Showing posts with label commerce. Show all posts
Showing posts with label commerce. Show all posts

Wednesday, February 12, 2025

E-International Relations "The Geopolitics of Moldova’s Wine Industry"

 

 


"The Geopolitics of Moldova’s Wine Industry"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

E-International Relations 

12 February, 2025

Published: https://www.e-ir.info/2025/02/12/opinion-the-geopolitics-of-moldovas-wine-industry/

The Republic of Moldova has been deeply affected by the war in Ukraine. The war severely affected Chisinau-Moscow relations to the point that Russia cut energy supplies to Moldova, forcing Chisinau to completely overhaul its energy security strategy – a painful and expensive process for the country and its population. Yet, President Maia Sandu, re-elected in late 2024, has remained steadfast in her support for Kyiv. On the other hand, sectors of Moldova’s economy better adapted to the war and its consequences, specifically Moldova’s famous wine industry. The primary reason why the wine industry generally did not suffer due to the war was because Russia had previously applied sanctions, in 2006 and 2013-2014, against Moldova that had forced Chisinau to look for new markets and partners, thereby reducing the country’s dependence on the Russian wine market.


Monday, January 27, 2025

The Diplomat: " Trump 2.0 and Central Asia: Optimism After Rubio’s Comments"

 

 


 

"Trump 2.0 and Central Asia: Optimism After Rubio’s Comment"

 Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Crossroads Asia

Central Asia

27 January 2025

Published: https://thediplomat.com/2025/01/trump-2-0-and-central-asia-optimism-after-rubios-comments/

 During his nomination hearing last week, now-Secretary of State Marco Rubio endorsed the annulment of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, although its removal is ultimately a Congressional task.

 

Thursday, June 6, 2024

The Diplomat: " Could Iran be a Gateway for Central Asia? "

 

"Could Iran be a Gateway for Central Asia"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Crossroads Asia

The Diplomat

6 June, 2024

Originally published: https://thediplomat.com/2024/06/could-iran-be-a-gateway-for-central-asia/

Connecting with Iran may be tempting for Central Asian countries like Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but increased relations with Tehran may ultimately be counterproductive.

Continue reading... 

Monday, September 5, 2022

The Diplomat: " Kazakhstan and Singapore Look to Boost Economic Links "

 

"Kazakhstan and Singapore Look to Boost Economic Link"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Crossroads Asia

The Diplomat

3 September 2022

Originally published: https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/kazakhstan-and-singapore-look-to-boost-economic-links/

Investment opportunities in the trade and commerce sectors, particularly related to transportation and the Middle Corridor, may prompt closer bilateral ties.

 

Continue reading...

Friday, August 5, 2022

Geopolitical Monitor: Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan: The Axis of the Middle Corridor

 

"Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan: The Axis of the Middle Corridor"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez and Kamila Auyezova

Opinion

Geopolitical Monitor

5 August 2022

Originally published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/kazakhstan-azerbaijan-the-axis-of-the-middle-corridor/

As the war in Ukraine continues, the world is experiencing new energy and food crises, and sanctions on Russia mean that East-West and West-East commerce must find routes that reach Europe while simultaneously avoiding Russian territory. In this new reality, global supply chains are not only adapting to the dramatic effects of COVID-19 that have shaken the world for the past two years but also the war, which has brought new challenges.

One alternative route that has gained prominence in recent months is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), commonly known as the Middle Corridor, a joint venture composed of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. The relationship between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan is at the heart of this Trans-Caspian initiative.

 

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Thursday, August 4, 2022

E-IR: Supply Chains and War: The Importance of Baku’s Port


 

"Supply Chains and War: The Importance of Baku’s Port"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Opinion

E-International Relations

04 August 2022

Originally published: https://www.e-ir.info/2022/08/04/opinion-supply-chains-and-war-the-importance-of-bakus-port/

As the world prepares for a new Cold War (or a second Cold War), the stress on global supply chains due to the war in Ukraine continues to affect international commerce. The flow of goods, particularly energy, from Central Asia to Europe has become a vital issue since the war commenced, with Europe looking for alternative routes that avoid Russian territory. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), commonly known as the Middle Corridor, has emerged as a viable alternative. The infrastructural cornerstone of this route is Azerbaijan’s Baku International Sea Trade Port.

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Wednesday, January 26, 2022

Journal: Latin America and the Caribbean Meet the Post-Soviet World: Can Pro Forma Diplomacy Evolve?

 

 

"Latin America and the Caribbean Meet the Post-Soviet World: Can Pro Forma Diplomacy Evolve?"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Research Essay

Journal of International Analytics

Vol. 12, No. 3, 2021

Originally published: https://www.interanalytics.org/jour/article/view/389

Abstract

The 33 countries that constitute Latin America and the Caribbean and the 11 countries of the former Soviet Union (not counting the Russian Federation and the three Baltic nations) conform 44 states which are, with a few exceptions, on the periphery of global geopolitical aff airs, with limited international influence or at the mercy of conflicts that have disrupted their internal balance and international image in the past decade. While the topic of how peripheral nations and regions interact with each other has been analyzed in academia, in-depth studies about relations between these specific regions are very limited and scarce. This paper seeks to fi ll in that gap by providing recent examples on issues like trade and high-profile diplomatic visits between Latin American and Caribbean governments with their post-Soviet counterparts. Moreover, I will discuss the issue of the location (or lack thereof) of embassies, a topic not discussed in the consulted literature, as an example of how governments from peripheral states and limited budgets decide where to open an embassy. It is proposed here that the 44 states that make up Latin America, the Caribbean, and the post-Soviet world will remain cordial and friendly strangers for the foreseeable future. A lack of grand-strategy vision, with a few exceptions, is a major hindrance to stronger relations between these states. The most plausible scenario is bloc-to-bloc trade agreements; however, the COVID-19 pandemic and more pressing issues that these countries face mean that treaties with geographically distant states that are not trading partners or potential sources of financial aid are not regarded as priorities.

