Geopolitical Monitor: Illegal Coltan Mining Fuels Colombian Narco-Insurgents

 

"Illegal Coltan Mining Fuels Colombian Narco-Insurgents"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Situation Report

Geopolitical Monitor

20 June, 2023

Originally published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/illegal-coltan-mining-fuels-colombian-narco-insurgents/

Illegal mining is a widespread problem whose negative consequences include pollution, destruction of local ecosystems, and hazardous working conditions, not to mention the crime itself. In Colombia, illegal mining has an even more problematic dimension: coltan (and gold) is mined to finance narco-insurgents.

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Presentacion: El analista de COHA, W. Alejandro Sánchez, da una presentación en la Academia de la Policía Nacional de Colombia

"El analista de COHA, W. Alejandro Sánchez, da una presentación en la Academia de la Policía Nacional de Colombia"

Presentacion

Bogota, Colombia

Agosto 20, 2015

Comunicado de Prensa de COHA: http://www.coha.org/el-analista-de-coha-w-alejandro-sanchez-da-una-presentacion-en-la-academia-de-la-policia-nacional-de-colombia/

El jueves 20 de agosto, W. Alejandro Sánchez, analista del Consejo de Asuntos Hemisféricos, dió una conferenci, via Skype en la Escuela de Postgrados “Miguel Antonio Lleras Pizarro” de la Policía Nacional de Colombia (PNC). El título de la presentación del Sr. Sánchez fue “¿Es que los movimientos violentos latinoamericanos, hoy en día, tienen una ideología política?” La audiencia incluyó a más de 200 oficiales de la PNC.

El Coronel Luis Ernesto García Hernández, director de la escuela de postgrados de la PNC, dió un mensaje introductorio.

El Sr. Sánchez ha llevado a cabo una extensa investigación acerca de las ideologías políticas y las motivaciones de los movimientos violentos latinoamerianos, pasados y presentes. Ponemos a continuación una lista de algunos de sus artículos sobre este tema:

• Alejandro Sánchez. “Give War a Chance Revisited – The Price to Pay: The Military and Terrorism in Peru.” Defense Studies. 2011. Volume 11, Issue 3. Pages 517-540.
• Alejandro Sánchez. “Sangre Joven: Understanding the New Wave of Armed Groups in Latin America.” Security and Defense Studies Review: Interdisciplinary Journal of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. Volume 12, No. 1 & 2. Fall-Winter 2011. P. 135 -153.
• Alejandro Sánchez and COHA Research Associate Kimberly Bullard. “On Separatism in Latin America.” e-International Relations. May 20, 2013.
• Alejandro Sánchez. “Defining Mexico’s Zapatista Army of National Liberation.” E-International Relations. October 22, 2012.
• Alejandro Sánchez. “The End of Ideologically-Motivated Violent Movements in Latin America?” E-International Relations. September 24, 2012.

Blouin Beat: ELN attack on oil pipeline is a bad sign for potential peace negotiations

"ELN Attack on Oil Pipeline is a Bad Sign for Potential Peace Negotiations"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: Politics
July 7, 2014
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatworld/2014/07/07/eln-attack-on-oil-pipeline-is-a-bad-sign-for-potential-peace-negotiations/

On Sunday, June 29, the National Liberation Army (ELN), a Colombian insurgent movement, attacked the country’s Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline. While there were no fatalities from the attack, 13 individuals were reported injured.

Apart from temporarily halting oil production, the attack also dampened the country’s mood following the recent re-election of President Juan Manuel Santos. A cornerstone of the president’s electoral campaign was a pledge to achieve a lasting peace with Colombia’s two insurgent movements, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the aforementioned ELN. However, the attacks on Caño Limón have caused Colombian citizens and analysts in general to question whether the president’s strategies will be successful.

According to reports, on that Sunday afternoon, insurgent fighters threw an explosive at the camp where workers congregate, not at the pipeline itself. The commander of the Colombian Army, General Jaime Lasprilla, provided more information about the incident via social media: a June 30 tweet explains that the ELN threw a “cylinder bomb” at the workers while they were taking part in mass. Due to the relative high number of injured workers the Colombian Minister of Mining and Energy Amilkar Acosta had a gloomy assessment of the situation, stating that the incident “could have been a massacre.”

