Living in Peru: Peruvian foreign policy will not change under next president

"Peruvian Foreign policy will not change under next President"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Opinion
Living in Peru
March 21, 2016
Originally published: http://www.peruthisweek.com/blogs-foreign-policy-elections-opinion-109088

The April 10 elections in Peru will not significantly alter the foreign policy of the Andean state, regardless of which candidate wins the presidency or which party (or coalition of parties) gains control of congress. Peruvian foreign policy for the past couple of decades has been fairly predictable and these elections will most likely not bring about major surprises.

Peru’s relations with the rest of the world are not a major issue to the Peruvian electorate; the hot topics of this election are improving internal security and the economy. Obviously, the latter issue has a lot to do with international commerce as the cornerstone of Peru’s growing economy over the past two decades has been the export of its natural resources (such as natural gas, minerals, oil and agricultural goods). Hence, it comes as no surprise that the main candidates have made similar promises, namely to maintain the current trade model. This will include cementing Peru’s role in the Pacific Alliance, a regional free trade bloc (along with Chile, Colombia and Mexico) as well as pushing for new free trade agreements, probably with India and Turkey. Additionally, the next congress will likely ratify the Trans Pacific Partnership which will open Asia Pacific markets to Peruvian goods.

When it comes to foreign policy itself, Peru is not a Latin American powerhouse, and it enjoys cordial relations with most of its neighbors. The only outstanding issue may be the future of the territorial dispute with Chile. Lima already had some success in a maritime dispute with its Southern neighbor via the 2014 ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Hence, the next head of state may see the ICJ as an option to solve this dispute as well.

Ultimately, while the Andean nation has witnessed its fair share of internal turmoil over the past decades, its foreign policy has remained generally constant. Arguably, Peru’s internal problems, such as terrorism in the 1980s or political instability in the 1990s due to the Fujimori dictatorship, did not allow the Andean country to focus on the outside world. Nevertheless, some foreign policy stances have been constant and will remain so. For example, Lima has been a close ally of Washington, and this will not change, particularly as the Peruvian government and security forces will look for U.S. support to combat drug trafficking.

It is worth noting that of the remaining presidential candidates, only a few have an extreme-left ideology. In theory, if one of them is elected, we could see a radical foreign policy change. This is already happening in Argentina, as new President Mauricio Macri is approaching Washington; this is an almost 180 degree turn when compared to the foreign policy of his predecessor, President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who was known to be a close friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin. As for Peru, in the 2006 elections then-candidate Ollanta Humala was defeated, in part, because he was regarded as a close friend of the late President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and a follower of his socialist ideology. Nevertheless, the “extreme left” candidates are fairly down on the polls so unless a major surprise occurs in April, Peru’s relations with the global powers will generally remain unaltered. (The next head of state will likely continue to purchase Russian military equipment, which the Peruvian military is used to utilizing, but we will not see Russian bombers landing in Peru à la Venezuela in 2013).

FAME and Peru’s military industry

On a personal note, I would like to see Peruvian presidential candidates address foreign policy. International commerce is an obvious issue, but there are other parts of the country’s foreign policy that should be discussed, such as the future of the Andean Community (which is headquartered in Lima), having a Peruvian citizen elected to head a major international organization (like UNASUR), the significance of Peru’s recent ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty or the future role of the Peruvian military in UN peacekeeping missions.

For over a decade, Peru has enjoyed significant economic growth. Unfortunately, this has not prompted Lima to have a more ambitious foreign policy – coincidentally, I discuss the steps that the Andean country can take to be more influential in regional geopolitics in a working paper for the Argentine think tank Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales entitled, Pax Inca: Why Peru is not a Regional Powerhouse in Latin America.

Hopefully Peru’s next president, whoever he or she may be, will be interested in boosting the country’s foreign policy.

You can follow W. Alejandro on Twiter @W_Alex_Sanchez

Interview: Peru’s election shake-up

"Peru's Election Shake-Up"
The Stream - Al Jazeera
March 14, 2016
Originally published: http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/201603111507-0025170





On Monday, March 14 at 19:30 GMT:

Julio Guzman and Cesar Acuna, two of Peru’s main presidential candidates, have been barred from participating in next month’s election after weeks of back and forth between various electoral boards. Guzman’s candidacy has been ruled ‘inadmissible’ because it was not registered in accordance with electoral procedures, while Acuna has been banned because of vote buying.

