A US Navy Rear Admiral highlighted the
importance of the US working closely with allies in its own backyard as
Louisiana shipbuilder delivers latest patrol vessel to partner nation.
Lacking
hefty procurement budgets, small Central American countries are
struggling to fulfil their defence equipment acquisition ambitions – and
the situation is only likely to worsen once the ramifications of
COVID-19 become clearer.
But if anyone has the world’s goods and sees his brother in need,
yet closes his heart against him, how does God’s love abide in him?” 1
John 3:17 On November 25, some 500 migrants, including women and children,
attempted to cross the Mexico-US border near the Mexican city of
Tijuana. They were repelled by US border patrol agents using tear gas.
The Mexican government has declared that those involved in the incident
will be deported.
This incident comes at the heels of the Trump administration’s controversial authorization of lethal force,
if necessary, by US troops stationed on the border with Mexico. He has
similarly increased his rhetoric when referring to the migrants, whom he
has labeled as “criminals,” and characterized the caravan as an “invasion.” Such statements do no help defuse the tense situation at the border.
Migrants and Troops
At the time of this writing, reports from the border say
that between five and nine thousand migrants from Central America,
particularly Honduras, are in Tijuana, camping by the border and at a
sports complex. The November 25 incident demonstrates that these people
are not willing to wait long until their case is heard by US immigration
authorities. (Certain media reports say some migrants are returning to their homeland.)
In response, President Donald Trump deployed over five thousand troops to the border—the mission was originally called Operation Faithful Patriot, but later the Department of Defense labeled it as simply border support. Additionally, military police officers from the port of entry in Texas have been deployed to support Border Patrol agents in the San Ysidro Land Port of Entry in San Diego.
According to CNN,
the Pentagon has explained that “the $72 million price tag covers the
cost of deploying the approximately 5,900 active duty troops until
December 15 and will increase the longer the troops are deployed.” This
is quite the price tag to deal with unarmed men, women, and children.
“Rocks as Rifles”
President Trump has shown no reservation regarding how the migrants should be treated. He declared:
Anybody throwing stones, rocks, like they did to Mexico and
the Mexican military, Mexican police, where they badly hurt police and
soldiers of Mexico, we will consider that a firearm… We’re not going to
put up with that. They want to throw rocks at our military, our military
fights back. I told them to consider it a rifle.
This statement was probably a reaction to a photo that has been circulating online which shows a bloody Mexican police officer; violent migrants allegedly injured him. That story has been exposed as a lie as the photo was actually taken in 2012.
Moreover, Newsweek has published
a decision memorandum, dated November 20 and signed by President Trump,
which states that the deployed military personnel to the border “may
perform those military protective activities that are reasonably
necessary to ensure the protection and safety of Federal personnel,
including a show of force (including lethal force, where necessary),
crowd control, temporary detention, and cursory search” (click here
for the entire document). The incident last month is an example of US
security personnel taking non-lethal actions in response to an attempted
stampede by the migrants to cross the border.
Discussion
The caravan coincided with the US midterm elections; hence, President
Trump made it an electoral issue. The US president has characterized
the caravan members as “young men, strong men,” many of whom are criminals, according to him. He once stated that there were individuals from the Middle East in the caravan—he would later acknowledge that there was no proof for this accusation.
To be fair, the US Department of Homeland Security
reportedly has informants in the caravan, and DHS officials have worked
with Mexican authorities to identify them and figure out if any of them
have criminal pasts. Authorities should treat such individuals
appropriately (including deportation), but President Trump’s stereotypes
and lies are a major problem. Similarly, individuals interviewed by Fox News
have also said that the migrants have diseases like smallpox,
tuberculosis, and even leprosy. In other words, the men, women, and
children of this caravan are evil-incarnated, and they are coming to
“invade,” as President Trump tweeted on October 29, the US and spread violence and leprosy. (Did Jesus not treat a leper with kindness rather than hate?)
This type of inflammatory language is not helpful. Rather than
engaging with the governments of Central America or the new
administration in Mexico, or with the caravan leaders themselves,
President Trump has focused on militarizing the border, vilifying the
migrants, and threatening US allies—he has threatened to cut financial aid to the Central American nations where the migrants come from.
Final Thoughts
It is understandable that any nation should refrain from having an
open-door migration policy, and should the situation turn more violent
at the border, it is correct for military personnel to defend
themselves. However, it is certainly not acceptable for any government
to spread hate and lies while dealing with a defenseless migrant
population.
—
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical,
military, and cybersecurity issues in the Western Hemisphere. The views
expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not
necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is
associated.
Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.
“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.
By Alejandro Sanchez
In the past year a number of narco submarines have been seized in several Latin American states. Narco submarines continue to be a problem as hemispheric security forces combat drug trafficking. Unfortunately for every narco sub that is seized, another is under construction. While recent successful operations should be applauded, combating narco subs needs a regional strategy of its own.
