"The Unknown Congolese Heroes – Book Review: ‘Spies in the Congo: America’s Atomic Mission in World War II’"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez and Yves Bashonga
Book Review & Analysis
24 August 2018
International Policy Digest
Spies in the Congo
by Dr. Susan Williams discusses U.S. intelligence operations in the
Belgian Congo (now the Democratic Republic of Congo: DRC), to secure
uranium during World War II while also preventing Nazi Germany from
obtaining said mineral for its own nuclear weapons program. This is a
very well-written book that effectively narrates the activities that
members of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS, the predecessor of the
Central Intelligence Agency) carried out in the Belgian Congo. Without a
doubt, Williams’ book combines both a deep discussion about World War
II geopolitics while also bringing these individuals, too many of whom
died at a young age, to life.
Moreover, Spies in the Congo discusses the other
unknown heroes of this massive operation, the people of the Congo
itself, who suffered then and continue to suffer, because of the
richness of their country.
An Ideal Movie Plot
What transpired in the Belgian Congo during World War II is a plot
worthy of a movie or a Netflix miniseries. On 2 August 1939, Albert
Einstein wrote a letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, explaining
that uranium reserves in the U.S. were very poor and in moderate
quantities. He added that some good ore may be found in Canada and the
former Czechoslovakia, while the most important source of uranium is in
the Belgian Congo. As war in Europe was looming – Nazi Germany invaded
Czechoslovakia in March of that year and invaded Poland only a month
later following Einstein’s letter in September. As a consequence, it was
important for the U.S. to push forward with its own nuclear program
which required rich ore.
The book discusses in great detail the activities of OSS members in
the Belgian Congo as they attempted to procure all uranium out of the
Shinkolobwe mine in Katanga, and how it was transported from there to
the coast: first to Lobito in Angola, a Portuguese colony at the time,
and later through Matadi in the Congo and from there to the U.S. As the
OSS members set up and monitored this massive operation, we learn more
about them, as well as other individuals and entities that were involved
in the uranium game: the sometimes unhelpful US consuls in the Congo,
the British intelligence officers; Belgian officials, like the governor
general of the Congo, the Belgian state police and intelligence agency
Sûreté de l’État, which operated in the Congo; Belgian companies like
Union Minière du Haut Katanga (which operated the Shinkolobwe mine) and
Société Générale (which controlled the UMHK) not to mention the several
often-unreliable individuals that the OSS had to work with. Everyone had
his own interests and objectives.
Williams does an excellent job at explaining how Washington and the
OSS in the Belgian Congo, successfully managed to keep its operations
regarding the Shinkolobwe mine a secret, not to mention the overall
objective of the Manhattan Project. The OSS team in the Belgian Congo,
led by the book’s protagonist, Wilbur Owings “Dock” Hogue (Codename
Teton), managed to successfully maintain a cover to combat the illegal
diamond trade, rather than uranium. There was a constant fear that the
Nazis would somehow figure out the US operations in the Belgian Congo
and attempt to smuggle uranium via Nazi-friendly smugglers and Belgian
officials. The Allies were also unclear about how developed Nazi
Germany’s nuclear program was. In the end, to the Allies’ surprise, said
program was not very developed at all.
Congolese uranium will be eventually used for the U.S. nuclear bombs
(“Little Boy” and “Fat Man”) that were dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in 1945.
Unknown Heroes
Thanks to declassified documents and other research, we know more
about OSS operations in the Belgian Congo, as well as the divided
interests of the Belgian government and business community both in
Brussels and Léopoldville (now Kinshasa, the capital of the DRC). Some
were determined to fight the Nazis, while others were sympathetic. There
was also a faction that behaved pragmatically supporting whichever side
was winning the war.
But what about the Congolese themselves? While Spies in the Congo
focuses on the OSS and World War II, Williams does a great job telling
us about the people who actually worked at the Shinkolobwe mine and
helped win the war.
Williams is blunt about the treatment of the Congolese by the
Belgians. Both before and during the war, they were exploited, and the
eventual victory of the Allies did nothing to improve their conditions
until the Belgian Congo’s eventual independence in 1960. She discusses
the role of King Leopold II of Belgium, which transformed the territory
into the Congo Free State in the 19th century.
Leopold’s harsh rule has
been well examined, including the use of the infamous chicotte “which at
the time was made from hippopotamus hide with razor-sharp edges,” to
punish the Congolese. How many Congolese died during Leopold’s rule is
anyone’s guess. Williams cites the number at 10 million “as result of
the routine brutality and executions,” but other authors cite different
numbers, also in the millions; hence the genocide during the Congo Free
State should be more well-known than it is today. (For more information
about Leopold’s rule and Congo, see Adam Hochschild’s King Leopold’s Ghost.)
