Diplomatic Courier: Befriending States That Don’t Exist: The Leaders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Visit Venezuela

"Befriending States That Don’t Exist: The Leaders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Visit Venezuela"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Diplomatic Courier
22 January, 2019
Originally published: https://www.diplomaticourier.com/2019/01/22/befriending-states-that-dont-exist-the-leaders-of-south-ossetia-and-abkhazia-visit-venezuela/ 

On January 10, President Nicolas Maduro commenced another term as leader of Venezuela, a controversial development as several governments across the Western Hemisphere and beyond refuse to recognize the May 20, 2018 elections. Hence, Maduro’s inauguration ceremony included the presence of delegations from Venezuela’s few remaining allies in the world. Two individuals whose appearance in Caracas is worth noting are Anatoly Bibilov and Raul Khajimba, de facto presidents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, respectively—two breakaway regions in Georgia.

Even though South Ossetia and Abkhazia proclaimed their independence after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, only five governments recognize them as independent states: the Russian Federation, the Republic of Nicaragua, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the Republic of Nauru and the Syrian Arab Republic. Syria became only the fifth state to do so in May 2018, “in a gesture of thanks to its largest patron of late, Russia. Georgia responded by severing diplomatic relations with Syria,” Eurasia.net explains. A May 2018 article published by TASS, a Russian news agency, also mentions that Tuvalu and Vanuatu recognized the independence of the two regions in 2011, but these declarations were subsequently withdrawn.

Interestingly, the Venezuelan government has not provided much information about the visits of the two leaders to the South American country. A January 10 photo posted on President Maduro’s Twitter account shows the South Ossetian and Abkhazian leaders next to the few other heads of states that were present during the inauguration ceremony. Moreover, a brief press release by the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated January 11, mentions a meeting between Mr. Bibilov and Venezuelan Vice-President Delcy Rodríguez, but it simply states that the two sides “evaluated cooperation agreements.” The same was reported in a separate press release about a meeting between Vice-President Rodríguez and Mr. Dzhumkovich.

Unsurprisingly, the Latin American media covered these visits with curiosity. For example, Colombia’s El Tiempo’s headline was “South Ossetia, the non-recognized country that supports Venezuela.”

It is difficult to believe that Venezuela would have recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia if Russia was not a link between them. The decision by the Venezuelan government to do so in 2009 was influenced by then-President Hugo Chávez’ intention to strengthen relations with Moscow—anecdotally, the announcement that Caracas was going to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia occurred when Mr. Chavez visited the Russian capital. Nevertheless, since that declaration, there has been little, if any, contact between these governments other than a 2010 visit by then-Presidents Sergei Bagapsh and Eduard Kokoity, of Abkhazia and South Ossetia respectively, to Caracas and Managua. Trade between Venezuela and the two separatist regions appears to be non-existent.

It is unlikely that other governments from the Western Hemisphere will recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia. There might have been a slight chance of that occurring a decade ago, when President Chavez was still around and there were several Chávez-friendly leaders in the region, such as Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Lula da Silva in Brazil or Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina. However, in 2019 the region, including the three aforementioned nations, is populated by generally Washington-friendly leaders, which makes the recognition of pro-Moscow separatist regions unthinkable.

Recognition is an important part of a country’s diplomatic toolkit. One obvious example is the Republic of China/Taiwan, which has lost a plethora of allies in recent years, including the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama, as the governments decide to establish relations with the People’s Republic of China in order to benefit from access to the Chinese market and financial aid from the Asian giant.

In the case of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, neither Nicaragua nor Venezuela benefit directly from having relations with the tiny breakaway regions (South Ossetia’s population is around 50 thousand), but rather the objective is to cement relations with Moscow. Interestingly, in spite of recognition by Caracas, Managua, and most recently by Damascus (which has received substantial Russian support during its ongoing war), other close Russian allies like Belarus have not recognized the separatist states.

The support from South Ossetia and Abkhazia for the Maduro regime is symbolic at best, and this is essentially the most Venezuela can hope for from the international community in general. The limited number of heads of state and delegations that traveled to Caracas for the January ceremony highlights Venezuela’s dire situation in the diplomatic world nowadays.

About the author: Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Geopolitical Monitor: DRC Elections and the Fate of the UN MONUSCO Mission

"DRC Elections and the Fate of the UN MONUSCO Mission"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Geopolitical Monitor
Opinion
21 January 2019
Originally published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/drc-elections-and-the-fate-of-the-un-monusco-mission/

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) held long-awaited general elections on 30 December to replace President Joseph Kabila, who has ruled the country for almost two decades. The results were controversial: opposition candidate Felix Tshisekedi was declared the winner, but another candidate, Martin Fayulu, has cried foul, stating that he is the rightful winner and that Tshisekedi’s victory is a result of a pact between him and Kabila. At the time of this writing the Constitutional Court has reportedly confirmed Tshisekedi’s victory.

