Arm Sales, Especially by Russia and China, Continue to Penetrate Latin America

by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sanchez. Contributions by COHA Research Associates Karen Schwindt & Julissa Delgado.

February 21, 2011
http://www.coha.org/arm-sales-especially-by-russia-and-china-continue-to-latin-america/

Russian military sales have become so frequent in recent years that they no longer make for major headlines. However, as Washington policymakers continue to voice concern about Iran’s growing influence in Latin America, some alarmists argue that Russia’s eagerness to supply the region with weapons is likely to trigger a “soft arms race” and present itself as a threat to the United State’s historic hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Adherents to this point of view persist in looking at Moscow through a nostalgic Cold War lens that sees Russia (and probably China) as a growing and certain threat to U.S. national security. Little, if anything, is heard of WashingtonWashington concerns about other countries (like Israel or France) selling weaponry to the region.

Russia’s Arms Sales to Venezuela and Other Latin American Clients
President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela has made calculated and highly publicized purchases of military equipment in recent years, particularly from Russia and China. He has obtained Sukhoi fighter jets, helicopters (models Mi-26, Mi-35, Mi-17 and Mi-28N), 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles, as well as manufacturing and servicing facilities from Russia. In mid-2007, Chávez acquired 5,000 Dragunov sniper-rifles from Moscow.
There is also a Kalashnikov rifle (type 103) factory in Venezuela that is presently under construction, along with an additional facility to produce ammunition. However, according to Venezuelan specialists interviewed by the authors, construction of the facility has lagged for several years because of financing problems ,which has led to Moscow’s refusal to deliver its weaponry until Caracas first makes its payments.
In late 2010, several news agencies reported that Russia had approved a loan to Caracas totaling USD 4 billion to buy additional military equipment which President Chávez has stated will be used for “defensive” operations. Likely to be included in growing Venezuelan arsenal will be 92 T-72 tanks. According to UN and other leaked diplomatic cables, Russia has delivered as many as 1,800 shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles to the Venezuelan military. The models of the missiles that have been decided upon by Venezuelan military contractors are known as Igla-S (SA-24).

As part of its “military diplomacy,” Moscow also has sold significant amounts of weaponry to other regional states with the purpose of adding revenue to its coffers while developing good relations with governments and militaries in Latin America. In February 2009, Bolivia signed an agreement with Russia for a USD 150 million credit that will allow it to modernize its military (Moscow has yet to transfer the agreed upon amount). In addition, Russian officials have expressed an interest in selling Bolivia 1017 5B helicopters and Antonov An-148 aircraft.

Russia has also sold, or is in the process of negotiating the sale of military equipment to several other South American nations, including one Mi-8/Mi-17 helicopter to Ecuador in 2009. That same year, Brazil acquired 12 Mi-35M helicopters in a larger deal reportedly worth USD 150 million. In addition, Uruguay has acquired 48 multi-purpose amphibious vehicles (type GAZ-3937). Peru has committed itself to upgrading its helicopter fleet, acquiring a number of Mi-17 helicopters from Russia, including six helicopters of that model in 2010. In late February of this year, the Peruvian media reported that Lima will receive in March two helicopters type Mi-35. Mi helicopters are particularly important for the Peruvian army as the aircraft can attain high altitudes in the country’s highlands like the Andes mountains. They are particularly useful for current military operations in the Peruvian highlands against the narco-terrorist group, the Shining Path.

Other Military Equipment Providers
To be fair, it is not only Russia that boasts such significant inventory of arms sales to the region. A number of European countries, as well as Israel, are showing their highly lauded military products to Latin states, and China’s growing influence in Latin countries with small defense budgets is rising trend. One example of a non-Russian arms transaction is the plan by Brazil to build a nuclear-powered submarine, a scheme that dates back to the 1970s when a military junta ruled the country (1964-1985). France is helping the South American giant with this massive construction project. So far, estimates optimistically puts the launching of the submarine at 2021—though at one point, the goal was 2015. France also has sold two sonar systems to the Ecuadorian navy, to be used by its type-209 submarines.

