PS21: Post-Conflict Colombia: Demining The Battlefield

"Post Conflict Colombia: Demining the Battlefield"
W. Alejandro Sanchez And Brittney J. Figueroa
PS21
January 4, 2017

By W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto and Brittney J. Figueroa. W. Alejandro is an international security analyst. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez. Brittney is a recent graduate from the University of California, Santa Barbara with a Bachelors degree in Global Studies, and a Minor in Latin American Iberian Studies.

Colombia is entering its post-conflict era as a peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) has been ratified by the Colombian Congress, while talks with the country’s other insurgent movement, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberacion Nacional, ELN ) will commence in January 2017. Hence, it is natural that analysts, including the authors, are discussing what the government’s priorities should be toward maintaining peace and bringing more development and justice to post-conflict Colombia. One issue that President Juan Manuel Santos is paying particular attention to is the removal of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

The Situation

The use of mines and IEDs is a standard tactic utilized by insurgent and terrorist movements worldwide (Hollywood brought this issue to light via 2008’s The Hurt Locker). When it comes to Colombia, it is impossible to adequately estimate how many mines, IEDs, and unexploded ordnance lay across the South American country, as we would have to combine those that belong to the FARC, ELN and now-defunct insurgent groups.

As such, possibly the best way to assess the current situation  is by focusing on the number of casualties. In response to the problem, the Colombian government created an agency called Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal (DAICMA) to track injuries and casualties caused by mines and IEDs. While overall incidents have significantly decreased since 1990, tragically, deadly explosions do still occur. For example, in 2013, two separate events of accidental mine explosions in Northern Colombia took the lives of two 13-year-old boys; one while he was walking with his grandmother, and the other during a school beach clean-up activity. Moreover, just this past November, Yisely Isarama Caisamo, a six-year-old girl from the Chocó department, tragically lost her life when she stepped on a mine. Her mother was severely injured as well, but survived. Mines have also taken the lives of animals: in January 2016, in the department of Cauca, an army dog saved the lives of 30 of his fellow soldiers when he stepped on a landmine covered by brush while attempting to secure the trail ahead.

When it comes to areas affected, most mines seem to be located in Antioquia, Nariño, and Meta.Acción Contra Minas, reports that from January 1990 to 30 November 2016, there have been 195, 121, and 63 deaths caused by mines in these departments, respectively. Of those 379 combined casualties, 106 were children. This is unfortunately not surprising, as these are areas with strong insurgent presence. The mine problem is exacerbated because areas with high amounts of mines are consistently found in rural areas where poverty, inadequate infrastructure, and lack of accessible healthcare are rampant, making it more difficult for injured people to receive quick medical treatment.

An Elevated Response

As the war comes to a close, President Santos is pushing for increased demining of the battlefield as exemplified by his 15 October pledge that in four years 21 million square meters will be cleared of mines and IEDs. In order to achieve this, the Colombian Army has created a brigade, Brigada de Desminado Humanitario, tasked with demining operations. Currently, the brigade stands at 500 troops, however the plan is to increase its number to a division, or 5000 troops, in 2017 and to double that number in 2018.

Additional troops are a welcomed initiative as mines continue to be found. For example, according to a 15 December press release by the Colombian Army, the 160th Battalion located and deactivated four antipersonnel mines in Cerro Guerrilla, in the Chocó department. The Army reported that the devices belonged to the Ernesto Che Guevara Front of the ELN.

Insurgent And International Support

President Santos’ pledge is important and commendable, and the tragic recent loss of a little girl due to an explosive, highlights the need to rid Colombia of these weapons in order to prevent further loss of life. Nevertheless, one important issue to keep in mind is that in order to achieve that 21 million square meters of clearance, the Colombian military will have to operate in territory currently controlled by the guerrillas. Hence, insurgent support will be instrumental in finding minefields, and other areas where IEDs are located, to speed up their removal. It is important to emphasize that a treaty with the FARC has been signed, but negotiations with the ELN are only starting, so it would be a gesture of goodwill by the latter insurgent group to begin helping demining operations.

We must also briefly mention the role of the international community in this process. For example, the Obama administration and the Norwegian government have launched the Global Initiative for Demining Colombia. Similarly, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is also operating in the South American nation. As for non-governmental organizations, one major example is the British-based Halo Trust that has operated in Colombia for years.

