"A Non-Violent Conflict: The Venezuela-Guyana Dispute"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
E-International Relations
July 21, 2015
Originally published:
http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/21/a-non-violent-conflict-the-venezuela-guyana-dispute/
An old territorial dispute between Venezuela and Guyana has
flared up once again as the Guyanese government contracted ExxonMobil to look
for offshore oil in an area that Caracas claims as its own. While it is
unlikely that this particular instance will escalate into an armed conflict,
these tensions highlight how non-violent incidents over coveted resources will
continue to occur. Moreover, should clashes over this disputed territory
continue, Venezuela will, in this author’s opinion, come out as the loser as it
will be inexorably regarded as the aggressor against a militarily weaker
neighbor.
Moreover, while this dispute has thankfully been
non-violent, it could affect U.S.-Venezuela relations as the two governments
have been at odds for over a decade and a half. Washington could capitalize on
Venezuela’s aggressive stance in order to strengthen relations with Guyana to
better monitor developments in Caracas.
A Brief Overview
A full historical review of the Venezuela-Guyana dispute is
beyond the scope of this analysis, but it is necessary to give a basic
historical overview to put the current situation in the proper context. Guyana
is a former British colony (with Dutch influence), formerly known as British
Guyana, which obtained its independence in 1966. However, the area, while it
was under London’s control, was at odds with Venezuela due to a territorial
dispute that dates back to the 19th century. Venezuela obtained its
independence in 1824 from Spain, much earlier than Guyana, and has consistently
claimed a portion of present-day Guyana.
London and Caracas reached an agreement via the 1899
International Arbitral Awards (held in Paris) which was thought to have put an
end to differences. In 1962, Venezuela declared the 1899 treaty void and
returned to its pre-1899 claims. In 1966, the same year that Guyana gained its
independence, a Mixed Commission was established to address Venezuela’s renewed
demands; but while negotiations took place, the Venezuelan military was accused
of carrying out incursions into Guyana’s border territory, including the
occupation of the Guyanese half of the Ankoko Island. Negotiations and
incidents followed, as well as agreements such as the Protocol of Port of
Spain, which Venezuela decided not to renew in 1982.
Caracas claims a contested area of around 155 thousand
square kilometers in addition to a maritime area off the contested coast.
The dispute generally remained dormant for decades as the
21st century began but resurfaced in November 2007 due to a bizarre incident in
which some 30 Venezuelan soldiers entered Guyanese territory and used
explosives to destroy two dredges. The Guyanese Defense Forces were deployed to
the area, but by that time the Venezuelans had already returned to their
country. Fortunately the incident did not escalate into an armed conflict. The
Venezuelan government apologized for the incursion as Deputy Minister of
External Relations Rodolfo Sanz travelled to Guyana to diffuse the situation.
He declared that Caracas “expressed sincere regrets and assured that the
incident had no political motive on the part of the Venezuelan Government.”
Another incident occurred on October 2013 when the
Venezuelan Navy intercepted the Teknik Perdana, a ship flying Panama’s flag
that was hired by the Guyanese government and the Anadarko Petroleum
Corporation to carry out seismic investigations. This was a preliminary step
for future expeditions to look for offshore oil reserves. Thankfully, like in
2007, the incident did not evolve into a conflict, but the situation does
highlight how the two countries began to clash at sea.
The newest round of tensions erupted in March, less than a
decade after the Venezuelan military incursion into Guyana and only two years
after the Teknik Perdana incident. ExxonMobil started looking for oil through
its research vessel, the Deepwater Champion. According to Reuters, “Exxon
signed an agreement with Guyana to explore the 26,800 square kilometer block,
100 to 200 miles (160 to 320 km) offshore, in 1999.” On May 20, the company
found (black) gold as it announced that it had discovered oil. Days later, the
Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro announced that the area in dispute is
rightfully Venezuelan. Even more, the Venezuelan presidential decree No. 1.787
(dated May 27) divided Venezuela’s coast into four defense areas. One of them
is called the “Zona Operativa de Defensa Integral Maritima Insular Atlantica”
(ZODIMAIN Atlantica; Atlantic Operational Maritime & Insular Defense Zone),
which extended from the Promonotory of Paria to the border shared with Trinidad
& Tobago; hence it included the disputed maritime area between Venezuela
and Guyana. In early July, the Venezuelan government took a step backwards by
passing the presidential decree No. 1.859 which modified the aforementioned No.