Currently, France’s military exports to Latin America are not particularly significant. Hence, Paris hopes that the nuclear submarine project with Brazil will lead to further expansion of exports to the region. Specifically, Paris would like to increase exports of its EADS Eurocopters and Rafale warplanes, something it has not been able to pull off elsewhere with other potential clients in Africa and the Middle East. Brasília already has bought 50 Eurocopters and is currently contemplating about acquiring Rafale warplanes. Brasília, under the Lula administration, was scheduled to buy a number of Rafale warplanes to upgrade its air force, but new president Dilma Rousseff is reportedly looking for other options.

Other European arms vendors plying their lines in Latin America include Spain and Germany. Madrid has sold patrol boats to Venezuela. Meanwhile, Berlin has sold 60 Leopard 2 tanks and 146 Marder military vehicles to Chile in 2009. In addition, there is a growing Israeli activity regarding arms sales to Latin America. The Colombian armed forces have obtained a number of Kfir fighter planes from Israel, and, through a licensing agreement with Tel Aviv, Bogotá can assemble Israeli Galil rifles. In addition to sales to Colombia, Israel has also sold up to six unmanned air vehicles (UAVs – in this case, types Heron and Searcher) to Ecuador. Furthermore, Brazil has purchased 200 Derby BVRAAM missiles for its F-5E (F-5m) modernized combat aircraft.
Latin America also remains a consistent buyer of weaponry from the United States. Although Washington-Brasília relations have somewhat cooled in recent years, this has not halted weapon sales. According to the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI), some of the military inventory sold by the U.S. to Brazil includes seven EDO-997 sonar systems, eight AN/APS-137(V) Me aircraft radar systems, 30 Mk-48 torpedoes, 16 Blackhawk helicopters and up to eight S-70N Seahawk helicopters. Furthermore, in recent years, the Colombian armed forces have received a major number of Black Hawk helicopters from Washington and the Chilean government has purchased F-16 fighter planes.

China as a Rising Vendor
Despite the strong presence in Latin America of the U.S., Russia, and other major European states as weapons suppliers, Beijing has sought to enter the market with the region as well. For example, Beijing has sold radar systems (10 JYL-1) to Venezuela; up to four different types of Chinese YLC air search radars to Ecuador in 2009 as well as several K-8 combat aircraft to Bolivia. Mexico also has purchased Chinese Model-57 105mm towed guns. In 2010, China was gearing up to sell MBT-2000 tanks to Peru, but the deal fell through.

While there is certainly a market for Chinese weaponry, Beijing will have no easy time gaining an effortless entrance in the region. Chinese weaponry is typically regarded as cheap and not as sophisticated as Russian military technology, but Beijing does manage to sell some of its less sophisticated arms to countries that have smaller defense budgets such as Bolivia or some Central American states. Bolivia’s purchase of K-8 combat aircraft is an example of this.

In addition, there is a question of whether local militaries will want to switch to Chinese technology, considering that they are used to being outfitted by other suppliers. Peru stands as a good example of this. The Andean country has an abundance of U.S. and Soviet-era weaponry that its military has operated for decades, particularly the country’s Mi-helicopters. It would be difficult for China to try to sell its own helicopters (type Zhi-6 for example), considering that the Russian Mi has proven to be a reliable workhorse helicopter.

Certainly, there is the potential for Chinese sales to grow as military educational exchanges continue (ie. Latin American officials going to China for military training and studies), and for Latin American army officers to begin to gain trust in the Asian country’s military products. Today, dozens of Latin American junior officials attend academies of the People’s Liberation Army which will pave the way for future relations between Latino and Chinese officials. With that being said, it is important to take into consideration what R. Evan Ellis, an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies at the National Defense University, stated in a report entitled “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study.” Ellis explains that “[i]n the arena of China–Latin America military exchanges, it is interesting to note that Latin American military officers participating in such programs are often jokingly stigmatized by their colleagues in ways that officers participating in exchange programs in the United States are not.” In other words, Chinese military officers have not gained the strong human connections with their Latin peers needed to ensure that Chinese military equipment may be regarded as a major option in future purchases.