The authors suggest that U.S. troops could be deployed to Colombia to actively help with the clearing operations. For example, the 122d Engineer Combat Battalion or the 1221st Route Clearance Companycould visit the South American state and offer their expertise. These two units are singled out because they belong to the South Carolina National Guard that has been assigned to Colombia as part of theNational Guard State Partnership Program. A sort of joint-mining clearance operation between the S.C. National Guard and the Colombian mining brigade would help strengthen bilateral military relations while working for a noble cause.

The Woes of Chocó

In a July 2016 press release, Acción Contra Minas outlined its goals and achievements relating to the mine situation. Some of these victories include the announcement that five municipalities in four departments:two in Antioquia, and one each in Bolivar, Meta, and Santander, were declared safe from mine contamination. Additionally, it was reported that there are currently mine-clearing operations in three other departments: Caldas, Sucre, and Tolima. The government is also working with civil society organizations as well as non-governmental organizations like the HALO Trust, Handicap International, and Ayuda Popular Noruega (APN).

While the ongoing mine-clearing efforts outlined by Acción Contra Minas are valiant, and the victories admirable, it is worrisome that Chocó, the poorest and most underdeveloped department in Colombia is not on the Desminado Humanitario 2014-2016 Plan of Action demining priority list—a list that includes 91 municipalities in 13 different departments. In many areas, mine-related incidents (both injuries and fatalities) havegenerally decreased (e.g. Antioquia, Caqueta, Tolima), while the number of incidents in Chocó hasfluctuated. For example, between 2012 and 2014, the annual total of incidents went from 16, to 10,and back to 16, respectively. In 2015, there were 17 incidents, the highest ever recorded in the department. As for 2016, the number is back down to 10.

Although the mine situation is a result of the country’s decades-old conflict, the infrastructural shortcomings of Chocó due to state neglect make the clearance of mines a more complex challenge. According to the National Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento Adminstrativo Nacional de Estadística; DANE), in 2015 the poverty rate in Chocó was an astounding 62.8%, with 37.1% living in extreme poverty.Given the current economic situation of Choco’s inhabitants, those injured by mines face extreme difficulty in receiving the support they need. Quibido, the department’s capital has but one hospital for 400 000 people. This problem is aggravated because the road system in Chocó remains inadequate, despite an improvement project that first began in 1967.

The continued presence of mines and IEDs has had a deep social and very human impact on civilians living in areas where mines have yet to be extracted; hence it is imperative that Bogota continues to deploy mine-clearing missions. It is the authors’ hope that in due time, Desminado Humanitario programs will accomplish the total clearing in Chocó so that the state can then focus on setting and reaching new goals of infrastructural development in the weary department.

Final Thoughts

Mines and explosives are nasty tools of war. They do not recognize friend from foe, civilian from fighter, young from old. They lay underground waiting for days, weeks, or years before they are ignited. Countries like Cambodia and Vietnam are still suffering from these unexploded weapons of war, and Afghanistan and Iraq will suffer the same fate. Sadly, Colombia will similarly have to live with mines and IEDs in the countryside for the foreseeable future, though the creation (and future expansion) of the Army’s demining brigade, as well as international support, will hopefully quicken their removal. Cooperation with the insurgents will be key to locate the mines and other explosives in order to avoid future loss of life. Mines, IEDs, and unexploded ordnance have no place in 21st century Colombia.

The authors wish it to be known that the views presented in this essay are their sole responsibility do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the authors are associated. 

PS21 is a non-national, non-governmental, non-ideological organisation.

E-IR: Pop Culture and Latin America’s Conflicts

"Pop Culture and Latin America's Conflicts"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
E-International Relations
Article
December 3, 2016
Originally published: http://www.e-ir.info/2016/12/03/pop-culture-and-latin-americas-conflicts/

Latin America has been plagued with internal conflicts for decades, be them against left-wing insurgencies or narco-cartels. Naturally, regional film and television industries have utilized them as sources of inspiration for the plots of films and soap operas (the famous Latin American telenovelas). How Latin American security forces are portrayed in these productions is controversial, as there seems to be a bias towards portraying them in a negative way. Whether this is done on purpose or not is debatable, however it appears that regional defense officers believe that entertainment industries deliberately critique them while glorifying criminals. This is an important issue to keep in mind as the entertainment industry has an important effect on how the civilian population views its government and security forces.

