Showing posts with label military exercises. Show all posts
Showing posts with label military exercises. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 10, 2024

CIMSEC: "BRACOLPER at 50: A Model Multinational Riverine Exercise"

 

"BRACOLPER at 50: A Model Multinational Riverine Exercise"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

The Southern Tide

Center for International Maritime Security

10 December, 2024

Originally published: https://cimsec.org/bracolper-at-50-a-model-multinational-riverine-exercise/


Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

Multinational naval exercises occur frequently across the globe. They are effective confidence-building mechanisms that promote integration, cooperation, and trust while improving the participating personnel’s capabilities and expertise. The most prominent naval exercises in the Western Hemisphere are the US-sponsored UNITAS, SOLIDAREX, and TRADEWINDS.

However, naval exercises do not solely occur at sea but also occur in inland bodies of water. Enter the multinational riverine exercise BRACOLPER, which, as the name suggests, brings together the navies from Brazil, Colombia, and Peru.

Monday, November 11, 2024

Zona Militar: "Red Cat expands clientele to Australian Navy and US CECOM"

 

"Red Cat expands clientele to Australian Navy and US CECOM"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Zona Militar

11 November, 2024

Originally published: https://www.zona-militar.com/en/2024/11/11/red-cat-expands-clientele-to-australian-navy-and-us-cecom/

Red Cat, a producer of Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS), had a busy October, as the company announced new contracts with the Royal Australian Navy and United States Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM), in addition to the presentation of its Arachnid UAS family.

 

En castellano: https://www.zona-militar.com/2024/11/12/red-cat-equipara-con-sus-uas-arachnid-a-la-real-armada-australiana-y-al-comando-de-comunicaciones-y-electronica-del-ejercito-de-ee-uu/

Red Cat, un productor de Sistemas Aéreos No Tripulados (UAS), tuvo un mes de octubre ocupado, ya que la compañía anunció nuevos contratos con la Real Armada Australiana y el Comando de Comunicaciones y Electrónica del Ejército de los Estados Unidos (CECOM), además de la presentación de su familia de UAS Arachnid.

Friday, April 26, 2024

Essay: "South America: small wars, insurgencies & aerial acquisition programs"

 


 "South America: small wars, insurgencies & aerial acquisition programs"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Small Wars and Insurgencies

Published: 24 April, 2024

Originally published: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2024.2336089

 Abstract: While maintaining minimal deterrence capabilities, South America’s has not experienced inter-state warfare in almost three decades. Internal security challenges exist, while militaries are involved in various other missions, including humanitarian assistance, search-and-rescue, combating wildfires, and combating environmental crimes like illegal fishing and illegal mining. This analysis will discuss the evolving role of South American insurgencies vis-à-vis small wars, insurgencies, and other combat and non-combat missions by focusing on regional air fleets. The types of rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft Air Forces, Armies, and Navies are purchasing (or domestically manufacturing) explain what kinds of missions and threats armed services are focused on today and tomorrow’s priorities. Small case studies of helicopter and combat warplane fleets across South American militaries will help us understand what regional services spend their often-limited funds on. Moreover, we will address how regional air fleets may be composed a decade from now, by 2034, considering regional geopolitics, missions, and priorities (including environmental protection). Confidence-building mechanisms and the influence, or lack thereof, of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on recent acquisition programs and strategies will provide a more complete analysis.

 Continue reading: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2024.2336089

Sunday, October 9, 2022

The National Interest: The War in Ukraine Has Revealed an Independent Kazakhstan

 

"The War in Ukraine Has Revealed an Independent Kazakhstan"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

The Buzz

The National Interest

09 October, 2022

Originally published: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/war-ukraine-has-revealed-independent-kazakhstan-205253

Astana is undergoing a diplomatic and political shift amid the Russo-Ukrainian War, and observers should keep a close eye on its balancing act.

Continue reading... 

Thursday, September 29, 2022

CIMSEC: Naval Operations Across South American Rivers: The “Other” Theater of Operations

 

"Naval Operations Across South American Rivers: The “Other” Theater of Operations"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

The Southern Tide

Center for International Maritime Security

29 September

Originally published: https://cimsec.org/naval-operations-across-south-american-rivers-the-other-theater-of-operations/

When thinking about navies, there is a natural tendency to focus on operations in the open sea and the role of carriers, frigates, and submarines. However, aside from protecting their territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, South American navies have another equally important theater of operation: inland water bodies like lakes and rivers.

The recently concluded riverine exercises ACRUX X and BRACOLPER and even last year’s UNITAS 2021 demonstrate the importance that regional navies place on inland bodies of water and riverine populations. Activities carried out by local navies, not to mention other armed services, including defense/security operations, combating crimes (illegal mining and smuggling are significant problems in the region), search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations. In South America, the armed forces help extend the reach of the state to areas where civilian agencies do not operate; navies utilize rivers as a system of complex highways via which they can move and operate just as efficiently as in the open sea.

Continue reading...

