Showing posts with label technology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label technology. Show all posts

Monday, September 7, 2026

Radio Free Europe: " Pax Silica или WAICO: сможет ли Казахстан усидеть на двух стульях в глобальной гонке ИИ "

 

 


"Pax Silica или WAICO: сможет ли Казахстан усидеть на двух стульях в глобальной гонке ИИ"

By: Khadisha Akayeva

Azattyq Asia 

7 September, 2026

 Уайлдер Алехандро Санчес, президент консалтинговой фирмы Second Floor Strategies в Вашингтоне, который отслеживает геополитические вопросы в Центральной Азии, отмечает, что «не политизировать» гонку ИИ не получится.

Sunday, May 3, 2026

Future Warfare: " SAS 2026: New technologies to support the fleet "

 


 

" SAS 2026: New technologies to support the fleet "

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Future Warfare

28 April  2026

Published: https://www.fw-mag.com/shownews/1044/sas-2026-new-technologies-to-support-the-fleet 

 

The development of major naval technologies, such as warships and submarines, tends to dominate the news cycle. However, niche technologies are just as important for helping the fleet operate effectively. FW MAG spoke with several defense companies prior to and during the recent Sea Air Space (SAS) summit outside Washington, DC, about new systems and contracts for high-tech technology to support the US Navy. 

Wednesday, January 14, 2026

The Diplomat: " The Feasibility of Kazakhstan’s Digitalization Ambitions "

 


 "The Feasibility of Kazakhstan’s Digitalization Ambition"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

The Diplomat 

Crossroads

14 January, 2026

Published: https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/the-feasibility-of-kazakhstans-digitalization-ambitions/ 

Tokayev is committed to making Kazakhstan “fully digital within the next three years,” but what exactly does that mean, and are the government and people of Kazakhstan ready?

 

 

Wednesday, October 8, 2025

International Policy Digest: "Kazakhstan 2.0: Tokayev’s High-Speed Bid to Digitize a Petrostate"

 

 

"Kazakhstan 2.0: Tokayev’s High-Speed Bid to Digitize a Petrostate"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

International Policy Digest

7 October 

Published: https://intpolicydigest.org/kazakhstan-2-0-tokayev-s-high-speed-bid-to-digitize-a-petrostate/ 

The 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly is over, and the familiar churn of speeches will fuel analysts for weeks. But Astana isn’t waiting on New York.

In his State of the Nation address, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev set out a domestic agenda for the second half of the decade—an attempt to steer Kazakhstan through a volatile era by marrying digital transformation with targeted investment and institutional reform. “The world has entered a new historical era,” he warned, one that will test governments that fail to adapt.

 

Tuesday, March 23, 2021

The Diplomat: What’s in Kazakhstan’s 2025 Development Plan?

 

"What’s in Kazakhstan’s 2025 Development Plan"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Crossroads Asia

The Diplomat

23 March, 2021

Originally published: https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/whats-in-kazakhstans-2025-development-plan/

On the road to 2050, Nur-Sultan aims to diversify its economy and develop new industries.

 The government of Kazakhstan recently released its National Development Plan Through 2025, which complements the government’s primary objective of becoming one of the world’s 30 most developed nations by 2050.

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Tuesday, April 21, 2020

Capian Policy Center: AIFC: The Rise of Virtual Arbitration Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic





"AIFC: The Rise of Virtual Arbitration Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Opinion
Caspian Policy Center
April 13, 2020

Originally published: https://www.caspianpolicy.org/aifc-the-rise-of-virtual-arbitration-amid-the-covid-19-pandemic/

Governments, businesses, industries, and people worldwide are adapting to the “new normal” that is the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. Investment and commercial arbitration is no different.


The AIFC in 2020

Kazakhstan’s Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC), opened its doors in 2018 and has striven to become the premier financial and investment hub not only for Kazakhstan, but also for Eurasia. Its bodies include the Astana International Exchange (AIX), the AIFC Court, which can handle cases related to finance, construction, trade, insurance, IP, energy, subsoil, and contracts, and the International Arbitration Centre (IAC). The Centre’s rules resemble those of the leading arbitration bodies around the world, such as the London Court of International Arbitration and the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre. The IAC has 37 international arbitrators, according to the Center’s website.


Continue Reading....

Sunday, January 19, 2020

India Global Business: India as a Digital Decider in 2020


"India as a Digital Decider in 2020"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
India Global Business
Opinion
January 10, 2020
Originally published: https://indiaincgroup.com/india-as-a-digital-decider-in-2020-india-global-business/


Today, India is one of the pillars of the global economy and an influential player in regional and global affairs. Similarly important are India’s contributions to information technology as Indian companies and experts are the forefront of new developments in IT, including artificial intelligence and cyber security.


Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an international security analyst who focuses on geopolitics, military and cyber security issues.

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Wednesday, October 16, 2019

DefenceIQ: A Bright Future for the Signature Management Industry



"A Bright Future for the Signature Management Industry"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Land Force
Defence IQ
October 15, 2019
Originally published: https://www.defenceiq.com/army-land-forces/articles/a-bright-future-for-the-signature-management-industry 


Fibrotex USA, a subsidiary of the Israeli company Fibrotex Technologies, opened a vertical camouflage manufacturing facility in Stearns, Kentucky, on August 29. This new plant should be placed in a wider discussion about the evolution of signature management systems and industry worldwide.
 

Continue Reading....

Friday, March 23, 2018

Diplomatic Courier: The Rise of the Tech Ambassador



" The Rise of the Tech Ambassador"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Diplomatic Courier: A Global Affairs Media Network
23 March, 2018
Originally published: https://www.diplomaticourier.com/2018/03/23/the-rise-of-the-tech-ambassador/


The government of Denmark has sent Casper Klynge, a career diplomat who previously served as the Danish ambassador to Indonesia, to Silicon Valley to strengthen ties between the IT industry and Copenhagen. A Wired Magazine published an article last year, described this initiative with a provocative title: The first Silicon Valley ambassador is out to make nice with tech giants.

Denmark’s Consulate General in Palo Alto is part of Copenhagen’s strategy to approach global technological hubs via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Innovation Centre, which also has offices in New Delhi, Seoul, and Shanghai. Ambassador Klynge’s tasks as tech ambassador are  similar of any other diplomat: “he’s trying to encourage investment into Denmark from the West Coast tech companies, and to promote Danish exports to Silicon Valley StartUps. Along the way, he’s also hoping to push brand Denmark on to the world, convincing them there’s more to his home country than bacon, LEGO and Hans Christian Andersen,” the article explains.

Ambassador Klynge’s deployment could be the trend-setter, as other governments could choose to follow this initiative. On March 1, the Center for International and Strategic Studies in Washington DC organized an event titled “A National Machine Intelligence Strategy for the United States.” During the Q&A section, I asked if other governments could similarly deploy tech ambassadors to IT hubs like Silicon Valley, New Delhi, Shenzhen, among others, in the near future, to establish more direct government-industry relations. One panelist responded that it is important to have “direct outreach from governments around the world to the tech industry because there is a recognition that this technology has so much potential but poorly crafted policy could be detrimental to the development of the technology and to all of its benefits.”

Ambassador Klynge’s new post is a preview of the future of diplomacy. Government-to-government relations will generally continue as normal, with diplomats posted in capitals, trying to cultivate relations with the hosting government and promote their own country’s interests. Nevertheless, technological advances are affecting how diplomacy is conducted, as now diplomats can chat with their home governments instantaneously via text messages or WhatsApp, and foreign policy decisions can be made through the small screen of a smartphone—though of course, ostentatious ceremonies in which heads of state meet to sign major agreements will continue to take place.

Additionally, there is the issue of the rising importance of information and communication technologies (ICTs) as part of a government’s foreign policy strategy. There is growing academic literature dedicated to science diplomacy or innovation diplomacy, like, for example, the 2017 essay Exploring the future of innovation diplomacy by Jos Leijten of the Joint Institute for Innovation Policy. Leijten explains how “many, if not all, developed nations have special offices in their foreign services, which are responsible for science diplomacy actions,” because, as the author aptly argues, “with the rise of the knowledge economy or, to put it differently, with the growth of the role of knowledge as a factor in economic prosperity of countries, knowledge has become an increasingly important issue in the relations between nations.”

Diplomacy is an ever-morphing organism and governments need to adapt constantly in a changing world, especially nowadays. Hence, it is no surprise that commentaries about the future of diplomacy published in recent years stress the need for diplomatic officers to be open to new ideas.
Case in point, some governments may now wish to focus on improving relations with a specific industry situated in another country; hence a local diplomatic office, like a consulate, in situ will be necessary. After all, Washington DC is geographically distant from California, no matter the size of an embassy’s trade and IT offices in the U.S. capital.

The deployment of the Danish tech ambassador offers one additional positive option: Copenhagen can now communicate directly with Silicon Valley companies without having to go through Washington, at a time when U.S.-Europe government relations are at a low point.

Information Technology is a multibillion-dollar industry with hubs around the world. The government of Denmark’s decision to have a tech ambassador directly aimed at improving relations between Copenhagen and the world of IT in the U.S. is an intriguing initiative that could prove to be very (financially) successful. Copenhagen’s move also supports the argument that diplomacy is an evolving field as governments come up with new initiatives to both protect and promote their national interests.

