Geopolitcal Monitor: "Istanbul 2.0? Kazakhstan Steps into the Ukraine War Diplomatic Arena"

 

 

"Istanbul 2.0? Kazakhstan Steps into the Ukraine War Diplomatic Arena"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Geopolitical Monitor

Opinion

7 August, 2026

Published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/istanbul-2-0-kazakhstan-steps-into-the-ukraine-war-diplomatic-arena/ 

 

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has no end in sight, as military operations by both sides continue deep in enemy territory. The war may have become a new textbook definition of intractable conflict. Since first breaking out in February 2022, several diplomatic attempts have been rolled out to bring a peaceful resolution, without success.

Now Kazakhstan is throwing its proverbial hat into the ring.

Geopolitical Monitor: "The DRC: Threats and Opportunities in a Complex Neighborhood"

 "The DRC: Threats and Opportunities in a Complex Neighborhood"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Situation Reports

Geopolitical Monitor

21 November, 2021

Originally published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/drc-foreign-policy-threats-and-opportunities-in-a-complex-neighborhood/

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has appointed the president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Félix Tshisekedi, as the mediator in Chad after a wave of violence hit the African nation in October. The designation was the culmination of a busy October for the Congolese leader, who carried out several international trips to neighboring countries and the United Kingdom and received high-profile delegations. The high-profile meetings occur amid tensions between the DRC and Rwanda over the crimes committed by Rwanda-supported M23 militants. Now more than ever, Kinshasa needs allies.

 Continue reading...

FPIF: The View from Syria’s Peace Talks

"The View from Syria’s Peace Talks"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez.
Foreign Policy in Focus
September 13, 2019
Originally published: https://fpif.org/the-view-from-syrias-peace-talks/

 

After 13 rounds of talks in Kazakhstan, the parties are aiming small. Still, that’s a lot better than nothing.

Eight years since its inception in 2011, the Syrian civil war rages on, a conflict that has taken on grand geopolitical dimensions and resulted in tens of thousands killed and a massive exodus of refugees. While other tensions and conflicts around the world have since grabbed the attention of major media outlets, the situation in Syria has not gotten any better. If anything, it has become even more complicated and violent.



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Providence: Colombia and the FARC: Problems with Creating Peace

"Colombia and the FARC: Problems with Creating Peace"

W. Alejandro Sanchez

Providence Magazine: A Journal of Christianity and American Foreign Policy

18 December 2017

Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2017/12/colombia-and-the-farc-problems-with-creating-peace/

The peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia: FARC) is slightly over a year old, and while the peace is holding and violence has dramatically decreased, there are a number of issues that will continue to be a concern from a practical and moral perspective. This commentary will briefly discuss some of them.

The “Missing” Insurgents
Any peace agreement that includes full demobilization must ensure that all insurgents lay down their weapons and return to civilian life. The first part of demobilization appears to have been achieved, as the United Nations mission in Colombia has overseen the FARC’s disarmament: 7,132 weapons have been retrieved from the insurgents.

The outstanding issue is the fate of the insurgents themselves. The number of FARC insurgents who surrendered via the peace deal and are now in camps is reportedly around 6,900. One major concern, obviously, is that if the demobilized insurgents are not reintegrated fast enough into civilian life, they may feel inclined to return to criminal activities. In fact, according to late-October reports by the Colombian media, some 800 fighters have not agreed to the peace deal and continue their illegal, violent activities (the number may actually be higher depending on what Colombian news outlets are consulted).

This situation is not new: last decade Bogota brokered a peace agreement with the paramilitary movement United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia: AUC). In a scenario similar to what is occurring today, many paramilitaries demobilized, but a number went on to create narco-criminal gangs (commonly known as Bandas Criminales: BACRIM), like the dreaded Aguilas Negras. The obvious fear is that the situation could repeat itself once again with the FARC.

Peace Over Victory
Another issue with the peace agreement is an ethical one: if the Colombian government was able to successfully bring an end to a five-decade war via peaceful means, did it not have the moral obligation to do so and prevent further loss of life?

At this point, it is worth mentioning a couple of facts about the FARC: its number of fighters has drastically diminished, from a high of an estimated 16,000 in the late 1990s to around 7,000 today (not counting those in prison). Nevertheless, in recent years the group maintained its fighting power, regularly attacked security units (11 soldiers were killed in an ambush in 2015), and protected its territory while profiting from drug trafficking and “taxing” mining companies, among other activities.

