Showing posts with label tensions. Show all posts
Showing posts with label tensions. Show all posts

Monday, September 12, 2022

International Policy Digest: Russia is Burning all Sorts of Bridges

 

"Russia is Burning all Sorts of Bridges"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

World News

International Policy Digest

11 September, 2022

Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/russia-is-burning-all-sorts-of-bridges/

Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s former president, made headlines in early August when he published a lengthy statement that labeled Kazakhstan as an “artificial state” and warned Nur-Sultan of a Ukraine-like scenario. Unfortunately, rather than constructive and bridge-building, comments like these continue to create a divide between Russia and its allies.

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Sunday, February 23, 2020

Quoted in: "India–Pakistan Border Draws Attention as US Adjusts Indo–Pacific Strategy, Experts Say"

"India–Pakistan Border Draws Attention as US Adjusts Indo–Pacific Strategy, Experts Say"
By: Venus Upadhayayaya
The Epoch Times 
February 19, 2020
Originally published: https://www.theepochtimes.com/india-pakistan-border-under-spotlight-as-us-adjusts-indo-pacific-strategy-experts_3234449.html



The importance of the India–Pakistan border has remained low for the United States for many decades, but experts say it is gaining new strategic meaning as part of its emerging Indo-Pacific strategy, which redefines U.S. resources and partnerships in the region.

The historically conflicted boundary between India and Pakistan also forms the territorial demarcation line between the U.S. military’s Central Command and its Indo-Pacific command and thus, places India and Pakistan into two separate strategic military zones, according to Kashish Parpiani, a Mumbai-based expert with the Observer Research Foundation.



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Tuesday, January 7, 2020

Quoted in: Iraq Playing ‘Balancing’ Act Between US and Iran by Passing Resolution to Expel Foreign Troops, Say Analysts

"Iraq Playing ‘Balancing’ Act Between US and Iran by Passing Resolution to Expel Foreign Troops, Say Analysts"
By: Venus Upadhayaya
The Epoch Times
 January 7,2020
Originally published: https://www.theepochtimes.com/iraq-playing-balancing-act-between-us-and-iran-by-passing-resolution-to-expel-foreign-troops-say-analysts_3194950.html


A resolution passed by the Iraqi Members of Parliament on Jan. 5 calling for the expulsion of the foreign troops from the country is a “balancing” act between the United States and Iran, according to expert sources who said the expulsion will most likely not take place.


It was then that the Iraqi parliament voted to invite international forces back into the country, to turn the tide in the war against ISIS. The presence of the same U.S. military forces are now a threat to Iraq, according to Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, a defense and geopolitics analyst based in Washington.

“I think this move made sense for Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi and the Iraqi government,” Sanchez told The Epoch Times.

“If U.S. troops do depart Iraq, any retaliatory operations from Iran against U.S. assets will, at least, not occur in Iraqi soil,” said Sanchez.



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Friday, February 8, 2019

Defence iQ: Is heavy armour obsolete? The view from Latin America


"Is heavy armour obsolete? The view from Latin America"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez and Samuel Casey
Defence iQ
7 February, 2019
 Originally published: https://www.defenceiq.com/armoured-vehicles/articles/is-heavy-armour-obsolete-the-view-from-latin-america


Defence iQ has recently hosted the International Armored Vehicle event and one of the big takeaways was the focus on mobility and modularity for tomorrows armoured vehicles. So, we ask: “Is the tank becoming obsolete for today's battlefields?”

For the U.S, military planners will have to reconsider their procurement needs in the near future in the context of U.S. security concerns and the likelihood that urban warfare will become more common over the next decade. However, what is the view from the Latin American perspective?

Latin American nations are decommissioning outdated models and replacing them with more modern machines. For example, Brazil is undergoing a modernisation program, which includes the revitalization of M60 combat vehicles, Leopard 1A1 and M113 armoured vehicles, greatly enhancing the effectiveness of its two tank battalions. 

Furthermore, Brazil recently donated a number of tanks to Uruguay.  Future acquisitions also need to take into account regional geopolitics, the likelihood of war and the technology of armoured vehicles itself. What is the future of heavy armour in Latin America?

Lessons from recent conflicts in Latin America

The last inter-state war between two Latin American states was the short 1995 border conflict between Ecuador and Peru. Other regional conflicts in the post-World War II era were the Falklands/Malvinas war between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982; the 1981 border conflict between Ecuador and Peru; and the 1969 Soccer War between El Salvador and Honduras.

