Costa Rica: An Army-less Nation in a Problem-Prone Region

This analysis was prepared by by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sanchez
June 2, 2011
http://www.coha.org/costa-rica-an-army-less-nation-in-a-problem-prone-region/

The Central American nation of Costa Rica is one of the few countries in the world that does not possess a standing military. Nevertheless, Costa Rica, like other Latin American countries, faces a variety of security threats that test the country’s security capacity. Major national security issues include border control, drug trafficking and the expansion of international criminal organizations into the country, like for example, the Mexican Sinaloa drug cartel. On the international front, Costa Rica is currently involved in a border dispute with Nicaragua, which includes the occupation by a contingent of Nicaraguan army troops of disputed territories along the San Juan River since last year. The river traditionally has served as a natural border between the two countries, but Nicaragua altered the river’s course last year, resulting in a newfound control of the disputed Calero Island, at least for the time being. In response, San José has created a new elite border unit. The combination of rising criminal activity and the current border dispute with a state that possesses a relatively strong standing military means that Costa Rica will have to develop a stronger defense capacity to tackle growing security-related issues.

The History
Costa Rica’s revered president, José Figueres Ferrer, abolished the country’s military on December 1, 1948. The following year, Article 12 of the new constitution codified the abolition of the military. The armed forces’ budget was then shifted to internal security goals by redirecting funds to the police force, education, environmental protection and cultural preservation.

As a result, the country became known as a ‘civilized nation’–a label that it could not have claimed before the abolition of the armed forces. Prior to Figueres’ landmark initiative, Costa Rica, had suffered from a series of unstable governments. From 1917 to 1919, the country was under the dictatorial grip of General Federico Tinoco Granados, until he was overthrown and forced into exile. Figueres himself came to power through an armed insurrection that pitted him against Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia, a former president (1940-1944) who was trying to regain power through fraudulent elections and, ultimately, violence. Some 2,000 people died during the 44-day uprising, and it has been argued that Figueres abolished the military in order to avoid a future potential military coup against him. Today Costa Rica, considered by some, perhaps naively, as the “Switzerland” of Latin America, serves as the host for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the United Nations’ University for Peace, and is a member of other organizations related to international justice and human rights, including the International Criminal Court.

The Equipment and Organization of Costa Rica’s Police Force
Even though it does not possess a standing military, Costa Rica does have extensive security forces meant to tackle internal issues of law and order. With a population of around 4.5 million, the country has a police force of approximately 10,000 officers, as well as a Civil Guard consisting of 4,500 troops. Compared to other Central American police units, Costa Rica’s police establishment appears to be fairly well-equipped and trained. However, this comparison might be somewhat deceiving, since Costa Rica’s police reportedly have insufficient training, a shortage of service men, and a lack of resources (including vehicles, weaponry, etc).

Without a formal military force, Costa Rica had no need to regularly invest in naval vessels, warplanes, or tanks, which typically make up the heavy equipment of any traditional armed forces. Hence, in theory, the country could focus its financial resources on developing the best possible police force to maintain internal order, at the lowest cost. In fact, in early 2008, as reported by the Spanish defense-news agency, Infodefensa.com, the Spanish company, FEDUR S.A., was awarded a contract by the Costa Rican Ministry of Security to provide new equipment to the nation’s police force. The total bill for the upgrade was close to €2.1 million (almost USD 3 million). The contract included 5,000 bulletproof vests, 10,000 police sticks, 1,000 helmets and 1,000 shields. However, more acquisitions are badly needed, According to an April 2011 report in The Economist, the country has only two helicopters, and the Coast Guard has only a dozen World War II-era patrol boats to police Costa Rica’s two coasts. In an interview with COHA, Mr. Kevin Casas-Zamora, former vice president of Costa Rica and now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, explained that the country has not spent enough of its resources on security for the past forty years.
However, San José has made efforts to improve the training of its police force. For example, in November 2010, after the 12th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Mechanism of Tuxtla Dialogue and Agreement, Costa Rica and Colombia signed an agreement whereby Colombian authorities would train and advise the Costa Rican police in order to improve its capacity for fighting drug trafficking. Costa Rican president Laura Chinchilla insisted that the police force was not being militarized. She emphasized to the press that “the Colombian police are a civilian police; we are not asking for assistance from the Colombian Army, or from any Central American army.” In addition, the country has a special elite police unit known as Unidad Especial de Intervencion (Special Forces Unit).

In March 2011, President Chinchilla announced the creation of a special unit of the border guards. Several reports, including an article that appeared in the Nicaraguan daily El Nuevo Diario, reported that the elite guards would be financed by USD 1 million, and would soon be equipped with automatic rifles. The first unit will consist of 150 police officers and will be deployed along the country’s borders with Panama and Nicaragua. In statements made to the media, José María Tijerino, a former Minister of Public Security, explained that the elite guards will be provided with 18 “pickup” vehicles, speedboats, communication equipment and other high-tech gadgets.

In terms of political developments, this past February, President Chinchilla and the heads of the country’s judiciary and legislature agreed on a 10-year plan to tackle Costa Rica’s internal crime. The plan itself was created by the United Nations Development Program and other experts. According to reports, the goal is to improve the training of the police forces and the creation of new prison facilities. Opposition parties have criticized the plan, claiming that it offers generalized goals instead of concrete solutions. There are also concerns that, in order to carry out these objectives, the legislature will have to approve of new taxes. As part of its strategy, the Costa Rican government has created the position of Drug Czar (Comisionado Nacional Antidrogas), and appointed lawyer Mauricio Boraschi as its new head.

In spite of improvements in training and equipment, there are other problems that have yet to be tackled, including police corruption, alleged human rights abuses and low wages for police officers. In 2008, 11 officers in the city of Heredia were arrested for drug trafficking. At the time, local media reports explained that the salary of a national police officer was about USD 328 a month, a modest salary which barely allows for maintaining a family, but is not enough to protect an officer from the temptation of possibly accepting bribes. In addition, in 2009, there were also accusations that members of the Dirección de Inteligencia y Seguridad (Intelligence and Security Directorate – DIS), the police intelligence unit, had been spying on anti-government political groups.

The latest development regarding Costa Rica’s security situation was the mid-May approval of a USD 132 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank to improve the country’s security. According to a report by Associated Press reporter Luis Alfonso Lugo, the goal of the loan is to build 2,700 cells in Costa Rican prisons and hire new staff for the national police academy.