Despite these strengthening ties it is probably safe to say that Russia and the U.S. will remain the major suppliers of weaponry to Latin America for the immediate future. China has yet to come up with a compelling explanation as to why Latin American states should choose its products over others. And though China has the possibility to grow, it lacks, for the time being, the connections that Washington, Moscow, and other European countries have enjoyed for decades.

Seeing Red
In recent years, conservative organizations such as the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, as well as Bush-era officials and policymakers have continuously raised red flags and published alarmist-articles about Russia’s growing role in the arms trade in Latin America, particularly in Venezuela. Such thinking harkens back to the neo-conservative rhetoric and a bipolar manner of looking at the world that dates back to the 1980s. It goes without saying that a major reason for this criticism is Venezuela’s president, Hugo Chávez’s strong anti-Washington stance and leftist tendencies. Even some officials at the State Department view the perceived rising tide of nationalistic-driven Chavismo, as an additional threat to regional harmony.

A leftover Cold War ideological fragment still views the world as either pro-Washington or pro-Moscow (which is still regarded by many hardline conservatives as a security-concern). Former officials such as Roger Noriega, an Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs under President George W. Bush who now is associated with the American Enterprise Institute, and legislators such as Chair of the House Foreign Relations Committee Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL-R), who has been in office since 1989, are two imposing examples of the continuation of single-dimensional ideologies whose influence over Latin American policy-making can be distortive. Unfortunately, a more open approach towards the region has been set back by the lack of progressive Latin-Americanists in the U.S. congress, especially with the death of Senator Ted Kennedy, and the retirement of Senator Christopher Dodd.

In a June 2010 report issued by the Heritage Foundation, Peter Brookes argues that “Chávez is also spending billions on arms from Russia in the absence of any valid threat coming from Washington.” But most worrisome, according to Brookes, is the Venezuelan leader’s interest in nuclear power, where he is seeking assistance from both Russia and Iran. This conjures up the deeply disturbing image of “a nuclear threat not far from our shores.” Furthermore, the well-known rightist-expert Ariel Cohen also has warned that, “President Hugo Chávez recently announced that Venezuela will purchase dozens of Russian tanks and [additional] arms [from Moscow], signaling growing military ties between the two countries—and trouble ahead in the hemisphere.” In addition, Venezuela’s Chávez repeatedly has been repeatedly accused by his foes of actively supporting the Colombian narco-guerrilla group FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), and other drug-trafficking organizations. Although Chávez has intermittingly expressed his ideological support for the FARC, his political foes opposing him often exaggerate their case by largely inventing claims that Venezuela has armed the FARC with Swedish-made anti-tank weapons.

Adding fuel to the growing blaze behind the Russian-Venezuelan relationship are the multiple visits that Chávez has made to Moscow. Similarly, Russian energy czar and current Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin visited Caracas in July 2010. Several agreements were signed on that occasion, ranging from joint energy to military cooperation. Such visits, which contribute to relations between Moscow and Caracas have led Cohen to observe, in another report, that “the Russia-Venezuela condominium is emblematic of geopolitical forces rising to challenge U.S. leadership and influence.” During a January speech in Colombia, Senator John McCain (R-AR) repeated his and his party’s traditional rightwing template of Latin America by simple-mindedly defining Venezuela as a security threat.