The Caño Limón pipeline is 780 kilometers long, starting in the Arauca department and ending in the Coveñas port in Colombia’s Caribbean coast, making it a frequent target of Colombian guerrillas. The late June attack occurred in Arauca, close to Colombia’s eastern border with Venezuela, but previously the ELN also attacked the pipeline in early May (in Boyacá department). Each time the pipeline is attacked, Colombian authorities must stop the flow of oil and inspect the pipeline. If an oil spill occurs, the local environment would be contaminated, and human life could be affected. Following the aforementioned early May attack, for instance, two Colombian communities,Agualinda and Cubará, were forbidden from drinking water for fear that an oil leak had contaminated local rivers.

The Caño Limón pipeline is a vital part of the Colombian economy. The oil pipeline transports up to70 thousand barrels of crude oil daily. ECOPETROL, a Colombian state-owned oil company, andOccidental Petroleum Corporation, a Texas corporation, control the pipeline. Occidental’s websiteexplains that “more than 1.2 billion barrels of oil have been produced at Caño Limón since Occidental discovered the field in 1983.” According to ECOPETROL’s website, the Colombian company controls 60% of the oil produced while 40% is owned by Occidental.

The ELN’s attack on the Caño Limón pipeline comes at an awkward moment. In early June, prior to the second round of presidential elections, President Santos declared that he was willing to start negotiations with the ELN. “The political responsibility of this new peace effort falls solely on my shoulders,” the head of state declared. The negotiations between Bogota and the ELN have not officially begun, and it is unclear if the attack on Caño Limón will affect them. In spite of wanting peace via negotiations, President Santos has declared that he will not give the ELN a free pass: on June 30 he tweeted “the armed forces will continue the offensive. We will find the culprits of the ELN’s terrorist attack that affected the population of Arauca.”

While President Santos may be willing to extend the ELN an olive branch, most of the Colombian military is skeptical of the ELN. On July 1 General Lasprilla tweeted “ELN: your declarations are contradictory. Liberty and dignity begin by respecting the most sacred right: Life. You do not intimidate us!” This was a strong response to the attacks on Caño Limón. Likewise, ColombianDefense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzón declared that the ELN’s attack was “cowardly.”

As a final point, it is necessary to mention that July 4 marked the 50th anniversary of the ELN’s creation, and the movement is “celebrating” it by calling for strikes in various departmentsthroughout Colombia. As it is likely that the ELN will continue its attacks and threats against Colombian citizens and infrastructure (i.e. the attack on the Caño Limón pipeline) as part of its anniversary, the peace negotiations between this particular movement and the government may be dead before they even formally begin.

In previous writings I have explained that peace negotiations between Bogotá and some of the country’s numerous insurgent movements have been successful over the past decades. Case in point is the peace accord with the M19 insurgent movement in 1990 and the demobilization of paramilitary groups between 2003 and 2006. Nevertheless, peace accords with the FARC and ELN have proven to be more elusive. Bogotá and the ELN leadership were engaged in negotiations as early as 2002 and 2007, and both times they were unsuccessful.

While we all want peace in Colombia, ELN-Bogota negotiations, if they ever jumpstart, have a very steep mountain to climb before an agreement could conceivably be reached.

VOXXI: Juan Manuel Santos seeks ambitious re-election

Juan Manuel Santos seeks ambitious re-election
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
November 23, 2013
Originally published: http://voxxi.com/2013/11/23/juan-manuel-santos-seeks-re-election/

Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos has announced that he will seek a second term in his country’s upcoming elections, which will take place on May 25, 2014.  He declared his candidacy this past Wednesday, November 20, but the move came as a surprise to very few as he has hinted his intentions regarding re-election for a long time.

This is an ambitious endeavor as Santos will have a difficult time winning over (again) the support of the majority of the Colombian population.

The Negotiations

The Santos presidency is currently in a difficult moment, as it seems to have had more failures than successes, which has resulted in Santos’ plummeting popularity in the past months.

Santos’ declaration comes at the heels of a historic agreement between the Colombian government and representatives of the Colombian insurgent movement, the FARC. The two sides have been negotiating in Havana, Cuba over the course of a year to try to find an end to this decades-old internal conflict.

