VOXXI: Live in California? Drug cartel violence might be in your backyard

 Live in California? Drug Cartel violence might be in your backyard
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
March 27, 2014
Originally published: http://voxxi.com/2014/03/27/drug-violence-california-mexican-cartels/2/

California’s Attorney General has released a new report, “Gangs Beyond Borders: California and the Fight Against Transnational Crime.” As the title suggests, the report discusses links between Californian criminal groups and criminal organizations from countries in Eastern Europe, Asia and, as we will discuss here, in Mexico.But the spillover of violence from the cartels might be as close as your back yard, as far as the report can tell.

It is common knowledge that Mexican criminal groups such as the powerful Sinaloa Cartel, which recently suffered the capture of its leader “El Chapo,” have ties with criminals in the U.S. and throughout Latin America. Nevertheless, “Gangs Beyond Borders“ does a great job of explaining how these unholy relations are currently morphing, which makes it even more difficult for security agencies to crack down on criminal entities in California.

The Morphing Relationship of Cartels and Gangs

The Sinaloa cartel has a significant presence in California, as it is responsible for the vast majority of “drug, weapons, and human trafficking across the California-Mexico border,” as the aforementioned study highlights. The report also addresses relations between Sinaloa and California gangs, such as the Hispanic Sureño street gang. By using the Sureños as proxies, Sinaloa has increased its presence into Northern California, particularly in San Jose, but also in areas such as Santa Cruz, Santa Clara, Monterey and Kern.

It is important to note that Sinaloa is not the only, or first, Mexican cartel with a presence in California.Gangs Beyond Borders explains that La Familia Michoacana (LFM) used to have a strong presence as well, particularly regarding methamphetamine production in the state’s Central Valley. However, the LFM has lost much of its strength since the 2010 death of its leader, Nazario Moreno Gonzalez, and the 2011 capture of Jose de Jesus “El Chango” Melendez, the cartel’s second in command.

How the presence of Mexican cartels has impacted, and will impact, crime rates in the near future in California is an obvious concern of the Attorney General’s report. In other words, how bad will the spillover effect of cartel violence in Mexico be for California?

The Californian Attorney General’s report hypothesizes that “this ever-increasing zone of influence has caused friction with existing regional gangs [in California] that had previously controlled trafficking routes, resulting in threats of violence, homicides, kidnappings, and extortion.”

SEE ALSO: The Sinaloa Cartel prevailed in Mexico’s drug war

There is another type of spillover effect: Mexican criminals are creating their own gangs in the U.S. One prime example is Jorge Rojas, who fled from Mexico to California where he founded Los Palillos (“The Toothpicks”) gang. Rojas has vast experience regarding criminal groups, as he is the brother of the late Victor Rojas, the leader of the also defunct Arellano-Felix Organization, another Mexican cartel.

Rojas and one of his lieutenants, Juan Francisco Estrada Gonzalez, were convicted this past January on numerous accounts of murder and kidnapping in San Diego. Nevertheless, in March the jury announced that it was unable to decide whether both criminals deserved the death penalty.

While it is logical to fear a spillover of Mexican violence into California, it is important to note that there are differing views whether this could actually occur.

In contrast to Gangs Beyond Borders is a February 2013 study by the Government Accountability Officewhich argued that data shows that the average rate for both violent and property crimes had dropped in the Southwest border states. The renowned InSight Crime news website argues that this data means that the spillover fear is unfounded.

 Criminals say Presente!

Spillover violence by Mexican cartels has affected other parts of the hemisphere, however. For example, a horrific massacre took place in May 2011:  27 people were executed in a cattle ranch in northern Guatemala, close to the border with Mexico. The Zetas cartel has been blamed for carrying out this attack.

Moreover, it is worth noting that other criminal networks across the hemisphere are increasing their ties with different international syndicates, not just from Mexico. For example, in 2013 Domenico Trimboli a high-profile leader of the ‘Ndrangheta (an Italian mafia-type criminal group in Calabria) was arrested in Colombia. The ‘Ndrangheta exports cocaine from Colombia to Europe.