During World War II, the Allies’ need for Africa’s raw resources,
such as uranium, rubber, cotton among others, dramatically increased.
Williams explains how “between 1938 and 1944, the Union Minière
workforce almost doubled from 25,000 to 49,000; so did the number of
fatal accidents at Union Minière plants.” Even more, Congolese soldiers
were also conscripted into the Force Publique, the Belgian Colonial
Army, which fought in Ethiopia (then Abyssinia), Nigeria, Egypt and
Palestine. The 11th battalion of the Force Publique included 3,000
Congolese soldiers and 2,000 bearers who fought valiantly in Ethiopia.
Unsurprisingly, Congolese soldiers were badly treated by white officers,
and they were told that, if they fled, their families would be
punished. This mirrored the situation of the Congolese in the civilian
world under Belgian rule, as they were treated as second class citizens,
underpaid and segregated from white-neighborhoods in Leopoldville or
Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi).
As a final point, it is important to highlight that the radioactivity
of uranium does not care about skin color. Several OSS personnel would
become sick and die at early ages, partially weakened by diseases like
malaria, but their continuous exposure to uranium certainly did not help
their health. The same can be said about the Congolese workers who
worked at the Shinkolobwe mine without protective equipment. Williams
correctly concludes that the Congolese “were simply used as workers, as
if they had no rights as equal human beings. This was a process for
which the US, the UK and Belgium bear a heavy responsibility.”
Analysis: Who Benefits from Congo’s riches?
In her conclusions, Dr. Williams discusses how, when Congo achieved
independence, it attempted to remain neutral in the emerging Cold War,
“but it was unavoidable: the Congo’s resources, including its uranium,
put the newly independent nation at the very heart of Cold War
concerns.”
This seems to be part of a pattern when it comes to the Congo; over the
centuries, different outside actors have arrived to plunder and steal
(for there is no other term to describe this process) its natural
resources: during World War II, it was the U.S. to defeat the Nazi
empire; today they are transnational companies, rebel movements, not to
mention certain governments. Whether it is diamonds, uranium, copper,
cobalt or coffee, it seems that the entire world benefits from the
Congo, except for the Congolese themselves.
A lot has changed in the past 70 plus years since the end of the War:
the DRC is now an independent nation, but Congolese villagers continue
to work for transnational companies in atrocious circumstances, with said companies giving little back to local communities in exchange for what they extract.
In early June 2018, the DRC signed into law a revised version of the
2002 mining code, which will hopefully mean more tax revenue for the
government from transnational companies that operate in the country.
“The DRC does not have a strong history of obtaining taxes from the
general population, so taxes from these companies are vital for our
development,” explains one of the authors of this commentary.
Unsurprisingly, this move has prompted criticism by mining companies
like Glencore and Randgold, which argue that “the tax hikes and the
removal of exemptions for pre-existing operations are a breach of their
agreements with the government,” explains Reuters.
As for Congolese-Belgian relations, the legacy of the Congo Free
State and the Belgian Congo remains in the minds of the Congolese who
have learned their nation’s history, not to mention the role that the
Belgian government played in the assassination of the Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba
(a renowned supporter of Pan-Africanism) via Katangan separatists in
1961.
Brussels has recognized its role in Lumumba’s death: it apologized in 2002 and this past June it inaugurated the Patrice Lumumba square at the entrance to the Belgian capital’s largely Congolese Matonge area. In spite of the symbolic importance of this initiative, bilateral relations have continued to deteriorate
and it will be important to monitor these to see if they improve in the
future after the DRC’s upcoming elections, scheduled for December 2018.
Without a doubt, Spies in the Congo is a great book that
tells a vital, though obscure story about World War II, namely the role
the Congo had in helping the Allies win, and the U.S. development of its
nuclear program in particular. Today Congo continues to supply the
world with critically important resources, and sadly the vast majority
of the Congolese people have yet to profit from them.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors
alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with
which the authors are associated.
Sunday, August 26, 2018
Tuesday, August 7, 2018
CIMSEC: Tradewinds 2018 and the Caribbean’s Maritime Security Challenges
"Tradewinds 2018 and the Caribbean’s Maritime Security Challenges"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
The Southern Tide
Center for International Maritime Security
7 August 2018
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/tradewinds-2018-and-the-caribbeans-maritime-security-challenges/37315
The Southern Tide
Written by W. Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.
“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.
By W. Alejandro Sanchez
The first two phases of the multinational, Caribbean-focused military exercise Tradewinds 2018 took place between 4-21 June. Said maneuvers, sponsored by U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), brought together an estimated 1,700 troops from almost two dozen nations. Given the ongoing maritime security challenges that the Greater Caribbean continues to face, these confidence and interoperability-building exercises continue to be very important.