About the author: W. Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.  

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

 The author would like to thank Brittney J. Figueroa for editorial assistance.

Tuesday, February 20, 2018

The Space Review: Latin America’s space programs: an update


"Latin America’s space programs: an update"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
22 January, 2018
The Space Review
Originally published: http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3413/1



Latin American space programs have continued to develop and expand in recent years, with countries like Bolivia and Peru achieving major victories after the successful launches of new satellites. While there has been the occasional loss, like the 2015 destruction of a Mexican satellite aboard a Russian rocket, regional space programs have in general continued to grow, with additional launches planned for the near future.

This commentary is an update to the author’s 2012 article on the subject (see “Latin America’s space programs in 2012”, The Space Review, August 27, 2012), aimed at discussing new developments among Latin America’s programs and what they signal for the future.

Recent successes

This article will not attempt to enumerate every single test and initiative that Latin American space programs have carried out in the past five years. Rather, this will focus on highlighting particular accomplishments by different nations to provide a broad overview of recent developments.

As mentioned in the introduction, two successful launches that occurred in recent years were part of Peru’s and Bolivia’s growing programs. In the case of Peru, its high-resolution Earth observation satellite, Peru-Sat1, was constructed by Airbus Defense and Space and launched from French Guiana in September 2016. The Airbus-Peru deal included the construction of a center (Centro Nacional de Operaciones de Imágenes Satelitales: CNOIS) outside Lima so the Peruvians can control their satellite. The project has generally been regarded as a success, as the Peruvian government has declared that “the investment it has made into the satellite programme has already been recouped,” according to a December 2017 Airbus press statement that also explained that in its first year of operations, the satellite has delivered more than 71,000 images. Peru-Sat1 was also praised for helping monitor the damage caused by floods that affected the country’s northern regions in early 2017.

Meanwhile, Bolivia’s new telecommunications satellite, Tupac Katari (TK-1), was constructed by China and launched in 2013. Bolivia’s space agency (Agencia Boliviana Espacial: ABE) manages the satellite, which is aimed at improving access of Bolivian citizens to telecommunications and media services. It is worth noting that the project has not been without criticism, as an August 20, 2017, article by the Bolivian daily El Deber explained that ABE’s high prices deter some Bolivian telecommunications companies from utilizing the satellite’s broadband services. In spite of price issues, agencies like Bolivia’s customs service (Aduana Nacional) and the state-owned oil company (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos: YPFB) already utilize the satellite, in addition to numerous radio and television stations. The telecommunication company Viva has stated that thanks to the satellite, it can provide better broadband services to customers in rural and isolated areas.

As for Colombia, the country’s domestically-manufactured satellite UAPSAT was put into orbit in January 2014 after being launched from Wallops Island, Virginia. The Colombian daily El Colombiano has described UAPSAT as the “first satellite manufactured with Colombian parts and systems,” albeit with support from the Peruvian university Alas Peruanas.
 
These examples highlight the different types of services new satellites are rendering for Latin American countries, ranging from better access to communication services to helping monitor their territories, particularly after extreme weather events. Colombia’s UAPSAT satellite is also worth noting, as this was a domestically manufactured platform, demonstrating how more countries want to develop their own satellite-building capabilities (more on this later).

In spite of these recent successes, there has been one loss, though not a direct cause of Latin American programs themselves: in May 2015, a Russian Proton-M rocket launched from the Baikonur space center (Kazakhstan) failed, causing the loss of a Mexican telecommunications satellite called Centenario.

The Latin American-Kazakh connection

One aspect to keep in mind is the different launch centers that Latin American countries utilize to deploy their new satellites, such as include China, French Guiana, and the United States. It is also noteworthy that Kazakhstan’s Baikonur Cosmodrome has been utilized by several Latin American nations for launches in recent years.

For example, back in 2007, Colombia’s Libertad 1 cubesat was launched from Baikonur. Four years later, in 2011, a Russian-built Proton rocket launched Mexico’s QuetzSat-1. More recently, in 2014, Chasqui-1, a nanosatellite constructed by a Peruvian state university (Universidad Nacional de Ingenieria: UNI), was launched aboard a Russian rocket. Finally, in July 2017, a Russian Soyuz rocket left Baikonur with a payload of dozens of satellites, including a nanosatellite manufactured by an Ecuadorian university (Universidad Tecnológica Equinoccial) with Russian assistance. A June 15, 2017, article by Russian government news service Sputnik Mundo highlighted that this successful launch meant that for the first time Ecuador had a satellite in orbit that was constructed by one of its universities.