The Costa Rican Police: Better than its neighbors
With that said, the Costa Rican Fuerza Publica, is seen as being better trained and equipped than the police forces of other Central American states. In an interview with COHA, Dr. John Booth, a regents professor at the University of North Texas, said that “I’d rather be arrested in Costa Rica than anywhere else in Central America because the general human rights climate is much better– there is less abuse by the Fuerza Publica.” Former Vice President Casas-Zamora believes that, despite the bad image the Costa Rican security forces may be experiencing, they are not perceived as a threat by the local population; “they are not regarded as a predatory police,” he explained to COHA.

Other Latin American police forces do not enjoy such a positive perception. El Salvador, for example, carried out a major crackdown on gangs through an operation known as Mano Dura (Strong Hand), which has been widely condemned by human rights organizations as being too violent and ineffective. The Guatemalan police also suffers of a bad name, particularly after the country’s chief of national police and the country’s top anti-drugs official (Baltazar Gomez and Nelly Bonilla), were arrested in March 2010 over drug trafficking connections.

U.S. Offers Support to Costa Rica
The U.S. military has recently taken a keen interest in Costa Rica’s war on drugs. In July 2010, a fleet of U.S. warships and 7,000 servicemen arrived in Costa Rica. The American naval deployment included the carrier USS Making Island, several frigates, submarines and a hospital ship. Costa Rican opposition parties like Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC), Unidad Social Cristiana and the Frente Amplio objected to the port call, stating that “the destructive force of the ships, helicopters and marines is disproportionate to combating drug trafficking.” The Chinchilla administration was quick to respond that the U.S. forces would not be permanently deployed on Costa Rican territory or take part in security operations beyond traditional policing. However, it is worth mentioning that the close relations between Washington and San José have attracted criticism. In September 2010, outspoken Bolivian president Evo Morales quipped that Costa Rica does in fact have an army, referring to the U.S. military. The Andean president eventually issued an apology and retracted his comments.

In fact, Anne S. Andrew, U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, has asked that the Costa Rican legislature allow U.S. warships to make a port call. So far, the local legislative body has only allowed U.S. Coast Guard vessels to dock in Costa Rican ports. Juan Carlos Mendoza, an opposition deputy for the PAC, stated that his party opposes the docking of American naval warships because “it is not clear what other strategic military goals they have, besides combating drug trafficking.” In comments reproduced by Infodefensa.com, Paul Trivelli, a consultant for SOUTHCOM, stated that the Pentagon wants to repair Costa Rican patrol boats so they can be used in drug trafficking operations. Trivelli stated, “it is necessary to take into account that drug traffickers are now paying with cocaine and creating problems in many countries. Colombian and Mexican drug cartels are here and they must be combated [by the U.S.] as partners of Costa Rica.” San José signed a defense agreement with the U.S. in 1999, but many opposition factions would like to see it voided.

Internal Security Issues
Today, the Costa Rican police force faces several difficult dilemmas. Because of its geographical location, the country is part of a transit corridor (via land, air and sea) of drugs coming from South America to North America and, more indirectly, to Europe. In addition, an April 2011 article by Time reporter Tim Rogers explains that a booming tourism industry and immigration by Americans and Europeans have raised local consumer demand for drugs. Futhermore, there is a growing concern about the presence of Mexican cartels and even the possibility of the Colombian FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) operating within the country, which in fact, had an earlier presence in the country in the 1990s.

The December 21, 2010 edition of the highly regarded defense e-newsletter Southern Pulse quotes a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) representative, Phillip Springer, as confirming that the Mexican Sinaloa cartel had established control over drug trafficking in Costa Rica. Springer also predicted that other organizations would expand their networks in the country because of Costa Rica’s lack of a standing army and its sub-par police force. For the Costa Ricans, the major fear is that other groups like the Zetas cartel will try to enter their country and begin a turf war with the Sinaloa cartel, bringing about major levels of inter-cartel violence. This has already happened in Guatemala and the fear is that the situation will repeat itself farther south.

In recent months, there have in fact been a number of indications of a growing presence of transnational criminal organizations in the Central American country. The accurate daily publication, Latin News, has reported that Costa Rican security forces carried out several major raids in late February 2011 in Alajuela, Cartago and San José. Three Mexican citizens were arrested and up to 319 kilograms of cocaine were seized. Costa Rican officials believe that the three foreigners are members of the Sinaloa Cartel. Also in February 2011, local police found the bodies of a couple known to be drug dealers in the neighborhood of El Progreso, in the Pacific port of Puntarenas. It is believed that they were killed over a debt owed to their Mexican bosses.

Security experts explain that the flow of drugs partially operates like this: the drugs originate in Panama, go up the Pan-American Highway through Costa Rica, and enter Nicaragua through a number of remote crossings. In addition, Puntarenas port has become a major stopover for drug shipments by sea.

External Security: The Border Dispute with Managua
Costa Rica’s border dispute with Nicaragua, in one sense, has been going on for over a century, although the present conflict erupted in October 2010 when Nicaraguan workers began a dredging operation in the bordering San Juan River. This resulted in the flooding of Costa Rican territory, which effectively moved the border into Managua’s hands. In addition, several Nicaraguan troops (reportedly less than two dozen) have been stationed on a narrow stretch of the disputed land near Calero Island, whose ownership is also in dispute. Meanwhile, San José has dispatched its police to the border and raised protests to the Organization of American States (OAS) as well as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague. As the plaintiff, Costa Rica has a December 5 deadline to present its case to the ICJ, while Nicaragua will have until August 6, 2012 to present its counter-arguments.

Somewhat ironically, the Nicaraguan government has taken advantage of some errant Google Maps to justify its altering of the disputed border. While utilizing data from the U.S. State Department for its global mapping, the internet giant mistakenly transferred 2.7km of Costa Rican territory to Nicaraguan jurisdiction. In November 2010, Google apologized for the incorrect cartographic projections and has since corrected the original error. Nonetheless, in early February 2011, the Nicaraguan Institute of Territorial Studies published a new “official” map of the country, with the boundaries of the disputed territory reflecting its own cartographic interests.
In early March, in a preliminary ruling, the judges of the ICJ decided that neither country should send military or civilian personnel into the disputed zone until the ICJ gave a final ruling on who has jurisdiction. However, it allowed Costa Rica to send civilian personnel to “protect the environment.” Each country has claimed the interim ruling as a diplomatic victory. Although Costa Rica remains reluctant to give up any of the territory, President Chinchilla declared that she is willing to “normalize” relations with Nicaragua. Meanwhile, President Ortega stated that the resolution is positive and that there are no hard feelings towards the neighboring state. The resolution, from Nicaragua’s point of view, means that it can continue to divert some of the water of the San Juan River. Nevertheless, the presence of Nicaraguan troops on disputed soil remains an issue, as Costa Rica continues to demand that Nicaragua remove its troops. At the same time, Managua argues that its military is there to fight drug trafficking and organized crime. Both countries appear to want to normalize relations, but neither seems willing to give in to the other’s demands.

