Showing posts with label peace. Show all posts
Showing posts with label peace. Show all posts

Friday, August 7, 2026

Geopolitcal Monitor: "Istanbul 2.0? Kazakhstan Steps into the Ukraine War Diplomatic Arena"

 


 

"Istanbul 2.0? Kazakhstan Steps into the Ukraine War Diplomatic Arena"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Geopolitical Monitor

Opinion

7 August, 2026

Published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/istanbul-2-0-kazakhstan-steps-into-the-ukraine-war-diplomatic-arena/ 

 

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has no end in sight, as military operations by both sides continue deep in enemy territory. The war may have become a new textbook definition of intractable conflict. Since first breaking out in February 2022, several diplomatic attempts have been rolled out to bring a peaceful resolution, without success.

Now Kazakhstan is throwing its proverbial hat into the ring.

Monday, November 21, 2022

Geopolitical Monitor: "The DRC: Threats and Opportunities in a Complex Neighborhood"


 "The DRC: Threats and Opportunities in a Complex Neighborhood"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Situation Reports

Geopolitical Monitor

21 November, 2021

Originally published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/drc-foreign-policy-threats-and-opportunities-in-a-complex-neighborhood/

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has appointed the president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Félix Tshisekedi, as the mediator in Chad after a wave of violence hit the African nation in October. The designation was the culmination of a busy October for the Congolese leader, who carried out several international trips to neighboring countries and the United Kingdom and received high-profile delegations. The high-profile meetings occur amid tensions between the DRC and Rwanda over the crimes committed by Rwanda-supported M23 militants. Now more than ever, Kinshasa needs allies.

 Continue reading...

Friday, September 10, 2021

The Diplomat: UN Mission to Afghanistan Relocates to Kazakhstan

 

"UN Mission to Afghanistan Relocates to Kazakhstan"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

The Diplomat

10 September, 2021

Originally published: https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/un-mission-to-afghanistan-relocates-to-kazakhstan/

As the world adapts to a “new” Afghanistan, there is much work to be done to help Afghans in need. From its temporary base in Almaty, UNAMA will continue to work toward this goal.

Continue Reading...

Tuesday, December 8, 2020

The Diplomat: Kazakhstan Aims to Increase Participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions

 

 


 

"Kazakhstan Aims to Increase Participation in UN Peacekeeping Mission"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Crossroads Asia 

The Diplomat

December 8, 2020

Originally published: https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/kazakhstan-aims-to-increase-participation-in-un-peacekeeping-missions/

 The additional troops won’t be deployed until 2022 and it’s not clear where they will be stationed.

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev recently announced his intention to deploy additional Kazakhstani military personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKOs).  The Central Asian nation has significantly increased its participation in PKOs in recent years by sending over 100 contingent troops to the U.N. mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Nur-Sultan appears to be keen to continue this trend.

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Wednesday, July 15, 2020

The Diplomat: Kazakhstani Blue Helmets in Lebanon


"Kazakhstani Blue Helmets in Lebanon"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez


The Diplomat
Crossroads Asia
15 July, 2020
Originally published: https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/kazakhstani-blue-helmets-in-lebanon/


Exploring Kazakhstan’s contribution to the UN Peacekeeping force in Lebanon, a landmark for the Central Asian state.







Originally published...

Sunday, September 15, 2019

FPIF: The View from Syria’s Peace Talks

"The View from Syria’s Peace Talks"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez.
Foreign Policy in Focus
September 13, 2019
Originally published: https://fpif.org/the-view-from-syrias-peace-talks/

 

Eight years since its inception in 2011, the Syrian civil war rages on, a conflict that has taken on grand geopolitical dimensions and resulted in tens of thousands killed and a massive exodus of refugees. While other tensions and conflicts around the world have since grabbed the attention of major media outlets, the situation in Syria has not gotten any better. If anything, it has become even more complicated and violent.



Keep Reading...

Monday, January 21, 2019

Geopolitical Monitor: DRC Elections and the Fate of the UN MONUSCO Mission

"DRC Elections and the Fate of the UN MONUSCO Mission"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Geopolitical Monitor
Opinion
21 January 2019
Originally published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/drc-elections-and-the-fate-of-the-un-monusco-mission/


The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) held long-awaited general elections on 30 December to replace President Joseph Kabila, who has ruled the country for almost two decades. The results were controversial: opposition candidate Felix Tshisekedi was declared the winner, but another candidate, Martin Fayulu, has cried foul, stating that he is the rightful winner and that Tshisekedi’s victory is a result of a pact between him and Kabila. At the time of this writing the Constitutional Court has reportedly confirmed Tshisekedi’s victory.

While this new political crisis hits the African nation, one question that should be asked: What will be the future of the UN mission to the DRC, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO)?

The Elections
The population of the DRC and the international community in general have waited for fair presidential elections in the African nation for a long time, not to mention a peaceful transfer of power. President Kabila took control of the country when his father, President Laurent Kabila, was assassinated in 2001. The young Kabila would then rule until today, presiding over a transitional government when the Second Congo War ended, and winning elections in 2006 and 2011, which were marked by controversy. The country was supposed to hold new elections in 2016 and Kabila was constitutionally barred from running again, but the polls were ultimately postponed, as Kinshasa argued that ongoing violence in the East, a lack of funds to organize the elections, and insufficient time to update the voter registry prevented the government from holding them. 