In recent months, several narco submarines have been seized in various Latin American states. For example, on 5 August, Ecuadoran marines located one in the Las Delicias area, close to the border with Colombia. For Colombia, a narco sub was seized in an operation by army and naval personnel in the San Juan and Baudó Rivers in the Choco department in late July. The platform, which was carrying approximately four tons of cocaine, was apparently manufactured by ELN rebels. The Colombian Navy explained that this was the first time a narco sub was operating in a river, and that it probably took some five to six months to be constructed. Not long after, in mid-August, the Colombian Navy located yet another narco sub, this time in the Nariño department and with the capacity to transport up to four tons of drugs. This one measured 14 meters, with a diesel motor and propellers, the Navy explained in a communiqué.
Narco subs have also been located in Central America. For example, a narco sub, reportedly 16 meters in length and capable of transporting up to five tons of drugs, was found inGuatemala in mid-April. Months later, in late July, the Costa Rican Coast Guard found a similar illegal platform on a beach. Local authorities believe that the vessel, with the capacity to transport up to four tons of drugs, had a motor problem and was discarded by the crew, until it washed ashore and got stuck in the sand.
Catching Them At Sea
The aforementioned examples highlight one fact. So far, the vast majority of narco-platforms are captured in the mainland (meaning either on dry land or “docked” in some body of water), either before they depart or upon arriving to their destination.
As far as the author has been able to find, in the past couple of years, there have only been a couple of narco subs intercepted in open waters. One was in July 2015, when during a “joint operation, the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and assets from the Customs and Border Protection Office of Air and Marine, intercepted a “narco submarine” off the coast of El Salvador,”Business Insider explains. The platform was carrying over 16,000 pounds of cocaine.
More recently, in early September 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Waesche intercepted a narco sub in the Pacific Ocean off the Central American coast. The Cutter reportedly launched two vessels and an armed helicopter in pursuit. U.S. personnel caught up with the sub, apprehended five suspects, and thwarted a scuttling attempt by pumping water out of the interior of the sub.” By preventing the sinking of the sub, the USCG seized more than 5,600 pounds of cocaine, with an estimated value of USD$73 million.
Who Finds The Narco Subs?
Nowadays, several Latin American and Caribbean navies and coast guards are undergoing a modernization process, which includes the acquisition of new platforms. For example,Colombia and Mexico are domestically manufacturing new fleets of patrol vessels. Christian Ehrlich, a director of intelligence for Riskop, a Mexican Strategic intelligence and risk control company explained to the author that the Mexican Navy is in the process of adding Damen Sigma 10514 frigates to its fleet, “this will provide a decisive boost to Mexico’s Maritime Domain Awareness but unfortunately it will be some time before this system has an acceptable operational level” (construction for the first of the new frigates commenced in mid-August). Meanwhile The Bahamas is in the final stretch of its ambitious Sandy Bottom Project, via which it is obtaining a fleet of different patrol boats from Damen Group. Similarly, in late June IHS Jane’s reported that Louisiana-based shipbuilder Metal Shark and Damen will construct near coastal patrol vessels (NCPVs) for regional U.S. partners like “the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala.” It is worth noting that Mr. Ehrlich, remarked how Mexico possesses aircraft like CASA CN—235 and Beechcraft King Air 350ER for ISR; Colombia also possesses similar assets.
Nevertheless, in spite of more modern navies and coast guards, locating narco subs at sea continues to be a problem. In an interview with the author, Gustavo Fallas, a journalist for the Costa Rican daily La Nacion, explained that “[Costa Rica] depends on the Americans to combat [narco submarines]. In 2006 we detained a submersible with three tons [of drugs] and it was thanks to an American frigate. In 2012 we chased another one in the Caribbean, and it was also after the Americans alerted us. For those reasons it is vital to have U.S. aid to locate these platforms.” Mr. Fallas added that Costa Rica must create a shield (meaning more vessels, radars, personnel) to prevent drug traffickers from using the country as a warehouse or transit path for drugs.
Unfortunately, Randy Pestana, a policy analyst at Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, has a gloomy assessment about regional naval forces vis-à-vis narco subs. Mr. Pestana explained to the author how “relying on partner nations to stop, slow, or detain these shipments is difficult in itself as they do not have the necessary tools to do so unless provided by the U.S.” Of a similar opinion is Mr. Ehrlich, who stated to the author that “there isn’t a navy or coast guard in Central America with the [necessary platforms] to detect, follow and interdict [narco submarines].”
In other words, Central American navies will continue to rely on the U.S. (be it SOUTCHOM or the Coast Guard) to monitor maritime areas in order to combat, among other threats, narco submarines. This is problematic, since, as Mr. Pestana remarked, even U.S. security agencies have limits to their abilities, particularly nowadays when the U.S. has other security operations and geopolitical concerns around the globe. Furthermore, there is the problematic and ever-present red tape, namely, “the inability of the U.S. to respond to an identified narco submarine without permission from higher leadership. This often led to the narco submarine to either get away, or move out of the U.S. areas of operation,” the FIU expert explained.
