CIMSEC: "Increase Collaboration with South America to Protect U.S. Antarctic Interests"

 

 

"Increase Collaboration with South America to Protect U.S. Antarctic Interests"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez and William Muntean

25 November 2025 

Published: https://cimsec.org/increase-collaboration-with-south-america-to-protect-u-s-antarctic-interests/

 

The United States has significant national interests in Antarctica, but it currently lacks the maritime capacity to secure them. The United States sent more commercial vessels (42) and citizens (over 50,000) to the Southern Ocean than any other country during the 2023/2024 season. The United States, unlike many other nations, can also conduct unannounced inspections of stations and equipment in the region. However, the U.S. government is reducing its icebreaker capacity in the region by removing two vessels from service, continuing to rely on one heavy icebreaker that is beyond its expected service life. As of this writing, the United States has yet to take concrete steps to design and build appropriate vessels to ensure continued access in the region.

 

While Washington has acted to eventually address icebreaker shortcomings in the Arctic, it has not taken similar steps to protect its Antarctic interests. Therefore, as it starts the lengthy process of planning and building Polar Security Cutters for Antarctic operations, the United States should increase its collaboration with South American countries. Doing so will strengthen already-positive relations with key South American countries, protect American citizens and economic interests, and help the United States leverage Antarctic Treaty provisions to maintain peace in the region amid growing geopolitical interests. 

 

 

Book Chapters in: “Maritime Strategy and Security Challenges in South America”

 

Maritime Strategy and Security Challenges in South America

 Henrik Shilling and Anne Runhaar (Eds)

ISPK Seapower Series

Vol. 6, First Edition, 2025

Nomos, Baden-Baden  

Chapter: "Maritime Strategy and Security Challenges in South America" p. 23-42

Chapter: "IUU Fishing and South American Navies" p. 159-172

https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/en/document/view/detail/uuid/a0885c17-cad1-3152-9408-7bd601824bd2 

 

 

Breaking Defense: "With Argentina’s new leader likely comes an ‘austere’ defense budget: Analysts "

 

"With Argentina’s new leader likely comes an ‘austere’ defense budget: Analysts"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Breaking Defense

15 December, 2023

Originally published: https://breakingdefense.com/2023/12/with-argentinas-new-leader-likely-comes-an-austere-defense-budget-analysts/

New President Javier Milei’s top priority is fixing the economy, which could put the brakes on some, but likely not all, planned defense programs, analysts told Breaking Defense.

 WASHINGTON — As Argentina’s new president embarks on an ambitious plan to shore up the South American nation’s economy, analysts say the country’s defense budget is likely to be an early casualty of tightening belts.

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Geopolitical Monitor: Argentina: In the Eye of the Lithium Storm

 

"Argentina: In the Eye of the Lithium Storm"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Situation Report

Geopolitical Monitor

24 April, 2023

Originally published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/argentina-in-the-eye-of-the-lithium-storm/

Journal: A roadmap to make Peru a regional power in Latin America

 

 "A roadmap to make Peru a regional power in Latin America"

 "Una hoja de ruta para transformar a Perú en una potencia de Latinoamérica"

 Wilder Alejandro Sánchez

Cuadernos Iberoamericanos

Vol.9, No. 4 (2021

Publicado: https://www.iberpapers.org/jour?locale=en_US

Providence: How Can the US Help Taiwan in the Western Hemisphere?

"How Can the US Help Taiwan in the Western Hemisphere?"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Providence
October 22, 2019
Originally Published: https://providencemag.com/2019/10/how-can-us-help-taiwan-western-hemisphere/

The government of the Solomon Islands has decided to switch its diplomatic relations from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This announcement occurred almost parallel to the US government’s decision to provide a major package of military technology, namely “66 F-16C/D Block 70 aircraft and related equipment and support for an estimated cost of $8 billion,” to the Asian nation.

Thus, while Washington continues to support Taipei, it has been unable to prevent some governments from establishing relations with Beijing. Many of the nations that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan are located in Latin America and the Caribbean, two regions where the US has plenty of allies and partners; hence, as we discuss Taipei’s future in the Western Hemisphere, we must discuss what Washington can (realistically) do to help its ally.

 

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Providence: South America’s Protests: Why Blame Yourself When You Can Blame Someone Else?

"South America’s Protests: Why Blame Yourself When You Can Blame Someone Else?"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Providence
November 20, 2019
Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2019/11/south-americas-protests-why-blame-yourself-when-you-can-blame-someone-else/

Three South American countries—Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador—have experienced massive protests in the past couple of months. Discontent against the powers-that-be originated for different reasons, including anger over subsidy cuts, costlier living expenses, disrespect for indigenous rights, and one head of state’s attempt to remain in power.

In all three countries, their respective governments have blamed external actors for the violence. While a case can be made for this possibility, blaming “others” is also a sign that these presidents (or the former president, in the case of Bolivia) did not want to admit their own faults and shortcomings.

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Providence: Guyana Matters to China, So It Should Matter to the US

"Guyana Matters to China, So It Should Matter to the US"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Providence
November 18, 2019
Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2019/11/guyana-china-us/

 During President David Granger’s salute to the People Republic of China’s (PRC) seventieth anniversary, the Guyanese leader labeled Beijing as a “reliable partner.” Indeed, the small Caribbean state and the Asian giant have a long history since bilateral relations were established in June 1972, a history that is centered on Beijing’s interest in Guyana’s natural resources and geographic location. 