Elections were then supposed to occur on 23 December 2018, only to be postponed once again, and they finally took place on 30 December.
According to election officials, “Mr Tshisekedi received 38.5% of the vote, compared with 34.7% for Mr Fayulu. Ruling coalition candidate Emmanuel Shadary took 23.8%,” the BBC explains. “Fayulu has alleged that Tshisekedi’s win was the result of a backroom deal between Tshisekedi and Kabila that allows Kabila to maintain control over important ministries and the security services,” Al Jazeera reports.

There is widespread concern about the elections and the future of the country, with entities like the Southern African Development Community and other international organizations either requesting a recount or calling for calm in the African nation. The African Union has requested Kinshasa to suspend the announcement of final election results, which the DRC government has denied, insisting that the Constitutional Court’s assessment of the vote’s legality is impartial. It remains to be seen whether the international community will recognize Tshisekedi’s apparent victory – analysts that follow African affairs should monitor which heads of state and diplomatic delegations attend his swearing-in ceremony, which is “scheduled for Tuesday, January 22, according to the latest calendar of the National Independent Electoral Commission (Céni),” AfricaNews reports.

Discussing MONUSCO’s Future
It is in this scenario that MONUSCO continues to operate in the DRC. The UN Security Council, via Resolution 2409 (2018), extended MONUSCO’s mandate until 31 March of 2019, with a ceiling of “16,215 military personnel, 660 military observers and staff officers, 391 police personnel, and 1,050 personnel of formed police units,” including an Intervention Brigade. According to data provided by UN Peacekeeping, as of 31 December 2018, MONUSCO has 15,366 UN contingent troops; 1,364 UN police officers; and 263 staff officers, making it the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world. As for the mission’s mandate, Article 31 of Resolution 2409 explains that MONUSCO’s priorities are 1) protecting civilians; and 2) supporting the implementation of the 31 December 2016 agreement to hold elections.

The critical question that must be addressed is: What is MONUSCO’s future? Should it commence a withdrawal from the country or continue operating there?
There is no consensus on MONUSCO’s future among experts as the situation in the DRC is so complex. On the one hand, the country did hold elections, which fulfills one of the mandate’s objectives; however, the polls were controversial to say the least, and violence has already occurred as the population takes to the streets. Scott Morgan, a long-time analyst of African affairs, argued to me that “the uncertainty of the presidential polls could lead to violence regardless of which candidate is declared the winner. Having the mission remain to monitor the situation is crucial at this time.”  Moreover, violence in the Eastern part of the country continues, and the “situation in Burundi is not expected to show any improvement in the near future. The repatriation of FDLR fighters to Rwanda is another issue that needs to be addressed.” To make things even worse, as if that were possible, there is a new Ebola outbreak to deal with, and there have been over 600 reported cases and 368 deaths as of early January.

UN peacekeepers could be a key player in handling these challenges, particularly as the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) “either lack the capacity or the will to address these issues,” Morgan concludes, not to mention that the national police and the FARDC are guilty of plenty of crimes themselves. “Women and children are often kidnapped, frequently for the purpose of sexual exploitation, with rapes and gang rapes committed both by armed groups and sometimes by the army,” a UN report explains.

Alas, the mission’s own record so far is hardly ideal, considering widespread evidence of peacekeepers involvement in sexual abuse, human rights violations, corruption, or failing to protect Congolese civilians even though they are mandated to do so.

In a co-authored article entitled “Yes, MONUSCO Needs To Stay in the DRC,” published by the International Policy Digest in May 2017, Scott Morgan and I argued that, in spite of MONUSCO’s many, many shortcomings and flaws, it should stay in the DRC. Moreover, the mission’s troops should receive clearer mandates and orders about supporting and protecting Congolese civilians from violence and abuse. When I asked an African expert whether MONUSCO should stay in the DRC, the blunt reply I received was: “to do what? They do not protect civilians right now, so why should they stay?” The expert also argued that MONUSCO’s mandate needs to be more forcefully implemented by the blue helmets in the ground.

Other experts have argued that it is time for MONUSCO to leave, but in an orderly, well-planned, and structured fashion. This may have to occur anyways, as, given its size, MONUSCO is an expensive operation and the United States, among many other countries, are not paying their dues to the UN. One possibility is that the mission can be transformed into a political mission or a police one – akin to the UN mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH, which became MINUJUSTH.

Finally, it is important to mention that a key factor that will influence the future of MONUSCO is the attitude of the new president toward implementing rule of law, transparency and security in the country. Relations between MONUSCO and Kabila were often tense, so we will similarly have to monitor the new government’s attitude toward the UN mission.

MONUSCO Is Trying
To be fair, MONUSCO has attempted to improve the situation in the DRC. For example in May 2018, the UN mission inaugurated “several projects in support of victims of sexual exploitation and abuse” in the North Kivu area. On 17 January, a vocational training center project for ex-combatants and young people at risk was launched, which was funded by the UN mission. Additionally, “MONUSCO has provided support to the Ebola response since the beginning of the outbreak through the provision of logistical support, office facilities, transportation, communication, and security,” the World Health Organization explains.

Even more, MONUSCO personnel have lost their lives trying to make the African nation a better place. According to UN data, the mission has suffered 167 fatalities; in one incident this past November 2018, six Malawian and one Tanzanian peacekeepers, in addition to several FARDC troops, were killed in Beni territory, North Kivu, while carrying out joint operations against a rebel movement called Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).