How To Find A Narco Sub
Locating a narco submarine at sea is a tricky business. In an interview with the author, Mario Pedreros, a retired Chilean Naval officer and an expert in airborne maritime patrol, provided an excellent analysis on this problem.
As previously mentioned, the term narco submarine is commonly utilized for these vessels, however they are not really submarines. As Mr. Pedreros explains, these platforms are semi-submersibles, meaning that they cannot go completely underwater, and if they can do so, it is for brief periods of time. (“Narco submarine” is still a catchier name than “narco-semi-submersible” though). However, even if these vessels cannot fully dive, they are nonetheless difficult to locate at sea. Mr. Pedreros explained how some of these platforms have electronic motors, which makes them more silent than diesel engines, making them harder to find with passive sonar. “When it comes to semi-submersibles, utilizing sonar is not very efficient,” Mr. Pedreros concludes. Adding to the problem is that the vessel is pretty small, and “once at sea, the submersibles have 20 percent of their structure above the surface,” making them hard to pinpoint by radar.
Mr. Pedreros recommended maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) as an ideal tool to combat narco submarines at sea, as these aircraft possess superior sensors and radars for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Obviously, locating the target is only part of the solution, because then it has to be intercepted. “The aircraft must work with together with a vessel to capture the submersible. In other words, there are three components in this process: an aircraft (MPA), a vessel, and a light boat that can board the submersible and detain the crew,” the retired Chilean Naval officer explained. As previously discussed, various Latin American and Caribbean navies are acquiring OPVs with attached light boats, while Colombia and Mexico have platforms for maritime patrol, fulfilling the requirements by Mr. Pedreros; what is needed is greater multinational support, apart from additional platforms.
The Future of the Narco Sub
It would be naïve to assume that recent successful operations by regional security forces will convince drug traffickers to stop investing in narco submarines. There is simply too much money to be made in drugs, and the subs cost only around USD$1 million to manufacture. Even if five narco subs are stopped, drug traffickers only need one or two successful deliveries to make up for their losses.
Moreover, recently seized narco subs show they are becoming more technologically advanced, including bigger in size so they can transport greater quantities of contraband. The narco sub seized in mid-July in Choco had space for a crew of four, measured 9 meters in length by 4 wide, had radars, stabilizers, ballast weights and was powered by over 100 batteries, according to the Colombian daily El Colombiano.
Indeed, the (brief) history of narco subs shows a trend towards modernization, particularly as drug lords are always looking for new methods to transport drugs, from Cessna aircraft and go-fast boats during the Pablo Escobar era to drones and narco subs nowadays (though of course, narcos continue to utilize the former as well). Mr. Pestana drives this home remarking how “top drug traffickers are relatively smart and have a good grasp on technology and history.” Moreover, the attractive wages narco-organizations can afford to pay means that they can hire “former engineers or other trade workers,” as Mr. Pestana explains, to continuously improve previous designs.
Final Thoughts
From a scholarly point of view, the appearance of the narco sub is a fascinating development as it highlights drug traffickers’ ingenuity as they continuously think of new ways of transporting their contraband. Unfortunately, this represents an ongoing problem for regional security forces, as new narco subs become more technologically advanced. Unfortunately, even though many narco subs have been stopped, it only takes one successful trip to make a large profit.
In spite of several successful operations, combating narco submarines requires both a multiagency and multinational strategy of its own. Mr. Ehlrich stresses the necessity to disrupt the construction of these platforms (which requires cooperation between police and military units). As for when narco submarines are at sea, the Greater Central American region requires united front, such as a regional anti-narco submarine task force. By combining resources, in which member states can contribute platforms to create the three-platform interception teams that Mr. Pedreros described, this unit would ideally be more successful at locating narco subs at sea, and not just in inland waterways. This will decrease the region’s dependency on the U.S., which Mr. Pestana and Mr. Fallas highlighted.
Unfortunately, narco submarines are a problem that will not sink, hence new strategies are needed in order to combat them more efficiently.
Alejandro Sanchez Nieto is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez
The author would like to thank the various experts that contributed to this commentary:
Christian J. Ehrlich, Director of Intelligence, Riskop; External Analyst, Mexican Navy
Gustavo Fallas, Journalist, La Nacion (Costa Rica)
Mario Pedreros, a retired Chilean Navy Officer, expert in aero-maritime patrol. He participated as a Tactical Coordinator Officer (TACCO) in different missions overseas onboard Chilean Navy P-3 Orion aircrafts. Missions include Anti Submarine Warfare, Anti Surface Warfare, Anti Terrorism missions and Search and Rescue operations. He is currently based in Washington, DC. doing consulting for several Defense and Security companies.
Randy Pestana, Policy Analyst, Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, Florida International University
The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.
"Sea Shepherd in Latin America"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
The Southern Tide
Center for International Maritime Security
September 21, 2016
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/sea-shepherd-latin-america/28147
Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.
“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.
By Alejandro Sanchez
Nowadays, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private military companies (PMCs) are deploying their own vessels to the open seas in order to have a greater role in protecting maritime traffic or the maritime ecosystem. When it comes to Latin America, one NGO in particular has made a name for itself in the past decade and a half: the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society.