In early May, delegations from the two countries met in La Antigua Guatemala, Guatemala, to discuss inter-state police cooperation and how to combat drug trafficking across their borders. As reported by The Costa Rican News, the agreed protocol permits Costa Rican police boats to cross the maritime border while chasing drug-laden vessels without violating Nicaraguan sovereignty, and vice versa. The agreement states that the police forces on each side should notify the other side of pursuits across their common border. Such meetings and agreements are positive steps.
Not all of the developments for a peaceful solution have been positive, however. In early April, Nicaragua denied an international environmental commission (part of the Secretaria de la Convención sobre Humedales – Secretariat for the Convention on Wetlands) permission to assess potential environmental damage as a result of Nicaraguan dredging. As previously stated, the ICJ ruling said that Costa Rica could access the disputed area if it provided Managua with notification. Nicaragua argued that Costa Rica requested the authorization only two days in advance and did not sufficiently explain the reasons for the mission. Meanwhile, in Costa Rica, the PAC opposition party has complained to President Chinchilla about statements offered by now former Costa Rican Minister Tijerino, which insinuated that Nicaragua might resort to laying mines along its strategic delimitation and utilize its air force in order to more effectively secure the disputed territory. Such comments did not go over well with some Costa Rican politicians, as they did not help to improve relations between the two countries.

At the end of January, the results of a CID-Gallup poll showed that Costa Ricans were more worried about the incident than the citizens of Nicaragua were. According to Insidecostarica.com, 91 percent of Nicaraguans believed that the conflict was over nothing more than unclear border limits, while 73 percent of Costa Ricans were convinced that their neighbor wanted to invade the country. Interestingly, most Nicaraguans believe that Costa Rica has an army and it could invade their country, even though the “tico” security forces lack warplanes, tanks, or naval vessels to be a worthy foe.

A Regional Perspective
Costa Rica is trying to cope with several internal security issues in addition to the increased tensions with neighboring Nicaragua. It is important to consider that a state that has no military is by nature nonviolent. Simply put, it is hard to regard the country as aggressive, given its lack of traditional arsenal or weaponry and trained personnel. Should the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border dispute escalate (which is considered highly unlikely by most experts), it could be difficult for Nicaraguan President Ortega to not appear as an aggressor; considering that he has a relatively professional standing army behind his rhetoric. In December 2010, President Chinchilla declared that “I want to remind ‘esos señores del norte’ (the gentlemen of the north) that only ‘cobardes‘ (cowards) are courageous against the defenseless.”
A Costa Rican lawyer interviewed by COHA explained that the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan diferendum is very old and that he is confident that in no way is there any degree of realistic prospects for a violent confrontation to take place between the two countries. He explained that the border dispute is a historical one and both sides already know what diplomatic parlance to use without it affecting overall inter-state relations. This is particularly true for Nicaraguan President Ortega who is up for re-election and appears to be using the issue with Costa Rica to rally support for himself and divert attention from some of his unpopular domestic policies. Dr. Booth explained to COHA that, “the country that has most threatened Costa Rica in the past is, in fact, Nicaragua, but the incidents [were] in 1948, 1953, and again during the Nicaraguan insurrection in 1978-1979 when Somoza was still in power.” So far, for all the tensions in 2010 and the presence of Nicaraguan troops in the disputed territory, all experts interviewed by COHA agreed that the ongoing situation will be solved diplomatically.

The Costa Rican lawyer concluded by explaining that the Iraq War showed that in modern times, even a global power needs to provide the international community with justifications for going to war with another country. In any case, there is no justification for Nicaragua to invade an army-less state. By abolishing its military and carrying out a pacifist international role, San José has almost a bulletproof national security strategy at its disposal.

Conclusions
Synchronizing the country’s peaceful persona with its purportedly “friendly” diplomacy, helps portray Costa Rica as one of the countries least likely to act aggressively towards another neighboring state. Certainly, the Costa Rican security forces with their present armaments and training arrangements cannot be regarded as an army. So far, the Central American state has not considered re-instituting its military, although the creation of its special border guards does suggest that San José recognizes additional highly-trained security forces may be a necessity. While a re-militarization is generally not desired, it is clear that the police, border guard and other security departments of this de-militarized state have their work cut out for them.

Mexico’s Drug War: A Society at Risk – Soldiers versus Narco-Soldiers

by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sánchez
22 May 2007
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
http://www.coha.org/mexicos-drug-war-a-society-at-risk-soldiers-versus-narco-soldiers/

In early May, five Mexican soldiers, including an army colonel, were killed in a shootout with drug traffickers. It is believed that some of the attackers were members of Los Zetas, former members of Mexico’s Special Forces who have deserted or retired and who now work for the drug-trafficking Gulf Cartel. This violent incident is an example of the brutal tactics routinely utilized in the current daily confrontations taking place in Mexico. Upon assuming office last December 1st, President Felipe Calderón quickly came to the conclusion that he had to deploy the Mexican armed forces to fight alongside the police, and often in place of them, against the drug-trafficking cartels. This decision has created a situation in Calderón’s war on drugs that has firmly pinned Mexican Zetas against their former comrades, taking the conflict to a new level of violence in which military-style tactics, equipment and weaponry are now being utilized in an all-out conflict between the state and the para-state of the drug cartels.

These weapons in the thousands, are being smuggled into Mexico from U.S. sources; policing such shipments are given low priority by U.S. officials. Not only have the country’s various police forces been completely discredited, but much of the military has been as well. Today, Mexico is a country dangerously devoid of any security; a country which cannot defend itself against a pathological danger that has rendered its citizens completely vulnerable to what is little better than a state within a state. Along with the endemic corruption is an unacceptable level of domestic and imported crime and a surge of weapons for which a deeply complicit Washington shamefacedly does little better than shrugs its hands.

