Interview: Voice of Russia: Lavrov's Peru Visit Very Much in Line with Past Russian Foreign Policy

"Lavrov's Peru Visit Very Much in Line with Past Russian Foreign Policy"
Interview by Rustem Safronov and Kells Hetherington
Voice of Russia - US Edition
May 2, 2014
Originally published: http://voiceofrussia.com/us/2014_05_03/Peru-Visit-Very-Much-In-Line-With-Past-Russian-Foreign-Polic-2938/

WASHINGTON (VR) — The West and the United States and Europe perceived Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s current tour of Cuba, Nicaragua, Peru and Chile as a response to the large American presence in eastern Europe and U.S. meddling in Ukraine, which has always been regarded as part of Russia's sphere of influence, according to Alex Sanchez, a Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs based in Washington. Sanchez added, Lavrov’s trip to Latin America was regarded as a way for Moscow to demonstrate now Russia can be aggressive and expand its foreign policy and its sphere of influence historically regarded as in Washington's backyard.

 "And I have to just point out,” Sanchez said that “Russia has been paying attention to Latin America and the Caribbean more and more in recent years. For example, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, he was in Peru actually in October or November. He went to Brazil as well and also to Peru. So Peru, I will say, in the past couple of years, Peru has had quite a bit of attention from Russia."According to Sanchez, Cuba and Nicaragua, the latter country, now under the [Daniel] Ortega presidency, have had a history of tensions with the US, but countries such as Peru and Chile have always been more neutral, although their foreign policies have tended toward U.S. appeasement. And he added, this is a big part of the reason Lavrov’s visit to Chile specially was unsettling to Washington.

Radio VR's Rustem Safronov emphasized, in trips such as the recent one by Lavrov Russia has worked to achieve a “multipolar world” as opposed to a U.S. centric one. Russia has a longstanding relationship with the Peruvians, and may be in talks with the Lima government to supply military equipment, including Russian tanks. Peru needs the equipment to fight a war on drugs in the country.

Audio Recording of Interview Available at: http://voiceofrussia.com/us/2014_05_03/Peru-Visit-Very-Much-In-Line-With-Past-Russian-Foreign-Polic-2938/
Read more: http://voiceofrussia.com/us/2014_05_03/Peru-Visit-Very-Much-In-Line-With-Past-Russian-Foreign-Polic-2938/

VOXXI: Politics in Peru and the Twitterverse

Politics in Peru and the Twitterverse
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
January 7, 2014
Originally published: http://voxxi.com/2014/01/07/politics-peru-and-twitterverse/

Twitter has become an increasingly popular tool for policymakers, including heads of state, to communicate with their citizens. However, while some presidential Twitter accounts are used to report a government’s accomplishments and give non-controversial statements, other senior policymakers are tweeting confrontational messages. Peru’s former president Alan Garcia Perez (1985 – 1990 and 2006 – 2011) is an example of this development.

Presidential spouses?

First of all, it is important to explain that article 112 of the constitution of this South American nation does not allow for direct presidential re-election. Hence, current President Ollanta Humala (2011 – 2016) is not allowed to run for a new presidential term in 2016 and will have to wait until the 2021 elections at the earliest to seek re-election.

An additional clarification regarding Peru’s electoral system is also necessary. The Peruvian constitution does not prohibit the country’s First Lady from running for the presidency.

On the other hand, article 107 of the electoral law by Peru’s electoral agency (the ONPE), prohibits relatives of government officials (such as spouses) from being candidates.

In mid-2012, an ONPE official proposed a modification to ONPE’s law (not the constitution) that would allow the First Lady to run, but this proposal was withdrawn in January 2013.

The lack of harmony between the constitution and the electoral agency has created a heated debate, which the opposition parties have capitalized upon to aggressively critique the presidential couple.

Namely, there has been widespread speculation that Ollanta’s wife, First Lady Nadine Heredia, will ultimately run in 2016, creating some sort of presidential continuation via a spouse in the Andean state (akin to the Kirchners in Argentina).