Activities
Sea Shepherd is arguably most well-known for Whale Wars, a television show broadcasted by Animal Planet documenting activities by the organization’s vessels as they attempt to stop Japanese whale hunters in the Antarctic. However, Sea Shepherd also carries out operations around the world. When it comes to Latin America, the organization has been active throughout region, especially in Central America, Ecuador, and Mexico.
Regarding Central America, Sea Shepherd was first active in Guatemala in 2002, when the Ocean Warrior, commanded by the famous Paul Watson (founder and president of Sea Shepherd), attempted to crack down on illegal fishing in the Caribbean. The operation ended with an incident between Watson and the Costa Rican government that has had repercussions to this day (we will discuss it in the following section).
Sea Shepherd returned to Guatemala the following decade: in 2014 the organization’s 35 meter interceptor, the Brigitte Bardot, helped crack down on marlin poachers. A 2014 article in the Tico Timesexplains how “for the next several weeks, the Brigitte Bardot will be based out of Port San José, on Guatemala’s southern Pacific coast in the department of Escuíntla, with eight Sea Shepherd crew on board, along with Guatemalan Naval and police officers.” The presence of local security officials aboard the vessel is an important fact as they are ultimately in charge of arresting suspects.
As for Ecuador, Sea Shepherd has been in the South Pacific for over a decade to protect the Galapagos Islands. As early as 2002, the organization’s Sirenean was active in the Galapagos againstillegal fishing. Years later in 2007, Sea Shepherd’s activists worked with Ecuadorean law enforcement to crack down on sea cucumber poachers. The bilateral relationship took a leap forward this past March, when Sea Shepherd signed an agreement with Quito to support the protection of the islands for the next four years. AMarch 11 press release explains,
“Sea Shepherd has previously used an innovative approach to conservation needs that have been used in cooperation with public institutions such as the Galapagos National Park, the National Police and the legal system…Sea Shepherd’s previous conservation work in the Galapagos includes the installation of an AIS system, donation of a patrol vessel, police communications equipment, a legal reform and capacity building program and a marine conservation book.”
There already appear to be quick results, as in May Sea Shepherd and Ecuadorean authorities presented a new environmental penal code.
Concerning Mexico, the organization’s sailing ketch Martin Sheenparticipated in 2015’s Operation Milagro, which focused on “protecting the endangered vaquita in Mexico’s Sea of Cortez.” The operation occurred as part of an agreement between Sea Shepherd and Mexico’s National Commission of Natural Protected Areas (CONANP) and the Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection (PROFEPA) to protect the vaquita (a porpoise) and other marine fauna. The apparent success of Operation Milagro prompted a new initiative this year: Operation Angel de la Guarda, via which Sea Shepherd’s “anti-poaching vessel, the M/V Farley Mowat, is partnering with the Mexican Navy and environmental protection agency PROFEPA to patrol against totoaba poaching.”
Finally, it is worth mentioning that Sea Shepherd also participates in regional conferences that address environmental crimes. For example, in 2013, the organization presented a video on shark fishing at the Fifth Latin-American Congress of Environmental Prosecutors, held in Bogotá, Colombia.
The Costa Rica Incident
In spite of successful partnerships and initiatives with various Western Hemisphere nations, it is important to stress that Sea Shepherd’s relationship with the region has not been trouble-free. Namely the organization’s founder Paul Watson is wanted by the Costa Rican government.
A brief summary of the 2002 incident should suffice: the Ocean Warrior, commanded by Paul Watson, patrolled Guatemalan waters looking for vessels engaged in shark fishing. It was in this mission that Watson located a Costa Rican vessel, the Varadero I. There are conflicting reports on what happened afterwards: theOcean Warrior detained the Varadero I, and either the fishing vessel managed to flee, or Guatemalan authorities requested Watson to release the fishing boat. Watson then docked the Ocean Warrior in Costa Rica, where local authorities arrested him and charged him with attempted murder and shipwrecking. The charges were ultimately dropped, but because of Watson’s failure to appear in court for subsequent hearings, “Costa Rica court declared Watson as a rebel and issued a warrant of arrest for violation of ship traffic.”
To this day there is a request for Watson’s extradition by the Costa Rican government. He was detained in Germany in 2012 asINTERPOL posted a Red Notice, or international wanted person alert, for him (he is also wanted by Japan) but he was later freed. Watson filed a petition of his own against San Jose in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 2015.
The Future of NGOs and Maritime Security
Several NGOs, both international and domestic, operate in Latin America to address maritime affairs; however, Sea Shepherd appears to be the only entity that has vessels helping Latin American governments. The one arguable exception would be Greenpeace as its vessel, Arctic Sunrise, docked in Argentina in thelate 1990s and early 2000s to protest river pollution and promote wind energy. Nevertheless, the difference is that Greenpeace’s vessel was utilized as a publicity stunt to bring attention to an issue, while Sea Shepherd has deployed its vessels to Latin American waters to actively combat illegal fishing.