Thursday, May 5, 2022

CIMSEC: Brazilian Navy Participates in Exercise Obangame Express 2022


 "Brazilian Navy Participates in Exercise Obangame Express 2022"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

The Southern Tide

Center for International Maritime Security

05 May, 2022

Originally published: https://cimsec.org/brazilian-navy-participates-in-exercise-obangame-express-2022/

Exercise Obangame Express 2022, the largest multinational maritime exercise in Western Africa, concluded its 11th iteration in Dakar, Senegal, on March 18. A total of 32 nations participated, including regional countries like Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, extra-regional nations like France and the United States, and multinational agencies including the Economic Community of West African States and the Economic Community of Central African States.

One extra-continental participant was the Brazilian Navy (Marinha do Brasil), via oceanic patrol vessel (OPV) Amazonas (P120). Brazil’s participation is neither an oddity nor a development that should be overlooked in Washington; the Brazilian military, particularly the navy, has a long history of close relations with many African militaries to increase the Portuguese-speaking nation’s presence and image across the South Atlantic, as well as strengthen military-to-military relations.

Continue Reading...

Tuesday, April 5, 2022

CIMSEC: Exercise Tradewinds 2022: Mexico’s and Belize’s Time to Shine

 

"Exercise Tradewinds 2022: Mexico’s and Belize’s Time to Shine"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

The Southern Tide

Center for International Maritime Security

5 April, 2022

Originally published: https://cimsec.org/exercise-tradewinds-2022-mexicos-and-belizes-time-to-shine/

 

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“Whether [working] against COVID, transnational criminal organizations, the predatory actions of China, the malign influence of Russia, or natural disasters, there’s nothing we cannot overcome or achieve through an integrated response with our interagency allies and partners.” – General Laura J. Richardson, Commander, U.S. Southern Command”  

Multinational exercise Tradewinds 2022, the Caribbean’s premier military exercise, will be co-hosted by Belize and Mexico and will take place on May 7-21, 2022. This is a great opportunity to promote greater interoperability among the two host nations, the United States, and Canada, as well as partners from the greater Caribbean.

 Continue reading...

Sunday, June 23, 2019

Defence IQ: Moldova-US relations and the National Guard’s State Partnership Programme


"Moldova-US relations and the National Guard’s State Partnership Programme"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Defence IQ
June 19, 2019
Originally published: https://www.defenceiq.com/army-land-forces/articles/moldova-us-relations-and-defence-industry-opportunities


The Importance of the National Guard State Partnership Programme

“It’s a great programme. Both sides get a lot out of it, and to the degree that we can expand it, I think it makes sense to do so,” said Dr. Mark T. Esper, Secretary of the Army, after I asked about the National Guard’s State Partnership Programme at the Atlantic Council, in Washington DC, in mid-May.

The partnership programme teams up a state’s national guard with a US partner international partner, such as the Republic of Moldova and the North Carolina National Guard.

The US is Moldova’s major defence partner, and the Chisinau-North Carolina relationship has become the cornerstone of this evolving partnership.


Keep on Reading

Friday, March 1, 2019

Geopolitical Monitor: Moldova’s February Elections and Regional Geopolitics

"Moldova’s February Elections and Regional Geopolitics"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Geopolitical Monitor
Opinion
1 March, 2019
Originally published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/moldovas-february-elections-and-regional-geopolitics/

The Republic of Moldova held parliamentary elections on February 24 with the goal of electing a new government that will, ideally, not be either corrupt or incompetent. Moreover, given the country’s geographical location, between Romania and Ukraine in southeastern Europe, these elections are important as Western governments and the Russian Federation aim at strengthening their influence in Chisinau.

The elections provided no clear winner, which means that both domestically and geopolitically, Moldova remains in limbo.

The Elections
Moldova is a parliamentary representative democracy; the president is head of state, and the prime minister is head of government. Several prime ministers over the past decade, including the incumbent Pavel Filip, have maintained a pro-Europe stance. Examples of pro-European initiatives include Moldova joining “the European Union’s Eastern Partnership in 2009 [while] the EU-Moldova Association Agreement entered into force on 1 July 2016.” On the other hand, President Igor Dodon is openly pro-Russian, as exemplified by his regular trips to Moscow. In 2018, the country obtained observer status in the Eurasian Economic Union, which President Dodon praised.

Just under 1.5 million Moldovan citizens voted on February 24, which is only 49% of the total number of voters, or about 200,000 fewer votes compared to 2014. The elections left no clear winner: the pro-Russia Socialist Party (PSRM) won 35 out of 101 seats, well short of a majority. On the other hand, the pro-European Democratic party obtained 30 seats. Meanwhile a new bloc, whose pledge was to fight corruption, the ACUM DA PAS, obtained 26 seats. Due to space issues we will not address the country’s  controversial new electoral law or widespread reports of voting irregularities.

Hence, Moldova will have a “deeply divided parliament without a clear majority that could have trouble agreeing on a new government.” Snap elections may be called again for later this year if no government is formed. The landlocked nation’s challenges have been well-analyzed over the past years, such as the infamous theft of around USD$1 billion from local banks, political corruption, and other issues.

