Showing posts with label guyana. Show all posts
Showing posts with label guyana. Show all posts

Thursday, May 8, 2025

Shephard: "Metal Shark starts production on HSMUSVs as US shipyard targets further Caribbean orders"

 

 

"Metal Shark starts production on HSMUSVs as US shipyard targets further Caribbean orders"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Naval Warfare

Shephard

8 May 2025

Published: https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/naval-warfare/metal-shark-starts-production-on-hsmusvs-as-us-shipyard-targets-further-caribbean-orders/

 

The US shipyard’s new High Speed Maneuverable Unmanned Surface Vessel (HSMUSV) will have a range of more than 500 nautical miles.

 

Monday, April 28, 2025

CIMSEC: "The Caribbean Sea: A Strategic Area with Many US Allies and Partners"

 


 

"The Caribbean Sea: A Strategic Area with Many US Allies and Partners"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

The Southern Tide

Center for International Maritime Security

28 April, 2025

Published: https://cimsec.org/the-caribbean-sea-a-strategic-area-with-many-us-allies-and-partners/

In late March, the U.S. Navy cruiser USS Normandy (CG 60) and the Guyanese patrol vessel Shahoud carried out joint exercises in Guyana’s exclusive economic zone and international waters. Washington has many allies and partners across the Greater Caribbean, particularly among the region’s English-speaking nations. Despite having limited budgets and assets, the defense forces of the English-speaking Caribbean are training and increasing their capabilities to carry out missions, which aligns with US diplomatic and military objectives.


Thursday, January 23, 2025

Modern Diplomacy: "The year of Japan-CARICOM Friendship"


 "The year of Japan-CARICOM Friendship"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

East Asia

Modern Diplomacy

23 January, 2025

Published: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/01/23/the-year-of-japan-caricom-friendship/

Last year was the Japan-CARICOM (Caribbean Community) Friendship Year, aimed at strengthening relations between Tokyo and this important 15-member bloc. Analyses about extra-regional nations with Western Hemisphere states tend to focus on the mainland, namely Latin America. Hence, Tokyo’s interest in engaging the Caribbean, an often-overlooked region, deserves praise and analysis.

The Japan-CARICOM Year had three pillars: cooperation towards sustainable development, including overcoming vulnerabilities particular to Small Island Developing States (SIDS), which include CARICOM members; deepening and expanding bonds; and cooperation on global challenges. The Japan-CARICOM Friendship Year also commemorated the 30th anniversary of Japan-CARICOM relations and the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and Jamaica & Trinidad and Tobago.

 

 

 

Thursday, March 9, 2023

Shephard Media: Guyana Defence Force looks to modernise air and naval fleets

 

"Guyana Defence Force looks to modernise air and naval fleets"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Air Warfare

Shephard Media

9 March, 2023

Originally published: https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/air-warfare/guyana-defence-force-looks-to-modernise-air-and-naval-fleets/

Guyana is set to replace an 'unserviceable' patrol vessel and is eyeing acquisition of new light transport aircraft.

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Friday, February 3, 2023

Shephard Media: Metal Shark makes programme progress for Caribbean navies

 

"Metal Shark makes programme progress for Caribbean navies"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Naval Warfare

Shephard Media

3 February, 2023

Originally published: https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/naval-warfare/metal-shark-makes-programme-progress-for-caribbean-navies/

US shipbuilder Metal Shark has delivered a new patrol vessel to Costa Rica and achieved a major milestone on a project for Guyana.

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Monday, November 28, 2022

Shephard Media: "South American navies grow fleets despite modest budgets"

 


"South American navies grow fleets despite modest budgets"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Naval Warfare

Shephard Media

18 November, 202

Originally published: https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/naval-warfare/south-american-navies-grow-fleets-despite-modest-budgets/

Naval forces in Uruguay, Argentina and Guyana are growing their fleets with additional patrol, research and multi-mission craft.

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Sunday, April 5, 2020

The National Interest: The Western Hemisphere’s Latest Slow-Motion Catastrophe Isn't the Pandemic


"The Western Hemisphere’s Latest Slow-Motion Catastrophe Isn't the Pandemic"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez & Ryan Berg
The National Interest
April 5, 2020
Originally published: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/western-hemisphere%E2%80%99s-latest-slow-motion-catastrophe-isnt-pandemic-140692


A slow-motion catastrophe is playing out in the Western Hemisphere. No, it’s not the coronavirus pandemic or the alarming collapse of Venezuela’s healthcare system, which will be overrun by coronavirus victims. It’s the world’s newest oil power, Guyana, and its still-disputed results from the country’s general elections in early March.  
 

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Saturday, December 14, 2019

Providence: Guyana Matters to China, So It Should Matter to the US


"Guyana Matters to China, So It Should Matter to the US"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Providence
November 18, 2019
Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2019/11/guyana-china-us/

 During President David Granger’s salute to the People Republic of China’s (PRC) seventieth anniversary, the Guyanese leader labeled Beijing as a “reliable partner.” Indeed, the small Caribbean state and the Asian giant have a long history since bilateral relations were established in June 1972, a history that is centered on Beijing’s interest in Guyana’s natural resources and geographic location. 

The attention of the international media will (temporarily) focus on Guyana as President Granger has finally announced general elections for March 2, 2020, following domestic and international pressure after he lost a no-confidence vote in 2018. The upcoming elections, Beijing-Georgetown relations, and Venezuela’s own claims to Guyanese territory should make Guyana a bigger priority for Washington.
  