The War and Arms Link
A report called “Arms-R-Us: South America Goes Shopping,” issued by the Washington Office on Latin America found that “[w]hether or not you call it an arms race, the increase [in arms sales] is substantial; in 2008, the 12 S.A. countries together channeled more than USD 50 billion into military expenditures, about 30% more than in 2007.” The article addresses the usual concerns, though not to the level of intensity of articles published by conservative agencies like the Heritage Foundation and American Enterprise Institute, stating that the South American “arms race could awaken old and unresolved conflicts, [and] fuel feelings of mistrust and fear among countries in the region.” There are certainly still a number of unsolved conflicts still lingering in the region. For instance, the maritime dispute between Peru and Chile currently under review at The Hague, as well as the ongoing border dispute between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. However, a link between an arms race and the inevitability of inter-state warfare has not been fully confirmed.

Determining when an arms race begins and ends is complicated. Even if there is a “soft” arms race going on in South America—one that, at the present time, involves Venezuela, Brazil, and Chile as the major buyers of military hardware—it is not necessarily correct to reach the conclusion that this will inevitably Latin America lead to full scale warfare. The area has found itself face to face with a number of inter-state engagements over the past decades, including conflicts between Peru and Ecuador (1941, 1981, 1995), the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador (1969), and the Falklands War between Argentina and the United Kingdom (1982). This doesn’t include U.S. military interventions in the Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989).

While all of these conflicts were costly and challenging, they were generally short-lived, geographically limited, and arguably did not cost anything like the previous major inter-state conflict in the region—e.g., the three year Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay in the 1930s. Tying arms races to the possibility of open warfare may be tempting, but it is not necessarily accurate, especially when pragmatically looking through some of the main points of Latin American history. Since the Chaco War, Latin America has experienced arms races, a plethora of military governments, and ongoing inter-state tensions; however, the tally of inter-state wars, as previously mentioned, has been surprisingly low.

Arizona Republican Senator John McCain’s definition of Venezuela as a “security threat” resonates well with his party’s traditional ideology towards Latin America. However, he seems to not have taken into consideration Bogotá’s new objectives vis-à-vis Caracas since the inauguration of President Juan Manuel Santos. While McCain was accusing Venezuela of being a “threat,” Colombia’s President Santos has been working hard to improve his country’s previously rancid ties with Chávez. In an August 2010 interview with the Christian Science Monitor, Colombian political affairs columnist Laura Gil noted that “years of confrontation with Venezuela has brought nothing […] Santos is not naive. He was minister of defense during the worst times, but he is very pragmatic.” An example of an attempt to restore functional ties between the two countries occurred in late December 2010, only weeks before McCain visited Colombia. Venezuelan security forces captured a commander of Colombia’s second largest rebel group, the ELN, Nilson Teran Ferreira (also known as Tulio), and promptly extradited him to Bogotá. While this may not fully appease skeptics about Chávez’s intentions, it is a gross distortion to define the Venezuelan leader as a “security threat.”

Certainly, the major military purchases by Caracas in recent years are a concern, and occasional tensions, like the May 2008 incident involving Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela have occurred. Nevertheless, with a new chief executive in Bogotá, there are real signs that confidence-building mechanisms are working, and that Colombia-Venezuela relations at the political and security level are significantly improving.

Conclusion
While several Latin American countries have disagreed over various issues, such as border disputes, these differences have seldom resulted in aggressive action (the 2008 incident in which Venezuela sent part of its army to the border with Colombia is one recent example), let alone war. Therefore, the mere fact that Latin American countries have continued modestly to build up their military arsenals does not mean that this apparent “soft arms” race warrants extreme alarmist rhetoric hinting at the likelihood of inter-state warfare.

That Moscow (in addition to other countries around the globe) continues to supply Latin America with such diverse weaponry does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the sale of armaments will trigger an arms race, much less inter-state warfare. While many Central and South American countries have experienced tense relations, and at times, outright conflicts with their neighbors, these clashes have rarely resulted in overt combat over the past decades. A review of recent Latin American history does not reveal a strong link between the build-up of arms in the region and outright inter-state war.