Certainly, an argument could be made that, since the FARC leadership was open to dialogue, this probably meant that they saw themselves on the losing side of the war. Thus, the Colombian military could argue that the agreement was unnecessary as they could have defeated the FARC militarily if the war had continued.  With that said, there was no real indication, at least from the author’s perspective, that the Colombian security and defense forces were close to dealing a devastating blow to the FARC when negotiations commenced in 2012. If anything, the FARC proved to be adaptable, able to overcome the loss of its leadership (e.g. the controversial 2008 airstrike in Ecuador that killed FARC leader Raul Reyes) and to continue fighting. The Colombian defense forces could have, probably, militarily defeated the FARC, but it would have certainly taken years with further loss of life for both sides as well as civilians—the conflict has already cost an estimated 220,000 deaths between 1958-2012, according to Colombian statistics.

Since a government’s primary duty is to protect its citizens, and there was no clear indication that the FARC could be militarily defeated in the near future without further significant loss of life (including civilian), there is a moral argument to be made in favor of the peace agreement.

Peace Over Justice?
Colombians have also had to deal with whether the peace agreement signifies amnesty for the insurgents. According to media reports citing Colombian government data, Bogota has granted amnesty to so some  6,000 FARC fighters as of July 2017, while 1,400 have been released from prison and granted conditional liberty. As part of the peace process, the FARC fighters were (only?) accused of crimes such as illegally carrying weapons and military uniforms, not actually taking part in attacks or murders, and they had to sign documents stating that they will not carry out any criminal activities again.
Understandably, there is debate about whether individuals accused of murder or drug trafficking have been given amnesty too as part of the peace agreement. For example, there are conflicting reports about whether a FARC leader, known as Jesús Santrich, has been granted amnesty.

Certainly, the fact that most insurgents will not serve jail time (or be released from it) is a bitter development to those who fought the FARC or suffered due to it. On the other hand, it would be absurd to believe that any insurgent movement would have agreed to demobilize in exchange for its members serving (lengthy) prison sentences.

The amnesty, a minimum government salary for a number of months, and representation in congress with 10 guaranteed seats—the FARC is now a political party—is the price the Colombian government had to pay for the peace. An insurgent movement like the FARC had to have some “wins” in order to be convinced to be demobilized, and the government’s challenge has been to find a balance between how much the FARC could get in exchange for peace and how much was ethically (and politically) acceptable to grant.

Final Thoughts
The issues discussed here are some of the most problematic Colombia faces regarding the post-conflict era. Certainly, there are others, such as the fate of land controlled by the FARC and if it will be returned to its previous owners, and financial retributions to the victims of the conflict.
However, the author chose the aforementioned three issues because they provide a good overview of the challenges to peace that Colombia faces. Full demobilization is a utopia, and it was to be expected that some insurgents would continue their activities. The challenge now is to bring them to justice while preventing more demobilized fighters from taking up arms again. Additionally, we have discussed the morality of making peace with an insurgent movement. This is a controversial initiative, but if there is a reason to believe the insurgents will respect the deal, isn’t it necessary in order to save lives?

—
W. Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez

The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Journal: Can Governments Negotiate With Insurgents? The Latin American Experience

"Can Governments Negotiate With Insurgents? The Latin American Experience"
W. Alejandro Sanchez and Erica Illingworth
Small Wars & Insurgencies
Volume 28, 2017 - Issue 6 - P. 1014-1036
Originally Published: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2017.1374607

Please contact me if you would like a free eprint of this essay.

Abstract

In June 2016, the Colombian Government and the FARC insurgent movement signed a ceasefire agreement, which brings the two sides one step closer to putting an end to over five decades of war. Unfortunately, Latin America has a rich history of insurgent movements, particularly during the cold war era, some of which continue to operate today. Most of these movements disappeared due to military operations, though some did so via peace negotiations. This essay aims to discuss the various ends of Latin American insurgencies to answer whether, indeed, insurgents can be negotiated with.

