"Can Governments Negotiate With Insurgents? The Latin American Experience"
W. Alejandro Sanchez and Erica Illingworth
Small Wars & Insurgencies
Volume 28, 2017 - Issue 6 - P. 1014-1036
Originally Published: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2017.1374607
Please contact me if you would like a free eprint of this essay.
Abstract
In June 2016, the Colombian Government and the FARC
insurgent movement signed a ceasefire agreement, which brings the two sides one
step closer to putting an end to over five decades of war. Unfortunately, Latin
America has a rich history of insurgent movements, particularly during the cold
war era, some of which continue to operate today. Most of these movements
disappeared due to military operations, though some did so via peace
negotiations. This essay aims to discuss the various ends of Latin American insurgencies
to answer whether, indeed, insurgents can be negotiated with.
Keywords: Latin America, insurgency, terrorism, internal
conflict, cold war, FARC, ELN, Shining Path, conflict resolution, hurting
stalemate
This past November, the Peruvian government and the U.S. Trade Representative Office (USTR) announced advances in combating illegal logging in the South American country. This crime hasintense repercussions for Peru, and the global ecosystem, and therefore calls for greater international attention. Increased cooperation between Lima and Washington is required, as many illegal logging shipments from the Andean nation are exported to the U.S. market.
The Problem
In order to provide a proper idea of the magnitude of this crime, we will first mention some official data and recent incidents. According to Peruvian government statistics, in 2015 a total of 39,294.803 cubic meters of wood (or over 95 thousand trees) were extracted from unauthorized areas. Statistics are not yet available for 2016, but a few incidents prove this is a major ongoing problem.
For example, this past December, authorities in the Loreto region regained over 1,000 pieces of wood(types like lupuna, copaiba, quinilla, shihuahuaco –ironwood tree- and utucuro) that were being transported without proper documentation. That same month, security officers, aided by indigenous Peruvians, detained two vehicles that were transporting 1,120 feet of cedar wood in the Pasco region. This incident is particularly troubling because the cedar was illegally extracted from the San Matias San Carlos forest, an area under supposed government protection.
The problem is exacerbated as many shipments are transported and exported relatively easily. A September reportby the Peruvian dailyEl Comerciostated that, according to Peruvian authorities, between 2009 and 2016, 80% of 4,420 logging shipment inspections (to ensure that they were taken from authorized areas) had some sort of irregularity. The most frequent istimber laundering, namely the falsification of documents to make timber appear as if it had been legitimately harvested.
Further, in regions where illegal logging is rampant, such as Ucayali, seized wood can still make it into the market, as corrupt local authorities can falsify documents about the wood’s origin. This scenario is best exemplified by the April 2016 arrest of 19 members of a logging mafia, which included local authorities and security officers who worked with criminals to facilitate the export of illegal wood.
The U.S.- Peru Connection
As for the way the U.S. fits in this situation, according to a 2012 report by the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), up to 20 U.S. companies were involved in illegal logging that originated in Peru. Following this revelation, that same year the EIAformally petitioned Washington to “verify the legal origin of shipments from at least two Peruvian companies [Maderera Bozovich SAC and Maderera Vulcano SAC], and to audit dozens more.” One incident worth mentioning was featured inAl Jazeera’s 2015 documentary, Peru’s Rotten Wood. The film explains how a company called “Inversiones La Oroza SRL, is owned by the same proprietors of a timber concession, Oroza WoodSAC, that was cancelled in 2012 after EIA’s report illustrated that their illegal timber was coming to the United States.” That is to say that company owners can flout responsibly and create companies under different names after the originals are “red flagged.”
It is worth noting that a free trade agreement (FTA) between Washington and Lima has been in effect since January 2009. TheFTAis significant because it has asection directly addressing illegal loggingthat allows U.S. authorities to both audit and verify the origins of suspicious shipments. However, the U.S. did not invoke the procedures provided in the agreement untillate February 2016, when theUSTRrequested that Peru verify the legality of a single La Oroza shipment. Not surprisingly, in August 2016, the shipment was found to contain a significant amount ofillegally harvested timber.
While the aforementioned incidents explain why illegal logging in Peru has been so difficult to combat, the recent November meeting between Peruvian and U.S. authorities regarding this issue offers a glimmer of hope, as it is a sort of “next step” under the FTA framework. The meeting, the first since Peruvian president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski took office, thankfully did make mention of common goals, such as the much-needed modification of documentation of exports within the supply chain in order to increase transparency.
