Geopolitics: crimes

A Facebook page reportedly managed by or at least linked to Mukhtar Ablyazov, a Kazakh businessman and fugitive, is busy these days, routinely posting criticisms of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, several posts have also criticized the Kazakhstani government, arguing that it is helping Moscow evade sanctions.

Criticism of any government regarding their stance on the war is fair, but it is problematic when Ablyazov does it, as he is accused of embezzling around $7.5 billion from his country.

Monday, February 2, 2015

Interview: LA MENACE DES DRONES

"LA MENACE DES DRONES"
by: Nicolas Berube
January 30, 2015
la presse
originally published: http://plus.lapresse.ca/screens/62ce8842-bb5b-4739-a2be-ac03afd5fca1%7C_0.html

Les incidents impliquant des drones se multiplient depuis quelque temps. Au-delà de la campagne controversée d’assassinats par drones de guerre menée par la CIA dans plusieurs pays du globe, assiste-t-on au début d’une nouvelle ère où les différents groupes terroristes pourront utiliser les drones pour semer la terreur ? Un expert interrogé par La Presse le croit.

NICOLAS BÉRUBÉLA PRESSE

Édition du 30 janvier 2015, section ACTUALITÉS, écran 8

UN DRONE S’INVITE À LA MAISON-BLANCHE

Tôt lundi matin, un drone d’environ 60 cm de diamètre a heurté un arbre et s’est écrasé sur un terrain de la Maison-Blanche. Mardi, la Maison-Blanche a dit que le drone avait été piloté par un employé de la National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. L’homme a dit « avoir bu » avant de faire voler le drone dans le quartier où il réside, près de la Maison-Blanche. Il est allé au lit après avoir perdu le drone, et a contacté les autorités le lendemain. La Maison-Blanche a dit que l’appareil n’avait pas été détecté par ses radars, car il était « trop petit » et qu’il volait à très basse altitude. Une enquête est en cours. La semaine dernière, un drone identique a été présenté dans un symposium par le Département américain de sécurité intérieure : le drone était capable de transporter 1,36 kg (3 livres) de faux explosifs…

Type de drone : DJI Phantom

Prix : 479 $US

SITE NUCLÉAIRE EN FRANCE

Le 1er décembre dernier, un vol de drone près de la centrale nucléaire EDF de Golfech, près de Toulouse, a poussé l’armée française à dépêcher deux hélicoptères de combat Gazelle dans le secteur. Les pilotes du drone n’ont pas été arrêtés ni identifiés. L’incident est loin d’être isolé : c’était la deuxième fois en un mois que la centrale Golfech était survolée par un drone. Au plan national, une vingtaine de vols de drone ont été recensés au-dessus des installations nucléaires françaises dans le seul mois précédent l’incident du 1er décembre, ont dit les autorités.

Type de drone : « Des mini-drones, en vente dans le commerce », a dit le porte-parole de l’armée de l’Air française, le colonel Jean-Pascal Breton.

Prix : indéterminé

FRONTIÈRE MEXICAINE

La semaine dernière, la police mexicaine a découvert un drone qui s’était écrasé dans un stationnement de Tijuana, près de la frontière américaine. L’engin transportait 2,7 kg (6 livres) de méthamphétamine. La police mexicaine a dit que ce n’était pas la première fois qu’un tel dispositif était utilisé pour faire de la contrebande de drogue dans la région frontalière.

Type de drone : indéterminé, mais ressemble à un drone de 3D Robotics, compagnie californienne qui a une usine de drones à Tijuana.

Prix : indéterminé

L’AVIS DE L’EXPERT

« L’utilisation de drones par des groupes terroristes pour commettre des attentats n’est pas de la science-fiction. On sait déjà que le groupe État islamique, le Hamas et le Hezbollah possèdent des drones. Pour le moment, il s’agit de petits drones que l’on retrouve dans le commerce, avec des caméras de surveillance. Mais l’un des dangers est qu’ils deviennent des « drones suicides », c’est-à-dire des drones munis d’explosifs qui vont s’écraser dans une foule ou un bâtiment. Les autorités doivent se préparer à une telle éventualité. »

— W. Alejandro Sanchez, chercheur senior au Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), à Washington, et spécialiste des drones, en entrevue avec La Presse.

DRONES ET SITES NUCLÉAIRES

NICOLAS BÉRUBÉLA PRESSE

Le 1er décembre dernier, un vol de drone près de la centrale nucléaire EDF de Golfech, près de Toulouse, a poussé l’armée française à dépêcher deux hélicoptères de combat Gazelle dans le secteur. Les pilotes du drone n’ont pas été arrêtés ni identifiés. L’incident est loin d’être isolé : c’était la deuxième fois en un mois que la centrale Golfech était survolée par un drone. Au plan national, une vingtaine de vols de drone ont été recensés au-dessus des installations nucléaires françaises dans le seul mois précédant l’incident du 1er décembre, ont dit les autorités.