At a February 22 event titled “Russia Abroad,” held at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington DC,  Professor Anna Ohanyan of Stonehill College discussed Russia’s attempts at capitalizing on the divides and fractures within post-Soviet and other nations to increase Moscow’s influence. In response to a question by the author of this commentary, Professor Ohanyan explained that when it comes to Moldova’s elections “it probably matters less as to who comes to power but as to whether the institutions and elections remain clean.” The professor also added that the Transnistrian people will have to decide as to whether they “might see value in staying with Moldova or if Moldova becomes so fully integrated regionally that Transnistria [Moldova’s separatist region] negotiates a deal so it can dip into both sides.”

It will be interesting to monitor if the 24 February elections affect in any way Chisinau-Tiraspol relations.

Moldova in The New Great Game
The future of Moldova will have repercussions on regional geopolitics as well, including from a defense point of view. Let us briefly summarize recent developments:

Apart from the association agreement with the European Union, “a civilian NATO Liaison Office in Chisinau was established in December 2017 [in Moldova] to promote practical cooperation and facilitate support for the country’s reforms.” Moldovan troops have also regularly participated in multinational maneuvers, such as Rapid Trident 2017 and Platinum Eagle. Moreover, the US military is reportedly planning to establish a presence at the Buboaca training base, and, according to Jane’s Defence Weekly, US military aircraft have been spotted by open-source networks to be flying out of Constanta airport, Romania, and over Transnistria and the Transnistria-Ukraine border.

Meanwhile, Russia continues to maintain a military presence in Transnistria in the form of the Operative Group of Russian Troops (OGRT) and via peacekeepers. Moreover, Russian troops regularly carry out exercises with the separatist regime’s local forces. Also, President Dodon has stated his support for Russian peacekeepers in the country, stating “we confirmed the importance of keeping the peacekeeping mission there as a factor of stability in the Security Zone,” TASS news agency reported in late December 2018.
In other words, both Washington/Europe and Moscow have a presence and interest in the future of Moldova as it will affect geopolitics in southeastern Europe.

At this point, it is necessary to mention that Moldova’s constitution stresses the country’s neutrality, hence Chisinau cannot join military blocs like NATO and, given the fractured state of Moldovan politics, it is highly unlikely that the constitution could be modified in order to achieve NATO membership in any case.

Final Thoughts
Ideally, the February 24 elections would have ended in a clear winner, and this would have provided an idea of what we could expect regarding Moldova’s foreign policy in the near future. Unfortunately, the controversial and inconclusive result means that the status quo will remain. In theory the Socialist Party could assemble a coalition which, combined with President Dodon, would orient the country’s foreign policy in favor of Moscow; however, we will have to wait and see if indeed a government is formed.

Moldova has plenty of internal political and economic challenges. Its geographical location, right in the middle of this new Cold War, will not help it attain political stability or meaningful socio-economic development anytime soon.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com or any institutions with which the author is associated.

Tuesday, August 7, 2018

CIMSEC: Tradewinds 2018 and the Caribbean’s Maritime Security Challenges


"Tradewinds 2018 and the Caribbean’s Maritime Security Challenges"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
The Southern Tide
Center for International Maritime Security
7 August 2018
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/tradewinds-2018-and-the-caribbeans-maritime-security-challenges/37315

The Southern Tide
Written by W. Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.
By W. Alejandro Sanchez

The first two phases of the multinational, Caribbean-focused military exercise Tradewinds 2018 took place between 4-21 June. Said maneuvers, sponsored by U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), brought together an estimated 1,700 troops from almost two dozen nations. Given the ongoing maritime security challenges that the Greater Caribbean continues to face, these confidence and interoperability-building exercises continue to be very important.

Tradewinds ‘18
The first two phases of Tradewinds 2018 took place in Saint Kitts and Nevis and then in The Bahamas. Phase III, a seminar among regional leaders to discuss the results of the first two phases, occured from 17-19 July in Miami, Florida. The participating nations included the majority of Caribbean states, in addition to Canada, Mexico, the U.S. and extra-hemispheric states like France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

Some of the platforms that were deployed include the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Charles David Jr. (WPC-1107); the British RFA Mounts Bay (L3008), a Bay-class auxiliary landing ship dock; Canada’s HMCS Shawinigan (MM 704), a Kingston-class coastal defense vessel; and Mexico’s ARM Oaxaca (PO 161), an Oaxaca-class patrol vessel. As for aerial platforms, these included AS365N3 Panther and UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters. As SOUTHCOM explains “this year’s focus is on countering transnational organized crime in the region,” apart from other priorities like improving disaster response. Operations at sea including procedures to intercept a non-compliant vessel, and live firing exercises with deck-mounted weapon systems like .50 caliber machine guns and 25 mm cannon.

