Showing posts with label personal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label personal. Show all posts

Friday, October 27, 2017

IWP: Alumnus Spotlight: W. Alejandro Sanchez, International Affairs Analyst



Institute of World Politics
October 26, 2017
Originally published: http://www.iwp.edu/news_publications/detail/alumnus-spotlight-w-alejandro-sanchez-international-affairs-analyst


In this interview, we speak with W. Alejandro Sanchez, IWP Class of 2007. Alejandro is an international affairs analyst who focuses on geopolitical and defense issues in the Western Hemisphere.
How did you become interested in international affairs/national security? 
My father is a colonel (now retired) in the Peruvian Army, and several of my relatives have also been part of the Peruvian armed forces (my godfather is a retired general etc). Hence I grew up learning about the Peruvian military, the country's internal security problems (back in the 1980s and early 1990s we had two terrorist groups, Shining Path and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) as well as South American geopolitics. I wouldn't say that I became interested in international relations and defense issues but rather that such issues have been part of my life for as long as I can remember.
What attracted you to IWP?
A decade ago, IWP had some signs in the DC metro, and I remember seeing one and decided that I would check it out. 
I had almost finished my M.A. degree, but I felt like I wanted to keep on studying and learn more perspectives about security affairs and global geopolitics. So I wrote down IWP's name and website on a notebook (this was just before smartphones came out), checked out the course catalog, and liked the courses that were offered. I also attended one of the open houses and found the staff and faculty very friendly, so I decided to apply.
IWP's location was another factor that convinced me to attend, as I work in the Dupont area, so commuting was pretty easy.
What was the most interesting thing you have learned at IWP? Did you write any papers or take any classes that you particularly enjoyed/were useful? 
Two classes I remember taking were Geography and Strategy with Professor Marek Jan Chodakiewicz and Chinese Grand Strategy with Professor Ross Munro. I really enjoyed the course on China, as I had never taken one just about said country before, and it really opened my eyes to Chinese foreign policy. I have written some pieces on China's relations with Latin America and Caribbean relations for several outlets, and it really helped me to take such a class to understand Beijing's vision and objectives.
As for the Geography class, I remember that we had to do a term paper, and I decided to go outside my area of expertise and I picked the Golan Heights. My paper discussed their importance from military and political perspective. I researched it so much that I decided to write a letter to the editor to the Jerusalem Post to provide my opinion about the importance of the Heights. And it was published! I remember adding the letter to my paper.
This success helped me gain confidence to write pieces on topics other than Latin America and the Caribbean.
Did studying at IWP change your thoughts about international affairs or national security?
I like to think that I'm open minded and willing to have my opinions changed, particularly when it comes to geopolitics, which is all about perspectives. At IWP, I certainly learned new points of view and opinions that I had not been exposed to in other places where I studied. Even if I do not agree with a point of view regarding international affairs, it's important for me as an analyst to be aware of it so I know how other individuals regard a particular issue. 
What do you feel are the most impactful actions/decisions you have made so far in your career? 
 I would say, writing about topics that could be considered obscure but are important geopolitically. I realized that to stand out as an analyst, I couldn't just write about the same issues everyone else was writing about, particularly as there are people much smarter than me (quite a lot of them) that analyze the same geographical regions as I do. So rather than writing about country X or problem Y that were on the news, I'd do some of that but also write about other areas. And it paid off!
Once I did a report on the role of Latin American militaries in United Nations peacekeeping operations, as my father was a Peruvian peacekeeper during the Yom Kippur War.
After the report was published, a professor contacted me saying he had read my piece and he invited me to write an essay for him, as he was the guest editor of an issue of the journal Globalizations. Of course I accepted, and I wrote about Brazil's role in the peacekeeping operations in Haiti and East Timor. I realized the literature out there, particularly in English, about Latin America's role in peacekeeping is very limited, so I started writing more pieces. Eventually, I became a member of an initiative called Providing for Peacekeeping: I did a profile of Peru's role in peacekeeping operations and I became their "Peru expert." I've also been invited to be a peer reviewer for a couple of journals on articles that discuss peacekeeping, and recently I co-authored a piece about MONUSCO, the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with an analyst friend of mine who focuses on African affairs, as he has read my work on peacekeeping. 
It's pretty amazing the opportunities one gets from having an idea that's different.
What are your plans for the future?
I've thought about applying for a PhD program, as I think I have done enough articles, including various essays in books and peer-reviewed academic journals, that demonstrate that I'm a serious analyst and scholar. 
Additionally, I've thought about writing a book, though I have yet to find a topic that I can write 300 pages or more about and that would be of interest to publishers and readers.
What is a piece of advice you would give to members of the IWP community interested in joining the national security field? 
Considering all the different jobs and activities that fall under the umbrella term "national security," it is difficult to give a one-size-fits-all type of advice. 
I would say to those that want to be national security analysts (which includes a lot of intelligence/information gathering, analysis and writing), recognize you that your first draft will never sound like Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. You can write the best analysis imaginable, but if it has spelling/grammatical mistakes, your boss will be mad at you - I've seen reports lose credibility fast because the author kept writing "Columbia" instead of "Colombia" or the author mistook Paraguay for Uruguay. Always take the time to edit whatever you just wrote.
In your opinion, what is the strategic importance of Latin America and the Caribbean to the US? 
While I certainly acknowledge the tensions Washington has with countries like Venezuela these days, the truth is that the vast majority of Latin American and Caribbean states have cordial relations with the U.S. and want to maintain them, if not increase them.  While in other regions of the world, there is concern about U.S. military presence for example, most regional governments would actually welcome more U.S. security aid, particularly to combat transnational crimes like drug trafficking. I've read several posture statements by the commanders of Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) that repeatedly state how said agency has the lowest priority among the other Commands. I certainly understand the reason for this situation, as Latin America does not have nuclear weapons or major military powers that could threaten the U.S. or its allies (actually most Latin American governments can be regarded as U.S. allies!). Hence, I understand that this regional stability allows Washington to focus on more problematic areas of the world. 
With that said, the U.S. is part of the Western Hemisphere, this country has significant trade relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, a growing number of U.S. citizens have Latin American or Caribbean descent, and most regional states are reliable U.S. allies.
Moreover, since the region is not at risk of some violent conflict (Mexico's internal struggle with cartels notwithstanding), this means that the U.S. does not need to deploy major military resources and assets to protect its allies. Economic aid, greater support to combat transnational crimes, educational scholarships, public diplomacy initiatives, visits by the USS Comfort to communities in need, fairer trade agreements, or more regular visits by senior officials can go a long way to show to Latin America and the Caribbean that Washington recognizes their importance and values their support.