But it is the ruling on Guzman that is particularly controversial. Guzman, a relatively unknown economist until recently, emerged as the main challenger to frontrunner Keiko Fujimori in past few months. Many feel his removal from the race was political. Guzman himself slammed the decision, calling it “flagrantly illegal and unconstitutional.” But the National Jury of Elections struck down his candidacy on the grounds that he was not selected by his party, Everyone for Peru, through a legitimate internal election. Guzman plans to launch one last “extraordinary” appeal, but few expect it to be successful.

For Peruvians, this is the latest twist in an election where around 70 percent of voters were already dissatisfied with the candidates running. Guzman, on the other hand, appealed to 63 percent of voters who wanted a new figure, having cast himself as an outsider in a race full of familiar faces. Despite leading in the polls, Fujimori is opposed by many others who associate her with her father, a former president found guilty of human rights abuses in 2009. She has also been accused of vote buying. Other remaining candidates face controversies ranging from plagiarism to being on trial for murder.

So what’s next for Peru’s election, and how will the shake-up affect the race?

Joining this conversation:

Alejandro Sanchez @W_Alex_Sanchez
International Security Expert
wasanchez.blogspot.com

Francisco Sagasti @FSagasti
Everyone For Peru Party (Todos Por El Peru)
franciscosagasti.com

Raul Benavides @DiarioAltavoz
Co-Director, Diario Altavoz
altavoz.pe

Miklos Lukacs @mlukacs
Professor, Esan Graduate School of Business 
en.esan.edu.pe

Blouin World: Rio Olympics: What’s the worst that could happen?

"Rio Olympics: What's the worst that could happen?"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: World
April 8, 2016
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatworld/2016/04/08/rio-olympics-whats-the-worst-that-could-happen/

The Brazilian government, presidential scandals aside, is focused on ensuring that the upcoming Summer Olympics and Paralympics in Rio de Janeiro occur successfully and peacefully. The event is expected to attract between 350 to 500 thousand foreign tourists, not counting the 10 thousand athletes that will compete in 42 different sports. The question is: what security-related incident is Brasilia trying to prevent?

The obvious answer is some type of terrorist operation, with the 2015 attacks in Paris and Brussels by ISIS serving as a recent and tragic precedent. In fact, the Paris attacks occurred while a friendly soccer match between France and Germany was taking place at the Stade de France. Moreover, there is already the precedent of one successful terrorist attack during an Olympic event: the 1972 Munich attacks carried out by the Palestinian Black September group, which killed 11 Israeli Olympian athletes and one German police officer.

In order to prepare for the worst-case scenario, the Brazilian security and defense forces will carry out an unprecedented operation. Brazilian Defense Minister Aldo Rebelo announced in March that 38 thousand military personnel will be deployed, with 20 thousand in Rio itself, not counting personnel from other security agencies. According to the Brazilian Defense Ministry, Rio will be divided into four defense command sections (CDS Deodoro, CDS Maracana, CDS Copacabana and CDS Barra da Tijuca) in order for the security forces to better monitor the Olympic venues. Rio certainly appears to be ready for the Olympics from a security perspective as the defense commands are training for any type of incident, be it a terrorist attack or even nuclear, radiological or biological threats.

Nevertheless, this preparedness program has not been scandal-free. Case in point: In late March, Colonel Adilson Moreira from the National Force for Public Security resigned after sending an e-mail to his colleagues that was critical of President Dilma Rousseff.

It is worth noting that, some protests aside, the Brazilian government has successfully organized major sporting events in recent years, namely the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup and the 2014 FIFA World Cup. Moreover, Gustavo Palhares, a partner at Furriela Advogados (a São Paulo law firm with a branch in Washington DC), told me that “for the past decade, the city and state of Rio have invested in security, particularly to ‘pacify’ the favelas [shantytowns]; although crime has not disappeared in Rio, the city is more prepared than ever to host the Olympic Games.”

Indeed, as Palhares explained, rather than some terrorist attack à la Munich 1972, the major concern regarding the upcoming Games is crime, i.e., the possibility of tourists or athletes being robbed (or worse) by the city’s numerous gangs. Unfortunately, there have been recent incidents that stress this possibility. For example, in January, four people were killed and 11 were injuredwhen criminals attacked a bar in Rio’s western area, in Vargem Pequena. Then, in mid-March, a member of a Pacifying Police Unit (Unidad de Policia Pacificadora, UPP) was murdered by unknown bandits in broad daylight during a routine patrol. Finally, and in an ironic development,Lieutenant-Colonel Murilo Angelloti of the Copacabana division of the Military Police (BPM) was recently the victim of a robbery. When he left his home on Sunday, April 3, three men held him at gunpoint and stole his car. Palhares clarified that “these crimes occurred in areas of the city where the Games will not take place.”