For her part, First Lady Heredia has repeatedly denied that she will run in 2016, and the electoral law (not the constitution) also states that she cannot. Nevertheless, a development that supports the belief that she will in fact be a candidate occurred in late December of 2013, when Heredia was named the new leader of her husband’s political party, the Nationalist Peruvian Party (Partido Nacionalista Peruano).

Tweeting criticism

By now there is already an idea of who the major candidates will be in 2016. Given that there is no limit on the number of times a former head of state can run for re-election in Peru, former president Alejandro Toledo (2001 – 2006) declared in September that he intends to run. Likewise, the aforementioned Garcia Perez is also expected to run for a third presidential term, and true to the essence of politics, accusations of foul play have already emerged.

Namely, Garcia Perez tweeted on January 4 “The President-candidate [Heredia] has decreed that I should be prohibited [from running in 2016]. Press, universities, elections. The plan goes on.”

The “president-candidate” label is an insult to President Ollanta, as it has been argued by opposition parties that, even though Ollanta is the head of state, it is his wife, First Lady Heredia, who actually governs the country. In fact, in a June 2013 poll, 40% of respondents said that they believed Heredia rules Peru.

As for the “candidate” part of the tweet, this refers to the aforementioned assumption that Heredia will run in 2016, in spite of declarations to the contrary. Finally, “the plan goes on,” refers to allegations that the presidential couple are cracking down on Peruvian opposition parties and individuals, as well as censoring the Peruvian media, in order to perpetuate themselves in power.

Moreover, it is not solely Garcia Perez who is tweeting this type of accusations. Keiko Fujimori, daughter of former Peruvian dictator Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) and who lost to Ollanta in the 2011 elections, has also turned to social media to critique the Peruvian leader.

On December 30, Fujimori’s daughter tweeted “President Humala says farewell to 2013 turning away from citizen security and freedom of the press.” The same day, she also tweeted a “request” to the president to not turn Peru into Venezuela (regarded as an autocratic government).

At the time of this writing, Heredia has not utilized her Twitter account to respond to either Garcia Perez or Keiko Fujimori. Nevertheless, on November 27 the Peruvian First Lady tweeted that “la lacra” (loosely translated from Spanish as “the filth”) has infiltrated Peruvian governmental institutions since the 1990s. This was a direct message to Keiko Fujimori’s father, Alberto Fujimori, whose regime was known for its corruption and the manipulation of the Peruvian media, among other crimes.

Dirty politics and Twitter

As 2016 approaches, more candidates will appear who aspire to become the head of state of this Andean nation, which currently enjoys a booming economy. Hopefully the situation regarding the First Lady’s eligibility, or lack thereof, to run for the presidency will clear up as well.

Ultimately, it is a tragic but true to form of most countries’ political systems, accusations of foul play will likely continue as well, not just via speeches at rallies and television interviews, but also increasingly via social media.

Twitter, perhaps more than other social media outlets, has truly become a political tool.

BLOUIN BEAT: World: Peru’s beating the Shining Path, but needs a new strategy

Peru's beating the Shining Path, but needs a new strategy
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: World
August 16, 2013
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatworld/2013/08/16/perus-beating-the-shining-path-but-needs-a-new-strategy/

A joint intelligence operation carried out by the Peruvian military and police has yielded major results in the country’s war against the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, or SL), a narco-terrorist movement. On August 11, a firefight broke out between Peruvian security personnel and a group of Shining Path fighters, resulting in the death of two leaders of the terrorist movement: “Alipio” (Alejandro Borda Casafranca), “Gabriel,” (<Marco Antonio Quispe Palomino) and “Alfonso,” Alipio’s second in command.