The reason why Kazakhstan is singled out as a launch center is because Kazakh-Latin American relations are fairly limited (see the author’s December 2017 commentary, “The Eurasian Economic Union and Latin America: What could 2018 Bring?”). Hence one strategy that Astana could utilize to approach Latin America is to provide potential customers from the region more cost-efficient launch services.

What will the future bring?

As for future initiatives, Chile is arguably the nation is most need to launch a new satellite, as Fasat Charlie has been in orbit since 2011. Back in 2016, the Chilean media was already discussing when will the government order a replacement for the satellite, but so far no new project has been announced. Even more, a January 2 op-ed in the Chilean daily El Mostrador, which discussed the country’s natural security challenges, called out the lack of progress regarding a replacement for Fasat Charlie. The argues that “so far there is no new information regarding a final decision, even though Chile requires satellites to strengthen its telecommunications industry and to monitor its territory in order anticipate possible natural disasters.” It will be interesting to see if president-elect Sebastian Piñera will make the acquisition of a new satellite a priority when he returns to power this March (he was previously president from 2010 to 2014.)

As for Brazil, in October, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense announced the drafting of a new blueprint to revamp the country’s space program. This proposal includes establishing a national council for space affairs (Conselho Nacional do Espaço: CNE) and an executive committee for space (Comitê Executivo do Espaço: CEE). It is unclear if current President Michel Temer will be able to make this proposal become law, given the year he has left in office, or if a decision will be made by the next president: Brazil will carry out general elections this October and the next head of state takes office on January 1, 2019. The South American giant is well known for its ambitious space program, exemplified by the Alcântara center (Centro de Lançamento de Alcântara: CLA), so hopefully the blueprint helps create a new momentum so it continues to grow. It is also worth noting that there are also plans to expand the CLA’s facilities, but this goal has encountered resistance from the communities that live in the area. Coincidentally, also in October, Paraguay held its first ever conference on space issues at the country’s Central Bank. The landlocked nation’s space agency (Agencia Especial del Paraguay: AEP) organized the event, and brought renowned special guests like Brazilian astronaut Marcos Pontes, to develop interest among the audience members to support AEP.

As for upcoming launches, one country that will have a new satellite in orbit this year is Argentina, as the country’s space commission (Comision Nacional de Actividades Espaciales: CONAE) is finishing the construction of its SAOCOM 1A satellite. The platform is part of an ambitious project between Argentina and Italy to establish a satellite network (Sistema Italo-Argentino de Satelites para la Gestion de Emergencias: SIASGE), and will reportedly be launched out of Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, in August. Similarly, in October, Costa Rica announced the successful construction of Proyecto Irazú, Central America’s first domestically-manufactured satellite. The satellite, a joint project by Central America’s aerospace association (Asociación Centroamericana de Aeronáutica y del Espacio: ACAE) and a Costa Rican university (Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica: TEC), is a cubesat that will be utilized to measure carbon gas emissions. The satellite will now be sent to Japan for final tests before it is launched.
Brazil’s blueprint, as well as Costa Rica’s and Argentina’s new satellites, demonstrate the ongoing interest of Latin American nations to develop their space programs. While these countries do not yet have the capability to launch crewed spacecraft, the fact that several countries are domestically manufacturing satellites is a promising step that should be praised, and also deserves the support of the international community.

Final thoughts

Latin American space programs have enjoyed significant accomplishments in recent years as countries like Bolivia and Peru have modern new satellites in orbit that support telecommunications and surveillance projects, while Argentina, Central America, Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico have domestically constructed their own platforms. There have even been bureaucratic developments, as Brazil is looking to revamp its new space program while Paraguay is attempting to jumpstart its own. Recent years have brought more successes than failures, notwithstanding the loss of a Mexican satellite and the delay in replacing Chile’s Fasat Charlie.
Earth’s orbit is increasingly cluttered with space debris, but hopefully there is still space for Latin America’s ambitious programs.

