in 2014. Finally, the Angolan government announced in late 2015 that it will purchase “two fast-attack naval craft and several coastal radar and repeater station systems worth €122 million from two subsidiaries of Italy’s Finmeccanica.”
As has been discussed in various analyses, due to the general inter-state tranquility of the South Atlantic, regional navies are looking for a new raison d’etre. Protecting natural resources and non-traditional security threats are the standard reasons. Without a doubt, Africa’s West coast continues to have a major problem with piracy, including the hijacking of transport ships, so it is in the interest of regional governments to have strong navies to monitor their waters. As for protecting natural resources within a country’s Exclusive Economic Zone, this includes both oil exploration as well as combating crimes like illegal fishing. Nevertheless, while African states have valid reasons to upgrade their naval forces, Brazil has a more difficult case regarding its projects. Without addressing the nuclear submarine or carrier by name, in his interview with El País, Admiral Ferreira argues that Brazil must maintain a deterrent force to protect its natural resources, “we have [offshore] oil fields, and if there is an energy crisis it is necessary to deter anyone from coming to Brazil to take our resources.” While there is an obvious logic to the Brazilian Admiral’s statement, it is unclear exactly who is this enemy that requires a nuclear-powered submarine to defeat.
Global Powers
Finally, Admiral Ferreira argued that no world power has vessels in the South Atlantic. That is generally true, particularly since 1986, when the United Nations created the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone, which declares that the South Atlantic is a nuclear weapons-free zone.
Nevertheless, warships from the global powers routinely cross the South Atlantic; just this past April 2015, the USS Spearhead arrived in Gabon and carried out exercises with the local navy as part of theAfrica Partnership Station. “During our visit, we’ll conduct marine-to-marine training along with medical subject matter expert exchanges, thus helping build a stronger Global Network of Navies,” said Commander Matthew Flemming. In May of the same year, the French offshore patrol vessel L’Adroit docked in Cape Town. As for the other side of the Atlantic, the USS America visited Brazil in 2014 while the aforementioned French OPV L’Adroit docked in Uruguay in mid-February 2016. Furthermore, apart from the Falklands, London also controls South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands. Moreover, the British-controlled Ascension Island was a strategically important stopover for British warships and transport vessels during the Falklands War.

Hence, Admiral Ferreira’s declaration is a slight overstatement. While there are no British battle groups patrolling the Falklands nor does the U.S. Navy have a fleet stationed in Ascension Island (though the U.S. Air Force does utilize an auxiliary field there), global powers do have a constant presence in the South Atlantic’s waters.
A South Atlantic NATO?
Even though Admiral Ferreira did not discuss South Atlantic integration, it is important to mention that that the two sides of the Atlantic have increased defense ties in recent years. For example the ATLASUR naval exercises bring South American and African navies together, while Brazil and South Africa (along with India) have carried out the IBSAMAR exercises.
Nevertheless, calls for greater South-South cooperation have not ended in some grand new maritime defense initiative. The aforementioned exercises are important, but neither Brazil nor South Africa, the two powerhouses of the South Atlantic, have taken major steps to bring together all these navies towards some common objective (i.e. forming a trans-oceanic task-force to combat maritime crimes). The region already came together in 1986 with the SAPCZ and there is already a modern precedent for various countries attempting to deal with maritime affairs – namely, the African Union’s “2050 Africa’s Integration Maritime Strategy,” which will address (and ideally solve) the continent’s maritime issues, such as border disputes. We have yet to see the South Atlantic capitalize on its general peacefulness to address non-traditional defense problems.
Final Thoughts
Brazilian Admiral Ferreira is generally correct by praising the peacefulness of the South Atlantic. Of course, an unforeseen incident could occur or a series of decisions within a government that prompts it to decide to start a war with a neighboring state. The possibility of petro-money is an enticing reason to engage in violence, particularly as this non-renewable commodity becomes scarcer in the near future or, as the aforementioned ISS report explains, “maritime boundary disputes, many long dormant, are increasingly exacerbated by a growing interest in exploring and exploiting natural resources.” Nevertheless, the region can praise itself for having avoided inter-state war in spite of several border disputes.
Currently, the South Atlantic’s maritime security issues revolve around cracking down on piracy, drug trafficking and protecting natural resources (like oil deposits and the maritime ecosystem). Robust navies, including coast guards, are an obvious requirement, but there is a thin line that separates obtaining equipment that is needed (like Argentina purchasing search-and-rescue vessels or Angola buying crafts) to other whose usage is questionable (i.e.,  Brazil’s acquisition of a nuclear submarine).