Final Thoughts
Nowadays, governments recognize that environmental crimes constitute a national security problem. Activities such as illegal logging, illegal fishing, or wildlife trafficking depredate a country’s natural resources, resulting in violence, loss of revenue for the state, as well as in the destruction of the environment. It would be wrong of us not to acknowledge that Peruvian authorities seem to understand this problem, as made clear in their statements and actions, including the 2015Legislative Decree No. 1220, which creates a legal framework to combat illegal logging.
Nevertheless, more success is needed. The amount of illegally seized wood over the past few years is alarming and Lima-Washington cooperation will be key to combat it under the 2009 FTAframework. It is imperative that U.S. authorities promote stricter regulation on the “demand” side of the problem to seize illegally harvested wood, and provide support to the Peruvian government and civil society organizations to help protect the South American nation’s rich environment.
W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto is an international security analyst. Follow him on Twitter:@W_Alex_Sanchez
Brittney J. Figueroa is a recent graduate from the University of California, Santa Barbara with a Bachelors degree in Global Studies, and a Minor in Latin American Iberian Studies.
The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the authors are associated.
Astronautics Corporation of America has begun the upgrading the Peruvian Air Force's (FAP's) L-100 Hercules transport aircraft.
The L-100 is the civilian variant of the Lockheed Martin C-130 Hercules.
The Wisconsin-based company was selected in April 2015 to modernise the aircraft cockpits. Astronautics explained in a statement that it will install an "integrated glass cockpit designed to maximise crew situational awareness with digital interfaces and displays".
The new tools include six Astronautics electronic flight/engine and caution advisory system displays and dual engine data units. The agreement includes training for FAP personnel.
In mid-January a ceremony was held in the Grupo Aéreo No. [...]
The Colombian Army plans to create 12 new battalions compromised of reserve troops for disaster relief.
General Marco Tamayo, head of the army's recruitment centre, said in mid-January that the units will be staffed without using forceful recruitment - referring to the practice known as 'batidas' in which soldiers detain individuals in the streets, take them to a base, and force them to join the military.
Colombia has suffered a number of powerful natural disasters in recent years. For example, in late 2015 strong rains along the country's Pacific coast, particularly in Cauca, affected some 13,000 people. Earlier in January, rains caused the Caunapí River to overflow, affecting some 500 families in Nariño.
This past December 2015, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced that female military personnel will now be able to join all units of the U.S. armed forces. The lifting of gender-based restrictions in the U.S. military is a historical decision as it opens the door for women to join elite special forces and to be deployed to the front lines. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter has received the backing of the commanders of the U.S. armed forces regarding this decision, though the Marine Corps have reservations.
As for Latin America, the region accepts women into its armed forces and in recent years a number of female officers have been promoted to the highest echelons of the military hierarchy. For example in 2012, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro named Carmen Melendez as the country’s first admiral while in March 2015 Gina Reque Terán became Bolivia’s first female Army general. Most recently, as one of her final acts as head of state, this past October then-President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner of Argentina promoted María Isabel Pansa to the rank of Army General.
Women becoming generals or admirals is important, but I would highlight that we do not hear much, if at all, of women participating in combat operations. Granted, Latin America (thankfully) does not have ongoing inter-state conflicts (the last war was between Peru and Ecuador in 1995), but throughout my research I have not heard about female soldiers taking part in front-line internal security operations in Colombia, Mexico or Peru.
In Peru, female military service is voluntary but there is a great interest among Peruvian women to join the armed forces. A March 2015 article in the Peruvian daily Diario Correo mentions that there isan annual 20% increase of women joining the Peruvian Army, and bases in Arequipa, including one called Salaverry, are now accepting female soldiers. Moreover, last December 2013 a major milestone was reached: for the first time a female cadet, Vanessa Torres Sullca, graduated as “sword of honor” (the top of her class) from the Peruvian Army training school, the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos.
As in other countries, female personnel generally carry out support operations, including administrative duties. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Peruvian women in uniform do not face danger. The best example actually comes from the Peruvian police (PNP). In 2012 Captain Nancy Flores Páucar, a police pilot, was killed when her helicopter came under fire from Shining Path insurgents. While the aircraft managed to escape, Captain Flores Páucar died, making her the first female pilot in the history of the Peruvian police to die in the line of duty. In other words, even though female personnel may not be deployed to the front lines of a conflict, they can easily be involved in a firefight and become casualties.