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Tuesday, July 21, 2015

E-IR: A Non-Violent Conflict: The Venezuela-Guyana Dispute

"A Non-Violent Conflict: The Venezuela-Guyana Dispute"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
E-International Relations
July 21, 2015
Originally published: http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/21/a-non-violent-conflict-the-venezuela-guyana-dispute/


An old territorial dispute between Venezuela and Guyana has flared up once again as the Guyanese government contracted ExxonMobil to look for offshore oil in an area that Caracas claims as its own. While it is unlikely that this particular instance will escalate into an armed conflict, these tensions highlight how non-violent incidents over coveted resources will continue to occur. Moreover, should clashes over this disputed territory continue, Venezuela will, in this author’s opinion, come out as the loser as it will be inexorably regarded as the aggressor against a militarily weaker neighbor.

Moreover, while this dispute has thankfully been non-violent, it could affect U.S.-Venezuela relations as the two governments have been at odds for over a decade and a half. Washington could capitalize on Venezuela’s aggressive stance in order to strengthen relations with Guyana to better monitor developments in Caracas.

A Brief Overview

A full historical review of the Venezuela-Guyana dispute is beyond the scope of this analysis, but it is necessary to give a basic historical overview to put the current situation in the proper context. Guyana is a former British colony (with Dutch influence), formerly known as British Guyana, which obtained its independence in 1966. However, the area, while it was under London’s control, was at odds with Venezuela due to a territorial dispute that dates back to the 19th century. Venezuela obtained its independence in 1824 from Spain, much earlier than Guyana, and has consistently claimed a portion of present-day Guyana.

London and Caracas reached an agreement via the 1899 International Arbitral Awards (held in Paris) which was thought to have put an end to differences. In 1962, Venezuela declared the 1899 treaty void and returned to its pre-1899 claims. In 1966, the same year that Guyana gained its independence, a Mixed Commission was established to address Venezuela’s renewed demands; but while negotiations took place, the Venezuelan military was accused of carrying out incursions into Guyana’s border territory, including the occupation of the Guyanese half of the Ankoko Island. Negotiations and incidents followed, as well as agreements such as the Protocol of Port of Spain, which Venezuela decided not to renew in 1982.

Caracas claims a contested area of around 155 thousand square kilometers in addition to a maritime area off the contested coast.

The dispute generally remained dormant for decades as the 21st century began but resurfaced in November 2007 due to a bizarre incident in which some 30 Venezuelan soldiers entered Guyanese territory and used explosives to destroy two dredges. The Guyanese Defense Forces were deployed to the area, but by that time the Venezuelans had already returned to their country. Fortunately the incident did not escalate into an armed conflict. The Venezuelan government apologized for the incursion as Deputy Minister of External Relations Rodolfo Sanz travelled to Guyana to diffuse the situation. He declared that Caracas “expressed sincere regrets and assured that the incident had no political motive on the part of the Venezuelan Government.”

Another incident occurred on October 2013 when the Venezuelan Navy intercepted the Teknik Perdana, a ship flying Panama’s flag that was hired by the Guyanese government and the Anadarko Petroleum Corporation to carry out seismic investigations. This was a preliminary step for future expeditions to look for offshore oil reserves. Thankfully, like in 2007, the incident did not evolve into a conflict, but the situation does highlight how the two countries began to clash at sea.

The newest round of tensions erupted in March, less than a decade after the Venezuelan military incursion into Guyana and only two years after the Teknik Perdana incident. ExxonMobil started looking for oil through its research vessel, the Deepwater Champion. According to Reuters, “Exxon signed an agreement with Guyana to explore the 26,800 square kilometer block, 100 to 200 miles (160 to 320 km) offshore, in 1999.” On May 20, the company found (black) gold as it announced that it had discovered oil. Days later, the Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro announced that the area in dispute is rightfully Venezuelan. Even more, the Venezuelan presidential decree No. 1.787 (dated May 27) divided Venezuela’s coast into four defense areas. One of them is called the “Zona Operativa de Defensa Integral Maritima Insular Atlantica” (ZODIMAIN Atlantica; Atlantic Operational Maritime & Insular Defense Zone), which extended from the Promonotory of Paria to the border shared with Trinidad & Tobago; hence it included the disputed maritime area between Venezuela and Guyana. In early July, the Venezuelan government took a step backwards by passing the presidential decree No. 1.859 which modified the aforementioned No. 1.787; the new directive withdrew specific coordinates for the ZODIMAINs.

Guyanese President David Granger labeled Venezuela’s claims as a “legal absurdity” and stated that Exxon’s operations will continue. The situation worsened in early June, when the Guyanese government decided to stop flights made by CONVIASA, Venezuela’s state-owned airline. Georgetown officially states that this is due to “the non-payment of bonds and landing fees to the government and the Cheddi Jagan International Airport.” However, it is impossible to deny the obvious coincidence that this drastic measure comes shortly after Venezuela’s claim over Guyanese waters. In retaliation, Caracas called in the Venezuelan ambassador to Guyana in early July and also announced that it will not renew a rice trade agreement with Guyana, which is set to expire in November.

Analysis

At the time of this writing, the possibility of inter-state warfare between Venezuela and Guyana thankfully remains extremely low. The two countries have never gone to war over the territory in dispute, but the aforementioned incidents that occurred in the past decades are problematic since they deteriorate bi-national relations—i.e. the cancellation of CONVIASA’s flights, which left dozens of people, including Venezuelan citizens, stranded in Georgetown. Moreover, in a worst-case scenario, a small incident like a seized vessel could be the trigger that transforms it into a greater conflict if tensions are not properly managed.

