Showing posts with label gangs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label gangs. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 19, 2016

Blouin World: Rio Olympics: What’s the worst that could happen?


"Rio Olympics: What's the worst that could happen?"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: World
April 8, 2016
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatworld/2016/04/08/rio-olympics-whats-the-worst-that-could-happen/

The Brazilian government, presidential scandals aside, is focused on ensuring that the upcoming Summer Olympics and Paralympics in Rio de Janeiro occur successfully and peacefully. The event is expected to attract between 350 to 500 thousand foreign tourists, not counting the 10 thousand athletes that will compete in 42 different sports. The question is: what security-related incident is Brasilia trying to prevent?
The obvious answer is some type of terrorist operation, with the 2015 attacks in Paris and Brussels by ISIS serving as a recent and tragic precedent. In fact, the Paris attacks occurred while a friendly soccer match between France and Germany was taking place at the Stade de France. Moreover, there is already the precedent of one successful terrorist attack during an Olympic event: the 1972 Munich attacks carried out by the Palestinian Black September group, which killed 11 Israeli Olympian athletes and one German police officer.
In order to prepare for the worst-case scenario, the Brazilian security and defense forces will carry out an unprecedented operation. Brazilian Defense Minister Aldo Rebelo announced in March that 38 thousand military personnel will be deployed, with 20 thousand in Rio itself, not counting personnel from other security agencies. According to the Brazilian Defense Ministry, Rio will be divided into four defense command sections (CDS Deodoro, CDS Maracana, CDS Copacabana and CDS Barra da Tijuca) in order for the security forces to better monitor the Olympic venues. Rio certainly appears to be ready for the Olympics from a security perspective as the defense commands are training for any type of incident, be it a terrorist attack or even nuclear, radiological or biological threats.
Nevertheless, this preparedness program has not been scandal-free. Case in point: In late March, Colonel Adilson Moreira from the National Force for Public Security resigned after sending an e-mail to his colleagues that was critical of President Dilma Rousseff.
It is worth noting that, some protests aside, the Brazilian government has successfully organized major sporting events in recent years, namely the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup and the 2014 FIFA World Cup. Moreover, Gustavo Palhares, a partner at Furriela Advogados (a São Paulo law firm with a branch in Washington DC), told me that “for the past decade, the city and state of Rio have invested in security, particularly to ‘pacify’ the favelas [shantytowns]; although crime has not disappeared in Rio, the city is more prepared than ever to host the Olympic Games.”
Indeed, as Palhares explained, rather than some terrorist attack à la Munich 1972, the major concern regarding the upcoming Games is crime, i.e., the possibility of tourists or athletes being robbed (or worse) by the city’s numerous gangs. Unfortunately, there have been recent incidents that stress this possibility. For example, in January, four people were killed and 11 were injuredwhen criminals attacked a bar in Rio’s western area, in Vargem Pequena. Then, in mid-March, a member of a Pacifying Police Unit (Unidad de Policia Pacificadora, UPP) was murdered by unknown bandits in broad daylight during a routine patrol. Finally, and in an ironic development,Lieutenant-Colonel Murilo Angelloti of the Copacabana division of the Military Police (BPM) was recently the victim of a robbery. When he left his home on Sunday, April 3, three men held him at gunpoint and stole his car. Palhares clarified that “these crimes occurred in areas of the city where the Games will not take place.”
The aforementioned examples demonstrate that crime in Rio has been contained, rather than completely eradicated. Certainly, it would be naïve to believe that crime in a city like Rio (with a population of well over six million) could be fully solved via the pacification operations.
Ultimately, it is necessary to place potential crimes (not terrorist attacks) during the Olympics in the context of Brazil’s current tense political situation. Should foreign tourists or Olympian athletes be mugged, as Palhares explains, this will negatively affect President Dilma Rousseff’s image, “especially at a moment when she is in a political war to save her presidency.” While the possibility of a terrorist attack in Rio is arguably extremely remote, even a wave of robberies may be enough to hurt the president.
- W. Alejandro Sanchez, researcher
@W_Alex_Sanchez | Blog: Geopolitics

