Showing posts with label separatism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label separatism. Show all posts

Sunday, May 10, 2026

E-International Relations: "Opinion – Moldova: Between Ambitious Plans and Present-Day Challenges"

 

 


 

"Moldova: Between Ambitious Plans and Present-Day Challenges"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Opinion

E-International Relations

8 May 2026

Published: https://www.e-ir.info/2026/05/08/opinion-moldova-between-ambitious-plans-and-present-day-challenges/ 

 Resolving the Republic of Moldova’s separatist issue and joining the European Union are the primary objectives of President Maia Sandu and her administration. Yet, the war between Russia and Ukraine is a constant reminder for Chisinau that there are serious, ever-present day threats to the country’s stability. Russian drones, water pollution, and energy security are daily threats and concerns for the Moldovan population and government; these challenges could also delay Moldova’s preparations for European Union membership. While Moldova has not become a target of the hostilities, incidents continue to occur. Specifically, suspected Russian uncrewed aerial systems (UAS, commonly known as drones) and missiles have been detected flying through Moldovan airspace, while some drones have crashed on Moldovan territory – a reminder that the frontlines of the war are not far away.

Sunday, April 19, 2026

Global Encyclodia of Territorial Rights: "Moldova / #Transnistria “ #FrozenConflict” and Russia's Invasion of Ukraine "

"Moldova/Transnistria “Frozen Conflict” and Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Global Encyclopedia of Territorial Rights

(Springer Nature) 

 14 April, 2026

Published: https://link.springer.com/rwe/10.1007/978-3-319-68846-6_868-1


▶️ While initiatives to resolve the “frozen conflict” have not been successful, developments across the region have put this conflict at the forefront of European geopolitics.

▶️ Specifically, the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has made Moldova and separatist Transnistria (which borders Ukraine) the recipients of a new wave of international attention.

▶️ Ultimately, the relationship between Chisinau and Tiraspol has not changed, or at least improved, since the war commenced, though the 2025 gas crisis has changed the power-dynamics between the two sides, on Chisinau’s favor.

▶️ Communication between the two sides of the Dniester River continues, but it is unlikely that any breakthrough in negotiations will occur at this time.



Thursday, February 4, 2021

Book Chapter: Moldova's Transnistria Question: is the term 'frozen conflict' still applicable?

 


 "Moldova's Transnistria Question: Is the term 'frozen conflict' still applicable?"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez and Lucia Scripcari 

Separatism and Regionalism in Modern Europe

Chris Kostov (editor)

Publisher: Logos Verlag Berlin (2020)

To purchase, Click here

Thursday, August 22, 2019

Providence: US-Moldova Relations after June 2019


"US-Moldova Relations after June 2019"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez & Lucia Scripcari

Providence Magazine
20 August, 2019
Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2019/08/us-moldova-relations-after-june-2019/

The Republic of Moldova is entering a new era after the events of June 2019, with the rise to power of Prime Minister Maia Sandu, the first woman to ever hold this position, and an agreement of sorts between Washington and Moscow to support the political changes that have been taking place within the landlocked southeastern European state over the last two months. 

This is the ideal time to strengthen Washington-Chisinau relations, as the small European country attempts to become a reliable and stable partner for both the US and Europe.



To Keep Reading Click Here....

Tuesday, January 29, 2019

Diplomatic Courier: Befriending States That Don’t Exist: The Leaders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Visit Venezuela


"Befriending States That Don’t Exist: The Leaders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Visit Venezuela"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Diplomatic Courier
22 January, 2019
Originally published: https://www.diplomaticourier.com/2019/01/22/befriending-states-that-dont-exist-the-leaders-of-south-ossetia-and-abkhazia-visit-venezuela/ 


On January 10, President Nicolas Maduro commenced another term as leader of Venezuela, a controversial development as several governments across the Western Hemisphere and beyond refuse to recognize the May 20, 2018 elections. Hence, Maduro’s inauguration ceremony included the presence of delegations from Venezuela’s few remaining allies in the world. Two individuals whose appearance in Caracas is worth noting are Anatoly Bibilov and Raul Khajimba, de facto presidents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, respectively—two breakaway regions in Georgia.

Even though South Ossetia and Abkhazia proclaimed their independence after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, only five governments recognize them as independent states: the Russian Federation, the Republic of Nicaragua, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the Republic of Nauru and the Syrian Arab Republic. Syria became only the fifth state to do so in May 2018, “in a gesture of thanks to its largest patron of late, Russia. Georgia responded by severing diplomatic relations with Syria,” Eurasia.net explains. A May 2018 article published by TASS, a Russian news agency, also mentions that Tuvalu and Vanuatu recognized the independence of the two regions in 2011, but these declarations were subsequently withdrawn.

Interestingly, the Venezuelan government has not provided much information about the visits of the two leaders to the South American country. A January 10 photo posted on President Maduro’s Twitter account shows the South Ossetian and Abkhazian leaders next to the few other heads of states that were present during the inauguration ceremony. Moreover, a brief press release by the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated January 11, mentions a meeting between Mr. Bibilov and Venezuelan Vice-President Delcy Rodríguez, but it simply states that the two sides “evaluated cooperation agreements.” The same was reported in a separate press release about a meeting between Vice-President Rodríguez and Mr. Dzhumkovich.