Keywords: Latin America, insurgency, terrorism, internal conflict, cold war, FARC, ELN, Shining Path, conflict resolution, hurting stalemate

Blouin Beat: One more time: Colombia’s FARC announces ceasefire

 

 "One more time: Colombia’s FARC announces ceasefire"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: World
July 8, 2015
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatworld/2015/07/08/one-more-time-colombias-farc-announces-ceasefire/

On Wednesday July 8, the largest Colombian narco-insurgent movement in Colombia, the FARC (short for Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) announced a new unilateral ceasefire starting this upcoming July 20. It is supposed to last for one month.

The FARC has waged a war against the Colombian government since the early 1960s. At its height in the mid-1990s, it had around 16,000 fighters but current estimates put its number of fighters at under 8,000. A large number of these fighters are minors, and the insurgents, in a goodwill move, declared this past February that they will stop recruiting fighters under 17. While the move was generally praised, the group was critiqued because while it promised to stop recruiting new underage fighters, it will not release the ones it currently has in its ranks.

But in spite of having less than half the fighters it had almost two decades ago, many of whom are minors, the FARC have yet to be militarily defeated – making them continual a thorn in Bogotá’s security side. During his first presidential term, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos chose a different tactic, as bilateral negotiations between the government and the insurgents started in Norway in 2012, before moving to Cuba. The two sides have been meeting in the Cuban nation for the past three years, and while several issues have been agreed upon, a final (and permanent) agreement has yet to be reached.

One obvious worry is that the negotiations could go nowhere and full-blown war could start once again. This is of particular concern for large segments of the Colombian military that fear the negotiations and ceasefires are part of the FARC’s plan to re-organize forces to launch a new wave of offensives. This scenario is not so far-fetched – in fact, it happened in the late 1990s when former President Andres Pastrana launched his own wave of negotiations, which were ultimately unsuccessful.

Apart from the fact that the negotiations have been dragging on for three years, clashes between the security forces and the insurgents have continued. In May, the Colombian armed forces attacked a rebel camp in the Cauca department, killing 26 fighters. Nevertheless, the government has suffered setbacks. This past June, three people, (a lieutenant colonel from the Colombian police, another officer, and a civilian) were killed in the Nariño department when they were attacked via explosives. According to the Colombian government, the police officers survived the explosions but were summarily executed afterwards. More recently, in early July, one soldier was killed and two were injured, all members of the Army’s Sixth Division, in another clash with the FARC in the Putumayo department. The FARC last declared a unilateral cease this past December 2014 and while it lasted for a few months, it has been effectively over since the May attack.

In other words, the recent declaration by the FARC’s peace negotiators in Havana that there will be a new ceasefire is important, as this may give a new momentum to the peace talks. The insurgents have requested that President Santos agree to a bilateral ceasefire, but at the time of this writing there has been no response from Bogotá on that matter. (Santos did tweet that he “values” the FARC’s gesture but “more is needed, particularly a real compromise to speed up the negotiations”).

It is difficult to be optimistic about the peace negotiations nowadays. The longer they drag on the more chances there are for them to be derailed completely. Lasting peace agreements between governments and rebel movements are possible, however, as best exemplified by Colombia’s successful negotiations with the M-19 insurgents in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, the FARC have proven to be a much trickier and complicated entity to negotiate with. Hopefully this new ceasefire will be permanent, but history is not on its side.

Blouin Beat: Colombia: FARC to stop recruiting fighters under 17

"Colombia: FARC to stop recruiting fighters under 17"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: World
February 18, 2015
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatworld/2015/02/18/colombia-farc-to-stop-recruiting-fighters-under-17/

As negotiations between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) progress, albeit at a snail’s pace, rebels announced a major decision in early February: they will stop recruiting fighters younger than 17 years of age. The FARC currently recruits fighters as young as 15 (though there are plenty of accusations that they utilize minors who may be as young as 10-11). This increased age limit is a move in the right direction to reduce the group’s exploitation of child soldiers. (For the record, in Colombia a person legally becomes an adult at 18).