1.787; the new directive withdrew specific coordinates for the ZODIMAINs.
Guyanese President David Granger labeled Venezuela’s claims
as a “legal absurdity” and stated that Exxon’s operations will continue. The
situation worsened in early June, when the Guyanese government decided to stop
flights made by CONVIASA, Venezuela’s state-owned airline. Georgetown
officially states that this is due to “the non-payment of bonds and landing
fees to the government and the Cheddi Jagan International Airport.” However, it
is impossible to deny the obvious coincidence that this drastic measure comes
shortly after Venezuela’s claim over Guyanese waters. In retaliation, Caracas
called in the Venezuelan ambassador to Guyana in early July and also announced
that it will not renew a rice trade agreement with Guyana, which is set to
expire in November.
Analysis
At the time of this writing, the possibility of inter-state
warfare between Venezuela and Guyana thankfully remains extremely low. The two
countries have never gone to war over the territory in dispute, but the
aforementioned incidents that occurred in the past decades are problematic
since they deteriorate bi-national relations—i.e. the cancellation of
CONVIASA’s flights, which left dozens of people, including Venezuelan citizens,
stranded in Georgetown. Moreover, in a worst-case scenario, a small incident like
a seized vessel could be the trigger that transforms it into a greater conflict
if tensions are not properly managed.
One aspect worth stressing is that the 2007 dredges incident
brought Guyana onto the U.S. radar. At the time, relations between the U.S. and
Venezuela, then led by Presidents George W. Bush and the late Hugo Chávez
respectively, were continuing to deteriorate. Caracas had accused Washington of
being behind a short-lived coup that briefly removed Chávez from power in April
2002. Meanwhile, Washington was concerned about a Caracas-Moscow alliance, as
the Russian government had begun to sell high-tech weapons to the South
American state. Thus, Washington saw this incident as a valid reason to have a
stronger presence on Venezuela’s eastern flank. For example, military
cooperation between the U.S and Guyana increased: The “USS Kearsarge,” a
multipurpose amphibious assault ship, made a port call in 2008. Officially, the
Pentagon said that this was a humanitarian mission, but at the time IPS News
explained how the assumption in Guyana was that the naval visit was “designed
to send a tacit political and military signal to neighbouring Venezuela,”
particularly as “U.S. military helicopters are flying around communities as
close as 16 kilometers from the Venezuelan border.” It makes sense to believe
that Washington was capitalizing on Georgetown’s security concerns with its
neighbors in order to monitor Venezuela.
Let us look at Venezuela’s geopolitical situation in another
way: the country borders three nations, and it has been at odds with two of
them in the past decade. Apart from Guyana, Venezuela also has a territorial
dispute with neighboring Colombia. Even more, Bogota and Caracas had tense
relations during the rule of President Alvaro Uribe and the late President
Chavez (respectively) – to the point that in 2008 the two countries almost went
to war. Nowadays, relations are much better but Venezuela is still concerned
about the fact that Washington remains a steadfast Washington ally. As for Brazil
and Venezuela, the two countries have maintained cordial relations and there
have not been any security incidents. Finally, Caracas has declared that U.S.
aircraft flying from the Forward Operating Location base in Curacao (a
Caribbean overseas territory of The Netherlands, just north of Venezuela) were
surveillance planes spying on Venezuela.
In other words, Guyana-Venezuela tensions have to be placed
in the proper context of Venezuela’s complex relationship with its neighbors, a
development that Washington has capitalized on. From Venezuela’s point of view,
Washington can be regarded as trying to encroach on the South American state by
increasing security ties with its neighbors.
