Wednesday, November 13, 2013

COHA REPORT: PERU ON PROBATION WHEN IT COMES TO PROTECTING DOLPHINS AND SHARKS


Peru on Probation when it comes to protecting Dolphins and Sharks
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Council on Hemispheric Affairs - Report
November 13, 2013
Originally published: http://www.coha.org/coha-report-peru-on-probation-when-it-comes-to-protecting-dolphins-and-sharks/



The Peruvian government is, finally, taking a strong stance to protect its marine ecosystems, as it contemplates the implementation of a ban on shark fishing. Ideally, this ban will not only protect sharks that inhabit Peruvian waters but will do the same for dolphins, as these animals are killed both for human consumption and to serve as bait for sharks. Dolphin fishing is illegal in Peru, but recent revelations by two conservation NGOs have brought to light this ongoing brutal practice, which is contributing to the devastation of not just one, but two marine species that are vital for maintaining the balance of a marine ecosystem, not just in Peruvian waters but in the South Pacific as a whole. 
A Tragic Revelation
The relationship between dolphin and shark fishing has been brought to light due to the recent investigations by Mundo Azul, a Peruvian NGO founded in 1999 which focuses on conservation efforts, particularly marine and coastal protection. Mundo Azul carried out its investigations as part of a joint project with Blue Voice, an ocean conservation organization based in St. Augustine, Florida. The two NGOs have declared that a plethora of small fishing vessels along the Peruvian coast (known in Peru as barcos artesanales) regularly pursue dolphins.
Human consumption is not the only motive for killing dolphins, though this occurs as well, but rather the animals are killed (sometimes they are harpooned) and put out to float on the water so that their blood will attract sharks. The modus operandi for captured dolphins is called long-line fishing: the fishermen operate in small wooden craft from which they lay down a rope that can be over 22km long across the open waters. Every 100 meters, an additional rope is tied to the main rope, which has a hook with bait at the end. It is estimated that a fishing boat can kill between two and six dolphins on each trip, which can amount to  as many as 15 thousand dolphins killed every year. [1] The two aforementioned NGOs estimate that as many as 545 small ocean vessels hunt dolphins in Peruvian waters. According to Mundo Azul, the major Peruvian ports out of which these fishing boats operate are Paita, Pucusana, Ilo, and Mollendo, among several others along the vast Peruvian coast.[2]
The revelations were released to the Peruvian public as well as the national media with little surprise. For example, the Peruvian TV news show Cuarto Podersummarized the situation by saying, “in only two months, [Mundo Azul’s investigation] has shown that the Peruvian law that prohibits the hunting, commercialization and killing of dolphins is as dead as every killed dolphin […]”[3] For their part, Peruvian fishermen deny the accusations that they are responsible for killing dolphins to hunt sharks, but rather that they use anchovies.[4]
As for the sharks, a press statement issued by Blue Voice explains,
Blue sharks and Mako sharks were taken on board the Peruvian fishing vessel, whose name must remain confidential. The process involves unbelievable cruelty and can take can take as long as an hour. Mako sharks, which are dangerous on deck, are cut behind the head to sever the spine. The fishermen cut the entire rostrum [pointed snout at the anterior end] off the blue sharks. [5]  
The shortfin Mako sharks are extremely active, epipelagic (open water) fish which are found from Oregon to southern Chile. The species is found circumglobally. Likewise, the blue sharks also are a highly migratory, pelagic, oceanic species.
In other words, hunting dolphins in Peru is illegal, but shark fishing is legal. Shark meat is a highly expensive delicacy in Asia, giving Peruvian fishermen a strong financial incentive to carry out different tactics to produce it, even if it means illegally killing dolphins.
Human Consumption
Small scale fisheries are important for Peru’s fishing industry and are the backbone for thousands of family livelihoods in the area, including those of fishermen and merchants. But these small-scale fishing operations – also called artisanal fishing – are also damaging ecosystems since, in spite of some laws, it remains largely unregulated and repeatedly subject to overexploitation.
Shark meat is legal in many countries, and is sold on the Peruvian domestic market as well as internationally, though its legality does not make the killing of sharks for their fins any less barbaric. The fins are separated in port by an intermediate fish dealer for export.[6] But more often than not, fins are also illegally taken at sea.  The value of the fins is often times found to be far greater than the value of the meat, hence fishermen will seek after sharks, remove their fins, and throw the sharks back into the water.  Most sharks breathe by a process called ram ventilation- that is, they must keep swimming forward with the mouths partially open to force water over their gills.  Without fins, these sharks inevitably will die from drowning.