Utilizing child soldiers to increase rank-and-file troops is a tactic used by insurgent movements worldwide. For example, years ago, the world became obsessed with hunting down the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Joseph Kony, after the “Kony 2012” video became a viral sensation. One aspect of the LRA’s tactics that was highlighted in the international media was its reliance on child soldiers. Similarly, the moribund Peruvian insurgent movement, Shining Path, currently has around 300 fighters, several of which are child soldiers. In fact, in late 2014, Cuarto Poder, a Peruvian television show that conducts journalistic investigations, aired a video produced by Shining Path which shows an insurgent leader, “Comrade Raul,” training a group of guerrilla fighters. The group includes several children, who are taped singing one of the insurgent’s battle hymns and carrying rifles. The program speculates on whether the video is a way for Shining Path to demonstrate its ability to once again carry out terror operations, like massacres of civilians.

Unfortunately, child soldiers will continue to be utilized by armed movements. UNICEF estimatesthat “some 300,000 children – boys and girls under the age of 18 – are today involved in more than 30 conflicts worldwide.” The United Nations agency explains that children can serve multiple roles, ranging from active combatants to “messengers, porters and cooks and for forced sexual services.” The Shining Path video is an example of how Peruvian guerrillas are indoctrinating children to become active fighters in the very near future (if they are not already).

Hence, the decision by the FARC’s leadership, the Secretariat, to stop utilizing child soldiers (or at least those under 17), is an important development. Nevertheless, the announcement has been received with a certain degree of rightful skepticism and criticism. For example, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos supported the FARC’s decision but stated that he did not understand why the movement set the limit at 17 years of age rather than 18.  The head of state, as well as other government officials, also declared that the FARC should release its current underage fighters.

Apparently the insurgent movement will only stop recruiting new young fighters but will not, barring a new declaration in the future, free the children it already has in its ranks. Then again, the FARC’s Secretariat knows that a sizable part of the movement’s fighting force is made up of minors. Thus, it comes as little surprise that they are unwilling to release them, as it would severely cripple the movement’s operations.

The number of minors below the age of 18 that actually make up the FARC’s ranks is understandably difficult to estimate. Some analysts state that the number may be as high asaround 40% of a total force of around 8,000 fighters. Information about rescued/demobilized young fighters provides another indicator. According to the Colombian Ministry of Defense, in the last 12 years 4,067 minors have been rescued from violent movements, 2,648 of who were part of the FARC.

For the record, not all children are forced by the FARC to join its ranks. As one commentator explains, some joined due to lack of other options and, in the case of girls, to escape sexual abuse at home.

The Colombian government and the FARC have been engaged in peace talks for over two years in Cuba (with Havana and Norway acting as guarantors), and several issues have been agreed upon. But while the talks have dragged on, they have maintained a momentum due to recent initiatives from insurgents. Just this past December the Secretariat announced a unilateral cease-fire; and now, some two months later, we receive the aforementioned announcement regarding child soldiers.

Certainly, there is the possibility that the insurgents may decide not to honor their own promises or void them at some point in the near or distant future. With that said, it is acceptable to be tacitly optimistic that the rebel movement will indeed stop recruiting, forcibly or not, child soldiers (at least younger than 17) to its ranks.

The utilization of minors by insurgent movements is an ever-present issue worldwide and hopefully the FARC will not only stop recruiting minors, but will also release the ones currently within its own ranks.  This will not stop violence in Colombia’s decades-old conflict altogether, but at least it may limit the type of combatants that are involved in it.

Blouin Beat: ELN attack on oil pipeline is a bad sign for potential peace negotiations

"ELN Attack on Oil Pipeline is a Bad Sign for Potential Peace Negotiations"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: Politics
July 7, 2014
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatworld/2014/07/07/eln-attack-on-oil-pipeline-is-a-bad-sign-for-potential-peace-negotiations/

On Sunday, June 29, the National Liberation Army (ELN), a Colombian insurgent movement, attacked the country’s Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline. While there were no fatalities from the attack, 13 individuals were reported injured.

Apart from temporarily halting oil production, the attack also dampened the country’s mood following the recent re-election of President Juan Manuel Santos. A cornerstone of the president’s electoral campaign was a pledge to achieve a lasting peace with Colombia’s two insurgent movements, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the aforementioned ELN. However, the attacks on Caño Limón have caused Colombian citizens and analysts in general to question whether the president’s strategies will be successful.