Mexican Military – The Human Side
As a result of their secrecy of operation and their often antiquated combat style, the Mexican armed forces are often characterized as a relic of a bygone era. While the rest of the nation works on developing more accountable government institutions, the armed forces remain virtually unchanged in organization and tactics. Today, the military has a combined force of around 183,000 troops, with only a very small percentage of them being combat-ready. While this is a significant level of troops, their relatively poor quality along with the phenomena of desertion has reached alarming levels.

A January 29 article in the Mexican daily Reforma found that between 2001 and November 2006, a total of 99,767 members of the armed forces deserted, of which 88,889 were from army units. This means that, on average, 46 soldiers deserted every day from the Mexican army. This intolerably high desertion rate has been attributed to hazing, low payments (a soldier earns less than a policeman) and a lack of unity, integration and communication between the regular troops and career officers. It is also important to note that the military salaries for troops as well as non-commissioned officers is low, while the annual budget for the entire armed forces is estimated to be a modest $3.1 billion.

The question remains as to how a military with no direct external enemies manages to spend even this relatively modest budget. In a 2000 article in U.S. News & World Report, Sergio Aguayo, a political analyst at El Colegio de Mexico, described the Mexican military as “the last bunker,” still waiting to be taken in the country’s democratization process.

Mexican Military: Mouse or Lion

The military’s mandate is ostensibly routine: mainly to protect the nation from traditional external threats to the state to the more contemporaneous task of ensuring the internal security of the citizenry. Mexico’s somewhat unique geo-strategic position means that it faces no such major external security threat. As stated by Arturo Sotomayor in an April 2006 issue of Hemisphere, the Mexican military is too weak to battle the American military, but, at the same time, it is far too strong to be concerned about any form of hostile action from its Central American neighbors such as Belize or Guatemala. The history of Mexico’s military is also somewhat of an aberration when compared to other Latin American armed forces, due to their almost complete lack of involvement in domestic politics. While South America went through a period of harsh military governments during the 1970s and 1980s, there hasn’t been a Mexican military coup in over seventy years.

An important moment in the history of the Mexican military took place in 1981, when the Mexican National Defense College or CDN (Colegio de Defensa Nacional) was inaugurated. The goal of the college is to provide a higher level of military and strategic education to junior military officers; additional offerings have included conferences on human rights and terrorism. However, as important as the CDN may be, it seems that its ideals as well as its educational dividends have not always been successfully transmitted to the foot soldiers.

Even though the military today is a fairly popular institution in the country, it also has experienced some very dark episodes. An example of this was the 1968 massacre in Tlatelolco Square in Mexico City, when troops shot and killed as many as 300 student protesters to avoid to avoid unsightly protests during the upcoming Olympic games. Sotomayor explains that accusations of human rights violations by military personnel are common but seldom penalized, with soldiers rarely having to face civilian trials even if accused of committing a crime. Such immunity before the law most likely creates a feeling of invincibility within the rank-and-file of the Mexican military that they have a license to badger, steal and even kill with impunity.

Los Zetas
More mysterious and less transparent than the regular Mexican military are Los Zetas. Little is known about the members of the “military wing” of various drug cartels, in part in order to spare the Mexican military of the embarrassment that scores of former special forces have been lured into being criminals for much higher wages. It is known that Los Zetas are more often than not former members of the Mexican Special Air Mobile Group. In the late 1990s, this unit was sent to the Mexican state of Michoacan, where it is believed that the unit’s command made its initial contacts with the leaders of the Gulf Cartel. Over the next several years, the desertion level within the elite group began to mount. It is now known that most of these former soldiers were hired by the Gulf Cartel, becoming essentially hitmen and contract killers. It is almost certain that these former special forces also have trained regular members of the Gulf Cartel’s security forces, making the criminal organization even more dangerous. It is unclear how many Zetas are currently under the control of the Gulf Cartel but various reports put the number at no more than several hundred. It is an established fact that the Zetas have built training camps in the states of Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon and Michoacan.

Multiple reports indicate that the Zetas are also in contact with “Los Kabiles,” former Guatemalan soldiers who were members of elite units who then deserted and have become enforcers for various Central American drug-trafficking operations. The strength and efficiency of the Zetas have created a kind of “Zeta-effect,” where those they train are now better equipped to professionally perform due to the instructions that the Zetas provide to their students, potentially making them deadlier than normally would have been the case. The result of this lugubrious training has been a wave of increasingly violent and brutal armed confrontations across the country with local security forces and military units in recent years, as drug death squads assassinate those affiliated with their rivals with impunity, including hundreds of corrupted law enforcement agents.

To understand the composition of Los Zetas, it would help to read the reports of captured or killed Zeta members. In November of 2006, two former army corporals were identified by the Mexican prosecutor general’s office as Zetas. Efraín Teodoro Torres, known as “Zeta 14,” and Gustavo González Castro, were trained in assault operations during their seven years in the military, serving in the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (SEDENA). After leaving the army, they joined the Zetas, and it is believed that they led an infamous raid against the prison at Apatzingán on January 5, 2004, in which 25 prisoners were freed.

An important apprehension took place in early February 2007, when José Ramón Dávila López, known as “El Cholo,” was being detained in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas. Dávila López had served in the army for six years from 1995 to 2001, as part of the Air Mobile special forces group. In another incident, one of the founders of Los Zetas, Nabor Vargas García, “El Débora,” was captured in a shoot-out in Tabasco on April 18th in which two people were killed. He was arrested with 20 other individuals, many of whom presumably were also Zetas. The government claims that Vargas García ran a unit of Zetas in Tabasco, Campeche and Chiapas. He later admitted that he had served in the army, leaving the Presidential Guard’s assault battalion in 1999.

One has to wonder, when looking at the breadth of desertion which has taken place in the army, what kind of training the members of the Mexican military receive. Are the regular troops being given adequate instruction from their officers regarding issues of national identity which can be counted on to instill in them sufficient respect for the nation and civil society, even after they leave active duty?

Calderon Raises the Stakes
As one of his first mandates as president, Felipe Calderón deployed the armed forces throughout the country to help law enforcement agencies tackle crimes associated with drug trafficking and related matters. Michoacán was the first state to which Calderón deployed the army when he took office on 1 December. Since early December 2006, over 24,000 troops have been rotated to various areas by the military high command. In the Acapulco area, for example, 7,000 troops were sent to in an attempt to halt the turf war between the Sinaloa and Gulf cartels.