While this new political crisis hits the African nation, one question that should be asked: What will be the future of the UN mission to the DRC, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO)?

The Elections

The population of the DRC and the international community in general have waited for fair presidential elections in the African nation for a long time, not to mention a peaceful transfer of power. President Kabila took control of the country when his father, President Laurent Kabila, was assassinated in 2001. The young Kabila would then rule until today, presiding over a transitional government when the Second Congo War ended, and winning elections in 2006 and 2011, which were marked by controversy. The country was supposed to hold new elections in 2016 and Kabila was constitutionally barred from running again, but the polls were ultimately postponed, as Kinshasa argued that ongoing violence in the East, a lack of funds to organize the elections, and insufficient time to update the voter registry prevented the government from holding them. 

Elections were then supposed to occur on 23 December 2018, only to be postponed once again, and they finally took place on 30 December.

According to election officials, “Mr Tshisekedi received 38.5% of the vote, compared with 34.7% for Mr Fayulu. Ruling coalition candidate Emmanuel Shadary took 23.8%,” the BBC explains. “Fayulu has alleged that Tshisekedi’s win was the result of a backroom deal between Tshisekedi and Kabila that allows Kabila to maintain control over important ministries and the security services,” Al Jazeera reports.

There is widespread concern about the elections and the future of the country, with entities like the Southern African Development Community and other international organizations either requesting a recount or calling for calm in the African nation. The African Union has requested Kinshasa to suspend the announcement of final election results, which the DRC government has denied, insisting that the Constitutional Court’s assessment of the vote’s legality is impartial. It remains to be seen whether the international community will recognize Tshisekedi’s apparent victory – analysts that follow African affairs should monitor which heads of state and diplomatic delegations attend his swearing-in ceremony, which is “scheduled for Tuesday, January 22, according to the latest calendar of the National Independent Electoral Commission (Céni),” AfricaNews reports.

Discussing MONUSCO’s Future

It is in this scenario that MONUSCO continues to operate in the DRC. The UN Security Council, via Resolution 2409 (2018), extended MONUSCO’s mandate until 31 March of 2019, with a ceiling of “16,215 military personnel, 660 military observers and staff officers, 391 police personnel, and 1,050 personnel of formed police units,” including an Intervention Brigade. According to data provided by UN Peacekeeping, as of 31 December 2018, MONUSCO has 15,366 UN contingent troops; 1,364 UN police officers; and 263 staff officers, making it the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world. As for the mission’s mandate, Article 31 of Resolution 2409 explains that MONUSCO’s priorities are 1) protecting civilians; and 2) supporting the implementation of the 31 December 2016 agreement to hold elections.

The critical question that must be addressed is: What is MONUSCO’s future? Should it commence a withdrawal from the country or continue operating there?

There is no consensus on MONUSCO’s future among experts as the situation in the DRC is so complex. On the one hand, the country did hold elections, which fulfills one of the mandate’s objectives; however, the polls were controversial to say the least, and violence has already occurred as the population takes to the streets. Scott Morgan, a long-time analyst of African affairs, argued to me that “the uncertainty of the presidential polls could lead to violence regardless of which candidate is declared the winner. Having the mission remain to monitor the situation is crucial at this time.”  Moreover, violence in the Eastern part of the country continues, and the “situation in Burundi is not expected to show any improvement in the near future. The repatriation of FDLR fighters to Rwanda is another issue that needs to be addressed.” To make things even worse, as if that were possible, there is a new Ebola outbreak to deal with, and there have been over 600 reported cases and 368 deaths as of early January.

UN peacekeepers could be a key player in handling these challenges, particularly as the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) “either lack the capacity or the will to address these issues,” Morgan concludes, not to mention that the national police and the FARDC are guilty of plenty of crimes themselves. “Women and children are often kidnapped, frequently for the purpose of sexual exploitation, with rapes and gang rapes committed both by armed groups and sometimes by the army,” a UN report explains.

Alas, the mission’s own record so far is hardly ideal, considering widespread evidence of peacekeepers involvement in sexual abuse, human rights violations, corruption, or failing to protect Congolese civilians even though they are mandated to do so.

In a co-authored article entitled “Yes, MONUSCO Needs To Stay in the DRC,” published by the International Policy Digest in May 2017, Scott Morgan and I argued that, in spite of MONUSCO’s many, many shortcomings and flaws, it should stay in the DRC. Moreover, the mission’s troops should receive clearer mandates and orders about supporting and protecting Congolese civilians from violence and abuse. When I asked an African expert whether MONUSCO should stay in the DRC, the blunt reply I received was: “to do what? They do not protect civilians right now, so why should they stay?” The expert also argued that MONUSCO’s mandate needs to be more forcefully implemented by the blue helmets in the ground.