Type de drone : « Des mini-drones, en vente dans le commerce », a dit le porte-parole de l’armée de l’Air française, le colonel Jean-Pascal Breton.

Prix : indéterminé

DRONES ET TERRORISME

NICOLAS BÉRUBÉLA PRESSE

— W. Alejandro Sanchez, chercheur senior au Council on Hemispheric Affairs, à Washington, et spécialiste des drones, en entrevue avec La Presse

DRONES ET CONTREBANDE

NICOLAS BÉRUBÉLA PRESSE

Type de drone : indéterminé, mais ressemble à un drone de 3D Robotics, entreprise californienne qui a une usine de drones à Tijuana.

Prix : indéterminé

UN DRONE S’INVITE À LA MAISON-BLANCHE

NICOLAS BÉRUBÉLA PRESSE

Type de drone : DJI Phantom

Prix : 479 $US

Tuesday, August 5, 2014

VOXXI: El Salvador arrests Spanish Priest accused of aiding Mara gang

"El Salvador arrests Spanish Priest accused of aiding Mara gang"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
August 5, 2014
Originally published: http://voxxi.com/2014/08/05/salvador-arrests-antonio-rodriguez-tercero/

Local authorities arrested a Spanish priest in El Salvador last week after accusing him of aiding the dreaded gangs known as Maras. Father Antonio Rodriguez Tercero has stated that he only carries out charity work to support gang members who are trying to reintegrate into society.

He was freed on Monday, August 4, though his judicial challenges are far from over.

15 Years in El Salvador

The 38-year old priest, who is also known as “Father Toño,” comes from the Daimiel municipality in Spain’s Ciudad Real province and has lived in El Salvador for 15 years.

In an interview with the Spanish daily El País, Father Rodriguez explained that he came to Central America after learning about the 1980 assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero and the 1989 massacre of several Jesuit priests.

These events inspired him to go to El Salvador to work for peace and address social inequality (For a further discussion of the latter crime, see my September 2013 commentary).

Father Rodriguez’s church is located in Mejicanos, a municipality close to San Salvador. One of the social programs he carries out is helping former gang members reintegrate themselves into society.

The Facts As We Know Them

The office of El Salvador’s Attorney General has accused Father Rodriguez of smuggling illicit objects, such as mobile phones, into prisons. They also argue that the priest has illicit associations with gang members like Carlos Ernesto Mojica Lechuga, a well-known Barrio 18 leader who is currently in prison.

As evidence of these connections, one of the alleged phones was used to coordinate an extortion operation carried out by Barrio 18 members in Santa Ana.

The Salvadoran police force has monitored over 100 of Father Rodriguez’s phone calls, which seem to be the cornerstone of the prosecutors’ accusations. “Rodriguez did everything that Mojica Lechuga ordered him to do,” a Salvadoran prosecutor has declared.

On July 29, authorities arrested the Spanish priest in his house in Mejicanos. The detention was part of a raid in which police forces apprehended 127 individuals throughout the country, charging them with different crimes. Father Rodriguez was held in the “División Central de Investigaciones,” and it was here that Spanish diplomats visited the priest.

Father Rodriguez’ arrest prompted social demonstrations in his native country. On August 3, around three hundred people protested in Daimiel, demanding his release. Daimiel’s mayor, as well as a former gang member who now lives in Spain, spoke in favor of the incarcerated priest.

Likewise, El Salvador’s Catholic Church has declared its support for Father Rodriguez.

El Salvador’s Archbishop Jose Luis Escobar Alas explained to the press that it is important “to recognize all the good work Father Rodriguez has done […] on behalf of the poor via his church’s social program.”

Out Of Prison, Not Out Of Trouble

The Salvadoran media reported that Father Rodriguez’ hearing ended at 3 AM on August 4. While the prosecution stressed his ties with leaders of the maras, a judge granted him conditional liberty.

The website ElSalvador.com has a video of Father Rodriguez after he was released. He appeared to be in good health and explained to the press that “the [judicial] process will continue.”

According to La Prensa Gráfica, Father Rodriguez is not allowed to leave the country or have associations with any gang members, and he must return to court whenever needed. At the time of this writing, Salvadoran prosecutors have officially charged the Spanish priest though it is unclear if he is still free or if he has been arrested once again.

Political Motivations?