The attention of the international media will (temporarily) focus on Guyana as President Granger has finally announced general elections for March 2, 2020, following domestic and international pressure after he lost a no-confidence vote in 2018. The upcoming elections, Beijing-Georgetown relations, and Venezuela’s own claims to Guyanese territory should make Guyana a bigger priority for Washington.

  

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Providence: As China Increases its Presence in the Western Hemisphere, Where is US Leadership?

"As China Increases its Presence in the Western Hemisphere, Where is US Leadership?"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Providence
September 24, 2019

Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2019/09/china-western-us-leadership/

General Wei Fenghe, minister of defense of the People’s Republic of China, met with his Brazilian counterpart on September 6, less than two months after the Asian nation’s minister of foreign affairs, Wang Yi, also visited the country. These high-level meetings occur parallel to other major investment agreements, like a port in Peru that will be constructed by a Chinese company.


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W. Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere

Diplomatic Courier: Befriending States That Don’t Exist: The Leaders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Visit Venezuela

"Befriending States That Don’t Exist: The Leaders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Visit Venezuela"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Diplomatic Courier
22 January, 2019
Originally published: https://www.diplomaticourier.com/2019/01/22/befriending-states-that-dont-exist-the-leaders-of-south-ossetia-and-abkhazia-visit-venezuela/ 

On January 10, President Nicolas Maduro commenced another term as leader of Venezuela, a controversial development as several governments across the Western Hemisphere and beyond refuse to recognize the May 20, 2018 elections. Hence, Maduro’s inauguration ceremony included the presence of delegations from Venezuela’s few remaining allies in the world. Two individuals whose appearance in Caracas is worth noting are Anatoly Bibilov and Raul Khajimba, de facto presidents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, respectively—two breakaway regions in Georgia.

Even though South Ossetia and Abkhazia proclaimed their independence after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, only five governments recognize them as independent states: the Russian Federation, the Republic of Nicaragua, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the Republic of Nauru and the Syrian Arab Republic. Syria became only the fifth state to do so in May 2018, “in a gesture of thanks to its largest patron of late, Russia. Georgia responded by severing diplomatic relations with Syria,” Eurasia.net explains. A May 2018 article published by TASS, a Russian news agency, also mentions that Tuvalu and Vanuatu recognized the independence of the two regions in 2011, but these declarations were subsequently withdrawn.

Interestingly, the Venezuelan government has not provided much information about the visits of the two leaders to the South American country. A January 10 photo posted on President Maduro’s Twitter account shows the South Ossetian and Abkhazian leaders next to the few other heads of states that were present during the inauguration ceremony. Moreover, a brief press release by the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated January 11, mentions a meeting between Mr. Bibilov and Venezuelan Vice-President Delcy Rodríguez, but it simply states that the two sides “evaluated cooperation agreements.” The same was reported in a separate press release about a meeting between Vice-President Rodríguez and Mr. Dzhumkovich.

Unsurprisingly, the Latin American media covered these visits with curiosity. For example, Colombia’s El Tiempo’s headline was “South Ossetia, the non-recognized country that supports Venezuela.”

It is difficult to believe that Venezuela would have recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia if Russia was not a link between them. The decision by the Venezuelan government to do so in 2009 was influenced by then-President Hugo Chávez’ intention to strengthen relations with Moscow—anecdotally, the announcement that Caracas was going to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia occurred when Mr. Chavez visited the Russian capital. Nevertheless, since that declaration, there has been little, if any, contact between these governments other than a 2010 visit by then-Presidents Sergei Bagapsh and Eduard Kokoity, of Abkhazia and South Ossetia respectively, to Caracas and Managua. Trade between Venezuela and the two separatist regions appears to be non-existent.

It is unlikely that other governments from the Western Hemisphere will recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia. There might have been a slight chance of that occurring a decade ago, when President Chavez was still around and there were several Chávez-friendly leaders in the region, such as Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Lula da Silva in Brazil or Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina. However, in 2019 the region, including the three aforementioned nations, is populated by generally Washington-friendly leaders, which makes the recognition of pro-Moscow separatist regions unthinkable.

Recognition is an important part of a country’s diplomatic toolkit. One obvious example is the Republic of China/Taiwan, which has lost a plethora of allies in recent years, including the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama, as the governments decide to establish relations with the People’s Republic of China in order to benefit from access to the Chinese market and financial aid from the Asian giant.

In the case of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, neither Nicaragua nor Venezuela benefit directly from having relations with the tiny breakaway regions (South Ossetia’s population is around 50 thousand), but rather the objective is to cement relations with Moscow. Interestingly, in spite of recognition by Caracas, Managua, and most recently by Damascus (which has received substantial Russian support during its ongoing war), other close Russian allies like Belarus have not recognized the separatist states.

The support from South Ossetia and Abkhazia for the Maduro regime is symbolic at best, and this is essentially the most Venezuela can hope for from the international community in general. The limited number of heads of state and delegations that traveled to Caracas for the January ceremony highlights Venezuela’s dire situation in the diplomatic world nowadays.

About the author: Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Citado en: Bases militares: la carrera de las superpotencias por Sudamérica

"Bases militares: la carrera de las superpotencias por Sudamérica"
Por: Irene Ayuso Morillo
Publimetro - Chile
7 de Enero, 2019
Publicado Originalmente en:  https://www.publimetro.cl/cl/noticias/2019/01/07/bases-militares-rusia-eeuu-china-se-disputan-sudamerica.html

Tanto China como Rusia quieren expandir su presencia en Latinoamérica y el Caribe via temas de seguridad y defensa, lo que ha creado recelos por parte de EEUU 

El pasado viernes el presidente brasileño Jair Bolsonaro dijo estar abierto a albergar una base militar de Estados Unidos para contrarrestar la influencia de Rusia en la región. En diciembre, Rusia y Venezuela efectuaron una misión conjunta de adiestramiento en suelo venezolano que fue criticada por el secretario norteamericano de Estado, Mike Pompeo.