According to reports, on that Sunday afternoon, insurgent fighters threw an explosive at the camp where workers congregate, not at the pipeline itself. The commander of the Colombian Army, General Jaime Lasprilla, provided more information about the incident via social media: a June 30 tweet explains that the ELN threw a “cylinder bomb” at the workers while they were taking part in mass. Due to the relative high number of injured workers the Colombian Minister of Mining and Energy Amilkar Acosta had a gloomy assessment of the situation, stating that the incident “could have been a massacre.”

The Caño Limón pipeline is 780 kilometers long, starting in the Arauca department and ending in the Coveñas port in Colombia’s Caribbean coast, making it a frequent target of Colombian guerrillas. The late June attack occurred in Arauca, close to Colombia’s eastern border with Venezuela, but previously the ELN also attacked the pipeline in early May (in Boyacá department). Each time the pipeline is attacked, Colombian authorities must stop the flow of oil and inspect the pipeline. If an oil spill occurs, the local environment would be contaminated, and human life could be affected. Following the aforementioned early May attack, for instance, two Colombian communities,Agualinda and Cubará, were forbidden from drinking water for fear that an oil leak had contaminated local rivers.

The Caño Limón pipeline is a vital part of the Colombian economy. The oil pipeline transports up to70 thousand barrels of crude oil daily. ECOPETROL, a Colombian state-owned oil company, andOccidental Petroleum Corporation, a Texas corporation, control the pipeline. Occidental’s websiteexplains that “more than 1.2 billion barrels of oil have been produced at Caño Limón since Occidental discovered the field in 1983.” According to ECOPETROL’s website, the Colombian company controls 60% of the oil produced while 40% is owned by Occidental.

The ELN’s attack on the Caño Limón pipeline comes at an awkward moment. In early June, prior to the second round of presidential elections, President Santos declared that he was willing to start negotiations with the ELN. “The political responsibility of this new peace effort falls solely on my shoulders,” the head of state declared. The negotiations between Bogota and the ELN have not officially begun, and it is unclear if the attack on Caño Limón will affect them. In spite of wanting peace via negotiations, President Santos has declared that he will not give the ELN a free pass: on June 30 he tweeted “the armed forces will continue the offensive. We will find the culprits of the ELN’s terrorist attack that affected the population of Arauca.”

While President Santos may be willing to extend the ELN an olive branch, most of the Colombian military is skeptical of the ELN. On July 1 General Lasprilla tweeted “ELN: your declarations are contradictory. Liberty and dignity begin by respecting the most sacred right: Life. You do not intimidate us!” This was a strong response to the attacks on Caño Limón. Likewise, ColombianDefense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzón declared that the ELN’s attack was “cowardly.”

As a final point, it is necessary to mention that July 4 marked the 50th anniversary of the ELN’s creation, and the movement is “celebrating” it by calling for strikes in various departmentsthroughout Colombia. As it is likely that the ELN will continue its attacks and threats against Colombian citizens and infrastructure (i.e. the attack on the Caño Limón pipeline) as part of its anniversary, the peace negotiations between this particular movement and the government may be dead before they even formally begin.

In previous writings I have explained that peace negotiations between Bogotá and some of the country’s numerous insurgent movements have been successful over the past decades. Case in point is the peace accord with the M19 insurgent movement in 1990 and the demobilization of paramilitary groups between 2003 and 2006. Nevertheless, peace accords with the FARC and ELN have proven to be more elusive. Bogotá and the ELN leadership were engaged in negotiations as early as 2002 and 2007, and both times they were unsuccessful.

While we all want peace in Colombia, ELN-Bogota negotiations, if they ever jumpstart, have a very steep mountain to climb before an agreement could conceivably be reached.

VOXXI: Colombia: FARC Guerrillas Rap for Peace

"Colombia: FARC Guerrillas Rap for Peace"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
May 15, 2014
Originally published: http://voxxi.com/2014/05/15/colombia-farc-guerrillas-rap-for-peace/

The Colombian FARC guerrilla movement and the Cuban band “Cuentas Claras” have produced a rap video entitled “Pueblo Colombiano pa’ la mesa” (Colombian people, go to the negotiation table) featuring two well-known FARC fighters.

The song praises the FARC for seeking equality and peace in Colombia, while criticizing the government for endangering the ongoing peace talks in Havana, Cuba.

While the song will not win any Latin Grammys, it is a public diplomacy tool aimed at helping the Colombian narco-insurgents gain popularity.