To be fair, it is not just Peru that is hunting sharks, for either domestic consumption or export. Due to the high demand in Asia (particularly in China) for shark fins as an essential ingredient to prepare the famous shark fin soup, several other Latin American countries are also involved in the shark trade, and they will go to great lengths to protect this important source of income. Most notably, in 2010, British celebrity chef Gordon Ramsay was in Costa Rica to film a TV documentary calledGordon’s Shark Bait for the British Channel 4.[7] Not surprisingly, the chef and his camera crew were not welcomed by Costa Rican fishermen, and at one point the British chef was held at gunpoint and petrol was poured on him by individuals who did not want to show to the world the volume of shark fins that are caught or the gruesome processes that are customarily used by Costa Rican fishermen to catch them.[8]
Nevertheless, there is some reason to be cautiously optimistic as the consumption of shark fins may be decreasing in Asia, particularly in China. To use economic language, by decreasing the demand for this commodity, the production of the supply (in this case, killing dolphins to hunt sharks) could significantly decrease in Peru. In fact, an October 21 article by Simon Denyer in the British daily The Independentreports that there has been a success in raising awareness among the Chinese population about the implications of consuming shark fin soup on the global marine environment.[9] The author explains, “Just a few years ago, most Chinese people were oblivious to what was happening […] But in 2006, WildAid enlisted Chinese professional basketball player Yao Ming, who played for the [NBA team] Houston Rockets, to front a public awareness campaign.” This initiative managed to gain support in the Chinese business community and even the Chinese parliament, the National People’s Congress. Today consumption in the nation is recorded to be down, but not completely eradicated. “In high-end seafood restaurants in Beijing, shark fin soup is still on the menu — for between $60 and $325 a bowl — but some hotels and restaurants no longer offer it,” Denyer explains.[10]
In other words, legislation to ban shark fishing may just push fishermen in Peru and other countries to become more covert when hunting sharks and selling their fins, but a decrease in consumer demand would ideally have even more positive effects.
Peru: Lack of Compliance with Existing Laws
In declarations to the Peruvian daily La Republica, Stefan Austermuhle, the director of Mundo Azul, stresses that while shark fishing is legal in Peru, there are considerations and limits to the type of shark that can be fished which are not being respected. These include captured sharks which have to be over 1.60 meters in length, and if they are less, they cannot amount to more than 10 percent of the total of all sharks that were captured.[11] Austermuhle explained that sharks shorter than 1.60 meters are considered juveniles, so they should not be captured, in order to preserve the species. Hence, fishermen should only capture adults who are sexually mature so they would, hopefully, already have had the opportunity to contribute to the existing population. If too many adults and juveniles are caught, there is not enough time to replace them with younger generations, which potentially would lead to the extinction of the population.
Dolphin fishing has been illegal in Peru since 1996, when the legislature passed Law No. 26585. This law prohibits the hunting of certain breeds of dolphins, such as the dark dolphin, bottlenose dolphin, and the tucuxi, a type of dolphin that inhabits the rivers of the Amazon Basin.[12] If properly applied, the penalties for the killing of dolphins are somewhat severe, ranging from the suspension of fishing permits as well as three to five years in jail.[13] Another Peruvian law that protects dolphins is theDecreto Supremo No. 002-96-PE, which was signed on July 14, 1996.[14] Article 3 of the law declares that it is illegal to consume dolphins. Meanwhile, Article 4 states that any dolphin that is still alive and is captured in artisanal or industrial fishing vessels must be freed.[15] While these laws have been around for almost two decades, their pathetically low success rate of preventing dolphin hunting is a major source of embarrassment. The fact that this illegal activity continues demonstrates that the existing laws in Peru to protect dolphins are inefficient.
The Response Gains Momentum
The Peruvian government has not denied the claims made by the Mundo Azul and Blue Voice investigations, but has tried to portray a willingness on its part to take decisive action. For example, on October 24 the Peruvian media reported that inspectors from the Ministry of Production seized 1.5 kilos of illegal dolphin meat in a restaurant in the province of Callao, where Peru’s major port is located.[16] Moreover, after Mundo Azul made its research findings known, the Peruvian Ministry of Production (which oversees the Vice Ministry of Fishing) commissioned the Instituto del Mar del Peru (Institute of the Peruvian Sea), to draft a study to find the exact locations where these fishermen are carrying out their illegal activities.[17]  It is oftentimes more effective to work collaboratively with local fishermen to establish small protected areas, which are collectively and effectively managed, in order to help the species have an area where they can repopulate. Nevertheless, such a measure could only be effective if it is in an area where sharks and/or dolphins can be found. Funds and additional studies are required to find the appropriate maritime areas as it is unproductive to carve out a random no-fishing zone and simply hope for the best.
Moreover, Deputy Minister for Fishing Paul Phumpiu recently stated that the Peruvian government has designed a so-called “action plan” to preserve sharks and other endangered species, a plan that will ideally become a reality in 2014.[18] The government official also stated that it is the duty of regional governments to help carry out their own investigations in order to map out the networks so that illegally fished dolphin and shark products do not make their way to local and international consumers.[19] Furthermore, Phumpiu announced a proposal to initiate a public awareness campaign that would inform the Peruvian citizenry of the inhumane nature of shark fishing, in order to discourage domestic consumption.[20] The Deputy Minister boldly stated that “we do not consider them [shark fishermen] artisanal fishermen but rather delinquents”[21]
There is some reason to hope that the Mundo Azul revelations will encourage the Peruvian government to take bolder steps in protecting its marine ecosystem; namely, Deputy Minister Phumpiu explained that the government is evaluating the institution of a prohibition on shark fishing. By making shark fishing illegal, the ideas is that Peruvian fishermen would be discouraged from hunting dolphins as well. Coastal security agencies and marine conservation organizations must work in collaboration with local fishing communities to see that such prohibitions are properly enforced.