“La cuestión física puede ser hasta simbólica. Hoy en día, el poderío de las fuerzas armadas norteamericanas, chinas, rusas, alcanza el mundo todo independientemente de la base”, indicó y aseguró que de hecho Estados Unidos tiene intereses de esa naturaleza en “varios países suramericanos”.

Esto responde a la preocupación en los últimos meses por parte de EEUU ante la creciente influencia en el hemisferio sur de países como Rusia y China.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, analista de seguridad y geopolítica, asegura que "Rusia y China están intentando expandir su influencia en América Latina y el Caribe, en el caso de Moscú, están intentado obtener de nuevo la presencia que tenía en estas regiones durante la época de la Unión Soviética".

-Base militar en Brasil

Los americanos le han pedido al presidente Bolsonaro tener una mayor presencia en la zona del norte de Brasil, pero por el momento dijo que podría discutir el tema "en un futuro", lo mismo que declaró en su momento el presidente argentino Mauricio Macri cuando le pidieron entre 2015 y 2016, instalar en el mediano plazo 3 bases amerianas en el país, dos en el sur y una en el norte, en Misiones, según sostiene Witker.

Desde el punto de vista histórico,  esto no es ninguna novedad: las fuerzas militares de Estados Unidos y Brasil mantuvieron la colaboración de 1941 a 1945, asociación que incluyó una base aérea cerca de Natal. El entonces presidente de Estados Unidos, Franklin Roosevelt, describió a Natal —el punto más próximo del continente americano a África— como el “Trampolín hacia la Victoria” en la Segunda Guerra Mundial porque permitía el envío de suministros a las fuerzas aliadas en África. Durante parte de la guerra, la localidad costera brasileña contaba con uno de los aeropuertos de mayor

-Base militar rusa en Venezuela 

Medios rusos señalaron recientemente que ocuparían una base aérea en una isla de La Orchila como parte de una incursión militar a largo plazo en Venezuela.

"En el caso de Rusia, se conoce muy bien las exorbirtantes venta de armas a Venezuela durante la época del ex presidente Hugo Chávez, la venta de tanques y blindados a Nicaragua, la venta de helicópteros a Perú. Además ,Rusia ya ha enviado una pequeña flota naval a Venezuela en el 2009, la primera vez que esto ocurre desde el final de la Guerra Fría. El gobierno nicaraguense por su lado , ha ceptado que tropas rusas entren regularmente al país para llevar a cabo actividades de entrenamiento con las furzas armadas de Nicaragua", evalúa Sanchez.

-El paradigma chino en la Patagonia argentina

En los últimos años, China ha mostrado un mayor interés por Latinoamérica.  "El gigante asiático está intentando vender armamento a América Latina, sin mucho éxito, pero han habido donaciones de equipo no-letal, como vehículos a Argentina y las Bahamas.  Además, China está intentado establecer y cimentar relaciones amigable sentre las fuerzas armadas de su país con la de países de Latinoamérica y el Caribe", declara el también colaborador del  Cimsec (Centro para la Seguridad Marítima Internacional, Alejandor Sanchez.

A China le interesa tener acceso en materias primas y participar en grandes obras de infraestructuras,  y en ese  sentido tuvieron  un avance muy importante en Neuquén, en la localidad Bajada del Agrio,cerca del límite con Mendoza, donde se instaló una base de investigación espacial china.  Se trata de una antena gigante, creada por el ejército chino: pesa 450 toneladas y tiene un valor de 50 millones de dólares.

Muchos diarios americanos  están preocupados por la cualidad militar que tiene para los chinos: “la base solitaria es uno de los símbolos más impactantes de la estrategia que Pekín lleva implementando desde hace tiempo para transformar América Latina”, dice el diario New York Times. 

"Para los chinos es una base estrictamente militar, porque el proyecto espacial chino es militar, no civil. Se trata de una base de Observación del Espacio Lejano, pero está construída  y provisionada por el Ejército Popular de Liberación, es todo personal militar el que está ahí, y esa base no está bajo supervisión de nadie, ni siquiera del gobierno argentino", señala Witker.

El mayor cuestionamiento y la alarma que enciende el Times es respecto al presunto espionaje chino que se hace desde la Patagonia.

“Una antena gigante es como una enorme aspiradora”, comentó Dean Cheng, quien trabajó como investigador en el Congreso estadounidense y ahora estudia la política de seguridad nacional de China. “Succiona señales, información, todo tipo de cosas”.

La creciente influencia china no solo se evidencia sobre Argentina, sino sobre otras naciones de la región, en las que ha invertido en obra pública o a las que ha concedido préstamos a cambio de participaciones en reservas de hidrocarburos. Por ejemplo, en Bolivia también están muy metidos porque tienen un acuerdo bilateral,  por el cual  los bolivianos crearon la Agencia Boliviana del Espacio y hay un satélite, íntegro hecho y manejado por los chinos, señala Witker.

Asímismo Sanchez sostiene que "tanto China como Rusia, querien expandir su presencia en Latinoamérica y el Caribe via temas de seguridad y defensa, eso no signica que alguno de estos países vaya a establcer bases militares con tanques, aviones y sofisticados sistemas de armas. Más bien están intentando expandir su influencia via ventas de armas y entrenamentos con las fuerzas de defensa de nuestra región".