In general, Caribbean governments and security forces have generally had a positive attitude toward these maneuvers. For example, Prime Minister of St. Kitts and Nevis and Minister of National Security the Honourable Dr. Timothy Harris reportedly stated “I have been assured that we can therefore expect training components or injects that reflect real world scenarios so that in the face of a real threat, our security forces and emergency response personnel will be able to coordinate seamlessly and in a manner and time that both meet international standards.” Similarly, Christian J. Ehrlich, an external analyst at the Strategic Research Institute of the Mexican Navy (Instituto de Investigaciones Estratégicas de la Armada de México), explained to the author that Tradewinds will help improve  interoperability between regional navies and coast guards.

Caribbean Threats
The Caribbean’s maritime security challenges are very diverse. They include drug trafficking (Washington’s primary concern), weapons and human trafficking, illegal fishing, not to mention search and rescue operations. These crimes have been extensively recorded, but it is worth noting that some occurred, somewhat ironically, at the same time that Tradewinds was taking place. For example, in mid-June Her Majesty’s Bahamian Ship (HMBS) Durward Knowles, a patrol vessel, intercepted a 50-ft Dominican fishing vessel that was poaching in Bahamian waters. Around the same time, the Dominican Republic chased a speedboat until it stopped in the coast of Pedernales province. Aboard were 351 packets which apparently contained cocaine. A month earlier, in early May, it was the Jamaican Defense Force’s turn to catch a vessel at sea, as a ship reportedly intercepted off the coast of Westmoreland had “764.9 pounds of compressed marijuana.”

Even more, piracy is becoming a noteworthy problem: in 2017 the organization Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) “recorded 71 incidents in Latin America and the Caribbean. Most incidents in the region occurred in territorial waters, with anchored yachts being the primary targets for attackers.” There were also 16 attacks against tankers and three fishing vessels, among other types of ships. A map prepared by OBP shows a cluster of incidents off the coast of Belize, Colombia, Venezuela as well around the islands of Grenada, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

Not counted in the report was a late-April 2018 incident along the Guyanese-Surinamese border, where pirates attacked a group of four fishing boats, robbing the crew and killing several of them.

The Status of Caribbean Maritime Forces
Some Caribbean defense forces have attempted to upgrade and expand their maritime fleets in order to take better control of their exclusive economic zone (EEZ). For example, the Royal Bahamas Defense Force (RBDF) has cquired several vessels constructed by Damen Shipyard  via the Sandy Bottom Project. These include Damen Stan 3007 and Stan Patrol 4207 patrol vessels as well as one Stan Lander 5612 auxiliary transport, roll on-roll off vessel. Similarly in 2016 the Jamaican Defense Force (JDF)  upgraded its fleet by receiving two new Stan Patrol 4207 from Damen in 2017. That same year, the JDF received two 38-foot SAFE boats and two 37-foot Boston Whaler vessels, donated by the U.S. More recently, in late July 2018, the Barbados Coast Guard commissioned patrol boat Endurance, a 958Y inshore vessel donated by China earlier this year.  The ambitious Sandy Bottom Project notwithstanding, Caribbean defense forces in general have limited defense budgets, hence new platforms, aerial or maritime, are not acquired or modernized regularly. Moreover, the aforementioned examples also highlight the continuous reliance on extra-regional allies  for donations in order to expand the naval inventory of these defense forces.

Mr. Ehrlich mentions that greater regional cooperation and interoperability is needed in order to make up for a limited number of platforms and personnel, and in order to decrease the region’s dependence on SOUTHCOM and the U.S. Coast Guard. The Mexican Navy could step up its presence in the Caribbean to help its partners with maritime security, but unfortunately the Mexican Navy seems to be more focused on its Pacific territory.

As a final point, it is important to highlight the troubling scandals regarding regional defense officers that are caught in cahoots with criminals. For example, Colonel Rafael Collado Ureña of the Dominican Republic’s Army, was arrested in mid-2017 in Puerto Rico as he was about to carry out a sale of 12.9 kilograms of cocaine. Around the same time, a member of the Jamaican Defense Force was arrested at Kingston airport as he tried to board a flight to Toronto with 2.8 kilograms of cocaine. 

Final Thoughts
Exercise Tradewinds 2018 recently concluded, and hopefully the maneuvers and training exercises that Caribbean forces carried out with counterparts such as those from Canada, Mexico, the UK, and the U.S, will be helpful for their future patrol and interdiction operations in their respective EEZs. We can also hope that these ongoing exercises, as well as generally cordial regional diplomatic, trade and defense relations, will lead to greater interoperability between regional forces.

While Tradewinds 2018 can be regarded as a success, these maneuvers will have limited positive impact if Caribbean defense forces do not obtain additional funding for new aerial and naval platforms given the size of the Caribbean Sea. Even more, scandals among security personnel, namely their involvement in criminal activities, stain the reputation of regional defense forces and limit the success of any training operations.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Sunday, April 1, 2018

IPD: Assessing U.S. Military Assistance Towards Latin America

" Assessing U.S. Military Assistance Towards Latin America"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
International Policy Digest
30 March 2018
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/03/30/assessing-u-s-military-assistance-towards-latin-america/

here is an ongoing debate in Washington about the U.S. defense budget and the future of U.S. military operations around the world, whether it is President Donald Trump questioning NATO or operations in Afghanistan, Iraq or other places. Another pillar of U.S. military presence around the world are Foreign Military Training (FMT) programs with partner nations. In this commentary we will briefly discuss this initiative with a focus on partnerships between the U.S. and its Latin American allies.