 Sanchez W.A. Latin America and the Caribbean Meet the Post-Soviet World: Can Pro Forma Diplomacy Evolve? Journal of International Analytics. 2021;12(3):154–172. https://doi.org/10.46272/2587-8476-2021-12-3-154-172

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Tuesday, January 25, 2022

Book chapter: "A Frontier Market in the COVID-19 Era: Kazakhstan’s Economic Diversification in the 2020s"

 


"A Frontier Market in the COVID-19 Era: Kazakhstan’s Economic Diversification in the 2020s"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

 Chapter published in: 

Jean-François Caron and Hélène Thibault (Eds), Central Asia and the Covid-19 Pandemic, Springer Link, 2022: 139-170
 
 

Abstract

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government of Kazakhstan was carrying out a strategy of economic diversification in order to decrease the country’s dependence on its profitable energy industry which constitute the bulk of Kazakhstan’s exports. As part of the diversification of its economy and trading partners, Kazakhstan has a long-term objective: become one of the world’s 30 most developed economics by 2050. The Central Asian nation is classified as a frontier market by global indexes, which means that it is viewed as having less developed political and economic structures, which makes them more volatile. However this label can be misleading as it does not properly demonstrate what Kazakhstan has accomplished in recent years in its quest to attract new trade partners and investors. New entities like the Astana International Financial Centre; the government's plans to become a trilingual nation; and recent initiatives to develop industries like agriculture, banking, manufacturing and tourism; demonstrate what good planning can accomplish. How will the pandemic affect Kazakhstan’s plans and objectives? This essay seeks to demonstrate that the country has handled COVID-19 generally well from an economic point of view. While the informal sector and lack of development in the periphery remain problematic issues, Nur-Sultan has achieved much in its three decades of independence as a frontier market, transforming from a Soviet-style to a Western-style economy. Kazakhstan, thus, is an example of how a global pandemic does not necessarily have to cripple the development plans of a frontier market, if said country has clear short-term as well as long-term goals.

 

 

 

Monday, December 24, 2018

IPD: Happy Anniversary Kazakhstan: What Will the New Year Bring?

"Happy Anniversary Kazakhstan: What Will the New Year Bring?"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
25 December, 2018
International Policy Digest
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/12/25/happy-anniversary-kazakhstan-what-will-the-new-year-bring/


The Republic of Kazakhstan celebrated its 27th independence anniversary on December 16th. This past year has brought a number of significant foreign policy-related successes for the Central Asian state. Hence, it is mandatory for those of us that work on international affairs to monitor Astana in 2019 as it approaches three decades of independence.

Achievements GaloreSince the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Kazakh government has carried out an ambitious policy not only to promote internal development and expand its international presence. Astana’s modus operandi is to achieve short-term goals and also carry out long-term strategies; this way of thinking has, without a doubt, helped the country gain a prominent status as a Central Asian regional power and an actor in its own right in global affairs. Case in point, the current goal is for Kazakhstan to become one of the world’s 30 most developed nations by 2050, which would help it gain membership to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The country is also seeking to attract more extra-regional investors via the partial privatization of some of its more valuable state-run enterprises. For example, in mid-November, as many as 15 percent of shares belonging to Kazatomprom, the world’s biggest producer of uranium, were open for trade at the London Stock Exchange and the Astana International Financial Centre’s Astana Stock Exchange.

Trade with other nations reached interesting levels in recent years. For example, according to the US Trade Representative, “the U.S. trade balance with Kazakhstan shifted from a goods trade surplus of $380 million in 2016 to a goods trade deficit of $239 million in 2017.” Due to space considerations, we will not analyze this dramatic shift, but simply highlight this discrepancy and stress that bilateral trade relations should be closely monitored. On the other hand, trade with South Korea appears to be gaining momentum, as Kazakh Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, Bakyt Dyussenbayev, has declared that “we expect that the final figures for 12 months [for 2018] will approach $3 billion.” Similarly, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), of which Kazakhstan is a member, finalized in December a temporary agreement on the formation of a free trade zone between the EUAU and Iran, which could help promote Kazakh trade with its Caspian Sea neighbor.

Finally, it is worth noting that Kazakhstan is the first ever Central Asian state to hold a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council (2017-2018) and was the rotating president in January 2018. The country also holds important positions in other organizations, like for example the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States, where Kazakh national Baghdad Amreyev is the current secretary general.

How will Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy Look at 28?
As the Central Asian state begins its journey towards turning 28 years of age, there are a few initiatives to look forward to. One important development is that Kazakhstan has deployed 120 peacekeepers to the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL), after receiving training via the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The Kazakhstan Peacekeeping Company will operate under the command of the Indian Army’s JAT Infantry Battalion stationed there. Kazakhstan already participates in other UN missions but at a much lower scale, for example, it currently has deployed four experts on a mission to the UN mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

The UNIFIL deployment is a significant development as Kazakhstan has already made a name for itself in the mediation of conflicts – for example Kazakhstan held a round of peace talks over Iran’s nuclear program back in 2013; moreover, an agreement that may put an end to the Caspian Sea dispute was signed in the Kazakh city of Aktau this past August. Hence, Astana can now proclaim that it is not only trying to bring peace via negotiations but also by actively participating in UN peace missions. Should the Kazakh Peacekeeping Company perform professionally in Lebanon, this may set the tone for future Kazakh participation in other UN missions.