COHA has previously published articles on Russian geopolitical influence in Latin America as well as studies regarding the role of regional the armed forces. Such studies have focused on regional armed forces and their connections abroad. This is an updated analysis reflecting new developments. To access one of the previous articles; click here (http://www.coha.org/the-russian-arm%E2%80%99s-merchant-raps-on-latin-america%E2%80%99s-door/).

COHA Research Fellow Alex Sanchez recently published an article in the Journal of Transatlantic Studies, (Vol. 8, Issue 4) titled: “Russia and Latin America at the dawn of the twenty-first century.” The abstract and how to access the article can be found via this link. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a930888602~frm=titlelink

Entrevista: Democracia a la Fuerza

Democracia a la Fuerza
Programa: Detras de la Noticia
Canal: Russia Today - Espanol
Febrero 2011
Website: http://actualidad.rt.com/programas/detras_de_la_noticia

Tema: ¿Quién busca promover golpes suaves o revoluciones de colores? ¿Por qué la Cámara de Representantes del Congreso estadounidense promete ser un campo de batalla? Y ¿debe existir una libertad sin límites en Internet? Prepárense para conocer datos reveladores y escuchar opiniones contrastadas en “Detrás de la noticia”.

Latin America and State Recognition: Palestine, the Caucasus, Kosovo, and Taiwan

by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sanchez
COHA Commentary
December 13, 2010
http://bit.ly/hY0vyZ


• Venezuela and Nicaragua recognize breakaway South Ossetia and Abkhazia

• Taiwan and Kosovo, recognized by a number of Latin American states more likely due to national economic interest rather than abstract concepts of goodwill and friendship

• Recognition of Palestine seen as latest example of Latin American divergence from U.S. influence

In 2008, Russia fought a five-day war with Georgia, an independent nation in the southern Caucasus, which gained its independence following the breakup of the Soviet Union. While the details of the incident remain controversial, it is generally agreed that Georgia was the aggressor. One critical consequence of the conflict was that two Georgian separatist regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, were recognized relatively quickly as independent states by four countries: Russia, the Pacific island of Nauru and the Latin American countries of Venezuela and Nicaragua.

Why were Venezuela and Nicaragua persuaded to recognize the two separatist states and what is the likelihood of a subsequent Latin American wave of recognition taking place? The experience of South Ossetia and Abkhazia may help highlight two distinct factors involved in the recognition process:

1. Although there is no recognition policy in effect, Latin American states tend to extend recognition to states outside the hemisphere principally based on a closely-felt geopolitical sense of national interest as opposed to a clear understanding of the merits and facts of a given conflict or transition; and
2. Due to forces of globalization, Latin American countries are now extending ties to areas of previously little interest.

Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay decided to recognize Palestine as an independent state based on its 1967 borders, much to the distress of U.S. and Israeli policy makers. Paraguay is now expected to follow in the wake of its fellow MERCOSUR members. Reasons for this decision are largely economic in nature. Nevertheless, the decision to recognize Palestine is somewhat surprising in Argentina’s case, given its foreign minister, Hector Timerman’s, Jewish background.

Latin America and the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia

That two of the four countries recognizing the breakaway regions are Latin American may reflect a growing trend in the region’s diplomacy. Recognition seems to be in the air: Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay have likewise recognized Palestine. Delegations from South Ossetia and Abkhazia have recently visited several Latin America countries in order to attract more attention, particularly focusing on Russia-friendly states like Cuba, Ecuador, and Bolivia. It would not be inconceivable if, in the coming months, other Latin American states recognize the two separatist entities.