Tuesday, April 19, 2016

Presentation: U.S.-Western Hemisphere Relations - The Obama Legacy

"U.S.-Western Hemisphere Relations - The Obama Legacy"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Presentation
Miami University (Ohio). Washington  DC Program.
February 3rd, 2016

Sunday, July 26, 2015

Presentation: Is Cuba a U.S. National Security Threat in 2015?



"Is Cuba a U.S. National Security Threat in 2015?"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Senior Research Fellow, Council on Hemispheric Affairs

"Charting a Course for Cuba"
The Washington Center
Track | International Affairs
July 24, 2015


Saturday, July 18, 2015

Presentation: "U.S.-Western Hemisphere Relations And The U.S.-Cuba Rapprochement"


"U.S.-Western Hemisphere Relations and the U.S.-Cuba Rapprochement"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Senior Research Fellow, Council on Hemispheric Affairs

July 15, 2015
American University, Washington Semester Program


Thursday, June 25, 2015

Presentation: Colombia - Drones & Security


"Los Drones y la Seguridad en Latinoamerica"
Presentacion via Skype
Conferencia en la Escuela de Postgrados de la Policia - Policia Nacional de Colombia
Bogota, Colombia
Junio 24, 2015




Thursday, June 4, 2015

Presentation: " A Brief Overview of U.S.-Western Hemisphere Relations"


" A Brief Overview of U.S.-Western Hemisphere Relations"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Senior Research Fellow, Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Miami University (Ohio)
June 4, 2015


Thursday, April 9, 2015

Interview: Cuba: Obama is much more popular than Castro brothers. Why?

"Cuba: Obama is much more popular than the Castro brothers. Why?"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Interview
Matisak's Blog (A Stamp on the World)


According to one published poll US President Barack Obama is much more popular in Cuba than Castro brothers. Why would you say it is so, how would you read the mood of Cubans out of it?Read few comments.
W. Alex Sanchez, Research Fellow, Council on Hemispheric Affairs
It would be bizarre to believe that in 2015 the population of an authoritarian state like Cuba would truly believe that the U.S. is “the enemy.” Sure, the internet does not have a widespread presence in the Caribbean island as in other countries, but it does have an impact. Additionally, relaxed travel rules allow for Cuban Americans to return to the island and tell their relatives that Washington is some kind of “evil empire,” that is prepared to invade their country.
Moreover, since his election, President Obama himself has been viewed positively by the Latin American masses. His handshake with President Raul Castro during Nelson Mandela’s funeral, while it may have been improvised and inevitable because the two leaders ran into each other and it would have been too awkward for them not to greet, was widely covered in Latin America, as a sign that Washington and Havana under Obama and Raul Castro could fix their historical differences.
Finally, this poll was taken in March, months after the historic December 2014 speech in which both governments declared their intentions to improve relations, so Obama has probably that going on for him.
I would say that this poll may be slightly bias. The Miami Herald explains that this was a “secret” poll taken from 1,200 adults without the knowledge and approval of the Cuban government. So one can only wonder if the support rates for Obama or disapproval for the Castros are in some way skewed even more because of the fear that some Cubans may have felt of getting into trouble for taking part of a secret poll.

Sebastian Arcos, Associate Director, Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University
Although I am not familiar with the methodology used in this poll –and therefore cannot take its validity for granted- I am not surprised by this particular result. Cubans see  in President Obama what they would like to see in their own leaders: Obama is young while most of the Cuban leadership is older than 80; Obama is black-like a majority of Cubans are- while the Cuban leadership is overwhelmingly white; Obama is accountable to the media and to a Congress controlled by the opposition party, while the Cuban leadership is accountable to no one; Obama is willing to give his enemies the benefit of the doubt, while the Cuban leadership calls its opponents “mercenaries” and “traitors” and will not even allow the Ladies in White to march in silence to church without harassment.
Cubans are tired of 57 years of sacrifices, scarcity, repression and propaganda. They need hope in their lives, and they are hopeful that the new policy implemented by President Obama will make their miserable lives a little easier. More than anything, that explains Obama’s popularity. Unfortunately, they will be disappointed.