Unsurprisingly, the Latin American media covered these visits with curiosity. For example, Colombia’s El Tiempo’s headline was “South Ossetia, the non-recognized country that supports Venezuela.”

It is difficult to believe that Venezuela would have recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia if Russia was not a link between them. The decision by the Venezuelan government to do so in 2009 was influenced by then-President Hugo Chávez’ intention to strengthen relations with Moscow—anecdotally, the announcement that Caracas was going to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia occurred when Mr. Chavez visited the Russian capital. Nevertheless, since that declaration, there has been little, if any, contact between these governments other than a 2010 visit by then-Presidents Sergei Bagapsh and Eduard Kokoity, of Abkhazia and South Ossetia respectively, to Caracas and Managua. Trade between Venezuela and the two separatist regions appears to be non-existent.

It is unlikely that other governments from the Western Hemisphere will recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia. There might have been a slight chance of that occurring a decade ago, when President Chavez was still around and there were several Chávez-friendly leaders in the region, such as Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Lula da Silva in Brazil or Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina. However, in 2019 the region, including the three aforementioned nations, is populated by generally Washington-friendly leaders, which makes the recognition of pro-Moscow separatist regions unthinkable.

Recognition is an important part of a country’s diplomatic toolkit. One obvious example is the Republic of China/Taiwan, which has lost a plethora of allies in recent years, including the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama, as the governments decide to establish relations with the People’s Republic of China in order to benefit from access to the Chinese market and financial aid from the Asian giant.

In the case of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, neither Nicaragua nor Venezuela benefit directly from having relations with the tiny breakaway regions (South Ossetia’s population is around 50 thousand), but rather the objective is to cement relations with Moscow. Interestingly, in spite of recognition by Caracas, Managua, and most recently by Damascus (which has received substantial Russian support during its ongoing war), other close Russian allies like Belarus have not recognized the separatist states.

The support from South Ossetia and Abkhazia for the Maduro regime is symbolic at best, and this is essentially the most Venezuela can hope for from the international community in general. The limited number of heads of state and delegations that traveled to Caracas for the January ceremony highlights Venezuela’s dire situation in the diplomatic world nowadays.

About the author: Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.


Tuesday, June 9, 2015

Monday, September 15, 2014

Quoted in: Un referéndum histórico en Escocia


"Un Referendum Historico en Escocia"
By: Jose A. Delgado
El Nuevo Dia
September 14, 2014
Originally published: http://www.elnuevodia.com/unreferendumhistoricoenescocia-1853878.html
Este jueves, Escocia decide si se separa del Reino Unido mediante una votación con cuyos resultados está comprometido el gobierno inglés
 