Final Thoughts
It goes without saying that the UN Security Council will renew MONUSCO’s mandate for another year, however what is debatable is whether the UNSC will order a downsizing of the mission as a sign that it is time for MONUSCO to leave. Tragically, the country continues to face several challenges, including political instability. Thus, the weeks ahead will provide an idea of whether the DRC can have a peaceful transition of power and what this means for the future of the UN mission in the African nation.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues. @W_Alex_Sanchez.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Monday, September 17, 2018

IPD: Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: Building Peace as a Legacy

"Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: Building Peace as a Legacy"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
International Policy Digest
17 September 2018
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/09/17/kazakhstan-s-foreign-policy-building-peace-as-a-legacy/


The Kazakh government hosted a gathering of the Group of Eminent Persons (GEM) and the Youth Group of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in late August 2018, during which Astana declared its intention to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Even though Kazakhstan does not possess nuclear weapons, this, mostly symbolic, initiative highlights the Kazakh government’s intention to promote regional (and global, in the case of nuclear weapons) peace. While Astana has not been particularly successful in this endeavor, nowadays good intentions still count.

Recent Initiatives

In recent years the Kazakh government has carried out a number of diplomatic initiatives to promote peaceful resolutions to conflicts.

The major examples include:

In mid-August 2018, a meeting was held in Aqtau. Kazakhstan, which brought together the presidents of the five nations that border the Caspian Sea: Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan. A 24-article agreement was signed which apparently signals the end of a dispute of how this body of water will be divided among the five governments.

Kazakhstan is a non-permanent member of the United Nation Security Council for 2017-2018, the first Central Asian state to achieve this membership. The country also held the UNSC’s rotating presidency in January 2018.

During the aforementioned hosting of the GEM and CTBT meetings, Kazakh Foreign Affairs Minister Kairat Abdrakhmanov declared: “we call on states to declare their support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Kazakhstan signed the TPNW on March 2, 2018, and is currently preparing for its ratification.”

In 2013, Kazakhstan hosted peace talks on Iran’s nuclear program, and in 2017, the country hosted peace talks to compliment the Geneva process regarding the Syrian conflict.
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has supported Eurasian integration, which culminated in the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union. The Kazakh regime has also supported the idea of establishing a Central Asian Union.
The Kazakh government is educating Afghan medical students so that they can return to their homeland and contribute to its development.

Finally it is worth noting that Astana has attempted to become a mediator in the Ukrainian conflict, though Belarus was not pleased about this as it already hosts the Minsk Process.

In declarations made on October 2017, Yerzhan Ashikbayev, Kazakhstan’s deputy foreign minister, summarized his government’s attitude towards mediation. The official stated that “we really believe in the power of dialogue…If countries, if conflicting parties feel better here, in the windy climate of Astana, they are welcome to come…If Kazakhstan can be of any practical assistance to achieving this noble goal, we are ready.”

Why Peace?
What is Kazahstan’s interest in peace-building and conflict mediation? One obvious reason is that a peaceful region benefits Kazakhstan. The Central Asian state is located in a particularly unstable area with security threats emanating out of Afghanistan, it is also close to Iran and is sandwiched between China and Russia. Promoting a military solution to the several disputes in Astana’s greater neighborhood (i.e. control of the Caspian Sea) will likely be counter-productive; hence it makes sense to promote peaceful initiatives. This would also help Astana’s reputation and international status grow, which have already helped the country obtain UNSC membership.

Another reason has also to do with improving the country’s image due to domestic issues. Kazakhstan has been governed by President Nursultan Nazarbayev since achieving independence from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s; the country’s elections are regularly condemned by the international community for their lack of transparency and democracy. After almost three decades in power, it is expected that President Nazarbayev, age 78, may leave power soon and he will likely want to leave behind a legacy of peace-building that can make up for his extended time in power and accusations of human rights abuses in his country.

The Kazakh regime’s motivations notwithstanding, the ultimate question is whether these pro-peace initiatives have been successful. Tragically the conflict in Afghanistan and Syria continues the future of Ukraine rests in Moscow; moreover, there is little interest by nuclear powers to give up their weapons of mass destruction (at the time of this writing, it is pointless to be optimistic about North Korea’s program).

With that said, there are reasons to be tentatively hopeful that the dispute over the Caspian Sea may be resolved – this would be a big step forward towards regional integration and cooperation, though, depending on how the final settlement is written, extra-regional powers like the U.S. may be the big losers. Similarly, the new regime in Tashkent is opening up to the rest of Central Asia and the world: an Astana-Tashkent alliance of sorts would be the cornerstone towards greater integration among the five Central Asian states.

Final Thoughts
A pillar of Kazakh foreign policy is promoting peace across Central Asia and even in more distant conflict areas. While its record and motivations are questionable, Astana’s ultimate objective is commendable.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.


Thursday, December 21, 2017

Providence: Colombia and the FARC: Problems with Creating Peace


"Colombia and the FARC: Problems with Creating Peace"

W. Alejandro Sanchez

Providence Magazine: A Journal of Christianity and American Foreign Policy

18 December 2017

Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2017/12/colombia-and-the-farc-problems-with-creating-peace/

The peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia: FARC) is slightly over a year old, and while the peace is holding and violence has dramatically decreased, there are a number of issues that will continue to be a concern from a practical and moral perspective. This commentary will briefly discuss some of them.

The “Missing” Insurgents
Any peace agreement that includes full demobilization must ensure that all insurgents lay down their weapons and return to civilian life. The first part of demobilization appears to have been achieved, as the United Nations mission in Colombia has overseen the FARC’s disarmament: 7,132 weapons have been retrieved from the insurgents.