Colombian cocaine also finds its way toGuinea Bissau, a nation in West Africa, which is widely considered one of the world’s foremost narco-states. From there the drugs are smuggled into Europe.

SEE ALSO: Vigilantes fight off Knights Templar

It is ironic that while governments and security agencies often have problems promoting cooperation amongst each other due to differences regarding political ideologies or jurisdictional concerns, cooperation between criminal entities tends to be flourishing.

The report Gangs Beyond Borders serves as a powerful reminder of the growing and morphing inter-connectivity between Mexican cartels and Californian gangs. The report even explains relations between LFM and non-Hispanic gangs, such as the Aryan Brotherhood. In other words, the power of money can blur ethnic and cultural differences.

Finally, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto met with Jeh Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security this past March 20 in Mexico City. The Mexican media has reported that the two discussed economic agreements between both Washington and Mexico City and development of border communities. Hopefully, the security situation across the Mexico-California border was discussed in detail since, as the new report by California’s Attorney Generalexplains, this border area needs more attention by both governments.

VOXXI: The capture of El Chapo is a major victory for Mexico

The Capture of El Chapo is a Major Victory for Mexico
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI News
February 24, 2014

Originally published: http://voxxi.com/2014/02/24/how-el-chapo-guzman-was-arrested/

In the early hours of Saturday, February 22, the Mexican government and security forces scored a huge success in the war against cartels: the arrest of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, the leader of the powerful Sinaloa Cartel. It’s  a huge success for Mexican security forces and a gold star in President  Enrique Peña Nieto’s administration.

Guzmán, once declared by Forbes as one of the richest men on Earth, was the effective ruler of a parallel narco-terrorist state covering large swaths of Mexican states. So far it is unclear what specific charges he will be trialed for, or in which prison he will carry out his sentence – he’s currently in the Altiplano prison.

The prison that will ultimately host him is doubly important since he already escaped from one once. There is also the possibility that he will be eventually extradited to the U.S.

Moreover, another question that analysts are scrambling to figure out is how his capture will affect, in the short and long term, both the Sinaloa Cartel as well as the country’s other cartels.

For the time being, President Enrique Peña Nieto can add Guzmán’s capture to the list of major achievements under his leadership. Let us hope that the Sinaloa leader remains behind bars.

The operation to capture “El Chapo”

Surprisingly, the Mexican media has reported several details of Guzmán’s capture. The operation took place around 3-4 AM this past Saturday as Guzmán slept in a fourth floor suite of a somewhat upscale 27- floor building in Mazatlan, a city in the state of Sinaloa.

The Mexican daily Milenio explains that Mexican intelligence services, in cooperation with the DEA, detected that Guzmán had been staying in room 401 of the building for two days. (The role of U.S. security and intelligence agencies in Guzmán’s capture will surely be scrutinized for months to come.)

By 6:40AM both Guzmán and his bodyguard had been neutralized and arrested. The media has emphasized that not a single shot was fired to apprehend Mexico’s most wanted man, though some physical force was used by the marines who arrested him as he struggled to escape.

The captured leader of the Sinaloa Cartel was then taken to the Mazatlan airport, and from there he was airlifted to Mexico City. Finally, he was transported to the Altiplano prison via one of Mexico’s Policia Federal (Federal Police) helicopters.

The effects of his arrest

President Peña Nieto confirmed Guzmán’s capture via social media, tweeting: “I recognize the work of the security agencies of Mexico to capture [Guzmán] in Mazatlan.” He also started the hashtag #MexicoEnPaz (#MexicoInPeace).

The Mexican president’s aforementioned hashtag was created to stress that Guzmán’s capture is an example of the Mexican government’s initiatives to bring back stability and peace to the country. Whether these efforts will actually succeed is debatable. While Guzmán’s capture is certainly a commendable achievement, it is unclear to what extent it will affect violence within Mexico.