Meanwhile, the U.S. military’s most recent interventions in the region were in Haiti in 1994 (Operation Uphold Democracy) and in Panama in 1989 (Operation Just Cause).

While there are ongoing border disputes (e.g. Bolivia and Chile or Guyana and Venezuela) and tensions (mostly coming out of Venezuela these days), security threats in the region are generally insurgent in nature. For example, terrorist movements like Colombia’s ELN and EPL, Peru’s Shining Path, or Paraguay’s EPP; narco-cartels in Mexico; or organised gangs such as the Maras in Central America or the Primero Comando da Capital in Brazil. These entities are highly mobile and operate in isolated regions or in urban areas.

Recent Tank Acquisitions in Latin America

Latin American governments continue to acquire new (or used) platforms for their armed forces, but heavy armour is not purchased particularly often.  Some recent deals worth noting are:
  • In December 2018, the Brazilian Army completed the transfer of 25 M41C light tanks to the Uruguayan army. “Of the 25 vehicles, 15 were completely refurbished by Brazil while the remaining 10 will be used for parts. Those that will remain intact will be assigned to armoured infantry units, which currently use M24 light tanks,” Jane’s explains.
  • In 2016, Russia delivered 50 T-72B1 tanks to Nicaragua. The platforms are “an upgrade of the 1970s-era main battle tank and feature explosive reactive armour and thermal weapon sights, among other improvements.”
  • Venezuela has received a plethora of Russian weaponry over the past couple of decades, though these deals have been quite scarce in recent years due to Caracas’ financial crisis. Amongst the acquisitions are T-72 tanks, as well as infantry fighting vehicles like the BMP-3M, and an array of transport vehicles.

"Latin American governments continue to acquire new (or used) platforms for their armed forces, but heavy armour is not purchased particularly often"

As for other nations, while no other major sales have occurred, there are ongoing reports about armoured vehicles in need of modernization or replacement. For example, Chile possesses Leopard 2A4 tanks, and it will be interesting if they will be upgraded anytime soon, given that the Chilean government is replacing the famous Copper Law, which helps fund the Ministry of Defence. Meanwhile, Peru has yet to find a replacement for its old T-55 tanks, while Ecuador recently upgraded several AML and M113 A2 Plus armoured vehicles, as the country does not possess heavy armour.

As for Mexico, its fleet consists of light and medium armoured vehicles. Finally, Colombia also possesses light armoured vehicles; for example, media reports published in late January show vehicles that appear to be the EE-09 Cascavel, a 6x6 light tank, on patrol in urban areas close to the border with Venezuela.

Latin American Armoured Vehicle Requirements 

The intrastate conflict that has plagued many Latin American countries is one of the strongest drivers for defence spending.  Many countries continue to acquire new (or refurbished) platforms, such as Brazil’s new carrier Atlantico, Chile’s new Sikorsky S-70i Blackhawk helicopters, Argentina’s used AB-206 helicopters, or Mexico’s new patrol vessel Reformador. As for Peru, the Andean state has commenced the construction of a second landing platform vessel, BAP Paita. However, when it comes to heavy armour (or even medium armour) new contracts have been quite scarce in recent years.

One argument in favour of procuring heavy armour is so that nations can maintain minimal deterrence capabilities. While interstate warfare is very unlikely, it does not mean that the scenario is impossible. The Venezuelan government’s behaviour, particularly during the 2008 crisis in the Andes is an example of this ever-present possibility. Nevertheless, given the region’s current peaceful status, limited defence budgets and other security threats, it is understandable that regional governments have other priorities. Moreover, the focus for Latin American governments is the acquisition of multipurpose platforms, which can be utilized not solely for war.

This is exemplified by the new vessels the region is acquiring (or domestically manufacturing) which can be utilized for military and peaceful operations, such as combating maritime crimes (like illegal fishing) and transporting supplies to areas affected by natural disasters. Helicopters can similarly be utilized to transport medical personnel and supplies to remote areas after disasters occur, not just troops.

As for armour, personnel carriers have been recently utilized in Brazil and Peru as part of emergency and support operations to help civilian populations. It is their flexibility to have multiple uses that makes them attractive to civilian and military leaders alike. The problem with heavy armour is that it is difficult for the main battle tank to have another use other than what it was designed for. “A tank cannot carry humanitarian assistance, so it is difficult for us to convince our civilian leaders of the need to buy new ones in times of peace,” explained a Latin American military officer interviewed by the authors.