Tuesday, August 5, 2014

VOXXI: El Salvador arrests Spanish Priest accused of aiding Mara gang

"El Salvador arrests Spanish Priest accused of aiding Mara gang"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
August 5, 2014
Originally published: http://voxxi.com/2014/08/05/salvador-arrests-antonio-rodriguez-tercero/


Local authorities arrested a Spanish priest in El Salvador last week after accusing him of aiding the dreaded gangs known as Maras. Father Antonio Rodriguez Tercero has stated that he only carries out charity work to support gang members who are trying to reintegrate into society.
He was freed on Monday, August 4, though his judicial challenges are far from over.
15 Years in El Salvador
The 38-year old priest, who is also known as “Father Toño,” comes from the Daimiel municipality in Spain’s Ciudad Real province and has lived in El Salvador for 15 years.
In an interview with the Spanish daily El País, Father Rodriguez explained that he came to Central America after learning about the 1980 assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero and the 1989 massacre of several Jesuit priests.
These events inspired him to go to El Salvador to work for peace and address social inequality (For a further discussion of the latter crime, see my September 2013 commentary).
Father Rodriguez’s church is located in Mejicanos, a municipality close to San Salvador. One of the social programs he carries out is helping former gang members reintegrate themselves into society.
The Facts As We Know Them
The office of El Salvador’s Attorney General has accused Father Rodriguez of smuggling illicit objects, such as mobile phones, into prisons. They also argue that the priest has illicit associations with gang members like Carlos Ernesto Mojica Lechuga, a well-known Barrio 18 leader who is currently in prison.
As evidence of these connections, one of the alleged phones was used to coordinate an extortion operation carried out by Barrio 18 members in Santa Ana.
The Salvadoran police force has monitored over 100 of Father Rodriguez’s phone calls, which seem to be the cornerstone of the prosecutors’ accusations. “Rodriguez did everything that Mojica Lechuga ordered him to do,” a Salvadoran prosecutor has declared.
On July 29, authorities arrested the Spanish priest in his house in Mejicanos. The detention was part of a raid in which police forces apprehended 127 individuals throughout the country, charging them with different crimes. Father Rodriguez was held in the “División Central de Investigaciones,” and it was here that Spanish diplomats visited the priest.
Father Rodriguez’ arrest prompted social demonstrations in his native country. On August 3, around three hundred people protested in Daimiel, demanding his release. Daimiel’s mayor, as well as a former gang member who now lives in Spain, spoke in favor of the incarcerated priest.
Likewise, El Salvador’s Catholic Church has declared its support for Father Rodriguez.
El Salvador’s Archbishop Jose Luis Escobar Alas explained to the press that it is important “to recognize all the good work Father Rodriguez has done […] on behalf of the poor via his church’s social program.”
Out Of Prison, Not Out Of Trouble
The Salvadoran media reported that Father Rodriguez’ hearing ended at 3 AM on August 4. While the prosecution stressed his ties with leaders of the maras, a judge granted him conditional liberty.
The website ElSalvador.com has a video of Father Rodriguez after he was released. He appeared to be in good health and explained to the press that “the [judicial] process will continue.”
According to La Prensa Gráfica, Father Rodriguez is not allowed to leave the country or have associations with any gang members, and he must return to court whenever needed. At the time of this writing, Salvadoran prosecutors have officially charged the Spanish priest though it is unclear if he is still free or if he has been arrested once again.
Political Motivations?
In March 2012, El Salvador’s two major maras––Barrio 18 and Mara Salvatrucha––signed a historic peace agreement with the help of the country’s Catholic Church. Months after the truce came into effect crime, particularly homicides, dropped drastically. Nevertheless, recent reports highlight that gang violence is on the rise once again.
Naturally, the Spanish media has taken an interest in this case. The opening sentence of a July 30 article in El País states that, “El Salvador had a shocking morning,” when the country learned about Rodriguez’ arrest. The article later describes Rodriguez as having been a “heavyweight” in 2012.
A recent article by the Inter Press Service also discusses Father Rodriguez’s role in the peace negotiations, explaining how the Spanish priest initially critiqued the peace agreement but eventually came to support it.
Innocence in El Salvador
Many praise Father Rodriguez for his role to achieve peace between gangs in El Salvador. However, his connections to El Salvador’s Barrio 18 have ultimately landed him in prison. Those following the story still do not know whether the accusations are politically motivated or if in fact Father Rodriguez is actively helping gang members.
The Spanish daily El Día quotes a Salvadoran priest who recently declared that the arrest of Father Rodriguez “is a type of social or political pressure” because of his close relationship with the country’s gangs.
Civic society and religious institutions in El Salvador and in Spain are generally on Father Rodriguez’ side, but their support is not enough to be safe in a country like El Salvador.