In an April 2010 interview with the Mexican magazine “Proceso,” Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, the Sinaloa cartel’s second in command after Guzmán, summarized the leadership structure of cartels.

“When it comes to the capos, jailed, dead or extradited – their replacements are ready” the cartel leader explained.

Indeed, a problem with these vast criminal networks is that even when a major leader is captured or eliminated, the cartel’s leadership structure is either flexible enough to select a new leader to maintain its cohesion, or it breaks apart into multiple smaller networks. There is just too much money to be made in drug trafficking and other crimes for new cartels not to appear.

A textbook example of a Mexican cartel surviving what should be a decapitating blow happened in July 2013, when the Mexican government captured another high-profile criminal: Miguel Angel “Z-40” Trevino, head of the Zetas Cartel. However, this has not hampered the Zetas, as new leaders have emerged.

Likewise, there are also cases of new cartels emerging from defunct ones. The Zetas themselves were originally the armed wing of the Gulf Cartel, before splitting to become their own criminal entity. Similarly, the Knights Templar Cartel, Mexico’s third largest cartel (currently in a bitter war against vigilante forces in Michoacan), is itself a splinter group from the now defunct Familia Michoacana cartel.

Experts on Mexican security are participating in the debate of the Sinaloa cartel’s future: one of these specialists is Guillermo Valdes, former director of CISEN  (a Mexican intelligence agency). He declared  to Milenio that Guzmán’s capture means that the Sinaloa cartel has lost “50% of its leadership.” He explained that while he does not think the Sinaloa Cartel will disappear, it has been severely weakened, and it remains an open question whether the aforementioned Zambada, the cartel’s second in command, will be able to keep Sinaloa united.

As a final point, in a July 2013 commentary for VOXXI, I discussed the capture of the aforementioned Z-40 of the Zetas. At the time, I highlighted the importance of having state-of-the-art maximum security prisons to keep high-profile criminals behind bars. Tragically, Mexican prisons have a tendency to allow for prisoner escapes – Guzmán himself escaped from jail in 2001.

After the huge success for Mexican security forces now they need to manage the Mexico’s penitentiary system to keep El Chapo behind bars this time.

VOXXI: A necessary evil? Peru’s military draft

A Necessary Evil? Peru's Military Draft
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
June 26, 2013
Originally published:http://www.voxxi.com/necessary-evil-peru-military-draft/

Peru’s First Constitutional Court has agreed to a request by the country’s Public Defender to temporarily suspend a proposed military draft lottery that the government wanted to implement.

There have been protests by civic society and opposition politicians against it, arguing that the law is discriminatory, as the majority of potential draftees would be poor, young Peruvians. The government is currently trying to organize counter-arguments to challenge the judiciary’s decisions.

While the draft is undoubtedly controversial, Peru’s internal and external security challenges are consequential, making it an imperative that the country increases its security forces.

Security and Defense Realities

Although the Andean nation has enjoyed economic growth and development over the past decade, it continues to face real security threats. At the domestic level, Shining Path, a narco-terrorist organization, operates in the Peruvian highlands, namely in the Huallaga Valley and the Valley of the Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro Rivers (known as VRAEM in Spanish).

The group is divided into two factions and has roughly 300-400 fighters altogether – its tactics focus on ambushing military and police patrols in the aforementioned areas.

Certainly the Shining Path today is less than a shadow of what it was in the 1980s, Peru’s era of terror, when it was present throughout most of the country and utilized car bombs to instill fear among the population (its trademark modus operandi). Nevertheless, the group remains a major security threat as there is a possibility that it could re-organize itself or form some kind of unholy alliance with Colombian FARC guerrillas or the Mexican Sinaloa cartel.

The fact that Peru is a major producer of cocaine, (second in the world according to the United Nations, but first according to the U.S.) serves as an incentive for transnational criminal groups to expand their operations to the Andean country. In particular, a renewed and rearmed Shining Path presents a significant danger for the country and a difficult challenge for Peru’s government, military and civil society.