This massive national military mobilization has yielded some limited, successes. On May 10, Mexico’s SEDENA published a communiqué, stating that during a routine bus inspection in Cucupa, troops from the 22nd Motorized Cavalry regiment found 336 packets of cocaine (amounting to an overall weight of 381 kg), and an additional 23 packets of methamphetamines (weighing 11 kg), hidden inside the motor and restroom of a bus. Similar successes have prompted General Guillermo Galván Galván, Mexico’s Defense Secretary, to declare that “el narcotráfico no doblegará al Ejército” (“drug traffickers will not defeat the army”). Other experts see Calderon’s reliance in the armed forces from a different perspective. In an interview with COHA, Professor Jack Child of American University explains that Calderon’s use of the military “is a measure of desperation as he tries to make good his campaign promises to get tough with the drug cartels (in contrast with his predecessor Fox, whose administration appears to have reached an unofficial understanding with them).”

Dangers of Reliance on the Military as a Police Force
Different issues have come up regarding Calderon’s utilization of the country’s military as a police force. The first one is that greater use of the military in domestic affairs actually might have the negative effect of affording the armed forces more power and control in the nation than traditionally has been the case. The Mexican military has traditionally been known for being relatively apolitical, only rarely showing much partisan interest in domestic politics. This condition—which normally would keep the military out of politics—may be undermined if the military high command begins to believe that, as protectors of the nation both from external and internal security threats, they should have a greater say in the government’s decision-making process, perhaps also demanding an increase in the defense budget, or a fixed percentage of it.

Another potential effect of the military’s expanding functions is strained relations between the military and the police. Calderon’s decision to turn to the military may be meant to impart an indirect message to the police that he does not trust this institution due to its endemic corruption and ineptitude. Strained relations between two forces that should be fighting in union against a common enemy may have other negative effects like a lack of intelligence information sharing or mutual assistance. This may already have happened. During the May attack in which five soldiers were killed by cartel hitmen, it was discovered that the ambush took place only 30 meters away from the Presidencia Municipal (the mayor’s offices) of Carácuaro. Yet despite the proximity to the mayor’s office, the police officials stationed there took no effort to come to the aid of the besieged soldiers.

Finally, soldiers are trained for search and destroy missions, often relying on large scale mobilizations, which could lead to widespread destruction and wide scale human rights abuses. During the Central American wars of the 1980s, militaries across the region were used to fight leftist rebels, leading to civilian massacres and brutal techniques like Guatemala’s ‘scorched earth policy’ or El Salvador’s death squads. Professor Child explains that “even among the more professional of the Latin American militaries, there is a process of “desgaste” (grinding down) as they act as a domestic police force. The military tends to have an end and means problem when faced with violent situation, reacting sharply and violently when faced with a violent adversary.”

A similar scenario may eventually begin to take place in Mexico. The country’s daily Mural reported on May 9 that soldiers went to Carácuaro and Nocupétaro to look for those who attacked a military convoy encouraging massive looting and abuses against the civilian population. Numerous witnesses state that the soldiers, looking to revenge their fallen comrades, stole money and jewelry from ordinary Mexicans; in some cases women were sexually assaulted, while men were verbally harassed, threatened, and pushed around.

The Price in Blood
Despite some successes as a result of the military’s crackdown operations, Mexican drug cartels do not appear to be visibly shaken as the violence at their hands continues to rage. In 2006, over 4,000 were killed in Mexico in drug-related violence. So far this year, according to various unofficial Mexican newspaper accounts, between 900 and 1000 people have fallen. On May 16 alone, over 30 people died across the country in cartel-related violence in the bloodiest day since Calderón took office. A shootout that day between the Mexican police and drug hitmen (it is unclear if they were Zetas) left 15 suspected criminals dead, along with five policemen and two civilians. The firefight took place on a ranch in the state of Sonora, around 100km from the border with Arizona. In a speech delivered the next day, Calderón declared that he will continue to use the military against the traffickers and that the drug war “es una batalla que vamos a ganar […] vamos a rescatar a Mexico de esos grupos [criminales]” (“a battle that we are going to win […] we are going to save Mexico from those [criminal] groups”).

The fight between Mexican security forces and the cartels rages on. Even as kingpins and hitmen are being detained, tried and sentenced in large numbers, others are being brought in to fill in the vacated spots. A number of presumed Zetas have been either killed or detained in recent months. On May 7, the army attacked a house being held by gangsters in the centre of Apatzingán. In an operation significant for the powerful weaponry utilized – military units attacked the house, starting with MK-19 grenade launchers, as a result of which they killed four criminals and wounded three others.

Meanwhile, the armed forces’ death toll is slowly beginning to rise. The May 1 incident which killed five soldiers and wounded four others involved an ambush against a military convoy composed of members of the 12th infantry battalion. The ambush was carried out by between 12 to 30 Cartelistas, all heavily armed and well organized. It is believed that at least some of them may have been Zetas. It is unclear if any of the attackers were either injured or killed in the attack that took place on a road between Morelia and Huetamo in the state of Michoacan. Huetamo has been the location of a hotbed of drug violence and the scene of several confrontations between the army and gangs. Calderón has since sent some 6,000 soldiers to Michoacan in a crackdown on this hub of the Gulf Cartel. Another casualty was Jacinto Pablo Granda, a Mexican infantry captain, who was kidnapped and later murdered on May 13 in the state of Guerrero. His body was found on a highway and had two gunshots to the head.

Luis Astorga, a specialist in drug trafficking from the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Mexico (UNAM), stated to the Mexican daily La Opinión that organized crime is now using guerilla-style strategies that are managing to “enloquecer” (“drive crazy”) the militiary. Astorga explained to La Opinión that the cartels are carrying out isolated attacks to distract the government forces, while drug trafficking goes on as usual. These strategies seem to be working – after the attack on the military convoy that killed the five soldiers, the military deployed over 1,300 troops throughout the area to root out the culprits. While attention was centered on these search missions, one can only speculate as to how many shipments of drugs were moved throughout the state during this period. Astorga added that drug-trafficking organizations are very good at adapting to new situations, and, right now, there is a transition taking place as drug kingpins switch from hiring common hitmen to recruiting premium forces such as the paramilitary Zetas, with their specialized military training. In response to the growing violence perpetrated by former members of this force, the Mexican government and its armed forces are rumored to be discussing plans to impose much longer prison sentences of 30 to 60 years on deserters who later become involved in criminal activities.

Additional Factors
Zeta operations are not directed solely at fighting the Mexican security forces. The different drug cartels operating in the country are in a constant struggle for territory and greater control of the drug flow. The Zetas therefore also fight the security wings of other drug cartels. Some of these groups include “Los Negros” of the Sinaloa cartel and “Los Chachos” of the Juarez cartel. It is unknown whether the other cartels are also employing former soldiers as hitmen, but if they are not yet, it seems only a matter of time until they do, further escalating this inter-cartel drug war to a new level of paramilitary violence.