The aforementioned examples demonstrate that crime in Rio has been contained, rather than completely eradicated. Certainly, it would be naïve to believe that crime in a city like Rio (with a population of well over six million) could be fully solved via the pacification operations.

Ultimately, it is necessary to place potential crimes (not terrorist attacks) during the Olympics in the context of Brazil’s current tense political situation. Should foreign tourists or Olympian athletes be mugged, as Palhares explains, this will negatively affect President Dilma Rousseff’s image, “especially at a moment when she is in a political war to save her presidency.” While the possibility of a terrorist attack in Rio is arguably extremely remote, even a wave of robberies may be enough to hurt the president.

- W. Alejandro Sanchez, researcher
@W_Alex_Sanchez | Blog: Geopolitics

Blouin Politics: Uruguayan navy forced to evolve in peacetime

"Uruguayan Navy forced to evolve in Peacetime"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: Politics
March 22, 2016
Originally published: http://blouinnews.com/91541/story/uruguayan-navy-forced-evolve-peacetime

Uruguay’s military is undergoing a transformation. Its limited defense budget, combined with no apparent traditional security threat, means that its armed forces must find a new raison d’être in order to justify obtaining new equipment. A prime example of this evolution is the Uruguayan Navy, which is currently attempting to choose the ideal offshore patrol vessel (OPV) to efficiently monitor its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Due to space issues, we will simply define OPVs as small vessels (between 60-90m long) that are utilized for coastal patrol to combat crimes like drug trafficking, illegal fishing, as well as carrying out search and rescue operations.  The fact that Uruguay regards them as the future cornerstone of its naval platforms explains the geopolitical situation in the South Atlanticnowadays. Montevideo enjoys positive relations with its two neighbors, Brazil and Argentina (the dispute with Buenos Aires over a controversial pulp mill notwithstanding), to the point that an inter-state war with either state is too farfetched to be realistically hypothesized. Hence, in order to justify its existence and budget, the South American nation’s navy is now focusing on combating non-traditional maritime threats, such as drug trafficking and illegal fishing. In order to achieve this, Uruguay needs a fleet of small but fast vessels that can monitor its EEZ, namely OPVs.

The need for a modern fleet that can patrol a country’s EEZ was made by a recent incident in which Argentina’s Coast Guard sank a Chinese vessel that was illegally fishing in its territorial waters. Buenos Aires argues that its Coast Guard shot at and sank the vessel after an ineffective chase that lasted hours. The Chinese government has declared that it is “very worried” about the incident.

As for Uruguay’s navy, back in 2013 the Uruguayan daily El País quoted Rear Admiral Daniel Núñez Rodriguez as saying that the fleet’s status was “disastrous” as several of its vessels are decades old and should be retired. To stress that point, in January an Uruguayan vessel, theROU Vanguardia, had to be rescued by a Chilean vessel when it was trapped in a storm in Antarctica and its motor reportedly suffered malfunctions.

The Uruguayan government seems to (finally) recognize this urgency and plans to purchase between two and three OPVs to modernize its fleet. This interest has caught the eyes of several important military industrial companies.

For example, in February the French Navy sent its OPV L’Adroit to Uruguay, both as a good will visit and as a way to showcase the vessel to Montevideo – unsurprisingly, the arrival of the vessel occurred only a couple of weeks before a visit by French President Francois Hollande to Uruguay. L’Adroit is produced by the French shipyard DCNS. Another European competitor for the contract is the German company Luerssen, which is offering its OPV 80.

It is worth noting that companies outside of Europe are also looking to win this coveted contract. One good example is Austal. The Australian company is known for its deals with the U.S. Navyto construct Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) such as the USS Montgomery. However, Austal produces smaller vessels like the High Speed Support Vessel (HSSV 72), which Oman has acquired, and the Patrol 58-cape class, which Austal constructed for Australia. Austal is already well regarded for its LCS warships, so it will be interesting to see if this pedigree helps their OPVs enter the Latin American market via Uruguay.

Uruguayan President Tabaré Vázquez can govern with the certainty that his country does not face any major security threats (e.g., Brazil trying to invade the country).  And while the Uruguayan military is not at a crossroads per se, it is nonetheless in the process of transforming itself into a new force that will focus on combating non-traditional security threats. Choosing the correct OPVs is the first step for the Uruguayan navy to effectively face its 21st century challenges.