One aspect worth stressing is that the 2007 dredges incident brought Guyana onto the U.S. radar. At the time, relations between the U.S. and Venezuela, then led by Presidents George W. Bush and the late Hugo Chávez respectively, were continuing to deteriorate. Caracas had accused Washington of being behind a short-lived coup that briefly removed Chávez from power in April 2002. Meanwhile, Washington was concerned about a Caracas-Moscow alliance, as the Russian government had begun to sell high-tech weapons to the South American state. Thus, Washington saw this incident as a valid reason to have a stronger presence on Venezuela’s eastern flank. For example, military cooperation between the U.S and Guyana increased: The “USS Kearsarge,” a multipurpose amphibious assault ship, made a port call in 2008. Officially, the Pentagon said that this was a humanitarian mission, but at the time IPS News explained how the assumption in Guyana was that the naval visit was “designed to send a tacit political and military signal to neighbouring Venezuela,” particularly as “U.S. military helicopters are flying around communities as close as 16 kilometers from the Venezuelan border.” It makes sense to believe that Washington was capitalizing on Georgetown’s security concerns with its neighbors in order to monitor Venezuela.

Let us look at Venezuela’s geopolitical situation in another way: the country borders three nations, and it has been at odds with two of them in the past decade. Apart from Guyana, Venezuela also has a territorial dispute with neighboring Colombia. Even more, Bogota and Caracas had tense relations during the rule of President Alvaro Uribe and the late President Chavez (respectively) – to the point that in 2008 the two countries almost went to war. Nowadays, relations are much better but Venezuela is still concerned about the fact that Washington remains a steadfast Washington ally. As for Brazil and Venezuela, the two countries have maintained cordial relations and there have not been any security incidents. Finally, Caracas has declared that U.S. aircraft flying from the Forward Operating Location base in Curacao (a Caribbean overseas territory of The Netherlands, just north of Venezuela) were surveillance planes spying on Venezuela.

In other words, Guyana-Venezuela tensions have to be placed in the proper context of Venezuela’s complex relationship with its neighbors, a development that Washington has capitalized on. From Venezuela’s point of view, Washington can be regarded as trying to encroach on the South American state by increasing security ties with its neighbors.

As for the current tensions between Caracas and Georgetown, they come at a time of renewed strained relations between Caracas and Washington. In March, President Barack Obama announced that Venezuela is now considered a “national security threat,” a declaration that brought about economic sanctions on various Venezuelan government officials. At the time of this writing, both sides have been attempting to improve their tense relations, which date back to the Chávez years, as bilateral negotiations recently took place in Haiti. Nevertheless, no major announcement has come out of these talks. Moreover, while there have not been any new U.S. naval deployments to the region, a Guyanese vessel did participate in Tradewinds 2015 (naval exercises organized by the U.S. Southern Command and Caribbean nations).

It is also important to note that Guyana has been rallying its allies in the Caribbean and beyond to support its claims. So far, the Guyanese government has been successful, as in March when the other members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a 15-nation bloc of Caribbean states, declared that the organization “reiterates its firm, long-standing and continued support for the maintenance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Guyana.” The move was probably a blow to Caracas, as most CARICOM members, Guyana included, are members of PETROCARIBE, an alliance whose members purchase oil from Venezuela at reduced costs. These small Caribbean states are very dependent on cheap Venezuelan oil in order to maintain their economies and fulfill their energy needs; however, the latest Venezuela-Guyana incident highlights that they will rally to protect one of their fellow members against an external security threat.

Comparing Naval Forces

Given that the most recent incident has to do with offshore oil discoveries, I will briefly address the naval force of both countries. Guyana is a small nation whose military is called the Guyana Defense Force, and its naval branch is the Guyana Defense Force Coast Guard (GDFCG). While the GDFCG has limited resources at its disposal, it has been upgraded in recent years. In 2014 Guyana received back the flagship “GDFS Essequibo”, which had been sent to Brazil for repairs. The “Essequibo” is a remodeled British River-class minesweeper that Guyana acquired in 2001. As for recent acquisitions, the Guyanese obtained three speedboats in 2014, which were donated by the United States as part of Washington’s Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.

The Guyanese coast guard could hypothetically be a challenge to the Venezuelan Navy, but the latter country’s fleet has also been upgraded and expanded under the Chávez and Maduro regimes. For example, Venezuela has acquired Stan Patrol vessels for its coast guard as well as transport and multipurpose ships from Damen Shipyards Group. The Venezuelan Navy is also repairing its submarine fleet, as the submarine “Sabalo” is currently being upgraded by the DIANCA shipyard in Puerto Cabello.

Given this major disparity in military might, it would be next to impossible for Venezuela to not appear as the aggressor should a maritime conflict occur.

Why Countries Do Not Go To War

If anyone thought in 1899 that the agreement would solve the territorial dispute between Venezuela and the UK/Guyana, that person was grossly mistaken. While the dispute has thankfully remained non-violent, there have been a series of small incidents and diplomatic spats within the past decade. While the probability of either government committing itself to an armed conflict is very low, it would only take one small incident—i.e. a Venezuelan warship facing off with a Guyanese coast guard ship as the latter protects oil research vessels in the disputed territory—for the encounter to escalate.

This brings up the question of why both nations have not gone to war with each other over the disputed territory, particularly since Guyana gained independence from London in the 1960s and remains significantly weaker militarily when compared to Caracas. In a 2011 essay for Small Wars & Insurgencies, I discussed the lack of inter-state conflict in South America, including the Venezuela-Guyana dispute after the 2007 incident. In the analysis, I state that the last inter-state war in the region occurred in 1995 between Peru and Ecuador, while the last war that had a maritime theater of operations was between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Falklands/Malvinas in 1982. In other words, while there are plenty of territorial disputes in Latin America, actual inter-state warfare is scarce.

