Showing posts with label report. Show all posts
Showing posts with label report. Show all posts

Thursday, May 31, 2018

Report: Addressing Non-State Actors: Multiple Approaches

Addressing Non-State Actors: Multiple Approaches




Executive Summary

While the attacks of September 11, 2001 focused many in the United States on the dangers posed by non-state actors, challenges to state authority and international order by such groups are not new. With the global community now more aware of conflicts other than those between states, there is a need to better understand approaches that do—or do not—work when addressing non-state actors. Taking a wide view of what they see in their respective work and an expansive definition of “non-state,” experts in this report offer an array of recommendations, in many instances based on working with or engaging nonstate groups.

Drawing upon his experience in directly reaching out to armed non-state actors, primarily but not exclusively around landmine research and anti-landmine advocacy, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan offers advice to those who would approach such groups. Recognizing that there is danger in doing so, but also a need from a humanitarian perspective, he recommends being well aware of one’s own goals and the likely expectations of any engaged group as just two of many steps in outreach to non-state actors.

Noting the important achievements of the Mine Ban Treaty, especially in the context of Colombia where former FARC rebels are now engaging in mine clearance efforts, Maria Pia Devoto and Camilo Serna Villegas use developments in the country as an example of how it is possible for non-state perpetrators of armed violence to become agents of reconciliation. After briefly describing a group of 20 former combatants, now part of the “Humanicemos DH” effort, they argue that this work could be a model for other non-state armed groups still in the country.

Matthew Bolton
turns to another part of the world to discuss the roots of increased armed violence in Kenya by and against pastoral communities, initially around wildlife “poaching” but now linked to regional and global networks. Drawing upon insights from Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Academy meetings in the region and other scholarship, he concludes that when agreed by Kenya and properly implemented, the ATT could provide paths to improved community security, in part through increased transparency and better risk assessment in the arms trade.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
explores the troubling reality that weapons used by armed non-state actors in Latin America often come from the stockpiles of police or national armed forces. While recognizing that there are other sources of weapons and that there have been some successful cases of arms recovery, he argues that much more can and should be done to stem this flow of weaponry. Recommendations include tackling corruption more directly, possibly through stronger training and stiffer legal penalties, and also better sharing of records across jurisdictions.

Seth Binder
and Robert Watson tackle the ongoing practice of U.S. arming of non-state actors, noting both recent and historic examples. They argue that the lack of institutional capacity of many non-state actors, as well as the long life of various weapons, contributes to risk associated with such practices. They find that despite claimed goals— often short-term ones—, U.S. aid to non-state actors has typically not proven successful, resulting in unintended consequences and long-term instability.

Jeff Abramson
turns the issue around by looking for ways that civil society-led initiatives have an impact upon non-state actors, whether armed or arms producing. Using examples that broadly fall under the “humanitarian disarmament” umbrella, he identifies efforts to convince armed non-state groups to commit to the norms of the Mine Ban Treaty, actions to stop weapons production by stigmatizing financial investment in their manufacturers, and calls by scientists and artificial intelligence experts to prohibit killer robots. He concludes that such efforts focused on human security have a track record of success that merit ongoing support.

Authorship

Experts listed by the Forum on the Arms Trade were invited to participate in this publication, bringing in other colleagues if desired, to author short essays about how their work provides insights into challenges posed by non-state actors (broadly defined). Rather than create an exhaustive report, the intention is to gather diverse perspectives from those working on arms trade, security assistance, and weapons use, often in different regions of the world and focused on distinct issues. Each essay was reviewed by at least one peer, but each should be considered the independent work of the author(s).

Inclusion on the Forum on the Arms Trade expert list, and inclusion in this publication, does not indicate agreement with or endorsement of the opinions of others. Institutional affiliation of authors, when detailed, is indicated for identification purposes only.

Tuesday, July 21, 2015

E-IR: A Non-Violent Conflict: The Venezuela-Guyana Dispute

"A Non-Violent Conflict: The Venezuela-Guyana Dispute"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
E-International Relations
July 21, 2015
Originally published: http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/21/a-non-violent-conflict-the-venezuela-guyana-dispute/


An old territorial dispute between Venezuela and Guyana has flared up once again as the Guyanese government contracted ExxonMobil to look for offshore oil in an area that Caracas claims as its own. While it is unlikely that this particular instance will escalate into an armed conflict, these tensions highlight how non-violent incidents over coveted resources will continue to occur. Moreover, should clashes over this disputed territory continue, Venezuela will, in this author’s opinion, come out as the loser as it will be inexorably regarded as the aggressor against a militarily weaker neighbor.

Moreover, while this dispute has thankfully been non-violent, it could affect U.S.-Venezuela relations as the two governments have been at odds for over a decade and a half. Washington could capitalize on Venezuela’s aggressive stance in order to strengthen relations with Guyana to better monitor developments in Caracas.