Por José A. Delgado / jdelgado@elnuevodia.com
WASHINGTON.- Mientras en San Juan coquetean con procesos de status que no obligan a Washington, el gobierno británico se ha vinculado plenamente con un referéndum que, el jueves, puede generar un desenlace que no quiere: el voto del pueblo de Escocia a favor de su independencia.
El contraste con el caso de Puerto Rico es marcado. 
Sujeto a las negociaciones de un posible proceso de transición, el  independentismo escocés hace su reclamo sobre la base de una economía sólida y  diversa, con reservas de petróleo, capacidad para generar fuentes de energía renovable y un producto interno bruto (PIB) que proporcionalmente les coloca entre los más altos. 
Contrario al caso de  Puerto Rico, la relación de Escocia con el Reino Unido no es producto de una invasión, sino de una unión voluntaria. 
Antes de 1707, el año en que Escocia se integró al Reino Unido -formado también por Inglaterra, Gales e Irlanda del Norte-, Escocia fue una monarquía independiente.
Su autonomía fiscal, un asunto fundamental del debate, también es limitada, casi sin poder para variar la tasa tributaria que le impone el Reino Unido a sus ciudadanos.
Cuando la consulta comenzó a organizarse en 2012, la percepción era que el “no” ganaría la votación cómodamente. 
Ahora, las encuestas auguran una cerrada jornada electoral que, de una u otra forma, debe cambiar para siempre la configuración del gobierno británico, que en un acto de desesperación tiene a los tres partidos políticos principales prometiendo, finalmente, “máxima autonomía”.
“El gobierno británico pensaba que iba a poder frenar el debate por una generación o más. Pero, también reconoció que este era un proceso inevitable”, dijo el profesor  Jaime Lluch, catedrático de Ciencias Políticas en la Universidad de Puerto Rico (UPR) y autor del libro “Visions of Sovereignity: Nationalism and Accommodation in Multinational Democracies”.
El camino trazado
Cuando en 2012 se adoptó el acuerdo a favor del referéndum, el Partido Nacionalista acababa de obtener mayoría absoluta en el Parlamento de Escocia.
A diferencia del caso colonial de Puerto Rico, Escocia ha tenido representación plena en el Parlamento británico. Actualmente, ocupa 59 de los 650 escaños, una representación proporcionalmente más alta que las demás regiones.
El Parlamento británico retuvo la mayoría de los poderes, pero Escocia, explicó Lluch, “tiene funciones exclusivas como educación, salud, vivienda, desarrollo económico, transportación, y asuntos de derecho, tanto civil como criminal”.
Londres mantiene   el control de las relaciones exteriores, seguridad, defensa e inmigración, además de que limita el poder fiscal de Escocia.
En Escocia, el factor que da mayor impulso a su movimiento independentista no es necesariamente su identidad cultural.  “Lo económico ha sido lo más importante”, dijo Lluch, académico del  programa de Democracia, Ciudadanía y Constitucionalismo de la Universidad de Pensilvania.
Relación entre iguales.
Al convocar el proceso, el ministro principal escocés y líder del Partido Nacionalista,  Alex Salmond, afirmó que “Inglaterra, Gales e Irlanda del Norte serán siempre nuestros familiares, amigos y vecinos cercanos, pero con Escocia como país independiente, nuestra relación será entre iguales”.
En Puerto Rico, los datos del Censo federal indican que solo una cuarta parte de la población de la Isla tiene pleno dominio del inglés. En Escocia, solo el 25% se declara plenamente escocés y la lengua mayoritaria es el inglés. Pero, hace cuatro décadas el 39% se consideraba británico y ese porcentaje se ha reducido a 23%.
“El nacionalismo en Escocia no es el  de un país colonial ni de un país explotado por la metrópoli”, consideró el profesor  Juan Manuel Carrión, experto en asuntos de nacionalismo y catedrático de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales de la UPR.
A pesar del interés que han mostrado en mantener la ciudadanía estadounidense, en Puerto Rico su  apego al español y la identificación  étnica marcan diferencias de identidad fundamentales con Estados Unidos, agregó  el profesor Carrión.
Con una población de 5.3 millones de personas, en Escocia viven 500,000 personas nacidas en Inglaterra que  pueden decidir el referéndum. Unos 800,000 escoceses, que no podrán votar el jueves, viven en Inglaterra. 
Estructura política
Para Lluch, los contrastes entre los casos de Escocia, Puerto Rico y Cataluña, parten de la estructura política y constitucional de cada metrópoli.
Por ejemplo, el Reino Unido fue concebido como un estado nación, no como una nación estado. Nunca han objetado la diversidad nacional.
En Estados Unidos uno de sus lemas es “de muchos, uno”.  “EE.UU. es una federación, que es la quintaesencia de una nación estado, contrario a Canadá y Bélgica, que son federaciones multinacionales”, agregó Lluch.
Hay áreas grises  dentro del proyecto  independentista escocés, pues quieren mantener el reconocimiento -simbólico- de la reina de Inglaterra como la jefa de Estado de una Escocia independiente y el uso de la moneda oficial británica, la libra esterlina.   
“Lamont perdió el primer debate por el tema de la moneda. Sería depender de otro país con respecto a su política monetaria”, afirmó el profesor Lluch, aunque advirtió que una victoria del Sí daría, entonces, paso a un proceso de transición.
La encuesta de hace una semana que abrió la posibilidad a una  victoria independentista levantó temores de inversionistas y el Royal Bank of Scotland dijo que mudará sus cuarteles generales a Londres si triunfa el Sí.
Con la idea de frenar el avance del independentismo,  los tres partidos principales  británicos prometieron a Escocia el 100% de autonomía si votan “No” el jueves. El sondeo del viernes de la encuestadora You-Gov  otorga ahora al No una ventaja de 4%.
La historia de las relaciones coloniales entre Puerto Rico y Estados Unidos apunta a un desinterés marcado del Congreso por resolver el status territorial de la isla.
Mientras en Escocia el referéndum es vinculante y ofrece un cambio de status, el Congreso nunca se ha comprometido a acatar los resultados de  un plebiscito que le ofrezca a Puerto Rico la estadidad o la independencia.
El efecto
Escocia difícilmente cambie el ánimo en Washington.
“No se  va a crear un efecto dominó por otras regiones inmediatamente”, advirtió Alejandro Sánchez, experto  del Concilio de Asuntos Hemisféricos (COHA).
Pero, puede tener repercusiones importantes en España, donde el gobierno español no ha querido reconocer la consulta independentista de Cataluña del 9 de noviembre.
El excongresista demócrata boricua  Robert García, piensa que el caso de Escocia se examinará en Washington a través de los ojos de los empresarios. “Las corporaciones estadounidenses que hacen negocios en Escocia y Gran Bretaña informarán a sus miembros sobre cómo esto les afecta”, dijo García.
Para el presidente ejecutivo del Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño (PIP),  Fernando Martín, aunque Washington prefiera mirar para otro lado, el mensaje de Escocia es que “todos los ríos nacionales conducen al mar”. “Cuando un pueblo se concibe a sí mismo como una nación distinta -subrayó  el exsenador Martín-, la expresión política de esa identidad tarde o temprano va a ser la independencia”.