Nevertheless, when it comes to armoured vehicles, just like any other system, it is important to have a vision of the future and to carry out a cost-benefit analysis regarding weapons acquisition. In terms of life-cycle cost, it is more expensive and difficult to maintain heavy tanks that were designed in the 1950s-1970s, than to repair more modern equipment. Purchasing a tank is not a one-time payment, as this platform demands continual upgrades of its systems, armour, chassis, and weapons. This can often spiral and stakeholders become politically and financially tethered to projects making them hard to abandon. 

A great example of this is the modernization process of the M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks for the US and the Challenger 2 for the UK.  However, vehicles that were designed in the 1950s and 1960s have incredibly low survivability compared to modern assets. Even though Latin American governments may not want to upgrade their heavy armour, it may be financially advisable.

Geography is also an issue that influences the procurement of heavy weaponry. In spite of technological advances that make modern tanks able to operate in harsher conditions, it is difficult to justify the use of the main battle tank in insurgency operations. Brazilian, Colombian or Peruvian policymakers would traditionally use a combined force of infantry, light armoured vehicles and helicopters. 

As for urban warfare, light armour seems to be the norm, and, as previously mentioned, the Colombian army sent 6x6 light armoured vehicles in a routine operation through a Colombian town in late January. Light 8x8 armoured personnel carriers were also utilized in Rio de Janeiro as part of the Brazilian armed forces’ operations to combat criminal gangs in the city’s shantytowns (known as favelas). In these instances, The authors have been unable to find any incidents of explosives, such as rocket-propelled grenades, that were utilized against these platforms, however, this is an obvious concern. Theoretically heavy armoured could have been utilized in some of the wider streets though.

Lastly, we must remember that mobility has become a key requirement. If a tank is utilized in a cavalry role, it must be fast to deploy and able to pry open the enemy lines.

However, in a "rapid action response" scenarios that often faces many Latin American states, the main battle tank is unable to give commanders the ability to react to crises in remote areas with a flexible set of capabilities that can be tailored to the situation.

Similarly,  a command vehicle must be able to move about relatively unnoticed so as to not draw fire. Finally,  if a tank is used to strengthen a position, it must be tough enough and hit hard enough to win the fight. If a vehicle can’t manoeuvre because it is highly visible, or too slow to break contact then the effect is the same: your opponents locate you and bad things happen. Designing your system to be mobile enough to accomplish your mission is an absolute necessity.

Final Thoughts

Armour can be versatile, but going forward in the Latin American theatre, given the region’s clear-and-present dangers, it is difficult to make case for the acquisition of heavy armour in comparison to light platforms. Platforms with higher tactical and strategic mobility can be deployed in constrictive urban areas, or other assets that have multipurpose uses, such as personnel carriers, helicopters or ships.

Latin American countries need armoured vehicles that fit their own unique requirements. As financial and political will is often scarce, investing in new main battle tanks can be hard to justify as a more pop allocation of resources on a system that is singular in use and cannot adequately combat the most pressing threats.

While military cautions about being prepared to protect sovereignty against a country or group of countries, it rightfully remains primarily focused on more realistic security challenges, and to meet these challenges a mobile that is able to engage in non-traditional conflicts is needed.

About the Authors:
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military and cybersecurity issues. 

Samuel Casey has been an enlisted soldier in the South Carolina Army National Guard for eight years. He has his undergraduate degree in Intelligence and National Security Studies from Coastal Carolina University and works as a Contractor in Charleston, SC.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not reflect those of any institutions with which the author are associated.





Sunday, April 27, 2014

Interview: Cuba-US Relations Still Stuck In Cold War


"Cuba-US Relations Still Stuck In Cold War"
By: Rustem Safronov

Voice of Russia - US Edition
April 26, 2014

WASHINGTON (VR) – Despite a slight thaw in relations between Cuba and the United States during the Obama administration, relations between the two countries are still very far from ideal.