Finally, the Mexican military will essentially be fighting the various cartels “alone.” It is well known that many members of the Mexican police are on the drug-traffickers’ payroll, which provides a major explanation behind the ineffectiveness thus far of police efforts in tackling organized crime gangs. Regarding this chronic problem, Calderón announced in April that his administration will tackle corruption in the police, claiming that “coludirse con quienes atentan contra la seguridad es traicionar a Mexico” (“colluding with [criminals] is betraying Mexico”). His success in this ambitious project remains to be seen. Too little is known about corruption in Mexico’s military, however its magnitude is believed to be huge. At the same time, too little is known of Calderon’s bona fides on the drug question. Is he using it as a distraction, as was the case with his predecessor, Vicente Fox, or does he really believe that it should be the leitmotif of his presidency? The discussions about increasing prison penalties to former soldiers who join drug traffickers, namely Los Zetas, may be an indirect way for Calderon to admit that corruption is endemic in the country’s military, as it is in almost every other sector of Mexico’s public life.

Accepting Realities
In order to be effective and make an impression on the nation, Calderón’s aggressive drug policy will have to go hand in hand with a number of other reforms. There is an ever-growing need to reconstitute, modernize, and professionalize the Mexican armed forces, which will have to include greater accountability for its personnel, better pay and treatment for the troops, and also more ideological courses to insure that military members’ respect for the nation is institutionalized, even after they leave active duty. Another practical option is that the government should create high quality jobs specifically designed for former military, to give them less reason to consider joining drug cartels for the easy cash to be made; for example, authorities could give job-hiring preference to former soldiers that for a position in the law enforcement agencies. Lastly, the military’s high command should establish a monitoring committee to keep track of the troops once they retire or desert in order to make sure that they do not join criminal organizations.

The Mexican drug war is reaching a new level, not only because of the widespread violence, but because of the contending forces now being pinned against each other. Calderón’s continuous statements about defeating the cartels may be bordering on the naïve unless immediate reforms be made in the military and a massive crackdown on corruption occurs at the same time. Today, Calderón faces the hard fact that both Mexico and its drug cartels each have their own professionally-trained militarized forces. It is certain that the death toll on both sides will continue to mount while the ultimate victor is not at all clear. What is clear is that the viability of the Mexican state is now at risk.

Venezuela’s Security Factors and Foreign Policy Goals

by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sánchez
02 May 2007
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
http://www.coha.org/memorandum-to-the-press-venezuelas-security-factors-and-policy-goals/

• Venezuela builds up its weapon stock and deepens its ties to “pariah” nations
• Chavez’s very active regime policy intriguing some because it may be viewed as too presumptive
• Chavez plays his high-risk game with extraordinary skill

To Washington’s corrosive eye, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has become the hemisphere’s most marked “individual of concern.” However, exactly what is it about Chávez’s feisty foreign policy that has made it such a burr to U.S. national interests—symbolized by the formal takeover just hours ago of the last remaining examples of foreign-control of one of the country’s oil fields.

Foreign Policy: Making Friends of Washington’s Foes
The influence of Chávez around the hemisphere, if not the globe, is related to the rise of governments in the region, accurately reflecting a new genre of anti-American virulence. Chávez has managed to ally himself with a number of the continent’s more progressively-leaning leaders who share his counter-hegemonic views on regional affairs. Aside from his friendship with longtime Cuban leader Fidel Castro, he has befriended Bolivia’s Evo Morales, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega, among others. Beyond the hemisphere, Chávez also has developed close relationships with states that the U.S., at least until recently, often frowned upon, if not plotted against, such as Vietnam, Libya, Syria, Iran, the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation.

Ties with Current and Former Communist States
The most recent visit of a high-level foreign dignitary to Venezuela was in late March, when Li Changchun, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC’s Central Committee, along with other high-ranking Chinese officers, visited Caracas. An important outcome of the meeting was the signing of an agreement between Rafael Ramirez, president of Venezuelan Petroleum Incorporated (PDVSA) and Jiang Jemin, president of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). This agreement established the Petrozumano Company, designed to transport and store hydrocarbons. The two executives also agreed on a joint venture to develop oil production in the Junin-4 bloc of Venezuela’s Orinoco Oil Belt. After the signing of these agreements, Chávez declared, “we have always said that Venezuela wants to become a reliable, growing source of oil supply for China.” He added that in 2006, Venezuela exported 300,000 barrels a day to China, with a goal of 500,000 barrels for the end of the year. The March 2007 meeting was a continuation of an ongoing dialogue between both governments, which had recently reached a new peak when Chávez visited Beijing in June 2006 to meet with Chinese President Hu Jintao.

In addition to visiting China, Chávez also has traveled to a number of other countries in order to promote closer ties. Last May, Chávez’s trip to Moscow strengthened Caracas’ links with the Russian Federation, with the subsequent purchases of major categories of Russian military equipment aimed at upgrading Venezuela’s armed forces.

Growing Bonds of Friendship
Also of note was Chávez’s trip last June to Belarus. In return, in late March, a Belarusian delegation, headed by State Secretary of the National Security Council Viktor Sheyman, visited Venezuela. During Sheyman’s stay, twenty-two joint declarations were signed between the two governments regarding cooperation in the energy, trade, technology, housing construction, science and technical spheres. Another important agreement allows for a joint venture project for oil exploration and production in the Orinoco River basin. It is expected that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko will travel to the South American country in the near future.

Increasingly amicable relations have also recently developed with Vietnam. Chávez has met with President Nguyen Minh Triet on two occasions within the past year, once last August when the Venezuelan leader traveled to Vietnam, and then again when both leaders attended the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Havana last September. A Venezuelan delegation, headed by then deputy foreign minister Nicolas Maduro, went to the Asian country in March. The most important outcome of this event, according to an article carried by Thai Press Reports, was that Venezuela affirmed its support for Vietnam’s bid to become a non-permanent member of the United Nation’s Security Council for the 2008-2009 term. Venezuela itself may attempt once again to become a non-permanent member, and already is courting potential support from many of its new friends. Among his meetings, Villegas had appointments with officials from the Party Central Committee’s Commission for External Affairs, the Industry Ministry and the Vietnam Oil and Gas Group.