As for the current tensions between Caracas and Georgetown,
they come at a time of renewed strained relations between Caracas and
Washington. In March, President Barack Obama announced that Venezuela is now
considered a “national security threat,” a declaration that brought about
economic sanctions on various Venezuelan government officials. At the time of
this writing, both sides have been attempting to improve their tense relations,
which date back to the Chávez years, as bilateral negotiations recently took
place in Haiti. Nevertheless, no major announcement has come out of these
talks. Moreover, while there have not been any new U.S. naval deployments to
the region, a Guyanese vessel did participate in Tradewinds 2015 (naval
exercises organized by the U.S. Southern Command and Caribbean nations).
It is also important to note that Guyana has been rallying
its allies in the Caribbean and beyond to support its claims. So far, the
Guyanese government has been successful, as in March when the other members of
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a 15-nation bloc of Caribbean states,
declared that the organization “reiterates its firm, long-standing and
continued support for the maintenance of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Guyana.” The move was probably a blow to Caracas, as most CARICOM
members, Guyana included, are members of PETROCARIBE, an alliance whose members
purchase oil from Venezuela at reduced costs. These small Caribbean states are
very dependent on cheap Venezuelan oil in order to maintain their economies and
fulfill their energy needs; however, the latest Venezuela-Guyana incident
highlights that they will rally to protect one of their fellow members against
an external security threat.
Comparing Naval Forces
Given that the most recent incident has to do with offshore
oil discoveries, I will briefly address the naval force of both countries.
Guyana is a small nation whose military is called the Guyana Defense Force, and
its naval branch is the Guyana Defense Force Coast Guard (GDFCG). While the
GDFCG has limited resources at its disposal, it has been upgraded in recent
years. In 2014 Guyana received back the flagship “GDFS Essequibo”, which had
been sent to Brazil for repairs. The “Essequibo” is a remodeled British
River-class minesweeper that Guyana acquired in 2001. As for recent
acquisitions, the Guyanese obtained three speedboats in 2014, which were
donated by the United States as part of Washington’s Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative.
The Guyanese coast guard could hypothetically be a challenge
to the Venezuelan Navy, but the latter country’s fleet has also been upgraded
and expanded under the Chávez and Maduro regimes. For example, Venezuela has
acquired Stan Patrol vessels for its coast guard as well as transport and
multipurpose ships from Damen Shipyards Group. The Venezuelan Navy is also
repairing its submarine fleet, as the submarine “Sabalo” is currently being
upgraded by the DIANCA shipyard in Puerto Cabello.
Given this major disparity in military might, it would be
next to impossible for Venezuela to not appear as the aggressor should a
maritime conflict occur.
Why Countries Do Not Go To War
If anyone thought in 1899 that the agreement would solve the
territorial dispute between Venezuela and the UK/Guyana, that person was
grossly mistaken. While the dispute has thankfully remained non-violent, there
have been a series of small incidents and diplomatic spats within the past
decade. While the probability of either government committing itself to an
armed conflict is very low, it would only take one small incident—i.e. a
Venezuelan warship facing off with a Guyanese coast guard ship as the latter
protects oil research vessels in the disputed territory—for the encounter to
escalate.
This brings up the question of why both nations have not
gone to war with each other over the disputed territory, particularly since
Guyana gained independence from London in the 1960s and remains significantly
weaker militarily when compared to Caracas. In a 2011 essay for Small Wars
& Insurgencies, I discussed the lack of inter-state conflict in South
America, including the Venezuela-Guyana dispute after the 2007 incident. In the
analysis, I state that the last inter-state war in the region occurred in 1995
between Peru and Ecuador, while the last war that had a maritime theater of
operations was between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the
Falklands/Malvinas in 1982. In other words, while there are plenty of
territorial disputes in Latin America, actual inter-state warfare is scarce.
What explains the absence of war between Venezuela and
Guyana, as there have been three incidents in less than a decade but no shots
fired (though a couple of explosions over the dredges)? In spite of the
territorial and maritime claims, the two countries have maintained good
diplomatic relations as Guyana is a member of Venezuela’s PETROCARIBE
initiative. It is nevertheless concerning that Venezuela has called in its
ambassador to Guyana and cancelled negotiations over Guyanese rice as good
trade relations are an important confidence building mechanism that serves to
counterbalance security concerns. The deal will only expire in November, so
there is a chance that Caracas is using the deal to temporarily punish
Georgetown over the maritime dispute but will renew negotiations later. If this
does not happen, it will force Guyana to look for other trading partners for
its goods elsewhere, further creating a breach between the two governments and
populations.