FARC raps

“Pueblo Colombiano” includes not just the members of the Cuentas Claras group, but also Tanja Nijmeijer, a Dutch citizen who became a FARC fighter and is a member of the insurgent movement’s negotiation team at the talks in Cuba. In fact, she appears at the start of the video, calling Havana “the peace capital of the continent.”

Depicting himself as a joyful field worker, one of FARC’s founding fathers, Miguel Pascuas, also known as “Sargeant Pascuas,” also made a guest appearance. (The U.S. State Department offers a $2.5million reward for information leading to his arrest).

As for the lyrics and the video itself, it can be summarized as FARC propaganda. In general the lyrics praise the narco-insurgents; some verses state that the FARC came to Cuba to speak in favor of “shoeless kids” and “peasants who live under threat.”

On the other hand, “they,” meaning the Colombian government, are accused of protecting their “businesses,” “covering up the truth,” and keeping the people “ignorant.” One verse implies that the Colombian government unjustly accuses the FARC of hindering the ongoing peace negotiations. The video briefly shows images of police officers (arguably Colombian), beating up an unidentified person who is lying on a street.

Revolutionary music

The FARC-Cuentas Claras video is certainly not the first public relations stunt in which a revolutionary movement has resorted to music in order to improve their public image. Some songs have remained popular over the decades if they praise a popular hero.

Case in point is “Hasta Siempre” a song written by Carlos Puebla in 1965 which praises the Argentine revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara, who had left Cuba in order to organize revolutionary movements in Latin America. Two years later Guevara was killed bythe Bolivian Army.

Additionally, in the 1990s Sub-comandante Marcos, the leader of the Zapatista movement, requested the Spanish artist Joaquin Sabina to write a song for the non-violent Mexican movement. Sabin’s song is entitled “Como un Dolor de Muelas” (Like a Toothache).

Nowadays, even the powerful Mexican drug cartels have their own music bands. They perform songs praising the drug lords who control criminal networks, while also harassing their opponents. These “narco-corridos” have become both popular and deadly as it is not surprising nowadays to hear of a narco-singer that was murdered by a rival cartel.

One of the worst massacres occurred in January 2013, when all 14 members of the band Kombo Kolombia were murdered. Their songs praised the Zetas cartel and it is believed that the Gulf Cartel may be behind their deaths.

A discussion       

Colombia is scheduled to have presidential elections this upcoming Sunday, May 25. President Juan Manuel Santos is running for a second term and, even though his popularity has suffered over the past year, it is expected that he will emerge victorious.

Nevertheless, this victory will not be easy, as it is expected that the Colombian leader will have to go to a second electoral round againstOscar Ivan Zuluaga, of the Centro Democratico.

Santos’ re-electoral strategy was to achieve a permanent peace agreement with the FARC. But with peace negotiations well into their second year (they started in late 2012), it becomes disheartening to see only an agreement on a few issues as the only signs of progress in restoring social tranquility. In other words, it is blindly optimistic to imagine a peace agreement being reached before the upcoming elections.

The FARC high command, the Secretariat, knows that President Santos hoped for a positive outcome of the peace negotiations to assure his re-election. To what extent the FARC purposely stalled the negotiations to hurt President Santos is debatable. Solving a six-decade long civil war, in addition to a plethora of complexities involved, is certainly not something that is resolved overnight.

As for “Pueblo Colombiano,” the lyrics reflect the FARC’s ideology and critiques of the Colombian government. The addition of renowned fighters like Nijmeijer and historical leaders such as Pascuas is a jab at both Bogota and Washington.

It is likely that the FARC will continue to produce music videos. Certainly, songs are a quick and easy way for any entity, revolutionary or not, to gain popularity. Nevertheless, as catchy as “Pueblo Colombiano” may be, hopefully it will not win a Latin Grammy.

VOXXI: Colombian army intelligence reportedly spying government negotiators

Colombian Army Intelligence reportedly spying government negotiators
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
February 6, 2014
Originally published: http://voxxi.com/2014/02/06/farc-negotations-spying-colombia/

On February 3, the renowned Colombian magazine Semana revealed that members of the Colombian Army’s intelligence service have been spying on government and FARC negotiators as they discuss a historic peace agreement in Havana, Cuba.