Which Wars to Portray?

Prior to beginning our discussion on how conflicts are portrayed by Latin American entertainment industries, we first need to clarify what types of conflicts are depicted. For example, Hollywood producers have the dubious luxury of being able to make a film inspired by one of the many military operations that the US has carried out throughout the world, as portrayed in films like American Sniper, Black Hawk Down, Lone Survivor, Platoon, Zero Dark Thirty, to name a few.

On the other hand, it is important to note that as violent as Latin America is perceived to be, inter-state conflict in the region is actually scarce. Case in point, the last inter-state war in the region occurred in 1995: a short-lived, non-declared war between Ecuador and Peru. The most recent conflict prior to that one was the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982 between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Rather, Latin American militaries and police forces have been deployed internally to combat insurgencies in various countries, between the 1960s to mid-1990s, as well as drug trafficking entities nowadays, like Mexico’s war against narco-cartels, and transnational gangs like the Maras that operate in El Salvador and Honduras.

In other words, while Hollywood can produce a film that depicts a real U.S. military operation abroad, Latin American producers wishing to tell stories about recent real world Latin American military operations have to, by default, focus on internal conflicts.

How Are They Portrayed?

Due to space issues, we cannot discuss every Latin American production, whether a film or telenovela, that addresses some regional internal conflict, whether it be against left-leaning insurgents or a narco-cartel. The list below includes films that, in the author’s opinion, provide a particularly harsh portrayal of regional defense forces.

At a personal level, one of the earliest TV portrayals of the Peruvian military that the author watched was the Peruvian telenovela Los De Arriba y Los De Abajo (The Elite and Lower Ones) in the early-mid 1990s. One of the telenovela’s subplots revolved around an army commander who accidentally orders his troops to fire upon a group of civilians in an Andean town while they were searching for terrorists. The commander and the widow of one of the men killed meet again decades later after their children fall in love. The inspiration for this plot comes from the real-life conflict between the Peruvian military and two terrorist movements, the Shining Path (SenderoLuminoso, SL) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru, MRTA). The military has been accused of carrying out massacres against civilians throughout the 1980s and early 1990s during the internal war against said movements (e.g. the 1985 Accomarca massacre). Another controversial soap opera is Brazil’s Amor e Revolução (Love and Revolution), which has been critiqued for focusing on human rights abuses committed by the Brazilian military government (1964-1985).

As for movies, most critique regional militaries. For example, the 2006 Colombian-Argentine film Soñar No Cuesta Nada (Dreaming Is Free) focuses on a group of Colombian soldiers who discover a cache of money belonging to the insurgent movement Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC); rather than reporting the find, they keep the money and spend it amongst themselves. The film was inspired by a similar real-life 2003 incident. Similarly, the 2003 Argentine drama Captive discusses the fate of children who were adopted by families connected to the military after their parents were disappeared by the Argentine military government (1976-1983). Decades later, these individuals have begun to find out their true identities. Like the aforementionedSoñar No Cuesta Nada, the film is inspired by real events. For instance, in 2015 the Argentine media reported that a man called Mario Bravo discovered his true identity: as a child he was taken away from his mother who was arrested by the military government in the 1970s.

Another example is the 2009 Peruvian film La Teta Asustada (The Milk of Sorrow)  which discusses the fate of Peruvians that were affected by the massacres committed by Peruvian insurgents and the security forces during the country’s internal war (early 1980s to mid-1990s). The movie’s IMDB webpagesummarizes the plot: “Fausta is suffering from a rare disease called the Milk of Sorrow, which is transmitted through the breast milk of pregnant women who were abused or raped during or soon after pregnancy.” A scene from the movie, in which the main character hyperventilates after seeing a photo of a military officer, implies that the Peruvian armed forces in some way abused her or her family.

A final example is the 2004 Mexican film Voces Inocentes (Innocent Voices) which focuses on El Salvador’s civil war (1980-1992).  The movie tells the story of children and teenagers that were forced to join the Salvadoran military to combat the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, FMLN).  The role of child soldiers in this Central American nation’s civil war has also been well recorded.