The Arab/Persian Connection
At a time when much of the world is focused on the threat of terrorism posed by Islamic fundamentalists, Chávez has approached governments that have long been accused of some form of involvement with international extremists, namely Syria, Iran and Lybia. The Venezuelan president traveled to Damascus last August, where he met with President Bashar al-Assad. Another Venezuelan delegation, headed by deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Vladimir Villegas visited Syria in early March of this year. “My visit to Damascus comes in the framework of boosting ties and promoting them in all domains,” declared Villegas after several meetings. One interesting agreement between both countries was made known last November, when the two governments, along with Iran, signed a preliminary agreement to construct an oil refinery in Syria capable of processing 140,000 barrels a day. According to the Syrian official news agency SANA, the document was signed by Syria’s deputy oil minister Hassan Zeinab, his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Nematzadeh, and Roberto Delgado, general-director of oil refineries in Venezuela. According to Damascus, the goal of the refinery is to boost Syria’s economy and ensure the necessary oil derivatives for local consumption. The oil refinery is expected to cost $1.5 billion.

Chávez also has met with longtime Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi when he visited Tripoli for two days in May of 2006. Officials of both governments refused to comment on what the leaders discussed, but it is known that they met for over an hour. Chávez has met Gadhafi four times prior to this event and their friendship is well known. The Libyan leader has presented Chávez with the Gadhafi Human Rights Prize, while Chávez often quotes Gadhafi’s Green Book in his speeches. It has been widely speculated that Chávez and Gadhafi, as members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), most likely discussed oil prices and supplies during their meeting.

With regards to Iran, and in order to bring the two nations together, several new initiatives have occurred during the Chávez presidency, driven by their characteristically strained relations with the U.S. An event that symbolizes the increased close ties between the two governments has been the recent designation of a Caracas-Tehran weekly flight, with a stopover in Damascus. The flights will be operated in a code-share agreement by the Venezuelan state-controlled airline Conviasa and Iran’s national carrier, Iran Air. “Mr. Chávez is much loved in our country, and our people want to come here to get to know this land,” Iran’s ambassador to Venezuela Abdullah Zifan said when plans for the flight were announced.

Discussing the close relations among Caracas, Damascus and Tehran, the Brazilian newspaper Correio Braziliense, on January 24 of this year, published an article that explained: “Sworn enemies of the United States in the Middle East, Iran and Syria are taking advantage of the leftist wave in Latin America to launch an unprecedented diplomatic offensive. And they are finding in Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela an important ally in the geopolitical energy complex.” The key component of this “defense” pact is oil, as is described in the article. Boris Saavedra, a consultant on hemispheric security, has been quoted as saying that Chávez has succeeded in creating “focal points of power” that oppose North American hegemony. He maintains: “This is an axis with a common ideology and an energy capacity. They have an agreement by which, in case one of those countries is attacked, militarily or not, the others will suspend the oil supply. There are 7 million barrels that would be taken off the market in one day.”

Security Policy: Arming up… for What?
Russian-Venezuelan arms deals in the last few years have made worldwide headlines. In 2006, Caracas startled the world by announcing a significant weapons purchase from Moscow: 100,000 Kalishnikov assault rifles (type AK-103), 24 Sukhoi (SU-30) fighter jets, and 53 military helicopters. The eventual price tag of the unfolding deal came close to $3 billion. The aircraft already have begun to be delivered to Venezuela, with the first two having arrived on December 8, 2006, at the Lieutenant Luis del Valle Garcia Air Base.

Another factor tying Caracas and Moscow together is the continuous flow of military personnel, such as pilots and technicians, winging in both directions to provide training. Venezuelan pilots are already taking flight instruction classes from Russian teachers, while Russian technicians have traveled to Venezuela to instruct local mechanics on how to service the newly purchased and relatively sophisticated Russian equipment. Also, plans are being worked out to construct a factory capable of mass production of Russian AK automatic rifles in Maracay, Venezuela’s Aragua State. It is expected that the facility will be operational by 2010 and produce as many as 50,000 units per year.

Numerous reports indicate that Venezuela is also out to buy an indeterminate number of Antonov model 76 transport planes (which will replace the US-made C-130s), as well as three Amur-class submarines. The number of transport aircraft that Venezuela may eventually purchase has not been specified, however, sources aware of the details speak of a “large consignment.”

The most recent Venezuelan acquisitions occurred early this year when it was announced that Caracas would buy ten to twelve TOR-M1 anti-aircraft defense missile systems from Moscow. The cost of the proposed deal is estimated at $290 million. The BBC reprinted an article published by Caracas’ daily El Nacional, which quotes a retired member of Venezuela’s Presidential General Staff, General Alberto Muller Rojas, as saying: “I do not know if there will be more, but 12 is too few; in any case, there will be 12 batteries. To prevent an air attack, more missiles are needed.” Such a statement coming from someone who is known to be very close to President Hugo Chávez fortifies the likelihood of a higher volume of military purchases down the road, with Moscow appearing more than willing to oblige. In addition, Muller Rojas’ intriguing statement poses the question of exactly which outside source might attempt to carry out such a putative air assault against Venezuela.

Other Suppliers
Military technology also has come from other suppliers. In November 2005, Caracas signed a 1.2 million euro deal with Madrid for the construction of eight patrol boats for service in the Venezuelan navy. In mid-April, navy commander Vice-Admiral Benigno Calvo Díaz visited the Spanish shipyards of Puerto Real and San Fernando, in Cadiz, to inspect the construction of the new vessels. A February 2007 report in the Spanish daily El País mentions that Madrid has sold the Venezuelan armed forces ammunition for light weapons, costing a total of 3.2 million Euros. Early efforts by Spain to consummate much larger military transactions with Venezuela were thwarted because Washington bans shipments containing US parts to Venezuela.

Increasingly active relations between Belarus and Venezuela also have resulted in weapon sales, but at a more modest level. The Eastern European nation will supply night vision devices to the Venezuelan army, with President Chávez declaring that “every single rifle in the Venezuelan army” will be fitted with these upgrades. A March 23 article by Deutsche Presse-Agentur reports that since the Venezuelan army has around 34,000 troops, the potential value of the Venezuelan night scope order to Belarus would be between 3 and 24 million dollars. In addition, Minsk has offered Caracas an arms package that includes anti-aircraft missiles. Belarusian officials also have in their arsenals modernized Soviet-era medium and short range missile systems, called Pechora-2T and Osa-1T by the Belarusian army. The Belarusian arms firm Teteraedr, manufacturer of the Pechora and Osa missiles, also has be en prepared to offer Venezuela the newly-developed TRK missile system.