FMTs and LatAm
The U.S. State Department, in co-operation with the Defense Department publishes every operation that falls under FMT programs between the U.S. and Latin America, titled “Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest” (click here for the 2016-2017 version). Two key FMT programs are International Military Education and Training (IMET) and the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP). The U.S. enjoys cordial relations with most Latin American and Caribbean nations which primarily fall under the jurisdiction of Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

The latest FMT report outlines the plethora of initiatives the U.S. carries out with its partners, including bringing Latin American military and police personnel to the U.S. for training at the Army War College, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, the Inter-American Air Forces Academy, the Coast Guard Training Center, the Aviation School at Columbus Air Force Base, the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, among several other institutions.

The training programs carried out are similarly varied, like for example: aircraft electrician and avionic mechanic programs with Colombia; basic army intelligence and naval intelligence courses with the Dominican Republic; NCO professional development training with El Salvador; and courses on countering transnational threats and basic psychological operations with Honduras, just to name a few programs.

Exercises and Partnerships
It is worth noting that U.S. military agencies regularly conduct major training exercises with their Latin American partners which do not fall under the category of FMT programs, but they do serve to promote better interoperability between different military forces. Case in point, multinational naval exercises like UNITAS or PANAMAX help U.S. naval platforms train with platforms and personnel from allied navies. For example, for UNITAS 2017, which took place in Peru, the U.S. Navy deployed USS Somerset (LPD 25), USS Chafee (DDG 90) and USCGC Escanaba (WMEC 907), as well as U.S. Marines – for UNITAS Amphibious 2017, which also took place in Peru – to train alongside regional partners including Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru; and extra regional allies like Spain and the United Kingdom.

Finally, SOUTHCOM is part of the U.S. National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP), via which “17 U.S. states, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia have active partnerships with defense and security forces from 23 nations in the Caribbean, Central America and South America.” For example, Louisiana NG carries out initiatives with Belize; Massachusetts NG partners with Paraguay; South Carolina NG teams up with Colombia; and West Virginia NG partners with Peru. Initiatives carried out under the SPP umbrella include Colombian army officers attending a live-fire artillery exercise at McCrady Training Center in November 2017; or personnel from South Dakota NG working alongside Surinamese troops to renovate parts of the O.S. Majosteeg 3 School in Paramaribo last August 2017.

There is a veritable plethora of scholarly work about the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of U.S. FMT programs – a cursory online search shows insightful analyses in War on the Rocks, The Nation, Truth-Out, among many others. However, most of these commentaries focus on Africa, the Middle East and specific countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. This is understandable, as the U.S. is particularly active in these regions and states nowadays. The problem is that the conclusions and lessons learned from these case studies should not be generalized.

Furthermore, assessing the effectiveness and need for FMT programs and training exercises is complicated: on the one hand, it is important for the U.S. to keep close defense relations with allies and partners by training military and police officers, particularly if it doesn’t, other global powers, like China, may step in to fill in the void. On the other hand, the U.S. military cannot, and should not, be so involved in another country to the point that it is effectively constructing or reforming its armed forces. Even more, it is impossible to see the effects of these training initiatives until after they occur: will U.S.-trained military offices use what they have learned for the good of the country or will they carry out their own coups?

Generally speaking, U.S. training of Latin American armed forces has a negative connotation, as it brings up memories of regional military officers carrying out coups and human rights abuses during the Cold War – such as General Hugo Banzer Suarez of Bolivia, who attended the School of the Americas (now known as WHINSEC) in 1956 and carried out a coup in 1971.

Then again, a former U.S. special forces interviewed by the author who has trained various armed forces, including from Latin America, pointed out that “it is impossible to know if in three, five or 10 years, someone that we trained will attempt to carry out a coup.”

Moreover, it is important to note that present-day hemispheric armed forces do not require the start-from-the-bottom approach that the U.S. has taken elsewhere. That is a point in favor of continuing ongoing FMT programs and other partnerships.


Even more, Latin America’s security problems, particularly drug trafficking, are a direct problem for the U.S. as drugs make their way from the South to the U.S. market, which supports the argument of ongoing strong engagement in the region.

A final issue is, as other articles have discussed, whether the U.S. is trying to train too many armed forces around the globe. The aforementioned operator acknowledges that, “we are doing too much in too many countries…the U.S. doesn’t need it.” The problem is that most Latin American governments enjoy cordial relations with the U.S. and would actually want more defense and security assistance in order to face threats like drug trafficking, narco-cartels and insurgencies. “I trained various Latin American armies and I never felt any animosity towards myself for being a gringo,” the operator said. Indeed, a retired senior army officer from South America interviewed by the author, similarly mentioned that greater U.S. military involvement would be ideal – the Cold War legacy notwithstanding. Therefore, the question is reaching that delicate balance in which the U.S. military helps partner nations, but it does not do “so much” to the point that it becomes too involved in said country’s internal affairs.