The Shining Path is a terrorist organization that launched a so-called “people’s war” in the early 1980s. Its aim? To install a Maoist government in Peru, with its leader, Abimael Guzman, as the head of state (he was known among his cadres as Presidente Gonzalo or Comrade Gonzalo, after his self-applied nom de guerre). After a period of terror throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, during which the Shining Path utilized car bombs as its trademark modus operandi, the group lost what little support it had among the Peruvian population, even as a series of successful security operations culminated in the capture or elimination of major leaders. Guzman was captured in 1992 — and will spend the rest of his days in a Peruvian prison. Another high profile prisoner is“Feliciano” (Oscar Ramirez Durand), who assumed control of Shining Path after Guzman was captured in 1999. The group’s last major leader, “Artemio” (Florindo Flores Hala), was captured in 2012. The elimination of Gabriel and a number of other important Shining Path members constitutes yet another major setback for Shining Path, one President Ollanta Humala and his defense cabinet are trying with some justification to portray as a great success resulting from their effective leadership. After the operation, Ollanta declared to the Peruvian media, “This is a big hit. We have cut the head of the military command of Shining Path’s remnants in the VRAEM.”

This operation could not have come at a better time, as Humala has been critiqued in recent months by opposition parties and has faced protests against some of his government’s decisions. Major popular unrest  occurred just prior to the celebrations for Peru’s July 28 independence anniversary, which was an embarrassment for Humala. The government had also stressed the importance of Gabriel’s elimination, portraying him — the second-in-command of his faction of the group — as military commander, one who orchestrated serious missions. This portrayal is in some ways justified, as Gabriel was a high-profile individual who led major actions, such as the April 2012 kidnapping of over 30 workers in the Camisea region, an incident which brought about a major military deployment in Peru’s Cuzco region. Humala probably hopes that the elimination of Alipio and Gabriel will serve to (temporarily) silence some of his ardent critics.

Shining Path’s future does indeed look grim. The group has been reduced to a few hundred fighters — in a May 2009 interview with the Peruvian media, a Shining Path leader, “José” said that he had around 300 combatants, and this is the rough number still utilized by Peruvian security analysts (the group had roughly 3,000 fighters at the peak of its power by the end of the 1980s).

The group is currently divided into two factions that operate in the Peruvian highlands, one in the Huallaga Valley and another in the Valley of the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro Rivers (commonly known by its acronym in Spanish, VRAEM). Gabriel was the second-in-command of the VRAEM faction, whose leader, Víctor Quispe Palomino, is known as “José” – and is Gabriel’s older brother. For all that, the SL is still operational and capable of sustaining itself financially through drug trade and other criminal activity.

But it is quickly running out of leaders. According to Peruvian officials, the individuals likely to fill in Gabriel’s and Alipio’s shoes are fighters known as “Olga” (Loyla Vilchez), “Lucio” (Franklin Grover Tello Ichaccaya) or “Dino” (Teodoro Benites Bustamante). And while analysts and scholars in general agree that Shining Path does not any longer pose the direct threat to the Peruvian government that it did in the 1980s, that does not mean the Ollanta government will be backing off. There is still plenty of poverty in Peru’s Andes and Amazon regions, which may serve as an incentive for Peruvians to join the Shining Path. Which means that a true defeat of the group will require a two-pronged strategy. A continued military push is necessary, yes – including search-and-eliminate operations against the Shining Path’s remaining leadership. Additionally, increased security patrols in the VRAEM are expected, as the Peruvian armed forces and police are wary that the Shining Path will carry out violent reprisals against local communities to avenge their fallen leaders. But military operations need to be accompanied by initiatives aiming to improve the social and economic lot of isolated and poor communities, a past breeding ground for Shining Path recruitment.

Back in February, President Humala declared that “to solve the problem of poverty [in Peru], one has to solve the problem of inequality, Peru is a very unequal country.” The head of state asked regional authorities in Peru to focus on improving the quality of life of Peruvians (i.e. building water and sewer pipes), instead of building more monuments. On his side Humala has significant financial resources, as Peru has enjoyed years of economic growth. In addition, agencies like the Andean Community of Nations and the European Union are carrying out initiatives to fight poverty in the South American country as well. But the numbers suggest poverty will not be significantly reduced anytime soon in Peru (recent data puts poverty in the nation at 25.8% in 2012) – and certainly not within Humala’s remaining three years in office. Which is going to be major stumbling block in tackling the last remnants of this once-major, but still fierce, terror corps.