Wednesday, March 25, 2015

New Title: Forum on the Arms Trade - Expert


March 25, 2015

Very honored to have been accepted as an Expert at the Forum on the Arms Trade.

"The Forum on the Arms Trade is a cooperative project of arms trade experts, currently managed by Jeff Abramson.

The Forum partners to host an array of events, as well as promote arms trade-related gatherings in Washington DC, including quarterly public events, a yearly Arms Trade Summit, and informal monthly conventional brown bag lunches where experts share their work in off-the-record discussions—an opportunity for ongoing professional development. Related, the Forum maintains a closed listserv for its members and interested individuals to communicate and discuss arms trade issues, built upon a pre-existing list that remained active after the hibernation of the Arms Transfers Working Group."

http://www.forumarmstrade.org/alejandro-sanchez.html

Alejandro Sanchez
Senior Research Fellow, Council on Hemispheric Affairs (website)
twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez     web: wasanchez.blogspot.com
email: wilder.a.sanchez [at] gmail [dot] com 

Saturday, September 8, 2012

El Comercio (Peru): Promesas y Ausencias





Promesas y Ausencias
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Analyst
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
El Comercio (Peru)
September 8, 2012

Sunday, August 26, 2012

Quote: S. America cybersecurity spend set to grow




 

S. America cybersecurity spend set to grow

UPI.com
Security Industry
August 24, 2012
Originally published: http://bit.ly/PGNyAZ

Cybersecurity products and services are geared for a major growth in Latin America between now and next year, with a surge in spending already in evidence, current industry data indicated.


SANTIAGO, Chile, Aug. 24 (UPI) -- Cybersecurity products and services are geared for a major growth in Latin America over the next year, with a surge in spending already in evidence, current industry data indicated.

Regional interest in cybersecurity has increased with rising development expenditure and multibillion-dollar government and private sector investment in high-value projects in aviation, defense, oil and natural gas, hydroelectric power generation, transport and border security.

Demand for high-end information technology, defense and security hardware and software has drawn international manufacturers, suppliers and security experts to Latin America.

The market for purchases of information technology goods and services by business and government will go through two transitions during the period, the Global Tech Market Outlook For 2012 and 2013 report predicted.

The report by Andrew Bartels identified Latin America as a major growth area alongside the Asia Pacific region.

"Fast growth in emerging markets like Asia Pacific and Latin America has partially offset a struggling Europe," Bartels said in the report. "Vendors will focus more on the potential of emerging markets in 2012."

South American buyers and vendors showed up in significant numbers at England's Farnborough Air Show, which brought together not only aviation and defense experts but also security industry businesses.

Subsequent shows in Brazil and Chile and a forthcoming event in Puerto Rico reinforced business leaders' view that Latin America would see further cybersecurity growth in the coming months.
Analysts said the industry was also seeing a major shift from older technologies like servers, routers and desktop computers to mobile devices, analytics and advanced software.

Latin American companies, with cash infusions from governments, especially in Brazil and Chile, have turned attention to acquiring technological capacity they can turn around and exploit as new avenues for business activity and exports.

Niksun Inc., a major U.S. manufacturer and provider in real-time and forensics-based cybersecurity and network monitoring solutions, announced it is hosting a customer and partner event next week in Puerto Rico as part of its strategy to position itself in Latin America and the Caribbean.

"Entering the Caribbean and Latin America region is part of our strategy to continue that growth. After all, cyberwarfare has no borders," Niksun Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Parag Pruthi said.
The company cited a Forrester Research study that said, "Fast growth in emerging markets like Asia Pacific and Latin America has partially offset a struggling Europe," and vendors would likely focus more on the potential of emerging markets in 2012.

A World Wide Security and Mobility Conference July 9-11 in Princeton, N.J., highlighted recent high profile cyberattacks that have cost industry and governments billions of dollars.

"The amount of money costing companies and governments from even a minor data breach is staggering," Pruthi said at the conference.

A report by the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, which has headquarters in Washington, noted Latin American awareness of cybersecurity risks is growing.

"While demonstrably the expansion of Internet usage (in Latin America) has not rivaled that of the United States, Europe, or some Asian states like South Korea and Japan, the growth of the Internet in the region continues at a steady tempo," said the report by W. Alex Sanchez, a research fellow at the council.

"Additionally, we are witnessing a rise in the importance of cybersecurity as cases of hacking and other cybercrimes proliferate," Sanchez added.

Read more: http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2012/08/24/S-America-cybersecurity-spend-set-to-grow/UPI-47501345836220/#ixzz24f62amCQ

Saturday, August 25, 2012

Interview: Ecuador, Julian Assange and the OAS

Topic: Ecuador, Julian Assange and the meeting held at the Organization of American States on August 24th
HispanTV
August 24, 2012

Thursday, August 16, 2012

Interview: Uncensored the Doc

Interviewed on Wednesday August 15 for an upcoming documentary entitled: "Uncensored."

Uncensored is a 70-minute documentary that recounts the lives of journalists during the most violent years of Colombia’s history. In the 1980s, Pablo Escobar’s narcoterrorism war tore the country apart and by 1985 Colombia had the highest murder rate in the world. Throughout the 1990s drug lords and corrupt government officials controlled the country. Those in power used intimidation tactics, kidnapping and murder to silence the courageous journalists who sought to expose corruption.

The documentary is sponsored by the Southern Documentary Fund.