Discussing what should be the future of FMTs and other partnership programs is complicated. Overall there seems to be a general consensus that the U.S. military is trying to do “too much” in certain countries, to the point that it is counter-productive. Even more, any time that a U.S.-trained military officer carries out human rights abuses or attempted coups, this adds fuel to the argument that the U.S. should withdraw from nation-building or army-building altogether.


Ongoing diplomatic issues notwithstanding, U.S.-Latin America defense relations nowadays are arguably at their highest, as Washington does not face any credible security threats from the region, and most armed forces would welcome greater U.S. military involvement to address mutual security threats. The geopolitics and security situation in Latin America cannot be compared to that of Africa, the Middle East or Asia. Thus, an eventual reform of FMT and partnership programs should not be done hastily.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Sunday, February 25, 2018

IPD: Kazakhstan Should Have a Bigger Role In UN Peace Operations

"Kazakhstan Should Have a Bigger Role in UN Peace Operations"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
International Policy Digest
25 February 2018
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/02/25/kazakhstan-should-have-a-bigger-role-in-un-peace-operations/

Kazakhstan held the rotating presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) throughout January 2018, a significant accomplishment for the Central Asian country, which has also chaired the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in recent years. While Astana’s seat in the UNSC is certainly commendable as it is the first Central Asian nation to join this body, the Kazakh government should take a further step forward as it strives to promote global stability by having a larger role in United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKO).

To be clear, Kazakhstan has participated in peace operations and has carried out non-military operations in other missions, but the author argues that this presence should be increased. The Central Asian state first announced that its armed forces would participate in PKOs in 2013. According to January 2018 official data by the UN’s Peacekeeping Operations website, there are currently five Kazakh experts on mission serving in the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

Apart from the UN, Kazakhstan deployed Army engineers to Iraq after the 2003 war to provide humanitarian assistance, including carrying out mine-clearing operations. “In 2003, Kazakhstan sent 27 military engineers to assist operations of the coalition in Iraq. Over five years, nine contingents totaling 290 Kazakh peacekeeping troops were rotated through Iraq,” the Kazakh government reports. Finally, Kazakh troops have been involved in training foreign troops, such as Afghan border security forces, to help improve internal security in the fellow Central Asia state.

While Kazakhstan’s role in peace operations is praiseworthy, more can, and should, be done. It is worth remembering that, upon joining the UNSC in 2017, Kazakhstan stated its priorities, which ranged from “eliminating the threat of a global war” to “bringing peace to the African continent.” Tragically, eight of the UN’s 15 PKOs are located precisely in Africa, such as the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) or the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which have well over ten thousand peacekeepers each, in an attempt to strengthen security and the rule of law. In order to keep up with its noble intentions, the Kazakh government should consider sending additional troops to more UN peace missions.

Training foreign security forces and sending engineers is an important component of promoting security and state-building, however, it has to go hand in hand with improving the security situation on the ground. Sadly, there are plenty of hot spots of violence that warrant attention and active participation from the international community, particularly from capable armed forces. In other words, the UN could use well-trained Kazakh troops on the ground in countries like the DRC, CAR among several others. As a final point, it is important to stress that saying that Central Asian armed forces as “well-trained” is not an overstatement, as Kazakh defense personnel regularly train with military powers such as the U.S. Case in point, in September 2017, 35 troops of the country’s peacekeeping battalion carried out a three-day training course with instructors from the U.S. Defence Institute for Medical Operations. Also last year British, Kazakh and U.S. troops carried out Exercise Steppe Eagle – Spring 2017 at the Iliyskiy training centre.

The decision to deploy more troops to UN peace missions should not be taken lightly, as there is an ever-present possibility for violence and, sadly, casualties – like the tragic deaths of 15 Tanzanian peacekeepers, assigned to MONUSCO, in December 2017. Thus, the Kazakh regime should not commit to deploying additional troops to UN peace missions without a careful consideration of the potential risks that such a deployment entails. With that said, instability and violence in the world continues, and nations like Kazakhstan, which have pledged to promote global peace, must have a bigger role in helping bring stability to troubled areas.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Monday, October 30, 2017

IPD: Moldova Participates in Rapid Trident 2017

"Moldova Participates in Rapid Trident 2017"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
International Policy Digest
19 September, 2017
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2017/09/19/moldova-participates-in-rapid-trident-2017/