Thus, Sea Shepherd serves as an important precedent for future partnerships, as states may request maritime conservation support not just from other governments and multinational organizations, but also from NGOs. A key issue for future agreements will probably be that local security officers must be aboard any NGO vessels to carry out arrests. For example, Sea Shepherd’s Brigitte Bardot embarked Guatemalan law enforcement in 2014, probably to avoid another Costa Rica-type incident. A similar situation occurred in Ecuador in 2003 when the Sirenean, with Galapagos National Park Rangers and Ecuadorian Naval crew aboard, stopped a poaching ship.
Another issue that may hinder future agreements is whether governmental objectives are in harmony with those of Sea Shepherd or other organizations. Without a doubt, there is always the possibility of an incident derailing a partnership.For example, while the Quito-Sea Shepherd alliance appears strong, there was at least one incident between them in 2007 when Sea Shepherd representative Sean O’Hearn was deported from Ecuador.
Final Thoughts
In the 21st century, maritime enforcement affairs are no longer confined to governments and their maritime forces, be they navies or coast guards. Economic and technological development as well as vibrant civic societies have helped create global NGOs that do more than organize mailing campaigns or protests ashore, they are also acquiring platforms to take their activities to the open seas.
In spite of the Costa Rican incident and the legal limitations this places on Sea Shepherd founder Paul Watson, his organization has managed to make a positive name for itself among governments in Ecuador, Guatemala, and Mexico. Case in point, a 2015 press release by the Mexican Ministry of Natural Resources announcing the partnership with Sea Shepherd to protect the vaquita explains that “[Sea Shepherd] has great experience regarding the protection of maritime resources, it has recently collaborated with Ecuador to stop illegal fishing.” In other words, Sea Shepherd’s success in Ecuador is helping it gain new allies in the region, the problem with Costa Rica notwithstanding.
Partnerships akin to what Sea Shepherd has accomplished in these nations may become a model for other Latin American and extra-hemispheric governments to imitate in the near future, if they can find NGOs with appropriate naval platforms, acceptable modus operandi, and similar objectives.
*The author contacted Sea Shepherd Conservation Society for input to this analysis but has not yet received a response at time of publication.
**The idea for this analysis came from a discussion entitled “A New Role for Non-State Actors in the Growing Competition for Strategic Marine Resources,” co-hosted by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC).
Alejandro Sanchez Nieto is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez. The views presented in this essay are his sole responsibility and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which he is associated.
Latin America does not depend solely on exports from extra-regional powers for military equipment. On the contrary, the region boasts its own thriving domestic weapons industry. The crown jewel of Latin America’s defense industries is arguably Brazil’s, which has made a name for itself by domestically producing military equipment for export. Case in point is the Super Tucano, a light military aircraft that can be utilized for either training or combat operations, which is produced by the Brazilian aerospace conglomerate Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica (EMBRAER) and enjoys significant prominence in the field. According to the latest headlines, the Portuguese-speaking nation is predicted to have a good year in weapon sales, bolstering Brazil and Latin America in terms of capital and relevancy in the global arms market.
Recent Transactions
Over the years, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) has monitored Brazil’s budding military industry. This includes a report published in 2009, entitled: “EMBRAER: Brazilian Weapons Industry becoming a Global Arms Merchant?” The report discusses the history and recent activities of EMBRAER, the aforementioned Brazilian aerospace conglomerate. The company’s origins can be traced back to the Brazilian military junta that ruled the country from 1964 to1985. General Emilio Medici was head of the military junta in 1969 when EMBRAER was initially founded. Medici wanted the country to have its own self-contained aircraft-manufacturing company, with the state in control of 51% of the shares. COHA’s 2009 report features an interview with Dr. Thomaz Costa, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. Costa explains, “[Embraer’s] business philosophy seems to reflect a market position defined by producing platforms with technology, electronic components, and had a large array of private stock of parts available in its on-site global market. Its products directed to civilian markets are based in cost-effectiveness of product life cycle.”[i]
Since the release of COHA’s “Global Arms Merchant” report, EMBRAER and Brazil’s arms industry have accomplished some significant achievements.
One interesting development occurred in mid-2014, when the Brazilian media reported that Brazil had sold its first batch of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), commonly known as drones, to an African nation. It remains unclear which African nation bought the drones, though it is known that three FT-1000 Horus were sold, produced by the Brazilian company FT Sistemas S.A.[ii] Drones for military use are becoming increasingly popular among defense forces across the world, presenting an opportunity for Brazil to make a name for itself as a producer of reliable and efficient UAVs.