What explains the absence of war between Venezuela and Guyana, as there have been three incidents in less than a decade but no shots fired (though a couple of explosions over the dredges)? In spite of the territorial and maritime claims, the two countries have maintained good diplomatic relations as Guyana is a member of Venezuela’s PETROCARIBE initiative. It is nevertheless concerning that Venezuela has called in its ambassador to Guyana and cancelled negotiations over Guyanese rice as good trade relations are an important confidence building mechanism that serves to counterbalance security concerns. The deal will only expire in November, so there is a chance that Caracas is using the deal to temporarily punish Georgetown over the maritime dispute but will renew negotiations later. If this does not happen, it will force Guyana to look for other trading partners for its goods elsewhere, further creating a breach between the two governments and populations.

Moreover, the 2013 and 2015 incidents can be interpreted not as threats to Guyana but rather as methods that the Venezuelan government and Navy used to demonstrate that they maintain their claim to the territories in dispute, seeing this is part of Venezuelan national identity. The same can be said for the new presidential decree 1.859, which does mention specific coordinates for Venezuela’s maritime claims – this way the Venezuelan government does not appear aggressive as it is not implying that its naval forces can now enter Guyanese-controlled waters.

As to whether there was ever a time when Caracas was realistically willing to start an armed conflict with Guyana in the past decade, I would say no. I would argue, as previously noted, that these incidents occurred because the Venezuelan government, Navy, and Army wanted to show that they continue to see Guyanese territory as rightfully belonging to Caracas. Moreover, the quick support that Guyana received from its CARICOM allies, who are also PETROCARIBE clients and even ALBA members, signaled to Caracas that further aggressive initiatives would hurt its relations with its allies; hence, the latest conflict has been short-lived.

Finally, it is necessary to discuss how Venezuela perceives its geopolitical situation versus potential (or imaginary) adversaries. After all, Colombia remains a steadfast U.S. ally. Meanwhile Brazil maintains cordial relations (including security-related) with Venezuela, but the two are in competition with each other for regional influence. Hence, policymakers in Caracas may perceive closer Washington-Georgetown relations as the U.S. and its allies encroaching on Venezuela.

I cannot speculate whether anyone in the Venezuelan military or Ministry of Defense truly believes that Washington would come to Georgetown’s aid if it is attacked, but the fact that the U.S. military has increased its cooperation with Guyana, including training exercises, has certainly not gone unnoticed. Nevertheless, even with some U.S. defense support, Guyana remains a militarily weak state, and Venezuela would undoubtedly be regarded as the aggressor in any military conflict between the two. In a vastly interconnected world, Venezuela’s international reputation would be significantly damaged if it were viewed as an aggressor. Hence, the potential for international shaming can also serve as another deterrent to avoid conflict (a country like Russia may see little problem with gaining this “label,” but Venezuela is no global power).

Ultimately, the interception of the Teknik Perdana or the ongoing dispute after the Exxon discovery are ways for Venezuela to flex its diplomatic and military muscle, not just at Guyana (to demonstrate that it still claims the disputed territory) but also at Washington. Just this past March, President Maduro ordered new military exercises in order to demonstrate his country’s military might. This came at a time when Washington had declared Caracas a “national security threat.”

Guessing the Future

The possibility for an inter-state conflict between the two countries, even over oil, remains low. Nevertheless, what is problematic is the potential for a small incident to quickly evolve into a greater one. For example, should a Venezuelan vessel, let us say the patrol vessel “Guaiqueri” (PO-11), detain an Exxon research vessel, the Guyanese “GDFS Essequibo” could then be deployed to assist the Exxon vessel. As a result, a standoff could occur where, unless cool heads prevail, any action taken by one vessel could be perceived as an aggressive move by the other. This escalation is not unheard of in the region. In 2008, a Colombian military operation that was carried out against FARC insurgents in Ecuador (without Quito’s approval) increased to the point that Venezuela, then ruled by President Chávez, was on the verge of declaring war on Colombia in order to protect the sovereignty of Ecuador, its ally.

Thankfully, the current tensions over Exxon’s oil explorations appear to be dissipating, but it is just a matter of time before another incident occurs, particularly if Guyana is fully committed to exploiting its offshore oil and Venezuela continues to claim the area. I would argue that another round of maritime incidents will occur soon given the creation of the aforementioned “ZODIMAIN Atlantica.”

Warfare may not come to the Venezuela-Guyana border, but it is clear that inter-state disputes among Western Hemisphere states over territory and resources will not end anytime soon.

Monday, September 22, 2014

VOXXI: Cuba’s brain drain takes hold in Guyana

"Cuba's Brain Drain takes hold in Guyana"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
September 15, 2014
Originally published: http://voxxi.com/2014/09/15/cuba-brain-drain-guyana/
Three Cuban doctors have disappeared from Guyana: They had been deployed to the small, South American state to help improve the country’s health services, but it is now thought that they are attempting to reach the U.S.
One of the pillars of Cuban foreign policy, aside from being a thorn in Washington’s side, is exporting its healthcare workers to nations in need of medical personnel. If the aforementioned doctors did indeed flee to the U.S., they can be added to the ever-increasing list of Cuban professionals that have defected from the Castro regime.
The facts on Cuban doctors
One of the three missing doctors is a pathologist hired by the Guyanese Ministry of Health to work in a hospital in Georgetown, the country’s capital. The two others are a physiotherapist, who was also working in a Georgetown hospital, and general practitioner who worked in the Mahaicony Hospital. Currently 166 Cuban health professionals work in Guyana, including 74 doctors and 35 nurses, with the rest being an assortment of health technicians.
The online news agency Kaieteurnewsonline.com reports, “the absence of the pathologist, had in fact severely affected the completion of Post Mortem examinations at the hospital. […] the hospital’s administration was forced to put measures in place to ensure that post mortems were conducted in a timely manner.”
In other words, Guyanese health professionals must now fill the void left by the three missing doctors.
It’s important to note that the Georgetown-Havana medical exchange is a two-way street. Not only does Cuba send health professionals to Guyana, but the Guyanese government also sends its own healthcare workers to the Caribbean island for additional medical training. Guyana’s Health Minister, Bheri Ramsaran, has declared that the long-term goal is to rid the country of the need for foreign healthcare workers who take care of the country’s population–estimated at over 700 thousand.
This long-term plan may already be coming to fruition.
In April, Minister Ramsaran reported that the government will reduce from 500 to 250 the number of scholarships for Guyanese health professionals to study in Cuba. This program was started in 2001 via an agreement between Fidel Castro and then-President Bharrat Jagdeo, of Guyana. Minister Ramsaran has declared that “now we have ample amount of specialized doctors in the health sector so there is not a need for so many scholarships this year.”
If we are to believe Minister Ramsaran’s remarks about the state of his country’s rising crop of new professionals, the “ample amount” of Guyanese doctors, trained in Cuba, will (hopefully) be able to make up for the loss of the three Cuban doctors.