Additionally, while this is still a couple of years away, Kazakhstan will host the WTO’s Ministerial Conference from 8-11 June 2020. This is significant given the ongoing shifts in global commerce, such as the trade wars between global powers; the appearance of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP-11 – the successor to the TPP sans the U.S.); the USMCA (the new NAFTA); figuring what European trade will look like if Brexit occurs; not to mention China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which will continue to expand in 2019. Given all these issues, the 2020 WTO meeting in Astana will be a forum where changing global trade will be discussed.

Education: Always a Pillar for Development
As mentioned in this author’s 8 October commentary, “Reforming Kazakhstan’s Education System and its Foreign Policy Implications,” the October 5th speech by President Nursultan Nazarbayev is a milestone in Kazakhstan’s educational sector. During his remarks, the Kazakh leader proclaimed that the Central Asian nation’s education system will be reformed, and “expenditures on education, science and healthcare [will be increased] from all sources up to 10% from the GDP within 5 years.” The country has a fairly good higher education system, including Nazarbayev University and the “Bolashak” program –which provides scholarships for Kazakh students to study abroad and then return to work in the country, like the Fulbright Program– however greater financial resources are always welcome. Around 11 thousand specialists have been educated in Western universities via Bolashak, including several senior Kazakh policymakers.

Adding to these programs is the goal of making the country a trilingual state: Kazakh, Russian and now English. During an December 11th speech at Georgetown University’s Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies, for an event titled “Future Calling: Infrastructure Development in Central Asia” the Kazakhstan ambassador to the US, Erzhan Kazykhanov, explained that the Kazakh government has changed the national alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin in order to facilitate learning computer science, and is also fomenting the teaching of English by training Kazakh teachers in rural areas and also bringing English-speakers to temporarily teach in Kazakh schools as well.


Increasing the budget of the education system, supporting the Bolashak program and furiously supporting English-education will be the pillars for the future of Kazakhstan, whether it plans to celebrate 27, 28 or 100-years of independence.

Final Thoughts: From Concerns to Promise
Kazakhstan, like the other post-Soviet republics, was in a complicated situation when it achieved independence back in the early 1990s when there was a general sense of pessimism towards the future. Even more, there was an ever-present possibility that the country could disintegrate even more à la USSR – there were precedents for this hypothesis, as a short-lived separatist war took place in Moldova in 1992, while Nagorno-Karabakh saw full-fledged violence that same year until 1994.

Kazakhstan has certainly bounced back from that troubling period. There are several outstanding issues that need to be addressed. However, this country has managed in record time to become Central Asia’s leader and is making a name for itself in global affairs.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.


Friday, September 28, 2018

Geopolitical Monitor: The AIFC: Kazakhstan’s Ambitious Step Forward

"The AIFC: Kazakhstan’s Ambitious Step Forward"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Geopolitical Monitor
Opinion
28 September 2018
Originally published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-aifc-kazakhstans-ambitious-step-forward/

The government of Kazakhstan launched its ambitious new project, the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC), on 5 July. Ideally, the AIFC will turn the Central Asian nation into a Eurasian commercial and trade hub, bringing in clients from Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. It is too early to predict the success or failure of this nascent organization, but we can view the AIFC through the prism of the Kazakh government’s grand diplomatic strategy.

Introducing the AIFC
The AIFC is part of the Kazakh regime’s “100 Concrete Steps Plan” to turn Kazakhstan into one of the 30 most developed economies by 2050. Its objective will be to transform Kazakhstan into a financial hub as it (ideally) becomes the pathway for investments and other opportunities for both the country and the wider Central Asian region.

To appeal to Western markets, the AIFC is comprised of various agencies, such as the AIFC Management Council; the AIFC Authority; the Astana Financial Services Authority; the AIFC Court; the AIFC International Arbitration Centre (IAC); and the AIFC Bureau for Continuing Professional Development.
The AIFC is based on the facilities of Expo 2017 Astana, and English will be its official language. It is reportedly based on “the best models of the financial centers in New York, Singapore, London, and Dubai.” In order to increase its credentials, NASDAQ and the AIFC signed an agreement in 2017 which includes implementing the Nasdaq Matching Engine, a trading platform. The Shanghai Stock Exchange is similarly involved with the AIFC.

What exactly is the AIFC trying to do? The answer is: a little bit of everything. An Astana Times article explains a few of the AIFC’s projects: e-Justice (AIFC digital financial system), digital crypto-exchange, a crypto-currency depository, financial supermarket, cyber-security center, Islamic financial technologies, and international start-up program aimed at creating an ecosystem of innovative financial technology. Similarly, a NASDAQ 2017 press release declares that the AIFC’s goal is to “attract investment into the economy through the establishment of an attractive environment for investment in financial services, to develop local capital markets, to ensure their integration with the international capital market, and to develop markets for insurance and banking services for Kazakhstan.”

In search of an effective arbitration system
The Court and the International Arbitration Centre deserve particular attention as they are structured after English law, in order to be more appealing to Western markets, while “party-friendly arbitration rules” have also been put in place. The IAC chairperson is Barbara Dohmann QC, who has worked at the Paris International Chamber of Commerce, along with other renowned agencies. The IAC has 28 arbitrators and mediators, including Aigoul Kenjebayeva, Managing Partner of Dentons, Europe, Almaty and Astana, and Alexander Korobeinikov, Counsel, Baker & McKenzie – CIS Limited. As for the Court, it is independent from Kazakhstan’s judicial system and will be the governing body for disputes between “AIFC participants, AIFC bodies and/or their foreign employees.”

The image of the Arbitration Centre will be critically important for the future of the AIFC.  The Kazakh judicial system has been critiqued for its lack of fairness, hence it comes as no surprise that the AIFC will be a separate entity, complete with foreign arbitrators, which will hopefully give potential AIFC clients confidence in its impartiality. It is similarly positive that this agency is reportedly modeled on the renowned DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre.