 

Monday, August 28, 2017

CIMSEC: Narco Submarines: A Problem That Will Not Sink


Narco Submarines: A Problem that will not Sink
W. Alejandro Sanchez
"The Southern Tide"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
24 August, 2017

Originally published: http://cimsec.org/narco-submarines-problem-will-not-sink/33819

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.
“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.
By Alejandro Sanchez
In the past year a number of narco submarines have been seized in several Latin American states. Narco submarines continue to be a problem as hemispheric security forces combat drug trafficking. Unfortunately for every narco sub that is seized, another is under construction. While recent successful operations should be applauded, combating narco subs needs a regional strategy of its own.
This commentary is a continuation of previous articles published by CIMSEC on this issue: “An Update on Narco Submarines and Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies’ Efforts to Thwart their Operational Effectiveness,” “Narco submarines: Drug Cartels’ Innovative Technology,” as well as the author’s “U.S. Southcom vs Caribbean Narco Pirates.” The incidents mentioned in this commentary will focus on events that have occurred over the past year. (The colloquial term “narco sub” will be utilized for these platforms, though we will later do a more thorough analysis of their characteristics.)
Recent Narco Sub Incidents
In recent months, several narco submarines have been seized in various Latin American states. For example, on 5 August, Ecuadoran marines located one in the Las Delicias area, close to the border with Colombia. For Colombia, a narco sub was seized in an operation by army and naval personnel in the San Juan and Baudó Rivers in the Choco department in late July. The platform, which was carrying approximately four tons of cocaine, was apparently manufactured by ELN rebels. The Colombian Navy explained that this was the first time a narco sub was operating in a river, and that it probably took some five to six months to be constructed. Not long after, in mid-August, the Colombian Navy located yet another narco sub, this time in the Nariño department and with the capacity to transport up to four tons of drugs. This one measured 14 meters, with a diesel motor and propellers, the Navy explained in a communiqué.

Narco subs have also been located in Central America. For example, a narco sub, reportedly 16 meters in length and capable of transporting up to five tons of drugs, was found inGuatemala in mid-April. Months later, in late July, the Costa Rican Coast Guard found a similar illegal platform on a beach. Local authorities believe that the vessel, with the capacity to transport up to four tons of drugs, had a motor problem and was discarded by the crew, until it washed ashore and got stuck in the sand.
Catching Them At Sea
The aforementioned examples highlight one fact. So far, the vast majority of narco-platforms are captured in the mainland (meaning either on dry land or “docked” in some body of water), either before they depart or upon arriving to their destination.
As far as the author has been able to find, in the past couple of years, there have only been a couple of narco subs intercepted in open waters. One was in July 2015, when during a “joint operation, the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and assets from the Customs and Border Protection Office of Air and Marine, intercepted a “narco submarine” off the coast of El Salvador,”Business Insider explains. The platform was carrying over 16,000 pounds of cocaine.


More recently, in early September 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Waesche intercepted a narco sub in the Pacific Ocean off the Central American coast. The Cutter reportedly launched two vessels and an armed helicopter in pursuit. U.S. personnel caught up with the sub, apprehended five suspects, and thwarted a scuttling attempt by pumping water out of the interior of the sub.” By preventing the sinking of the sub, the USCG seized more than 5,600 pounds of cocaine, with an estimated value of USD$73 million.

Who Finds The Narco Subs?
Nowadays, several Latin American and Caribbean navies and coast guards are undergoing a modernization process, which includes the acquisition of new platforms. For example,Colombia and Mexico are domestically manufacturing new fleets of patrol vessels. Christian Ehrlich, a director of intelligence for Riskop, a Mexican Strategic intelligence and risk control company explained to the author that  the Mexican Navy is in the process of adding Damen Sigma 10514 frigates to its fleet, “this will provide a decisive boost to Mexico’s Maritime Domain Awareness but unfortunately it will be some time before this system has an acceptable operational level” (construction for the first of the new frigates commenced in mid-August). Meanwhile The Bahamas is in the final stretch of its ambitious Sandy Bottom Project, via which it is obtaining a fleet of different patrol boats from Damen Group. Similarly, in late June IHS Jane’s reported that Louisiana-based shipbuilder Metal Shark and Damen will construct near coastal patrol vessels (NCPVs) for regional U.S. partners like “the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala.” It is worth noting that Mr. Ehrlich, remarked how Mexico possesses aircraft like CASA CN—235 and Beechcraft King Air 350ER for ISR; Colombia also possesses similar assets.
Nevertheless, in spite of more modern navies and coast guards, locating narco subs at sea continues to be a problem. In an interview with the author, Gustavo Fallas, a journalist for the Costa Rican daily La Nacion, explained that “[Costa Rica] depends on the Americans to combat [narco submarines]. In 2006 we detained a submersible with three tons [of drugs] and it was thanks to an American frigate. In 2012 we chased another one in the Caribbean, and it was also after the Americans alerted us. For those reasons it is vital to have U.S. aid to locate these platforms.” Mr. Fallas added that Costa Rica must create a shield (meaning more vessels, radars, personnel) to prevent drug traffickers from using the country as a warehouse or transit path for drugs.
Unfortunately, Randy Pestana, a policy analyst at Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, has a gloomy assessment about regional naval forces vis-à-vis narco subs. Mr. Pestana explained to the author how “relying on partner nations to stop, slow, or detain these shipments is difficult in itself as they do not have the necessary tools to do so unless provided by the U.S.” Of a similar opinion is Mr. Ehrlich, who stated to the author that “there isn’t a navy or coast guard in Central America with the [necessary platforms] to detect, follow and interdict [narco submarines].” 
In other words, Central American navies will continue to rely on the U.S. (be it SOUTCHOM or the Coast Guard) to monitor maritime areas in order to combat, among other threats, narco submarines. This is problematic, since, as Mr. Pestana remarked, even U.S. security agencies have limits to their abilities, particularly nowadays when the U.S. has other security operations and geopolitical concerns around the globe. Furthermore, there is the problematic and ever-present red tape, namely, “the inability of the U.S. to respond to an identified narco submarine without permission from higher leadership. This often led to the narco submarine to either get away, or move out of the U.S. areas of operation,” the FIU expert explained.
How To Find A Narco Sub
Locating a narco submarine at sea is a tricky business. In an interview with the author, Mario Pedreros, a retired Chilean Naval officer and an expert in airborne maritime patrol, provided an excellent analysis on this problem.
As previously mentioned, the term narco submarine is commonly utilized for these vessels, however they are not really submarines. As Mr. Pedreros explains, these platforms are semi-submersibles, meaning that they cannot go completely underwater, and if they can do so, it is for brief periods of time. (“Narco submarine” is still a catchier name than “narco-semi-submersible” though). However, even if these vessels cannot fully dive, they are nonetheless difficult to locate at sea. Mr. Pedreros explained how some of these platforms have electronic motors, which makes them more silent than diesel engines, making them harder to find with passive sonar. “When it comes to semi-submersibles, utilizing  sonar is not very efficient,” Mr. Pedreros concludes. Adding to the problem is that the vessel is pretty small, and “once at sea, the submersibles have 20 percent of their structure above the surface,” making them hard to pinpoint by radar.