It could be argued that recognition of the two tiny territories by Venezuela and Nicaragua was due less to any particular sympathy for their cause (or even some fundamental understanding of the conflict’s roots), than to Caracas and Managua wanting to court Moscow as a possible source of weapons sales and client for their commodity exports. In the past several years, Venezuela has purchased several billions of dollars worth of Russian armaments, with President Hugo Chávez becoming a frequent flier to Moscow. In 2008, a visit to Caracas by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was arranged to coincide with the arrival of Russian naval units to carry out naval exercises with their Venezuelan counterparts. This marked the first time since the advent of the Cold War that the Russian navy had entered Latin American waters. As for Nicaragua, President Daniel Ortega has been an ally of Moscow dating back to the 1970s when the Cold War was in its ascendency. While its current policies have not included a particularly effusive rapprochement with Moscow, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Bolivia are among the three hemispheric countries that today are committed to being in Russia’s good graces in order to receive trade benefits, market access, and privileged financial and military sales opportunities.

Will an upcoming change in the Peruvian Presidency signal important shifts in Lima’s recognition policies?

Peruvian Presidential candidate Ollanta Humala is known to be close to Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez. During Peru’s 2006 presidential race, the Venezuelan leader made no effort to conceal his support for the retired Peruvian army officer and left-leaning political figure. If Ollanta Humala is elected to the presidency in 2011, he may well decide to recognize the independence of the separatist states, thereby emulating Chávez’ example. Though this could give Washington dyspepsia, it could put the Andean country in line to obtain some military aid from Russia on concessionary terms. It should be recalled that during the period of military rule, the Peruvian Armed Forces depended upon Moscow as an important supplier of aircraft and tanks.

As a retired army officer, Humala knows very well that much of Peru’s current military equipment obtained from the Soviet Union is now over 30 years old. This includes Mi helicopters, and T-type tanks, as well as MiGs and Sukhois aircraft. Peru is now in the process of refurbishing or replacing them with updated weaponry. For example, in recent years Russian engineers have been upgrading Peru’s Mi helicopter fleet. Ollanta Humala would certainly want to ensure Peru’s access to top of the line and affordable Russian military equipment. Bolivia, Peru’s southeastern neighbor, has in fact received credit lines from Moscow to buy new weaponry and a new presidential plane; since La Paz has not recognized the South Caucasus states, this certainly looks like a dangling carrot. Military aid from Russia could prove to be of great importance to Lima in view of Peru’s recently revived encounters with the narco-terrorist movement Shining Path, as well as its ongoing maritime border` dispute with its historical nemesis, Chile.

It should be noted that Ollanta Humala has already expressed an interest in recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia. During an April 2009 visit to Russia, he declared to the local media that since Lima had recognized Kosovo’s independence, it had no major justification not to do so with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. He explained that the reason behind President García’s delay in recognizing them appeared to be the position that due to Washington’s engagement with Iraq and Afghanistan, the Caucasus is now one of the United States’ key areas of interest. Later, on November 11, 2009, seven Peruvian deputies (all members of Humala’s Nationalist Party) presented a motion (#08928) to recognize the two states, though, ultimately, the initiative did not make it to the floor of Congress.

Latin America and recognizing “controversial” states

Within the hemisphere, recognition regarding the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has been driven by Nicaraguan and Venezuelan self-interests as much as by anything else. This would be nothing new for Latin America. Neither would it be a strange phenomenon that a Latin American state would move quickly to recognize a country that has declared independence, even if most areas were holding their decision in obeisance. Latin America’s recognition of Kosovo and Taiwan, as well as the more recent action on Palestine, are all cases in point that the recognition process is in ferment.

The recognition of Palestine

In recent days Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay have recognized Palestine as an independent state. Paraguay is expected to follow suit. Both Washington and Tel Aviv have expressed their disappointment, if not to say their consternation. The State Department was quick to call the move “counter-productive.” This development highlights a number of recent trends. First, Latin America continues to ease out of Washington’s sphere of influence, with Bolivia and Venezuela pursuing a growing relationship with Iran, while Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay have just recognized Palestine. State Department officials as well as both Republican and Democratic members of Congress have openly criticized the move. Second, the direction of Latin America’s recognition policy is not that surprising since Latin America has a growing commercial and political link with the Muslim world, hence recognizing Palestine is as much a political gesture an economic move aimed to please Islamic leaders in order to cement strong trade relations. President Mahmoud Abbas of Palestine, visited Brazil in 2005 and 2009, and outgoing Brazilian president Lula da Silva made the first-ever trip by a Brazilian head of state to Palestine and Israel in March of this year. The Council on Hemispheric Affairs’ director, Larry Birns, has stated that “in a way this move isn’t surprising; the Arab world is big but there is only one Israel.” In terms of policy, Latin America apparently feels free to thumb its nose at Israel, regardless of U.S. pressure to the contrary.