Saturday, March 22, 2014

VOXXI: Latin America’s mixed response to the Ukraine crisis


Latin America's mixed response to the Ukraine Crisis
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
March 21, 2014
Originally published: http://voxxi.com/2014/03/21/latin-america-reaction-ukraine-crisis/
The situation in Ukraine remains dire as the interim government in Kiev faces the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. At the time of this writing, governments from Washington to London and Berlin are discussing potential responses, including sanctions against Russia.
While Latin America is geographically distant from Ukraine, various Western Hemisphere governments have made official statements reacting and explaining their position on the situation in Crimea. Suffice to say, Latin America is all over the spectrum regarding their support or criticism of Russia’s actions vis-à-vis Ukraine.
Chile and Mexico
Chile is one of Latin America’s current representatives at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) – the other is Argentina. Due to this honor, President Michelle Bachelet, who was inaugurated last March 11 as her country’s new leader, has been placed  in the spotlight regarding the Ukraine.
Ambassador Octavio Errázuriz, Chile’s representative at the UNSC, has declared that Chile supported a resolution, proposed by the U.S. that condemned the referendum that took place in Crimea this past March 16. The Chilean ambassador stated that international law demands “the respect of the independence, sovereignty, and the current borders of Ukraine.”
The aforementioned UNSC resolution was ultimately vetoed by Russia. Moreover, through the referendum, Crimeans voted in favor of seceding from Ukraine to become part of Russia.
Meanwhile, Mexico has taken a more neutral position regarding the situation in Crimea. A March 4th press release by the country’s Secretariat for Foreign Affairs called for dialogue between “all actors within and outside of Ukraine involved in this crisis.”
Maduro: Don’t Mess with Russia
On the other hand, the Venezuelan government has taken a more aggressive stance on Ukraine. In fact, when Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was removed from power this past February he fled to Russia while the Ukrainian congress voted that he was unfit to fulfill his presidential duties – President Maduro used the opportunity to blame the West.
President Maduro stated that Yanukovych’s fall from power was a “Neo-Nazi coup” carried out by extremist groups within Ukraine and orchestrated by the U.S. and NATO.
Such declarations are unsurprising given that the Venezuelan government has accused Washington of fomenting protests in Venezuela to overthrow President Maduro. Three American diplomats were expelled from the U.S. embassy in Caracas this past February.
Moreover, the Venezuelan head of state has come out in support of Russia’s operations in Ukraine. “The U.S. has tried to frighten the great Russia and Putin has come out with his flag of historical dignity,” President Maduro has stated.
Argentina: Crimea = Falklands?
Finally, Argentina has also taken a somewhat bizarre position regarding the Ukraine. President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner has come out to say that the West is applying a “double standard” regarding the Crimean referendum.
Her logic is this: It is hypocritical that Western states have labeled the Crimean referendum as illegal. (U.S. President Barack Obama has declared that the U.S. will “never” recognize Crimea’s secession.)
This hypocrisy forms Kirchner’s point of view: Western powers do not recognize the results of Crimea, but have generally supported the results of the March 2013 referendum in the Falkland Islands. (I discussed the results of the Falklands’ referendum in a March 2013 commentary for VOXXI, explaining that Buenos Aires does not recognize that referendum, arguing that the Falklanders are not indigenous inhabitants of these islands).
Nevertheless, it is important to note that even though President Kirchner does not agree with theWest’s critiques of the Crimean referendum, Argentina voted in favor of the aforementioned draft resolution by the U.S. at the UN Security Council.
A March 15 press release by the press office of Argentina’s mission at the UN quotes Ambassador María Cristina Perceval, Argentina’s representative to the UN, who called for “all Ukrainian parts to stop from carrying out unilateral acts that obstruct dialogue.”
No Unified Stance
As the crisis in Ukraine is not likely to be resolved anytime soon, we will probably see more policy statements by Latin American states and regional blocs on the crisis.
So far, declarations and press memoranda by the countries discussed in this commentary demonstrate that Latin America has no common stance on this crisis.
Moreover, what positions have been put forward revolve around a government’s own ideology or interests as reflected by domestic realities (i.e. Venezuela focused on the coup while Argentina focused on the referendum) rather than the realities of the situation in Ukraine.
At this point, it is highly doubtful that anyone in Kiev, Crimea, Moscow or Washington care much about what Latin American governments think of a crisis on the other side of the planet but that negligence may come back to bite them as Latin American leaders exploit the events in Ukraine for their own ends.
If nothing else, the fact that Latin American states have opinions on the Ukraine and Crimea demonstrate that we live in a shrinking world.