Mr. Pedreros recommended maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) as an ideal tool to combat narco submarines at sea, as these aircraft possess superior sensors and radars for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Obviously, locating the target is only part of the solution, because then it has to be intercepted. “The aircraft must work with together with a vessel to capture the submersible. In other words, there are three components in this process: an aircraft (MPA), a vessel, and a light boat that can board the submersible and detain the crew,” the retired Chilean Naval officer explained. As previously discussed, various Latin American and Caribbean navies are acquiring OPVs with attached light boats, while Colombia and Mexico have platforms for maritime patrol, fulfilling the requirements by Mr. Pedreros; what is needed is greater multinational support, apart from additional platforms. 

The Future of the Narco Sub
It would be naïve to assume that recent successful operations by regional security forces will convince drug traffickers to stop investing in narco submarines. There is simply too much money to be made in drugs, and the subs cost only around USD$1 million to manufacture. Even if five narco subs are stopped, drug traffickers only need one or two successful deliveries to make up for their losses.
Moreover, recently seized narco subs show they are becoming more technologically advanced, including bigger in size so they can transport greater quantities of contraband. The narco sub seized in mid-July in Choco had space for a crew of four, measured 9 meters in length by 4 wide, had radars, stabilizers, ballast weights and was powered by over 100 batteries, according to the Colombian daily El Colombiano.
Indeed, the (brief) history of narco subs shows a trend towards modernization, particularly as drug lords are always looking for new methods to transport drugs, from Cessna aircraft and go-fast boats during the Pablo Escobar era to drones and narco subs nowadays (though of course, narcos continue to utilize the former as well). Mr. Pestana drives this home remarking how “top drug traffickers are relatively smart and have a good grasp on technology and history.” Moreover, the attractive wages narco-organizations can afford to pay means that they can hire “former engineers or other trade workers,” as Mr. Pestana explains, to continuously improve previous designs.
Final Thoughts
From a scholarly point of view, the appearance of the narco sub is a fascinating development as it highlights drug traffickers’ ingenuity as they continuously think of new ways of transporting their contraband. Unfortunately, this represents an ongoing problem for regional security forces, as new narco subs become more technologically advanced. Unfortunately, even though many narco subs have been stopped, it only takes one successful trip to make a large profit.
In spite of several successful operations, combating narco submarines requires both a multiagency and multinational strategy of its own. Mr. Ehlrich stresses the necessity to disrupt the construction of these platforms (which requires cooperation between police and military units). As for when narco submarines are at sea, the Greater Central American region requires united front, such as a regional anti-narco submarine task force. By combining resources, in which member states can contribute platforms to create the three-platform interception teams that Mr. Pedreros described, this unit would ideally be more successful at locating narco subs at sea, and not just in inland waterways. This will decrease the region’s dependency on the U.S., which Mr. Pestana and Mr. Fallas highlighted.
Unfortunately, narco submarines are a problem that will not sink, hence new strategies are needed in order to combat them more efficiently.
 Alejandro Sanchez Nieto is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez
The author would like to thank the various experts that contributed to this commentary:
Christian J. Ehrlich, Director of Intelligence, Riskop; External Analyst, Mexican Navy
Gustavo Fallas, Journalist, La Nacion (Costa Rica)
Mario Pedreros, a retired Chilean Navy Officer, expert in aero-maritime patrol. He participated as a Tactical Coordinator Officer (TACCO) in different missions overseas onboard Chilean Navy P-3 Orion aircrafts. Missions include Anti Submarine Warfare, Anti Surface Warfare, Anti Terrorism missions and Search and Rescue operations. He is currently based in Washington, DC. doing consulting for several Defense and Security companies.
Randy Pestana, Policy Analyst, Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, Florida International University
The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Tuesday, August 9, 2016