Additionally, concerns remain regarding Peru’s Southern neighbor, Chile. The two nations have had tense relations since the 19th Century War of the Pacific. Currently, the countries have turned to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of The Hague to settle a maritime dispute. The ICJ could make a decision as early as July.

While the realistic possibility of war between Lima and Santiago is arguably very small, there is a sincere concern within Peru of what could happen if the ICJ rules in Lima’s favor.

There have been several meetings of senior Peruvian and Chilean defense and diplomatic policymakers over the years that serve as confidence building mechanisms, but doubts remain whether Peru’s military is strong enough to be a deterrent to a potential Chilean aggression.

The Challenges of Insufficient Personnel

The aforementioned security challenges that Peru faces, ranging from narco-terrorism, drug trafficking and the possibility (in a worst case scenario) of war with Chile, puts the proposed military draft lottery in a new perspective.

The Andean country has a police force of around 106,000 members, but budget cuts have reduced the military’s personnel in recent years. This is not enough to properly address the security threats of a large nation like Peru, which has around 30 million citizens and borders that are not conducive to effective patrols.

President Ollanta Humala has admitted that the country has a deficit of 30,000 police officers. Meanwhile, if the draft lottery had taken place, it would have given the military an additional, badly needed, 12,500 new recruits.

Hence, the need to install a military draft (or actually re-install it, as one existed up to the late 1990s) has been heatedly debated by policymakers and NGOs. Moreover, the issue has been critiqued and politicized by individuals such as Oscar Valdes, a former minister, who has also declared his intention to run for the presidency in 2016.

Is the law discriminatory? Arguably yes, since the upper socioeconomic classes will be able to pay a fine in order for their family members to avoid being drafted. The fine is of 1850 soles (roughly USD $660-700). Therefore, most of draftees will come from the country’s lower classes. Due to the fact that members of the middle/upper classes are generally light skinned and the lower classes are indigenous, the proposed law takes a racial angle.

It is noteworthy to highlight that the Humala administration has tried to appease concerns by stating that there is no intention to send the recruits to the VRAEM to combat Shining Path.

Who Fights?

The Peruvian youth should be free to pursue their own interests and goals, instead of preparing to fight the country’s internal and external security threats. With that said, Shining Path, the drug-related violence, and the threat (real or not) originating from Santiago are not going away soon.

Moreover, if some sort of draft is not carried out, who will fight to protect Peru’s civilian society? Does the Peruvian population want to see Shining Path reinvigorated and see the nation return the era of terror of the 1980s? Even if a military draft is not implemented, the government, civic society and NGOs must find some kind of mechanism to appropriately augment the number of security personnel in the country (i.e. by making voluntary service more financially appealing).

A military draft may not be fair, but no one ever said war was fair. And Shining Path, to name just one of Peru’s clear and present dangers, has shown that they do not play fair.

Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/necessary-evil-peru-military-draft/#ixzz2XMAbriYL

Journal Active Measures: Should High-Profile Terrorists and Cartel Leaders Be Eliminated? Targeted Killings in Latin America

Should High-Profile Terrorists and Cartel Leaders Be Eliminated? Targeted Killings in Latin America
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Active Measures
Volume II, Spring 2013
P. 14-20
PDF available: http://www.iwp.edu/docLib/20130620_AM2013.pdf

 In September 2012, the Mexican newspaper Proceso reported that the U.S. government had plans to eliminate Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, the leader of the Sinaloa drug cartel, without notifying Mexican authorities.1 The revelation, while explosive, did not appear to have damaged bilateral relations. Nevertheless, the prospect of an American military strike team entering Mexican territory to eliminate a high value target such as El Chapo Guzman is comparable to the May 2011 U.S. operation in Pakistan that eliminated Al Qaeda terrorist leader, Osama bin Laden.