As for the amount of personnel and technology available for Peruvian authorities to patrol its ports and wide coast to make sure that bans are properly implemented, Deputy Minister Phumpiu has declared that there are today more than 250 qualified inspectors to enforce the 1996 ban on killing dolphins. Nevertheless, this figure does not appear to be sufficient to properly monitor Peru’s numerous ports (which is why coalitions with local communities are so important in the enforcement of conservation laws).[22] Meanwhile Rear Admiral Edmundo Deville, director general of Peru’s Coast Guard, explained that his agency has six patrol boats for maritime surveillance to combat illicit activities, while another 24 vessels can patrol the coast and go as far as 50 miles into the open sea. He explained that there are plans for Peru’s fleet of patrol boats to expand to 44 in number by 2016.[23]
It seems that combating the illegal fishing of dolphins and sharks is gaining momentum in Peru. Besides the Peruvian government and the proposed IMARPE study, the respected Peruvian daily El Comercio published on October 19 a set of five suggestions to help combat this tragic development. These recommendations included improving the monitoring and tracking of artisanal vessels (many of them do not have the proper fishing licenses), ensuring that harpoons are not on board of artisanal vessels before they leave port, and more effective police operations to crack down on markets that sell dolphin meat, so that it can be seized and the merchants can be prosecuted.
Lose the Fish, Lose the Ocean
By indiscriminately slaughtering two precious species such as sharks and dolphins, Peruvian fishermen are putting the Pacific Ocean’s fragile marine ecosystem at risk. This should be reason enough to encourage Lima (and other governments) to strive to protect these animals. More specific factors to take into account regarding why the uncontrolled killing of sharks and dolphins should be stopped include,
  1. Their long-lived, low fecundity, and late age of maturity. Unlike many other species of bony fish that produce thousands of eggs at a time once (or more than once) a year from a relatively early age of maturity, sharks do not start reproducing until they are much older than some other fish. Once they start reproducing, many of these species birth just one offspring every two years. They also can live much longer than many fish species – in some instances surviving for over seventy years. Their low fertility makes it very hard for such stock to survive amidst increasing fishing pressures. In other words, sharks are being fished faster than they can reproduce and are at risk of being driven into extinction.
  2. The presence of apex predators, like sharks and dolphins, are often thought to be an indication of the health of an ecosystem.  It is theorized that healthy numbers of these predators means that an ecosystem is functioning properly.  By eliminating these species in alarmingly high numbers, it can have a massive impact on the rest of the environment.
  3. Trophic cascades.  Eliminating highly sensitive species (like sharks and dolphins) affects the rest of the ecosystem, an effect called a trophic cascade. The removal of apex predators entails that the population rates of their prey species are not kept in check. These prey species can then reproduce without control and can throw an ecosystem out of balance. The well-documented case of killer whales and their impact on sea otters in Western Alaska is a good example of how an imbalance in the amount of one species can disrupt the balance of an ecosystem.[24] Another example is a 2007 report in the journalScience regarding great white sharks in the Atlantic Ocean, which explains the negative effects of a decrease in 11 species of sharks, which have plummeted over the years, while the prey species that these consume have soared (rays, skates, and small sharks).”[25] On the other hand, a 2000 article in the Journal of Marine Science carried out several simulations staged in various regions of the world where sharks are to be found. The goal of these experiments was to discuss whether the absence of sharks would dramatically affect the local ecosystem.[26] The comprehensive analysis concluded, “shark depletion across ecosystems are often difficult to foresee, but may be ecologically and economically significant, and may persist over long time periods.”[27] 
Conclusions
One can only hope that the recent bloody revelations brought to light by the laudable work of Mundo Azul and Blue Voice will help to raise awareness of the perilous plight of dolphins and sharks in Peru. So far, Peruvian government officials have attempted to portray a proactive stance on the dolphin question in order to slow illegal hunting practices. Placing a ban on shark fishing would be a venturesome idea, and hopefully it will not take years to have it implemented. It is doubtful that the sharks and dolphins that currently swim in the Peruvian sea (and elsewhere) can wait much longer.
Credit: This author would like to thank the marine biologist interviewed for this analysis, as well as Sierra Ramirez, former Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs and current M.A. candidate at American University, for their constructive feedback on earlier versions of this report.
W. Alejandro Sanchez, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs
References
[1] “Peru: 15 mil delfines mueren al ano en manos de pescadores artesanales.” La Republica. Sociedad. October 17, 2013.
[2] “Peru: 15 mil delfines mueren al ano en manos de pescadores artesanales.” La Republica. Sociedad. October 17, 2013.