The outstanding issue is the fate of the insurgents themselves. The number of FARC insurgents who surrendered via the peace deal and are now in camps is reportedly around 6,900. One major concern, obviously, is that if the demobilized insurgents are not reintegrated fast enough into civilian life, they may feel inclined to return to criminal activities. In fact, according to late-October reports by the Colombian media, some 800 fighters have not agreed to the peace deal and continue their illegal, violent activities (the number may actually be higher depending on what Colombian news outlets are consulted).

This situation is not new: last decade Bogota brokered a peace agreement with the paramilitary movement United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia: AUC). In a scenario similar to what is occurring today, many paramilitaries demobilized, but a number went on to create narco-criminal gangs (commonly known as Bandas Criminales: BACRIM), like the dreaded Aguilas Negras. The obvious fear is that the situation could repeat itself once again with the FARC.

Peace Over Victory
Another issue with the peace agreement is an ethical one: if the Colombian government was able to successfully bring an end to a five-decade war via peaceful means, did it not have the moral obligation to do so and prevent further loss of life?

At this point, it is worth mentioning a couple of facts about the FARC: its number of fighters has drastically diminished, from a high of an estimated 16,000 in the late 1990s to around 7,000 today (not counting those in prison). Nevertheless, in recent years the group maintained its fighting power, regularly attacked security units (11 soldiers were killed in an ambush in 2015), and protected its territory while profiting from drug trafficking and “taxing” mining companies, among other activities.

Certainly, an argument could be made that, since the FARC leadership was open to dialogue, this probably meant that they saw themselves on the losing side of the war. Thus, the Colombian military could argue that the agreement was unnecessary as they could have defeated the FARC militarily if the war had continued.  With that said, there was no real indication, at least from the author’s perspective, that the Colombian security and defense forces were close to dealing a devastating blow to the FARC when negotiations commenced in 2012. If anything, the FARC proved to be adaptable, able to overcome the loss of its leadership (e.g. the controversial 2008 airstrike in Ecuador that killed FARC leader Raul Reyes) and to continue fighting. The Colombian defense forces could have, probably, militarily defeated the FARC, but it would have certainly taken years with further loss of life for both sides as well as civilians—the conflict has already cost an estimated 220,000 deaths between 1958-2012, according to Colombian statistics.

Since a government’s primary duty is to protect its citizens, and there was no clear indication that the FARC could be militarily defeated in the near future without further significant loss of life (including civilian), there is a moral argument to be made in favor of the peace agreement.

Peace Over Justice?
Colombians have also had to deal with whether the peace agreement signifies amnesty for the insurgents. According to media reports citing Colombian government data, Bogota has granted amnesty to so some  6,000 FARC fighters as of July 2017, while 1,400 have been released from prison and granted conditional liberty. As part of the peace process, the FARC fighters were (only?) accused of crimes such as illegally carrying weapons and military uniforms, not actually taking part in attacks or murders, and they had to sign documents stating that they will not carry out any criminal activities again.
Understandably, there is debate about whether individuals accused of murder or drug trafficking have been given amnesty too as part of the peace agreement. For example, there are conflicting reports about whether a FARC leader, known as Jesús Santrich, has been granted amnesty.

Certainly, the fact that most insurgents will not serve jail time (or be released from it) is a bitter development to those who fought the FARC or suffered due to it. On the other hand, it would be absurd to believe that any insurgent movement would have agreed to demobilize in exchange for its members serving (lengthy) prison sentences.

The amnesty, a minimum government salary for a number of months, and representation in congress with 10 guaranteed seats—the FARC is now a political party—is the price the Colombian government had to pay for the peace. An insurgent movement like the FARC had to have some “wins” in order to be convinced to be demobilized, and the government’s challenge has been to find a balance between how much the FARC could get in exchange for peace and how much was ethically (and politically) acceptable to grant.

Final Thoughts
The issues discussed here are some of the most problematic Colombia faces regarding the post-conflict era. Certainly, there are others, such as the fate of land controlled by the FARC and if it will be returned to its previous owners, and financial retributions to the victims of the conflict.
However, the author chose the aforementioned three issues because they provide a good overview of the challenges to peace that Colombia faces. Full demobilization is a utopia, and it was to be expected that some insurgents would continue their activities. The challenge now is to bring them to justice while preventing more demobilized fighters from taking up arms again. Additionally, we have discussed the morality of making peace with an insurgent movement. This is a controversial initiative, but if there is a reason to believe the insurgents will respect the deal, isn’t it necessary in order to save lives?

—
W. Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez

The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.



Monday, October 30, 2017

Journal: Can Governments Negotiate With Insurgents? The Latin American Experience




"Can Governments Negotiate With Insurgents? The Latin American Experience"
W. Alejandro Sanchez and Erica Illingworth
Small Wars & Insurgencies
Volume 28, 2017 - Issue 6 - P. 1014-1036
Originally Published: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2017.1374607

Please contact me if you would like a free eprint of this essay.

Abstract
In June 2016, the Colombian Government and the FARC insurgent movement signed a ceasefire agreement, which brings the two sides one step closer to putting an end to over five decades of war. Unfortunately, Latin America has a rich history of insurgent movements, particularly during the cold war era, some of which continue to operate today. Most of these movements disappeared due to military operations, though some did so via peace negotiations. This essay aims to discuss the various ends of Latin American insurgencies to answer whether, indeed, insurgents can be negotiated with.


Keywords: Latin America, insurgency, terrorism, internal conflict, cold war, FARC, ELN, Shining Path, conflict resolution, hurting stalemate

Monday, August 28, 2017

Peru to join UN Security Council in 2018



Peru to join UN Security Council in 2018
W. Alejandro Sanchez & Brittney Figueroa
Living in Peru
August 1, 2017

Originally published: https://www.livinginperu.com/peru-join-un-security-council-2018/

Peru will become a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the 2018-2020 period.