The practice of targeted killings is controversial and complicated, not only for operational and legal reasons, but also from a moral standpoint. Arguably, there are a number of “bad guys” in the Western Hemisphere in addition to El Chapo Guzman who could qualify for this treatment, ranging from terrorist leaders to major cartel bosses. Regardless, determining which method is more effective, assassination or imprisonment of high-level criminals, requires a case-by-case study.

Most current analyses on targeted killings focuses on violent movements, such as al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Hezbollah. This paper analyzes target killing opera- tions from a Latin American perspective due to of current Western Hemispheric security issues.

Targeted Killings in the Western Hemisphere

It is inaccurate to consider terrorists, drug traffickers, transnational gangs, and insurgents as the same class of criminals, in spite of their similarly destructive modus operandi. The motivations, ideology, and objectives, as well as structures, of the numerous Latin American criminal entities are different. There are, however, common threads among organizations such as the Medellin cartel in Colombia, the Shining Path in Peru, and the Sinaloa cartel in Mexico, as all have become major security threats inside, and sometimes outside of, their respective nations. As Latin American countries are increasingly confronted with violence and security threats, regional governments may resort more often to targeted killing operations instead of search-and-capture operations. Nevertheless, it is debat- able if the elimination of a group’s leadership may necessarily halt its operations permanently. For example, terrorist movements may react differently than drug cartels when a leader is eliminated. Furthermore, there are cases in which search- and-capture operations have been successful in affecting a criminal organization’s structure, as was the case when Peruvian security forces captured major terrorist leaders.

Eliminated Targets. Among the leaders of violent organizations killed by targeted killing operations in recent years, Osama bin Laden’s assassination stands out in the Western world, but Israel has also employed targeted killings to elimi- nate leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas.2 Such operations are likely to continue, with the missions increasingly carried out by predator drones instead of Special Forces.3

Latin American governments, too, have resorted to targeted killings. Pablo Escobar, head of Colombia’s infamous Medellin cartel, was shot to death in 1993 during a police raid.4 Escobar rose to prominence in Colombia during the 1980s, becoming infamous for acts violence against drug rivals, civilians, and govern- ment officials. In one of his boldest operations, Escobar ordered the death of Colombian presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan in 1989.5

Colombian security forces carried out a targeted killing operation against the leadership of the insurgent movement, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2008, bombing an Ecuadorian camp where members of FARC’s leadership, including the group’s then-leader Raul Reyes, were suspected of hiding.6 The bombing raid killed Reyes and several other insurgents, but the backlash brought Colombia to the brink of war with Ecuador, which viewed the operation as a violation of its sovereignty. To further complicate matters, the Ven- ezuelan government deployed its army to the Colombian border and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez declared the possibility of going to war with Colombia to protect Ecuador’s sovereignty.7 In recent years, the Colombian military has been successful in eliminating other major FARC leaders: Jorge Briceno (aka Mono Jojoy) in September 2010, and Alfonso Cano in November 2011.

Similarly, the Mexican military has managed to eliminate the leadership of some of Mexico’s major drug cartels. For example, Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano (aka El Lazca) of the Zetas Cartel, was shot to death by Mexican marines last October.8

High-Profile Individuals Still Free. In Latin America, numerous lead- ers of violent organizations remain at large and are likely subjects for targeted killings. Some examples of potential targets in Mexico include El Chapo Guzman, the ruthless head of one the most powerful and violent drug cartels in Mexico with significant wealth from drug trafficking;9 Miguel Angel Trevino (aka Z-40), leader of the dreaded Zetas cartel; and Fernando Sanchez Arellano (aka The Engi- neer), head of the Arellano cartel.10

Leaders of hemispheric insurgent movements that could be targets for TK operations include Rodrigo Londono (aka Timochenko), current leader of the FARC; Nicolas Rodriguez Bautista (Gabino), the insurgent group’s second in command; Jose Benito Cabrera (aka Fabian Ramirez),11 current commander of the National Liberation Army (ELN); and the leader of Peru’s Shining Path, Vic- tor Quispe Palomino (aka Jose), who is believed to be operating in the Peruvian highlands.12