Quite radical reforms by the government of Raul Castro, the presence of foreign capital on the island, growing direct contacts between the Cuban diaspora in the United States and Cuba itself have not yet led to the lifting of the embargo.
However, the Cubans on the island do not hide their readiness for change, but only for changes that would allow keeping gains of the revolution including high-quality education and health care. Both the government and the citizens are happy with investments and capital flows, but are obviously not prepared for the restitution of property.
What is the American administration expecting? Obviously, Cuba is changing in response to the processes taking place in a rapidly changing world, and the U.S. government still maintains many of the stereotypical attitudes of the Cold War. And the symbol of this is the existing embargo.
These and more topics were analyzed by Radio VR's Rustem Safronov hosted along with an esteemed panel of experts which included: Ernesto Cabo, a director of Cuban Americans for Engagement (CAFE), Dr. Andy Gomez, a senior policy advisor with Poblete Tamargo, and Alex Sanchez, Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.

Monday, March 10, 2014

Blouin Beat: Politics - Awkward: U.S. is middleman in Venezuela helicopter sale


"Awkward: U.S. is middleman in Venezuela helicopter sale"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: Politics
March 10, 2014
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatpolitics/2014/03/10/awkward-u-s-is-middleman-in-venezuela-helicopter-sale/

As protests and tensions in Venezuela continue while Washington criticizes Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro’s handling of the situation, an unusual development has occurred in the area of military sales: A U.S.-based company has sold helicopters to the Venezuelan government.
On March 3, the Enstrom Helicopter Corporation announced it had received a signed contract from the Venezuelan Ministry of Defense for 16 training helicopters. The company, based in Menominee, Michigan, explains that 16 standard model 480B helicopters will be delivered over the next 18 months to the South American nation. In addition, the contract also includes, “spare parts and tools, pilot and mechanic training, and in-country technical assistance during the life of the contract.” It is expected that the new Venezuelan trainers will be built in Enstrom’s factory at Menominee-Marinette Twin County Airport.
No reports have been made available regarding the price tag of this contract.
Enstrom has had a busy couple of years. Apart from signing high-profile contracts with various governments, in late 2012 the company was bought by the Chinese company Chongqing Helicopter Investment Co., Ltd. (CQHIC). As for the Enstrom-Caracas deal, it is logical that the Venezuelan government chose these helicopters, as Venezuelan security forces already operate them, providing pilots and technicians with a working familiarity of the aircraft. Venezuela’s National Guardfirst purchased Enstrom helicopters in 1970 and expanded their fleet in 2001. A report by thesecurity news agency Infodefensa.com explains that the new fleet of Enstrom helicopters will be the cornerstone for a future Venezuelan military academy that will train helicopter pilots.
Despite the U.S involvement in this deal — which makes for very bad optics for the Obama administration — it should not come as a shock that a Chinese-owned firm would sell materiel to Venezuela. During his lengthy presidency, Hugo Chavez established close relations with Beijing; Chinese companies have invested billions of dollars in Venezuela’s Orinoco Belt oil fields. More crucially, military relations between the two countries are strong, including on arms sales. This is exemplified by Venezuela’s purchase of 111 armored personnel carriers that Caracas bought from China North Industries Corp (Norinco).
We see here the power of globalized trade: the U.S. Is, essentially, acting as an intermediary between Beijing and Caracas. Whether the Obama administration regards this deal as worth a public display of attention remains to be seen. A good precedent to look to might be found in late 2006, when Washington managed to put the kibosh on a planned sale of 12 military aircraft from Spain to Venezuela — the justification being that the planes in question contained U.S. military technology and could not be transferred to another country without Washington’s approval. At the time, Eduardo Aguirre, the U.S. ambassador to Spain, said the sale could be a “destabilizing factor.”
The recent deal between Enstrom and Caracas becomes all the more salient considering the broken state of U.S.-Venezuela relations. In late February Caracas expelled three diplomats from the consular services at the U.S. embassy in Venezuela; Washington retaliated by expelling three Venezuelan diplomats from Caracas’ embassy in the U.S.
The Enstrom deal — along with the fact that, for over a decade and despite strained-to-nonexistent ties, Caracas has continued to sell oil to the U.S. — is yet more evidence that in today’s globalized world, the hard facts of economic reality exist in tension with stated policies — and sometimes even supersedes them.