The Andean nation will join the Council’s other new members, Equatorial Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kuwait, and Poland, starting 1 January 2018.

Peru is no stranger to the UNSC, as it has served as a member on four occasions so far: 1955-1956, 1973-1974, 1985-1986, and 2006-2007. In other words, the country is part of one of the most important bodies of the United Nationsalmost once a decade, a significant accomplishment of the Peruvian diplomatic corps over the years.
The timing of Peru’s election could hardly be more relevant, as the global body is facing a number of security-related crises and issues which will require all 15 members to work in harmony to achieve long lasting solutions.  At the global level, crises like the wars in Iraq and Syria and their repercussions, particularly the immense number of internally displaced people as well as refugees seeking a better life in Europe, means that the UNSC will have to work in coordination with regional governments, international agencies, and other UN bodies.

In addition, the UNSC may have to adapt to doing more, or the same, with less, as US President Donald Trump’s 2018 Budget Plan proposes to reduce the funds Washington pays to the UN.

The US is the UN’s top contributor, providing 22% of the core budget and 28.5% of the peacekeeping budget, hence the diminution of financial support of the organization could make its current and future operations that much harder. In fact, the US government has already commenced a review to decide whether or not to continue funding each of the UN’s 16 current peacekeeping missions.  Should cuts take place, it will be up to the UN Secretary General, the UNSC, and the General Assembly to address this troubling scenario in order to continue the good work the UN carries out around the world.
Presently, Peru has deployed military personnel to eight peacekeeping missions.
t is important to note that at the hemispheric level, the UN will have two new peace missions, the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), which will replace the current MINUSTAH mission in Haiti beginning this October, as well as a political mission that will oversee the peace and reintegration process in Colombia now that the conflict with the FARC insurgents has ended.
Most notably, the Andean nations’ military just withdrew the last of its troops that were part of the mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH. Currently, the country’s largest contribution is a company of engineers in the UN mission in the Central African Republic, MINUSCA, which constructs and maintains roads and airfields.

Even at the individual level, it is worth noting that Peruvians have made valuable contributions to the UN’s bureaucracy.

The most well know example is prominent Peruvian Javier Perez de Cuellar who served as the UN Secretary General (1982-1991). During his tenure, Perez de Cuellar was very involved in the Contadora Peace Process in Central America, among other initiatives. As for other notable Peruvians in the UN Tarcila Rivera an indigenous leader, was elected as a representative to the UN’s Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2016. Another noteworthy individual is Gladys Acosta Vargas, who has collaborated with the UN Research Institute for Social Development and is currently a member of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2015-2018).
This initiative probably played an influential role in the transcendental 2015 COP climate change conference in Paris.
As for participation in other UN agencies, Peru is one of the 54 current members of the UNECOSOC(UN Economic and Social Council), which focuses onissues such as health, poverty, food security, and humanitarian aid to refugees. Additionally, in 2015, the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA), a joint effort by the two nations to bring together state and non-state actors to work in cooperation against climate change, launched a website in anticipation of the then-upcoming 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21).
Peru’s membership in the UNSC during the 2018-2020 period means that Lima will be a kite in a metaphorical storm, as the UN faces a number of troubling challenges, particularly the anticipated drastic budget constraint proposed by the US. In spite of the UN’s uncertain future, this new term at the UNSC nomination should make Peruvians proud and will offer the Andean country an ideal stage to demonstrate its commitment to global progress and how Peru can be a positive actor at the global level.
Also read Alejandro Sanchez, “Pax Inca: Why is Peru Not a Regional Powerhouse in Latin America?” Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales. 2013. (PDF Available here)
Alejandro Sanchez Nieto is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.
Brittney J. Figueroa is a recent graduate of the University of California, Santa Barbara with a Bachelors degree in Global Studies, and a Minor in Latin American Iberian Studies.
The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the authors are associated.

Friday, January 20, 2017

Providing for Peacekeeping Project: Peru Profile (Update)



"Peru Profile"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Updated version, January 2017
Providing for Peacekeeping Project