 

 

CIMSEC: Atlantico: Brazil’s New Carrier

"Atlantico: Brazil's New Carrier"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
The Southern Tide
Center for International Maritime Security
16 October, 2018
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/atlantico-brazils-new-carrier/38351

Written by W. Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” –Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114^th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.

By Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Brazil’s new helicopter carrier, PHM Atlantico (A 140), docked in Rio de Janeiro on 25 August 2018 after sailing across the Atlantic Ocean from Plymouth, United Kingdom, its former home. The vessel is the new pride and joy of the Brazilian Navy. However, apart from possessing an imposing appearance, how is this vessel useful to Brazil?

The New Ship
Atlantico was formerly known as HMS Ocean (L 12), an amphibious assault ship that belonged to the British Royal Navy. It was commissioned in 1998 and decommissioned earlier this year. The Brazilian government purchased it for 84 million British pounds. Among its characteristics the vessel displaces 21,000 tons, has a length of 203 meters, a max speed of 21 knots, and a range of up to 8,000 miles. According to the Brazilian Navy, the vessel is equipped with four 30mm DS30M Mk2 guns, two 1007 radars, one 1008 radar, and one Artisan 3D 997 radar. Atlantico transports a crew of 303 with only one female naval officer, Captain Márcia Freitas, chief of the vessel’s medical department. The ship can also transport as many as 800 marines. “It’s a new ship, in good condition. It can be operational for 20 to 30 years,” declared Brazilian Admiral Luiz Roberto Valicente to the Brazilian daily Estadao.

Atlantico can transport as many as 18 helicopters, but it is still unclear which type of aircraft the Brazilian Navy will deploy aboard its new vessel. On 5 September, the Brazilian aerospace company Helibras, a division of Airbus, tweeted a photo of H225M helicopters landing on the deck of Atlantico, hinting that these types of aircraft could be deployed on the new carrier. Additionally, the Estadao article declared that the carrier is compatible with all the models of helicopters currently operated by the Brazilian Navy.

It is worth noting that this is the third carrier that the Brazilian Navy has operated. Atlantico replaces the Clemencau-class carrier Sao Paulo (A 12), which was decommissioned in 2017. Previously, Brazil operated a Colossus-class aircraft carrier Minas Gerais (A 11), which was decommissioned in 2001.

Why Does Brazil Need a Carrier?
The standard explanation out of Brasilia for the purchase of the helicopter carrier is that it will help protect Brazil’s exclusive economic zone, which is rich with maritime resources such as fish and oil deposits. Moreover, in an interview with the Brazilian defense news website Defesanet, Capitan Giovani Corrêa, commander of Atlantico, explained that with the addition of the carrier, “the Navy will have a platform with dissuasive capabilities [which will help the] control of vast maritime areas…will help maintain security in the South Atlantic and…will protect Brazil at the international level.”

The statement about “dissuasive capabilities” raises the question of which nation could possibly attack Brazil in the first place. The country last fought an inter-state war when it deployed an expeditionary force to Europe to fight alongside the Allies during World War II. Even more, when it comes to conflicts with neighboring states, the last war that Brazil participated in was the Acre War (1899-1903) with Bolivia.

Additionally, it is important to mention that Latin American geopolitics are fairly stable these days (the situation in Venezuela notwithstanding), which means that the rest of the region does not view Brazil’s recent acquisition, or its similarly ambitious submarine and corvette programs, with concern. In other words, there have been no apparent moves by regional navies to upgrade their own defenses in response to the acquisition of Atlantico. Latin America is not experiencing an arms race these days and Brasilia’s relations with its neighbors are fairly cordial, which effectively rules out the hypothesis of a regional state attempting to obtain control of Brazilian waters by force.

Thus, apart from patrolling Brazil’s territorial waters looking for non-traditional threats (such as illegal fishing, drug trafficking, or piracy), what other duties will Atlantico perform? In the aforementioned interview, Captain Corrêa suggested the carrier could be used to support humanitarian operations and as a command and control center for a task force. This raises the hypothesis that the ship could be deployed to United Nations peacekeeping operations. One likely candidate is the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, which has a naval component, the Maritime Task Force. Brazil regularly deploys a vessel to this naval force – the current ship there is the frigate Liberal (F 43). Hence, Atlantico could similarly be deployed to the Mediterranean to serve as a command center, should the task force attempt to carry out a major operation there.   

Finally, and perhaps most importantly for Brasilia, Atlantico will give the Brazilian Navy true blue water capability. That was the main purpose of the previous carrier, Sao Paulo, but the vessel spent more time docked and undergoing repairs than at sea, so hopefully for Brazil, Atlantico will perform much better.

Final Thoughts
The acquisition of the helicopter carrier Atlantico, alongside the PROSUB submarine program and the Tamandare corvette program, are examples of the Brazilian Navy aiming to become a true blue water navy in the 21^st century. 
Domestically speaking, Brazil has little to fear about a conflict with a neighboring state, but Atlantico, should it perform better than its predecessor Sao Paulo, will be of great help to project the image of the marinha do Brasil well past the South Atlantic.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Diplomatic Courier: How Will the Demise of UNASUR Affect Latin American Integration?

"How Will the Demise of UNASUR Affect Latin American Integration?"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Diplomatic Courier: A Global Affairs Media Network
3 October 2018
Originally published: https://www.diplomaticourier.com/2018/10/03/how-will-the-demise-of-unasur-affect-latin-american-integration/

The government of Colombia has announced that it will withdraw from the Union of South American Nations (Union de Naciones Sudamericanas – UNASUR), an initiative that brings together all 12 South American states. This bloc has been adrift for years due to the lack of a Secretary General, while its members are at odds with each other regarding the crisis in Venezuela. If this is the end of UNASUR, what will South America lose? Very little.