An arbitration specialist interviewed by the author noted that it will be important to clarify how the IAFC’s arbitration court will function in relation to bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The specialist has studied the AIFC’s constitutional statutes, which state that any previously signed and ratified treaties, including bilateral investment treaties, take priority over AIFC agreements; “this will be good for the client, but the AIFC’s arbitration center could find it challenging to become a relevant agency if it is overruled by BITs,” the expert concluded. On the other hand, the provisions on arbitration appear to be efficient and up-to-date, and they even “take into account certain matters that have not been covered in previous arbitration rules. This shows that [the AIFC] is not improvising rules, but rather it has applied careful consideration, it has learned from arbitration precedents and is attempting to improve them.” In other words, the AIFC’s arbitration center, unlike the Kazakh judicial system, appears to be set up for professional and impartial rulings.

Discussion
During the ceremonial launch of the initiative, President Nursultan Nazarbayev highlighted that “AIFC participants will have access to the capital not only of Kazakhstan and the region, but the whole world. Unprecedented conditions have been created here that have no analogues in the post-Soviet space.” The AIFC also hopes to capitalize on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as Kazakh Deputy Foreign Minister, Roman Vassilenko has declared that “the whole idea of the Astana International Financial Center is to serve not only as the hub for Central Asia, but also for the Silk Road project.”

In spite of the Kazakh government’s expectations and ambitions regarding the AFIC, there are some issues to consider that may influence its success (or lack thereof). First of all: location (still) matters. As developed and stable as Kazakhstan may be, particularly when compared to its neighbors, Central Asia is still fairly geographically distant from Western European and Asian markets. The AIFC is trying to solve this problem by reportedly not making it mandatory for clients to have offices in Kazakhstan, though tax free and visa-waivers have been imposed in order to attract people to visit the country (citizens of OECD states, the US, and several other nations do not require visas).

Moreover, there is the issue of how to attract customers and investors. Two of Kazakhstan’s neighbors, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, have small markets. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan is well known for its secrecy and shunning of the outside world. The bright light is that Uzbekistan’s new government is keen to open up to the world, and the AIFC could be a valuable conduit. In other words, the other “stans” will not be major investors in the AIFC. China is a natural target, and the Belt and Road Initiative is China’s masterplan to expand its commercial relations and influence across Eurasia, but why would Beijing let the AIFC take the lead in this project?

The AIFC’s personnel and the headquarters are also factors to keep in mind. The Center’s language will be English, but Kazakhs mostly speak either Kazakh or Russian, a legacy of the Soviet Union. Will Astana promote teaching English in schools so young Kazakhs can work at the AIFC? One alternative is the Bolashak scholarship programme, which sends Kazakhs to study abroad and then, after graduating, they return to work in their homeland. Finally, Astana is not London or New York, hence the city itself will have to expand its list of amenities to attract foreigners (particularly the ones living in Almaty).

As a final point, there is always the concern that while well-intentioned, the AIFC could backfire. At the 2018 PONARS Conference in Washington DC, a panelist responded to a question from the author on the AIFC, stating that this is an intriguing idea, but one pressing concern is that it could be “subverted by its own stakeholders.”

Not everything is a concern
To be fair, there are valid reasons why investors should look at Kazakhstan with interest and why the AIFC could work. After all, the Central Asian state has enjoyed steady economic growth a
The government of Kazakhstan launched its ambitious new project, the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC), on 5 July. Ideally, the AIFC will turn the Central Asian nation into a Eurasian commercial and trade hub, bringing in clients from Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. It is too early to predict the success or failure of this nascent organization, but we can view the AIFC through the prism of the Kazakh government’s grand diplomatic strategy.

The AIFC and geopolitics
How does the AIFC fit into Kazakhstan’s foreign policy? Astana’s goal since achieving independence from the Soviet Union has been to not only become a regional power, but also attain global-level status. The country is generally regarded as the leader of Central Asia with its modern economy. Moreover, the country is currently a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council; it has been part of the mediation process in Iran and Syria, and an August meeting that may signal the end of the dispute over the Caspian Sea took place in Aktau, Kazakhstan.

Given its geopolitical situation, it is logical for the Kazakh government to look for innovative methods to improve its global standing.

Final thoughts
If the AIFC operates as expected, it would not only improve Kazakhstan’s global standing as a financial hub, but bring additional foreign investment into the country. This is one big “if” and Kazakhstan has a history of not always delivering on reform promises; but if it works, and clients utilize the AIFC to invest in the country and neighboring Central Asian nations, the AIFC could become an effective pillar of Kazakh development and foreign policy.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Wednesday, June 20, 2018

Mexico-Russia Relations: Fútbol and Much More


Mexico-Russia Relations: Fútbol and Much More
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Geopolitics
20 June 2018

Mexico is one of the 32 nations that will participate in the 2018 FIFA World Cup that the Russian Federation will host from 14 June to 15 July. To prepare for the expected influx of Mexican tourists traveling, the Mexican government is increasing its diplomatic presence in Russia (like mobile consulates). While this sudden flow of Mexican citizens will be short lived, Mexico City-Moscow relations are gaining momentum.

Trade And Investment Grows

An important development in bilateral commercial relations occurred earlier this year, when a consortium between Russian oil company Lukoil and the Italian company ENI won a bid to explore for oil in the Gulf of Mexico. This is actually the second contract that Lukoil has gained in Mexico as it won a different bid last year. These type of commercial transactions are standard, but since Mexico is a close ally of the U.S., the fact that a Russian oil company will now operate (or at least search for oil) in Mexico is a significant development.