In March 2012, El Salvador’s two major maras––Barrio 18 and Mara Salvatrucha––signed a historic peace agreement with the help of the country’s Catholic Church. Months after the truce came into effect crime, particularly homicides, dropped drastically. Nevertheless, recent reports highlight that gang violence is on the rise once again.

Naturally, the Spanish media has taken an interest in this case. The opening sentence of a July 30 article in El País states that, “El Salvador had a shocking morning,” when the country learned about Rodriguez’ arrest. The article later describes Rodriguez as having been a “heavyweight” in 2012.

A recent article by the Inter Press Service also discusses Father Rodriguez’s role in the peace negotiations, explaining how the Spanish priest initially critiqued the peace agreement but eventually came to support it.

Innocence in El Salvador

Many praise Father Rodriguez for his role to achieve peace between gangs in El Salvador. However, his connections to El Salvador’s Barrio 18 have ultimately landed him in prison. Those following the story still do not know whether the accusations are politically motivated or if in fact Father Rodriguez is actively helping gang members.

The Spanish daily El Día quotes a Salvadoran priest who recently declared that the arrest of Father Rodriguez “is a type of social or political pressure” because of his close relationship with the country’s gangs.

Civic society and religious institutions in El Salvador and in Spain are generally on Father Rodriguez’ side, but their support is not enough to be safe in a country like El Salvador.

Monday, June 23, 2014

Blouin Beat: Politics - Big sanctions delisting sign of moribund Cali Cartel?

"Big Sanctions delisting Sign of Moribund Cali Cartel?"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: Politics
June 23, 2014
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatpolitics/2014/06/23/big-sanctions-delisting-sign-of-moribund-cali-cartel/

On June 19 the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced that it had removed 308 “individuals and entities from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list (SDN List)” – people and groups that were regarded as affiliated with the Cali Cartel, a Colombian drug trafficking organization. This is the largest single delisting (as Treasury’s release points out) in the history of the Treasury Department’s sanctions programs.

The reason for the delisting? According to Treasury, the Cali Cartel has suffered a financial collapse.

A quick overview of this world-famous criminal entity is in order. The cartel emerged during the 1980s, obtaining its name due to its origins in Cali, a city in Western Colombia. At the height of its power, the syndicate was a strong opponent to the Medellin Cartel, led by the infamous Pablo Escobar. (See this August 1988 report from El Pais). Print media from the late 1980s and early 1990s also recount the influence of this dangerous organization. In 1995, the U.S. government declared that the Cali Cartel was responsible for 80% of the cocaine being trafficked into the country.

But over the next decade, the Cali Cartel suffered various defeats, both at the hands of rival criminal groups and operations by the U.S.-backed Colombian security agencies. Extradition hurt the group as well: in December 2004, Cartel boss Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela (AKA “The Chess Player”) was extradited to the U.S. This was a significant development: Orejuela was the biggest Colombian drug player extradited up until that point in time — he was wanted by the U.S. on charges of cocaine trafficking and money laundering. In 2006, Gilberto and his brother Miguel, who had also been extradited, declared themselves guilty of trafficking cocaine in a Miami court. They were sentenced to 30 years in prison. (I would recommend reading Los Rodriguez Orejuela: El Cartel de Cali y Sus Amigos for more information about the life and crimes of the Orejuela family and the Cali Cartel).

The Colombian media has been quick to report the decision of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to remove the 308 names from its sanctions list. The renowned Colombian magazine Semana has extensively discussed the cartel’s historical influence in the South American country. It explains that the cartel had a “spider web” of enterprises under its control, such as investment firms and a chain of drug stores called Drogas La Rebaja. Even more, the popular Colombian football team America de Cali was also placed in OFAC’s list of sanctions in 1997, when U.S. officials demonstrated that the club was a conduit in the cartel’s money laundering operations — it was controlled by the aforementioned Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela, who had purchased the team in the early 1980s. The club spent 16 years on OFAC’s list and was finally removed in 2013.

It is important to note how the removal of these 308 names from OFAC’s list is being reported. Understandably, the Treasury press release has an optimistic tone, arguing “the primary goal for sanctions is behavioral change; the people and entities delisted today credibly showed that they have stopped engaging in sanctionable activities.” On the other hand, a Semana commentary is more ironic, stating that the “paradox” of the end of the Cali Cartel is that while Miguel and Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela, along with five of their children, are now in prison, the enterprises that were founded with drug-money and utilized for criminal ventures “are now in ‘liberty.’”

Ultimately, the legacy of the apparently defunct cartel will be one of violence. A December 2013 report in El Pais discusses the scars that that city of Cali still has to live with due to the cartel wars in the 1980s and 1990s. Namely, the article mentions the explosion of a car bomb in Cali on May 13, 1990, allegedly carried out by the Medellin Cartel during its turf war with the Cali Cartel. The attack killed nine and injury 45 people.