VOXXI: Peru’s Protests: Significant, but no sign of a “Peruvian Spring”

Peru's Protests: Significant, but no Sign of a "Peruvian Spring
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
August 2, 2013
Originally published: http://www.voxxi.com/peru-protests-no-peruvian-spring/

On July 28, Peru celebrated the 192nd anniversary of its independence. While the South American nation has enjoyed a fairly productive decade, with political stability and significant economic growth, a series of major protests in Lima preceded and marred the recent celebrations.

These were particularly embarrassing for President Ollanta Humala, since they occurred just days before he delivered his July 28 speech, which highlighted the accomplishments of his presidency.

Nevertheless, Peru is far from witnessing a “Peruvian Spring,” and though the protests are significant, they should not be compared to those that recently took place in Brazil and Turkey.

The protests in Peru

Approximately 8,000 citizens took part in the July 27 protests in downtown Lima (the Twitter hashtag #27J quickly went viral). For the most part, the discontent was directed at a new and unpopular law regarding the autonomy of Peruvian universities.

In addition, members of Peru’s main workers’ union, known as the Confederacion General de Trabajadores del Peru (CGTP), also joined to protest a law regarding civil servants (the Ley del Servicio Civil), which had been approved by the Peruvian Congress in early July.

This marked the third in a string of other major protests that took place on July 17 and July 22 (which also went viral, with the hashtags #17J and #22J, respectively). Protesters also took to the streets in response to Humala’s designated appointments, including the Constitutional Court and the Central Reserve Bank.

There is a widespread belief that these appointments were not based on merit and qualifications, but rather on personal preferences and friendships.

Though the earlier protests were generally peaceful, the July 27 protests took a violent turn. According to the Peruvian police, a group of fans from a local soccer team, Universitario de Deportes, jumpstarted the violence.

The protests by the Universitario fans were aimed at the management of their soccer club, and they allegedly began throwing stones and pieces of wood at the police, prompting the response of the law enforcement officials. Several videos have appeared on websites like YouTube showing the fight between the protesters and the police. Overall, the violence left over 15 people arrested and over 40 wounded.

The protests that have rocked Lima throughout July exemplify the distaste that segments of the Peruvian population feel for certain laws and initiatives recently passed by the Humala administration.

As a final example of discontent against the government, by the end of July, after the independence celebrations, Peruvian nurses carried out a protest in front of the Ministry of Health. A water-shooting police truck was utilized in order to disperse the protesters.

Don’t predict the future

The current internal situation in the Andean country cannot be easily summarized or interpreted. In spite of overall good economic performance, there are still sections of the population that have not benefited from Peru’s good fortunes.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that these social movements are apolitical. Political groups like the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and the supporters of former dictator Alberto Fujimori (labeled as the “fujimoristas”) are suspected of fomenting these protests in order to undermine Humala’s reputation and popularity.

And they seem to be working, as the president’s popularity has plummeted from a stable 50-55% at the beginning of the year down to around 39%.

According to Peru’s constitution, presidents cannot serve consecutive terms, so Humala cannot run for election in 2016. However, there are rumors that his wife, First Lady Nadine Heredia, will try running for the presidency.

If successful, this would represent a nepotism-type cycle of governments, similar to what happened in Argentina with the late President Nestor Kirchner and the subsequent presidency of his wife, current President Christina Fernandez de Kirchner.

Certainly, it is in the best interest of Peruvian opposition parties to tarnish Humala’s image (and indirectly, his wife’s image) in order to have a shot at taking control of the country in three years.

Though protests against Humala will likely continue, Latin Americanist scholars should not assume that they will reach the magnitude of those in Brazil and Turkey.

Even at the domestic level, the July 27 protests cannot be compared to, for example, the protests that helped bring down the Fujimori dictatorship. Moreover, the 2009 protests in the northern city of Bagua left dozens of civilians and police dead (around 38 police officers were temporarily held hostage, nine of which were killed).

In spite of their ferocity, these protests did not spread to the rest of the country. On the other hand, the string of recent July 2013 protests, while large in scale, has not been nearly as violent.

Finally, it is critically important to highlight the perceivably less genuine interests of political opposition groups that wish to harness the discontent shown in these popular uprisings in order to increase their chances of gaining political power in the 2016 elections.