A Brief Overview

A full historical review of the Venezuela-Guyana dispute is beyond the scope of this analysis, but it is necessary to give a basic historical overview to put the current situation in the proper context. Guyana is a former British colony (with Dutch influence), formerly known as British Guyana, which obtained its independence in 1966. However, the area, while it was under London’s control, was at odds with Venezuela due to a territorial dispute that dates back to the 19th century. Venezuela obtained its independence in 1824 from Spain, much earlier than Guyana, and has consistently claimed a portion of present-day Guyana.

London and Caracas reached an agreement via the 1899 International Arbitral Awards (held in Paris) which was thought to have put an end to differences. In 1962, Venezuela declared the 1899 treaty void and returned to its pre-1899 claims. In 1966, the same year that Guyana gained its independence, a Mixed Commission was established to address Venezuela’s renewed demands; but while negotiations took place, the Venezuelan military was accused of carrying out incursions into Guyana’s border territory, including the occupation of the Guyanese half of the Ankoko Island. Negotiations and incidents followed, as well as agreements such as the Protocol of Port of Spain, which Venezuela decided not to renew in 1982.

Caracas claims a contested area of around 155 thousand square kilometers in addition to a maritime area off the contested coast.

The dispute generally remained dormant for decades as the 21st century began but resurfaced in November 2007 due to a bizarre incident in which some 30 Venezuelan soldiers entered Guyanese territory and used explosives to destroy two dredges. The Guyanese Defense Forces were deployed to the area, but by that time the Venezuelans had already returned to their country. Fortunately the incident did not escalate into an armed conflict. The Venezuelan government apologized for the incursion as Deputy Minister of External Relations Rodolfo Sanz travelled to Guyana to diffuse the situation. He declared that Caracas “expressed sincere regrets and assured that the incident had no political motive on the part of the Venezuelan Government.”

Another incident occurred on October 2013 when the Venezuelan Navy intercepted the Teknik Perdana, a ship flying Panama’s flag that was hired by the Guyanese government and the Anadarko Petroleum Corporation to carry out seismic investigations. This was a preliminary step for future expeditions to look for offshore oil reserves. Thankfully, like in 2007, the incident did not evolve into a conflict, but the situation does highlight how the two countries began to clash at sea.

The newest round of tensions erupted in March, less than a decade after the Venezuelan military incursion into Guyana and only two years after the Teknik Perdana incident. ExxonMobil started looking for oil through its research vessel, the Deepwater Champion. According to Reuters, “Exxon signed an agreement with Guyana to explore the 26,800 square kilometer block, 100 to 200 miles (160 to 320 km) offshore, in 1999.” On May 20, the company found (black) gold as it announced that it had discovered oil. Days later, the Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro announced that the area in dispute is rightfully Venezuelan. Even more, the Venezuelan presidential decree No. 1.787 (dated May 27) divided Venezuela’s coast into four defense areas. One of them is called the “Zona Operativa de Defensa Integral Maritima Insular Atlantica” (ZODIMAIN Atlantica; Atlantic Operational Maritime & Insular Defense Zone), which extended from the Promonotory of Paria to the border shared with Trinidad & Tobago; hence it included the disputed maritime area between Venezuela and Guyana. In early July, the Venezuelan government took a step backwards by passing the presidential decree No. 1.859 which modified the aforementioned No. 1.787; the new directive withdrew specific coordinates for the ZODIMAINs.

Guyanese President David Granger labeled Venezuela’s claims as a “legal absurdity” and stated that Exxon’s operations will continue. The situation worsened in early June, when the Guyanese government decided to stop flights made by CONVIASA, Venezuela’s state-owned airline. Georgetown officially states that this is due to “the non-payment of bonds and landing fees to the government and the Cheddi Jagan International Airport.” However, it is impossible to deny the obvious coincidence that this drastic measure comes shortly after Venezuela’s claim over Guyanese waters. In retaliation, Caracas called in the Venezuelan ambassador to Guyana in early July and also announced that it will not renew a rice trade agreement with Guyana, which is set to expire in November.

Analysis

At the time of this writing, the possibility of inter-state warfare between Venezuela and Guyana thankfully remains extremely low. The two countries have never gone to war over the territory in dispute, but the aforementioned incidents that occurred in the past decades are problematic since they deteriorate bi-national relations—i.e. the cancellation of CONVIASA’s flights, which left dozens of people, including Venezuelan citizens, stranded in Georgetown. Moreover, in a worst-case scenario, a small incident like a seized vessel could be the trigger that transforms it into a greater conflict if tensions are not properly managed.