Wednesday, June 18, 2014

VOXXI: Bolivian gang members create a lost generation


"Bolivian Gang Members create a Lost Generation"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
June 18, 2014

The Bolivian government claims an alarming 10,500 Bolivian teenagers are gang members, comprising most of the Andean nation’s major cities, including La Paz.
These statistics show that Bolivia could be experiencing a “lost generation” of young Bolivians who are not productive members of society. With the upcoming elections in October, the next government –whether President Evo Morales is re-elected or not–will hopefully prioritize internal security and social programs to aid the country’s youth. But this is unlikely.
Looking under the statistical hood
Some statistics are necessary to place the aforementioned estimate into proper perspective. According to a2012 census, Bolivia’s total population was at most, 10.496 million citizens. By 2014, let’s estimate that it has already surpassed 10.5 million. Women account for the majority, with 5.255 million female citizens compared to 5.240 million males.
A January 7, 2014, report in Bolivian daily La Razon regarding age demographics shows that the Bolivian population under 15 years of age is just over 3.2 million (31.6% total population), while an additional million are between 15-19 years old.
In other words, Bolivia has a significantly young population; hence it’s increasingly problematic that more and more young Bolivians are joining gangs. “La Razon” explains that Bolivian security agencies have arrested gang members who are as young as 13 years of age.
A report by the Bolivian think tank Observatorio Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana (ONSC – National Observatory of Citizen Security) estimates that, based on data provided by the Bolivian Police, some 762 gangs exist in the capitals of most parts of the country.
Most gangs have approximately 50 members, though an estimated 10% have more than 50 members. TheBolivian ombudswoman Shirley Pardo explains that 34% of gangs in Bolivia are located in La Paz, 22% in Santa Cruz, and 14% in Cochabamba.
When breaking the gangs down by gender, 79% of gang members are male while 21% are female. It is worth highlighting that in spite of this gender difference, at least one all-female gang exists. The group is called “Bola 8-M” and seems to operate in the Pampa de la Isla township, in the department of Santa Cruz.
According to the ONSC, between 2011-2013, 17.2% of the gangs carried out fights with other criminal groups and committed crimes including robbery and vandalism. Tragically, fights between gangs tend to end in murder.
For example, in early May, a 16 year old gang member was killed during a fight with a 23 year old rival gang member, who stabbed him multiple times in his left thigh, causing him to bleed to death. There are also reports of gang members fighting with law enforcement agents, as the former tend to outnumber the latter.
Things to come with gangs?
The extent of the unfortunate situation in Bolivia is not easy to predict and it would be unhelpful to be overly pessimistic or exaggeratory.
On the one hand, Bolivian gangs tend to be small (to the extent that 50 members in a gang can be considered small) and operate in specific neighborhoods. In other words, we are not (yet) witnessing the creation of one gang with branches in various cities across the country or abroad, such as the maras in Central America.
That is the good news.
The bad news is how powerful Bolivian gangs could become if the Bolivian government and society in general are not able to reintegrate these young men and women back into society.
One particular concern is that foreign criminal entities may attract Bolivian gangs to become their proxies. The online security news agency InSightCrime has discussed reports that a Brazilian prison gang, the Primeiro Comando da Capital, is increasing its presence in Bolivia.
Additionally, Bolivia remains a major producer of cocaine, and acts as a stopover for Peruvian cocaine traveling to Brazil and Paraguay. Closer relations between Peruvian drug syndicates and Bolivian drug traffickers and gangs are also a problematic scenario.
As for the government’s response, occasional legislations to crack down on gangs have been debated in the Bolivian congress to no major avail. Increasing the size and capabilities of the Bolivian police force is another logical option, particularly as a report by La Razon found severe personnel problems with police stations in La Paz; some stations only have one to three officers.
This past 14-15 of June, Bolivia hosted a major international summit of the G77 + China group. In order to prepare the city of Santa Cruz for the meeting, law enforcement agents cracked down on the city’s gangs and illegal migrants. This sounds eerily familiar to Brazil’s initiatives of pacifying favelas prior to the start of the ongoing World Cup and the 2016 Rio Olympics.
The G77 + China summit was a success for the country’s government, but the existence of gangs, and the reasons why young Bolivians are joining them, persists. Hopefully the Bolivian government is thinking outside the box about long-term solutions to address this issue. But the little that has been reported gives us little reason to be hopeful.