Friday, January 24, 2014

COHA RESEARCH – JANUARY 27, 2014: A DATE WITH DESTINY FOR PERU AND CHILE


January 27, 2014: A Date With Destiny for Peru and Chile
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
January 24, 2014
Originally published: http://www.coha.org/january-27-2014-a-date-with-destiny-for-peru-and-chile/

The events of this upcoming January 27, 2014 are likely to determine the short and long-term future regarding the relations between Peru and Chile. [1] On that date, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague will announce its ruling on a long-standing maritime dispute between the two South American coastal states. [2]
The Dispute
In dispute is an area of approximately 38,000 square kilometres of the Pacific Ocean.[3] The nation that controls it will see great benefits to its fishing industry – the Peruvian media explains that this area is rich with sea life like the jurel and the anchoveta (of the anchovy family).[4] The association of artisanal fishermen of Arica in Chile have claimed that if the aforementioned disputed territory is surrendered to Peru, they could lose 40% of their fishing territory.[5]
Peru went to the ICJ to resolve this dispute in 2008; six years later, the court will finally give its verdict. [6] A December 2013 ICJ press release solemnly declares that, “It is recalled that the judgements of the Court have binding force and are without appeal for the parties concerned.” [7]
Both sides have put forward compelling cases by their advocates. Chile argues that Lima agreed to Santiago’s version of the border via agreements in 1952 and again in 1954. On the other hand, the Peruvian government argues that these accords addressed fishing rights, not the delimitation of the maritime border.[8] Lima also wants the ICJ to rule that the border between the two states was limited in a 1929 Treaty and a 1930 demarcation process.[9]
To protect their country’s interests at The Hague, Santiago and Lima have sent teams of international lawyers (interestingly Chile refuses to publicize the names and salaries of its lawyers) and diplomats, such as Peru’s renowned diplomat Allan Wagner.[10] Unsurprisingly, private companies involved in fishing are interested in the verdict, hence they have supported their respective governments; for example Angelini, a conglomerate of Chilean fisheries, has provided the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs with information to back Chile’s claim.[11] Representatives from both governments have optimistically declared that the ICJ will rule in their favor.[12]
Peru-Chile Relations
Historically, Peru and Chile have not had ideal inter-state relations dating back to the War of the Pacific. [13] That conflict lasted from 1879 to 1883 and involved Peru, Bolivia and Chile (the latter which received major amounts of military aid from the British Empire). This 19th century conflict has defined modern day inter-state relations between the three South American nations; due to the war, in which Chile emerged victorious, Bolivia was rendered a landlocked nation while Peru lost the copper-rich regions of Arica and Tarapaca.
Even though Chile and Peru have developed commercial and diplomatic ties, there are also occasional spikes of tensions between the two nations, such as Peruvian hackers reportedly attacking Chilean government websites and vice-versa.[14] There are also occasional low-key incidents that easily exacerbate nationalistic sentiments. For example, when a Peruvian tourist raised the Peruvian flag in Arica (a territory that Chile gained during the 19th century war’); he was arrested by the Chilean police.[15]
Moreover, there are also disputes over traditional goods such as Pisco, a famous Peruvian drink, that Chile claims was originally created in its country.[16] Additionally, both countries claim to that the potato originates in their respective territories.[17]
Furthermore, there have been occasions when ties between the governments turned tense and the possibility of armed conflict became a real option. In 1975, Peru almost initiated a war with Chile to gain back control of the territories lost during the War of the Pacific. More recently, in 2009 there was a diplomatic tiff when it was discovered that a Peruvian Air Force officer provided Chilean intelligence agencies with classified information.[18]
Nevertheless, the past and current record of disputes and incidents between the two states, Lima and Santiago actually have developed significant commercial relations between themselves. Both nations are part of the Pacific Alliance, a trade bloc of economically-vibrant Latin American nations.[19] Apart from strong trade relations there is a strong human connection between the two countries as Peruvian migrants in Chile have made a good living by opening restaurants that serve Peruvian food in the Southern nation.[20]