Living in Peru: Peru’s new satellite to launch in September

"Peru's new Satellite to launch in September"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
August 9, 2016
Living in Peru - Opinion
Originally published: http://www.peruthisweek.com/blogs-perus-new-satellite-to-launch-in-september-110151

Peru’s new satellite is scheduled to be launched from the European spaceport in Kourou, French Guyana, in mid-September. PeruSat-1, the name of the satellite, will be the new crown jewel of the Peruvian space program led by the National Commission for Aerospace Research and Development (Comisión Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo Aeroespacial; CONIDA).
In 2014 the Peruvian and French governments signed an agreement for the construction of PeruSat-1. The satellite was manufactured by Airbus Defense and Space, based on theAstroBus-S platform. A March 2015 press release by the aerospace company explains how “PeruSat-1 is also the first programme run by the Projects Factory, a new and more integrated working organisation in the Space System business unit. This new way of working brings down development and construction lead times for satellites up to 500 kg and optimises their costs, without impacting quality in any way.”
The satellite was constructed at the Airbus facilities in Toulouse, France. Peruvian scientists and officers have regularly travelled to the French city to supervise the construction as well as to receive training on how to operate the satellite.
CONIDA has constructed a new facility to control PeruSat-1, called the National Center for Satellite Imagery Operations (Centro Nacional de Operaciones de Imágenes Satelitales; CNOIS). The facilities occupy 15 hectares and are located in Punta Lobos, south of Lima.
According to the Peruvian media, PeruSat-1 will be utilized for various activities, such as monitoring weather patterns, which will help Peru’s agro-industry and to address natural disasters. Additionally, the satellite will help with internal security, as it can be utilized for border surveillance as well as to combat illicit activities like illegal mining or illegal logging.
When the deal was first announced in 2014, it attracted a fair amount of politically-influenced criticism against the then Ollanta Humala-administration. The main argument was that the satellite was too expensive (it reportedly cost USD$213 million), and CONIDA could have gotten obtained two smaller satellites for the same amount. It is the opinion of this author that the Humala government was correct in acquiring one heavy (it reportedly weights over 300kg) satellite, which will be the cornerstone of the country’s space program for the immediate future.
CONIDA has been busy in recent years as, apart from the satellite, it successfully carries out other projects. In 2013 the center launched its first rocket built domestically. The Paulet 1-B reportedly managed to travel vertically 15km. Additionally, CONIDA has organized workshops on the issue of satellites for defense. For example in 2015, the agency hosted a seminar for members of the Peruvian armed forces, entitled “Optical Satellite Imagery and Defense.”
CONIDA was established in June 1974 by the military government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado. Its staff is compromised of Peruvian scientists, technicians and members of the military (particularly the Air Force). Its headquarters are located in San Isidro, downtown Lima, and it also has the aforementioned testing center and future CNOIS base called Punta Lobos in Pucusana, south of Lima. CONIDA’s current director is Air Force General Carlos Rodríguez Pajares.
While expensive, PeruSat-1 is a major accomplishment for the Peruvian space program which needed to take the next leap forward in order to have a bigger presence in spatial affairs and to carry out more projects for the benefit of Peruvian society. In five years time Peru will celebrate its bicentennial independence anniversary, and it should welcome this milestone by having the Peruvian flag proudly displayed both in Earth and space.

Tuesday, August 18, 2015

Blouin Beat: Mr. Robot: A realistic hacker show?