Out of a five-point peace plan, the two sides reached an agreement over land reform this past May. More recently, in early November, the two sides accomplished another milestone: the insurgent movement will be allowed to participate in Colombia’s political system if a full peace agreement is reached.

Nevertheless, there are other issues that need to be agreed upon and the parties do not have much time left before the May elections.

It is worth noting that the FARC leadership has praised Santos’ willingness to negotiate. This is best exemplified by a November 13 interview between the Voice of Russia’s Brittany Peterson with Victoria Sandino Palmera, a female FARC commander and representative in the negotiations that are taking place in Cuba.

FARC’s Sandino Palmera declared that “You could say that the government has political will, as does […] Santos […]. But at least in the most recent times he has expressed more of an emphasis for arriving to a deal that allows an end to the conflict.”

Should another head of state come into power to replace Santos, it is debatable whether he (or she) may want to continue with the negotiations.

The momentum (broadly speaking) of the peace negotiations with the FARC has made Santos become even more ambitious as it has been hinted that the Colombian government may also start negotiations with the country’s other insurgent movement, the ELN.

Without a doubt, if some kind agreement is reached with either group in the near future, Santos can use this as a propaganda tool during his presidential campaign.

Protests by Peasants

It is important to stress that Colombians will not cast their votes solely based on their country’s security situation (though this is central issue). Obviously, the national economy is also critically important.

Colombia may be a member of the Pacific Alliance, the latest trade bloc to appear in Latin America and whose members are pro-free trade economies, but segments of Colombia’s workforce, particularly the agricultural sector, are displeased with the government’s pro-free trade stance.

This is best exemplified by the weeks of (sometimes violent) protests that were carried out both on Colombia’s countryside as well as major cities this past August-September. The protests started via Colombian farmers and peasants who were upset about Colombia’s free trade agreement with the U.S., which they argue will hurt Colombia’s important agricultural sector.

Popularity Challenges

Given these drawbacks, it comes as little surprise that Santos’ popularity was at a worrisome 21% by early September. However, he appears to be on a rebound, as a recent poll gives him a slightly more encouraging29% approval rating.

As for potential contenders, the major challenger so far appears to be Oscar Iván Zuluaga. According to a November 20 article mentioned in the British daily The Guardian, a poll by Invamer-Gallup found that 27% of people surveyed would vote for Santos, while Zuluaga comes in second place at 15%.

Interestingly, Zuluaga and Santos know each other fairly well as they both served under the administration of President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010). At the time Zuluaga was the finance minister while Santos was Uribe’s defense minister.

However, times have changed and Uribe has become one of Santos’ harshest critics, particularly due to Santos’ decision to negotiate with the FARC. (It has been recently revealed that the FARC had schemed a plot to murder Uribe, which adds to the former president’s anti-negotiations stance). President Uribe has even formed a political coalition, the Uribe Centro Democratico, with the aforementioned Zuluaga as his presidential candidate, to oust Santos.

After the Colombian head of state declared his intention to run again for the presidency, Zuluaga declared to the press that peace in Colombia “is not built by chasing peasants that protest while protecting terrorists that kidnap.” That is a pretty straightforward position on how Zuluaga views Santos’ ongoing negotiations with the FARC.

As for how the Colombian media has reacted to Santos’ presidential intentions, an op-ed in the renownedColombian daily El Colombiano argued that the president’s re-election plans actually started “almost 40 months ago, when he first assumed the presidency.”

It would seem that no one is surprised that Santos decided to run for a second presidential term. But whether he will be able to achieve this it is still too early to tell.

VOXXI: Colombian government to begin talks with ELN guerrillas?

Colombian government to begin talks with ELN guerrillas?
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
September 26, 2013
Originally published: http://www.voxxi.com/colombia-government-talks-eln-guerrillas/

The Colombian government has made headlines once again regarding potential peace negotiations with guerrilla movements. However, the news does not concern any kind of breakthrough between Bogota and FARC insurgents, as negotiations have stalled for weeks.

Rather, the newest development is that the Colombian government has announced that it is ready to begin negotiations with Colombia’s other rebel movement, the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN – National Liberation Army).

A short history of the ELN

The smaller of the two current Colombian left-wing insurgent organizations, the ELN has had a violent history since its creation in 1962 when six Colombian students created a movement called the “Brigada Jose Antonio Galan” – in 1964 the group began training in Santander and 1965 it carried out its first operation.