In addition to military aircraft, Brazil also produces and exports land equipment. In early February, the Italian-based Industrial Vehicles Corporation (IVECO) signed an agreement with Lebanon to sell that nation around 80 military and police vehicles. It is important to note that ten of these armored vehicles will be manufactured in Brazil.[iii]Specifically, the vehicles that will be produced in the South American state are the Guarani (VBTP-MR), a 6×6 armored personnel carrier that can carry up to eleven troops.[iv] They will be assembled in IVECO’s plant in Sete Lagoas, located in Brazil’s Minas Gerais state, which will boost the local workforce.[v]
Moreover, in November 2014, the Brazilian company AGRALE reached a deal with the government of Namibia for the sale of 141 Marrua, four-by-four wheeled transport and utility vehicles.[vi]/The African defense news website DefenceWeb explains that AGRALE has had a foothold in Namibia’s defense forces since 2011, when Namibia’s state owned Windhoeker Maschinenfabrik (WMF) company partnered with the Brazilian company to assemble its vehicles, including tractors.[vii]
Furthermore, in late-2014 the Angolan Navy ordered seven Macae-class patrol boats from Brazil. This came about via an agreement between the defense ministries of the two countries, with four of the vessels to be constructed in Rio de Janeiro by Brazil’s Empresa Generencial de Projectos Navais (EMGEPRON).[viii]
Finally, in response to an e-mail query by COHA, DefenceWeb also mentioned the A-Darter missile project between South Africa and Brazil. Just this past February, the Brazilian Air Force reported the successful firing of an air-to-air A-Darter missile. The defense news portal Defense Industry Daily has generally praised this partnership, explaining that “there’s a new advanced dogfighting missile coming to town, and it won’t be coming from any of the standard players.”[ix] The missile is a partnership between the Brazilian Air Force, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense and the South African-based Denel Dynamics (a subsidiary of Denel SOC Ltd) which dates back to 2006.[x]
The aforementioned examples of confirmed orders highlight the growing presence of Brazil as a global arms merchant not only when it comes to warplanes, but also manufactures land and sea equipment. The independent geopolitical risk consultant Milena Rodban explained to COHA that “Brazil’s defense industry is protected as part of the country’s National Defense Strategy, which stresses the need for an autonomous national defense industry to keep Brazil from becoming reliant on other countries to equip its armed forces.”[xi]
The U.S.-Super Tucano Deal
The sale of Super Tucano planes to the U.S. deserves an in-depth discussion in itself. In recent years, Washington-Brazil relations have been at times tense, particularly due to the 2013 discovery that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) had spied on President Dilma Rousseff’s telephone and e-mail accounts. But prior to the diplomatic tensions, the two countries had reached an agreement over the transaction of 20 Super Tucanos. According to a September 2014 article in AviationWeek.com, the U.S. Air Force has begun receiving the first of the A-29 Super Tucanos purchased by the U.S. government.[xii] EMBRAER has teamed up with Sierra Nevada Corp., an electronic systems provider and systems integrator headquartered in Nevada. This was a very important order as it was EMBRAER’s first successful venture in the U.S. defense market.”[xiii]
It is worth noting that the U.S. is merely a stopover for the Super Tucanos, as they will be eventually taken to Afghanistan to be flown by the local Air Force. In fact, renownedJane’s Defense Weekly reports that as early as this January, the U.S. Air Force has “begun training Afghan pilots and maintainers on the Embraer A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft at Moody Air Force Base (AFB) in Georgia.”[xiv] It is certainly a great honor for EMBRAER to have its flagship aircraft chosen by the U.S. Air Force, and even more so that it will be utilized by the Afghanistan military to bring security and order back to the troubled Central Asian state.
Nevertheless, the question remains whether current chilly Washington-Brasilia relations will affect future deals. Geopolitical risk consultant Milena Rodban argues that “Embraer’s plans to sell more planes to the U.S., for use in border surveillance and counter-narcotics missions, may be affected. I personally think that the likelihood of chilly relations resulting in fewer sales remains low. If Embraer loses out on bids, it’ll be because other companies are in a better position to provide adequate equipment, and not because of the fallout from the NSA scandal.”[xv] The opinion is shared by Inigo Guevara, a specialist in Latin American defense affairs. In an interview with COHA, Guevara explained that “the first Super Tucano deal was agreed upon before the NSA scandal. The question now is whether the U.S. government will want a second batch of these planes.”[xvi]
Sales Speculation
As is generally the case with the global arms trade, there is plenty of speculation regarding future prospects for Brazil’s weapons industry. For the sake of the argument, we will mention the most prominent rumors.
