Geopolitical Monitor: Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping Geography in 2018

"Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping Geography in 2018"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Opinion
Geopolitical Monitor
26 April 2018
Originally published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/kazakhstans-foreign-policy-escaping-geography-in-2018/

Astana approaches Washington….
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev met with US President Donald Trump in Washington DC on 16 January 2018, which was a major diplomatic victory for the Central Asian state. As part of the visit, the US Department of State praised bilateral ties, highlighting in a press release how trade “grew to $1.9 billion in 2016.”  Additionally, the renowned think tank Atlantic Council held an event in January with the Kazakh ambassador to the U.S., H.E. Erzhan Kazykhanov, to discuss bilateral relations. The two governments have also increased military ties and there have been new initiatives related to cooperating on nuclear energy issues.

Moreover, the Kazakh government is committed to exposing its youth to the West as a Kazakh government official explained to the author that as many as 2,500 Kazakh students are currently attending universities in the United States.


….But Moscow and Beijing still exist
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that the Kazakh government is “pivoting” toward the West. That’s where geography kicks in. After all, the Central Asian state has a border with Russia that extends over six thousand kilometers, and also has an ethnic Russian population in the northern part of the country. Additionally, Kazakhstan is part of Moscow-backed multinational organizations, such as the Eurasian Economic Union; the Collective Security Treaty Organization; and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Due to space considerations, we cannot analyze Moscow-Astana relations in depth, but they include strong trade and defense ties (joint military exercises and Astana regularly purchases Russian military technology).

As for Sino-Kazakh relations, the two countries are both members of the aforementioned SCO and, more importantly, Kazakhstan, again, due to its geographic location, is in the middle of China’s grandiose One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR, also known as the “New Silk Road”), which seeks to (re)connect the Asian giant with Europe through a network of roads and railways via Central Asia and Russia; and through a series of ports in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. As part of this grandiose project, a Chinese company is constructing a massive “dry port,” the Khorgos Gateway, in Kazakhstan.

Geography and Foreign Policy
The link between geography and foreign policy has been well-researched – see for example Tim Marshall’s Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Explain Everything About the World or the works of Halford MacKinder– but we should stress that it is not solely global powers like China, Russia or the U.S., but also other nations, including regional powers like Kazakhstan, that mold their foreign policy by their geographical location in the world.

After all, it is difficult to foresee a staunch pro-Washington government in the middle of Central Asia, with Beijing and Moscow as direct neighbors. An extreme scenario was proposed in a January 2018 report by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a think tank in Washington DC, which hypothesized reasons why Russia could militarily intervene in Kazakhstan – comparisons were made to the situation in Crimea – perhaps not by coincidence, the report was published at the same time President Nazarbayev visited Washington. Certainly, closer Washington-Astana diplomatic or military relations would be a big red flag for Moscow; though suggesting a Russian military operation in Kazakhstan seems unnecessarily alarmist. Likewise, the Kazakh government does not want to put Chinese investment at risk by supporting Washington policies that Beijing disagrees with.

Thus, the Kazakh government has to walk a fine diplomatic line regarding what it can realistically achieve at the foreign policy level, not because of lack of resources or will, but rather because of possible issues with two of its neighbors.
As a final point, it is worth noting that a January 2018 article in the New York Times noted the battle for influence between Beijing and Moscow due to OBOR, hinting at how Astana “has tried since independence in 1991 to stay on good terms with Russia but has also steadily eroded Moscow’s once overwhelmingly dominant position in the region by expanding ties with China.” Similarly, a commentary in the Huffington Post on Kazakh-Russian relations also explains why Kazakhstan cannot distance itself too much from Moscow, because doing so would risk a possible Crimea-type situation, akin to what the AEI muses, and because Russian military assistance helps President Nazarbayev’s own “anti-Islamist campaigns” at home. While the word “geography” is not flat out mentioned, it is certainly implied.