Other experts have argued that it is time for MONUSCO to leave, but in an orderly, well-planned, and structured fashion. This may have to occur anyways, as, given its size, MONUSCO is an expensive operation and the United States, among many other countries, are not paying their dues to the UN. One possibility is that the mission can be transformed into a political mission or a police one – akin to the UN mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH, which became MINUJUSTH.

Finally, it is important to mention that a key factor that will influence the future of MONUSCO is the attitude of the new president toward implementing rule of law, transparency and security in the country. Relations between MONUSCO and Kabila were often tense, so we will similarly have to monitor the new government’s attitude toward the UN mission.

MONUSCO Is Trying

To be fair, MONUSCO has attempted to improve the situation in the DRC. For example in May 2018, the UN mission inaugurated “several projects in support of victims of sexual exploitation and abuse” in the North Kivu area. On 17 January, a vocational training center project for ex-combatants and young people at risk was launched, which was funded by the UN mission. Additionally, “MONUSCO has provided support to the Ebola response since the beginning of the outbreak through the provision of logistical support, office facilities, transportation, communication, and security,” the World Health Organization explains.

Even more, MONUSCO personnel have lost their lives trying to make the African nation a better place. According to UN data, the mission has suffered 167 fatalities; in one incident this past November 2018, six Malawian and one Tanzanian peacekeepers, in addition to several FARDC troops, were killed in Beni territory, North Kivu, while carrying out joint operations against a rebel movement called Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).

Final Thoughts

It goes without saying that the UN Security Council will renew MONUSCO’s mandate for another year, however what is debatable is whether the UNSC will order a downsizing of the mission as a sign that it is time for MONUSCO to leave. Tragically, the country continues to face several challenges, including political instability. Thus, the weeks ahead will provide an idea of whether the DRC can have a peaceful transition of power and what this means for the future of the UN mission in the African nation.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues. @W_Alex_Sanchez.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Quoted in: Matisak's Blog (A Stamp on the World): Venezuela: What’s next for Nicolas Maduro?

"Venezuela: What's Next for President Maduro?"
 By Andrej Matisak
Matisak's Blog (A Stamp on the World)
10 January 2019
Originally published: https://matisak.wordpress.com/2019/01/10/venezuela-whats-next-for-nicolas-maduro/



What do you expect from another presidential term of President Nicolas Maduro? We could probably see a further isolation of Venezuela under Maduro as we just witnessed with the Lima Declaration, so how safe is Maduro’s position? Read few comments.

W. Alejandro Sanchez, International Security Analyst

President Maduro has no intention of leaving power. The same can be said of his allies in the Venezuelan government and armed forces. Any analysis about Venezuela’s future must start with those two undeniable facts.
Beginning on 10 January, President Maduro will be considered an illegitimate president by most of the international community. For example, the government of Peru has stated that it will not allow President Maduro, family members and members of his cabinet, to enter Peruvian territory beginning on that date. It would not surprise me if other regional states follow this model. There is also the probability that Latin American nations will recall their ambassadors or remove other diplomatic personnel.

But here is the problem, these are governments which are already critical of the Venezuelan government, so we are not talking about “additional” isolation other than what we are already witnessing. Venezuela’s regional allies are Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua, along with a few Caribbean states (mostly because they still benefit from Venezuela oil, but even this will not last), along with extra-regional states like China, Iran, Russia and Turkey. If any of these countries withdrew their support (diplomatically or, even more important, when it comes to trade and economic aid), this would truly isolate Venezuela.

As for how “Safe” is President Maduro, the recent defection of Venezuela Supreme Court judge Christian Zerpa in addition to ongoing arrests of members of the armed forces highlight the constant discontent against Maduro and his close allies.

Alas, even if President Maduro were to resign tomorrow, the problem is not just him but the leadership of the armed forces, the controversial Constituent Assembly, cabinet of ministers, among others. What will they do if President Maduro leaves? It is ridiculous to believe that they will all resign and go home (or seek asylum someplace), and allow for a peaceful and democratic transfer of power. So the issue is not just how “safe” is President Maduro himself but the regime as a whole. And so far, in spite everything that has happened in the past few years, they remain firmly in control of the country.

FAT: In 2019, Latin American Defense Industries Will Strive to Continue Replacing Out-of-Region Imports

 
"In 2019, Latin American Defense Industries Will Strive to Continue Replacing Out-of-Region Imports"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Looking Ahead Series

Forum on the Arms Trade

9 January, 2019

Originally published: https://www.forumarmstrade.org/looking-ahead-blog/in-2019-latin-american-defense-industries-will-strive-to-continue-replacing-out-of-region-imports

This is the seventh blog post in a series looking at an array of issues in 2019 related to weapons use, the arms trade and security assistance, at times offering recommendations.