In 2005, Caracas acquired several 3-D long-range JYL-1 radar systems for command of military air operations from China’s state-owned Electronics Import and Export Corporation. Venezuela’s decision to turn to nations like Russia, China and Belarus for weaponry mainly has to do with its lack of other potential military suppliers. The U.S., since 2005, has suspended the sale of spare parts for Venezuela’s American-made weapon’s system for its F-16s. Another example is Spain’s decision to cancel a $620 million-order to Venezuela for twelve transport aircraft because of direct U.S. intervention.

The Blunders:
His critics will argue that Chávez has committed some significant blunders regarding both foreign and security policy matters. One of these has been his comparison of Israel to Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany. He made this statement during the summer 2006 war between the Israeli Defense Forces and the terrorist organization Hezbollah in Lebanon. In an August 2006 interview with the Al-Jazeera news agency, Chávez said Israel’s air strikes against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon were an “unjustified aggression that is being carried out in the style of Hitler, in a fascist fashion.” The Venezuelan leader then removed his ambassador to Israel after the war commenced. While Chávez is known for not always having a silver tongue, he is just as famous for a lack of a self-censoring mechanism and does not always realize the explosive effect that some of his words can have. Whatever his beliefs on Middle Eastern affairs, comparing the Israeli government to Adolf Hitler is totally inadmissible and does grave damage to his image as a thinker rather than a bomb thrower.

Another issue that has hurt Chávez’s international standing is his declared sympathy for the Colombian rebel movement, the FARC. To this end, even though Chávez has the right to acquire any quantity and grade of weapons he feels that Venezuela may requires, he well understands that such precipitous decisions like the purchase of 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles and the construction of a Kalashnikov manufacturing complex in Venezuela provide some grounds for causing unrest to his neighbors, particularly Colombia, where the leftist guerilla groups FARC and ELN operate. The question on everyone’s mind is: why would Venezuela need so many rifles, if it only has an armed force of around 55,000 troops (including 24,000 paramilitary troops responsible for internal security)? The fear in Washington and Bogotá is that some of those rifles may find their way into the hands of the FARC. In a press conference in Washington on March 20, Colombian foreign minister, Fernando Araújo (who was a prisoner of the FARC for six years), said that “Chávez is the ideological leader of the guerrillas in Colombia. The FARC say they have great admiration for him.” It should be noted that Chávez repeatedly has denied providing any kind of military or financial aid to the FARC or the ELN. Unfortunately, the construction of the rifle factory will only provide more firepower to his detractors.

The Analysis
Venezuela can formulate whatever foreign policy it wants as a sovereign state, which can include pursuing relations with renowned human right violators and despotic governments like Libya and Iran. Washington may criticize Caracas and raise serious questions of its choice of friends, but it is also important to remember that the U.S. had its share of interactions with chronic human right violators like the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, Vietnam. In addition, Washington has taken Libya off the list of countries that sponsors terrorism, which exemplifies how the U.S. changes its mind abruptly about the status of a nation based not on objective standards, but whether it is good for U.S. interests, at times narrowly defined. From this point of view, Chávez is simply looking for potential allies who share his common interests and preferences. In the end, oil understandably has become the firmest glue between Venezuela and those countries in its, and that is what proves the most worrisome for Washington.

The mass purchases of military equipment by Venezuela should be seen as part of a wider modernization process now taking place across South America. Much has been written about Venezuela’s purchase of Sukhoi jet fighters and Kalashnikov rifles. However, little has been said about Chile’s purchase of F-16C fighter jets and state-of-the-art Leopard tanks and Humvees, which are of great concern to Peru, Bolivia and Argentina. Caracas’ decision to approach Russia for equipment, following Chávez’s mission to break apart from Washington influence, also has to do with the simple fact that Washington has refused to sell spare parts to maintain and upgrade Venezuela’s fleet of F-16 jets, which are probably rusting in some work shed in that country. Of Venezuela’s twenty-two U.S. -supplied F-16 jets, only around eight are currently operational. While the Venezuelan Air Force has managed to keep some F-16 jets operational in the face of a de facto embargo, a recent report in Military Technology outlines that “the jet’s medium-term serviceability [is] in obvious doubt.” From this point of view, it is only logical that Venezuela would turn to Russia, a country that holds no reservations in selling military hardware to any nation with enough cash.

Furthermore, even if Venezuela is upgrading its military more than other countries in its category, it is most likely doing so for defensive purposes. It would be ludicrous to believe that the country would launch any kind of military aggression against the U.S., shooting at Stealth bombers with rifles. Any kind of military aggression against nearby Caribbean islands or Guyana (with which Venezuela has a longstanding border dispute), would be internationally condemned. As a consequence, Chávez would lose the credibility he has painstakingly managed to create among his neighbors. An armed conflict with Brazil is also unlikely as this would have to be done mainly through air battles and guerrilla warfare, given that the border between both countries is basically an impenetrable jungle. In addition, Chávez wants to bring together the Southern Cone via the proposed gas pipeline, not conquer it. The only logical point of conflict could be Colombia, as relations between Caracas and Bogotá have been historically tense, particularly now during the Chávez and Uribe administrations. In 1987, the countries almost went to war when a Colombian warship was spotted in Venezuelan waters. However it is unlikely that an armed conflict would result because Colombia cannot afford to fight a two-front war – one against the Venezuelan military while simultaneously fighting the FARC and ELN. At the same time, politically speaking, Chávez could hardly afford to launch any kind of offensive if he would appear to be the aggressor.

Conclusions
Hugo Chávez, as a former military officer with bitter memories of the failed April 2002 coup against him, understands the necessity of having a strong and loyal military serving him. In order to satisfy this perceived necessity, he needs to upgrade Venezuela’s military even if there are no logical immediate enemies for an offensive war. From this point of view, Venezuela’s recent arms purchases should be seen as defensive. At the same time, the country’s foreign policy of befriending U.S.-styled pariah nations like Syria and Iran should not be regarded as some kind of potentially dangerous international cabal.

The center of Chávez’s foreign policy seems to be focused around oil, whose earnings he in part uses to befriend oil-producing nations as well as major oil importers like China. In spite of whatever provocative statements the Venezuelan leader may make during his trips to Tripoli, Tehran and Minsk, he also understands that in order to gain the petro-dollars in sufficient supplies that he needs to update his country’s military, he needs a stable environment, which today will only come from major oil clients like the U.S not roiling the waters.