One aspect worth stressing is that the 2007 dredges incident brought Guyana onto the U.S. radar. At the time, relations between the U.S. and Venezuela, then led by Presidents George W. Bush and the late Hugo Chávez respectively, were continuing to deteriorate. Caracas had accused Washington of being behind a short-lived coup that briefly removed Chávez from power in April 2002. Meanwhile, Washington was concerned about a Caracas-Moscow alliance, as the Russian government had begun to sell high-tech weapons to the South American state. Thus, Washington saw this incident as a valid reason to have a stronger presence on Venezuela’s eastern flank. For example, military cooperation between the U.S and Guyana increased: The “USS Kearsarge,” a multipurpose amphibious assault ship, made a port call in 2008. Officially, the Pentagon said that this was a humanitarian mission, but at the time IPS News explained how the assumption in Guyana was that the naval visit was “designed to send a tacit political and military signal to neighbouring Venezuela,” particularly as “U.S. military helicopters are flying around communities as close as 16 kilometers from the Venezuelan border.” It makes sense to believe that Washington was capitalizing on Georgetown’s security concerns with its neighbors in order to monitor Venezuela.

Let us look at Venezuela’s geopolitical situation in another way: the country borders three nations, and it has been at odds with two of them in the past decade. Apart from Guyana, Venezuela also has a territorial dispute with neighboring Colombia. Even more, Bogota and Caracas had tense relations during the rule of President Alvaro Uribe and the late President Chavez (respectively) – to the point that in 2008 the two countries almost went to war. Nowadays, relations are much better but Venezuela is still concerned about the fact that Washington remains a steadfast Washington ally. As for Brazil and Venezuela, the two countries have maintained cordial relations and there have not been any security incidents. Finally, Caracas has declared that U.S. aircraft flying from the Forward Operating Location base in Curacao (a Caribbean overseas territory of The Netherlands, just north of Venezuela) were surveillance planes spying on Venezuela.

In other words, Guyana-Venezuela tensions have to be placed in the proper context of Venezuela’s complex relationship with its neighbors, a development that Washington has capitalized on. From Venezuela’s point of view, Washington can be regarded as trying to encroach on the South American state by increasing security ties with its neighbors.

As for the current tensions between Caracas and Georgetown, they come at a time of renewed strained relations between Caracas and Washington. In March, President Barack Obama announced that Venezuela is now considered a “national security threat,” a declaration that brought about economic sanctions on various Venezuelan government officials. At the time of this writing, both sides have been attempting to improve their tense relations, which date back to the Chávez years, as bilateral negotiations recently took place in Haiti. Nevertheless, no major announcement has come out of these talks. Moreover, while there have not been any new U.S. naval deployments to the region, a Guyanese vessel did participate in Tradewinds 2015 (naval exercises organized by the U.S. Southern Command and Caribbean nations).

It is also important to note that Guyana has been rallying its allies in the Caribbean and beyond to support its claims. So far, the Guyanese government has been successful, as in March when the other members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a 15-nation bloc of Caribbean states, declared that the organization “reiterates its firm, long-standing and continued support for the maintenance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Guyana.” The move was probably a blow to Caracas, as most CARICOM members, Guyana included, are members of PETROCARIBE, an alliance whose members purchase oil from Venezuela at reduced costs. These small Caribbean states are very dependent on cheap Venezuelan oil in order to maintain their economies and fulfill their energy needs; however, the latest Venezuela-Guyana incident highlights that they will rally to protect one of their fellow members against an external security threat.

Comparing Naval Forces

Given that the most recent incident has to do with offshore oil discoveries, I will briefly address the naval force of both countries. Guyana is a small nation whose military is called the Guyana Defense Force, and its naval branch is the Guyana Defense Force Coast Guard (GDFCG). While the GDFCG has limited resources at its disposal, it has been upgraded in recent years. In 2014 Guyana received back the flagship “GDFS Essequibo”, which had been sent to Brazil for repairs. The “Essequibo” is a remodeled British River-class minesweeper that Guyana acquired in 2001. As for recent acquisitions, the Guyanese obtained three speedboats in 2014, which were donated by the United States as part of Washington’s Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.

The Guyanese coast guard could hypothetically be a challenge to the Venezuelan Navy, but the latter country’s fleet has also been upgraded and expanded under the Chávez and Maduro regimes. For example, Venezuela has acquired Stan Patrol vessels for its coast guard as well as transport and multipurpose ships from Damen Shipyards Group. The Venezuelan Navy is also repairing its submarine fleet, as the submarine “Sabalo” is currently being upgraded by the DIANCA shipyard in Puerto Cabello.

Given this major disparity in military might, it would be next to impossible for Venezuela to not appear as the aggressor should a maritime conflict occur.