The Trump-Nazarbayev meeting was heralded as a diplomatic victory for Kazakhstan, and it will be certainly interesting to see how far bilateral relations will go. However, as this commentary has sought to explain, Kazakh foreign policy ambitions will be tempered by the country’s geographic location, namely having the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China as immediate neighbors.

In spite of the evolution of diplomacy and the metaphorical shrinking of the world due to technological advancements that facilitate faster communication and transportation, in 2018 geography continues to matter and will certainly continue to influence foreign policy.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated, nor those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

Journal: On (the lack of) Latin American supranationalism

"On (the lack of) Latin American supranationalism"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Global Change, Peace and Security
 Volume 29, 2017 - Issue 2
P. 179-187
Published Online 28 February 2017

ABSTRACT

This commentary discusses the state of supranationalism in Latin America. We will enumerate the numerous regional organizations in the Western Hemisphere, and also discuss their successes and failures at regional integration. While integration has had some successes, supranationalism has yet to flourish among Latin American states and it will probably not for the immediate future. Empirical evidence suggests that, while inter-state warfare is scarce in the region, there are still too many inter-state tensions, including ongoing border disputes, as well as occasional incidents, which prevent supranationalism from taking hold. This explains the lack of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization-esque type South American bloc. Nevertheless, small-scale integration projects have been successful, like visa waivers systems, educational programs or defense-cooperation projects. Ultimately, in a changing global geopolitical system, the distrust for supranationalism remains the same in Latin America.

KEYWORDS: Latin America, Caribbean, supranationalism, security, integration, geopolitics

*Please contact the author for free a PDF copy

IPD: Assessing U.S. Military Assistance Towards Latin America

" Assessing U.S. Military Assistance Towards Latin America"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
International Policy Digest
30 March 2018
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/03/30/assessing-u-s-military-assistance-towards-latin-america/

here is an ongoing debate in Washington about the U.S. defense budget and the future of U.S. military operations around the world, whether it is President Donald Trump questioning NATO or operations in Afghanistan, Iraq or other places. Another pillar of U.S. military presence around the world are Foreign Military Training (FMT) programs with partner nations. In this commentary we will briefly discuss this initiative with a focus on partnerships between the U.S. and its Latin American allies.

FMTs and LatAm
The U.S. State Department, in co-operation with the Defense Department publishes every operation that falls under FMT programs between the U.S. and Latin America, titled “Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest” (click here for the 2016-2017 version). Two key FMT programs are International Military Education and Training (IMET) and the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP). The U.S. enjoys cordial relations with most Latin American and Caribbean nations which primarily fall under the jurisdiction of Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

The latest FMT report outlines the plethora of initiatives the U.S. carries out with its partners, including bringing Latin American military and police personnel to the U.S. for training at the Army War College, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, the Inter-American Air Forces Academy, the Coast Guard Training Center, the Aviation School at Columbus Air Force Base, the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, among several other institutions.

The training programs carried out are similarly varied, like for example: aircraft electrician and avionic mechanic programs with Colombia; basic army intelligence and naval intelligence courses with the Dominican Republic; NCO professional development training with El Salvador; and courses on countering transnational threats and basic psychological operations with Honduras, just to name a few programs.

Exercises and Partnerships
It is worth noting that U.S. military agencies regularly conduct major training exercises with their Latin American partners which do not fall under the category of FMT programs, but they do serve to promote better interoperability between different military forces. Case in point, multinational naval exercises like UNITAS or PANAMAX help U.S. naval platforms train with platforms and personnel from allied navies. For example, for UNITAS 2017, which took place in Peru, the U.S. Navy deployed USS Somerset (LPD 25), USS Chafee (DDG 90) and USCGC Escanaba (WMEC 907), as well as U.S. Marines – for UNITAS Amphibious 2017, which also took place in Peru – to train alongside regional partners including Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru; and extra regional allies like Spain and the United Kingdom.