Monday, May 20, 2013

e-IR:On Separatism in Latin America


On Separatism in Latin America
W. Alejandro Sanchez, with COHA Research Associate Kimberly Bullard
e-International Relations
May 20, 2013
Originally published: http://www.e-ir.info/2013/05/20/on-separatism-in-latin-america/


In mid January 2013, the inhabitants of Chile’s Easter Island carried out major protests, declaring that the central government in Santiago had largely forgotten them and had failed to contribute to the island’s growth and development. An article in the British daily The Guardian explained how some islanders had even asserted their right to self-determination, threatening to secede from Chile.[i] The protests eventually dissipated, and order has been restored for time being. However, there is always the possibility that the Easter Islanders may rebel again, particularly if the next president (Chile will hold elections in 2014) does not address the islanders’ concerns.
This article uses the Easter Island demonstrations as a starting point for a discussion on separatism in Latin America. The goal of the following analysis is to begin a debate about the different manifestations of separatism and to describe to what extent these movements have taken place in Latin America. While Latin Americans have suffered many types of violence—narcotrafficking, guerrilla terrorism, and inter-state warfare—over the past several decades, traditional separatist movements have not been as prominent as in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. In particular, Latin America has not witnessed the collapse of existing States along with the subsequent emergence of new countries, as with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the violent fragmentation of Yugoslavia. It would still be incorrect to say that the region has not experienced any separatist movements in recent decades. While many scholars have minimized the presence of Latin American separatist movements, their analyses misrepresent the region’s reality.
New Nations Everywhere
The first era of global separatism began after World War II with a wave of decolonization, which created new States with “socialist” orientations. Socialism was considered the best political tool available for resisting “imperialism.” This first type of separatism did not appear in Latin America outside of the Caribbean due primarily to three characteristics shared among the region’s diverse ethnic groups, mainly of American, Asian, and African descent: (1) politically organized into republics; (2) a common language (Spanish or Portuguese); and (3) a common religion (Catholicism).
The end of the Cold War signaled the rise of a new brand of separatism in Europe and Africa, which aimed to overthrow a plethora of dictatorships and one-party States. Accordingly, the democratization of the Soviet Union (USSR) under Mikhail Gorbachev laid the foundation for separatist movements in the Balkans.[ii] Supporters of these movements believed that a State would be more successful politically and economically if they adopted free-market capitalist ideologies which called for privatization of its national economy and the opening up to foreign investment and trade. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, the Russian Federation emerged as a new State and 14 other former USSR members became independent, including the Baltic region, South Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.[iii]  In addition, in 1993, Czechoslovakia broke apart into two countries, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. But, it was the division of Yugoslavia that really exemplified post-Cold War separatism. The term “balkanization” was coined as Yugoslavia violently broke apart in the 1990s and a multitude of new nations emerged, such as Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro. Outside Europe, other nations have also appeared over the past decade. For example, in 2002, East Timor achieved independence from Indonesia.[iv] Most recently, in July 2011, Sudan split into two entities, Sudan and South Sudan, after a bloody civil war.[v] There are also new States that have only been recognized by a very limited number of nations such as Taiwan.[vi] Another recent example of this would be Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two separatist regions of Georgia that became independent from Tbilisi following the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia.[vii] Nevertheless, only a few governments have recognized the independence of these regions, such as Russia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (though even this limited support may change in the future).[viii]
But the global order seems to be perpetually reorganizing itself, and there is a real possibility that new regions may achieve independence in the coming years, either through formal negotiations or violent rebellions, as there are a number of regional and subnational movements with demands varying from greater autonomy to complete independence. Among the new independent States that may appear in the future is Scotland, the citizens of which will vote on a referendum in September 2014 to decide whether their nation will remain part of the United Kingdom or become an independent entity.[ix] However, although secessionist conflicts continue to exist in various areas of the globe, it is very unlikely that we will see any Latin American nations break apart in the future.[x]
The Western Hemisphere and New Nations
When it comes to 20th century nations in Latin America, only a few new ones have appeared in the “mainland” of the Western Hemisphere. The most recent examples would be Cuba, which became independent from the United States in 1902 and Panama, which separated from Colombia in 1903 (a reason for this was U.S. involvement, known as “gunboat diplomacy,” to build the Panama Canal).
As previously mentioned, the post-World War II era saw several European colonies become independent. In the Western Hemisphere, this occurred primarily in the Caribbean. For example, Suriname became independent from the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1975, while Guyana and Belize gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1966 and 1982 respectively. Nevertheless, the independence of Caribbean nations was generally achieved via negotiations, and Latin America (Spanish-speaking nations plus Brazil), has not witnessed separatist wars a laYugoslavia in over a century.