Why Countries Do Not Go To War

If anyone thought in 1899 that the agreement would solve the territorial dispute between Venezuela and the UK/Guyana, that person was grossly mistaken. While the dispute has thankfully remained non-violent, there have been a series of small incidents and diplomatic spats within the past decade. While the probability of either government committing itself to an armed conflict is very low, it would only take one small incident—i.e. a Venezuelan warship facing off with a Guyanese coast guard ship as the latter protects oil research vessels in the disputed territory—for the encounter to escalate.

This brings up the question of why both nations have not gone to war with each other over the disputed territory, particularly since Guyana gained independence from London in the 1960s and remains significantly weaker militarily when compared to Caracas. In a 2011 essay for Small Wars & Insurgencies, I discussed the lack of inter-state conflict in South America, including the Venezuela-Guyana dispute after the 2007 incident. In the analysis, I state that the last inter-state war in the region occurred in 1995 between Peru and Ecuador, while the last war that had a maritime theater of operations was between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Falklands/Malvinas in 1982. In other words, while there are plenty of territorial disputes in Latin America, actual inter-state warfare is scarce.

What explains the absence of war between Venezuela and Guyana, as there have been three incidents in less than a decade but no shots fired (though a couple of explosions over the dredges)? In spite of the territorial and maritime claims, the two countries have maintained good diplomatic relations as Guyana is a member of Venezuela’s PETROCARIBE initiative. It is nevertheless concerning that Venezuela has called in its ambassador to Guyana and cancelled negotiations over Guyanese rice as good trade relations are an important confidence building mechanism that serves to counterbalance security concerns. The deal will only expire in November, so there is a chance that Caracas is using the deal to temporarily punish Georgetown over the maritime dispute but will renew negotiations later. If this does not happen, it will force Guyana to look for other trading partners for its goods elsewhere, further creating a breach between the two governments and populations.

Moreover, the 2013 and 2015 incidents can be interpreted not as threats to Guyana but rather as methods that the Venezuelan government and Navy used to demonstrate that they maintain their claim to the territories in dispute, seeing this is part of Venezuelan national identity. The same can be said for the new presidential decree 1.859, which does mention specific coordinates for Venezuela’s maritime claims – this way the Venezuelan government does not appear aggressive as it is not implying that its naval forces can now enter Guyanese-controlled waters.

As to whether there was ever a time when Caracas was realistically willing to start an armed conflict with Guyana in the past decade, I would say no. I would argue, as previously noted, that these incidents occurred because the Venezuelan government, Navy, and Army wanted to show that they continue to see Guyanese territory as rightfully belonging to Caracas. Moreover, the quick support that Guyana received from its CARICOM allies, who are also PETROCARIBE clients and even ALBA members, signaled to Caracas that further aggressive initiatives would hurt its relations with its allies; hence, the latest conflict has been short-lived.

Finally, it is necessary to discuss how Venezuela perceives its geopolitical situation versus potential (or imaginary) adversaries. After all, Colombia remains a steadfast U.S. ally. Meanwhile Brazil maintains cordial relations (including security-related) with Venezuela, but the two are in competition with each other for regional influence. Hence, policymakers in Caracas may perceive closer Washington-Georgetown relations as the U.S. and its allies encroaching on Venezuela.

I cannot speculate whether anyone in the Venezuelan military or Ministry of Defense truly believes that Washington would come to Georgetown’s aid if it is attacked, but the fact that the U.S. military has increased its cooperation with Guyana, including training exercises, has certainly not gone unnoticed. Nevertheless, even with some U.S. defense support, Guyana remains a militarily weak state, and Venezuela would undoubtedly be regarded as the aggressor in any military conflict between the two. In a vastly interconnected world, Venezuela’s international reputation would be significantly damaged if it were viewed as an aggressor. Hence, the potential for international shaming can also serve as another deterrent to avoid conflict (a country like Russia may see little problem with gaining this “label,” but Venezuela is no global power).

Ultimately, the interception of the Teknik Perdana or the ongoing dispute after the Exxon discovery are ways for Venezuela to flex its diplomatic and military muscle, not just at Guyana (to demonstrate that it still claims the disputed territory) but also at Washington. Just this past March, President Maduro ordered new military exercises in order to demonstrate his country’s military might. This came at a time when Washington had declared Caracas a “national security threat.”

Guessing the Future

The possibility for an inter-state conflict between the two countries, even over oil, remains low. Nevertheless, what is problematic is the potential for a small incident to quickly evolve into a greater one. For example, should a Venezuelan vessel, let us say the patrol vessel “Guaiqueri” (PO-11), detain an Exxon research vessel, the Guyanese “GDFS Essequibo” could then be deployed to assist the Exxon vessel. As a result, a standoff could occur where, unless cool heads prevail, any action taken by one vessel could be perceived as an aggressive move by the other. This escalation is not unheard of in the region. In 2008, a Colombian military operation that was carried out against FARC insurgents in Ecuador (without Quito’s approval) increased to the point that Venezuela, then ruled by President Chávez, was on the verge of declaring war on Colombia in order to protect the sovereignty of Ecuador, its ally.