Links:
http://uncensoredthedoc.wordpress.com/

http://southerndocumentaryfund.org/projects/uncensored/

 Temporary trailer
Uncensored Extended Trailer from Uncensored on Vimeo.

Friday, August 3, 2012

Cyber Arms Deals And Latin America In The Post-Stuxnet World



W. Alex Sanchez
Research Fellow, Council on Hemispheric Affairs
August 3, 2012
Forbes.com
Available: http://onforb.es/M8P7Hf

Guest Blogger, W. Alex Sanchez, Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, and participant in the International Cybersecurity Dialogue, introduces the issues surrounding cyber arms dealing, especially as they relate to Latin America.

 In a way, the Stuxnet virus is not that surprising. Washington and Tel Aviv, just like Washington and London, have a historical “special relationship;” hence it is not astounding at all that binational operations include defense-related initiatives, such as dealing with a common foe (in this case, Iran). But what kind of precedent has been set by this inter-state cyber initiative? And what can we expect in the future? Malware can be acquired online fairly easily as many websites allow hackers to upload basic malware programs for download. Usually these viruses target basic software like chat programs, cracking product keys for professional software like Windows or Adobe Suite, and Trojans that can be sent to infect other computers. There are also IP addresses where, for the right price, more sophisticated malware programs can be quickly acquired. But these exist in the (borderline) illegal part of the internet and several governments are already formulating laws to catch up to the ever changing virus technology. But what about the future of legal cyber weapons trade?

The trade of conventional weapons between nations is a multi-billion dollar industry that circles the entire globe because trading such expensive weapons as warships, battle tanks and missiles can be a lucrative economic activity. States like the U.S., Russia, China and Israel are major conventional weapons suppliers, but even states not usually known for their strong militaries make a generous profit from weapons manufacturing. For example, Sweden’s SAAB produces high quality missile systems, such as AT4 anti tank weapons. But even when it comes to conventional weapons trade, there are limits of how far countries are willing to sell others regarding destructive weapons and state-of-the-art technology. For example, for several years Russia has delayed the delivery of its modern S-300 defense system to Iran (though, the Israeli government argues the contrary). There are also several treaties, ratified by a plethora of states, that impose limits to the type of weaponry they will sell each other; although, unfortunately, some of them are not always upheld.

But when it comes to cyber weapons, the developed cyber nations have yet to adopt rules and place limits on what kind of software can be exchanged or sold either between nations or a private company and governments. For example, much has been written lately of the controversial spyware known as FinFisher, produced by the UK-based Gamma group, and how it may have been used by the government of Bahrain to help crack down on protesters in that Arab state.

As an international security analyst for the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, my focus centers on defense issues that relate to Latin America and the Caribbean. Hence, it is part of my job to see how the development of cyber security affairs in the Global North (which I regard as the U.S., Europe, Israel, Russia and China), will affect Latin America in the coming years. This becomes even more important when we take into account that Latin America continues to be a region that is plagued with inter-state tensions that, in a worst-case scenario, could end in inter-state warfare (though it is worthy to highlight that this has been thankfully scarce in the past decades). For example, there is an ongoing maritime border dispute between Peru and Chile (the two countries have been at odds with each other since a 19th century war), and occasional flares between Colombia and Venezuela (like after an incident in 2008 that included a Colombian military raid in Ecuador to attack a guerrilla base there, subsequently Caracas almost declared war against Bogota to protect Quito’s sovereignty). The point here is, while Latin America has been slow to come around to the cyber world, this is rapidly changing, and cyber security is catching on. For example, Brazil’s army recently created a center for cyber defense. If we also take into account that a number of countries, besides Brazil, have experienced major economic growth in recent years, similar to Mexico and Peru, then the question becomes a matter of when, not if, cyber weapons will become a factor in Latin American military affairs.

Therefore, it becomes a necessity to begin some kind of international regulatory system for cyber weapons. In a few years, Stuxnet-like operations may not come just from some of the world’s most developed states, but regional powerhouses with more localized domestic national security interests. What should the role of the cyber powers be at that point? Could the government in Lima, a historical U.S. ally in Latin America (though of course not at the same level of Tel Aviv or London), approach Washington and ask to purchase cyber weapons capable of knocking out Chile’s electric grid as a mean to use as a dissuasive weapon to deter any possible conventional military threat from Santiago (another U.S. ally)? Or how about if Bogota, another close US ally, asks for spyware or more offensive software, should tensions flare up once again with Venezuela (repeatedly accused by the U.S. of being lax, at best, on fighting drug trafficking and for President Hugo Chavez’s friendship with the Iranian government). Finally, should London place limits on Gamma if it plans to sell its spyware to a Latin American state which is known for its crackdown on human rights?

While drafting this commentary I consulted a number of IT programmers, much more versed in coding and malware than myself. The obvious consensus was that, just like with conventional weapons, cyber weapons have to be custom made. A government cannot simply buy a virus and expect it to automatically adapt itself to the desired target; it must be formatted accordingly. Hence, the future of cyber arms trades, just like with conventional weapons, will rely not only on the sale of the software but also on educating the cyber-experts of the recipient government by supplying governments or companies. As one software programmer explained to me, “I wonder about the extent to which it’s possible for a cyber-weapons trade to exist—unless we think of the programmers (not their programs) as the weapons. Engineering competence isn’t easily transferred.”