[3] “Crimen en el mar: matanza impune de delfines en el Peru.” America TV. Cuarto Poder. October 20, 2013.
[4] “La fiscalia de Ilo investiga la matanza de delfines.” ElComercio.com.pe. October 24, 2013.
Available: http://elcomercio.pe/actualidad/1649286/noticia-fiscalia-ilo-investiga-matanza-delfines
[5] “Holocaust for Dolphins and Sharks in Peru.” Bluevoice.org. Press Release.
[6] “Holocaust for Dolphins and Sharks in Peru.” Bluevoice.org. Press Release.  Available:  http://www.bluevoice.org/news_perudolphins131016.php
[7] Mackenzie Wilson. “Gordon Ramsay ‘Held at Gunpoint’ in Costa Rica.” BBCAmerica.com. January 3, 2011.
[8]  Steven Winford. “Gordon Ramsay threatened at gunpoint during illegal fishing investigation.” The Telegraph (UK). January 3, 2011.
[9] Simon Denyer. “In China Shark Fin Soup is Losing its Fashion.” The Independent (UK). October 21, 2013.
[10]Simon Denyer. “In China Shark Fin Soup is Losing its Fashion.” The Independent (UK). October 21, 2013.
[11] “Peru: 15 mil delfines mueren al ano en manos de pescadores artesanales.” La Republica. Sociedad. October 17, 2013.
[[1]2] “Proteccion Legal de Delfines en el Peru.” Mundo Azul.
[[1]3] “Proteccion Legal de Delfines en el Peru.” Mundo Azul.
[14] Reglamento Para la Proteccion y Conservacion de los Cetaceos Menores. Decreto Supremo No. 002-96-PE. Government of Peru. Available:http://www.mundoazul.org/descargas/pnp/reglamento_cetaceos_ds002-96-pe1.pdf
[15] Reglamento Para la Proteccion y Conservacion de los Cetaceos Menores. Decreto Supremo No. 002-96-PE. Government of Peru. Available:http://www.mundoazul.org/descargas/pnp/reglamento_cetaceos_ds002-96-pe1.pdf
[16] “Carne de delfin fue decomisada en restaurante del Callao.” ElComercio.com.pe. October 24, 2013.
Available:  http://elcomercio.pe/actualidad/1649394/noticia-carne-delfin-fue-decomisada-restaurante-callao
[17]“Crimen en el mar: matanza impune de delfines en el Peru.” America TV. Cuarto Poder. October 20, 2013.
[18]“Gobierno condena la caza o captura de delfines” Peru21. Actualidad. October 18, 2013.
[19]“Gobierno condena la caza o captura de delfines” Peru21. Actualidad. October 18, 2013.
[20]“Gobierno condena la caza o captura de delfines” Peru21. Actualidad. October 18, 2013.
[21] “Produce: Peru condena la caza illegal de delfines y tiburones.” Rpp.com.pe. Economia. October 18, 2013.
[22] “Piden a Fiscalias Investigar caza de Delfines y Tiburones.” Rpp.com.pe. Politica. October 23, 2013.
[23]“Piden a Fiscalias Investigar caza de Delfines y Tiburones.” Rpp.com.pe. Politica. October 23, 2013.
[24] J.A. Estes, M.T. Tinker, T. M. Williams and D.F. Doak. “Killer Whale Predation on Sea Otters Linking Oceanic and Nearshore Ecoystems.”  Science. Reports. Vol. 282, October 16. 1998.P. 473 -476.
[25]Ransom A. Myers, Julia K. Baum, Travis D. Sherp, Sean P. Powers, Charles H. Peterson. “Cascading Effects of the Loss of the Apex Predatory Sharks from a Coastal Ocean.” Science. Vol. 315. March 30. 2007. P. 1846 – 1850.
[26] J.D. Stevens, R. Bonfil, N.K.Dulvy, and P.A. Walker. “The Effects of Fishing on Sharks. Rays, and Chimaeras (Chondrichtyans), and the Implications for Marine Ecosystems.” Journal of Marine Science. 57. P. 476-494.
[27] J.D. Stevens, R. Bonfil, N.K.Dulvy, and P.A. Walker. “The Effects of Fishing on Sharks. Rays, and Chimaeras  (Chondrichtyans), and the Implications for Marine Ecosystems.” Journal of Marine Science. 57. P. 490.
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Tuesday, November 12, 2013

VOXXI: The #9N protests in Venezuela and the Caracas-Havana connection


The #9N protests in Venezuela and the Caracas-Havana connection
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
November 12, 2013
Originally published: http://voxxi.com/2013/11/12/9n-protests-venezuela/


On November 9, thousands of people across Venezuela took to the streets to protest the presidency of Nicolas Maduro and his (mis)handling of the national economy.
The protests, called Marcha Autoconvocada (Self-convened March) quickly went viral on Twitter with the hashtag #9N, and took place not only in Caracas but in other major cities, such as Maracaibo, Valencia, San Cristobal and Merida.