Saturday, March 29, 2014

VOXXI: Live in California? Drug cartel violence might be in your backyard

 Live in California? Drug Cartel violence might be in your backyard
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
March 27, 2014
Originally published: http://voxxi.com/2014/03/27/drug-violence-california-mexican-cartels/2/
California’s Attorney General has released a new report, “Gangs Beyond Borders: California and the Fight Against Transnational Crime.” As the title suggests, the report discusses links between Californian criminal groups and criminal organizations from countries in Eastern Europe, Asia and, as we will discuss here, in Mexico.But the spillover of violence from the cartels might be as close as your back yard, as far as the report can tell.
It is common knowledge that Mexican criminal groups such as the powerful Sinaloa Cartel, which recently suffered the capture of its leader “El Chapo,” have ties with criminals in the U.S. and throughout Latin America. Nevertheless, “Gangs Beyond Borders“ does a great job of explaining how these unholy relations are currently morphing, which makes it even more difficult for security agencies to crack down on criminal entities in California.
The Morphing Relationship of Cartels and Gangs
The Sinaloa cartel has a significant presence in California, as it is responsible for the vast majority of “drug, weapons, and human trafficking across the California-Mexico border,” as the aforementioned study highlights. The report also addresses relations between Sinaloa and California gangs, such as the Hispanic Sureño street gang. By using the Sureños as proxies, Sinaloa has increased its presence into Northern California, particularly in San Jose, but also in areas such as Santa Cruz, Santa Clara, Monterey and Kern.
It is important to note that Sinaloa is not the only, or first, Mexican cartel with a presence in California.Gangs Beyond Borders explains that La Familia Michoacana (LFM) used to have a strong presence as well, particularly regarding methamphetamine production in the state’s Central Valley. However, the LFM has lost much of its strength since the 2010 death of its leader, Nazario Moreno Gonzalez, and the 2011 capture of Jose de Jesus “El Chango” Melendez, the cartel’s second in command.
How the presence of Mexican cartels has impacted, and will impact, crime rates in the near future in California is an obvious concern of the Attorney General’s report. In other words, how bad will the spillover effect of cartel violence in Mexico be for California?
The Californian Attorney General’s report hypothesizes that “this ever-increasing zone of influence has caused friction with existing regional gangs [in California] that had previously controlled trafficking routes, resulting in threats of violence, homicides, kidnappings, and extortion.”
There is another type of spillover effect: Mexican criminals are creating their own gangs in the U.S. One prime example is Jorge Rojas, who fled from Mexico to California where he founded Los Palillos (“The Toothpicks”) gang. Rojas has vast experience regarding criminal groups, as he is the brother of the late Victor Rojas, the leader of the also defunct Arellano-Felix Organization, another Mexican cartel.
Rojas and one of his lieutenants, Juan Francisco Estrada Gonzalez, were convicted this past January on numerous accounts of murder and kidnapping in San Diego. Nevertheless, in March the jury announced that it was unable to decide whether both criminals deserved the death penalty.
While it is logical to fear a spillover of Mexican violence into California, it is important to note that there are differing views whether this could actually occur.
In contrast to Gangs Beyond Borders is a February 2013 study by the Government Accountability Officewhich argued that data shows that the average rate for both violent and property crimes had dropped in the Southwest border states. The renowned InSight Crime news website argues that this data means that the spillover fear is unfounded.
 Criminals say Presente!
Spillover violence by Mexican cartels has affected other parts of the hemisphere, however. For example, a horrific massacre took place in May 2011:  27 people were executed in a cattle ranch in northern Guatemala, close to the border with Mexico. The Zetas cartel has been blamed for carrying out this attack.
Moreover, it is worth noting that other criminal networks across the hemisphere are increasing their ties with different international syndicates, not just from Mexico. For example, in 2013 Domenico Trimboli a high-profile leader of the ‘Ndrangheta (an Italian mafia-type criminal group in Calabria) was arrested in Colombia. The ‘Ndrangheta exports cocaine from Colombia to Europe.
Colombian cocaine also finds its way toGuinea Bissau, a nation in West Africa, which is widely considered one of the world’s foremost narco-states. From there the drugs are smuggled into Europe.
It is ironic that while governments and security agencies often have problems promoting cooperation amongst each other due to differences regarding political ideologies or jurisdictional concerns, cooperation between criminal entities tends to be flourishing.
The report Gangs Beyond Borders serves as a powerful reminder of the growing and morphing inter-connectivity between Mexican cartels and Californian gangs. The report even explains relations between LFM and non-Hispanic gangs, such as the Aryan Brotherhood. In other words, the power of money can blur ethnic and cultural differences.
Finally, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto met with Jeh Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security this past March 20 in Mexico City. The Mexican media has reported that the two discussed economic agreements between both Washington and Mexico City and development of border communities. Hopefully, the security situation across the Mexico-California border was discussed in detail since, as the new report by California’s Attorney Generalexplains, this border area needs more attention by both governments.