Cuban Defections
As for Cuba, if the three aforementioned doctors did in fact leave their posts in Guyana to flee to the U.S., they join an ever-growing list of Cuban defectors.
Naming every Cuban defector is beyond the scope of this article, but suffice it to say there have been some noteworthy incidents recently. For example, earlier this year, seven dancers of the National Ballet of Cubadefected while visiting Puerto Rico for a performance. Another recent defection was that of Yasmani Tomas, a baseball player who played for the Cuban team Industriales.
Defections have been a staple of the Castro regime. With that said, Raúl Castro, has introduced important initiatives to (very) slowly liberalize the country’s economy, thus attracting increased international investment and fostering the growth of a Cuban middle class with an improved standard of living. Case in point: the government is promoting the development of an industrial sector, called the Mariel economic development zone, which has already attracted Brazilian investment (namely the expansion of a port).
However it seems that even economic progress and the relaxation of certain strict policies (such as travel restrictions) are not stopping Cuban professionals of various fields from defecting in search of an improved quality of life, higher wages, and more career opportunities. In June, the aforementioned ballet dancers talked to the U.S. media in Miami, explaining that they are in search of professional opportunities in the U.S. As for Yasmani Tomas, recent speculations suggest that when he does sign for a MLB team, he could get as much as $100 million USD. Certainly more than what he would earn playing for a Cuban team.
As for the three Cuban doctors that have disappeared from Guyana, it remains to be seen where they end up. One possibility is that they seek asylum in neighboring Brazil, given that there is a precedent of Cuban doctors who defected while working in the Portuguese-speaking giant.
Thanks to Cuban help, Guyana may now have the medical staff to make up for the loss of three foreign doctors, but Havana cannot endure its brain drain.

Wednesday, September 10, 2014

Blouin Beat: World - U.S. Senate delays confirming ambassadors to the Western Hemisphere


"U.S. Senate delays confirming Ambassadors to the Western Hemisphere"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: World
September 10, 2014
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatworld/2014/09/10/u-s-senate-delays-confirming-ambassadors-to-the-western-hemisphere/

The highly regarded Foreign Policy magazine has published a list online of several nominees that await Senate confirmation to assume their positions as U.S. ambassadors to various nations across the world. In some cases, candidates have been waiting for over a year – one prime example is John Hoover, who was first nominated in July 2013 to become the ambassador of Sierra Leone, a nation that is making international headlines today due to a regional Ebola outbreak.
As for Latin American and the Caribbean there are numerous nations that still lack a U.S. ambassador. These include:
  1. John Estrada – Trinidad and Tobago – First nominated on July 31, 2013
  2. Noah Mamet – Argentina – First nominated on July 31, 2013
  3. Luis Moreno – Jamaica – First nominated on September 11, 2013
  4. Cassandra Butts – Bahamas – First nominated on February 10, 2014
  5. Leslie Bassett – Paraguay  – First nominated on June 4, 2014
  6. Todd Robinson – Guatemala – First nominated on June 4, 2014
  7. Scott Fitzgerald Haney – Costa Rica – First nominated on July 8, 2014
  8. Perry Holloway –  Guyana – First nominated on Monday July 28, 2014
  9. Mari Carmen Aponte – Organization of American States – First nominated on July 31, 2014
To look at the situation another way: the Western Hemisphere has a total of 35 independent nations, including the U.S., and Washington does not have an ambassador in eight of them (it is worth noting that Cuba and the U.S. do not have embassies in each other’s capitals, but they do have interests sections ). Moreover, Washington has yet to appoint a representative to the Organization of American States, the oldest bloc in the Americas and the only multinational organization in the region that has all Western Hemisphere states as members (minus Cuba).
Most countries where there is not a U.S. ambassador could generally be regarded as “minor players” in the inter-American system. Apart from the OAS, another exception is Argentina, a country with which the U.S. has a complicated history, including Washington’s role during the 1982 Falklands War, which pinned Argentina against the United Kingdom. More recently, Argentina’s relations with the U.S. have become even more troubled due to the infamous vulture funds, and a ruling by a New York judge that will have repercussions in Argentina’s economy for years to come.
In a February 2014 commentary for Blouin News, I discussed how in spite of a gaffe by Noah Mamet, the U.S. nominee to become ambassador to Argentina, who admitted that he has never visited that nation, the real tragedy of Washington-Buenos Aires relations is that the U.S. has not had an ambassador in the South American nation in over a year.  The aforementioned issue over the vulture funds adds additional importance to having a senior level official commanding Washington’s embassy in Buenos Aires.
Furthermore, there is another factor to keep in mind: Russia has banned exports from the West in retaliation for the U.S. and Europe’s sanctions against the Russian government and their position regarding the ongoing developments in Ukraine. Hence, Russia is now looking for nations that are not U.S. allies (i.e. most of Europe or Australia) to supply the massive Eurasian state with the imports that it requires to sustain its population. And one potential supplier could be Argentina. A mid-August report by Reuters explains how Argentina is preparing to send a delegation to Russia to explore greater commercial ties, namely Argentina’s exportation of beef and soymeal to Russia. In other words, geopolitical developments relating to Russia should serve as a way to begin fixing U.S.-Argentina relations, starting with ratifying a U.S. ambassador to the South American nation.
One additional situation that deserves some discussion is the case of Stafford Fitzgerald “Fitz” Haney, who has been nominated to be the U.S. ambassador to Costa Rica. Haney is not a diplomat or politician, but he does have some experience with the region as “his first job out of college was as an assistant brand manager for consumer giant Procter & Gamble in San Juan, Puerto Rico.” He has also worked “in Israel as a senior associate at Israeli Seed Partners, a venture capital firm.”
Haney’s nomination has not been without criticism. A brief Washington Post commentary describes him as “yet another blunder” by President Obama. The criticism focuses on the fact that Haney raised only $35,800 for the President’s re-election bid (through September 2012) and just under $200,000 since 2007. The point being that if Haney will receive an ambassadorial position as a reward for raising funds for the U.S. president, he did not raise very much. Interestingly, the Costa Rican media looks at Haney’s nomination not as a blunder but rather as a change of objectives. A July 8, 2014 article in the Costa Rican daily La Nación explains how his nomination means that the U.S. is looking to increase commercial relations with San Jose rather than focusing on political initiatives. If nothing else, ambassadorial nominations can be interpreted in vastly different ways depending on one’s point of view and interests.
Whether it is Argentina or Costa Rica, the fact that the world’s political, economic and military superpower does not have an ambassador in almost ten nations in the Western Hemisphere (in addition to the region’s major multinational organization) only sends the wrong message regarding Washington’s interests and priorities towards its continental neighbors.