It is the opinion of this author, which also appears to be the opinion of some Latin American defense officers, that the aforementioned movies address specific incidents or scandals, all of them unfortunately true, which give the viewer a negative opinion about armed forces. The problem may be that such productions lack a degree of balance, like for example some statement that not all military officers and troops behaved in such despicable manner during these periods of internal warfare or military rule.

Liberation Wars and Inter-State Conflict

To be fair, there have been films which portray Latin American militaries in a positive light, however they tend to focus on 19th century conflicts, namely the region’s independence wars. For example, the 2013 film The Liberator is a Venezuelan-Spanish historical movie which centers on the life of revered South American liberator Simón Bolívar. Similarly, there have been several movies about the Argentine José de San Martín, the region’s other liberator. Moreover, Gloria del Pacífico named the best Peruvian film in 2014, is about the 19th century War of the Pacific (between Peru and Bolivia against Chile, supported by the British Empire). The movie focuses on Peruvian Army hero Francisco Bolognesi.

It is worth noting that Argentina has produced movies about the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War, which, as previously mentioned, was an inter-state conflict. Such films include 2005’s Iluminados Por El Fuego or1984’s Los Chicos de la Guerra (The Boys of War)

A Sensitive Issue

Cinematographic and television portrayals of militaries and real world security operations are a sensitive issue. For example the film Zero Dark Thirty was critiqued as it showcased US intelligence officers (repeatedly) torturing prisoners to gather intelligence during the hunt for Osama bin Laden. This is even more controversial in Latin America as the conflicts portrayed in most films address civil wars and other internal conflicts, rather than operations on the other side of the globe. Another problem is that these films are about recent conflicts, some of which are still ongoing (e.g. Colombia). In other words, they will be even more relatable to viewers.

As part of the research for this analysis, the author carried out off-the-record interviews with members of Latin American security and defense agencies. The overall consensus, albeit from a miniscule pool of interviewees, is that regional television and cinematographic industries portray a skewed version of reality when it comes to the activities carried out by these agencies to protect the homeland. Namely, security forces are portrayed as “los malos,” (the bad ones) meaning that they are consistently showcased carrying out human rights abuses whether they be disappearances, rape, summary execution of civilians, or other abuses of power.

On the other hand, as one Colombian security officer explained to the author, there is a reversal of values, as narco lords like the infamous Pablo Escobar appear as a charismatic individual with altruistic goals, for example in series like Narcos; Pablo Escobar: El Patron del Mal (Pablo Escobar: The Lord of Evil); La Reina del Sur (The Queen of the South); El Señor de Los Cielos (The Lord of Heaven), among others. The officer explained that this portrayal does not allow the viewer to properly understand the duties and sacrifices of the members of the security and defense forces to protect the homeland.

At this point, it is worth remembering that in the US, Hollywood (broadly speaking) is often critiqued by conservative media outlets of having a “liberal agenda” which aims at vilifying the U.S. military. We will not delve into conspiracy theories regarding whether there is some “agenda” behind Latin American cinematographic and television productions and the negative way they portray security forces. Nevertheless, the author would like to highlight a comment by a retired Peruvian army officer about the way the country’s military has been portrayed in the aforementioned films and telenovelas. The officer explained “these people [meaning the producers and directors] have disliked the military since the time when it was in control of the country, this [the movies and telenovelas] is their revenge.” Meanwhile, a retired Colombian military officer explained that the country’s narco-related telenovelas are “apologists of crime.”

The issue, thus, may be one of perception. Are Latin American producers and filmmakers purposely trying to make security forces look “bad,” because of personal biasness? Additionally, do narco-novelas aim at glorifying narco lords and the narco life, or is this for dramatic effect in order to attract viewers?  No Latin American filmmakers, producers or script writers were consulted by the author, but the perception from interviewed Latin American defense and security officers (again from a very small number, but the author will cautiously generalize it) is that regional films and telenovelas focus on humanizing and even praising insurgents and criminals, while critiquing militaries and police forces. As a retired Colombian defense officer explained, this issue is part of a wider problem of civil military relations at a time of internal conflict. The officer explained, “in Latin America, certain social organizations consider themselves the exclusive owners of issues like the protection of minorities and human rights in general … they maximize any error or criminal act, done purposely or by accident, committed by defense forces while minimizing the atrocities committed by terrorists.”