The goal of these espionage operations was to sabotage the negotiations, as sectors of the Colombian military (and civic society in general) are against an agreement with theFARC insurgents.

While this scandal is just starting, it does not bode well for the future of President Juan Manuel Santos and his quest for a second presidential term in May.

The Facts on operation Andromeda

From what is known so far, the aim of the intelligence operation, called “Andromeda,” was to collect information from the email accounts, text-conversations, and online chats via Blackberrys and WhatsApp.

The targets were the Colombian government’s negotiators in Cuba, NGO representatives, and opposition (and arguably FARC-friendly) leaders such as the renowned Piedad Córdoba and Iván Cepeda.

Reports by the Colombian media explain that a group of senior military officers, known as the “generación de los 70,” were behind the espionage operation. It seems that intelligence operatives routinely briefed at least 70 retired generals.

The goal of Andromeda was to pressure President Santos to “change the rules of the peace process or end the dialogue altogether.”

Currently, the office of the attorney general is analyzing 26 computers that were seized during a raid on a restaurant in downtown Bogotá, which was apparently a cover for the headquarters of the espionage operations.

Additionally, the attorney general has already begun interviewing individuals who are allegedly connected with the case.

Meanwhile, Semana reports that the inspector general of the Army has until Saturday, February 15 to provide President Santos with a report of Andromeda.

It is too early to tell who else will be named as a participant in this operation. However, for the time being, General Mauricio Zuñiga, the chief of the Colombian Army’s intelligence, and General Oscar Zuluaga, director of the Central de Inteligencia Técnica del Ejército (CITEC), have been suspended from their duties.

President Santos, Andromeda and election season

An issue to keep in mind is how the Andromeda scandal could potentially affect, if at all, the ongoing negotiations in Cuba.

A FARC representative in Havana has declared, “Of course, (Former President) Alvaro Uribe is behind all of this. Don’t forget that Alvaro Uribe is public enemy number one of peace in Colombia.”

It is well known that former President Uribe is against the peace negotiations and favors a military solution with the FARC. Nevertheless, there have not been reports of the FARC leaving the negotiations thus far.

But there is one clear looser in this scandal: President Santos.

The Colombian President has utilized the negotiations as a tool to help him get reelected in the country’s upcoming May elections.

Recent polls show that Santos has a marginable lead over his closest opponent; a January poll by the polling agency “Cifras y Conceptos” for the Colombian news agency, Caracol, give Santos 26 percent of the vote, with Oscar Iván Zuluaga coming in second place with 9 percent. Even so, it is worth noting that the poll also showed that 30 percent of voters would vote blank.

In other words, more voters would prefer not to vote at all rather than to re-elect the president. The poll demonstrates that there is not an overwhelming amount of support for the head of state of this South American nation.

The FARC know that President Santos needs a success at the negotiating table which is, arguably, one of the reasons why the negotiations have gone over a year and why only two points of a six-point peace plan have been (tentatively) agreed upon.

In other words, both the Santos administration and the FARC leadership know that this peace process is not just about ending the conflict; but it is also a political (and electoral) weapon.

How Do You Want Peace?

The Andromeda operation highlights what is vox populi for scholars and the Colombian population: there are individuals in high-ranking positions in the Colombian government and military who do not want a peace agreement.

A major reason for the reluctance of segments of the armed forces towards the ongoing peace process is the belief that the guerrillas will use a long-term cease-fire to regroup and re-start the conflict. This scenario was previously played out during the Andrés Pastrana administration’s agreement with the FARC in the late 1990s.

In previous commentaries for VOXXI, I have argued that while I believe a peace agreement can be reached with the FARC’s leadership, I do not believe that all FARC fighters, estimated at around 8,000, will agree to demobilize.

But what will be the effect of the Andromeda scandal on the Colombian population? The aforementioned poll highlights that 39 percent of polled citizens favor the peace negotiations to end the conflict with the FARC.

This is a respectable but not overwhelming percentage, probably adding to the fact that the negotiations have gone on for a year, yet the violence continues.

(The FARC has been blamed for a mid-January motorcycle bomb that killed two individuals and injured around 40.)

The coming weeks (particularly after the report on Andromeda is presented by February 15) will be critical for President Santos as he will have to demonstrate what kind of statesman and leader he truly is. A true head of state needs to have a firm control over his military.