Separatist Movements in Latin America
In an April 2008 article for the CQ Global Researcher, Brian Beary discusses separatist movements across the globe.[xi] Interestingly, when it comes to the Western Hemisphere, only three cases are mentioned: Quebec in Canada, the Lakota Nation in the U.S. state of South Dakota, and the 2008 protests in Bolivia. While Beary describes extensively various separatist movements around the world, he summarizes separatism in the Western Hemisphere simply as, “across the Americas, separatist movements are scarcer and weaker than in Europe, Africa and Asia.”[xii] Nevertheless, even though Latin America has not experienced violent, secessionist-oriented separatism as compared to the USSR, Sudan, or Indonesia, it is imprecise to conclude that separatist movements have not existed in the region. The following are secessionist rumblings and incidents among Latin American states.
Ecuador
In Ecuador, indigenous communities, led by the National Confederation of Indigenous Nations of Ecuador (CONAIE), have suffered a long history of exploitation by European-mestizo elites who violated their territorial integrity and denied them the right to self-rule. Prior to President Rafael Correa’s ascension, CONAIE, directed by its political arm Pachacuti, formed alliances with the country’s urban forces to oust the right-leaning electorate.[xiii] CONAIE was most successful in June 1990 when nationwide protests managed to paralyze the entire country for one week. The event was Ecuador’s largest social uprising and actually forced the government to sit down and dialogue with the indigenous, but it did not eradicate the historical discrimination. Since then, the Ecuadorean indigenous has remained weak and unable to form rural-urban alliances.[xiv]
Today, CONAIE is disgruntled with Correa’s administration whose resource extraction policies have given a number of concessions to foreign mining and oil corporations that have not only undermined the subsistence of local fisherman and farmers but also continue to contaminate the environment, mainly the air and drinking water.[xv] The social group that has benefitted most from Correa’s regime is middle class professionals and progressives from the Quito urban area. They have received governmental preference for salary increases, contracts, and political employment—all made possible by the tributary culture (taxes and revenues) installed by Correa’s social revolution.[xvi] Thus, CONAIE’s separatist protests have been restricted to the marginalized population and easily squashed by those in power.
Venezuela
During the administration of the late Hugo Chávez, indigenous and Afro-Venezuelan communities, which historically occupied the bottom of the social ladder, often demanded greater autonomy. However, the government responded by increasing funding for social programs (particularly in health, education, and subsidized food stores), essentially buying out the marginalized masses and providing only limited autonomy.
Another separatist movement involved Venezuela’s oil rich state of Zulia, which is located on the western border with Colombia. The right-wing elites in Zulia’s government controlled the vast majority of Venezuelan oil production and thus the country’s revenues. In an attempt to achieve a more equitable distribution of national wealth, Chávez intervened in the provincial politics to centralize control over a number of public facilities and spending. The late president justified the executive intrusion by claiming that the entry of Colombian paramilitary forces in Zulia was a national security threat. Furthermore, Chávez, in a clientelistic move, appointed his own followers to provincial positions of power. Given Chávez’s preference to appease his allies, Zulia was not able to increase its decision-making authority.
Bolivia
Probably the closest that a Latin American State has come to breaking apart into two nations in reent memory occurred in 2008 when major protests broke out in Bolivia against President Evo Morales. Bolivia is an ethnically mixed nation, where socioeconomic differences divide the country into the highlands, which are known to be particularly indigenous, poor, and underdeveloped, and the lower regions (meaning in the lower Andes) of Pando, Tarija, and Santa Cruz, which are known to be especially rich as they enjoy natural resources. In May 2008, tensions exploded in major protests as the northern region (known as the Media Luna, the Half Moon, because of the shape it takes) wanted to break apart from the rest of the country in order to keep the wealth they earned from mineral exports. The protests, while they became violent, eventually subsided and Bolivia has remained united. Highlanders, who control the country’s natural resources and thus are wealthier than the indigenous lowlanders, feared that Morales’s efforts to redistribute the wealth more equitably would interfere with their traditional control of land and resources (oil and gas).[xvii]
Other Movements
In addition to the threat of secession by the inhabitants of Chile’s Easter Island, Chile has had problems with another major indigenous community, the Mapuches, who inhabit the southern cone area of Chile and Argentina.[xviii] The group was persecuted under the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet and abuses were committed against its members as some radicalized Mapuches who were members of the Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR) guerrillas that fought Pinochet’s rule. Even today, the Mapuches regularly stage protests demanding land rights, autonomy, and the protection of their historical territory.[xix] It is debatable if the Mapuches as a whole (around 1.5 million in Chile and over 200 thousand in Argentina according to recent censuses) want independence.[xx] Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that a constant demand of Mapuches in Chile is greater autonomy, and some more radicalized members may hope for an independent Mapuche State, like they once had.[xxi]
Brazil, has experienced several small separatist movements, such as the 19th century attempt to create the Republica Riograndense in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. Finally, some members of the Aymara people that inhabit the Andes would like to see the creation of an Aymara state that encompasses Southern Peru and parts of Bolivia and Chile.[xxii] Needless to say, all of these movements have been unsuccessful.
Discussion