Monday, September 24, 2012

EIR: The End of Ideologically-Motivated Violent Movements in Latin America?


The end of Ideologically-Motivated Violent Movements in Latin America
W. Alex Sanchez
E-International Relations
September 24, 2012
Originally published: http://bit.ly/QecoZJ

Violence continues to flourish in Latin America, perpetuated by a variety of ongoing criminal trends ranging from gruesome murders in Mexicoto deadly ambushes by guerrillas against security forces in Peru. While the crimes themselves are not new, the collective profile of the perpetrators has changed. In major cities like Caracas in Venezuela, Juarez in Mexico, and in the favelas (shantytowns) of Brazil, there seems to have been a shift in their goals and raison d’etre.
 The era of insurgent movements that fought governments in order to carry out regime change and install leftist-style governments seems to be coming to an end. Only a few movements remain, as compared to their heyday in the 1980’s, like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The new wave of violent organized movements is made up of international criminal networks, such as Mexican cartels or criminal gangs in Central America, who have gained power through the lucrative drug trade but lack a political ideology or objective. Does the change that we have witnessed in the past two decades signify the end of ideologically-motivated violent organizations in Latin America?
A Brief History of Ideological Terrorism in Latin America
Insurgent movements spread throughout Latin America at the height of the Cold War as a combination of proxy wars between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and as a way for masses to attempt regime change and alter social orders that, for the most part, essentially labeled poor and indigenous groups as second-class citizens. While few of those groups remain today, they had the numbers, strength, and support to make an impact in Latin America throughout the 1980’s. An incomplete list would include Peru’s Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), Colombia’s 19th of April Movement (M19) and Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) – which had factions active in Chile and Bolivia among other countries – Argentina’s Montonero Peronist Movement (MPM), Uruguay’s Tupamaros National Liberation Movement and Nicaragua’s Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).
Several insurgent movements ceased to exist between the end of the 1980’s and the mid-1990’s. Some of them went peacefully, as in the case of the Central America regional peace accords, which saw the end of insurgent movements like the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in Guatemala.  Other groups, like the MIR and the Tupamaros, were defeated via military operations, such as the Washington-orchestrated Plan Condor. Such initiatives, known for their abuses of human rights, were carried out by the military governments that ruled much of South America from the 1960’s to late 1980’s. In Peru, the MRTA became severely weakened after the capture of its major leaders, including its founder, Victor Polay Campos, which brought their operations to an end in the mid-1990’s. The group’s last major operation occurred in 1996-1997.
As part of demobilization initiatives, there were instances where some guerrilla movements attempted to become part of their countries’ political systems, with mixed results. For instance, the FMLN won the presidential elections of El Salvador in 2009 with Mauricio Funes as its candidate. On the other hand, Carlos Pizarro, leader of the M-19 Movement, was not so lucky.  In 1989, M-19 disbanded as an insurgent force and became a political party known as the M-19 Democratic Alliance. Pizarro ran for president of Colombia in the 1990 elections but wasassassinated on April of that year. Pizarro’s murder was allegedly ordered by Pablo Escobar—head of the infamous Medellin Cartel.[1] Another example of violent groups trying to become part of a political process is going on right now in Peru. In the Andean country, there is a political party known as Patria Roja, which has alleged ties with the Shining Path. In addition, Alfredo Crespo, lawyer of incarcerated Shining Path leader Abimael Guzman, has created an NGO called the Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights (MOVADEF). MOVADEF’s goal is to free Guzman and other individuals accused of terrorism, whom MOVADEF considers to be “political prisoners.” The group has twice attempted to register as a political party, but the Peruvian government has rejected it each time, leading Crespo to denounce the government’s “antidemocratic tendencies.” The attempts by demobilized insurgent movements to join legitimate political processes throughout Latin America are controversial, to say the least, but do exemplify that such organizations had, arguably, some kind of political objectives which they chose to pursue via non-violent, legal means.