One example of a positive portrayal of modern Latin American forces could be the Colombian television series Comando Elite, produced by RCN, which focuses on a police unit that combats crime, taking down real-life Colombian narco-lords and insurgent leaders. However, the overall pattern appears to be that portraying defense forces by default requires a negative portrayal, rather than a positive one. It is certainly possible to make a film that positively showcases the bravery of specific units in the field of battle, like for example the Mexican military’s operations against narco-cartels, or the Peruvian Army’s successes against Shining Path and the MRTA, however they may be critiqued for appearing as government-propaganda and not showcasing abuses committed by security forces, which have been well-recorded.

Due to space limitations we have not discussed the relationship between governments and entertainment industries, and the possibility of state-censorship of films or series critical of security forces. This author would argue that fact that these projects continue to be produced and broadcasted is an example of the general success of freedom of speech in Latin America (at least in this specific industry and in most countries, with some exceptions). If anything, regional film producers desire more state support for their movies to reach wider masses. For example, the film industry and the local governments in Colombia and Peru have attempted to design legislation to support their domestic cinematographic industry, while there are programs in countries like Argentina and Mexico where the state provides financial support, like subsidies, towards domestic television and film industries.

Concluding Thoughts

The influence of films on the views of populations is an issue that has been researched by academics. For example, Michelle Pautz, Associate Professor at the University of Dayton, has published an essay analyzing the influence of Argo and Zero Dark Thirty on how U.S. citizens view their government. In a 2015 blog commentary about her research, Professor Pautz states “films that have a more distinctive characterization of characters and institutions might foster a greater influence on viewers.  Put differently, if the “good guys” and “bad guys” are easier to determine, films might be able to influence their audiences.” Meanwhile, in a 2014 interview for the Peruvian daily Diario Correo, Peruvian actor Reynaldo Arenas, who had a role in Gloria del Pacifico, declared that “cinema teaches the youth to not forget history. This art must entertain, educate and inform.” Both Professor Pautz and Mr. Arenas touch on the issue of effects of movies in viewers, with the Peruvian actor taking the stance that movies have a sort of social duty.

Latin America is a region that has experienced major civil unrest over the past decades, morphing in type, from ideological-oriented uprisings to high levels of street violence and the so-called “war on drugs.” Naturally, regional television and film producers have plenty of material that can inspire them to write telenovelas and movies that discuss particular incidents or the consequences of abuses carried out by defense forces in the aforementioned internal conflicts. Hence, the reason why there’s a significant amount of productions about these internal conflicts may be simply because they are topical and it is something that viewers can relate to. Nevertheless, at least one of the aforementioned interviewed defense officers seems to believe that there is a resentment behind these films and telenovelas given how defense forces are portrayed while narco-criminals tend to be glorified.

It would certainly be a welcome development to have major productions that portray the efforts of modern military forces in a positive light, like what has been done with movies relating to the 19th century independence wars, but the problem is that they may in turn be dimissed as government propaganda. Nevertheless, as Professor Pautz and Mr. Arenas highlight, movies do have an influence on the perceptions of moviegoers and it would be a good method of improving popular opinion about security forces in the region since, while it is true that (many) human rights abuses have been unfortunately committed during internal security operations, Latin America is ripe with stories of heroes and heroines who gave their lives to protect their homeland from various internal threats. Militaries and police forces can win wars, but the television and cinematographic industries are critical components that will determine whether or not they will be remembered as heroes.

*The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

CIMSEC: The Status of Brazil's Ambitious PROSUB Program

"The Status of Brazil's Ambitious PROSUB Program"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Center for International Maritime Security
The Southern Tide
November 22, 2016
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/status-brazils-grand-prosub-program/29505

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114thCongress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.

By W. Alejandro Sanchez

In spite of Brazil’s political crisis, the Brazilian Navy has continued with its ambitious project of domestically constructing a new fleet of submarines, including a nuclear-powered platform. The first Scorpène-class submarine is expected to be launched in 2018, an important development though a couple of years behind schedule. However, the question remains: does Brazil require today, or will it require in the foreseeable future, an advanced submarine fleet?