National Unity and Respecting the ICJ Verdict
As January 27 approaches, the question is whether both governments will respect the ICJ’s verdict. At least for the time being, this international legal dispute has served as a catalyst for different political factions within Peru and Chile to harmonize their attitudes at least for the time being.
All former Chilean presidents recently met in order to discuss the case and have a united front between Chile’s political parties.[21] Chile held elections in late 2013 and former President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) won a new presidential term that will begin in March 2014.[22] She and current President Sebastian Pinera have also met to discuss the ICJ verdict.[23]
As for Peru, political figures are also calling for unity: Former President Alan Garcia Perez (1985-1990 and 2006-2011) has tweeted that the government should allow for businesses to open at 9am (Peruvian time) on January 27 so that Peruvians can watch the verdict at home. In his January 12 tweet, he also called for the Peruvian flag to be raised across the nation in a sign of national unity.[24]  At the executive level President Ollanta Humala gathered of former Peruvian heads of state this past Monday, January 20th, to discuss the maritime case.[25] The Peruvian leader head of state with met with leaders of major media outlets on January 13th to create a united national front before the verdict.[26]
In general, policymakers from both nations have declared that the ICJ’s ruling will be respected. Presidents Humala and Pinera met during a UN summit in New York this past September 2013, where they both declared to the media that they will respect The Hague’s verdict.[27]  More recently, in early 2014, there was a meeting between the governors of Peru’s Tacna and Chile’s Arica regions. The two regional governors signed a symbolic agreement in which both regions declared that they will respect the ICJ’s verdict. [28]
Finally, it is worth noting that in early January 2014, President Humala declared that he was confident that the “Chilean political class” is “sufficiently mature” to evaluate the cost of putting bilateral relations at risk if the ICJ’s verdict is not respected.[29] This statement highlights the potential for worst case scenario regarding the future of Lima-Chile relations in the post-maritime dispute era which will commence on January 28: How will a government react if the other ends up gaining control of the disputed territory?  Could an unfavorable verdict be enough of a justification to trigger a conflict between Peru and Chile? Will relations remain business as usual, or will there be some economic and/or diplomatic retaliation?
The ICJ and Supranationalism in Latin America
The issue of the ICJ’s upcoming ruling calls into question whether supranationalism is on the rise throughout Latin America, and whether regional states recognize the verdicts of international entities in order to obtain a (hopefully) impartial and a well-analyzed verdict on a dispute between Latin American nations. The maritime dispute between Peru and Chile is not the only Latin American case that the ICJ has handled in recent years.  In 2010, the court ruled on a dispute over a paper mill built by Montevideo on the River Uruguay, which borders Argentina and Uruguay.[30] Additionally, in 2012 the ICJ passed a verdict on a dispute over an archipelago and maritime territory that was being disputed between Colombia and Nicaragua.[31] Currently, Costa Rica and Nicaragua also have gone to the ICJ to resolve a border dispute.[32]
So far, the governments of Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Bogota and Managua have respected the ICJ’s verdicts. This is noteworthy but it should not be interpreted as Latin America having reached a tipping point and that Latin American leaders are giving up their country’s sovereignty to international agencies. If that was the case, entities like the Organization of American States, the Union of South American Nations or the Andean Community would have far more power over their member states than obviously is the case.
Nevertheless, the ICJ’s rulings signal a trend that Latin America is turning to international bodies to negotiate their disputes instead of starting armed conflicts (the author has previously written on the lack of inter-state wars in Latin America in a 2011 essay for Small Wars & Insurgencies).[33]
Conclusions
As January 27 approaches, we will see more coverage among the Peruvian and Chilean media regarding the probable scenarios regarding the ICJ’s verdict and what the future of Peruvian-Chilean relations will be. Certainly, the ICJ judges should not be influenced by how the verdict could (and will) it is likely to impact Peru and Chile, but rather should (and must) provide an objective and impartial analysis and judgement based on the information provided by Lima and Chile as well as their interpretation of the law.