From September 8th to the 23rd, the multinational exercise Rapid Trident will take place at the International Peacekeeping Security Centre near Yavoriv, Ukraine. According to the U.S. Army Europe’s website, these maneuvers will involve approximately 1,800 personnel from 14 nations: Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, Italy, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The exercises are regarded as a response to both the Russian-led exercise Zapad, which is almost simultaneously taking place in Belarus from September 14 to the 20th, as well as the conflict in Ukraine.
While there is plenty of geopolitical analysis to go around regarding the timing of both exercises and their short and long-term geopolitical ramifications, it is important to highlight the participation of one nation in Rapid Trident 2017: Moldova.
There are four facts that make the participation of the landlocked country, which borders Ukraine, in these exercises significant:
  1. Article 11 of Moldova’s constitution states that the country is “permanently neutral” and “shall not allow the dispersal of foreign military troops on its territory.”
  2. The country’s tumultuous governments, best exemplified by the fact that President Igor Dodon is a supporter of the Russian Federation, while Prime Minister Pavel Filip, is more pro-West (namely approaching the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization).
  3. Chisinau still depends on Russia for energy and remittances from Moldovan citizens working there.
  4. Moldova’s separatist Transnistria region hosts a number of Russian troops.
The decision to send Moldovan troops to Rapid Trident was criticized by President Dodon, who reportedly banned this order on September 5th, stating “we do not accept involvement by Moldovan servicemen in military exercises beyond the national borders.” Days later, on September 8th he posted a statement on Facebook further explaining his position. He also called for the Defense Minister Gheorghe Galbura to be fired for this deployment.
Nevertheless, the president’s role is largely symbolic in Moldova so said veto has no actual political weight. Hence, the troops were deployed and it is doubtful that Minister Galbura will lose his job. In fact, Prime Minister Filip has already declared his support for the deployment: “no one wants an unprepared and weak army,” he reportedly stated.
As for the troops themselves, it is worth stressing that we are not talking about a large deployment. According to the Moldovan Army’s website, the contingent consists of 57 troops from two units, 22nd Peacekeeping Battalion and “Moldova” Brigade, led by LTC Alexandru Marcuta. Rapid Trident will reportedly convene some 1,800 troops, hence 57 is not a particularly significant number; nevertheless it will be an important opportunity for the Moldovan troops to train with fellow European (and U.S.) militaries. The Moldovan army explained how “the exercise aims to develop the level of interoperability, to consolidate the defense capacities, and to promote the National Army image on international level for future participation in peacekeeping missions.”
Moreover, this deployment serves as an example of the current close ties between Chisinau and the West. Moldova has reportedly participated in Rapid Trident since 1996 and there have been other recent defense-related developments. For example, Moldovan troops participated in the 2015 maneuvers in Smardan, Romania, alongside troops from Romania, the U.K. and the U.S. Additionally, in 2017 the Moldovan government reportedly allowed NATO to install a civilian office in the country, a move drastically condemned by President Dodon. (The author has been unable to verify if said office has in fact been opened). PM Filip met with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on 30 March 2017.
It appears that Chisinau is attempting to befriend the West regarding defense affairs without violating its own constitution, which calls for neutrality. A NATO civilian office or participation in multinational exercises abroad with the aim of training troops to operate in peace operations – Moldova’s most notable deployment abroad is its presence in the KFOR peace force in Kosovo since 2014 – does not violate the letter of the law, but arguably the spirit. It will be interesting to see how the Moldovan government continues to attempt to maintain some sense of neutrality in an increasingly tense region and a divisive political situation domestically.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Monday, December 14, 2015

CIMSEC: Determining Success: TRADEWINDS 2015 and Lessons Learned


"Determining Success: TRADEWINDS 2015 and Lessons Learned"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Center for International Maritime Security
October 7, 2015
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/determining-success-tradewinds-2015-lessons-learned/19026