Most scholarly research on separatism focuses on areas that have gone through it, such as Africa or the Balkans. For example, Beary’s article mentions separatism in Tibet, Kosovo, and Iraq only in the first page. Denis Tull’s Separatism in Africa, while comprehensive, focuses on Africa.[xxiii] Using a variety of case studies from across the world, scholars argue that separatism generally crops up when at least one of two conditions is present—uneven development resulting in inequalities of wealth, income, and power, and/or polarization of ethno-religious differences, which are typically resolved through warfare and extreme violence. The commonality is that regional separatist movements arise from popular discontent.[xxiv]
With regards to Latin America, in spite of the examples above, what is usually discussed is a sort of reverse engineering situation about what ishappening rather than questioning why something is not occurring. Why, in spite of all kinds of warfare that Latin America has experienced, has separatist violence in the last decades not been as common as in other parts of the globe?
Modern Latin American violent movements have come primarily from movements from oppressed indigenous minorities or right-leaning, capitalist elites—in essence, conflicts between different social classes. In this way, violent groups have not aimed to breaking away from their countries, but rather at causing a political regime change. For instance, Peru’s Shining Path guerrillas aimed to overthrow the government in Lima (the group’s leader, Abimael Guzmán called himself President Gonzalo), rather than create some autonomous state in the Peruvian highlands of Ayacucho. Meanwhile, the Mexican Zapatista indigenous movement, which rose to prominence in the 1990s in the states of Chiapas and Oaxaca wanted more autonomy from the central government in Mexico City, not to secede from Mexico.
The strength of nationalism and national identities in Latin America may also be part of the answer to why separatist movements have not been as widespread in the Western Hemisphere as in other regions. Countries like Argentina, Mexico, and Peru have arguably stronger national identities than, for example, the mixed population of the former Yugoslavia or among separatist movements in India, and hence have a greater affinity towards their countries’ symbols and national integrity. The fact that Latin American guerrilla movements in the 1970s and 1980s fought for regime change instead of separatism or secession may be an example of this. Then again, when indigenous groups feel that the central government does not take their rights and beliefs into consideration, we may see the rise of groups demanding greater autonomy, like the Mapuches and Easter Islanders in Chile, Zapatistas in Mexico, or CONAIE in Ecuador. Historical racial tensions certainly play a role in these conflicts, as they did in the 2008 crisis in Bolivia, where resource-rich and ethnically different regions of the country believed that they were essentially maintaining the poorer regions. It can be argued that separatism in Latin America is due to uneven development, especially considering the numerous governmental policies that finance ruling elites in one region who are involved in banking, commerce, and extraction of low cost resources from another region. The consequence has been the concentration of wealth and accumulation of capital among a very small social group within the country.[xxv]
Finally, it is necessary to highlight an argument mentioned in Tull’s Separatism in Africa. He maintains that in Africa, “one reason for the lack of secessionist agendas may be the robustness of the international norm that protects the integrity of states.”[xxvi] This argument can also be applied to Latin America, where regional organizations such as the Organization of American States, the Andean Community, or the new Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) are less likely to recognize a region that has declared independence from the main government unless this occurred through a negotiated solution, such as the independence of several Caribbean islands from the United Kingdom between the 1960s and 1980s. On the other hand, when the violent protests occurred in Bolivia in 2008, the heads of UNASUR met in an emergency summit in Chile and stated their support for President Morales as the head of a united Bolivia.
Conclusion
For countries like India, Russia, and China that have to deal with separatist movements, a major concern is that of precedent. For example, there was concern in these governments that when new States, such as Kosovo and former Yugoslav republics achieved independence, it would inspire separatist movements in other nations (i.e. the ETA in Spain, Tibet and the Uyghurs in China, and Chechnya in Russia).
Latin American governments, for the most part, have not dealt with this issue, as separatist movements have been very scarce, though there is always the possibility of “what if” radicalized Mapuches begin earnestly and interruptedly protesting and demanding an independent state from Santiago. This might encourage similar protests by the Aymaras in Bolivia and Peru or communities in Ecuador or Brazil. With that said, the authors of this analysis would argue that, in spite of the turmoil Latin America has experienced in the past 50 years, from military juntas to civil wars, major protests, widespread human rights abuses, ongoing corruption and overall state weakness in several States, a strong sense of nationalism is widespread throughout the region, which makes separatist violence less probable than in other areas of the world.
—
W. Alejandro Sánchez is a Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) where he focuses on geopolitics, military and cyber security issues. He regularly appears in different media outlets like Al Jazeera, Russia Today, BBC, El Comercio (Peru), New Internationalist, among others. His analyses have appeared in numerous refereed journals including Small Wars and Insurgencies, Defence Studies, the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, European Security, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Cuban Affairs. Follow Alejandro on Twitter here.
Kimberly Bullard is a Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) where she focuses on regional integration, indigenous and mining corruption issues in Latin America. She has also researched Argentina and the Malvinas/Falklands dispute between Buenos Aires and London.