 My far-smarter-than-me colleague also mused how
“if your first [offensive] attempt is only half-successful and detected, it could give the opponent a chance to improve their defenses before any real damage is done. So if you’re the attacker, I would guess that a mere support contract isn’t going to suffice; you’ll want to have the programmers in house, and you want to have regular meetings with them, see their testing environment, and generally try to improve confidence that the attack is actually going to work on the first try. Any program of sufficient complexity, no matter how competent the programmer, is going to fail in various ways at first.”
In other words, what limits should be placed on not only technology but also the human component when it comes to manufacturing and trading cyber weaponry?

Finally, should there be limits regarding the type of cyber weapons that can be sold? Such software can range from defensive programs (i.e. state-of-the-art firewalls) to more offensive ones like spyware (which raises the question whether this can constitute a declaration of war if detected by the targeted nation), or others I consider “cyber weapons of mass destruction” (capable of bringing down a city or nation’s electric or communication grids). Such issues and questions are problematic enough today when we see only a handful of cyber-developed nations who happen to be close allies with each other (i.e. U.S. and the UK or U.S. and Israel). Reaching consensus on cyber weapons’ transfers will only become more problematic in the near future when other developing states (i.e Brazil, Mexico and Peru, to name a few, in Latin America), turn more of their resources to cyber weaponry to protect national interests.

Thursday, August 2, 2012

IPD: Figuring out Ecuador’s Foreign Policy: From Lukashenko to Assange


W. Alex Sanchez
Research Fellow, Council on Hemispheric Affairs
International Policy Digest
August 2, 2012
Originally published in: http://t.co/DzGoLrHI

A July 31st guest post in Latin America’s Moment, a blog of the Council on Foreign Relations handled by Shannon O’Neil (a Senior Fellow for Latin American Studies at CFR), discusses the differences between Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa and his eccentric Venezuelan counterpart, Hugo Chavez.

To summarize, the blog post compares and differentiates the two leaders, arguing that the “left-leaning presidents share a common rhetoric (frequently labeling opponents as oligarchs or imperialists), charismatic personalities, a disdain for (and often exaggeration of) U.S. influence in the region, and a taste for forging relationships with some of the world’s most notorious pariah states (Iran and Belarus).”

Nevertheless, Stephanie Leutert, the guest blogger on Latin America’s Moment argues that Correa cannot hope to become a new Chavez (should the Venezuelan leader loose the presidency due to the upcoming election or for health reasons).

“With double the population, triple the landmass, and five times more annual oil production, Venezuela has been able to back up its initiatives with significant funds. While Correa’s rhetoric is as feisty, his bank account is much less, limiting his ability to guide South America’s affairs,” Leutert writes.

Both sides of the coin are very true. However, the analysis does fall short of highlighting how, while small, Ecuador has carried out some provocative foreign policy initiatives during the Correa government and it has become fairly well noticed in the international arena.

One of Correa’s most famous, anti-Washington moments came when Ecuador chose not to renew an agreement with the U.S. over the renting of the military installations in Manta. The last American troops left that country in 2009 after a 10 year period in which the base was used for anti-drug U.S. military operations. Subsequently Washington opened a number of bases in neighboring Colombia.

More recently, Ecuador has had some other interesting foreign policy initiatives. For example, in late June/early July, Alexander Lukashenko, the president of Belarus and known as the “last dictator of Europe,” visited Ecuador. A number of security agreements were signed during the meetings between Correa and the controversial European head of state.

In addition, in mid-July, a Chinese ship used to train young naval cadets, arrived at Guayaquil. Of course, growing relations between militaries, particularly between China and Latin American states, is nothing new, but this is always an interesting development worthy of being mentioned as it shows how Beijing is finding new potential allies on the other side of the Pacific.

But even more newsworthy is the fact that the Australian Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, is currently in the Ecuadorean embassy in London despite requests for extradition by the Swedish government. According to Reuters, Ecuador’s Foreign Minister Ricardo Patino has promised to wait until the end of the London Olympic Games on August 12 to announce a decision.

As a security researcher, I have learned a lot from the thousands of documents WikiLeaks has made public and have used them extensively for my professional work. Hence, I have mixed feelings regarding what should be Assange’s fate. I do, however, find it intriguing that it was Ecuador, out of all countries, who offered Assange asylum.

In any case, returning to CFR’s argument that Correa is no Chavez, this is most likely true. But thanks to a number of initiatives, Correa has made sure that Ecuador has become noticed in the international arena, to the point that Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney recently commented that, regarding the relationship of economic development and culture, “and that exists also between other countries that are near or next to each other. Chile and Ecuador; Mexico and the United States,” Romney said at a fundraiser in Jerusalem’s King David Hotel. Romney added that culture “makes all the difference.” Seems even Republican politicians are talking about Ecuador these days.

For the record, between Ecuador and Chile there is a country called Peru that has experienced major economic growth over the past few years. However, unlike Correa, Peru’s last president, Alan Garcia, or especially the incumbent, Ollanta Humala, have not tried to behave or be compared to Chavez. If anything, Humala has distanced himself from the Venezuelan leader as much as possible.