In fact, Mexican-Russian trade has slowly grown in the past years – according to media reports, it reached USD$1.4 billion in 2016 and USD$1.6 billion in 2017 (though Mexico’s two main trading partners remain the U.S. and China). Additionally, a note by the Mexican daily El Universal explains that ProMexico – part of the Secretariat of Economy, aimed at promoting international trade and investment – will reportedly attempt to promote “seafood, meats, and dairy products” in the Russian market during the World Cup.

Even more, in spite of the ongoing Moscow-Washington tensions, Moscow-Mexico City diplomatic relations remain quite amicable. For example, in mid-May, the President of the Mexican Senate, Ernesto Cordero Arroyo, traveled to Moscow and met with Chairman of the Federation Council Valentina Matviyenko. Mr. Cordero declared that bilateral relations are passing through a very good phase (“un muy buen momento”) and they will continue, regardless of who is elected president of Mexico in the 1 July general elections. Even more, a press release published by the Mexican Senate as part of the visit highlights how Mr. Cordero mentioned that both Mexico and Russia support a “multipolar world.”

The Mexico-Russia-USA Triangle

The main issue to keep in mind is the geopolitical context of this apparent rapprochement. Diplomatic relations between Washington and Mexico City have reached a low point due to President Donald Trump’s inflammatory comments regarding immigration, the controversial border wall and the renegotiation of NAFTA.

Without a doubt, there are still plenty of positive initiatives, like for example high-level military meetings, and the apparent sale of eight MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopters helicopters as well as a number of missiles (type RGM-84L Harpoon Block II, among others ) to the Mexican Navy. However such developments are overshadowed by executive-level statements. It is in this new reality that Mexico City appears to be looking to strengthen trade relations with other partners.

Even more, the Mexican and international media have published a number of articles over the past year that discuss this complex geopolitical situation. For example, a 27 January 2018 commentary in Univision.com was bluntly titled “Russia quadruples its investment in Mexico while the US thinks about building walls.” Similarly, a 20 November 2017 article in El Cronista is titled “Mexico approaches Russia to make business as NAFTA stalls.”

Final Thoughts

While Russia cannot realistically replace the profits Mexico obtains from the U.S. market and NAFTA, the Russian market and potential investments are lucrative alternatives. We will have to wait until Mexico’s July elections, which will curiously occur in the middle of the World Cup, to have a better idea of the next Mexican president’s priorities and foreign policy objectives. It will be interesting to see how much Mexico can achieve in Russia, both regarding fútbol and everything else.

W. Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Thursday, March 22, 2018

Entrevista: Sputnik Mundo - ¿Continuarán Argentina y Rusia sus relaciones cordiales tras la reelección de Putin?


"¿Continuarán Argentina y Rusia sus relaciones cordiales tras la reelección de Putin?"
Sputnik Mundo
19 Marzo, 2018
Publicado en: https://mundo.sputniknews.com/russia-elections-2018-news/201803191077120633-politica-america-latina-buenos-aires-moscu-relaciones/



BUENOS AIRES (Sputnik) — La permanencia de Vladímir Putin en la presidencia de Rusia tras las elecciones del 18 de marzo permitirá mantener en un rumbo positivo las relaciones entre su país y Argentina, dijo a Sputnik el analista en geopolítica y seguridad internacional W. Alejandro Sánchez.
Con el 95% de las papeletas escrutadas Putin reúne el 76% de los apoyos, según los últimos datos de la Comisión Electoral Central rusa.

"La reelección del presidente Putin no afectará las relaciones con Argentina, que hoy en día son buenas y cordiales", dijo Sánchez, columnista del Centro para la Seguridad Marítima Internacional (Cimsec, por sus siglas en inglés).

La evolución de las relaciones diplomáticas entre los dos países se mantuvo estable bajo la presidencia de Mauricio Macri, observó.
"No son tan cercanas como durante la presidencia de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015), pero no son malas desde ningún punto de vista", abundó.
De hecho, la visita oficial de Macri a su homólogo ruso en enero pasado "es una muestra de lo cordiales que son las relaciones diplomáticas entre los dos Gobiernos hoy en día", dijo.

Por eso el desafío se centra en cómo hacer que esa amistad se transforme en proyectos e inversión, indicó el experto en geopolítica.

Comercio y defensa
El intercambio comercial con Rusia fue positivo para Argentina en 2017.

Las exportaciones argentinas en los 11 primeros meses del año pasado llegaron a 480 millones de dólares, y los rubros principales fueron peras frescas y limones, mientras que las importaciones desde Rusia sumaron 326 millones de dólares.

"El desafío para Rusia es que el Gobierno de Macri ve a la República Popular de China, la Unión Europea, Estados Unidos y los países del Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur, que integran además Brasil, Paraguay y Uruguay) como sus principales socios comerciales, cosa que son", reflexionó el analista.
Cuando en Argentina es verano en Rusia es invierno, así que "el país sudamericano podría ser un exportador fundamental de otros productos agrícolas a Rusia, pero eso depende mucho de la producción argentina y la demanda", continuó.


Ambos países tienen por reto el impulso de otras iniciativas, "como proyectos de construcción o minería, el intento de doblar el volumen de su comercio antes del fin de la década, o la puesta en marcha de ejercicios militares conjuntos", detalló Sánchez.

En cuestiones de defensa, circularon rumores sobre la posibilidad de que el Gobierno de Fernández comprara armamento ruso, como los aviones de combate MiG-35.

"Esto no ocurrió, con excepción de los cuatro buques clase Neftegaz, en gran parte por el limitado presupuesto de defensa argentino", recordó el especialista en seguridad internacional.

En cualquier caso, Sánchez destacó el papel de la participación del buque ruso Yantar, con un vehículo sumergible con capacidad para identificar objetos hundidos a 6.000 metros de profundidad, en la búsqueda del submarino argentino San Juan, desaparecido el 15 de noviembre de 2017.