Popular discontent

The #9N protests have generally been reported as non-violent, despite of a couple of isolated incidents and the deployment of the Bolivarian police. Unsurprisingly, representatives from the opposition coalition, the Mesa de la Unidad Democratica (MUD), are trying to maintain this momentum of citizen discontent as the country is scheduled to have municipal elections  on December 8.
The reasons for the protests are fairly straightforward. The country’s economy is worsening and inflation seems to worsen by the day. Recently, President Maduro took the controversial decision of seizing theDaka chain of electronic stores, arguing the wealthy elites of the city were purposely keeping some of the merchandise in order to increase the prices of their goods.
The Venezuelan head of state declared in a speech that the government would sell off the merchandise (i.e. plasma television sets) at lower prices to the Venezuelan citizenry.
According to a November 11 article in the Venezuelan daily El Nacional, since October 1, President Maduro has talked about the economy 24 out of 40 days on Venezuelan TV – an average of just over once every two days.
Moreover, the Venezuelan head of state has made a habit of proclaiming that there are conspiracies that seek to destabilize his government. The masterminds of said conspiracies include (unsurprisingly) the U.S., former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe and also three Venezuelan opposition leaders who Maduro has dubbed the “trilogy of evil.”
Additionally, #9N protestors expressed their concern about citizen insecurity as crimes across the country are also alarmingly constant. Just this past weekend (November 9-10), 29 people suffered violent deaths in Caracas alone.

The Havana connection

But there was apparently another issue that Venezuelans protested against on #9N, namely the close relations between their government and Cuba. Several photos and Youtube videos have been uploaded, apparently showing demonstrators from #9N who were burning Cuban flags. Some of the flags had messages such as “Get out of Venezuela” or “The Castros must Leave” written on them.
Without a doubt, the late President Hugo Chavez forged a close alliance with Cuba while he was in power, and he was a close friend of both Fidel and Raul Castro.
This close personal and governmental relationship was best exemplified by the joint projects that the two countries carried out, mostly to benefit the Caribbean island.
One good example is the subsidized Venezuelan oil that Cuba obtained from the Chavez government. Another Cuban-Venezuelan project was the initiative to build a nickel processing center in Holguin, Cuba – this past July it was reported that the project has been put on hold for four years.
Additionally, internet access in Cuba has improved thanks to an underwater fiber optic cable that originates in Venezuela.
Moreover, an ailing Chavez spent roughly three months in Havana (from December 2012 to February 2013) where he underwent surgery to treat his cancer.
This sparked a constitutional debate in Venezuela regarding who was in charge of the country and whether presidential elections should be called for.
The extent of the Cuban government’s influence over the daily decisions of the Venezuelan government is debatable.
Without falling into a discussion of conspiracy theories, we can note that several Venezuelan and other media outlets have reported for years the presence of Cuban military and intelligence personnel in the South American state, who apparently act in an advisory capacity to the Venezuelan armed forces.
For example, a September 2013 article in the Spanish daily ABC argued that Cuban military presence in Venezuela dates back to 2007, and that the structure of the Venezuelan armed forces has been remodeled to resemble that of the Cuban military.
Meanwhile, the Venezuela daily El Nacional reported this past July 29 that Cuban General Ramiro Valdes, a veteran of the Cuban Revolution and current Vice President of the Cuban Council of Minister, is the person who oversees Cuban’s military presence in Venezuela.
The recent #9N protests in Venezuela have demonstrated the growing discontent by several sectors of the population regarding where the country is heading, particularly when it comes to a deteriorating economy. Moreover, this past Saturday, Venezuelans protested what they see to be a growing Cuban influence in their country, particularly in the armed forces.
To what extent the Venezuelan opposition can capitalize on this popular discontent will be seen in December’s municipal elections.
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Monday, November 11, 2013

COHA: WEAPONS DIPLOMACY: RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTER SKIPS VENEZUELA DURING LATIN AMERICAN TOUR



Weapons Diplomacy: Russian Defense Minister skips Venezuela during Latin American Tour
W. Alejandro Sanchez and COHA Research Associate Ian Kowalski
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
November 11, 2013
Originally published: http://www.coha.org/weapons-diplomacy-russian-defense-minister-skips-venezuela-during-latin-american-tour/

In mid-October, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu travelled to Brazil and then went on to Peru in order to increase military ties between the Russian Federation and these two South American countries. Specifically, Shoigu’s goal was to lobby Peruvian and Brazilian government officials to purchase Russian military technology. The four-day diplomatic trip was not particularly noteworthy as no major deals regarding weapons sales were agreed upon. However, Shoigu’s trip does serve to highlight how Moscow continues to see Latin America as a potential major client for Russian military equipment at a time when most of the continent is enjoying an economic boom and many regional armed forces are seizing this opportunity as the time to upgrade their military equipment.