Wednesday, February 3, 2010

All is Not Well in Georgetown: Guyana’s Emerging Hemispheric Role

by COHA Research Fellow: Alex Sanchez
23 Jan 2008
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
http://www.coha.org/although-all-is-not-well-in-georgetown-guyana%E2%80%99s-emerging-hemispheric-role/

• Guyana and Venezuela’s longstanding territorial dispute—the “frozen conflict”—which is hopefully asleep for now
• Will Guyana’s vulnerable Jagdeo become Washington’s new best friend on the continent?

The latest confrontation between Venezuela and Guyana, which indisputably took place on Guyanese territory, has reminded Washington that Guyana exists and that complexities abound for the long troubled nation which is located in one of the South America’s newly emerging hot spots. The recent clash, which briefly revived memories of a dormant border dispute centering on the Essequibo long bedeviling the two nations’, has pushed Washington into approaching Georgetown in a less cautious, and more engaged, effort in order to gain its friendship at the hoped for expense of Washington’s most determined regional adversary, Hugo Chavez. The recent meeting between Guyanese and American military officials over defense issues may very well put Guyana’s weakened leader, President Bharrat Jagdeo ultimately in an untenable position where he may have to pick sides between Caracas and Washington, even though most specialists dismiss the recent Georgetown visit of senior U.S. naval officials as nothing more than a coincidence involved in carrying out a long-scheduled event.

A “Frozen” Conflict
Ever since Guyana gained its independence in the 1960’s, Guyana and Venezuela episodically have been involved in a recurrent territorial dispute. Caracas claims, but has not been heavily pressuring, its sovereignty over two thirds of Guyana’s total of 83,000 square miles, mainly in the sprawling timber and mineral-rich Essequibo region. In 1899, while the United Kingdom was Guyana’s colonial ruler (the country was then known as British Guiana), an international tribunal had demarcated the boundaries between the two states to be “a full, perfect and final settlement.” Nevertheless, throughout the years, Venezuelans have held mental reservations about that ruling – which gave most of the disputed Essequibo to Britain—and, from time to time, raised questions as if the issue at hand had not yet been finally determined.

At the 1899 boundary gathering, commissioners from the United States, Russia, Venezuela and Britain marked the border between the two territories. The full extent of Venezuela’s resentment over what it saw as an unjust demarcation with British Guinea became public only after its commissioner at the gathering, Mallet Provost, died in 1948. A November 21, 2007 article in Latin America explains that “writings [Provost] left behind appear to suggest that Venezuela was cheated out of the western Essequibo region that comprises a full two-thirds of Guyana’s [present] land area of 215,000 square kilometers, where most of its foreign investment in gold, diamond and timber is located.”

Latterly, Venezuela began reasserting its claim to the disputed territory, and in 1966, a commission was established to negotiate a settlement, but, as explained in the Caribbean Media Corporation in a November 17, 2007 report, border incidents repeatedly interrupted its work. However, observers are quick to point that the conflict has never been allowed to escalate into a full-fledged armed confrontation.

The November Incident
The latest challenge over the disputed territory occurred in mid-November 2007, when the Guyanese government declared that a Venezuelan military unit had attacked and destroyed two Guyanese dredges, which was followed by unauthorized Venezuelan aircraft flights into Guyanese airspace. To this day, it is unclear what motives were behind the Venezuelan attack.