Thankfully, the current tensions over Exxon’s oil explorations appear to be dissipating, but it is just a matter of time before another incident occurs, particularly if Guyana is fully committed to exploiting its offshore oil and Venezuela continues to claim the area. I would argue that another round of maritime incidents will occur soon given the creation of the aforementioned “ZODIMAIN Atlantica.”

Warfare may not come to the Venezuela-Guyana border, but it is clear that inter-state disputes among Western Hemisphere states over territory and resources will not end anytime soon.

Wednesday, July 8, 2015

CAEI: Observatorio de Rusia No.12



Observatorio de Rusia No.12
Otono Sur 2015, Año V I
Marzo, Abril y Mayo 2015
Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales

Integracion Regional
Cronología y Fenomenología - Pág. 20-26
A pesar de Ucrania, la Política Exterior rusa avanza (lentamente) -  Pág. 26-29

Por: W. Alejandro Sanchez








Thursday, March 5, 2015

E-IR: US Coast Guard’s Western Hemisphere Strategy: An Analysis

"US Coast Guard's Western Hemisphere Strategy: An Analysis"
W. Alejandro Sanchez & Erica Illingworth
e-International RelationsMarch 5, 2015

On September 2014, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) published its Western Hemisphere Strategy (WHS), a document explaining the vision, objectives, priorities, and initiatives that the USCG plans to take in the immediate future, in order to protect the US and support regional partners in the Western Hemisphere, notably in the Greater Caribbean. The WHS is an important document that requires in-depth research, since the USCG is greatly involved in the day-to-day counter-narcotic operations taking place in the Greater Caribbean. In this analysis, we aim to discuss the Western Hemisphere Strategy, primarily focusing on the USCG’s current and future security-related operations. 
Security Operations
One factor which aids the increased USCG involvement in the Greater Caribbean is that regional nations generally have cordial relations with the US (Cuba and Venezuela are two notable exceptions). Moreover, Caribbean governments and security forces are also carrying out security-strategies of their own to combat illicit drug trade and actually desire Washington’s support to combat transnational crime. Hence a more comprehensive, joint-multinational approach is welcomed.
Nevertheless, in spite of more robust security initiatives, including the controversial Mano Dura initiatives in various Central American countries, drug trafficking continues to expand, and the Greater Caribbean constitutes a series of corridors through which drugs from South America travel to the US and Mexico. The term Mano Dura (loosely translated to “iron fist”) refers to   policies aimed at broadening police powers, utilizing the military for internal security operations, and instituting longer prison sentences to target individuals and organizations involved in the drug trade. Critics of Mano Dura initiatives argue that its aggressive targeting, in the name of citizen security, leads to human rights abuses by the police and military. It now takes the effort of international actors working together to battle the highly-profitable drug trade. According to the Coast Guard Compass, drug trafficking is an astonishing multi-billion dollar industry, which destabilizes countries in the Western Hemisphere; undermining the rule of law, and bringing violence to local communities.
It is in this scenario that the WHS comes to life as it delineates the service’s goals for the near future. Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, Commandant of the USCG, explains that the strategy for the Coast Guard in the Western Hemisphere is comprised of three main points: combatting networks, securing borders, and safeguarding commerce. Each point is its own separate issue, but each is interconnected in how the U.S. Coast Guard will tackle transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). The WHS correctly states that “these challenges are converging as [TCOs] strengthen. If left unchecked, they could fuel a cycle of compounding loss that threatens economic growth and regional stability.”
Throughout its 60 pages, the report highlights the importance of the Greater Caribbean to U.S. homeland security. For example the WHS explains that “from 2009 to 2010, the National Drug Intelligence Center reported that cocaine along maritime routes between Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands tripled, and officials have estimated 75 percent of the homicides in Puerto Rico are drug and weapons trade related.” These statistics highlight how special attention needs to be taken in the Greater Caribbean waters to combat the drug trade.
Allies: Regional and Others
In a speech given at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in mid-January 2015, Admiral Zukunft stressed the importance of international cooperation. Similarly the WHS highlights the importance of the U.S. Coast Guard cooperating not only with other US security agencies, but also with Washington’s partners in the Greater Caribbean, as well as extra-hemispheric nations operating in the region.
Case in point is the United Kingdom, the other half of the “special relationship,” which continues to maintain overseas territories in the Caribbean and has close ties with members of the Commonwealth (e.g. Belize and Jamaica). Despite significant defense-related budget cuts, the United Kingdom has arguably maintained a strong presence in the Caribbean in recent years. In July 2014, two British Type 23 frigates, the HMS Argyll and HMS Portland, made port calls to Puerto Rico. The Royal Navy is actively working with the U.S. Coast Guard to combat the TCOs and when tensions arise in the Caribbean, British presence helps maintain stability by reassuring the powers involved.
The combined efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard and the British Royal Navy in the Caribbean have already proved effective. One recent example took place on January 22, 2015, when the Royal Navy seized a 1.25 ton cargo of cocaine, which held a wholesale value of over £60 million pounds. Additionally, successful teamwork between the USCG and the Royal Navy was demonstrated, when the British naval support ship, RFA Wave Knight, and a USCG patrol aircraft forced a speedboat to stop south of theDominican Republic. The drug traffickers were handed over to the U.S. authorities off the coast of Puerto Rico. These two examples illustrate why the USCG must continue to take advantage of the assets its allies are providing in order to crackdown on drug-trafficking.
Since transnational crime inherently occurs across borders, multinational cooperation is key to addressing such security concerns, particularly one as complex as drug trafficking. Given this premise, and given the fact that the Greater Caribbean security forces generally remain in less than optimal conditions to crack down on drug trafficking off their coasts (which will be discussed later), the USCG should continue seeking cooperation with friendly extra-hemispheric actors, such as the Royal Navy. Fortunately, Admiral Zukunft recognizes this, and made a point to stress the need for cooperation in hisspeech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