A Short Obituary
UNASUR was founded in May 2008, a time during which South America experienced a rise of leaders with left-leaning ideologies: Argentina’s Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, Bolivia’s Evo Morales, Brazil’s Lula da Silva, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, and Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, among others. This common ideology prompted the creation of a new bloc in the Western Hemisphere to promote South American integration, though with no long-term goals and little structure other than the ideological views of its members. Even though some governments (namely Colombia) maintained close relations with the U.S. during UNASUR’s heyday in the early part of the decade, the group’s other objective was to distance the region from Washington’s historical influence over the Western Hemisphere.

It is worth noting that during this period other organizations appeared with similar objectives, such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Venezuela-led Alianza Bolivariana para las Americas (ALBA).

To be fair, the Quito-based UNASUR did carry out some interesting initiatives in its early years. For example, it established a South American Defence Council, which attempted to promote defense cooperation in the region—some idealists argued that this agency could become the regional version of NATO. Additionally, the bloc supported President Evo Morales when Bolivia suffered major protests in 2008, and a coup d’etat was a real possibility.

Nevertheless, UNASUR was a creature of its time, and recent elections have brought more Washington-friendly leaders, like for example Mauricio Macri in Argentina. As a consequence, regional interest in UNASUR dramatically decreased. The most obvious example is that this organization has not had a Secretary General since January 2017, when former Colombian President Ernesto Samper finished his term—the current president pro-tempore is Bolivian President Evo Morales. Additionally, the political and socio-economic crisis in Venezuela has prompted a regional diplomatic crisis, with Venezuela and its ally Bolivia against the rest of South America.

It comes as no surprise that in late August, Colombia’s new president Ivan Duque announced that his country will leave UNASUR within six months; he argued that the bloc’s silence on the Venezuela issue is de facto supporting the Nicolas Maduro regime. Similarly, Chilean Foreign Affairs Minister Roberto Ampuero has reportedly discussed with other governments the possibility of leaving the organization. Other countries that are reportedly considering this possibility are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Peru; half of UNASUR’s membership.

An Alphabet Soup of Integration Efforts 
The Western Hemisphere has a plethora of diplomatic blocs such as the Organization of American States, CELAC, the Andean Community, the Caribbean Community, among others, as well as trade blocs like the Pacific Alliance and MERCOSUR. If UNASUR is dissolved, it will hardly be missed as there are other agencies that can replace it.
Certainly, the bloc had some interesting initiatives and objectives, however over the past decade it has done little to create a lasting legacy other than its support for President Morales in 2008. Should UNASUR dissolve, it will hardly affect regional integration, particularly because there is currently no long-term integration process in Latin America, other than increasingly close trade relations (i.e. the Pacific Alliance). The last war between two Latin American states was a short-lived war between Ecuador and Peru in 1995, hence a lack of diplomatic integration does not mean an increase in inter-state conflict (though there have been some occasional incidents as well as ongoing border disputes).
Even more, the lack of a European Union-style regional integration in South America should not be interpreted as a negative development, as the region should not use European integration as a standard to determine how successful, or unsuccessful, regional initiatives have been. Each region should integrate at its own pace and take into account its local geopolitics.

Final Thoughts
At the time of this writing UNASUR’s future is not optimistic, as Colombia plans to leave the bloc, and it is likely that other countries (i.e. Chile) will follow. It remains to be seen for how long can this bloc continue to operate without a secretary general, without all of its members, and with the Venezuelan crisis as a dividing issue. Theoretically, UNASUR could continue to exist, but it stopped behaving as a union a long time ago.

About the author: Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Quoted in: China Uses Space Diplomacy to Extend Its Inroads Into Latin America

"China Uses Space Diplomacy to Extend Its Inroads Into Latin America"
Andrew J. Wright
World Politics Review
10 September 2018
Originally published: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/25820/china-uses-space-diplomacy-to-extend-its-inroads-into-latin-america 

[CITATION]

MEDELLIN, Colombia—China has quickly established an extensive track record of using infrastructure spending, on everything from stadiums to ports, to secure resources and bolster trade across Eurasia, Africa and Latin America. Security and space industry analysts now say 2018 has already been a banner year for another part of China’s soft power outreach, as it has sold satellites and support systems to Nigeria, Cambodia and Pakistan. China’s space ambitions are closely tied to its Belt and Road Initiative. By the end of the year, it is expected that a basic system of 18 Chinese BeiDou-3 global positioning satellites will serve countries such as Pakistan, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates—all partners in Beijing’s massive infrastructure and development program.

But it is in Latin America that China’s space diplomacy takes on an added dimension. The majority of the 17 countries that still recognize Taiwan are located in the region. While on a recent trip to Latin America, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis oversaw the signing of a new agreement with Brazil to share information about known space objects, including Brazilian satellites. They also discussed an agreement to allow the United States to launch satellites from Brazil’s Alcantara Launch Center. In neighboring Argentina, the Chinese military recently completed a mysterious $50 million ground station in the remote Patagonia region—for what it says are peaceful, non-military purposes of monitoring satellites and other space missions. ...

IPD: Venezuela’s Elections Re-scheduled, but Maduro To Remain in Power

"Venezuela’s Elections Re-scheduled, but Maduro To Remain in Power"
W. Alejandro Sanchez and Scott Morgan
International Policy Digest
4 March, 2018
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/03/04/venezuela-s-elections-re-scheduled-but-maduro-to-remain-in-power/


Venezuela’s national electoral commission, surprisingly announced on 1 March that the country’s general elections will now take place on 20 May, a month after their controversial original date: 22 April.