It is debatable to what extent OFAC is correct in removing those 308 names from its list of sanctioned entities and persons, particularly as the Colombian media hints that they profited from drug-money. We will have to trust that the OFAC’s sources are reliable and those involved are no longer associated with illicit activities. Stranger things have happened.

Wednesday, June 18, 2014

VOXXI: Bolivian gang members create a lost generation

"Bolivian Gang Members create a Lost Generation"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
June 18, 2014

The Bolivian government claims an alarming 10,500 Bolivian teenagers are gang members, comprising most of the Andean nation’s major cities, including La Paz.

These statistics show that Bolivia could be experiencing a “lost generation” of young Bolivians who are not productive members of society. With the upcoming elections in October, the next government –whether President Evo Morales is re-elected or not–will hopefully prioritize internal security and social programs to aid the country’s youth. But this is unlikely.

Looking under the statistical hood

Some statistics are necessary to place the aforementioned estimate into proper perspective. According to a2012 census, Bolivia’s total population was at most, 10.496 million citizens. By 2014, let’s estimate that it has already surpassed 10.5 million. Women account for the majority, with 5.255 million female citizens compared to 5.240 million males.

A January 7, 2014, report in Bolivian daily La Razon regarding age demographics shows that the Bolivian population under 15 years of age is just over 3.2 million (31.6% total population), while an additional million are between 15-19 years old.

In other words, Bolivia has a significantly young population; hence it’s increasingly problematic that more and more young Bolivians are joining gangs. “La Razon” explains that Bolivian security agencies have arrested gang members who are as young as 13 years of age.

A report by the Bolivian think tank Observatorio Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana (ONSC – National Observatory of Citizen Security) estimates that, based on data provided by the Bolivian Police, some 762 gangs exist in the capitals of most parts of the country.

Most gangs have approximately 50 members, though an estimated 10% have more than 50 members. TheBolivian ombudswoman Shirley Pardo explains that 34% of gangs in Bolivia are located in La Paz, 22% in Santa Cruz, and 14% in Cochabamba.

When breaking the gangs down by gender, 79% of gang members are male while 21% are female. It is worth highlighting that in spite of this gender difference, at least one all-female gang exists. The group is called “Bola 8-M” and seems to operate in the Pampa de la Isla township, in the department of Santa Cruz.

According to the ONSC, between 2011-2013, 17.2% of the gangs carried out fights with other criminal groups and committed crimes including robbery and vandalism. Tragically, fights between gangs tend to end in murder.

For example, in early May, a 16 year old gang member was killed during a fight with a 23 year old rival gang member, who stabbed him multiple times in his left thigh, causing him to bleed to death. There are also reports of gang members fighting with law enforcement agents, as the former tend to outnumber the latter.

Things to come with gangs?

The extent of the unfortunate situation in Bolivia is not easy to predict and it would be unhelpful to be overly pessimistic or exaggeratory.

On the one hand, Bolivian gangs tend to be small (to the extent that 50 members in a gang can be considered small) and operate in specific neighborhoods. In other words, we are not (yet) witnessing the creation of one gang with branches in various cities across the country or abroad, such as the maras in Central America.

That is the good news.

The bad news is how powerful Bolivian gangs could become if the Bolivian government and society in general are not able to reintegrate these young men and women back into society.

One particular concern is that foreign criminal entities may attract Bolivian gangs to become their proxies. The online security news agency InSightCrime has discussed reports that a Brazilian prison gang, the Primeiro Comando da Capital, is increasing its presence in Bolivia.

Additionally, Bolivia remains a major producer of cocaine, and acts as a stopover for Peruvian cocaine traveling to Brazil and Paraguay. Closer relations between Peruvian drug syndicates and Bolivian drug traffickers and gangs are also a problematic scenario.

As for the government’s response, occasional legislations to crack down on gangs have been debated in the Bolivian congress to no major avail. Increasing the size and capabilities of the Bolivian police force is another logical option, particularly as a report by La Razon found severe personnel problems with police stations in La Paz; some stations only have one to three officers.

This past 14-15 of June, Bolivia hosted a major international summit of the G77 + China group. In order to prepare the city of Santa Cruz for the meeting, law enforcement agents cracked down on the city’s gangs and illegal migrants. This sounds eerily familiar to Brazil’s initiatives of pacifying favelas prior to the start of the ongoing World Cup and the 2016 Rio Olympics.

The G77 + China summit was a success for the country’s government, but the existence of gangs, and the reasons why young Bolivians are joining them, persists. Hopefully the Bolivian government is thinking outside the box about long-term solutions to address this issue. But the little that has been reported gives us little reason to be hopeful.