Part 1: Recent Trends
As a founding member of the UN, the Republic of Peru has maintained a continuous interest in contributing to UN peacekeeping operations. For decades, Peru has deployed personnel from its security agencies (Army, Navy, Air Force and the Police) to over 20 UN missions. The three major Peruvian deployments have been to the UN missions in Israel (after the 1973 conflict) and the ongoing operations in Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where Peru has deployed hundreds of military personnel. Peru has also recently contributed to the UN mission in Central African Republic, MINUSCA. Peruvian contributions to other operations have been generally small, mostly military observers and small numbers of troops.
A Brief History
Peruvian military personnel have been deployed to 20 UN operations. The first mission in which Peru participated was the UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958. It also had a large contribution to the Second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II) and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Middle East after the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict. The Peruvian military contingent was deployed both in the Sinai Peninsula between Israeli and Egyptian forces, and then to the Golan Heights between Israeli and Syrian forces. The Peruvian deployment lasted two years and totaled 497 troops (with occasional troop rotations).
In recent years, its largest deployment has been to the to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) since its creation in 2004. The deployment, known as Compañia Peru, has some 200 troops. According to official data, over 5,000 troops have been deployed to MINUSTAH over the course of over 20 rotations. In January 2016, Peru sent a first deployment of 250 troops, known as the Compañia de Ingeniería Peru (an engineer company), to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). A second deployment, this time of 205 troops, occurred in January 2017.
Peruvian officers have also achieved senior command status within UN operations. For example, Brigadier General Gastón Ibáñez O’Bríen of the Peruvian Army served as commander of the Brigada Norte of UNEF II, placing him in charge of the Peruvian contingent as well troops from other nations. Moreover, in 1992 Brigadier General Luis Block Urban became commander of the UN forces in MINURSO. Additionally, in 2008 Rear Admiral Mario César Sánchez Debenardi was appointed as Force Commander of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).
Official publications like Peru’s 2005 White Book, published by the Ministry of Defense, as well as the ongoing major deployment of troops to MINUSTAH, which now include female military personnel, and MINUSCA demonstrate a current interest from both the Peruvian government and armed forces in being part of the UN peacekeeping operations. In fact, Chapter VII of the 2005 White Book encourages Peruvian participation in these operations, as it is regarded as a way for the South American nation to promote its international presence, while at the same time providing real-life training for its security personnel.
Peru has participated in peace operations almost exclusively through the UN. The one exception is Peru’s participation in the Military Observer Mission Peru-Ecuador (MOMEP). The mission was created after a brief conflict in 1995 between Lima and Quito over a territorial dispute between the two South American states. MOMEP’s goal was to observe the ceasefire between the two countries leading up to a final demarcation of the disputed border.
A Peruvian peacekeeping training center was created in 2003, known as Centro de Entrenamiento y Capacitación para Operaciones de Paz  (CECOPAZ). Located in Ancón, north of Lima, this training center prepares Peruvian military, police and civilian personnel for deployment to UN missions, as well as the training of senior officers to become military observers. CECOPAZ courses are not just for Peruvian personnel; the center regularly carries out courses to train military observers from regional states (i.e. a 2012 course included officers from Argentina, Colombia and Ecuador).

Part 2: Decision-Making Process
Decisions for military deployment abroad are fundamentally political, originating from the President of the Republic of Peru in his capacity as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The Peruvian president is the policymaker responsible for signing the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Peru and the United Nations through which Lima agrees to deploy troops to a UN peacekeeping operation. This pledge is then approved by the Peruvian Congress via legislative resolutions and ratified by Supreme Decrees. The Peruvian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Joint Command of the Armed Forces are then tasked with organizing the personnel that will be deployed (i.e. choosing the most-qualified troops) and any necessary logistics (i.e. transportation and determining the necessary military equipment). The Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Economy and Finance provide support as needed.
Legislation that addresses Peru’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions includes the Decreto Legislativo N°1134 of the Ministry of Defense as well as Decreto Legislativo N° 1136 of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces. The MoD’s Directive is important as it explains the duties of the Peruvian Ministry of Defense, which prominently feature peacekeeping operations. For example, Article 5, section 25, explains that the MoD has the duty of consolidating and maintaining international peace. Meanwhile, Article 10, section 15, explains that the MoD and the MFA will supervise and foment the participation of Peruvian security personnel in peace operations. Likewise, Article 4.7 of the Joint Command’s directive explains that it is tasked with “planning, coordinating and carrying out the participation of the armed forces in peace operations.”
Furthermore, a significant development was the 2005 publication of Peru’s White Book of National Defense, which described the Andean nation’s defense priorities and objectives. The book was published during the presidency of Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) and is an important achievement as it is the first time Peru has published a White Book. Moreover, Chapter VII of this document addresses Peru’s advocacy regarding participation in peace operations (see Part 3).

Part 3: Rationales for Contributing
National prestige: The Peruvian government and military regard participation in UN peacekeeping operations as a way to promote the country’s image abroad and to increase its international pedigree. Chapter VII of Peru’s White Book explains that participation in UN peacekeeping missions:
“Constitutes one of the objectives of our foreign policy and is of national interest, as it also provides an opportunity for the Peruvian government to have a relevant role in the international arena. Furthermore, [participation in UN peacekeeping missions] increases the high level of professionalism of the personnel of the defense sector. This participation in peace operations promotes international cooperation and confidence building mechanisms.” [Translation by the author.]
In addition, the Peruvian government and military are interested in providing UN peacekeepers to showcase the training and professionalism of their armed forces to the rest of the world. This is best exemplified by the events and ceremonies that are regularly organized by the Peruvian government and armed forces, in which the military’s participation in UN peace missions is highly praised. For example, senior Peruvian military officers gave a speech in during the 2009 ceremony in Lima to celebrate the UN Peacekeeper Day (May 29). Then-commander of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, Army General Francisco Javier Contreras Rivas explained that “because of [the] capacity of the Peruvian soldier, the United Nations looks to … our country … because our soldiers of peace are men [and women] that work for a better world.” In May 2013, the Peruvian Ministry of Defense carried out a ceremony in CECOPAZ to honor soldiers that have participated in UN peacekeeping missions. Deputy Minister of Defense and Rear Admiral Sánchez Debernardi, who was the force commander to UNFICYP, highlighted the “professionalism” of the Peruvian troops. Such praise has been echoed by UN officials.
In other words, the leadership of the Peruvian military sees its participation in peace operations as a source of national prestige.
Economic rationales: The Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Economy and Finance are in charge of working out budgetary details regarding the international deployment of Peruvian troops. The allowances received by security personnel deployed in UN missions are significantly higher than the regular wages they would receive in Peru. Hence, the possibility of an additional salary via the UN serves as an incentive for Peruvian military personnel to apply to UN peace missions. The Peruvian government does not keep a portion of the money paid to its troops by the UN.
Security Rationales: These are not relevant as there are no UN peacekeeping missions near the country (the closest being MINUSTAH in Haiti).
Institutional rationales: These operations are regarded as an effective way to train Peruvian troops in different environments that they may not necessarily encounter at home. These institutional interests are exemplified by the creation of CECOPAZ to prepare troops for these missions (i.e. MINUSTAH and MINUSCA). According to its website, CECOPAZ’s mission is to train military, police and civilian personnel, as well as providing advice to the Joint Command of the Armed Forces in the realm of peace operations.
Participation in UN missions is also regarded as a confidence-building mechanism, as Peruvian troops form friendships and close relations with soldiers from other countries, both during deployments and during the pre-deployment training sessions. For example, Peru has built military relationships with Argentina and Chile on this basis. In October 2008, Peru and Argentina created a binational company of engineers, known as “Libertador Don Jose de San Martin,” aimed at carrying out operations in MINUSTAH. A December 2011 directive (called a Resolución Suprema) by the Peruvian MoD authorized a trip by a military delegation from Lima to Buenos Aires to take part in further negotiations regarding the future of the company, but this author has been unable to find more recent information regarding this initiative.
In addition, during a May 2013 meeting in Lima, the ministers of defense and foreign affairs of Peru and Chile, known as the Reunión 2+2, discussed the possibility of creating a binational unit of military personnel for UN peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, as of early 2017, this unit has yet to be formed, most likely due to recent diplomatic tensions between the two governments over a maritime border dispute that was judged by the International Court of Justice (a ruling was made in January 2014).