By 2012, only a handful of groups forged in the ideological crucibles of the 1960’s-1980’s continue to be operational. The biggest of these movements are the Colombian FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) as well as Peru’s Shining Path. While all three are weaker and more disorganized than they were decades ago – the FARC, for example, allegedly has around 9,000 troops, down from 16,000 in the 1990’s – they continue to carry out deadly operations. A major reason for the weakening of these groups has to do with successful military operations carried out by local security forces. As another example, the Shining Path’s last major leader, Florindo Flores, was captured on February 2012; effectively dividing the remaining insurgent groups into two separate factions. Meanwhile, the FARC has been weakened since losing its major leaders in recent years, such as Manuel Marulanda (AKA Tirofijo), Manuel Reyes, and Jorge Briceno (AKA Mono Jojoy). At the time of this writing, there are negotiations underway between the Colombian government and the FARC, though it is uncertain that these will be successful considering that the guerrillas are known for having broken previous ceasefires and other similar agreements.
The Rise of Narco-Violence
As insurgent movements backed up by political ideologies come to an end, major criminal cartels that lack political objectives and are centered on profiting from illegal activities have begun to rise. This isn’t to say that criminal groups did not exist in the 1970’s and 1980
’s, during the period of ideological civil wars. For example, during the 1980
’s and early 1990
’s, Colombia became notorious for the drug-related wealth and violence of the Medellin Cartel as well as the Cali Cartel.
Major drug trafficking cartels, such as the Sinaloa, Zetas, and Gulf Cartel have appeared throughout Mexico, and are slowly expanding their influence to Central America, like in Guatemala, and there are troubling reports that they have a growing presence in South America as well. Unlike the FARC or Shining Path, the Mexican cartels lack any kind of ideology or objectives beyond profit from lucrative crimes. Their goal is not to overthrow the Mexican government, but rather to create expanding spheres of influence where they govern parallel to central governments as a kind of narco-fiefdom.
There are also groups like the Maras Salvatrucha, an international gang based in Central America.[2] It is necessary to stress that the Maras do not have the same origins as the cartels; the Maras are a Hispanic gang that originated in cities like Los Angeles and whose members were deported to their countries of origin. A 2008 Time article reported that
, “[t]iny El Salvador has over 55,000 gang members, including some 10,000 deportees.” While the Maras’ reason for existence arguably was not drug trafficking, being involved in illicit activities like robbery and extortion has allowed it to gain considerable amounts of power.  The Maras have become particularly influential in El Salvador, to the point that theSalvadoran government recently brokered a peace agreement between them and one of its major rivals, the Barrio 18, in order to cut the level of violence in the country.
Other groups include the drug cartels in Brazil, which have brought violence to several major cities. The Washington Times reported in 2009, “In Brazil, 35,000 people were fatally shot in 2007, and most of the deaths were drug-related. According to the government’s public safety secretariat, there are nearly 23,000 drug-related homicides a year.” Confrontations between the Brazilian police and criminal organizations have escalated as the government tries to pacify the favelas in preparation for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro. A June 2011 operation between Brazilian Special Forces and armed naval personnel in a favela in Rio ended in a confrontation with local drug traffickers; a total of eight people were killed in the shootout. In addition, in order for Brazil to achieve greater internal security in the country, it will have to deal with the infamous First Command of the Capital (PCC).[3] The PCC is a criminal group that originated in Brazil’s prisons in the 1990
’s and today has a strong influence around the country. Unlike other criminal groups, the PCC claims that its goal is to fight “injustice and oppression in the prison system under the banner ‘Liberty, Justice, and Peace.’
It is debatable to what extent the PCC members actually believe in bringing peace and justice to the country’s prisons and streets, particularly considering the 2006 PCC-orchestrated violence that Sao Paulo suffered in 2006. Rather than demanding political goals, the violence was more as a ways for the PCC to showcase its power.