The PROSUB Program

A 2009 contract between the Brazilian Navy and French conglomerate DCNS “covers the design, production, and technology transfer required for four Scorpène-class conventional submarines, and the design assistance and production of the non-nuclear part of the first Brazilian nuclear powered submarine, including support for construction of a naval base and a naval construction site.” This contract was the result of a defense agreement signed in 2008 by then-Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and his French counterpart, then-President Nikolas Sarkozy. This project is known as the Submarine Development Program (Programa de Desarrollo de Submarinos; PROSUB).

At the time of this writing, SBR-1 Riachuelo (S-40) is nearing completion as it is expected to be launched in 2018 and delivered to the Navy in 2020. The next submarine, SBR-2Humaitá, will be launched in 2020, while SBR-3 Tonelero (S-42) and SBR-4 Angostura (S-43) are scheduled to be completed by the early 2020s.

It is worth stressing that the Brazilian Navy is particularly interested in learning how to manufacture the submarines domestically, rather than relying on DCNS to construct and assemble the submarines abroad. For example, in July, the Brazilian company Nuclebras Heavy Equipment (Nuclebrás Equipamentos Pesados; NUCLEP) delivered the stern section of Humaitá to Itaguaí Construções Navais (ICN) which is assembling the platform in Rio de Janeiro. According to IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, “the submarine’s hull has been divided into five sections and to date … four sections of SBR 2 [have been delivered]. The final one is scheduled to be delivered in November.”

As for the nuclear submarine SN-BR Alvaro Alberto (SN-10),the Brazilian Navy’s PROSUB webpage reports that it is still in the developmental phase and that actual construction will commence in 2017 and be completed by 2025. “The transfer [of the submarine] to the Navy is expected to take in 2027,” the Navy explains.

A word should be said about the status of the shipyard, also part of PROSUB, since the Navy wants the capacity to construct more of these platforms in the future. To this end, a 750,000 square meter complex is under construction in the municipality of Itaguaí (Rio de Janeiro). In 2013, the Metal Structures Manufacturing Unit (Unidade de Fabricação de Estruturas Metálicas; UFEM) was inaugurated, with then-President Dilma Rousseff in attendance. Among other tasks, UFEM will manufacture the metal hull structures of the platforms.

The DCNS and Other Issues

It is necessary to highlight that the construction of these platforms has not been a smooth ride. A 1 March 2013 article by Reuters reported that “the first conventional submarine [will be completed] in 2015 and the nuclear-powered submarine will be commissioned in 2023 and enter operation in 2025, the Brazilian Navy said in a statement.” The timetable was perhaps too ambitious as the first submarine Riachuelo is now scheduled to be launched in 2018, three years later than originally reported. Similarly, the nuclear platform is now expected to be ready by 2025, not 2023. Part of the reason for the delay has to do with the country’s recent economic crisis which has affected the budget of governmental agencies, including defense.

Due to space considerations, we cannot provide a full account of Brazil’s political crisis over the past year with regards to theLava Jato revelations. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Brazilian conglomerate Odebrecht, which is involved in PROSUB via its ICN unit, has been implicated in the scandal.(Ret.) Admiral Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva, considered the father of Brazil’s nuclear program and a major supporter of the nuclear submarine (see his biography in Togzhan Kassenova’s commentary Turbulent Times for Brazil’s Nuclear Projects) has also been implicated in illicit activities. He was sentenced to 43 years in prison this past August for corruption and money-laundering. While PROSUB itself has survived the recent crises, these scandals raise the question whether there will be new allegations of illegal activities surrounding the construction of these platforms in the near future.

The other problem with PROSUB is that sensitive information about the Scorpène-class subs may be out in the open as DCNS has suffered a massive intelligence leak. This past August, the Australian daily The Australian published documents which “detail the secret combat capability of six Scorpène-class submarines that French shipbuilder DCNS has designed for the Indian Navy.” According to reports, the DCNS leak includes more than 22,000 pages about the Indian platforms.

Regarding this incident, Brazilian Rear Admiral Flavio Augusto Viana published a letter stating that “the Brazilian submarines were designed along specifications made by the Brazilian Navy, which means that there are differences between our submarines and those of other countries.” Therefore, the Brazilian Navy, “does not foresee any impact on the construction of the SBR.” The author is not qualified to compare the Brazilian and Indian Scorpène-class subs, however it is likely that there are some general similarities between the two models.