The US is also working with forces within the Western Hemisphere, such as the Colombian Navy. According to the U.S. Defense Department, from January to June 2007, an estimated 70 percent of the cocaine in Colombia was smuggled out of the country by way of maritime segues. The drugs leave Colombia via go-fast vessels, fishing boats, the infamous narco-subs, and other forms of maritime transport. The U.S. Coast Guard has framed its strategy around supporting the Colombian Navy in improving its capacity to stop drug traffickers from using Colombia’s Caribbean and Pacific coasts for drug transportation. Given the history of strong US-Colombian security relations, it is no surprise that the Colombian Navy has constantly turned to the U.S. Coast Guard as an important ally. Moreover, the Colombian Navy is doing its part to promote Caribbean security. In December 2014, it carried out the 12th “International Course on Coast Guards,” in Cartagena de Indias. The course brought together naval officers from 18 countries, to learn about maritime interdictions, search and rescue operations and regional problems, such as drug and human trafficking. The naval personnel who attended the course came from Greater Caribbean nations like the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Panama.
The Caribbean island-states, while addressing major security challenges with smaller budgets, have also carried out other security-related initiatives. Most notably is the case of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, which inaugurated a new coast guard base in Canouan. The base was constructed with a $2 million USD financial contribution from the US government as part of the Secure Seas program(Washington also donated two inflatable boats and a pick-up vehicle).Meanwhile, Trinidad and Tobago is interested in acquiring two long range patrol vessels (likely from Spain) to support its coast guard, given ongoing problems with several of its current patrol boats.
The advantage that Washington and the U.S. Coast Guard have now is that regional nations also want to crackdown on transnational crimes. Applying this to the WHS, the authors of this research article disagree with its paradoxical statement, which argues:
Despite globalization of world economies, many regional countries are growing more politically independent and no longer rely as much on their North American partners for assistance in addressing domestic challenges. As these governments become more distant, they are cultivating non-traditional allies. Russia and China are beginning to see progress in their efforts to engage Western Hemispherenations.
Certainly several Greater Caribbean nations are looking to Moscow and Beijing for alliances and support, including arms sales (i.e. Venezuela), but this does not necessarily mean that these nations are interested in detaching themselves from US aid. For example, while Trinidad and Tobago may purchase Chinese patrol vessels for its coast guard, it is also a member of the Caribbean Border Security Initiative, which the US launched in 2009 to combat drug-related violence, trafficking, and terrorism in the region. Hence, acquiring Chinese (or Russian) security equipment does not necessarily signify that Greater Caribbean nations intend to sever their ties with the US. In other words, as the Greater Caribbean nations seek to tackle security challenges such as the drug trade, Washington is poised to remain involved as a prominent strategic partner.
Inter-Agency Cooperation
In his aforementioned speech at CSIS, the Coast Guard’s Admiral Zukunft also stressed the importance of task forces. In the strategy, he plans for the U.S. Coast Guard to continue to collaborate and team with the U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command “to increase awareness of threats, build competencies of partner nations by maintaining and expanding international training and exercise programs, and synergize strategies and operations for identifying and interdicting threats through established task forces.” These task forces include the Joint Task Force East, which deals with border security, and Joint Task Force West, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security. The WHS also stresses the importance of continuing to be a leading “partner of joint and interagency operations commands such as Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South,” which is a multi-national operation targeting the illicit trafficking routes in the Caribbean.
Another task force with notable importance is the Joint Task Force-Bravo, which operates out of Soto Cano, a US military base located in Honduras, a Central American state known for internal insecurity, violence, and high levels of drug trafficking. US security agencies, including the task forces, are operating major security initiatives, such as Operation MARTILLO–a US, European, Central American, South American and Caribbean effort that targets illicit narcotic trafficking routes in the coastal waters of the Caribbean. The US is heavily involved in the multinational detection, monitoring, and interdiction operations. It has also contributed various US Navy and Coast Guard vessels, an aircraft from US federal law enforcement agencies, and military and law enforcement units. Combined with other Caribbean and European security units and law enforcement officers, this multinational operation aims to deny TCOs the ability to exploit transnational shipment routes in Central American and Caribbean waters for the movement of narcotics.
The cooperative strategy between the US and its anti-drug trade allies is important to the counter narcotics operations as well. For example, the relationship between the Colombian Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard, dating back to 1997 with the signing of the Bilateral Maritime Agreement, has been very important to counter narcotics operations. Between 1997 and 2005, 435 metric tons of cocaine were seized in the Caribbean. Sixty-three percent of these seizures were the results of combined operations between the Colombian Navy and the Coast Guard.
Other countries, especially those suffering from the effects of the illicit drug trade, seek the help of the US. Hence, one positive geopolitical factor that the USCG has on its side is that, unlike other regions of the world where the US is struggling to make alliances, in the Greater Caribbean, most nations desire greater US support and there are already well established US security facilities, not to mention the geographical proximity to the US itself. Contrary to other regions in the world where governments can be labeled as unreliable (e.g. Central Asia and Africa), Greater Caribbean governments, with few exceptions, have been actively engaged in cooperating with the US to combat the illicit drug trade. In addition, most of these states participate in various programs and initiatives like the TRADEWINDS program and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, which will be discussed in the following section. Despite their capabilities, having allies that want to cooperate with the USCG and other US security agencies is a strong pillar from which beneficial multinational operations can sprout.