[i] Legrand, Christine, “Easter Island issues Chile with independence threat.” The Guardian (UK), January 15, 2013.http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/15/easter-island-independence-threat-chile
[ii] Petras, James. “Separatism and Empire Building in the Twenty-first Century.” Journal of Contemporary Asia. 39:1, February 2009, P.116-126.
[iii] “End of the USSR: visualising how the former Soviet countries are doing, 20 years on.” The Guardian (UK).  August 17, 2011.http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/aug/17/ussr-soviet-countries-data . Also see articles on the post-Soviet region by the journal “Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization.” Available: http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/programs/demokratizatsiya.cfm
[iv] Paul Hainsworth. “From Occupation to Independence: East Timor and the Struggle for Freedom from Indonesia.” Institute for British-Irish Studies // University College Dublin. IBIS Discussion Paper No 5. August 2010.http://www.ucd.ie/ibis/publications/discussionpapers/easttimorandthestruggleforfreedomfromindonesia/P_Hainsworth.pdf  Also see David Winning. “High-Profile Visit Gives Growing East Timor Its Moment.” Wall Street Journal. September 5, 2012.http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443571904577631053562009414.html
[v] “Their day in the sun.” The Economist. July 7, 2011.  http://www.economist.com/node/18929477 Also: “South Sudan celebrates a sweet separation.” The Guardian. July 9, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/10/south-sudan-celebrates-independence . “Born in Blood.” Time. July 18, 2011. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2081915,00.html . “Sudan after Separation-  New Approaches to a New Region.” Heinrich Boll foundation.Volume 28. http://www.boell.de/downloads/Sudan_after_Separation_kommentierbar.pdf
[vi] “China vs. Taiwan: Battle for Influence in the Caribbean.” COHA. http://www.coha.org/china-vs-taiwan-battle-for-influence-in-the-caribbean/
[vii] “The Five Day War.” Foreign Affairs. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64602/charles-king/the-five-day-war . “Russia and Georgia Clash Over Separatist Region.” The New York Times. Europe. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/09/world/europe/09georgia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
[viii] “Nicaragua recognizes independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia” The New York Times. Americas.http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/04/world/americas/04iht-georgia.4.15904253.html . “Why Nicaragua recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia.” Abhkaz world. http://www.abkhazworld.com/news/interview/347-why-nicaragua-recognised.html . “Abkhazia: Vanuatu Changes Its Mind Again.” Eurasianet.org. http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66703
[ix] “Alex Salmond announces Scottish independence referendum date.” The Guardian. March 21, 2013.http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/mar/21/scottish-independence-referendum-date . Scotland Referendum. The Scottish Government.http://www.scotreferendum.com/
[x] “A War of Attrition: Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers.” Small Wars & Insurgencies. 19/4 (December 2008). Also “The separatist map of Africa: interactive.” (The Guardian) UK. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2012/sep/06/africa-map-separatist-movements-interactive . The Dividing of a Continent: Africa’s Separatist Problem. The Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/the-dividing-of-a-continent-africas-separatist-problem/262171/ . Separatism in Sudan. http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2011C18_tll_ks.pdf . Also see Tull, Denis M., “Separatism in Africa,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Comments, August 2011, P. 1-4
[xi] Beary, Brian, “Separatist Movements,” CQ Researcher. Chapter 2.  April 2008. P. 108
[xii] Beary, Brian, “Separatist Movements,” CQ Researcher. Chapter 2.  April 2008. P. 108
[xiii] Petras, James., “Separatism and Class Politics in Latin America,” September 21, 2009, http://www.lahaine.org/petras/b2-img/petras_separat.pdf.
[xiv] Petras, James. “Separatism and Empire Building in the Twenty-first Century.” Journal of Contemporary Asia. 39:1, February 2009, P.116-126.
[xv] Petras, James., “Separatism and Class Politics in Latin America,” September 21, 2009, http://www.lahaine.org/petras/b2-img/petras_separat.pdf.
[xvi] Petras, James., “Separatism and Class Politics in Latin America,” September 21, 2009, http://www.lahaine.org/petras/b2-img/petras_separat.pdf.
[xvii] Petras, James. “Separatism and Empire Building in the Twenty-first Century.” Journal of Contemporary Asia. 39:1, February 2009, P.116-126.
[xviii] “Without Our Land We Are Not A People’: Chile’s Indigenous Mapuche Natives Fight A Forgotten, 500-Year War For Self-Determination.” International Business Times. http://www.ibtimes.com/without-our-land-we-are-not-people-chiles-indigenous-mapuche-natives-fight-forgotten-500-year-war#
[xix] Associated Press, “Chilean police clash with protesters during Mapuche march,” Fox News, October 15, 2012.http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/10/15/chilean-police-clash-with-protesters-during-mapuche-march/ , Also see Jarroud, Marianela, “Historic Mapuche Land Conflict Flares Up, Inter Press Agency, January 8, 2013. http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/01/historic-mapuche-land-conflict-flares-up/
[xx] Mapuche Statistics, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, April 11, 2013. http://www.unpo.org/members/7895
[xxi] For further information on the history of the Mapuches, see:  Mapuche History, MapucheNation.org, http://www.mapuche-nation.org/english/html/m_nation/main/history.htm , Also see: Herrera, Alejandro, “The Mapuche in Chile and their Struggle for Territorial Rights,” Institute de Estudios Indigenas, http://www.uwgb.edu/outreach/events/socialjustice/assets/pdfs/herreraMapuche.pdf
[xxii] “Lider evidencia sueno de conformar un pais aymara entre Peru, Bolivia y Chile.” Los Andes (Peru).http://www.losandes.com.pe/Nacional/20110629/51866.html
[xxiii] Tull, Denis M., “Separatism in Africa,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Comments, August 2011, P. 1-4
[xxiv] Petras, James., “Separatism and Class Politics in Latin America,” September 21, 2009, http://www.lahaine.org/petras/b2-img/petras_separat.pdf.
[xxv] Petras, James., “Separatism and Class Politics in Latin America,” September 21, 2009, http://www.lahaine.org/petras/b2-img/petras_separat.pdf.
[xxvi] Tull, Denis M., “Separatism in Africa,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Comments, August 2011, P. 2