One possible future for the Super Tucanos is Guatemala, as the country’s government has considered purchasing them for quite some time. In fact, Guatemala and EMBRAER signed an agreement in 2013 for a transaction including six Super Tucanos. Nevertheless, in 2013, Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina announced his decision to withdraw from the original order. The Guatemalan head of state argued at the time that the aircrafts were overpriced, hence his decision to cancel the deal.[xvii] As a penalty, Guatemala paid around 600 thousand USD dollars in fines.[xviii] It appears that Guatemala City still desires the planes, but only two instead of six. However, some concerns remain regarding the planes’ cost. Specifically, the Guatemalan Minister of Defense, General Manuel Lopez, has declared that purchasing the two Super Tucanos, along with three radars and two interceptor speed boats, will cost around $13 million USD. The highly regarded defense-news agency Infodefensa.com argues that even in the best of cases, this amount is too low, considering one new Super Tucano with basic-equipment costs around $10 million USD alone.[xix] The Guatemalan media has widely quoted Minister Lopez on the issue, who emphasizes that regardless of the cost, Guatemala is committed to obtaining several Super Tucanos this time around.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) are involved in rumors surrounding the notorious Super Tucanos. Senior military official Brigadier General Juniti Saito, Commander of the Brazilian Air Force, has declared that the UAE is interested in acquiring twenty-four A-29 Super Tucanos. This particular speculation may turn out to ring true in the near future, as the UAE government apparently aims to acquire some aircraft directly from the Brazilian Air Force’s inventory for a speedy delivery.[xx]
Another agreement over the Super Tucanos which is currently in the works is tied to Indonesia. The Asian nation originally wanted to purchase an aircraft, but relations between the two governments have soured since January when Indonesia executed Mario Archer, a Brazilian citizen who had been found guilty of smuggling 13.4 kilograms of cocaine into the country. Prior to the execution, President Rousseff herself called Indonesian President Joko Widodo, pleading for mercy on behalf of her citizen, but the Indonesian government continued with his execution and other prisoners, some of them also foreigners. In retaliation, Brazil called its ambassador back to the country for consultations and also did not recognize the credentials of the new Indonesian ambassador.[xxi] In response to this, Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla declared that his government was considering canceling the purchase of 16 EMB-314 Super Tucano warplanes for the Indonesian Air Force.[xxii] (For another perspective on this affair, it is worth noting that Indonesia is a long-time customer of EMBRAER, as it purchased 18 of their aircrafts in 2010.[xxiii])
It should be noted that there is another Brazilian citizen, Rodrigo Gularte, on death row in Indonesia. Like Archer, Gularte is also accused of smuggling cocaine.[xxiv] If Gularte is also executed, this could further tarnish relations, damaging any hope for the Super Tucano deal.
Analysis
In 2014, the major news regarding Brazilian arms sales was related to Brazil’s decision to purchase 36 Gryphen warplanes from the Swedish company Saab.[xxv] This decision was a shock formany because it was widely believed, that the Brazilian government would choose the Rafale warplanes, produced by the French company Dassault.[xxvi]But while Brazil’s purchase of weapons from the exterior is certainly noteworthy – the Gryphen deal will cost some $4.5 billion USD – the Brazilian weapons complex has not fallen behind. Recent deals over Super Tucanos with the U.S. and Afghanistan, the sales of combat and armored vehicles to Lebanon and Namibia, and even the sale of a small quantity of drones to an unidentified African nation, highlight that several governments, even major military actors like the U.S. and UAE, are interested in Brazilian-made weapons. Should new deals occur in the coming months, like with the UAE, this will only strengthen Brazil’s pedigree when it comes to the manufacturing of reliable weaponry that nations across the world desire.
Nevertheless, a word of caution is necessary. Although arms sales continue, they have fallen beneath the projections of what Brazilian weapons companies desire. Furthermore, not all aspects within these companies are ideal. Specifically, Sami Hassuani, CEO of Avibras Aeroespacial, a producer of military equipment, acknowledges that some 1,500 employees were not promptly paid this past December.[xxvii]
COHA interviewed Mauricio Santoro, a professor of International Relations at Candido Mendes University. Professor Santoro explained to COHA that during the Rousseff presidency, there have been “many cuts in the federal budget, and these companies experienced serious setbacks. Avibras´ situation is controversial. The Minister of Defense [Jacques Wagner] says that the problem is its management, and not lack of contracts.”[xxviii] As a way to assure its customers and employees of its current situation, Avibras released a press release just this past March 11, explaining that it is paying its collaborators and missing salaries.[xxix] It is a positive development that the company is paying its dues, but it is troubling that the company felt the need to publish a communiqué arguing that its management is in control of the company. While sharing his thoughts with COHA, independent analyst Inigo Guevara highlighted that “in the 1990s, ENGESA produced and exported armored vehicles and it went bankrupt,” highlighting how companies that are having successful sales can undergo major turmoil.[xxx]
Ultimately, there is the obvious concern of whether Brazilian arms manufacturers will be able to maintain their momentum regarding exports. The aforementioned sales exemplify that various countries desire to purchase Brazilian military technology. However, the global arms trade has a plethora of suppliers. Apart from the usual suspects like the U.S., Russia, and China, various other nations also produce high-tech weaponry. Sweden, for example, which is not usually regarded as a European military powerhouse, produces the Gryphen warplanes that Brazil recently purchased. Even Peru, which houses a smaller industry than Brazil, jumpstarted its weapons industry in recent years with positive results. For example, Servicios Industriales de la Marina (SIMA), a state-owned Peruvian company with multiple shipyards, produces vessels for the Peruvian Navy, including a new training vessel, the BAP Union.[xxxi] Furthermore, SIMA recently reached an agreement with Panama to open a SIMA subsidiary shipyard in the strategic Central American nation.[xxxii]
Geopolitical risk consultant Milena Rodban explained to COHA that one crucial factor that makes Brazilian weapons, and those produced by other Latin American countries, attractive, is the “willingness” of these governments “to sell to customers without imposing rules on resale, use, etc. This latter point is very important, since it greatly expanded the pool of potential customers, allowing Brazil to sell to countries including Libya and Saudi Arabia, which were willing to buy, but only if there were no strings attached to the sale.”[xxxiii] Professor Santoro adds that “Brazil has been trying hard to build an arms industry since the 1960s, but this project only advances when the State has enough resources to support the companies in a very competitive international market.”[xxxiv]
Ultimately, there is the question of how much of a “splash” is Brazil making in the global weapons market. The renowned Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has released a new report with updated data on the arms trade. A March 2015 SIPRI Fact Sheet, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2014,” states that the top 10 largest exporters of weapons nowadays are the U.S., Russia, China, German, France, the UK, Spain, Italy, Ukraine and Israel.[xxxv] In other words, even with the Super Tucano sale to the U.S. and sales to Namibia and Lebanon, Brazil is not considered within the top 10 of global weapons exporters.