Part 4: Barriers to Contributing
Strategic Priorities: This is best exemplified by ongoing rotations of military personnel to MINUSTAH since 2004 and MINUSCA since 2016. A critical factor that may affect current and future deployments is the internal security situation in Peru. The country is still battling a narco-terrorist movement called the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso). The insurgent group has weakened and fractured compared to its heyday in the 1980s. Currently, Sendero is split into two factions and has suffered several major losses in recent years, including the capture of its last remaining leaders.Sendero is believed to have only a few hundred fighters left, nevertheless, the narco-movement remains active and occasionally carries out attacks against Peruvian security forces (an April 2016 ambush by Sendero resulted in the deaths of 10 Peruvian soldiers).
In general, there is a lack of sufficient security personnel, both for the armed forces and police, to carry out their duties (i.e. internal security and to serve as a deterrent force). This is a source of concern for the population as the country still has to tackle internal security threats such as Sendero Luminoso and drug-trafficking criminal syndicates. While Peru does not possess drug-trafficking entities as widespread and powerful as those in Mexico, it is now regarded as the largest producer of cocaine in the world, making operations to combat cocaine production and smuggling a high priority. The country is also experiencing an increase in street crime (i.e. robberies and kidnappings).
Hence, it is a priority of the Peruvian government to increase its security forces to tackle the aforementioned domestic threats. This is best exemplified by a law that the Peruvian government tried to enact to create a military lottery, essentially a draft to increase the size of the armed forces. In June 2013, the Peruvian Supreme Court of Justice suspended the proposed law after complaints by the Public Defender and protests by civil society and opposition politicians who argued that the law is discriminatory. In addition, former President Humala has declared that the Peruvian police, which numbers about 106,000, has a deficit of around 30,000 officers. In other words, a major caveat to greater participation in UN peacekeeping is the current lack of sufficient security personnel that can adequately address Peru’s internal security challenges.
Resistance in the military: This is not relevant. Several senior military officers have declared themselves in favor of Peru’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions.
One major reason for this sentiment is that, in spite of operating in conflict zones, there have been no significant losses among Peruvian peacekeepers. Three soldiers lost their lives in 1974 during the deployment to UNEF II due to an antipersonnel mine while another soldier was lost during the UN mission in Mozambique, ONUMOZ. Most recently, a peacekeeper in MINUSTAH perished due to health issues in 2016. The minimal fatalities suffered in peace operations to date helps maintain support among the military leadership.
Damage to national reputation: This is also not relevant. Even though MINUSTAH had controversial origins, namely the overthrow of Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide in 2004, there has not been particular concern that Peru’s reputation will be damaged by participation in this mission. In addition, Peruvian peacekeepers have not been involved in human rights violations or other crimes during their deployment. The Peruvian media regularly publishes articles praising the participation of Peruvian personnel in UN peace missions (i.e. in the 1970s in the Middle East and currently in MINUSTAH and MINUSCA).
Difficult domestic politics: There has never been a national debate, either among the general public or among policymakers in the Peruvian Congress, regarding the country’s role in UN peacekeeping missions.
Absence of pressure: There has not been any pressure by international organizations or governments or the Peruvian military directed at the Peruvian government to either participate, or avoid participation, in UN peace missions.