The original date had been critiqued for its alarmingly short 90-day window for participating political parties to prepare, which bore the hallmarks of an attempt to cement power by the Nicolas Maduro regime and a continuation of the “chavista” ideology that has been in power for almost two decades.

The decision to delay the elections was due to an agreement, between the Venezuelan government and a number of opposition parties, but not the main one – Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD), which had already declared that it would not participate. While in theory the extra month gives the participating opposition, parties-broadly speaking, more time to organize, the reality of the situation is that this development demonstrates the fractured Venezuelan opposition coalition.

According to El Mundo, there are right now six presidential candidates: President Maduro, four candidates that have ties with the government and the only true “opposition” candidate. Henri Falcon, of Unidad Democrática who has been shunned by other opposition parties for breaking rank. Thus, the affirming the overall consensus is that President Maduro will “win” another six-year term as President of Venezuela.

So one key question to be determined is: what happens on 21 May? Will President Maduro be emboldened to further consolidate power or will he make a gesture of conciliation to the opposition? And how will the international community, especially Venezuela’s neighbors, react?

Since he ascended to the Presidency after the passing of former President Hugo Chavez (March 2013), President Maduro has made several moves to consolidate power among his loyalists. These include eroding the power of the Congress not only so that he couldn’t be removed from office, and create a National Constituent Assembly to act as a Rubber Stamp for his policy initiatives. which body was installed to replace the opposition-controlled National Assembly. The Venezuelan government is also accused of forcing Opposition Mayors and Governors out of office (or coming up with reasons to prevent them from taking office).

Using this as some criteria there is no logical reason to expect any new round of talks that have taken place in the Dominican Republic will bear fruit. The postponement of the elections is a major development, no doubt, and Caracas has reportedly requested that the United Nations send a team of observers to monitor the elections. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that under current conditions any opposition presidential candidate has a real chance of emerging victorious. Likewise the President currently feels that he is in no position to formally make a gesture (i.e. dissolving the controversial National Constituent Assembly) that could end the impasse and begin the process of restoring Venezuela to political and economic stability.

Latin American and Caribbean countries remain somewhat split regarding what to do with Venezuela. On the one hand, Caracas does enjoy allies among the governments of Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua. On the other, the Lima Group (Grupo de Lima) is a loose union of several regional states that have met to consistently condemn the Maduro regime. In mid-February, the foreign affairs ministers of the Lima Group decided to withdraw president Maduro’s invitation to attend the VIII Summit of the Americas, which will take place in Lima in mid-April (a month before the elections in Venezuela, one may note).

US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visited several Latin American nations in early February in order to gather hemispheric support against Venezuela, but the tour did not yield the desired outcome. Withdrawing President Maduro’s invitation to the Summit is an important diplomatic move, but the region in general does not want to see another war – for example a U.S. military intervention in Venezuela, a subject of a plethora of rumors in the region. It’s similarly unclear if regional states would want to also carry out some kind of sanctions against Venezuela. Colombia has closed its border with Venezuela in the past, only to reopen it.

Amid this internal and hemispheric catastrophe is a growing humanitarian one. As previously mentioned, the number of Venezuelan citizens (whether they should be called migrants or refugees is still up for debate) that are fleeing to Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Spain or the U.S. is now well over a million. Countries like Peru are giving temporary residency cards and validating university degrees so these individual can get jobs, but what of Venezuelans living in isolated border areas in Brazil and Colombia? If the exodus of Venezuelans continues, this will create a massive diaspora as well as a humanitarian crisis.

It has become virtually impossible to be optimistic about the future of Venezuela.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the authors are associated.

TNI: Russia May Make Another Power Play in South America

"Russia May Make Another Power Play in South America"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
The National Interest
12 November, 2017
Originally published: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-may-make-another-power-play-south-america-23161

"And It's Not Venezuela This Time..."

Russian president Vladimir Putin will travel to Bolivia to attend the fourth Gas Exporting Countries Forum summit, which will take place on November 20–24. This is President Putin’s first trip to the landlocked nation, and while Russia-Bolivia relations are not as researched and discussed as Moscow’s relations with Nicaragua orVenezuela, they are nevertheless worth discussing in depth.

In late October, the Bolivian daily El Deber quoted Russian ambassador to Bolivia Vladimir Sprinchan about a meeting he held with Bolivian authorities regarding President Putin’s upcoming visit. The Russian diplomat explained that “we analyzed different issues as Bolivia is a partner of Russia and we have a lot of common views, we have the same ideology, and that is very important.” Indeed, on 24 October, theRussian Federation used its veto power to block a resolution in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to “extend for one year the work of international inspectors investigating chemical-weapons attacks in Syria.” Bolivia, currently a rotating member of the UNSC, also voted against the resolution.

Apart from diplomatic support, Bolivia-Russia relations revolve around energy initiatives. For example, Russian energy giant Gazprom operates in Bolivia, dating back to a 2007 memorandum of understanding with the Bolivian state-owned petroleum company Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos. Gazprom started production on the Incahuasi field in 2016, has scheduled drilling in the Azero block for 2018 and has expressed interest in expanding its Bolivian operations even further. The Russian energy giant is apparently interested in drilling for hydrocarbons in La Ceiba, Vitiacua and Madidi. Furthermore, a October 6 Gazprom press release notes that the two sides have the “intention to set up a joint venture for gas marketing in Argentina and Brazil.” While it is debatable whether this will actually occur, such ambitious projects stress the close ties between Gazprom and Bolivia these days.