High-Profile Individual In Prison. On the other hand, various opera- tions have led to the capture and imprisonment of high-profile targets in Latin America, including Abimael Guzman, the leader of Shining Path, and Victor Polay Campos, the head of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) in Peru. These criminals have been in maximum-security prisons since 1992, under life sentences. Other high-profile criminals include Salvador Alfonso Martinez (The Squirrel), a Zetas leader linked to more than 300 murders, one of which was an American citizen.13 In Brazil, several leaders of the gang known as the First Capi- tal Command (PCC) have been placed under arrest. These examples of successful imprisonments demonstrate that viable options exist that do not involve targeted killings.

Analysis

Whether targeted killings are more effective than capture and imprisonment in removing high profile criminals from power depends largely on the capacity of a country’s judicial and penal system to conduct fair trials of criminals and to keep them successfully in prison. Peru has been successful in keeping top ter- rorist leaders behind bars, but this hasn’t always been the case. For example, the MRTA’s leader, Polay Campos, was captured in 1989 and escaped from prison, along with 47 other MRTA members in 1990.14 He was finally recaptured two years later. In addition, Pablo Escobar spent little over a year in a Colombian prison (1991–1992) before escaping. He remained on the run until he was shot in 1993.15

Meanwhile, the Mexican penal system’s ability to handle a “big fish” such as El Chapo is questionable. There have been several recent jailbreaks in Mexico and dozens of cartel members have managed to escape.16 Moreover, imprisoned criminal leaders are able to continue communicating with their subordinates out- side of prison—the leadership of the Brazilian PCC, for example, has conducted conference calls from behind prison walls.17 Hence, targeted killings for major criminal leaders may be the only option for some security forces, given the state of many Latin American penal systems that allow jailed criminals to continue giving orders to their henchmen.

The question remains as to whether targeted killing operations are successful in affecting a criminal organization’s leadership structure. Osama bin Laden’s death crippled al-Qaeda, and Escobar’s death dissolved the Medellin cartel. On the other hand, imprisonment of Abimael Guzman and Polay Campos was enough to severely cripple the Shining Path and the MRTA respectively.

As previously mentioned, a critical factor is the leadership structure of criminal movements. FARC’s leadership, unlike that of the Shining Path, does not revolve around one individual. Rather, a secretariat selects a new leader when one is eliminated,18 thereby enabling the group to withstand the loss of major leaders. Furthermore, the structure and lack of political and ideological objectives of drug trafficking groups, such as Mexico’s cartels, make it likely that the Sinaloa cartel could survive if El Chapo Guzman was eliminated. The result would likely be a factionalized Sinaloa cartel and continued drug trafficking operations. A September 14, 2012, blog post in the Houston Chronicle argues that cartels such as the Gulf Cartel and Felix Arellano Organization have survived the arrest of their major leaders by aligning themselves with stronger cartels (such as the Sinaloa or the Zetas). In addition, the Gulf Cartel “has deep connections in the social fabric of northeastern Mexico [and] it boasts of extensive U.S. domestic wholesale transportation networks.”19 With such a history and network, this cartel has survived the fall of its major bosses over the past decade, demonstrating that targeted killings do not always have the intended effects.

Conclusions

Some experts who have written on targeted killing operations against groups such as al-Qaeda argue that Washington and Tel-Aviv have set “a dangerous prec- edent for abusive regimes around the globe to conduct drone attacks or other strikes against persons who they describe in vague or overly broad terms as ter- rorists.”20 In Latin America, this precedent has arguably already been set with the 1993 raid on Pablo Escobar and the 2008 Colombian military raid in Ecuador to eliminate a FARC leader.