Moreover, the 2013 and 2015 incidents can be interpreted not
as threats to Guyana but rather as methods that the Venezuelan government and
Navy used to demonstrate that they maintain their claim to the territories in
dispute, seeing this is part of Venezuelan national identity. The same can be
said for the new presidential decree 1.859, which does mention specific
coordinates for Venezuela’s maritime claims – this way the Venezuelan
government does not appear aggressive as it is not implying that its naval
forces can now enter Guyanese-controlled waters.
As to whether there was ever a time when Caracas was
realistically willing to start an armed conflict with Guyana in the past
decade, I would say no. I would argue, as previously noted, that these
incidents occurred because the Venezuelan government, Navy, and Army wanted to
show that they continue to see Guyanese territory as rightfully belonging to
Caracas. Moreover, the quick support that Guyana received from its CARICOM
allies, who are also PETROCARIBE clients and even ALBA members, signaled to
Caracas that further aggressive initiatives would hurt its relations with its
allies; hence, the latest conflict has been short-lived.
Finally, it is necessary to discuss how Venezuela perceives
its geopolitical situation versus potential (or imaginary) adversaries. After
all, Colombia remains a steadfast U.S. ally. Meanwhile Brazil maintains cordial
relations (including security-related) with Venezuela, but the two are in
competition with each other for regional influence. Hence, policymakers in
Caracas may perceive closer Washington-Georgetown relations as the U.S. and its
allies encroaching on Venezuela.
I cannot speculate whether anyone in the Venezuelan military
or Ministry of Defense truly believes that Washington would come to
Georgetown’s aid if it is attacked, but the fact that the U.S. military has
increased its cooperation with Guyana, including training exercises, has
certainly not gone unnoticed. Nevertheless, even with some U.S. defense
support, Guyana remains a militarily weak state, and Venezuela would undoubtedly
be regarded as the aggressor in any military conflict between the two. In a
vastly interconnected world, Venezuela’s international reputation would be
significantly damaged if it were viewed as an aggressor. Hence, the potential
for international shaming can also serve as another deterrent to avoid conflict
(a country like Russia may see little problem with gaining this “label,” but
Venezuela is no global power).
Ultimately, the interception of the Teknik Perdana or the
ongoing dispute after the Exxon discovery are ways for Venezuela to flex its
diplomatic and military muscle, not just at Guyana (to demonstrate that it
still claims the disputed territory) but also at Washington. Just this past
March, President Maduro ordered new military exercises in order to demonstrate
his country’s military might. This came at a time when Washington had declared
Caracas a “national security threat.”
Guessing the Future
The possibility for an inter-state conflict between the two
countries, even over oil, remains low. Nevertheless, what is problematic is the
potential for a small incident to quickly evolve into a greater one. For
example, should a Venezuelan vessel, let us say the patrol vessel “Guaiqueri”
(PO-11), detain an Exxon research vessel, the Guyanese “GDFS Essequibo” could
then be deployed to assist the Exxon vessel. As a result, a standoff could
occur where, unless cool heads prevail, any action taken by one vessel could be
perceived as an aggressive move by the other. This escalation is not unheard of
in the region. In 2008, a Colombian military operation that was carried out
against FARC insurgents in Ecuador (without Quito’s approval) increased to the
point that Venezuela, then ruled by President Chávez, was on the verge of
declaring war on Colombia in order to protect the sovereignty of Ecuador, its
ally.
Thankfully, the current tensions over Exxon’s oil
explorations appear to be dissipating, but it is just a matter of time before
another incident occurs, particularly if Guyana is fully committed to
exploiting its offshore oil and Venezuela continues to claim the area. I would
argue that another round of maritime incidents will occur soon given the
creation of the aforementioned “ZODIMAIN Atlantica.”
Warfare may not come to the Venezuela-Guyana border, but it
is clear that inter-state disputes among Western Hemisphere states over
territory and resources will not end anytime soon.