Two important developments occurred in Latin America in the final months of 2018: in late November, Mexico commissioned its new long-range patrol vessel (Patrulla Oceánica de Largo Alcance: POLA) ARM Reformador (POLA-101); while in mid-December, Brazil launched its new submarine, the diesel-electric Riachuelo (S-40). What makes these two ceremonies even more significant is that both platforms were overwhelmingly manufactured domestically.

Out of all Latin American nations, SIPRI’s “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2017” fact sheet (released in March 2018) only lists Brazil as a major exporter of military equipment; coming in as the world’s 24th largest. While it is not expected that other Latin American countries will be added to that list soon, the region’s defense industries have demonstrated their ambition to learn and apply what they have learned; and they are doing so very quickly for both domestic production and international trade—trends that should continue in coming years. 

Recent National Developments

Latin American shipyards have been particularly busy in the past year. For example, Brazil launched its new submarine, named Riachuelo, and it is constructing three additional Scorpène-class diesel-electronic platforms with French assistance. The PROSUB (Programa de Desenvolvimiento de Submarinos) program is a partnership between Brazil’s Itaguaí Construções Navais and Naval Group (former DCNS), following an agreement between Brasilia and Paris. The infamous nuclear-powered submarine, which Brasilia has attempted to manufacture since the 1970s, remains unclear as construction continues to be delayed.

Meanwhile, Mexico’s state run-shipyard ASTIMAR and Damen Shipyards constructed Reformador, with most of the assembly taking place in ASTIMAR’s facilities. The Reformador is the first of an order of eight POLAs, according to the ASTIMAR-Damen contract, but the future of the program will ultimately be decided by President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who recently came to power. It is also worth noting that along with Reformador, the offshore patrol vessel ARM Jalisco (PO-167), was also commissioned. The latter is the seventh Oaxaca-class vessel constructed by ASTIMAR, demonstrating that the shipyard can construct a variety of platforms.

As for other nations, Peru commissioned its new landing platform dock, BAP Pisco (AMP-156), in June 2018, and construction is already underway for its sister ship, BAP Paita. The manufacturer of both vessels is the Peruvian state-run shipyard Servicios Industriales de la Marina (SIMA), which is also constructing a variety of riverine vessels for the Peruvian army. Meanwhile, earlier last year the Chilean shipyard ASMAR commenced the construction of a new ice-breaker for the Chilean Navy.

Not only shipyards had a busy 2018. In Argentina, the aircraft manufacturer FAdeA (Fábrica de Aviones Argentinos) has completed the construction and test flights of three IA-63 Pampa III advanced jet trainer aircraft destined for the Argentine Air Force. This is a major development as the Pampa program had stalled for several years. Meanwhile, Brazil’s planemaker Embraer may be purchased by Boeing, which would constitute a major merger; while another Brazilian company, Helibras, a subsidiary of Airbus, continues to deliver H225M helicopters to the Brazilian armed forces.

Trade Within and to Other Regions

Latin American defense industries are not solely constructing platforms for domestic use, they are exporting them as well. Colombia’s COTECMAR signed an agreement with the government of Honduras in late October for the construction of two naval interceptors. This agreement builds upon relations between Bogota and Tegucigalpa as COTECMAR has already delivered a multipurpose support vessel, named Gracias a Dios, to the Honduran navy. Meanwhile, Embraer continues to sell its Tucano aircraft to a variety of clients. Similarly, the Peruvian state-run company SEMAN is actively looking for potential clients for its KT-1P trainer aircraft, which were manufactured in partnership with South Korea’s KAI.

Without a doubt, Latin American governments will continue importing military equipment from extra-regional suppliers as they can provide highly sophisticated hardware. Nevertheless, the point here is that Latin American governments and armed forces want to also produce their own equipment, hence future weapons sales will continue to include “Know How” clauses, so that Latin American defense industries can learn how to manufacture more complex equipment themselves. The close relationship between Mexico and Damen is an example of this type of partnerships as the POLA is based on Damen’s Sigma Frigate 10514 model.

As a final point, the fact that Colombia’s COTECMAR has secured an additional contract to sell interceptor craft to Honduras highlights one important aspect of the ever-evolving arms trade. While extra-regional suppliers certainly offer more sophisticated equipment, countries with limited defense budgets may choose to acquire cheaper but reliable equipment from suppliers that are geographically closer, or with which they enjoy close diplomatic relations.

Analysts that monitor the global arms trade should pay special attention to South-to-South weapons contracts, particularly as certain Latin American defense industries learn how to manufacture more advanced equipment.


Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.