Nevertheless, it is surprising that Buenos Aires decided to recognize Palestine. In June, the country named its first foreign minister of Jewish origin, Hector Timerman, who replaced Jorge Taiana in the post. Argentina has had a mixed relationship with Israel and its own large and prosperous Jewish community, in great part due to the 1994 terrorist attacks against the Israeli-Argentine Mutual Associate building. A van filled with explosives drove into the complex, killing 89 and injuring more than 200. The Lebanese militant group Hezbollah and Iran have been implicated in perpetrating the attack. Buenos Aires has carried out several initiatives with the Arab world in recent years, including an agreement with Algeria over nuclear cooperation. An August 2010 article by the Global Arab Network quotes Egyptian Minister of Trade and Industry Rasheed Mohamed Rasheed, as maintaining that Cairo wants to strengthen its ties with Argentina, especially in the fields of medicine, textiles, and IT. The article explains that “the volume of trade exchange between Egypt and Argentina rose from 616 million dollars in 2007 to 1.2 billion dollars in 2008, but receded to 643 million dollars in 2009 due to the financial crisis.” Argentina is Egypt’s second largest trade partner in Latin America. The region’s growing ties with the Arab world comes at a time when Washington seems to be increasingly frustrated by developments with the West Bank settlement standoff (the Obama administration has decided to end its efforts to achieve direct talks between the sides).

The recognition of Kosovo

Kosovo gained its independence from Serbia in 2008 and so far it has been recognized by approximately 70 states, including most of Europe as well as the U.S. and Canada. Countries that are threatened by the possible flare-up of separatist issues of their own, like the Russian Federation, China, Turkey, and Spain, understandably have been slow to move on the issue. Two of Washington’s major allies, Colombia and Peru, have recognized Kosovo. Other Latin states that have recognized Kosovo are Panama, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Belize. Honduras is the latest Latin American state to recognize the country, doing so last September. The Central American state has been a regional pariah since the 2009 coup in which the democratically-elected president, Manuel Zelaya, was taken from his bed in pajamas and flown out of the country. It is unclear if the recognition of Kosovo is an attempt by Porfirio Lobo, (Honduras’ de facto president elected to office under cloudy circumstances after Zelaya’s ousting) did this in order to be appreciated by Washington. In March of this year, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton carried out a five-day tour of Latin America in which she tried to persuade regional states to recognize the Lobo government. Matters were not helped when WikiLeaks made public that U.S. ambassador to Honduras, Hugo Llorens, acknowledged in a cable to the State Department that “there is no doubt that the military, Supreme Court, and National Congress conspired on June 28 in what constituted an illegal and unconstitutional coup against the Executive Branch.” Clinton’s trip was not very successful, as exemplified by the recently concluded IX conference of defense ministers in Bolivia, to which Honduras was not invited. Lacking substantial regional allies, Lobo may very well have concluded that the otherwise improbable recognition of Kosovo would strengthen his ties to Washington and its vote in regional forums.

The recognition of Taiwan

Taiwan is becoming increasingly perturbed that Chinese economic assistance to Latin America will erode some of the support it has found in regional leaders. Just over 20 states worldwide currently recognize Taiwan as an independent state, separate from mainland China. Besides Vatican City, most of these countries are located in relatively underdeveloped regions like Africa, the Caribbean, and Central America.