At this point it is worth remembering the words of Admiral Eduardo Leal Ferreira, commander of the Brazilian Navy, who spoke at a recent 26 September event entitled “Addressing Challenges in the Maritime Commons” at the National Bureau of Asian Research. An article written by the author for IHS Jane’s Defense, quotes Admiral Ferreira stating that the PROSUB program is the Navy’s main priority, followed by upgrading the fleet’s frigates, and then repairing the Sao Paulo(A-12) carrier. In other words, PROSUB, in spite of delays, budget issues and other incidents, will continue.

Discussion

Given that PROSUB is well underway and by next decade we will see a modern, domestically constructed, Brazilian submarine flee. The question is: why does Brazil need these platforms?

The standard reason is for Brazil to monitor and protect its 7,500 kilometers of coastline and vast maritime territory, including its natural resources (the discovery of underwater oil reserves is an often-mentioned fact), from domestic and foreign threats. In his remarks for NBAR, Admiral Ferreira added that the Atlantic Ocean is an open ocean, not a closed sea, so Brazil requires a blue water navy, hence the importance of the submarine and aircraft carrier program. The admiral also highlighted the necessity to have freedom of navigation, implying a blue water navy is necessary, “so when there are problems in the South China Sea or the East China Sea or wherever, we won’t be affected.”

This author argues that Brazil does not have any major inter-state issues that would make the submarines, a platform suitable for conventional warfare, necessary. The reality of South American geopolitics is that Brazil’s relations with its 10 neighbors, including one-time competitor Argentina, remain quite cordial. Hence, the possibility that a regional state would attempt to aggressively take control of part of Brazil’s exclusive economy zone is too remote to realistically contemplate.

Additionally, while Brazil has pursued the submarine program (among other platform acquisition projects), this has not sparked a regional arms race for fear of an “imperialist” Brasilia trying to take over a neighbor’s territory. In other words, regional states do not appear threatened by Brazil’s PROSUB program, highlighting the current status of regional geopolitics and the general success of confidence building mechanisms (for example Brazil has a constant presence in regional military exercises, such as hosting UNITAS Brasil 2015 and serving as the deputy commander for PANAMAX 2016 – Multi-National Forces-South), which make the possibility of inter-state warfare remote in this region.

Likewise, there is little chance that an extra-regional power will deploy a fleet to Brazilian waters a la Spanish Armada to take over its oil platforms. While it is true that the U.S. did send a fleet, led by the USS Forrestal, to support Brazil’s military coup in 1964, bilateral, regional and global geopolitics are not the same as five decades ago.

Without a doubt, Brazil deserves a well-equipped and modern navy that can address its 21st century challenges, protecting its maritime territory, particularly the offshore oil platforms, and cracking down on maritime crimes like drug trafficking (or other types of smuggling) or illegal fishing. However, this author argues that submarines are hardly the appropriate platforms for these tasks. A fleet of oceanic patrol vessels (OPVs) along with a robust air wing would be more suitable for coastal and oceanic patrol, including the interdiction of suspicious vessels.

Final Thoughts

In his September remarks at NBAR, Admiral Ferreira explained the need for Brazil to possess a blue water Navy in case of a hypothetical armed conflict in the South or East China Seas. This author has not found a direct correlation between the two issues: if an incident took place, would Brazil need to deploy its platforms to the open seas in defense of freedom of navigation? While the Admiral’s statement is not clear, the wider goal is to obviously increase the power projection of the Brazilian Navy by making it a blue water navy. This explains PROSUB’s priority, as this will be a major source of pride regarding the country’s naval capabilities, including the ability to manufacture these platforms.

Additionally, Admiral Ferreira highlighted that the Brazilian Navy is a dual-purpose navy as “we are not just a war-fighting Navy like the U.S., we have other collateral tasks, we are coast guard, we are maritime authority for safety of the sea [and] we have lots of tasks in the Amazon basin.” Indeed, the Brazilian Navy has a variety of tasks. However, the question remains if a fleet of four Scorpène-class submarines and one nuclear-powered submarine are the ideal platforms to carry out these duties when OPVs and frigate-type platforms (which the Navy is upgrading) are more suitable for these tasks.