Monday, April 30, 2012

Commentary: Peru Finds Itself Snared in the Falklands/Malvinas Dispute




Commentary: Peru Finds Itself Snared in the Falklands/Malvinas Dispute
This analysis was prepared by W. Alex Sanchez, Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.
April 30, 2012.
Originally published in: http://bit.ly/IF2lon

Thirty years after a bloody war between the United Kingdom and Argentina, the longstanding territorial conflict over the Falklands/Malvinas islands continues to simmer. In recent months Buenos Aires has attempted to attract international support for its claim to the islands, particularly from fellow South American countries. Several regional states have stated their perfunctory support for Argentina, in some cases going so far as to accept a blockade on the Falklands, refusing vessels flying the islands’ flag to dock in their ports. One state that is in a particularly troubling position regarding which side to back is the Andean nation of Peru, as exemplified in a recent incident regarding the British frigate HMS Montrose.
Peru and the UK: a Troubled Historical Relationship
Though geographically distant, Peru and the United Kingdom often have had a troubled relationship, due to the Falklands sovereignty dispute, which is part of even greater geopolitical issues troubling South America. Though geographically distant, Peru and the United Kingdom’s relationship is characterized by a rocky past. Current tensions are rooted not only in the Falklands sovereignty dispute, but also in greater geopolitical issues to be found in South America.
In the 19th century, Peru, along with Bolivia as its ally, fought a bloody war against Chile, which became known as the War of the Pacific (1879-1883). The origins of this conflict centered on Chile’s desire for control over the mineral-rich coastal regions of Bolivia (Antofagasta) and Peru (Arica, Tarapaca and Tacna). Towards the end of the conflict with Peru, the Chilean army was able to occupy and then ransack Lima, thanks to Chile’s striking naval advantage. Chile eventually emerged victorious and, as part of the spoils of war, it gained valuable territory from Peru and Bolivia, turning the latter into a landlocked country. The Chilean government and its military have been able to profit from the minerals it gained from to the war, particularly from copper deposits.
What is not so well known is the role of the British Empire during the War of the Pacific, as London was an active supporter of Santiago. The British provided Chile with both warships and experienced naval officers, which proved to be a defining factor in the conflict. Peru has never forgotten the British military’s aid to Santiago, as the War of the Pacific became a critical milestone in Peruvian history, serving as an inspiration and source of nationalism that swept the country and an abiding distrust towards Chile.
Far from being ancient history, this 19th century  war would have repercussions in the 20th century, when the military junta in Argentina, facing a crippling economy, decided to launch an ambitious military offensive to gain control of the Malvinas and to distract the Argentine population from problems in the country. During the war, the Peruvian government played a dual role. On the one hand, then-President Fernando Belaunde Terry attempted to serve as a mediator between Buenos Aires and London in order to bring the conflict to an end.[1] Meanwhile, and more critically, Peru provided Argentina with Exocet missiles and Mirage warplanes that were later used against UK forces.[2] In fact, it is believed that a Peruvian Exocet missile was used by Argentina to sink the HMS Sheffield.[3]
It is worth noting that Chile, then ruled by General Augusto Pinochet, provided the UK with critical intelligence data that was used against Argentina’s military.[4] Santiago and Buenos Aires have had a historically tense relationship, not only because of Santiago’s role during the 1982 war, but because of a 1978 incident in which the two countries came close to combat as a result of a border dispute over the Beagle channel that was avoided thanks to Papal intervention.[5]
Most recently, an important incident occurred in 1995 which shook Lima’s position on the Falklands. On that occasion, Ecuador and Peru waged a non-declared military conflict known as the Cenepa War which lasted several weeks over a region that has been contested for decades, serving as the casus belli for two brief wars in 1941 and 1981. What makes this incident germane to the Falklands dispute was that Argentina, under President Carlos Menem, sold weapons to Ecuador, which were used against Peruvian troops.[6] For Peru, this was seen as a stab in the back from an ally to which Lima had previously provided vital military equipment and assistance during the 1982 war. Furthermore, Argentina is, along with the U.S., Brazil and Chile, one of the four guarantors in charge of maintaining the peace between Ecuador and Peru since the 1941 war. In view of Buenos Aires’ backing of Quito during the Cenepa War, Lima, particularly its military circle, may see little reason to continue supporting Buenos Aires regarding the Falklands.
After a 35-month trial, Menem and 17 other members of his government were ultimately found innocent of illegally selling guns to Ecuador and other countries.[7] In an interview with COHA a retired Peruvian colonel, who wanted to remain anonymous, stated that “it’s a shame no one will be punished for this crime, considering the historically close relations between Lima and Buenos Aires.”[8] In addition, Dr. Christian Maisch, an associate dean at the American University argued that “it’s important to stress that the illegal weapon sales were carried out by opportunistic government officials during the Menem government. This was apparently a traición oportunista [opportunistic betrayal] by some corrupt officials and not necessarily a policy formally approved by the Argentine government or supported by the will of the Argentine people.” The diplomatic historian went on to highlight the strong ties between Peru and Argentina, dating back to the 19thcentury independence movements, particularly the one led by Argentine General José de San Martín, which facilitated Peru’s independence from the Spanish Empire.[9]
The 2012 Montrose Incident
The year 2012 marks the 30th anniversary of the Falklands/Malvinas war and unanticipated tensions between Argentina and the United Kingdom have reignited. For example, Buenos Aires officials have declared that London is militarizing the South Atlantic. [10] This aggressive statement was in response to the deployment of a British warship to the islands, as well as the deployment of Prince William, a RAF search and rescue pilot, to the archipelago.[11] London stated that such military deployments are routine, but, in all fairness, a critical development regarding this particular move was that London had originally dispatched a frigate, the HMS Montrose, to the South Atlantic. The Montrose’s posting in the region was abbreviated, however, when it was decided that it should be replaced by another vessel, the destroyer HMS Dauntless, considered to be one of the most modern warships in the world.[12] The conservative Daily Mail stated that “naval chiefs admit sending the warship [the Dauntless] to the region will deliver a strong signal that Britain has no intention of relinquishing the Falklands.”[13]
Photo property of the Royal Navy ( http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/)
Peru fits in this latest round of tensions between Buenos Aires and London, as the Ollanta Humala government has also declared its support for Argentina’s claim to the islands. The problem arose when Lima also authorized the HMS Montrose to make a port of call in Callao, the major Peruvian port next to Lima. From what is understood, the Peruvian Congress, originally declared that the Montrose could dock in Callao but, shortly afterwards, the Peruvian executive reversed this decision and said the British warship could not do so.[14] These somewhat confusing instructions proved to be an embarrassment for the Ollanta government, as the international media argued that Peru was breaking rank from South America’s strong support of Argentina. [15]  Peruvian opposition parties stated that Peru was having a “contradictory” and even subservient relationship with Argentina.[16]
In the end, the Peruvian government maintained its solidarity with Argentina,[17] while the British government called Lima “unfriendly” for cancelling the Montrose’s visit.[18] In an interview with COHA, a British diplomat, who asked to remain anonymous, explained that “we think that the Montrose visit would have added another element of co-operation to the bilateral relationship.  And that is very much our ambition.”[19] Meanwhile, a Peruvian Congresswoman, Lourdes Alcorta, stated that “acá metieron la pata totalmente. Una cosa es la actitud solidaria que pueda haber con Argentina por el tema de las Malvinas, pero no se puede maltratar otros países”  (“everyone here screwed up. One thing is that we should have a solidarity act with Argentina over the Malvinas, but we cannot be rude to other countries”).[20]