Nevertheless, one particularly intriguing issue regarding Shoigu’s visit to the Western Hemisphere is the fact that the Russian leader chose not to visit any of the members of the left-of-center ALBA bloc, which are known for having an anti-Washington and pro-Moscow stance. Specifically, it is somewhat baffling that the Russian defense minister did not go to Venezuela during his recent trip, given that the Venezuelan government under the late Hugo Chávez had spent billions of dollars purchasing state-of-the-art Russian weaponry. If nothing else, Shoigu’s visit to Brazil and Peru exemplifies the types of relations that the Russian government wishes to maintain and with whom it wants to increase its stance as a major weapons supplier to Latin American states.
Trip to Brazil
The first stop in the course of Shoigu’s four-day Latin American journey was Brazil. The Portuguese-speaking giant has focused on upgrading its military hardware in recent years. Most notably, Brazil, with French help, is trying to build the country’s first nuclear-powered submarine (a dream of the Brazilian Navy dating back to the 1964-1985 military regime).
According to the Russian news agency RIA Novosti, Shoigu’s visit was specifically targeted to discuss the sales of Pantsir-S1 and Igla missile systems, which could become the cornerstone of the country’s air defenses. [1] Regarding the weapons themselves, an October 9 RIA Novosti article explains that
The Pantsir-S, produced by Russia’s KBP, is a gun-missile system combining a wheeled vehicle mounting a fire-control radar and electro-optical sensor, two 30-mm cannons and up to 12 57E6 radio-command guided short-range missiles, and is designed to take on a variety of targets flying at low altitudes. [Meanwhile the] Igla is a Russian man-portable infrared homing surface-to-air missile. [2]
If the sale is successful, it could be worth as much as $1 billion USD (certainly, this amount is no pocket change).  An October 16 article by the news agency Reuters explained that “Brazilian officials said they expect to sign a contract by the middle of 2014 for the […] Pantsir S1 [and] Igla-S.” [3] This means that the missiles may arrive too late to be used for the upcoming 2014 FIFA World Cup, but would be in place for the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio.
Additionally, Russia has been trying to convince Brazil to buy its Sukhoi-35 fighter jets as the South American nation has re-activated its FX-2 competition, meant to select a new top-of-the-line warplane for its fighter fleet; Brazil is expected to buy up to 36 warplanes from the winning design. [4] Besides Russia’s Sukhoi, other contenders for this coveted contract are the Rafale by the French company Dassault, the FA-118 Super Hornet from the American company Boeing, and the Gripen-NG from Sweden’s Saab. [5]
Trip to Peru
As for Peru, the Andean nation has been equipped with Russian military technology since the military regime of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975). Plenty of these weapons are still in use and in need of substantial upgrade, such as Peru’s now obsolete T-55 tanks. During the past years Peru has been a reliable client of the Russian military industry, as it recently fixed most of its Mi-17 helicopters.
During Shoigu’s trip, the Russian senior official lobbied the Peruvian government to purchase110 T-90S main battle tanks and the same number of BTR-80A armored personnel carriers in a deal worth about $700 million USD. In addition, Russia has offered 700 KAMAZ military trucks, both type 4×4 and 6×6, which are ideal for rough terrain use. [6]
For years, Peru has been trying to select a new battle tank to replace the T-55s, and has carried out tests on different tank models from different suppliers, such as the Chinese MBT-2000. [7] It would seem that the Peruvian military may ultimately opt to stick to a supplier and type of weapon with which it already is familiar. This past May, during an arms exhibition called SITDEF Peru 2013, Russia lent a T-90S battle tank to the Peruvian army so it could be tested to see if it fulfills the Peruvian military’s requirements. [8]
Moreover, Russia has offered to build a repair center for helicopters in Peru. This is a relatively novel offer as the Andean nation has a number of different types of Russian helicopters, such as the models Mi-8, Mi-17, Mi-25, Mi-26 and Mi-35. [9] Some of these are currently used by the Peruvian police and armed forces in the VRAEM region (Valley of the Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro Rivers), in the Peruvian highlands, in order to battle the narco-insurgent movement Shining Path. In addition, there are reports that Peru will also buy a total of 24 Mi-17 helicopters from Russia in a deal that is estimated to cost up to $406 million USD. [10] In other words, given the continued interest of the Andean nation to use Russian military technology to form the cornerstone of its helicopter fleet, it probably would make sense to have a specialized maintenance center in Peru for whenever such aircraft are in need of repair.
What about Venezuela and the ALBA Bloc?
Finally, it has been pointedly noticed that Defense Minister Shoigu did not visit Venezuela during his October trip to Latin America. Throughout the Hugo Chávez regime, Venezuela exponentially upgraded its military power by aggressively purchasing weaponry from the Russian Federation (as well as from other sources, such as China and Spain), which included Sukhoi fighter jets, helicopters, tanks, as well as Kalashnikov rifles and Dragunov sniper rifles.