While it is unlikely that female soldiers will be deployed to hunt down Shining Path narco-insurgents in the Peruvian highlands, they will hopefully have bigger roles in other initiatives. Case in point, Peru could deploy more female military personnel to its peacekeeping operations. Fortunately, this is already happening: a number of female military personnel joined the Compañia Peru, the Peruvian unit that is participating in the UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), earlier this year. According to reports, the female deployment included four officers, including a doctor from the Air Force, and 20 technicians.
The role of women in the military is a sensitive, if not controversial, topic in any country. Hopefully the ongoing changes in the U.S. military will foment a serious discussion regarding this topic across the Western Hemisphere, including in Peru. Peruvian women already put their lives on the line in both the Andean country’s armed forces and the police. The very least they deserve is a discussions at the higher echelons of the Peruvian government and military regarding what future opportunities they should have in order to continue defending their homeland.
"Haiti: Uruguay is withdrawing troops from UN Mission"
W. Alejandro Sanchez VOXXI
January 18, 2015
Originally published: http://voxxi.com/2015/01/haiti-uruguay-leave-minustah/
Fallout continues in the wake of President Michel Martelly’s decision to dissolve Haiti’s parliament.
On Thursday, January 15, the Uruguayan government announced that in response to his controversial decision, the South American nation will withdraw its troops from the UN mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH.
While Uruguay is not the main contributor of troops to MINUSTAH, this decision highlights the fatigue and frustration that the international community is experiencing, as Haiti is unable to emerge from its constant domestic crises.
Haiti’s latest crisis stems from President Martelly and opposition parties’ inability to negotiate a new electoral law.
The BBC explains that the electoral schedule has become stagnant as “mid-term Senate elections had been originally due in May 2012, while local polls are three years behind schedule.”
How far this situation will deteriorate remains to be seen, as ongoing violent protests in the Caribbean state call for the president’s resignation. Violent overthrows are commonplace throughout Haitian history. Most recently, President Jean Bertrand Aristide was overthrown in 2004 (allegedly via a U.S.-sponsored coup).
It was precisely the 2004 crisis that prompted the Brazil-led United Nations mission in Haiti. The mission’s mandate is renewed annually, as supporters argue that MINUSTAH has helped rebuild and stabilize the country. However, critics, including the Haitian population, argue that the UN mission has violated human rights over the years and hurt the country more than it has helped.
Discussing the successes and shortcomings of MINUSTAH is beyond the scope of this article due to its complexity. Suffice it to say, the peacekeepers have generally tried to improve the situation in the country since 2004. Moreover, when the deadly January 2010 earthquake struck,MINUSTAH was the spearhead of first responders.
However, the UN mission has certainly had its faults. Most prominent is the widespread belief that Southeast Asian peacekeepers introduced cholera into the nation around October 2010. Over 9,000 Haitians have died since the outbreak began, and around 1,500 victims and family members recently tried to sue the UN (unsuccessfully).
Montevideo’s Decision
Uruguay was not a major donor of troops, but its contribution was nonetheless significant.
According to MINUSTAH, as of December 31, 2014, the mission had a total of 7,213 total uniformed personnel, not including civilians, of which 595 were from Uruguay. This is not even half of the total of Brazil’s contribution (1,378 troops and police). Nevertheless, Uruguay’s departure means that MINUSTAH will lose a significant portion of its “blue helmets.”
But whether Uruguay can leave Haiti with its head held high is another matter. The tiny South American nation has contributed hundreds of troops to MINUSTAH and it was very active during the relief and reconstruction effort after the earthquake. For example, around 800 Uruguayan peacekeepers were in Haiti at the time, and Montevideo sent additional emergency personnel, water purifiers, and electricity generators.
On the other hand, Uruguayan peacekeepers have been at the center of accusations over human rights abuses. Case in point, in 2011, several Uruguayan soldiers were accused of raping a young Haitian man. The troops were sent back to Uruguay and in 2013, four Uruguayan naval personnel were sentenced to two years and a month in prison. The sentence has been condemned as barely a slap on the wrist.
Moreover, there is the question of what the country will lose by leaving MINUSTAH. Certainly the government, armed forces, and families will be happy that hundreds of Uruguayan military personnel are coming home. However, there will also be financial repercussions. The Uruguayan newspaper El Observador has declared the country will lose some $18 million USD that it received annually from the UN for participating in MINUSTAH.
In addition, there is the question of professional pride. MINUSTAH was a complex mission from the start, and while the presence and activities of Uruguayan peacekeepers was well intentioned, the 2011 rape incident will become a dark mark on the Uruguayan military’s record of peacekeeping operations.