Characterized by a Marxist-Leninist ideology inspired by the 1959 Cuban Revolution, the ELN aspires to create a Marxist government in the country.

The ELN is concentrated in the Norte de Santander, Arauca, Cauca and Valle del Cauca regions and, according to estimates, the group has less than 3,000 fighters (significantly less than the FARC’s estimated 8,000 fighters).

Nevertheless, one important factor to keep in mind is that while the FARC has lost several senior commanders over the years, the ELN has largely maintained its leadership structure—since 1998 its leader has been Nicolas Rodriguez (alias Gabino).

Likewise, it is worth noting that while the ELN has lost a lot of its fighting force over the past years, this was not simply due to successful operations by Colombian security forces, but also because of voluntary demobilizations. For example, this past July, 30 ELN fighters of the “Compañia Lucho Quintero Giraldo” laid down their weapons in a ceremony in which President Juan Manuel Santos was in attendance.

However, even with a reduced strength, the ELN remains an impressive foe, and has continued to launch high-profile attacks and kidnappings. For example, in January 2013, five civilians that worked for the Canadian company Braeval Mining were kidnapped by ELN fighters while they were in a mining site in the Bolivar department.

The incident made international headlines as the victims included two Peruvian citizens as well as one Canadian.

The ELN negotiations: A wider geopolitical context

In a September 6 commentary for VOXXI, I discussed whether President Santos deserved a 21% approval rating, according to the latest polls. In the article, I explained the reasons and setbacks that Santos has faced over the past year that have prompted this sharp decline in his popularity.

The protests by Colombian peasants that started in June and which quickly expanded throughout major cities are a major reason for this decline.Moreover, after much optimism, the ongoing peace negotiations with the FARC, which are taking place in Cuba, have stalled.

Only one partial agreement has been reached from a five-point peace plan, and it is highly unlikely that a full agreement can be reached before the end of the year.

Moreover, in the international arena, Santos received another blow when the International Court of Justice passed its 2012 ruling over a maritime dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua regarding an archipelago in the Caribbean.

The ruling was bizarre as Colombia maintained control of the islands, but Nicaragua obtained control of some of the Caribbean waters around them. The Santos presidency is crying foul over the ruling and has protested plans by Nicaragua to explore for oil in the disputed waters.

If the Colombian head of state hopes to be re-elected in the upcoming May 2014 elections, he needs a fast win. Santos’ September 24 speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations was riddled with references to peace.

For example, he stated that the Colombian guerrilla must understand that “it is time to exchange bullets for votes […] that the time has come to continue its struggle but via democracy.” (It is worth noting that Santos gave UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon a letter during the UN meeting to protest Nicaragua’s “expansionist” plans).

Hence, it comes at little surprise that he seems to have accepted a proposal by Uruguayan President Jose Mujica to have Montevideo host a potential round of negotiations between the ELN and the Colombian government.

If the (very unpopular) Colombian president wants to rebrand himself as a “champion of Colombian peace” by managing peace negotiations with both the FARC and ELN at the same time, this is certainly an ambitiously strategic endeavor.

But whether any of them will be successful is an entirely different matter. Peace agreements are possible, as exemplified by agreements with the M19 insurgent movement in 1990, and the demobilization of AUC paramilitaries between 2003 and 2006. Nevertheless, negotiations with the ELN were unsuccessful as recently as 2002 and 2007.

While seeking to end warfare and achieve peace via negotiations is certainly commendable, history and security analyses do not count towards Santos’ favor. For the time being, it is difficult for Colombian society to be optimistic that negotiations with the ELN may be more successful than they have been with the FARC.

Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/colombia-government-talks-eln-guerrillas/#ixzz2g3CfXD8v 

VOXXI: Peace can be reached between Colombia and FARC

Peace can be reached between Colombia and FARC
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
June 6, 2013,
Available: http://www.voxxi.com/peace-between-colombia-and-farc/

Successful negotiations in the past between the Colombian government and Colombian guerrilla groups provide some reason for cautious optimism about the ongoing peace process between the government and the FARC guerrillas.

There is certainly good reason to distrust the rebels, but I do believe that a deal between the Juan Manuel Santos administration and the FARC’s Secretariat can be reached. Nevertheless, even if a deal is struck with the Secretariat, it is debatable whether all of their fighting units will respect it.