Regarding the Western Hemisphere, the countries that recognize Taiwan are: El Salvador, Belize, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, as well as Paraguay. While some of these states may have genuine sympathy for Taiwan, others have switched from recognition of the island to now recognizing the mainland as the official Chinese state. Currently, there are deep concerns emanating from Taipei after Beijing announced in October that it will give USD 462 million in financing to construct a tourism complex in the eastern resort of Punta Cana, Dominican Republic. Dominican tourism minister, Francisco Javier Garcia, visited Shanghai in October, and he was quoted by the BBC as saying that his country was hoping for “complete” relations with China “sooner [rather] than later.”

Latin America meets the rest of the world

The recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as Muslims from these aspirant nations to Latin America, may produce one additional consequence. The Caucasus is one of the world’s last regions with which Latin America has not established close contacts; the recognition of these separatist states may actually be the catalyst that could bring them into a more regularized relationship with the previously neglected region.

Today, Latin America participates in conferences with parts on the globe that have historically not been in its political or economic focus, such as the Middle East and Africa. This development would become even more fixed if a given Latin American country develops a strong economic relationship with the Caucasus states. For example, the now increasingly effective rapprochement between Latin America and the African continent has Brazil as its principle catalyst, since that country already has strong political links with South Africa, as well as historical and ethnic ties with Portuguese-speaking nations such as Angola. Gilberto Carvalho, a close advisor to Brazilian President Lula da Silva, has observed that after the President steps down from power, “Lula da Silva’s task will be to help with the political reforms the country needs. Overseas, his target is helping Africa.”

With respect to Latin America and the Muslim world, Brazil and Venezuela are building strong ties with countries like Libya and Iran. Additionally, Argentina has signed a nuclear agreement with Algeria. Another emerging trend is the growing friendship between Bolivia and Iran, with Tehran offering La Paz technical expertise to help construct nuclear energy power plants in the Andean state. Most recently, the two states have formed a partnership to exploit Bolivia’s lithium deposits. South America and Arab countries have held two summits so far, in 2005 and 2009.

It’s a small world after all

The recognition by four states of the separatist regions of Ossetia and Abkhazia is regarded by some regional specialists as a threat to the national integrity of Georgia. General parallels can be made with Kosovo and Taiwan, two other comparable separatist states carved out of Serbia and China respectively, which may prove instructive. Certainly, the issues in Georgia, the Middle East, Serbia, and China are complex and have their own unique arguing points. Most likely, while some Latin American states may hold out some sympathy towards the separatist areas, recognition has, and will continue to be, extended in accordance with their own national interests.

This article is an expanded version of an interview given by the author to The Caucasus Times regarding the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Latin American states. The full interview, in Russian, can be found via this link: Caucasus Times

New Journal Article: Russia and Latin America at the dawn of the twenty-first century

Russia and Latin America at the dawn of the twenty-first century
Author: W. Alejandro Sanchez
Published in: Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Volume 8, Issue 4 December 2010 , pages 362 - 384
http://bit.ly/hoWWPI

Abstract
Russia's relations with Latin America can be traced back to the nineteenth century. Today, in the post-Cold War era, the Russian Federation has pushed for a renewed presence in the region, as US influence diminishes, adding to an increasing multilateralism in the Americas. The rise of leftist governments has prompted Latin American governments to look for allies outside the Western Hemisphere. In light of this, Moscow is resorting to diplomacy, commerce and trade, investment as well as military sales in order to become an influential power. While Latin America may not be a cornerstone of Russian foreign policy, it certainly has become one of its pillars.

Keywords: Russia; Latin America; foreign policy; military diplomacy; Russia; Peru; Colombia; Venezuela; arm sales; regional security

Affiliation: Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Washington, DC, USA


The link will take to the Taylor & Francis where you can register/purchase the article. Please contact me if you would like a .pdf version if you're an academic/researcher etc. wilder.a.sanchez at gmail.com