As far as the handful of exact details that are known suggest, what took place during that November day was that a contingent of 36 Venezuelan armed military personnel, led by a general, “entered into Guyana’s territory” (according to Georgetown officials) and proceeded to use military-type explosive devices to destroy two gold-mining dredges. According to the Guyanese side, the attack is said to have taken place near Iguana Island on the Cuyuni River. A November 21, 2007 wire story run by Latin America presented a somewhat different version by maintaining that “about 40 Venezuelan soldiers led by an apparently overenthusiastic senior officer crossed into Guyana’s border Cuyuni district in the west and used high-powered C-4 explosives to blow up two Guyanese-owned gold mining river dredges . . . on the first of a three-day maneuver allegedly aimed at expelling illegal miners from the area.” The dredges, according to local reports were not in operation at the time, hence no casualties were reported. The name of the Venezuelan officer who allegedly led the operation is still a mystery.

Regarding Caracas’ version, its ambassador to Guyana, Dario Morandy, has said that the Venezuelan military acted to remove illegal miners and that the incidents occurred in and around the Cuyuni River, in the San Antonio/ Eldorado area, approximately 80 km west of Guyana’s generally acknowledged border; therefore, it was not on Guyanese territory.

Morandy also has explained to the Guyanese daily Starbroek News, that his country was “protecting its natural resources and we need to remove all illegal miners from the area.” Venezuelan officials claim that the Guyanese miners were polluting Venezuela territory with mercury, as part of the mining process. Guyana officials have disputed this allegation, claiming the incident took place on the Cuyuni River, in an area that is indisputably under their own control.

According to a November 19, 2007 report in Starbroek News, after explosions had been heard in the area, Guyanese Defense Forces based in Eteringbang (some 40 miles away from where the incidents took place), reached the border area but encountered no Venezuelan military personnel in fixed positions.

The Diplomatic and Political Hot Seat
In the aftermath of these events, Venezuela’s Vice Minister for External Relations, Rodolfo Sanz, led a delegation to meet with Guyanese President Bharrat Jagdeo and some of his advisors. Venezuelan Ambassador to Guyana, Morandy, continued to deny that the destruction of the dredges and subsequent over flights by Venezuelan aircraft could be described as incursions into Guyana’s airspace.

Opposition Guyanese factions have seized the entire affair to exploit tactical possibilities for scoring political points against the ruling PPP party, which he’s not been in particularly good shape as a result in its being repeatedly targeted regarding for its involvement in a sphere of corruption charges, growing levels of drug activity and a lack of political coherence. In a joint statement, the opposition groups, Alliance For Change (AFC) and the Guyana Action Party/Rise Organize and Rebuild (GAP/ROAR) Movement alliance, insisted on a more aggressive projection of sovereignty abroad, as mentioned in a Caribbean Media Corporation November 20, 2007 report, that “quite frankly, a Note Verbale is a tame response to this action [the destruction of the dredges] and we call on the government of Guyana to register a stronger protest using all appropriate diplomatic options available.” According to a CMC November 22, 2007 report, Vision Guyana, a political faction run by Peter Ramsaroop (a possible presidential contender in 2011), joined other opposition parties in condemning the Venezuelan action and called for “a stronger government response.” The attack by Venezuela on Guyanese facilities in Guyana’s waters “cannot be condoned, not even in the face of a shipment of 16,000 barrels of fuel to avert a crisis gripping our nation. We should not be bought,” Vision Guyana declared in a statement.

The cargo referred to above was an “extraordinary” shipment of gasoline and diesel sent to Guyana by Venezuela in late November, which surely, even as an after thought, was in part meant to help diffuse the crisis. A press release by the Venezuelan embassy in Georgetown left no doubt of this when it pointedly explained that “this supply of fuel constitutes an extraordinary shipment to attend to the emergency that the Government of Guyana presented last week through Samuel Hinds […]” The embassy went on to say that with this delivery of fuel, Venezuela ratifies its policies of cooperation and solidarity to guarantee direct benefits for the people of Guyana and the other Caribbean countries. Likewise, it shows its disposition to work for the economic and social integration of the people of Latin America and the Caribbean.” The shipment also occurred amidst a dramatic shortage of fuel across the English-speaking state, which forced a number of pumps in the Georgetown area to temporarily shut down for lack of fuel during November 2007.

President Jagdeo, after the destruction of the dredges had occurred, chose to attend a previously scheduled Heads of Government meeting of the Commonwealth Nations in Uganda. After the gathering, the Guyanese leader declared that he had received the solidarity backing of the 53-member organization. “Heads… took note of the incursions by Venezuelan military personnel and aircraft into Guyana’s territory and airspace on November 15, 2007 and reiterated the need for the controversy to be resolved by peaceful means,” he observed, after quoting the Commonwealth communiqué, (according to a November 30 article on the Guyana Chronicle website). The IPS Article America account weighed into the Jagdeo administration for not exhibiting any muscular intensity in responding to Venezuela, as the “Starbroek News newspaper might have put it,” being saved with a proper amount of spleen, and for its “tortoise-like approach as it urged the government to internationalize the incursion fully.” With the Guyanese economy already in straitened shape, and with the political tension between the ruling PPP party and the main opposition party—under the uninspired leadership of Robert Corbin of the PNC—Guyana is not in a position to take much buffeting.

There have been several rumors that Guyana might make a grievous tactical mistake and take this incident to the Organization of American States or the United Nations, but COHA’s investigators have found that such a scenario was not likely to happen and in fact would reflect a tempest in a teapot mock crisis, coming after some bona fide confidence-building initiatives (like the oil shipment) had been staged to bring Georgetown and Caracas closer together.