Alejandro Sanchez Nieto is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Living in Peru: Peruvian blueberries go global

"Peruvian Blueberries go global"
W. Alejandro Sanchez

Living in Peru

Opinion

November 14, 2016

http://www.peruthisweek.com/food-peruvian-blueberries-go-global-110791

The blueberry market has steadily began to increase and make an important niche for itself within the country.

In a commentary for Living in Peru entitled Peru on its way to becoming leader in blueberry exports (November, 2014), the author was optimistic about Peru’s blueberry industry, stating that “while Peru continues to successfully export staple-goods like coffee, potatoes, and quinoa, the blueberry market has, in the span of only a couple of years, made an important niche for itself.” Two years later, this past October, Peruvian Minister of Agriculture Jose Hernandez declared that Peru could become the world’s biggest blueberry producer within the next two years. Needless to say, Lima has become quite ambitious about this particular berry.

According to said ministry, Peruvian blueberry producers are looking to cultivate up to 20 thousand tons of these berries in 2016. This seems like an achievable amount given how just in the first three months of 2016 alone, Peruvian farmers grew 3,600 tons of blueberries, four times the amount during the same period in 2015. If the situation continues, by the end of the year, Peru could have exported as much asUSD$200 million worth of blueberries.

A critical issue regarding the future of blueberry production is farming land. The good news is that according to Alfonso Velasquez Tuesta, president of Sierra Exportadora, the goal for this year is to have 3,200 hectares of land growing blueberries. Most of the farming land is found in La Libertad region.

Another positive news is that new markets are opening for Peruvian blueberry exports. Almost parallel to Minister Hernandez’s declaration, on October 10, Lima signed an agreement with the Colombian government via which five Peruvian agricultural products, including blueberries, can now enter the neighboring country. Even more, Peru has also signed a trade agreement with China, which allows Peruvian blueberries to be sold in this important Asian market. Similarly, Peruvian blueberries have also found their way to the United Kingdom. Finally, we should stress that Peru is also attempting to have a bigger foothold in the U.S. as a delegation of Peruvian trade representatives participated in the PMA Fresh Summit Expo held this past October in Florida – blueberries, among other products, were displayed for the thousands of attendees.

The interest in wellness has greatly contributed to the growing export of Peruvian crops associated with healthy eating, such as quinoa and blueberries.

In spite of these, we must remember that there are other South American blueberry producers which have similarly enjoyed recent accomplishments. For example, a new runway measuring almost 8,000 square meters was inaugurated in an airport in Tucuman, northern Argentina on October 6. The Argentinian daily La Nacion reported that, thanks to the expansion, just in October the airport transported 3,825,000 kilos of blueberries to the United States, which is more than the 3,200,000 kilos sent to said market in all of 2015. The report also mentioned that direct cargo flights (via Air Cargo Global) from Tucuman to London are now taking off in order to increase the presence of Argentinian blueberries in Europe. Meanwhile, Chile has also reported success in production and sales. A September report in Pulso states that Chilean blueberry exports reached USD$896 million in 2015. Chile is the third biggest exporter of this berry in the world, after the United States and Spain; this is an important fact to keep in mind since Peru attempts to enter the U.S. blueberry market, which means that Peruvian exporters will have to compete with local blueberry producers.

A final challenge regarding blueberries is that this is, obviously, an agricultural product. This means that it is at the mercy of the climate, which in Peru can include sharp changes in temperatures and other weather patterns that will be exacerbated by climate change. It is important to note that in Chile, the 2016/2017 season commenced two weeks early due to slightly higher-than-normal temperatures; this will negatively affect some varieties of Chilean blueberries. The author has not found sufficient information to discuss how climate change is affecting (or could affect) blueberry production in Peru, but hopefully appropriate research and planning is being carried out.

Miguel Cordano Rodríguez, general manager of Sierra Exportadora, declared earlier this year that there is “an unfulfilled demand for berries in the world. That’s why I encourage producers to keep on growing these crops to meet this demand, not only in terms of volume but also quality. This way, we will diversify our basket of products as well as the destination markets.” Analogous to the quinoa market, Peruvian blueberries are profiting from the global interest in wellness and healthy eating. Hopefully the new government will continue to support this booming berry industry so that the Ministry of Agriculture’s predictions become a reality by the end of the decade.

Follow W. Alejandro Sanchez on Twitter.