Agreements and Cooperation
The WHS focuses on how the Coast Guard can aid US partners in the Caribbean through various programs– one prominent example is TRADEWINDS, which includes classroom and at-sea training, practice drills, and scenario-based exercises to increase TCO network interdiction and coordination between partner nations. Another program that the US has spearheaded is the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. This initiative ensures that newly acquired assets and capabilities are used optimally by applicable partner nations, which will guarantee maximum execution of combating the illicit narcotics networks in the Caribbean waters.
The annual TRADEWINDS program involves most Caribbean states in exercises that strengthen their capabilities. This operation focuses on the development of basic military skills, as well as improving their responses to natural disasters, illegal migration, and narcotics trafficking. It also allows the US to build stronger relationships in the Western Hemisphere, though one concern is that such initiatives will make Washington’s partners rely too much on the US, and the Coast Guard in particular, for vital support to combat TCOs. At a time when the US government continues to debate over its future security objectives, and the defense budget has shifting priorities, it is in Washington’s interest to not only support its Caribbean allies, but also train them so that they do not have to perpetually rely on the USCG.
The WHS also highlights the importance of the Department of Homeland Security’s international diplomatic aid and security initiatives, such as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Such initiatives represent the pillar of the US security strategy that focuses on citizen safety throughout the Western Hemisphere. The CBSI brings together all members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Dominican Republic, to jointly collaborate on regional security with the United States as a partner. According to the State Department, the US has provided $263 million USD to the CBSI since 2010. Nevertheless, the CBSI initiative has also been critiqued because it allows for US security agencies to get more involved in Caribbean affairs, disrespecting the sovereignty of the smaller, weaker island-states. In other words, in strengthening USCG ties with its Caribbean partners, the Coast Guard must walk a fine line to not be regarded as undermining the sovereignty of these governments, as it will invoke recent experiences of the US doing so throughout the Cold War in the name of its national interests (i.e. the US military operations in the Dominican Republic in 1965 or Grenada in 1983).
Finally, in his speech at CSIS, Admiral Zukunft expressed the importance of bilateral agreements to combat TCOs. These bilateral agreements will strengthen the U.S. Coast Guard’s interdiction capabilities by obtaining legal and diplomatic approval that will allow authorities to board vessels suspected of illicit TCO network activities. The expansion of bilateral agreements will give the U.S. Coast Guard more jurisdiction in the Caribbean and Latin American waters, allowing them to do more preventative action in the “War on Drugs.”
Conclusions
The 2014 Western Hemisphere Strategy is an important document for the U.S. Coast Guard as it lays out the priorities for this security agency in coming years, most notably addressing drug trafficking within the Greater Caribbean. The WHS explains that the Caribbean should not be viewed as small, since it is an “incredibly diverse and expansive region includ[ing] more than 1,200 islands governed by more than 25 nations.” Thus, the challenge that persists is not merely harmonizing the security interests and priorities of over two dozen nations, but also in monitoring a large geographic area consisting of over a thousand islands. Additionally, the WHS correctly notes future developments that will affect the Greater Caribbean. For example, the expansion of the Panama Canal will change shipping routes for the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, while most of the analysis and recommendations found in the WHS is relevant and realistic, the report does fall short on some issues. For example, it does not fully discuss, or praise, the role of extra-hemispheric powers whose navies are active in combatting drug traffickers in the Caribbean. The truth is that the US is not alone in countering the illicit drug trade; the Royal Navy, for example, significantly invests in helping to counter the TCOs in the region by deploying several of its warships to Caribbean waters (with positive results). Moreover, the report also tends to mostly praise USCG accomplishments within the region without giving a brief “tip of the hat” to Caribbean nations which are doing what they can to increase their coast guard services and promote regional security, such as island states acquiring new equipment to monitor their maritime territory.
Growing relations between the region and countries like China and Russia are understandably portrayed under a prism of potential problems (especially given Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine). However, the report could acknowledge that this development is natural, as Greater Caribbean nations look to diversify their relationships beyond the U.S. to secure “good deals” on weapons purchases. While it may be troubling that Trinidad and Tobago aim to purchase patrol vessels from China, if said vessels are effectively cracking down on narco-submarines and narco-speedboats aiming to bring drugs into the US, then such a relationship may have its benefits. Moreover, most Greater Caribbean nations maintain strong security relations with the US, best exemplified by their participation in the CBSI, TRADEWINDS exercises and Operation MARTILLO.
It is a worrisome development that TCOs have developed, expanded, and are now present in various, if not all, Latin American and Caribbean states. But thankfully the region, along with extra-hemispheric partners, is coming together to combat these common security threats.
Given Washington’s history with Latin America, and the Greater Caribbean in particular, it is understandable that there is a certain degree of skepticism towards US military initiatives in the region. Nevertheless, as Admiral Zukunft puts it, “It takes a network to defeat a network.” Via its Western Hemisphere Strategy, the U.S. Coast Guard seems interested in being the tip of the spear regarding positive and constructive U.S. security activities in the Greater Caribbean’s future.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of any organizations or entities that they are affiliated with.