Finally, there is the question of whether Uruguay’s decision will open the door for other countries to leave MINUSTAH. As previously mentioned, there is a feeling of frustration among participating nations, due to the mission’s controversial origins and severe accusations of human rights abuses. Additionally, 11 years since MINUSTAH’s inception, the country remains plagued by internal issues.
Uruguay is not the only country reducing its presence in Haiti. Brazil, which has been the most significant contributor of troops and leadership to MINUSTAH, began a modest reduction of its personnel contribution in 2013.
MINUSTAH’s mandate is up for renewal in October and if Haiti’s political woes continue and other nations withdraw, we could be on the verge of witnessing this mission’s twilight.
"Repression and Security in Latin America"
W.Alejandro Sanchez
International Relations Online Blog
Global Security Program
American University
November 1, 2014
Originally published: http://ironline.american.edu/security-in-latin-america/
Latin America faces a series of security challenges, which affect not only regional stability, but also the security of the United States. While Latin American governments are taking proactive measures to deal with their internal security threats, particularly drug trafficking and criminal violence, there is still much to be done to ensure that enhanced security does not mean sacrificing citizens’ rights. Additionally, U.S. security policy has limitations in how much aid can be provided to Latin America, which further impacts the state of security in the region.
The State of Security in Latin America
The current security situation in Latin America is vastly different than it was during the Cold War. Latin America’s remaining guerrilla movements, like theColombian FARCor the Peruvian Shining Path, are too weak to achieve regime change. However, these groups and other criminal syndicates are earning a profit from the very lucrative drug trade in Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia, which are the three major producers of cocaine in the world. The drug lands in U.S. territory and Europe because it is often transported through the main corridors of Central America and the Caribbean, as well as West Africa. This drug trafficking has led to consequences that range from U.S. efforts to end the trade to illegal sales and violence.
Growing citizen insecurity is also a major concern in Latin America. Countries like Argentina are experiencing a crime wave, which hasprompted vigilantism. In one extreme incident, an18-year-old Argentinewas killed by a mob because he was suspected of robbing a woman’s purse. As for Central America, insecurity stems from criminal groups like the Maras and Barrio 18, two transnational gangs. These criminal entities have a particularly strong presence in Honduras and El Salvador that severely impairs the ability of these two governments to govern.
Fortunately, Latin American governments have taken measures to increase security to protect their people. For example, Mexico has apprehended various cartel leaders, like Sinaloa’sJoaquín “El Chapo” Guzmánand Hectór Beltrán Leyva, head of the Beltrán Leyva Cartel, who was recently arrested.
Repressive Security Tactics
Indeed, Latin America has a troubled history regarding upholding human rights, and regional security agencies are known for their repressive tactics. One critical concern is how far regional governments are willing to go to achieve internal stability.
This is prominently demonstrated in the allegations that the Mexican army summarily executed 22 individuals in June. Originally, the army claimed that the alleged delinquents were killed during a firefight, but recent discoveries contend that thesoldiers executed the suspectsafter they surrendered.
Meanwhile, leaders likePresident Salvador Sánchez Cerén of El Salvadorsupport creating more militarized police units to combat crime. In a recent speech at the United Nations, he called for the international community to support El Salvador as it faces internal security challenges. While this is a logical stance, the United States should be wary of supporting governments that have dismal records of human rights abuses like Mexico and El Salvador.
U.S. Aid in Latin America
As far as the United States is concerned, the task of improving hemispheric security falls largely onU.S. Southern Command(SOUTHCOM). The odds of U.S. security policy changing to further support its Western Hemisphere allies are slim.
SOUTHCOM’s2014 Posture Statementacknowledges the low-priority status of the region and offers an explanation as to why the U.S. administration is not significantly involved in Latin American security affairs. The document states that “over the next ten years, the Services are reducing deployments…in the context of tightening fiscal constraints…[and] the lowest priority Geographic Combatant Command [SOUTHCOM] will likely receive little, if any, ‘trickle down’ of restored funding.”
In spite of a diminished budget, U.S. security forces continue to combat transnational crime in Latin America. For example, during a routine patrol on September 8, 2014, the Coast Guard Cutter Bear stopped a suspicious vessel in international waters, northeast of Panama, and the boarding team found719 kilograms of cocaine(valued at US$23 million).
Apart from drug trafficking, the United States is also concerned with the expansion of Mexican cartels and the Maras throughoutborder states like Californiaand Texas. Hence, it is in the U.S. administration’s best interest to strengthen and train its southern neighbor’s security forces — by sellingBlack Hawk helicopters, for example. However, the United States should be wary of providing too much support for governments that carry out major human rights abuses, like the aforementioned massacre by the Mexican Army.