With that said, it becomes the duty of policymakers and scholars to understand and explain how this dispute will impact bilateral relations and prevent worst-case scenarios (i.e. an armed conflict) either in the short or long term.
The maritime dispute between Peru and Chile is complex with both sides believing that they are right in their demands. Over the short term, the outcome will grant a country’s fishing industry access to a greater segment of the Pacific. But this dispute also signifies a matter of national pride between two nations that, while they currently have strong economic and human relations, continue to have inter-state tensions and mistrust due to a 19th century conflict that has shaped their national identities (particularly in the case of the nations that lost, namely Peru and Bolivia)
 The respect, generally-speaking, of ICJ verdicts by other Latin American states and the context in which these are found, give hope that, whatever the verdict of this dispute, Lima and Santiago will respect it and the peaceful era it will most likely usher in.
W. Alejandro Sanchez, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs
For additional news and analysis on Latin America, please go to: LatinNews.com and Rights Action
References
[1] “Fallo de La Haya sobre diferendo maritime entre Peru y Chile sera el 27 de enero de 2014.” Emol.com. December 13, 2014. http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2013/12/13/634679/fallo-la-haya.html
[2] International Court of Justice. Official website. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=137
[3] Pablo Andres Rivero. “Stormy Waters? The Maritime Border Disputes between Bolivia, Chile and Peru.” Global Voices-English. February 4, 2013.http://globalvoicesonline.org/2013/02/04/stormy-waters-the-maritime-border-disputes-between-bolivia-chile-and-peru/
[4] “Remarcan que fallo de La Haya tendra mayor incidencia en la Pesca.” RPP (Peru). January 15, 2014. http://www.rpp.com.pe/2014-01-15-remarcan-que-fallo-de-la-haya-tendra-mayor-incidencia-en-la-pesca-noticia_662021.html
[5] “Los Pescadores artesanales de Arica perderian un 40% de su pesca si Peru gana en La Haya.” Soychile.cl. December 8, 2012.http://www.soychile.cl/Arica/Sociedad/2012/12/08/139797/Los-pescadores-artesanales-de-Arica-perderian-un-40-de-su-pesca-si-Peru-gana-en-La-Haya.aspx
[6] “Peru constitutes proceedings against Chile with regard to a dispute concerning maritime delimitation between the two States. International Court of Justice. Press Release – Unofficial. No. 2008/1. January 16, 2008. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/137/14387.pdf
[7] “Maritime dispute (Peru v. Chile) The Courte to deliver its Judgement on Monday 27 January 2014 at 3 p.m.” International Court of Justice. Press Release – Unofficial. No. 2013/40. December 13, 2013. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/137/17842.pdf
[8] “Maritime Delimitation between Peru and Chile.”  – Translation of the document “Delimitacion Maritima entre el Peru y Chile”, edited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru and published in El Comercio newspaper (Peru) on 22 March 2009. Embassy of Peru – Australia. http://www.embaperu.org.au/embassy/pdfs/Maritime%20Delimitation%20Peru%20Chile.pdf
[9] “Especial: Peru y Chile en la recta final en La Haya.” Peru21. Politica. December 2, 2012. http://peru21.pe/politica/especial-peru-y-chile-recta-final-haya-2106104
[10] “Chile rechazo reveler honorarios de abogados ante La Haya.” El Comercio(Peru). Mundo. January 13, 2014. http://elcomercio.pe/mundo/latinoamerica/chile-rechazo-revelar-honorarios-abogados-ante-haya-noticia-1702526 – Also see “Representacion Peruana ante Corte de La Haya: El mejor equipo con el que se puede contar.” La Republica (Peru). Politica. December 1, 2012.http://www.larepublica.pe/01-12-2012/representacion-peruana-ante-la-corte-de-la-haya-el-mejor-equipo-con-el-que-se-puede-contar – “Ex Ministro de Defensa Allan Wagner representara a Peru ante La Haya.” Emol.com. Mundo. December 20, 2007.http://www.emol.com/noticias/internacional/2007/12/20/285958/ex-ministro-de-defensa-allan-wagner-representara-a-peru-ante-la-haya.html
[11] “El desconocido rol del grupo Angelini en la defensa de Chile ante La Haya.” La Tercera. Negocios. December 16, 2012. http://diario.latercera.com/2012/12/16/01/contenido/negocios/27-125555-9-el-desconocido-rol-del-grupo-angelini-en-la-defensa-de-chile-ante-la-haya.shtml