Between May 31 and June 24 of this year, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) carried out joint naval exercises with its partners in the Greater Caribbean. The annual exercises, known as TRADEWINDS, brought together units from over a dozen countries. Without a doubt, multinational military exercises are useful as the personnel involved in the maneuvers learn new techniques from each other as well as how to work together. Nevertheless, a major concern is how well the lessons learned are properly applied to real-world operations.
The Exercises
TRADEWINDS 2015, the 31st iteration of these month-long exercises, took place in two phases: first in Saint Kitts and Nevis and then in Belize. U.S military personnel trained with their counterparts from 18 other nations, including Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, nations from the Greater Caribbean, Mexico, and even overseas partners like the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (which both have territories in the Caribbean).Caribbean multinational agencies also present included the Regional Security System (RSS), the Regional Intelligence Fusion Center (RIFC), and the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), among others. According toSOUTHCOM, the exercises were aimed at strengthening “the capacity of Caribbean nations to respond to natural disasters, humanitarian crises and counter transnational organized crime.”
There have been several reports that enumerate and explain the nature of the exercise. For example, off the coast of Belize, the navies from Belize, Mexico and the United Kingdom carried out a simulated vessel boarding, search, and seizure operation. Mexican naval personnel from the Mexican Navy ship ARM Independencia, travelling in an interceptor boat, boarded the British vessel theHMS Severn and “simulated [the] arrests of a group of merchant mariners who tried to resist.” Other exercises included crowd control, safety techniques like clearing buildings, and gunnery with a 50-caliber machine gun. A June 10 video posted in the Coast Guard Compass, the official blog of the U.S. Coast Guard, shows USCG personnel aboard a patrol boat from Grenada, explaining various techniques to their counterparts regarding how to understand the sea states and navigate effectively as they pursue a suspicious vessel.
In addition to praise from SOUTHCOM, the exercise has enjoyed the public endorsement and support from various Caribbean governments. For example ZIZ News, a Saint Kitts news agency, quoted Captain Kayode Sutton of the St. Kitts and Nevis Defence Force as saying, “the support from the government [in Basseterre] has been tremendous… Mr. Osbert DeSuza, the Permanent Secretary in the Office of the Prime Minister… visited the Exercise Control Centre and he received a brief as to what is going on for the entire exercise, the training, all the exercises that are going on right now.” Meanwhile, Guyana deployed its navy’s flagship, the GDFS Essequibo, to the exercise’s maritime phase, highlighting Georgetown’s commitment to display the best it has to offer to operate along its regional allies.
How to Determine Success?                                                    
During the TRADEWINDS 2015 opening ceremony in Saint Kitts,Lt. Col. Patrick E. Wallace, commander of the St. Kitts and Nevis Defense Force, declared, “I stress that the knowledge and skill that comes from this exercise is essential … However, just as important, is the strengthening of multi-national relationships." 
Making a multinational exercise successful so it can be properly applied in the real world includes coming up with realistic scenarios, as explained to this author by John Cope, a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He suggests that what’s needed are  “players (other than the US) had a major role in shaping the exercise scenario and the organization of the event so that the exercise emphasizes what they see as their needs rather than what the US/SOUTHCOM thinks are their needs, also the non-US players assume important positions in the structure of the exercise.”
A SOUTHCOM press release announcing the beginning of the exercises went over the two operational phases of TRADEWINDS 2015. But there is also a third phase, the “Key Leader Seminar,” designed to facilitate a discussion of the other phases and the way ahead. Ideally, a comprehensive report will be drafted regarding the lessons learned, as well as lessons that still need to be fully learned, from TRADEWINDS 2015. (In the interests of full-disclosure: in preparation for this commentary, I contacted SOUTHCOM for further information on the lessons learned aspect of TRADEWINDS 2015, but received no reply.)
Numerous military agencies, both U.S. and international, have published reports discussing how to properly adapt lessons learned from both exercises and operations. As the Establishing a Lessons Learned Program Handbook by the Center for Army Lessons Learned ponders, is a military organization “willing to openly discuss its mistakes, and is it willing to share those mistakes across organizational lines to make everyone better?” If not, it will be very difficult to implement an effective [Lessons Learned] program… The act of ‘saving face’ precludes individuals from admitting their mistakes.”
Hopefully phase 3 of TRADEWINDS 2015 included an open and honest discussion between representatives from the participating militaries, where there was not only praise for the event, but admitting, even if it was off the record, which areas they still need improving, in order to work in greater cohesion with the security forces of neighboring countries. Cope explains that, at least regarding the Caribbean, a base for institutionalizing operational and tactical procedures and processes that worked during an exercise may already be standard across various regional states. “Where CARICOM countries are struggling to perfect common approaches is in standardizing procedures for strategic and operational planning and strategic/political decision making. Their comprehensive disaster management process and experience with the Cricket World Cup have helped Caribbean countries, but leaders continually change.”
A PR Campaign?
Part of the problem may be simply a lack of a consistent PR campaign by regional navies (and security forces in general) to highlight the effectiveness of exercises. In other words, if a narco-speedboat is detained in the Caribbean by units of the U.S. and Jamaican coast guard services, it would be helpful if a subsequent press release could tie the hypothetical successful operation with lessons learned from TRADEWINDS. Another initiative would be to invite high-ranking government officials as well as journalists and other experts to the exercises as they take place, as this would help showcase the level of cooperation militaries from different states can achieve. This would have the added benefit of serving as a prime example to support similar exercises in the future.
At a time of budget constraints and with SOUTHCOM being the lowest-priority command center in the U.S. military, said agency needs to better demonstrate to Washington that its activities, including multinational exercises, are beneficial for both U.S. and regional security.
Concluding Thoughts
This discussion is not meant to question the validity of TRADEWINDS specifically, but rather to address multinational military exercises in general. The U.S. conducts quite a number of these in the Western Hemisphere, such as UNITAS, PANAMAX,Continuing Promise, and Beyond the Horizon/New Horizons.
Multinational exercises are important but a strong link has yet to be made between a successful naval exercise (i.e. in which units from two nations operate together to stop a suspicious vessel in the Caribbean), and whether the lessons learned from said simulation were successfully applied in the real world. Given the ongoing amounts of drug trafficking that flow through Caribbean waters, putting these lessons learned to the test would not be difficult.
Ultimately, SOUTHCOM is not lacking in exercises to increase its relations with regional allies in the Greater Caribbean and rest of Latin America; but it seems that the agency could do with a better PR campaign to explain how effective these exercises are in the long run.