The positive precedents

Over the past quarter of a century, there have been other successful peace agreements between the Colombian government and guerrilla movements that ended in demobilization. For example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Colombian government struck deals with the April 19 Movement (M-19) and Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) rebel groups.

It is also worth mentioning the demobilization of non-left leaning armed groups. Namely, President Alvaro Uribe reached a deal in 2006 to demobilize the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). The paramilitaries, under the leadership of Carlos Castaño (now deceased), had been a vital ally of the Colombian armed forces in their struggle against the guerrillas, but several blocs themselves became involved in drug trafficking.

Reasons to distrust the FARC

In spite of some successes with other guerilla movements, there are certainly valid reasons to distrust the FARC should an agreement be reached.

The Andrés Pastrana administration reached a peace agreement with the FARC in the late 1990s. However, rather than utilizing the agreement as a stepping stone to a lasting cease fire and demobilization, the FARC used the territory they controlled thanks to the deal to launch a new offensive.

And therein lies a major cause for apprehension: Can the Colombian government, armed forces, and civilian population really trust that the FARC will stay true to their word?

I remain “cautiously optimistic” about the likelihood of a FARC-Bogota agreement. But the problem is not so much whether the Colombian government and the Secretariat can agree to a permanent cease fire — the issue is whether the FARC’s 8,000 troops, particularly the commanders of its fighting units, which are divided into Bloques and Frentes, will respect such a deal. Some FARC groups are heavily involved in drug trafficking and profit handsomely from it, particularly the Bloque Sur.

Should a peace agreement be reached, there is doubt that we can trust all of the guerrilla commanders to demobilize. We will likely see the fractionalization of the FARC into smaller violent organizations that are financed by drug trafficking and extortion of mining operations.

The Colombian government has often hailed the successful demobilization of rebels over the past decades, including high-ranking FARC commanders such as Alberto de Jesús Morales (aka ”El Pajaro”), commander of the Frente 36, who demobilized in February 2011. Indeed, the FARC may only currently be willing to join the negotiation table because they are severely weakened, as they have seen a decrease to 8,000 fighters from 16,000 a decade ago.

Bogota is capable of handling the demobilization of the FARC’s current fighting force so that it reintegrates into society, but it is questionable if all of the guerillas will want to demobilize and give up their criminal activities. A precedent for this occurred with the AUC.

After the paramilitaries demobilized, many of its members created smaller criminal organizations, known in Colombia as the Bandas Criminales (BACRIM). Such groups include Los Rastrojos and Los Urabeños. This supports the argument that FARC Frentes might not respect a peace agreement but rather continue their criminal operations.

A precedent for the future

President Santos is under pressure to accomplish some kind of peace deal with the FARC before 2014, when Colombia will have new presidential elections. He is planning to run for re-election and hopes to utilize a successful agreement with Colombia’s largest insurgent movement as an electoral weapon. Theoretically, such an accomplishment would secure his re-election bid.

However, the FARC know this very well, and have made it clear that they will not be pressured into a peace agreement or be forced to follow any deadlines set by Bogota. If the government fails to reach some agreement, this may arguably undercut Santos’ bid for re-election, as he has made the peace negotiations the cornerstone of his presidency.

Colombia is enjoying huge economic growth and has become a darling of the international community, as exemplified by the creation of the Pacific Alliance (which recently hosted a summit in the Colombian city of Cali). But economic success alone may not be enough to secure Santos a new presidential term.

Meanwhile, even if some kind of lasting agreement is reached with the FARC, it is questionable whether all of the FARC’s field commanders will abide by it. As previously discussed, we may see the FARC fraction, which may or may not be more of a security problem than if the FARC continues to exist as a single entity.

Moreover, the FARC is only one of many criminal organizations operating in Colombia, including the previously mentioned BACRIM. In addition, there is the question of whether the possible success of the peace negotiations between Bogota and the FARC may set the stage for a similar future agreement  between the government and the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), Colombia’s other guerrilla movement — which has around 3,000 fighters.

The Colombian peace process is a complicated and sensitive issue. Nevertheless, one can only hope that a negotiated and peaceful solution can be achieved in this decades-long conflict.

Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/peace-between-colombia-and-farc/#ixzz2VU2kw3c1