While Moscow-Caracas relations have generally been cordial during the Nicolás Maduro presidency, it is undeniable that relations between the two countries are not nearly as close as they were during the high-yield intimacy of the Chávez-Putin era. For example, when Chávez was ill earlier in the year, presidential succession in Venezuela was unclear; there were rumors speculating whether new elections would occur, as well as some purported divisions within the Venezuelan government between Maduro and Diosdado Cabello, president of the National Assembly. [11] The best example of Russia’s ambivalence during this tense period was the decision by Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, who chose not to visit Venezuela during his February tour in Latin America, in which he made stopovers in Brazil and Cuba. [12]
Likewise, Shoigu did not visit Caracas in his most recent trip to lobby for more weapons’ sales. This can be due to a number of reasons. It could simply have been that Shoigu was on a tight schedule and his staff could not squeeze a third stopover on his Latin American tour; after his trip to Latin America, on October 23, the Russian Defense Minister met with U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel during NATO’s summit of Defense Ministers in Brussels. [13] Likewise, Shoigu and his staff might have deemed it unnecessary to do a stopover in Caracas as the country is already a reliable client of Russian weaponry, unlike Brazil and Peru. Not only are deals yet to be finalized, but Russia is also facing more competition, as there are other forceful vendors who are trying to sell weapons to these two countries.
Moreover, Diosdado Cabello recently visited Russia in early October—the first member of the Venezuelan National Assembly to officially visit the country. Announced by Maduro, Cabello met with a number of high-ranking Russian officials in hopes of strengthening ties between the two countries. He expressed President Maduro’s admiration of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s dedication to global peace through his recent efforts to resolve a critical moment in the Syrian conflict. Cabello also discussed with Russian authorities a bilateral agreement for the exploration and exploitation of the Orinoco River Oil Belt, an important venture for the development of power generation and gas extraction projects in Venezuela.
In reality, October was a month full of diplomatic activity between Caracas and Moscow, perhaps in response to Shoigu’s inability to travel to Venezuela earlier in the month. On October 28, Venezuela received two Russian bombers at its Maiquetia airport near Caracas, as part of a military exercise (the Venezuelan media has shown numerous images of these warplanes). The following day,on October 29, Maduro welcomed a Russian delegation and declared to the media, “Recognizing that thanks to the Eternal Commander Hugo Chávez, Venezuela now has a large Russian investment in technology, trade, and domestic security.” [14] Moreover, Maduro also announced yet another diplomatic visit to Russia by the admiral-in-chief of the Ministry of People’s Power for Defense, Carmen Meléndez. Planned to take place sometime in the coming days, the bilateral meetings aim “to further expand the various policies in the field of security and to achieve the development of a Bolivarian National Armed Forces more consolidated in all aspects,” according to Radio Nacional de Venezuela, a state-run news network. [15]
It is worth noting that the same delegation of Russian senior government officials and military officers then travelled from Venezuela to Nicaragua, another ALBA member. The Central American nation is currently ruled by Daniel Ortega, who was a staunch ally of the Soviet Union during the Cold War and also a close associate of the late president Chávez. The Russian delegation stayed in Nicaragua for two days, making the necessary declarations to the media about strengthening security ties between Managua and Moscow. While no arms deals were reportedly signed, media outlets last August reported that Nicaragua is considering acquiring Russian vessels for its Navy. [16] Likewise, the same two Russian warplanes that visited Venezuela also made their way to Nicaragua as part of the military exercise. A clear show of Russian military power, the nuclear-capable bombers performed a number of patrols throughout the Caribbean before ultimately returning home. [17]
It should be noted, however, that these exercises were not incident-free. While carrying out their patrols over the Caribbean, the two bombers allegedly violated Colombian airspace twice. In response, the Colombian air force deployed two KFIR fighter jets in order to intercept the bombers and drive them out of the country’s airspace. While the incident did not escalate, this could be interpreted as a Russian display of its military prowess throughout the Western Hemisphere. [18]
Finally it is also worth noting that Bolivia is yet another ALBA country that is currently discussing whether to acquire Russian military hardware. Recent reports explain that La Paz plans to acquire two Mi-17 Russian helicopters. [19] However, as with Venezuela and Nicaragua, Minister Shoigu did not choose to schedule a stopover in La Paz. Nor did the more recent Russian delegation also choose to visit Bolivia either. 
Conclusions
While recent relations between Venezuela and Russia appear to be slowed by the transition from the old to new administration in Caracas, diplomatic rhetoric between the two countries certainly seems to remain strong. In July, the two countries’ leaders met during a summit in Moscow of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, exchanging words of support. According to Voice of Russia, both Maduro and Putin “reaffirmed ‘their wish for continuing their course towards strategic cooperation in all sectors.’” [20] Putin further said, “Russia cherishes the memory of Hugo Chávez, a close and sincere friend of Russia and a courageous and strong man.” [21] President Maduro reciprocated the sentiments, acknowledging Russia’s “support and solidarity” towards Venezuela. [22]
In other words, it should not be interpreted that the close partnership between Caracas and Moscow is tapering off simply because of the fact that Shoigu did not stop in Venezuela during his recent trip to Latin America. As for explaining the visits by the senior Russian government official to Brazil and Peru, the two countries are enjoying an expanding economic period (though there are some indications that Brazil’s economy is slowing down), which means that the country’s armed forces have greater budgets to acquire new military hardware at this time.