Part 5: Current Challenges and Issues
The Peruvian government maintains a positive disposition towards providing peacekeepers. Nevertheless, security barriers remain a critical issue that arguably prevents a greater deployment of Peruvian troops to UN peace missions. As mentioned in Part 4, internal security remains a concern, given the ongoing operations of Sendero Luminoso and other drug trafficking syndicates (Peru is currently regarded as the world’s biggest producer of cocaine).
Regionally, Peru maintains generally good relations with four out of its five neighbors: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador. Tensions remain, however, with its southern neighbor, Chile, which date back to the 19th century War of the Pacific. In 2014, the International Court of Justice helped resolve a maritime border dispute between the countries. It is also important to highlight that tension between Peru and Chile cannot be overstated. While the two countries have generally strong trade relations and have carried out confidence-building mechanisms such as the attempts to create a binational military unit, distrust between the two governments, militaries and societies remains. Media articles and analytical reports were regularly published discussing whether one country could go to war with the other over maritime claims, while arms acquisitions by either side are viewed with concern.
With regard to the economy, Peru has enjoyed a positive decade, which supports the deployment of troops to UN missions. In addition, as noted above, military officers are interested in participating in UN missions, in part, for the additional UN allowances. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that Peru’s financial good fortunes are very recent. Factors like the Peruvian financial crisis of the 1980s and the slow economic jumpstart in the 1990s undermined Peru’s ability to produce military hardware, provide training and even the appropriate number of personnel. In recent years, there has been a program to acquire new platforms (including a new satellite, PeruSat-1, for its space program and a new training vessel for the Navy) but this has occurred at a slow pace. Moreover, the country still has internal security threats and, from the Peruvian perspective, an external one. Hence, the defense mindset among Peruvian policymakers and security officers is that additional personnel are needed first and foremost to safeguard the homeland.

Part 6: Key Champions and Opponents
There are no major policymakers or military officers who are particularly supportive or opposed to Peruvian participation in UN peacekeeping missions. Former President Ollanta Humala (2011-2016), a former military officer, has praised the participation of Peruvian security personnel in UN missions. The current head of state, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski has not reportedly made any major declaration for or against participating in UN missions. As previously mentioned, General Block, a former MINURSO force commander, has written articles in favor of Peruvian participation. Nevertheless, it would be an overstatement to label Presidents Kuczynski, Humala, or General Block as “champions” of Peru’s participation in UN peace operations.
Other senior policymakers occasionally visit Peruvian deployments to UN missions. For example Peru’s Defense Minister, Pedro Cateriano, visited the Compañia Peru in Haiti in December 2012, and expressed his support for Peruvian participation in the operation.
No Peruvian policymakers or military officers have made public declarations against Peruvian participation in UN peacekeeping missions. Apart from occasional mentions in talk shows and other discussion panels by security experts, Peru’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions has never been a controversial topic. This issue was not addressed in the debates over foreign policy and defense during the recent 2016 elections where President Kuczynski was elected. It is worth noting that in spite of the tragic loss of a number of Peruvian peacekeepers, a debate has not materialized within the Peruvian government or the general public to reconsider the country’s provision of UN peacekeepers.
The lack of a discussion regarding Peru’s role in peace operations exemplifies not only the lack of an opposition to these missions, but also the lack of interest or knowledge about them by the government and the citizenry in general. Events like the 2010 earthquake in Haiti raised the profile of Peru’s contribution to MINUSTAH, and, as mentioned before, the Peruvian media regularly publishes (brief) reports about Peru’s participation in UN peace missions. But increasing the country’s role in UN peace missions does not seem to be a priority for policymakers or military leaders in Lima.

Part 7: Capabilities and Caveats
Peru’s contributions to UN peacekeeping have increased in the past years, with a particular focus in MINUSTAH and, as of 2016, MINUSCA. At the time of writing, overall contributions close to 400 personnel are large for Peru. Nevertheless, MINUSTAH’s mandate is scheduled to finish on 15 April 2017. It is unclear if the Peruvian government will offer to join another mission with a large deployment of contingent troops, or if MINUSCA will remain the sole peace operation in which Peru will have a major participation.
It is worth noting that female Peruvian military personnel have also been deployed to MINUSTAH. This development was featured in a January 2011 article in Diálogo magazine, published by the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).
As a final point, it should be clarified that while Peru has a substantial number of helicopters, they have not been deployed to UN peace missions. The one exception occurred during the Alberto Fujimori regime, but this transaction was marred by money laundering allegations. Russia recently concluded the delivery of a new fleet of 24 Mi-171Sh helicopters, however the platforms will probably be utilized for internal security operations rather than to be deployed to the UN. Peru has sent construction equipment to MINUSCA, as the engineer company is in charge of the construction and maintenance of roads and landing strips for planes and helicopters.

Part 8: Further Reading
Comando Conjunto de lasFuerzas Armadas. 50 Años al Servicio del País: 1057-2007. El Comercio (Peru). Suplemento Contratado. May 10, 2007.
Gaetano Guevara Bergna, “Observador Peruano en Sudan,” Revista del Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas (Peru), Año 2, No. 2 (Sept. 2008): 43-47.
Christian Sánchez Campos,Batallón Especial “Peru:” Una Misión Singular, Actualidad Militar, Ejército del Peru, Ministerio de Guerra (Peru), No.219, Separata, April 1976.
  1. Alejandro Sánchez,Peacekeeping and Military operations by Latin American militaries: Between being a good Samaritan and servicing the national interest (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Report, January 22, 2010).
  2. Alejandro Sanchez, Misiones Singularmente Complicadas: El Rol de Peru en las Operaciones de Paz de las Naciones Unidas, Perspectivas, Vol.2 (July 2014): 7-19.


Notes
[1] Unless otherwise stated, data is drawn from IISS, The Military Balance 2016 (London: IISS/Routledge, 2016).
[2] The IISS figure of 114 helicopters likely includes a sizeable number of helicopters that are no longer operational or are limited to training uses. A more accurate estimate of helicopters currently in operation by all three branches of the armed forces is 47.
[3]Armed Forces Spending is a country’s annual total defense budget (in US dollars) divided by the total number of active armed forces. Using figures from IISS, The Military Balance 2016.