Even more, the Bolivian Nuclear Energy Agency (ABEN) and the Russian energy company (ROSATOM) signed a contract for the construction of a nuclear research and technology center (NRTC) last September. According to a statement by ROSATOM, the NRTC to be located in the Bolivian city of El Alto will comprise of a water-cooled research reactor, a multipurpose experimental gamma-installation center, engineering facilities and various laboratories. Investments in the project will reportedly amount to more than $300 million and the first facilities should be commissioned in 2019. ROSATOM is also increasing ties with Bolivia’s Higher University of San Andres.

As for potential projects that may materialize when President Putin visits, weapons sales are the most likely. According to the renownedJane’s, the commander of the Bolivian air force has recommended that La Paz acquire Russian Yakovlev Yak-130 “Mitten” light-attack aircraft to replace the service’s Lockheed T-33s. While Bolivia’s defense budget is not as large as Venezuela’s, the country is fertile ground for Russian weapons exports. Afterall, President Morales has strived to modernize his nation’s military and has carried out interesting acquisitions recently, including a radar system from Thales and Super Puma helicopters from Airbus. There have not been major Russian-Bolivian weapons sales recently, but the two governments did sign a defense cooperation agreement back in August, which can be seen as the first step by Moscow for larger weapons transfers to Bolivia.

The media coverage of the upcoming Gas Exporting Countries Forum summit will understandably center on the decisions of the twelve-member bloc regarding gas production. Nevertheless, it is also important to monitor meetings between the attending delegations and any potential bilateral projects that could come out of them. So far, in spite of ideological ties, Bolivia-Russia ties have been limited, with a strong focus on energy initiatives, but that also means that there is plenty of space for growth.

W. Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst that focuses on geopolitical and defense related affairs, with a focus on the Western Hemisphere. His analyses have appeared in numerous refereed journals includingSmall Wars and Insurgencies, Defence Studies, the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, European Security, Studies in Conflict and Terrorismand Perspectivas. Follow him on twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

CIMSEC: The UNCLCS Ruling and the Future of the Uruguayan Navy

"The UNCLCS Ruling and the Future of the Uruguayan Navy"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
October 12, 2016
The Southern Tide
Center for International Maritime Security
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/unclcs-ruling-future-uruguayan-navy/28738

The Southern Tide

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.

By W. Alejandro Sanchez

Uruguay’s continental shelf control has been extended to 350 nautical miles. On 30 August, the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) ruled in favor of the South American nation’s request to extend its maritime territory by83,000 square kilometers. While this is a major diplomatic victory for the Uruguayan government, the new territory will need to be properly patrolled, which means additional pressure on theUruguayan Navy that currently operates with an aging fleet.

The author of this commentary argues that Uruguay’s new maritime territory should be a starting point for a greater discussion about the future of its Navy, both in terms of its future fleet composition and missions.  

A Brief History

It is important to stress that the Uruguayan military has not been in an inter-state conflict in over a century. Its last major confrontation was the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870). In the 20th century, Uruguay supported the Allies in World War II (the 1939 Admiral Graf Spee incident occurred in Uruguayan waters). The only other major challenge to Uruguayan sovereignty occurred in the late 1960s to early 1970s when Uruguayan security forces battled the Tupamaros, a local insurgent movement.

In the 21st century, Uruguay has only had one small international incident. Between 2005-2010, the Uruguayan and Argentine governments had a diplomatic and legal dispute regarding the construction of a pulp mill in the Uruguay River, which serves as a border between the two states. Even though no conflict ever occurred, former Uruguayan President José Mujica famously declared in 2011 that he had contemplated the possibility of a war with Argentina over the pulp mill and had met with his military’s commanders about possible scenarios.

The Navy’s Current Platforms

Nowadays the Uruguayan military, and the Navy in particular, is in a dire state given limited budgets which prevent the acquisition of new heavy platforms.

In August, Admiral Leonardo Alonso, commander of the Uruguayan Navy, declared that the fleet has 12 operational sea platforms. The fleet composition includes a Joao Belo-class frigate, the ROU Uruguay; two Kondor II-class minesweepers, the ROUTemerario and the ROU Audaz (the ROU Fortuna was retired in 2014); the oceanic patrol vessel ROU Maldonado the support vessels ROU General Artigas and ROU Vanguardia. Additional vessels include the tugboat ROU Banco Ortiz; the oceanographic ship ROU Oyarvide; the ROU Sirius; and the patrol boats ROUColonia, ROU Rio Negro, and the ROU Paysandu. According toUruguayan media, the average age of the fleet is 50 years (e.g. the Joao Belo frigate was constructed in the late 1960s).

A strongly worded op-ed in the daily El Observador op-edpublished on 20 August, provocatively titled “Who Needs the Armed Forces?” stresses how the Navy is “bankrupt, not only because of its aging fleet, its lackluster training and small budget, but due to corruption scandals in recent years that have affected the morale.”

For the past couple of years, the Uruguayan military has attempted to purchase modern offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), which will be the cornerstone of the future fleet. The Navy has apparently selected Lurssen’s OPV 80 model and reportedly plans to procure three platforms in a deal which will cost an estimated USD $250 million. To date, no contract has been signed yet as the government appears to lack sufficient funds to purchase the vessels. 