The recent protests in Peru are important, but their significance should not be exaggerated or compared to the major protests that have occurred in other countries in recent months.

Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/peru-protests-no-peruvian-spring/#ixzz2arGN4uHC

BLOUIN: Venezuela’s Maduro attempts to assert his presidency

Venezuela's Maduro attempts to assert his presidency
W. Alejandro Sanchez
BLOUIN Beat: Politics
June 4, 2013
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatpolitics/2013/06/04/venezuelas-maduro-attempts-to-assert-his-presidency/

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has had a rough couple of months. After controversially winning the April 14 elections, he has been trying to strengthen his power in the eyes of the international community. Several nations whose leaders were close to his mentor, the late Hugo Chávez, have recognized Maduro’s victory. And in early May, he embarked on a “good will” tour, visiting Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Nevertheless, other governments are still hesitant to recognize Maduro’s leadership, namely the U.S. What’s more, recent diplomatic incidents, including verbal spats with the governments of Colombia and Peru, are showing a controversial side of Maduro’s personality and testing his leadership skills.

The (latest) controversy with Colombia was prompted by a recent meeting between Governor Henrique Capriles Randonski, the Venezuelan opposition candidate who ran against Maduro in April, and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos. Maduro saw this meeting as an insult to his government, as Capriles has been trying to rally international support to overturn the election results. Maduro derided the excuse that the Santos-Capriles meeting was a “misunderstanding” by the Colombian government, claiming instead that Bogotá is the center of a conspiracy that aims to overthrow the post-Chávez government. In retaliation, the Venezuelan leader declared that his country may review its role in the ongoing Colombian peace process between the government and the FARC guerrillas. It is safe to assume that Santos knew beforehand that a meeting with Capriles would stir controversy in Caracas, meaning this may have been a tactical move by the Colombian head of state to see how Maduro would react. Furthermore, the extent of Venezuela’s influence in the ongoing negotiations is debatable, accusations that the Colombian rebels use Venezuelan territory as a safe haven notwithstanding.

In early May, Maduro also butted heads with the (now) former Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rafael Roncagliolo, who called for “tolerance and dialogue” to stop violent protests in Venezuela after the controversial results of the elections. This statement provoked the wrath of Maduro, who declared on May 3 that Roncagliolo should not get involved in Venezuelan domestic affairs and that “we [Venezuelans] do not care what the Peruvian minister thinks about Venezuela.” As for Peruvian President Ollanta Humala, who was arguably sympathetic to Chávez, he has been ambivalent regarding Maduro. Nevertheless, Humala saved himself from further embarrassment – or at the very least from entering into a new war of words with Maduro – as Capriles decided at the last moment to temporarily suspend a trip to Lima that had been scheduled for Tuesday, June 4. If the Peruvian leader had met with Capriles, we would have witnessed an even angrier Maduro. Meanwhile, some Peruvian politicians have not missed the opportunity to attack Humala over the Capriles trip. For example,Congressman Luis Iberico provocatively declared that “the only reason why [Humala] would not receive Capriles is for ideological reasons or for another type of dependency towards Chavismo.”

Apart Bogotá and Lima, Maduro has been unable to secure high-level visits from Chávez’s friends in Moscow and Beijing.Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev skipped Venezuela when he did a mini-tour of Latin America in February, traveling instead to Brazil and Cuba. At the time of this writing, Chinese President Xi Jinping is on a tour of the Western Hemisphere, with stops planned in Costa Rica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, as well as the U.S. – but no Caracas.

Given that the opposition movement led by Capriles has lost its momentum, it is unlikely that Maduro’s presidency is in jeopardy. And while Capriles’ trips to Bogotá and to Lima, if the latter ever happens, may gain him some international sympathy, it seems clear that Maduro will remain in power as Chávez’s successor. If anything, statements towards the governments of Colombia and Peru may serve the purpose of making it clear that Maduro will not tolerate any questioning of his electoral victory. At the domestic level, look for the pro-government media (read the entire media following the sale of Globovision) to showcase that message to the Venezuelan masses as an example of Maduro’s statesmanship.