Finally, SOUTHCOM is part of the U.S. National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP), via which “17 U.S. states, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia have active partnerships with defense and security forces from 23 nations in the Caribbean, Central America and South America.” For example, Louisiana NG carries out initiatives with Belize; Massachusetts NG partners with Paraguay; South Carolina NG teams up with Colombia; and West Virginia NG partners with Peru. Initiatives carried out under the SPP umbrella include Colombian army officers attending a live-fire artillery exercise at McCrady Training Center in November 2017; or personnel from South Dakota NG working alongside Surinamese troops to renovate parts of the O.S. Majosteeg 3 School in Paramaribo last August 2017.

There is a veritable plethora of scholarly work about the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of U.S. FMT programs – a cursory online search shows insightful analyses in War on the Rocks, The Nation, Truth-Out, among many others. However, most of these commentaries focus on Africa, the Middle East and specific countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. This is understandable, as the U.S. is particularly active in these regions and states nowadays. The problem is that the conclusions and lessons learned from these case studies should not be generalized.

Furthermore, assessing the effectiveness and need for FMT programs and training exercises is complicated: on the one hand, it is important for the U.S. to keep close defense relations with allies and partners by training military and police officers, particularly if it doesn’t, other global powers, like China, may step in to fill in the void. On the other hand, the U.S. military cannot, and should not, be so involved in another country to the point that it is effectively constructing or reforming its armed forces. Even more, it is impossible to see the effects of these training initiatives until after they occur: will U.S.-trained military offices use what they have learned for the good of the country or will they carry out their own coups?

Generally speaking, U.S. training of Latin American armed forces has a negative connotation, as it brings up memories of regional military officers carrying out coups and human rights abuses during the Cold War – such as General Hugo Banzer Suarez of Bolivia, who attended the School of the Americas (now known as WHINSEC) in 1956 and carried out a coup in 1971.

Then again, a former U.S. special forces interviewed by the author who has trained various armed forces, including from Latin America, pointed out that “it is impossible to know if in three, five or 10 years, someone that we trained will attempt to carry out a coup.”

Moreover, it is important to note that present-day hemispheric armed forces do not require the start-from-the-bottom approach that the U.S. has taken elsewhere. That is a point in favor of continuing ongoing FMT programs and other partnerships.


Even more, Latin America’s security problems, particularly drug trafficking, are a direct problem for the U.S. as drugs make their way from the South to the U.S. market, which supports the argument of ongoing strong engagement in the region.

A final issue is, as other articles have discussed, whether the U.S. is trying to train too many armed forces around the globe. The aforementioned operator acknowledges that, “we are doing too much in too many countries…the U.S. doesn’t need it.” The problem is that most Latin American governments enjoy cordial relations with the U.S. and would actually want more defense and security assistance in order to face threats like drug trafficking, narco-cartels and insurgencies. “I trained various Latin American armies and I never felt any animosity towards myself for being a gringo,” the operator said. Indeed, a retired senior army officer from South America interviewed by the author, similarly mentioned that greater U.S. military involvement would be ideal – the Cold War legacy notwithstanding. Therefore, the question is reaching that delicate balance in which the U.S. military helps partner nations, but it does not do “so much” to the point that it becomes too involved in said country’s internal affairs.

Discussing what should be the future of FMTs and other partnership programs is complicated. Overall there seems to be a general consensus that the U.S. military is trying to do “too much” in certain countries, to the point that it is counter-productive. Even more, any time that a U.S.-trained military officer carries out human rights abuses or attempted coups, this adds fuel to the argument that the U.S. should withdraw from nation-building or army-building altogether.


Ongoing diplomatic issues notwithstanding, U.S.-Latin America defense relations nowadays are arguably at their highest, as Washington does not face any credible security threats from the region, and most armed forces would welcome greater U.S. military involvement to address mutual security threats. The geopolitics and security situation in Latin America cannot be compared to that of Africa, the Middle East or Asia. Thus, an eventual reform of FMT and partnership programs should not be done hastily.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.