The Uruguayan Navy has been lobbying the government for new funds and the approval of the OPV-deals in order to properly monitor the country’s growing sea. Admiral Leonardo Alonso has declared to the Senate that on any given day the Navy detects around 350 ships in Uruguayan waters “but we only see the ones that wish to be detected, which have their equipment on and are identified by our sensors,” which means that the country is vulnerable to “piracy, maritime accidents, pollution, drug trafficking, smuggling, and illegal fishing.” In an e-mail interview with the author, an Uruguayan naval officer explained that “in Uruguayan waters there is an average of 200 vessels (cruising or anchored) carrying out different tasks. This volume means that without proper control of maritime traffic, the probability of accidents and incidents escalates.” The officer also highlighted the necessity of a coastal surveillance network for Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) to aid the activities of the (yet to be acquired) OPVs and their support helicopters.

While this analysis is focusing on the Uruguayan Navy’s platforms and equipment, it is necessary to briefly mention personnel woes. The Uruguayan officer explained to the author that it is also vitally important “to retain our personnel and prevent a migration to the private sector as they seek salary improvements.” The problem of preventing qualified military personnel from migrating to better paid (and less dangerous) positions in the private sector is an issue that affects many militaries across the world.

The UNCLCS Ruling

It is in this problematic situation that the UNCLCS’s ruling enters the equation. Montevideo first requested the UNCLCS to expand its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in 2009. “Uruguay has a special interest in expanding its continental shelf rights since it is currently involved in the search for oil and gas in the so called Punta del Este basin,” explained a September 2009 report byMercoPress.

According to Uruguayan media, a Uruguayan delegation met with a UNCLCS commission 21 times to argue its case between 2011 and 2015. The aforementioned naval officer also highlighted the role of the oceanographic vessel Oyarvide and the Navy’s Oceanographic, Hydrographic, and Meteorological Service in contributing to the case made to the UNCLCS.

In 2016, Uruguay presented its case to the plenary of the UNCLCS and the Commission decided in favor of Montevideo’s request to expand its continental shelf to a total of 350 nautical miles on 30 August. According to IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, “the new territory grants mineral and resource rights over the continental shelf (sea floor) but it does not grant fishing rights over the new area.” Meanwhile, the Uruguayan daily El Observador explains that the country now has more maritime territory than dry land.

The UNCLCS’s decision has been a massive victory for the administration of President Tabaré Vázquez. In fact, the Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rodolfo Nin Novoa, has declared “nobody can do anything [in these waters] without Uruguay’s authorization.” The minister’s statement was perhaps too bold as the aforementioned Admiral Alonso has highlighted the problematic situation of the Navy while Defense Minister Jorge Menendez has stressed the need for USD $250 million to upgrade the fleet (namely to acquire the OPVs).

One Possible Way Forward

The expansion of Uruguay’s continental shelf should serve as a starting point for a discussion about the future of its Navy. Given the lack of an external security threat (the author has discussed South Atlantic geopolitics in a 17 February commentary for CIMSEC, “How Peaceful is the South Atlantic?”), particularly as the pulp mill diferendum with Argentina appears to have been solved, the Uruguayan armed forces have had to reinvent themselves in recent decades to justify their existence. Case in point, the country is a major supplier of peacekeepers to the United Nations – as of 31 August, Uruguay has a contingent of 1,457 troops participating in UN peacekeeping missions.

Regarding the Navy, its current and future challenges are transnational and irregular in nature. Rather than worrying about the Brazilian nuclear or Scorpene submarines appearing on its coast, the major maritime security threats include drug trafficking, illegal fishing, maritime pollution, as well as search and rescue operations.

Illegal fishing is a major problem for governments around the world, and the South Atlantic already has the precedent of the March incident between the Argentine Coast Guard and an illegal Chinese fishing fleet that highlights the need for a well-equipped and modern fleet that can chase and detain (or sink, if violence is necessary) illegal fishing vessels. To this point, the Uruguayan dailyEl Pais has noted that the country’s waters have fish species like merluza (a cod-like fish), the pescadilla (whiting) and the corvina, which must be protected from illegal fishing.

Another task for the Navy’s future will be to protect future oil platforms that may be constructed in Uruguay’s maritime waters. As a matter of fact, France’s Total company (with U.S. ExxonMobil and Norway’s Statoil as partners) has been looking for oil in Uruguayan and South Atlantic waters, though unsuccessfully so far. The South Atlantic does not have a piracy problem in the sense of oil platforms being at risk of criminal attack. However, if aDeepwater Horizon-type accident were to occur in one of these new wells, the Navy must have capable vessels able to rescue workers in peril and contain potential oil spills and other destruction. It is worth noting that just in late September the aforementioned Audazand Artigas had to assist the Fortune Harmony, a tanker that had a fire aboard while 20 miles off Piriapolis, Uruguay.

For these operations, the Navy requires new sea platforms, namely OPVs, to support and eventually replace the antiquated vessels it currently operates,  as well as a coastal monitoring network. While this author is not qualified to properly discuss the training of Uruguayan naval officers as well as the budgetary issues, the problem of preventing well-trained personnel from migrating to the private sector affects the Uruguayan Navy like in other defense forces across the world.

Final Thoughts

Proper surveillance of the extended continental shelf is a critical task for the Uruguayan Navy and will be the cornerstone of its maritime strategy going forward. Incidents like the March clash between Argentina and illegal Chinese fishing vessels (illegal fishing), or the recent Fortune Harmony incident (disasters at sea and possible pollution) are reminders of why it is a priority for a nation with a large continental shelf to have a modern fleet capable of adapting to different scenarios.

With that said, Uruguay’s history and current South Atlantic geopolitics argue that the possibility of inter-state warfare is minimal. Hence, Uruguay must upgrade its Navy, not just in terms of new platforms, radars and helicopters, but also its mission in the 21st century.

Alejandro Sanchez Nieto is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.