"Desafortunadamente hasta ahora dicho submarino no ha sido localizado, pero la ayuda rusa a esta operación ha sido bien vista por el Gobierno y la Fuerza Armada argentina", constató el experto.

Putin fue presidente de Rusia, primero de manera interina, y luego durante dos mandatos consecutivos, entre 1999 y 2008.


Dado que la Constitución rusa no permite ejercer ese cargo durante tres períodos consecutivos, ese último año se convirtió en primer ministro del Gobierno de Dmitri Medvédev.

En 2012, Putin volvió al Kremlin para un mandato de seis años tras ganar las presidenciales.



Tuesday, February 20, 2018

Presentation: The Moscow Connection: Latin America's relations with Russia



"The Moscow Connection: Latin America's relations with Russia"

W. Alejandro Sanchez & Nathan Davis

Forum on International Affairs

11 January, 2018
Washington, DC

Prezi publication available: http://prezi.com/kf7jhphzheaw/?utm_campaign=share&utm_medium=copy&rc=ex0share



Details

• What we'll do: Explore Latin America's relationships with Russia

• What to bring: A form of identification (driver's license, passport, student ID, government ID, etc.)

• Summary: During the Cold War, the principle and overriding concern for the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) was the perceived threat of communist, and therefore Russian, influence in the region. America's "backyard" was a geopolitical and actual battlefield between the world's two superpowers and their proxies. Recently, Russia has found common cause with countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela and others that desire to offset US domination both within their own countries and the region at large. Economically, Russian firms such as Rosneft and Gasprom have made inroads in the Brazilian, Argentine, and Venezuelan oil and gas markets. Politically, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his LAC counterparts have made a series of high profile state visits in recent years. After a retreat from LAC following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it now appears that Russia is again looking to spread its influence in the region. Join the Forum on International Affairs (FIA) as we dig deeper into the foreign affairs of Latin American states, and their strategies for engaging with Russia.

Questions to Consider:

1) What do LAC countries gain from closer relationships with Russia?
2) How does Russian involvement in LAC differ between countries based on country size, political regime, incumbent political party, and geographic location?
3) Given the size of its economy can Russia sustain involvement within LAC outside of the energy sector?
4) Is Russian strategy in LAC characterized by long- or short-term considerations?
5) Can Russia play a meaningful role in LAC given its power vis-a-vis the United States, China, and the European Union?

Thursday, October 12, 2017

IWP Presentation: Russia-Latin America and Caribbean Relations in 2017


You are cordially invited to a lecture on the topic of 
Russia-Latin America and Caribbean Relations in 2017 
with
Alex Sanchez
International Affairs Analyst, IWP Alumnus
Wednesday, October 11th
5:00 PM 
The Institute of World Politics
1521 16th Street NW
Washington, D.C.

About the lecture:
This presentation will discuss current relations between the Russian Federation and Latin American and Caribbean states. Apart from addressing Moscow’s relations with “the usual suspects” (e.g. Cuba and Venezuela), we will also explore initiatives with other regional states at the diplomatic, defense and economic level. We will conclude by discussing whether the Russian government currently has an overall strategy towards Latin America and the Caribbean and what new initiatives we can expect in the near future.
About the speaker:
W. Alejandro Sanchez is an international affairs analyst who focuses on geopolitical and defense issues in the Western Hemisphere. A member of the Forum on the Arms Trade, he is a regular contributor to IHS Jane's Defense Weekly, the Center for International Maritime Security, Living in Peru, among others. His analyses have appeared in journals including Small Wars and Insurgencies, Defence Studies, the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, European Security, Studies in Conflict and Terrorismand Perspectivas. He received his B.A. from Ursinus College, his M.A. from American University, his Certificate on Caribbean Defense and Security from the National Defense University (Washington, DC) and his Certificate on International Politics from the Institute of World Politics.
The views expressed in this presentation are the sole responsibility of the presenter and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the presenter is associated.

Monday, March 13, 2017

Working Papers for CAEI



My four working papers for the Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales / Mis cuatro reportes pare el Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales

“Las Relaciones entre Argentina y Rusia durante la Presidencia de Mauricio Macri”
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Reporte – Working Paper No. 53
Programa Rusia, Cáucaso & Asia Central
Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales

"Eligiendo Ganadores: Un Breve Analisis de la Compra de Armamento por el Peru"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Reporte - Working Paper No. 10 Defensa & Seguridad
Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales

“Colombia y Peru Necesitan Drones Armados?:
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Opinion - Working Paper No. 10
Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales

"Pax Inca: Why is Peru Not a Regional Powerhouse in Latin America?:
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Working Paper #32 - America Latina
Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales
November 2013
PDF disponible / PDF available (In English)

Monday, November 14, 2016

Living in Peru: Peruvian blueberries go global

"Peruvian Blueberries go global"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Living in Peru
Opinion
November 14, 2016


The blueberry market has steadily began to increase and make an important niche for itself within the country.