"Mr. Robot: A Realistic Hacker Show?"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: Technology
August 18, 2015
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeattechnology/2015/08/18/mr-robot-a-realistic-hacker-show/

The USA television network will soon air the finale of the debut season of Mr. Robot, whose popularity has already secured it a second one. This attention-grabbing program revolves around the members of a hacking group called F Society who are trying to bring down a fictitious villain company, named E Corp (or Evil Corp, to its enemies).
Mr. Robot’s main character is a young man named Elliot, a brilliant hacker who has emotional issues as well as social interaction problems. He works for the fictitious Allsafe, a cybersecurity company who has E Corp as a client. As hackers attempt to bring down the all-mighty E Corp, they produce online videos to criticize the company, expose information to get the company’s leaders arrested, and even approach a shadowy group of Chinese hackers for support. (There are various other subplots.) From a real-world standpoint, Mr. Robot is worthy of praise, as it properly exemplifies the complex world of cybersecurity.
One issue that Mr. Robot accurately portrays is how members of FSociety are able to exploit the lack of proper cybersecurity by the general population. For example, in one memorable scene, a policeman picks up a USB from the ground and plugs it into his computer at work. The USB displays a screen for free music, while in reality it is downloading a Trojan.
Luring unsuspecting victims into downloading a file from a website, inserting a USB, or clicking on a link in an email (maybe from an acquaintance or someone offering a one-in-a-million business transaction) is a common practice for cybercriminals. One recent example: Romanian banks being hit by the Tinba Trojan as it expanded via a maltervising campaign. The situation will become more problematic as Trojans appear in mobile apps, which many smartphone users download daily.
Clearly, Mr. Robot is accurate in that it does not portray its characters as omnipotent hackers who can penetrate a law enforcement network with a few simple clicks; rather, they rely on the naiveté of unsuspecting individuals who will infect their computers themselves. (An IT expert interviewed for this commentary explained how, as in the show, real-world police networks are offline systems referred to as air-gapped, and it is popular at IT-security conferences to find ways to break into them.) In fact, the use of USB sticks in the show is probably a nod to Stuxnet, a computer worm that crippled Iran’s controversial nuclear program and was delivered via a thumb drive.
What’s more, F Society’s main objective, to bring down a multinational corporation such as a bank or industrial conglomerate, has appeared often enough in the real world to be the inspiration for any number of Hollywood productions. For example, in 2013 the hacking groupAnonymous published “the login and private information from over 4,000 American bank executive accounts in the name of its new Operation Last Resort campaign, demanding U.S. computer crime law reform.” In other areas of the world, such as Brazil, hackers have attacked government websites. Moreover, Anonymous hacked Stratfor, a renowned global intelligence and security consulting organization. The group retrieved millions of emails, dated between 2004-2011, from the company’s employees as well as intelligence data. The information was then uploaded to the whistle-blowing site Wikileaks.
When it comes to carrying out its operations against E Corp, the hackers of F Society upload videos showing an individual with a top hat and a mask who explains, in a distorted voice, the wickedness that is E Corp. Creative yes, but also relevant. The rise of social media has increased the amount of platforms that hackers can use in order to disseminate their messages to the global masses. Anonymous regularly uploads videos in preparation for, or to report on, some of its operations; for example, in a June 17 video, the group announced its operations against the Canadian government in retaliation for the controversial Anti-Terrorism Bill C-51.
Finally, one notable aspect about F Society is its composition – the group has around half a dozen members, including four men and two women, with ages varying between early 20s to mid 30s. Curious if such gender diversity is present in real-life hacking organization? Not yet. My own research at least seems to show that hackers are predominantly male. Nevertheless, if theInternational Women’s Hackathon is anything to go by, this gap may close in the near future. (Read “Mr. Robot, Ms. Robot” for a discussion on how the show approaches gender norms.)
Motivations are another key element of the show: a few of the hackers question whether they are driven by a need for fame, the desire to bring about an “economic revolution,” or merely to embody the American dream as they perceive it? In real life, hackers’ motivations have been extensively analyzed (with one study dividing them into four categories: old school hackers; cyberpunks; professional criminals; and coders). Mr. Robot takes these nuances into account, rendering its characters more multi-faceted than the stereotypical Hollywood-hacker or socially awkward anarchist with a god-complex. USA’s surprise hit should not be placed in the growing ocean of television shows in which IT-savvy characters are drawn from stereotypical hacker clichés. On the contrary, Mr. Robot succeeds at displaying the complexities of the programmers behind the screen. Moreover, the show correctly portrays several issues of real-world cybersecurity, such as hackers attacking multinational corporations and boldly bragging about it online. In this way, it highlights the ongoing concerns surrounding personal online security. Hopefully, Mr. Robot’s season two continues to portray the intricacies of the hacker world. I, for one, will stay tuned.