On March 16, the Stimson Center, a Washington DC-think tank, hosted an event to celebrate the SIPRI report, which included speakers from SIPRI, the Forum on the Arms Trade and an expert from Stimson.[xxxvi] During the Q&A section, a COHA military analyst asked the speakers for their thoughts on Latin America as an emerging exporter of weapons, with Brazil as the crown jewel. The SIPRI expert, Dr. Aude Fleurant, spoke about South-South cooperation, while Jeff Abramson, from the Forum on the Arms Trade, spoke about countries having “niche markets” for their products. Moreover, it was highlighted that emerging powers with strong militaries are having troubles placing their domestically-made products in the global market, like for example India.
It seems that experts in general agree that several Brazilian companies, EMBRAER chief among them, are going to continue their weapons exports abroad; with the no-strings-attached sale certainly helping. Nevertheless, even the major sale of 20 Super Tucanos to the U.S. Air Force is not enough to break Brazil into the Top-10 list of major weapons exporters in the world. With that said, smaller sales to other developing nations will continue to enrich these companies’ coffers.
Conclusions
The early months of 2015 put the Brazilian weapons industry in an interesting situation. Several deals have transpired that should qualify the country as an admired and respected global arms merchant, best exemplified by its deals with Lebanon, Namibia, and even the U.S. and Afghanistan as a final destination for the planes. Nevertheless, there are obstacles. The issue of unpaid salaries is a troubling matter that may indicate managerial problems in some of these companies. Moreover, the 2013 annulment of the Guatemala deal and inter-governmental tensions that threaten the deal with Indonesia stress the subjectivity of speculation over agreements; even finalized agreements are at risk for cancellation. Professor Mauricio Santoro concludes that in Brazil, “there are some very dynamic companies, such as Embraer and Condor (which produces less-lethal weapons) and good perspectives for firms engaged in the Navy expansion program. But the future of many other companies, including Avibras, is still a difficult question to answer.”[xxxvii]
Finally, as Brazil’s weapons industry grows, the question becomes to which countries it is willing to sell weapons. The obvious concern is that Brazilian weapons may be acquired by governments that are accused of human rights abuses, such as genocide, or engaged in illicit activities. As a signatory of the UN Arms Trade Treaty, the Brazilian government has the duty not just to its domestic companies to ensure that they flourish, but also to humanity to ensure that Brazilian weapons are not used for evil.
With that said, Brazil continues to grow as a major weapons supplier to nations across the world. The country’s Super Tucano cannot be compared to the highly-advanced, and very costly, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter warplane (constructed by Lockheed Martin and funded by the U.S. and several of its allies), nor can the Horus UAV be compared to an armed Predator, but Brazil is also capable of meeting the demand for cheap and effective weapons on a global scale.
By: W. Alejandro Sanchez, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs
Please accept this article as a free contribution from COHA, but if re-posting, please afford authorial and institutional attribution. Exclusive rights can be negotiated. For additional news and analysis on Latin America, please go to: LatinNews.com and Rights Action.
Featured Photo: : Chris Carlson, a Sierra Nevada Corporation senior pilot, taxis an A-29 Super Tucano on the flightline during its first arrival, Sept. 26, 2014, at Moody Air Force Base, Ga. The Afghan Air Force will implement the A-29 as their current air-to-ground aircraft, the Mi-35 attack helicopter, reaches its end of service life in January 2016. (U.S. Air Force photo/Airman 1st Class Dillian Bamman) – http://www.af.mil/News/Photos/tabid/129/igphoto/2000945465/Default.aspx
[xxxiii] Milena Rodban. Geopolitical risk consultant. Interview with the author. March 2015.
[xxxiv] Mauricio Santoro. Professor of International Relations at Candido Mendes University. Interview with the author. March 2015.
[xxxv] Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman. “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2014.” SIPRI Fact Sheet. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. March 2015.