Sunday, March 1, 2015

CAEI: Observatorio de Rusia No. 10


Observatorio de Rusia No.10
Primavera Sur 2014, Año V 
Septiembre, Octubre y Noviembre 2014
Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales

Integracion Regional
Cronología y Fenomenología - Pág. 13-19
Ucrania Acapara Las Portadas   -  Pág. 20-23

Por: W. Alejandro Sanchez

Observatorio disponible: http://www.caei.com.ar/observatorio/observatorio-de-Rusia




Wednesday, October 8, 2014

Reporte: Rusia - Integracion Regional - CAEI Observatorio de Rusia No. 9






Observatorio de Rusia No.9
Invierno Sur 2014, Año V 
Junio, Julio y Agosto 2014
Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales

Integracion Regional
Cronología y Fenomenología - Pág. 22
Ucrania Acapara Las Portadas   -  Pág.27

Por: W. Alejandro Sanchez





Observatorio disponible: http://www.caei.com.ar/observatorio/observatorio-de-Rusia

 Versión PDF: http://www.caei.com.ar/sites/default/files/observatorio_rusia_septiembre_2014_1_.pdf

Sunday, July 6, 2014

Reporte: Rusia - Integracion Regional - CAEI Observatorio de Rusia No. 8




Observatorio de Rusia No.8
Otono Sur 2014, Año V 
Marzo, Abril y Mayo 014
Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales

Integracion Regional
Cronología & Fenomenología - Pág. 23
Resignificación y Sentido: Moscu Afianza su Influencia -  Pág.28

Por: W. Alejandro Sanchez



Observatorio disponible: http://www.caei.com.ar/observatorio/observatorio-de-Rusia

 Versión PDF: http://www.caei.com.ar/sites/default/files/observatorio_rusia_junio_2014.pdf

Sunday, April 6, 2014

Reporte: Rusia - Integracion Regional - CAEI Observatorio de Rusia No. 7




Observatorio de Rusia No.7
Verano Sur 2013, Año V 
Diciembre 2013 Enero y Febrero 2014
Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales

Integracion Regional
Cronología & Fenomenología - Pág. 18
Resignificación y Sentido: Moscu Afianza su Influencia -  Pág.22

Por, W. Alejandro Sanchez








Observatorio disponible: http://www.caei.com.ar/observatorio/observatorio-de-Rusia

 Versión PDF: http://www.caei.com.ar/sites/default/files/rusia_7.pdf