References
[1] “Defense Minister Shoigu to Push Russian Arms Sales in Brazil, Peru,” RIA Novosti, last modified October 9, 2013,http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20131009/184018090/Defense -Minister-Shoigu-to-Push-Russian-Arms-Sales-in-Brazil-Peru.html/
[2] Ibid.
[3] Anthony Boadle. “Brazil Builds Russian Defence Ties With Missile Plan,” Reuters, last modified October 16, 2013,http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/16/uk-brazil-russia-idUKBRE99F14V20131016
[4] “Rusia ofrece a Brasil aviones de caza Sukhoi Su-35,”Infodefensa.com, last modified May 24, 2013,http://www.infodefensa.com/?noticia=rusia-ofrece-a-brasil-aviones-de-caza-sukhoi-su-35/
[5] “Ministro Brasileño dice que es “urgente” la compra de cazas de combate,” Lainformacion.com, last modified April 9, 2013,http://noticias.lainformacion.com/politica /equipamiento-militar/ministro-brasileno-dice-que-es-urgente-la-compra-de-cazas-de-combate_jpjVk8vWQOJyDKhOTotFE/
[6] “Rusia ofrece 700 camiones tácticos KAMAZ al ejercito del Peru,” Infodefensa.com, last modified July 10, 2013,http://www.infodefensa.com/?noticia=rusia-ofrece-700-camiones-tacticos-kamaz-al-ejercito-del-peru/
[7] “No hay dinero para devolver tanques Chinos MBT-2000,” La Republica, last modified July 1, 2011,http://www.larepublica.pe/01-07-2011/no-hay-dinero-para-devolver-tanques-chinos-mbt-2000/
[8] “Defense Minister Shoigu,” RIA Novosti.
[9] “Rusia reitera ofrecimiento al Perú sobre un centro de mantenimiento de helicopteros,” Infodefensa.com, last modified October 17, 2013, http://www.infodefensa.com/?noticia=rusia-reitera-ofrecimiento-al-peru-sobre-un-centro-de-mantenimiento-de-helicopteros/
[10] “Perú comprará 24 helicópteros Rusos por 406 millones de dólares,” RPP, last modified March 30, 2013,http://www.rpp.com.pe/2013-03-30-peru-comprara-24-helicopteros-rusos-por-406-millones-de-dolares-noticia_580910.html/
[11] “Venezuela National Assembly Chief: Diosdado Cabello,” BBC News, last modified March 5, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-20750536
[12] W. Alex Sanchez, “Medvedev Misses a Spot on Latin America Visit,” Blouin News, last modified February 26, 2013,http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatpolitics/2013/02/26 /medvedev-misses-a-spot-on-latin-america-visit/
[13] “Readout of Secretary Hagel’s Meeting with Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu,” U.S. Department of Defense: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), last modified October 23, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16332/
[14] “Venezuela y Rusia reafirman relaciones en el ámbito de la seguridad y comercio,” Radio Nacional de Venezuela, last modified October 29, 2013,http://www.rnv.gob.ve/index.php/presidente-maduro-recibe-delegacion-rusa-para-fortalecer-relaciones-bilaterales/
[15] Ibid.
[16] “Nicaragua y Rusia acuerdan amplian cooperación económico-militar,” NODAL, last modified October 31, 2013, http://www.nodal.am/index.php/2013/10/nicaragua-y-rusia-acuerdan-ampliar-cooperacion-economico-militar; “La fuerza naval de Nicaragua incorporará nuevos patrulleros.”Infodefensa.com, last modified August 27, 2013.http://www.infodefensa.com/?noticia=la-fuerza-naval-de-nicaragua-incorporara-nuevos-patrulleros
[17] “Russian Strategic Bombers Complete South American Mission,” RIA Novosti, last modified November 5, 2013,http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20131105/184529333 /Russian-Strategic-Bombers-Complete-South-American-Mission.html
[18] “Colombian Kfirs Intercept Russian Bombers Enrout to Venezuela,” Defense Update, last modified November 6, 2013.http://defense-update.com/20131106_kfir_vs_blackjack.html?utm_source=feedblitz &utm_medium=FeedBlitzRss&utm_campaign=feedburner/defenseupdate
[19] “Bolivia negocia la compra de dos helicópteros Rusos Mi-17 para la lucha antinarcóticos,” Infodefensa.com, last modified September 7, 2013, http://www.infodefensa.com/?noticia=bolivia-negocia-la-compra-de-dos-helicopteros-rusos-mi-17-para-la-lucha-antinarcoticos/
[20] “Moscow, Caracas to Carry on Course Towards Strategic Cooperation – Putin,” Voice of Russia, last modified July 2, 2013,http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_07_02/Moscow-Caracas-to-carry-on-course-towards-strategic-cooperation-Putin-8863/
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
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