In a commentary for Living in Peru entitled Peru on its way to becoming leader in blueberry exports (November, 2014), the author was optimistic about Peru’s blueberry industry, stating that “while Peru continues to successfully export staple-goods like coffee, potatoes, and quinoa, the blueberry market has, in the span of only a couple of years, made an important niche for itself.” Two years later, this past October, Peruvian Minister of Agriculture Jose Hernandez declared that Peru could become the world’s biggest blueberry producer within the next two years. Needless to say, Lima has become quite ambitious about this particular berry.
According to said ministry, Peruvian blueberry producers are looking to cultivate up to 20 thousand tons of these berries in 2016. This seems like an achievable amount given how just in the first three months of 2016 alone, Peruvian farmers grew 3,600 tons of blueberries, four times the amount during the same period in 2015. If the situation continues, by the end of the year, Peru could have exported as much asUSD$200 million worth of blueberries.
A critical issue regarding the future of blueberry production is farming land. The good news is that according to Alfonso Velasquez Tuesta, president of Sierra Exportadora, the goal for this year is to have 3,200 hectares of land growing blueberries. Most of the farming land is found in La Libertad region.
Another positive news is that new markets are opening for Peruvian blueberry exports. Almost parallel to Minister Hernandez’s declaration, on October 10, Lima signed an agreement with the Colombian government via which five Peruvian agricultural products, including blueberries, can now enter the neighboring country. Even more, Peru has also signed a trade agreement with China, which allows Peruvian blueberries to be sold in this important Asian market. Similarly, Peruvian blueberries have also found their way to the United Kingdom. Finally, we should stress that Peru is also attempting to have a bigger foothold in the U.S. as a delegation of Peruvian trade representatives participated in the PMA Fresh Summit Expo held this past October in Florida – blueberries, among other products, were displayed for the thousands of attendees.
The interest in wellness has greatly contributed to the growing export of Peruvian crops associated with healthy eating, such as quinoa and blueberries.
In spite of these, we must remember that there are other South American blueberry producers which have similarly enjoyed recent accomplishments. For example, a new runway measuring almost 8,000 square meters was inaugurated in an airport in Tucuman, northern Argentina on October 6. The Argentinian daily La Nacion reported that, thanks to the expansion, just in October the airport transported 3,825,000 kilos of blueberries to the United States, which is more than the 3,200,000 kilos sent to said market in all of 2015. The report also mentioned that direct cargo flights (via Air Cargo Global) from Tucuman to London are now taking off in order to increase the presence of Argentinian blueberries in Europe. Meanwhile, Chile has also reported success in production and sales. A September report in Pulso states that Chilean blueberry exports reached USD$896 million in 2015. Chile is the third biggest exporter of this berry in the world, after the United States and Spain; this is an important fact to keep in mind since Peru attempts to enter the U.S. blueberry market, which means that Peruvian exporters will have to compete with local blueberry producers.
A final challenge regarding blueberries is that this is, obviously, an agricultural product. This means that it is at the mercy of the climate, which in Peru can include sharp changes in temperatures and other weather patterns that will be exacerbated by climate change. It is important to note that in Chile, the 2016/2017 season commenced two weeks early due to slightly higher-than-normal temperatures; this will negatively affect some varieties of Chilean blueberries. The author has not found sufficient information to discuss how climate change is affecting (or could affect) blueberry production in Peru, but hopefully appropriate research and planning is being carried out.
Miguel Cordano Rodríguez, general manager of Sierra Exportadora, declared earlier this year that there is “an unfulfilled demand for berries in the world. That’s why I encourage producers to keep on growing these crops to meet this demand, not only in terms of volume but also quality. This way, we will diversify our basket of products as well as the destination markets.” Analogous to the quinoa market, Peruvian blueberries are profiting from the global interest in wellness and healthy eating. Hopefully the new government will continue to support this booming berry industry so that the Ministry of Agriculture’s predictions become a reality by the end of the decade.
Follow W. Alejandro Sanchez on Twitter.

Saturday, October 15, 2016

Quoted: El papel de Brasil en la cumbre de los BRICS está en duda


"El Papel de Brasil en la Cumbre de los BRICS esta en duda"
Por: Ana Maria Palacios
Sputnik Mundo
14 October, 2016
Originally published: https://mundo.sputniknews.com/politica/201610141064105618-brics-brasil-politica/


BUENOS AIRES (Sputnik) — Es incierta la actitud que tomará el nuevo Gobierno brasileño de Michel Temer en la cumbre del grupo BRICS que se celebra en la ciudad india de Goa, indicó a Sputnik Nóvosti el experto en asuntos rusos Alejandro Sánchez.

"Veremos qué interés tiene el nuevo presidente Michel Temer en este bloque, que fue una prioridad para la expresidenta Dilma Rousseff", indicó Sánchez, integrante del Observatorio de Rusia en el Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales. 

La cumbre de los países que conforman el bloque de los BRICS (Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica) "ocurre en un momento muy importante para uno de ellos, Brasil", a pocas semanas de la destitución de la anterior jefa de Estado. "Por el momento veo a este nuevo Gobierno brasileño con más interés en Washington que en Moscú", explicó Sánchez, también analista para el Consejo de Asuntos Hemisféricos. En una entrevista con Sputnik y con la agencia india IANS, el presidente ruso Vladímir Putin manifestó su voluntad de "crear nuevos formatos y mecanismos de cooperación con los socios" del BRICS. Lea más: Los BRICS no planean admitir nuevos miembros Los cinco países están "firmemente decididos a cooperar en la lucha contra el terrorismo, las amenazas provenientes del tráfico de drogas, la corrupción, así como a contribuir juntos al arreglo de los conflictos y a la seguridad internacional en materia de información", aseguró Putin.

En sus declaraciones, Putin lamentó que los problemas de la economía internacional se intenten resolver a través de alianzas cerradas como el Acuerdo Transpacífico de Cooperación Económica (TPP) o la Asociación Transatlántica para el Comercio y la Inversión (TTIP). "Hay un ángulo político" en esa observación del mandatario ruso, afirmó Sánchez, "ya que todos los países" que están interesados en esos acuerdos "son países aliados o amigos de Washington". "No me sorprende que el Gobierno ruso critique la TTIP, dado que las relaciones entre las dos potencias mundiales, Rusia y Estados Unidos, están muy deterioradas", manifestó Sánchez. Lea más: Todo lo que tienes que saber sobre el TTP Moscú también tiene su propio bloque de integración político-económica por medio de la Unión Económica Euroasiática, recordó.