The future doctrines of U.S. security agencies have to navigate the problematic thin line of what form of aid, such as financial, training or weapons sales, they should provide to regional allies, not simply due to budget considerations, but also because of the ever-present possibility that Latin American governments could potentially utilize this aid to carry out repressive tactics against their populations.
This week the police in Peru arrested Muhammad Amadar, a Lebanese citizen who lived in the Surquillo district of Lima. Ordinarily, this type of event would not raise an eyebrow in the international media, except that the charges against him are particularly dire. He is accused of manufacturing explosives and is a suspected member of Hezbollah, an Islamic militant movement.
At a time when the international community, particularly U.S. policymakers, is concerned about the global spread of Islamic extremism, this development is particularly relevant. As for Peru, even one alleged Hezbollah militant in the Andean country is one problem too many, given the clear and present dangers that the Andean state faces.
A Successful Arrest of an alleged terrorist
Amadar, thought to be 28-years-old, arrived to Peru via a flight from Brazil on Tuesday, July 8. According to thePeruvian daily La República, the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad warned Peruvian authorities of his suspected militant ties. Immigration officers immediately detained him upon arrival at Lima’s Jorge Chávez International Airport, but because there was no international warrant for his arrest, he was let go.
Nevertheless, the Peruvian police continued to monitor his activities while he lived in Surquillo, which included searching Amadar’s garbage. This ended up being his downfall–as the police found traces ofTNT, coalas well as latex gloves among his trash. The Counter-Terrorist Directorate (DIRCOTE), a branch of the Peruvian police, was in charge of detaining Amadar on late afternoon on October 28th. When he was arrested, the police found TNT, black powder and other types of explosives in his home.
He was the only person arrested in the operation, as his wife Carmen del Pilar, who has dual Peruvian and American citizenship, is presently in the U.S.
Amadar is currently being detained in the headquarters of theaforementioned DIRCOTEwhere he is being interrogated.
According to the police, Amadar pretended to be a bodybuilder and worked out daily in a gym in Surquillo. “He was a friendly person, calm, he would greet us [when he came to work out] and only spoke English,” said the gym’s receptionist.
Hezbollah et al
Without engaging in alarmism, we can state some basic facts about Hezbollah. The group is notorious within Latin American security analysts for the two terrorists attacks it carried out in Argentina in 1992 and 1994. In the first incident, the target was the Israeli embassy, while the second was the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina; over 100 people died in the two attacks combined.
Currently, Hezbollah is thought to be operative in the tri-state border between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. These militants are known to have close ties with the Iranian government; hence it is generally believed that Tehran supports Hezbollah’s attempts to spread outside the Middle East. To what extent Hezbollah is planning to carry out new attacks inLatin Americaa laArgentina is unclear, and we will have to wait to learn what new information the Peruvian police gather from Amadar.
Amadar’s arrest comes at a problematic time in the U.S., where some policymakers and analysts have come out to declare that Islamic radicals could use Latin America as a corridor to enter the U.S. Case in point, Mexico continues to be referred to as the perfect passageway for members of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to enter the U.S. and carry outcar bomb attacks. Meanwhile, the Obama administration has stated that there is “no credible information” to support such a thesis. Arguing that ISIS could enter the U.S. via Mexico is more likely another opportunity for advocates of a more heavily patrolled and restrictive U.S.-Mexico border.
As for Peru, the presence of a Hezbollah militant in the Andean country raises a number of questions. For example: is Amadar part of a larger network of Hezbollah militants operating inPeruor was he acting alone? One must also ask: What were the targets for the explosives that he was manufacturing?
After having defeated two terrorist movements that brought destruction throughout the country throughout the 1980s to early 1990s, Peru has generally enjoyed a decade and a half of tranquility. Nevertheless, the country does have major internal security problems such as a rise of criminality and drug trafficking. In fact, the country is the world’s major producer of cocaine, a problematic title that was justified in late August, when the Peruvian police seized7.6 tons of cocainein the northern city of Trujillo. This impressive amount of drugs was destined for Holland.
The Peruvian government and security forces can ill-afford to have to worry about Islamic militancy spreading in the country, given Peru’s other security priorities. Hopefully, Amadar is an isolated case.
The Peruvian police should be applauded for making the arrest before any attack was carried out with the explosives Amadar was manufacturing. With that said, the nexus between Latin America and Hezbollah, and Islamic militancy in general, will have to be revisited given this new incident, hopefully without inflammatory language.