Finally, it is important to highlight that the FARC, ELN, and Shining Path all have morphed into criminal entities that finance themselves from drug trafficking, but continue to claim that they are fighting for a political ideology and some kind of ultimate goal (such as installing a new regime in their countries). It is highly debatable how many rank-and-file troops of the aforementioned movements actually believe in the group’s ideologies anymore. In an interview with the author, a security consultant who wished to remain anonymous and who has done extensive work regarding the FARC explained how years ago, new members were supposed to attend indoctrination classes that could last as many as six months, so they would learn the organization’s ideological origins and goals. Nowadays, he quipped, such “classes” last two weeks at the most.[4]
Arguably, only a few older members within any of the aforementioned guerrilla groups remain faithful to the ideological origins of their movement. In other words, the morphing of the old-guard groups into narco-insurgent movements, combined with the rise of non-ideological entities like the cartels and international gangs, seems to stress the fact that the ideologically-motivated violence in Latin America may be ending.
The EPP: A return to the Past?
The Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP) presents a fascinating case study as it may arguably be the first violent guerilla movement to appear in Latin America with a political ideology since the end of the Cold War. A 2011 report by the Council on Hemispheric Affairs explains the different origins attributed to the group. According to Jane’s Defense, the EPP was created in 1992 when a group of training priests, who were expelled from a Catholic seminary for their radical political views, established the Movimiento Monseñor Romero with the aim of plotting a socialist revolution. Meanwhile, a 2008 article in Paraguayan daily ABC defines the EPP as a group comprised of criminals who have murdered police officers and attacked police and military outposts, without attributing ideological objectives to it.  One of the group’s most well-known operations was the 2005 murder of Cecilia Cubas, daughter of former Paraguayan president Raul Cubas.
To justify its violent operations, the EPP argues that it is a group made up of peasant communities armed to fight for social justice and denies Asuncion’s accusations that it is a group of criminals or has any affiliation with criminal organizations like the Colombian FARC. Carmen Villalba, a self-declared spokeswoman of the EPP, has stated that the group’s support comes from “the Paraguayan people, the people who eternally feel that they have been ridiculed, discriminated against and stepped on.”  The EPP has said that it is influenced by Cold War heroes like Che Guevara and Regis Debray, as well as Paraguayan heroes like Mariscal Francisco Solano Lopez. Fidel Zavala, a former hostage of the EPP, has declared that the EPP also looks up to leftist-statesmen and ideologues like Fidel Castro, Hugo Chavez, and Karl Marx.  It is important to note that even though the EPP arguably has a Marxist-Leninist ideology, prominent individuals such as Luis Casabianca, leader of the Paraguayan Communist Party and a guerrilla member in the 1960
’s (as part of the Frente Unido de Liberación Nacional – Fulna) have condemned the Zavala kidnapping. In 2009 Casabianca stated that the EPP “is not revolutionary, rather, terrorist.”
On September 21, 2010, then-Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo allegedly received a threatening letter from the EPP, calling him a “walking cadaver” and calling Minister of the Interior Rafael Filizzola and his wife, Congresswoman Desire Masi, “oligarch bullies” and “money wasters.” Such terminology is similar to statements made by groups like Shining Path and the FARC during their heyday in the 1980s. The now deposed Fernando Lugo government pursued a tough policy to crush the EPP. In late April 2010, the Paraguayan leader ordered the deployment of 3,300 troops and police officers to the country’s northern provinces to crack down on the insurgents, an operation which was ultimately unsuccessful.
The June 2012 constitutional coup in Paraguay that overthrew Lugo from the presidency and installed his vice president, Federico Franco, has not seen any major changes in the EPP’s attitude towards the government. In late July, EPP guerrillas attacked an outpost in the Azote region. The attackers left a note identifying themselves as EPP members and blaming the oligarchy for the country’s poverty, illegal deforestation, and pollution of the environment, including water sources. Earlier in July, the EPP sent an email to a Paraguayan radio station in which it declared war against Franco’s government, which the group described as “extreme right” and a continuation of corruption and pro-oligarchy politics in the country. Franco has labeled the EPP as an extension of Colombia’s FARC (an accusation made also during Lugos’ government), and recently created a new security council to fight the insurgent group. From its public declarations, the EPP appears to be fighting for political objectives, though greater analyses will be necessary to confirm whether its members actually believe in installing a communist government in Asuncion or they are simply criminals using political ideologies as an excuse for their crimes.