A communiqué issued at the end of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) held in Barbados in July 2007, contained a section on the Guyana-Venezuela border issue (actually, a month before the Essequibo incident had occurred). They stated that “the Conference expressed satisfaction with the efforts made by Guyana and Venezuela to maintain good relations.” In August 2007, Jagdeo attended the Third PetroCaribe summit in Caracas (again, before the demolition of the dredges had occurred). It is noteworthy to mention that Guyana, along with other Caribbean countries, had signed an agreement with Venezuela on June 2005 during the first PetroCaribe summit, which took place at Puerta la Cruz. Guyanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Rudy Insanally has declared that the Venezuela attack will not affect the flow of its fuel to Guyana. “The two things are not linked and have never been,” the minister has said. This comment may have represented on of the more constructive statements in the entire donnybrook.

Unrelated Incidents?
In another incident, according to a report published in the Starbroek News on December 10, 2007, a shoot-out with police forces in Guyana resulted in the death of a Venezuelan national and the arrest of another suspect.

According to local police, the Venezuelan and his accomplice had kidnapped a woman and her child, and later tried to escape with them by boat, before they were confronted by Guyanese police in Pomeroon. Rather than being associated with the attack on the dredges, the local authorities, in a statement that they later issued, emphasized that the police are convinced that this incident involved drugs which is a burgeoning problem in Guyana. One of the men involved in this incident is identified as being involved in the drug-related activities. Sad to say, the founding father of modern Guyana’s Platonic Republic, the lordly Cheddi Jagan, would have been charging if he were aware of the drug-sodden entity his PPP party has become. But with the ineptitude of the opposition’s leadership by the PNC’s Corbin, the anti-Jagdeo grouping has not been able to make much political headway.

Washington’s Response
Predictably, the Bush administration may be seizing the occasion to tighten its relations with Guyana, as a function of what it surely must view. The much more important relations—or lack thereof—with Venezuela. According to the Embassy of the United States in Guyana, on December 13, 2007, the U.S. Embassy’s Military Liaison Office (USMLO) and the Guyana Defense Force wrapped up the last of three meetings, which concluded the first ever U.S.-Guyana Civil-Military Relations Conference. At the conference, U.S. and Guyana officials discussed a range of issues, including “improved security cooperation and security assistance, perspectives on modern security challenges that impact U.S. and Guyana defense policy, and implications of civilian oversight of defense activities.” The conference also allowed for discussions between “senior Guyanese civilian and military leaders regarding Guyana’s role as a partner for specific U.S. security assistance programs.” However, any dialogue over a future U.S. military base in Guyana was not discussed or, at least, not publicly announced. Even though representatives from the USMLO-Guyana, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and the U.S. Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management participated in the event.

Perhaps unrelated, but even before the previous incident occurred, Washington’s interest in Guyana had seemed to have grown in recent months. Perhaps it was purely coincidental, but during July, U.S. security forces intercepted four individuals who were allegedly plotting to attack New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport. The suspected leader of the Islamic group was a Guyanese-born U.S. citizen. The planned attack was meant to promote the idea of an emerging presence of radical Muslim organizations in the Caribbean, historically considered part of Washington’s backyard. In addition, in late 2007 as part of an effort to parade Washington’s humanitarian credentials throughout the Caribbean but before the November incident took place, the USNS Comfort (a 900-foot-long floating hospital) had visited Guyana where it provided medical services to the local community, as part of the Bush Administration’s good will policy.

The Reason Why Borders Matter
Guyana’s resources and its strategic geographical location could make it an important factor for global policy makers. In December, at the same time that Guyana and Venezuela were in the middle of the row over the dredge affair, Guyana Goldfields Inc. announced the results of the ongoing diamond-drilling exploration on its 100%-owned Aurora Project, located in the Cuyuni mining district of the country, according to a December 12, 2007 MarketWire report. In fact, Venezuela’s growing concerns about mercury poisoning of the environment caused by Guyanese gold-digging operations are not totally unfounded. A study conducted by the World Wildlife Fund For Nature showed, according to an August 2007 AP story, that about 90 percent of the 200 residents screened in one particular mining area community showed symptoms of mercury-derived illness from mercury traces found among Amerindians in the affected areas.

Its closeness to Venezuela makes Guyana, by definition, important to Washington; its president,
Jagdeo, knows this almost instinctively. Caracas has successfully used its oil diplomacy to help gain an open door in Central America and throughout the Caribbean through its founding of Petrocaribe. Washington is now attempting to use its own rather lame eco-diplomacy to gain allies in the region, in order to stay the expansion of Venezuelan influence; Guyana could play an important role, in Washington’s view, as a member of CARICOM, by monitoring the growth of Caracas’ influence in the Caribbean basin.

From the Guyanese point of view, however, it is important to have allies to lend it support and solidarity, as the impoverished country, on occasions, has had border issues which have brought on a great amount of friction with other neighbors, not only with Venezuela. A CMC September 22, 2007 report explained how pleased Georgetown was that, apparently, its border differences with Suriname had been finally settled. The area in dispute between the two countries is believed to be rich in oil and gas. There have been different estimates regarding what percentage of the disputed land Guyana was able to obtain from Suriname, but it seemed to have ranged from 51% to as much as two-thirds of the terrain. Nevertheless, it will be important for Guyana to have strong area allies to safeguard the country’s natural resources, and Washington appears to be more than willing to take up the task, particularly since one of Guyana’s immediate neighbors is Venezuela.

Conclusions
The Venezuela-Guyanese border dispute could be characterized as a kind of “frozen conflict” zone (a term used to describe unsolved conflicts in the post-Soviet world). In spite of the long history of boundary issues, an open all-out war involving Guyana has never occurred, nor is it likely to take place in the near future. With Venezuela being one of the parties in the potential dispute, adding to the fact that there are even more significant natural resources likely to be found on Guyanese territory in the future, any ongoing friction between Guyana and Venezuela would be of great interest to several international actors, with Washington being at the top of the list.