After the incident, the Peruvian Defense Minister, Alberto Otarola, declared that “in the [Defense Ministry] we were in favor of accepting the frigate’s visit.”[21] The Peruvian Defense Minister also stated that it is the Peruvian Congress and Ministry of Foreign Affairs that formulate Peruvian foreign policy, including which foreign ships can dock in Peruvian ports. While true, this can also be interpreted as the Peruvian defense ministry and military indirectly indicating that they wished to have stronger defense links with the British military, but that the civilian government was ultimately responsible for the failure of the Montrose to obtain the requisite docking permission in some Peruvian facility. Ultimately, the Montrose sailed on to Colombia and Panama and the British warship was allowed to dock in those countries. The aforementioned British diplomat explained to COHA:


 I am not aware that either of those governments came under Argentine pressure or were challenged about compromising regional solidarity.  They took the view, as do most in the region, that it is perfectly possible to have a full and productive bilateral relationship with the UK whilst maintaining a difference of view on the Falklands issue.[22]

Hence, it is debatable why Lima was so keen to reject the HMS Montrose to the point of becoming a regional embarrassment, when two other Latin American nations welcomed the British warship within their territorial waters.
London – Lima Relations Today
While perhaps not London’s major interest in Latin America, it is important to highlight that Peru and the United Kingdom currently have generally good relations, particularly regarding trade. The UK is the second biggest foreign investor in Peru; UK imports from Peru rose by 14% last year, and overall bilateral trade went up 17%. According to the online daily, The Peruvian Times, British businesses have more than US$4.45 billion invested in Peru.[23]
The aforementioned British diplomat explained to COHA that “we had an excellent bilateral trade event in London only last month, at which our Minister for the Americas, Jeremy Browne, gave a keynote address.  And our Financial Secretary met with Peru’s Economy and Finance Minister.”[24]  After the Montrose incident, there were concerns that Lima-London relations would suffer, but  Minister Browne and Peru’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rafael Roncagliolo, spoke on the phone and stated that both governments are committed to maintaining and strengthening relations.[25] In another attempt to generate closer relations, according to the aforementioned The Peruvian Times, a group of high-profile Peruvian officials visited London this month as part of a business delegation. The delegation included the Peruvian Minister of Finance, Luis Miguel Castilla, Central Bank president Julio Velarde, and Roberto Hoyle, president of the Lima Stock Exchange, as well as the British Ambassador to Peru, James Darius.[26]
The tensions surrounding the Falklands/Malvinas occurred at a time when London was reorganizing its foreign policy to reach out to areas like Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa. Because of its economic boom in recent years Peru is a high-profile target for British diplomatic and investments opportunities. On the other hand, at the time of the Montrose incident, Alfredo Ferrero, a former Peruvian Minister for External Trade and Tourism, critiqued Argentina’s economic model. He stated that the Argentine government is very protectionist and bilateral trade between Lima and Buenos Aires is not the best. He also said that “tenemos problemas para venderles nuestros productos” (“we have problems selling them our products”).[27]
Unraveling Geopolitics in South America
The Falklands have demonstrated just how complex South American politics are, and the recently concluded Summit of the Americas held in Cartagena, Colombia, is a perfect example. In a not-so-surprising development, Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner stormed out of the Summit after the attending heads of state could not agree on a declaration regarding the Falklands/Malvinas dispute (and the controversy over Cuba’s attendance).[28] To be fair, the Summit had little chance of accomplishing any kind of groundbreaking resolution, as there were at least three divisive topics on the table: the Falklands/Malvinas, Cuba, and the future of the hemispheric war on drugs, including the debate on possibility ending drug prohibition in favor of decriminalization.
Members of Union of South American Nations (Union de Naciones Suramericanas – UNASUR), generally have declared themselves in favor of Argentina’s position, but this does not exactly mean that a blank check has been drawn in support for Buenos Aires. The Uruguayan government, for example, supports Argentina, but Montevideo has not prevented its citizens from carrying out business with the islanders. For example, in early February 2012, a group of Uruguayan businessmen traveled to the islands,[29] without Montevideo preventing them from doing so.[30] Then again, Uruguay’s support for Buenos Aires has been tenuous at best as the two countries have had a heated, if bloodless, border dispute for years over a proposed pulp mill that Uruguay had wanted to construct close to the border with Argentina, which would have heavily polluted water sources along the border.[31]
In any case, Argentina is relying on a statement by UNASUR for regional unity.[32] In fact, it was arguably UNASUR’s support of Buenos Aires that provided the additional pressure on Lima to deny the Montrose entry. Then again, diplomatic pressure was not enough to move Colombia and Panama (not a UNASUR member) to deny the British frigate its decision to make a port call.
A final factor regarding Lima’s decision to bow to Argentina’s pressure may have to do with a maritime border dispute Lima has with Santiago. The Chilean government lays claim to a sizable amount of Peruvian territorial waters, and there are concerns over what would happen if the dispute escalates.[33]  For the time being, the dispute is at a stalemate as both countries have turned to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, which is set to issue a finding by 2013.[34] Peru may be trying to gain international support for its case; hence Lima is supporting Argentina over the Falklands/Malvinas.  Dr. Maisch argues that “Lima should maintain its current and historical position regarding the Falkland/Malvinas dispute because it is the right thing to do, both legally and politically.” He does not believe, however, that “Peruvian support for Argentina will necessarily translate in Argentine support for Peru in the latter’s dispute with Chile.” He thinks:


Switching support from Argentina to the United Kingdom on the Falkland/Malvinas dispute would make Peru look inconsistent and would not likely result in any diplomatic benefits for Lima in its maritime dispute with Santiago.  Chile and the United Kingdom have had strong historical ties going back over a century, and even if Lima were to change its position on the Falkland/Malvinas dispute, there is little chance that London would support Peru in its maritime dispute with Chile.  Moreover, that maritime dispute has already moved from the field of diplomatic negotiations (where allies can sometimes play a helpful role) to the realm of judicial adjudication before the ICJ, where cases should be decided on their legal merits.[35]

Should Peru Have a Bigger Role in the Falklands/Malvinas?
After the Montrose incident, President Ollanta Humala stated to the Peruvian media that “no somos satelite, ni colonia de nadie, no aceptamos imposiciones de nadie” (“we are not a satellite, no one’s colony, we do not accept impositions from anyone”).[36] While such statements are bold, it seems likely that Lima did not bend to pressure from London, but from Buenos Aires and UNASUR. On the other hand, Colombia and Panama agreed to host the HMS Montrose and it did not end in Argentina breaking its diplomatic relations with either country. Hence, it could be argued that Peru could have withstood the diplomatic heat from Buenos Aires and UNASUR if it had gone through and accepted a visit from the British warship.
Should Peru become more engaged in the Malvinas/Falkland dispute? An argument can be made that the Peruvian diplomatic corps could try promoting a confidence building mechanism such as multinational naval exercises in the South Atlantic combining British naval forces (like the Dauntless and Montrose) with those from Argentina and other regional states (such as the U.S. Brazil, Uruguay and Peru). Considering that the Argentine government has declared that London is militarizing the South Atlantic, multinational exercises would ideally serve to demonstrate that the British navy is not a threat to Argentine national security.  Finally, such multinational military exercises would be good for the Peruvian navy, as it would have the opportunity to carry out highly desirable naval exercises with the more developed and better-equipped British navy.
Unfortunately, such an idea, while theoretically viable, is unlikely to happen. London has stated that it is willing to discuss any kind of initiative regarding the disputed islands, including regional naval exercises, aside from sovereignty. On the other hand, if Argentina participates in such exercises, it could be perceived as an indirect validation of the presence of the British navy in the area, which would amount to political suicide for any administration in the Casa Rosada.
As for Peru’s role, it would probably be best for Lima to maintain its neutrality regarding the dispute of the islands instead of trying to become an active participant in mediation attempts between Buenos Aires and London, as this could easily backfire. With that said, while it makes sense for the Peruvian government to maintain its historical pro-Argentina stance for the sake of regional unity, Lima should continue strengthening financial and defense relations with London, by promoting more investment and accepting a routine port of call by a warship from a friendly foreign government.

 Finally, while Peru can certainly carry out naval exercises with other states that possess modern navies (like the U.S. or other European countries) it is certainly in Lima’s (and its military’s) best interest not to restrict itself from gaining the valuable military expertise it could gain from the British navy, simply to maintain diplomatic unity towards Argentina and its protracted territorial dispute. The retired Peruvian army officer concluded by saying that "it is in Peru’s national interest to maintain solidarity with friendly nations, but this policy should not mean missing the possibility to strengthen defense relations with other friendly nations." [37] In other words, Lima’s support for Buenos Aires on the Malvinas/Falklands and stronger defense relations with the British navy should not be seen as mutually exclusive objectives.