En su entrevista con las agencias rusa y china, Putin se refirió a la situación que padece Afganistán, país acosado por problemas de "terrorismo, extremismo y tráfico ilícito de drogas". El jefe de Estado ruso busca así "cambiar un poco la atención mundial de Siria a Afganistán", ante las críticas que ha recibido Rusia por los bombardeos en la ciudad siria de Alepo y por rechazar una propuesta de armisticio para la zona, presentada por Francia en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. Tanto Estados Unidos como la Unión Europea acusan a Rusia de apoyar la ofensiva del Ejército de Siria contra los terroristas del Frente Fatah al Sham (antes conocido como Frente al Nusra, proscrito en Rusia y otros países) y los grupos insurgentes en la parte oriental de esa ciudad siria.

La escalada de hostilidades en el este de Alepo, donde permanecen atrapados hasta 275.000 civiles, provocó en las últimas semanas centenares de muertos y heridos, según Naciones Unidas. En cuanto a Afganistán, "ningún país del BRICS ni de otras partes del mundo (incluyendo EEUU y Europa) quiere que los talibanes retomen el control de Afganistán, por lo que no sería difícil pasar alguna resolución del bloque ensalzando la cooperación de Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica contra el terrorismo", reflexionó Sánchez. Más allá de las declaraciones conjuntas de apoyo, "habrá que ver si los países geográficamente más cercanos a Afganistán (Rusia, China e India), promueven una mayor cooperación en temas de seguridad y defensa contra el terrorismo", opinó. 

Para Sánchez, el foro más apropiado para discutir estos asuntos sería la Organización de Cooperación Shanghái, de la que Rusia y China son miembros mientras India está en proceso de adhesión.

Más: https://mundo.sputniknews.com/politica/201610141064105618-brics-brasil-politica/

Tuesday, April 19, 2016

Living in Peru: Peruvian foreign policy will not change under next president


"Peruvian Foreign policy will not change under next President"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Opinion
Living in Peru
March 21, 2016
Originally published: http://www.peruthisweek.com/blogs-foreign-policy-elections-opinion-109088

The April 10 elections in Peru will not significantly alter the foreign policy of the Andean state, regardless of which candidate wins the presidency or which party (or coalition of parties) gains control of congress. Peruvian foreign policy for the past couple of decades has been fairly predictable and these elections will most likely not bring about major surprises.
Peru’s relations with the rest of the world are not a major issue to the Peruvian electorate; the hot topics of this election are improving internal security and the economy. Obviously, the latter issue has a lot to do with international commerce as the cornerstone of Peru’s growing economy over the past two decades has been the export of its natural resources (such as natural gas, minerals, oil and agricultural goods). Hence, it comes as no surprise that the main candidates have made similar promises, namely to maintain the current trade model. This will include cementing Peru’s role in the Pacific Alliance, a regional free trade bloc (along with Chile, Colombia and Mexico) as well as pushing for new free trade agreements, probably with India and Turkey. Additionally, the next congress will likely ratify the Trans Pacific Partnership which will open Asia Pacific markets to Peruvian goods.
When it comes to foreign policy itself, Peru is not a Latin American powerhouse, and it enjoys cordial relations with most of its neighbors. The only outstanding issue may be the future of the territorial dispute with Chile. Lima already had some success in a maritime dispute with its Southern neighbor via the 2014 ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Hence, the next head of state may see the ICJ as an option to solve this dispute as well.
Ultimately, while the Andean nation has witnessed its fair share of internal turmoil over the past decades, its foreign policy has remained generally constant. Arguably, Peru’s internal problems, such as terrorism in the 1980s or political instability in the 1990s due to the Fujimori dictatorship, did not allow the Andean country to focus on the outside world. Nevertheless, some foreign policy stances have been constant and will remain so. For example, Lima has been a close ally of Washington, and this will not change, particularly as the Peruvian government and security forces will look for U.S. support to combat drug trafficking.
It is worth noting that of the remaining presidential candidates, only a few have an extreme-left ideology. In theory, if one of them is elected, we could see a radical foreign policy change. This is already happening in Argentina, as new President Mauricio Macri is approaching Washington; this is an almost 180 degree turn when compared to the foreign policy of his predecessor, President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who was known to be a close friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin. As for Peru, in the 2006 elections then-candidate Ollanta Humala was defeated, in part, because he was regarded as a close friend of the late President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and a follower of his socialist ideology. Nevertheless, the “extreme left” candidates are fairly down on the polls so unless a major surprise occurs in April, Peru’s relations with the global powers will generally remain unaltered. (The next head of state will likely continue to purchase Russian military equipment, which the Peruvian military is used to utilizing, but we will not see Russian bombers landing in Peru à la Venezuela in 2013).
On a personal note, I would like to see Peruvian presidential candidates address foreign policy. International commerce is an obvious issue, but there are other parts of the country’s foreign policy that should be discussed, such as the future of the Andean Community (which is headquartered in Lima), having a Peruvian citizen elected to head a major international organization (like UNASUR), the significance of Peru’s recent ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty or the future role of the Peruvian military in UN peacekeeping missions.
For over a decade, Peru has enjoyed significant economic growth. Unfortunately, this has not prompted Lima to have a more ambitious foreign policy – coincidentally, I discuss the steps that the Andean country can take to be more influential in regional geopolitics in a working paper for the Argentine think tank Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales entitled, Pax Inca: Why Peru is not a Regional Powerhouse in Latin America.
Hopefully Peru’s next president, whoever he or she may be, will be interested in boosting the country’s foreign policy.
You can follow W. Alejandro on Twiter @W_Alex_Sanchez