In sum, it is not certain that targeted killings have had, or ever can have, a crippling effect on criminal entities in the Western Hemisphere. Arguably, the Sinaloa Federation could survive the elimination of its leader, El Chapo Guzman. Analysts have argued “the Federation is just that—a loosely knit alliance of smaller cartels that owe allegiance to El Chapo and his people. When a kingpin is cap- tured or killed, such alliances tend to fracture as it becomes a case of every man for himself.”21 In other words, while the elimination of El Chapo might weaken or even break apart the Sinaloa cartel, it would probably just lead to a factionalized organization, with little to no effect on drug trafficking itself.

Criminal entities in the Western Hemisphere range from narco-terrorist groups in Peru and Colombia, to expanding drug cartels in Mexico, and powerful gangs in Brazil and Central America. Each entity has its own raison d’etre and leadership structure, which means that some could arguably better withstand the fall of its leader more than others (for instance, the Sinaloa cartel compared to the Shining Path). Thus, specific analyses of each organization are essential to better understand whether a targeted killing of its leader would be successful. So far, the effectiveness of targeted killing operations, as compared to search-and-capture operations, has yet to be proven in the Western Hemisphere.

Notes

1. Jorge Carrasco and Jesus Esquivel, “Mision del Pentagono: Atrapar a ‘El Chapo’…. O acabar con el,” Proceso (Mexico), August 11, 2012. Accessed December 10, 2012: http://www. proceso.com.mx/?p=316815

2 “Israel’s Targeted Assassinations: An Overview Of Militants Killed By Israel (PHOTOS),”Should High-Profile Terrorists and Cartel Leaders Be Eliminated? The Huffington Post, November 14, 2012. Accessed December 22 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/14/israel-targeteded-assassinations_n_2131591.html. Also see: Gal Luft, “The Logic of Israel’s Targeted Killing,” The Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2003, Volume X, No. 1, Winter 2003, p.3-13.Accessed December 22, 2012, http://www.meforum.org/515/the-logic-of-israels- targeteded-killing

3 Joshua Fost, “Targeted Killing, Pro and Con: What to make of U.S. Drones in Pakistan,” The Atlantic, September 26, 2012. Accessed December 18, 2012 http://www.theatlantic.com/ international/archive/2012/09/targeted-killing-pro-and-con-what-to-make-of-us-drone-strikes- in-pakistan/262862/ Also see: Akbar Nasir Khan, “The US’ Policy of Targeted Killings by Drones in Pakistan,” IPRI Journal, XI, no 1, (Winter 2011), p. 21-40

4 Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo, (New York: Penguin Books, 2002).

5 “El sacrificio y la impunidad en el caso Galan,” El Espectador (Colombia), September 13, 2012. Accessed December 22, 2012 http://www.elespectador.com/especiales/articulo-374565- el-sacrificio-y-impunidad-el-caso-galan

6 “La muerte de ‘Raul Reyes’ desencadena una crisis diplomatica entre Colombia, Venezuela y Ecuador,” El Pais (Spain), Internacional, March 2, 2008. Accessed December 21, 2012 http://in- ternacional.elpais.com/internacional/2008/03/02/actualidad/1204412408_850215.html

7 Ian James, The Associated Press, “ Chavez Deploys Troops to border with Colombia,” The Spokesman Review, March 3, 2008. Accessed December 21, 2012 http://www.spokesman.com/ stories/2008/mar/03/chavez-deploys-troops-to-border-with-colombia/

8 Silvia Otero and Doris Gomora, “Confirman la muerte de Lazcano, lider de ‘Zetas,’” El Universal (Mexico), October 10, 2012. Accessed December 17, 2012 http://www.eluniversal.com. mx/notas/875733.html