[12] “Coagente peruano ante la corte de La Haya confia en que el tribunal les ‘dara la razon.’” Emol.com. Chile. December 13, 2013.http://www.emol.com/noticias/internacional/2013/12/13/634719/coagente-peruano-ante-la-corte-de-la-haya-confia-en-que-el-tribunal-les-dara-la-razon.html
[13] “Documental de la Guerra del Pacifico de DIREMAR.” Direccion de Reinvindicacion Maritima (DIREMAR) – Bolivia.
[14] Manuel Vigo. “Peruvian hackers attack Chilean army website.” Peruthisweek.com. National. January 16, 2013. http://www.peruthisweek.com/news-peruvian-hackers-attack-chilean-army-website-13436 Also see “’Hackers’ Chilenos invaden el portal web oficial del Estado Peruano.” El Comercio (Peru). Politica. November 21, 2009.http://elcomercio.pe/politica/371858/noticia-hackers-chilenos-invaden-portal-web-oficial-estado-peruano
[15] “ Detienen a hincha por izar la bandera peruana en Arica.” RPP (Peru). March 21, 2012.  http://www.rpp.com.pe/2012-03-21-detienen-a-hincha-por-izar-la-bandera-peruana-en-arica-noticia_463568.html
[16] David Cuen. “Agria batalla por el Pisco.” BBC Mundo.com. August 18, 2006.http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/business/newsid_5264000/5264022.stm
[17] “Peru y Chile tambien se disputan la papa.” BBC Mundo.com. March 29, 2006.http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_4858000/4858848.stm
[18] “Espionaje Chile Peu: Caso Victor Ariza sub oficial FAP.” La Republica (Peru). Especial. http://www.larepublica.pe/especiales/espionaje-chile-peru-caso-victor-ariza-sub-oficial-fap
[19] The Pacific Alliance. Official website. http://alianzapacifico.net/en/
[20] Camara de Comercio Peruano-Chilena. Official Website.http://www.camaraperuchile.org/ – “Uno de cada tres restaurantes que abren en Chile es Peruano.” El Comercio (Peru). Economia. October 21, 2012.http://elcomercio.pe/economia/mundo/uno-cada-tres-restaurantes-que-abren-chile-peruano-noticia-1485758
[21] “Pinera se reune con expresidentes para tratar el fallo de La Haya.” RPP (Peru). Internacional. January 10, 2014. http://www.rpp.com.pe/2014-01-10-pinera-se-reune-con-expresidentes-para-tratar-el-fallo-de-la-haya-noticia_660841.html
[22] W. Alejandro Sanchez. “Welcome back, President Bachelet.” Blouin Beat: World. December 17, 2013.http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatworld/2013/12/17/welcome-back-president-bachelet/
[23] “Bachelet y Pinera alinean posiciones frente al fallo de La Haya.” El Comercio(Peru). Mundo. January 7, 2014. http://elcomercio.pe/mundo/europa/bachelet-pinera-alinean-posiciones-frente-al-fallo-haya-noticia-1683459
[24] Alan Garcia (AlanGarciaPeru). “El 27: #27Embanderamiento y difusion del fallo en los centros de trabajo. Ver propuesta.” January 12, 2014. 1:15PM. Tweet.
[25] “Ejecutivo convoca a expresidentes para tratar fallo de La Haya.” RPP (Peru). Lima. January 15, 2014. http://www.rpp.com.pe/2014-01-15-ejecutivo-convoca-a-expresidentes-para-tratar-fallo-de-la-haya-noticia_662202.html
[26] “Fallo en La Haya: Ollanta Humala se reunio con directores de medios.” La Republica (Peru). Politica. January 13, 2014. http://www.larepublica.pe/13-01-2014/fallo-en-la-haya-ollanta-humala-se-reune-con-directores-de-medios
[27] Felipe Vargas.  “Pinera tras reunión con Humala: “Hemos acordado respetar, acatar y cumplir el fallo de La Haya.” Emol.com. September 25, 2013.http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2013/09/25/621447/pinera-tras-bilateral-con-humala.html
[28] “Alcaldes de Tacna y Arica firman declaracion de paz antes del fallo de La Haya.”La Republica (Peru). Politica. January 10, 2014. http://www.larepublica.pe/10-01-2014/alcaldes-de-tacna-y-arica-firman-declaracion-de-paz-antes-del-fallo-de-la-haya– “La Haya: Alcaldes de Tacna y Arica esperan tranquilos el fallo.” El Comercio (Peru). Actualidad. January 9, 2014. http://elcomercio.pe/actualidad/1684550/noticia-fallo-haya-alcaldes-tacna-arica-acordaron-recibir-decision-serenidad
[29] “Humala: Lo importante sera que el fallo se ejecute.” RPP (Peru). January 16, 2014. http://www.rpp.com.pe/2014-01-16-humala-lo-importante-sera-que-el-fallo-se-ejecute-noticia_662290.html
[30] “Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay). International Court of Justice. Official website. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=135&p3=4
[31] “Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia). International Court of Justice. Official website. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=124&code=nicol&p3=0
[32] “Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica).” International Court of Justice. Official website. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=152
[33] W. Alejandro Sanchez. “Whatever happened to South America’s splendid little wars?” Small Wars & Insurgencies. 2011. Volume 22, Issue 2. Pages 322 – 351.http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2011.573413#.UuHRVs4o5QI