Chaos with a Cause
In an interview by the author, a retired Colombian Army general was asked whether the era of ideologically-motivated violent insurgent movements in Latin America had come to an end. The officer stated that there continues to be a romantic perception of leftist Socialist ideology in the region, as well as a fascination of Cold War-era regional heroes, such as Fidel Castro and Ernesto “Che” Guevara.[5] An example of this can be seen in the rise of democratically-elected left-leaning governments in the region in the past decade, like Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Bolivia’s Evo Morales or Ecuador’s Rafael Correa. Meanwhile, young Peruvians who did not live throughout the extreme violence of the 1980
’s are joining the pro-Shining Path NGO known as MOVADEF. A July 2012 report in the British daily The Guardian quotes a young MOVADEF member saying that “the only man in the world who can solve our problems [is] Abimael Guzman.”
Regarding insurgent movements still active in the hemisphere, namely the FARC, ELN and the Shining Path, many seem to have become narco-terrorist organizations, with, arguably, only a few of their members maintaining some kind of loyalty to their founding ideologies. Greater in-depth analysis of the Paraguayan EPP will be necessary to fully state whether this new movement is true to its public declarations regarding its leftist ideology and political objectives, as this group could prove to be the exception to the rule regarding whether ideologically-motivated violence in Latin America has come to an end. Within a forthcoming article the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN),  will be specially discussed. Like the EPP, the Zapatistas claim to have an ideology; in this case, protecting the rights of indigenous Mexicans, though it does not have as an objective to overthrow the government.  It is debatable whether the Zapatistas should be labeled as an insurgent movement due to their goals and actions, which included both military operations as well as non-violent initiatives.
The rise of groups like the Mexican cartels, gangs like the Maras, criminal entities like the PCC and the reformation and rebranding of narco-terrorist movements like the Shining Path arguably indicates that we have witnessed the end of ideologically-motivated violence in the region, the debatable cases of the EPP and Zapatistas notwithstanding. Unfortunately, this does not mean that violence has ended and Latin America is finally at peace. Rather, it means that the motivations for the violence have slowly mutated from ideological collectives fighting for social change to more loosely aligned individuals fighting for personal and financial gains. A more complete analysis regarding the motivation of why individuals choose to join violent movements like the FARC and or a cartel like the Zetas, will require interviews with both current and former members, in order to make it clearer to what extent political ideologies and financial wealth play a factor when it comes to recruiting, and if this has changed over the years.
Like the aforementioned Colombian general said, there is still a certain romanticism associated with leftist ideologies, especially since, in spite of major economic growth in Latin America within the past decade
, there are still large economic disparities which are often aggravated by ethnic and racial factors. In a worst-case scenario, the kind that Latin America seems to have an affinity for, this might mean that we will see the eventual return of ideologically-motivated violence.
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W. Alex Sanchez is a Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) where he focuses on geopolitics, military and cyber security issues. He regularly appears in different media outlets like Al Jazeera, VOXXI, BBC, El Comercio (Peru), New Internationalist, among others. His analyses have appeared in numerous refereed journals including Small Wars and Insurgencies, Defence Studies, the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, European Security, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Cuban Affairs. Follow Alex on Twitter here.


[1] Bowden, Mark. “Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw.” Atlantic  Monthly Press. April 2001.
[3]Garzon, Juan Carlos. “Mafia & Co.: The Criminal Networks in Mexico, Brazil and Colombia.” Latin America Program.Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. June 2008.
[4]Author interview with security consultant. June 2012.
[5] Author interview with Colombian  Army General (ret). June, 2012.