9 “NARCO BLOG: Sinaloa Cartel Welcomes Police Chief with Tortured Body,” El Blog del Narco, Hispanically Speaking News, March 12, 2011. Accessed Decembe20, 2012 http://www. hispanicallyspeakingnews.com/el-blog-del-narco/details/narco-blog-sinaloa-cartel-welcomes-new- police-chief-with-tortured-body/6033/ . Regarding Guzman’s known wealth see: Erin Carlyle, “Billionaire Druglords: El Chapo Guzman, Pablo Escobar, The Ochoa Brothers,” Forbes.com,  March 3 2012. Accessed January 4, 2013 http://www.forbes.com/sites/erincarlyle/2012/03/13/billionaire-druglords-el-chapo-guzman-pablo-escobar-the-ochoa-brothers/

10 For other cartel bosses see: “De Siete al Inicio del Sexenio, los carteles mexicanos se multiplicaron: Calderon dejara por lo menos 25,” Tiempo Real (Mexico), August 20, 2012. Accessed January 4, 2013 http://www.sinembargo.mx/20-08-2012/335244

11 “Reaparece importante jefe de las FARC dado por muerto en Colombia,” Univision, July 31, 2012. Accessed December 16, 2012 http://noticias.univision.com/america-latina/colombia/ article/2012-07-31/reaparece-jefe-farc-dado-por-muerto-television-colombia#axzz2Fw5cCurP

12 Hans Huerto Amado, “Quien es el proximo cabecilla de Sendero Luminoso a ser neutral- izado?” El Comercio (Peru), February 13, 2012. Accessed December 18, 2012 http://elcomercio. pe/politica/1373857/noticia-quien-proximo-cabecilla-sendero-luminoso-neutralizado

13 Allison Jackson, “Mexico arrests Los Zetas drug cartel leader ‘The Squirrel’ over migrant massacres, US tourist murder,” The Global Post, October 8, 2012. Accessed December 20, 2012 http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/mexico/121008/mexico-los- zetas-drug-cartel-the-squirrel-migrant-massacres-murder-US-tourist

14 Ana Murillo, “Detenido en Peru el jefe del Tupac Amaru,” El Pais (Spain), Febru- ary 5, 1989. Accessed December 12, 2012 http://elpais.com/diario/1989/02/05/interna- cional/602636409_850215.html . Also see: Carlos Castillo, “A 20 anos de la fuga de Victor Polay,” El Comercio (Peru), May 31, 2010. Accessed December 12, 2012 http://peru21.pe/ noticia/487763/20-anos-fuga-polay

15 See Bowden’s book for in-depth details of Escobar’s lavish lifestyle behind bars.

16 Oscar Villalba, “Mexico Prison Break: More than 130 Inmates Escape from facility near U.S. border,” Huffington Post, September 17, 2012. Accessed December 15, 2012 http://www. huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/17/mexico-prison-break_n_1892209.html . Mexico also has problems in its judicial system. See: Patrick Corcoran. “Corruption could be undoing of Mexico’s judicial reforms,” MexicoData.Info, March 17, 2008. Accessed January 4, 2013: http://mexidata. info/id1754.html

17 Jack Davis, “Brazil Prison Gang conducted 10-Hour Conference Call,” InSightCrime, De- cember 5, 2012. Accessed December 22, 2012 http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/brazil- prison-gang-conducts-10-hour-conference-call

18 “Colombia Peace at last?” International Crisis Group, Latin America, Report N. 45, Sep- tember 25, 2012, p.13.

19 Nathan Jones, “Gulf Cartel will likely survive arrest of high-level leaders,” Houston Chronicle, September 14, 2012. Accessed, December 23, 2012. http://blog.chron.com/baker- blog/2012/09/gulf-cartel-will-likely-survive-arrest-of-high-level-leaders/

20 “Letter to Obama on Targeted Killings and Drones,” Human Rights Watch, December 7, 2012. Accessed December 21, 2012 http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/07/letter-obama- targeted-killings

21 Sylvia Longmire, “Why arresting ‘El Chapo’ might be a bad thing,” Small Wars Journal, October 31, 2012. Accessed December 21, 2012 http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why- arresting-%E2%80%9Cel-chapo%E2%80%9D-might-be-a-bad-thing