Tradewinds ‘18
The first two phases of Tradewinds 2018 took place in Saint Kitts and Nevis and then in The Bahamas. Phase III, a seminar among regional leaders to discuss the results of the first two phases, occured from 17-19 July in Miami, Florida. The participating nations included the majority of Caribbean states, in addition to Canada, Mexico, the U.S. and extra-hemispheric states like France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
Some of the platforms that were deployed include the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Charles David Jr. (WPC-1107); the British RFA Mounts Bay (L3008), a Bay-class auxiliary landing ship dock; Canada’s HMCS Shawinigan (MM 704), a Kingston-class coastal defense vessel; and Mexico’s ARM Oaxaca (PO 161), an Oaxaca-class patrol vessel. As for aerial platforms, these included AS365N3 Panther and UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters. As SOUTHCOM explains “this year’s focus is on countering transnational organized crime in the region,” apart from other priorities like improving disaster response. Operations at sea including procedures to intercept a non-compliant vessel, and live firing exercises with deck-mounted weapon systems like .50 caliber machine guns and 25 mm cannon.
In general, Caribbean governments and security forces have generally had a positive attitude toward these maneuvers. For example, Prime Minister of St. Kitts and Nevis and Minister of National Security the Honourable Dr. Timothy Harris reportedly stated “I have been assured that we can therefore expect training components or injects that reflect real world scenarios so that in the face of a real threat, our security forces and emergency response personnel will be able to coordinate seamlessly and in a manner and time that both meet international standards.” Similarly, Christian J. Ehrlich, an external analyst at the Strategic Research Institute of the Mexican Navy (Instituto de Investigaciones Estratégicas de la Armada de México), explained to the author that Tradewinds will help improve interoperability between regional navies and coast guards.
Caribbean Threats
The Caribbean’s maritime security challenges are very diverse. They include drug trafficking (Washington’s primary concern), weapons and human trafficking, illegal fishing, not to mention search and rescue operations. These crimes have been extensively recorded, but it is worth noting that some occurred, somewhat ironically, at the same time that Tradewinds was taking place. For example, in mid-June Her Majesty’s Bahamian Ship (HMBS) Durward Knowles, a patrol vessel, intercepted a 50-ft Dominican fishing vessel that was poaching in Bahamian waters. Around the same time, the Dominican Republic chased a speedboat until it stopped in the coast of Pedernales province. Aboard were 351 packets which apparently contained cocaine. A month earlier, in early May, it was the Jamaican Defense Force’s turn to catch a vessel at sea, as a ship reportedly intercepted off the coast of Westmoreland had “764.9 pounds of compressed marijuana.”
Even more, piracy is becoming a noteworthy problem: in 2017 the organization Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) “recorded 71 incidents in Latin America and the Caribbean. Most incidents in the region occurred in territorial waters, with anchored yachts being the primary targets for attackers.” There were also 16 attacks against tankers and three fishing vessels, among other types of ships. A map prepared by OBP shows a cluster of incidents off the coast of Belize, Colombia, Venezuela as well around the islands of Grenada, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.
Not counted in the report was a late-April 2018 incident along the Guyanese-Surinamese border, where pirates attacked a group of four fishing boats, robbing the crew and killing several of them.
The Status of Caribbean Maritime Forces
Some Caribbean defense forces have attempted to upgrade and expand their maritime fleets in order to take better control of their exclusive economic zone (EEZ). For example, the Royal Bahamas Defense Force (RBDF) has cquired several vessels constructed by Damen Shipyard via the Sandy Bottom Project. These include Damen Stan 3007 and Stan Patrol 4207 patrol vessels as well as one Stan Lander 5612 auxiliary transport, roll on-roll off vessel. Similarly in 2016 the Jamaican Defense Force (JDF) upgraded its fleet by receiving two new Stan Patrol 4207 from Damen in 2017. That same year, the JDF received two 38-foot SAFE boats and two 37-foot Boston Whaler vessels, donated by the U.S. More recently, in late July 2018, the Barbados Coast Guard commissioned patrol boat Endurance, a 958Y inshore vessel donated by China earlier this year. The ambitious Sandy Bottom Project notwithstanding, Caribbean defense forces in general have limited defense budgets, hence new platforms, aerial or maritime, are not acquired or modernized regularly. Moreover, the aforementioned examples also highlight the continuous reliance on extra-regional allies for donations in order to expand the naval inventory of these defense forces.
Mr. Ehrlich mentions that greater regional cooperation and interoperability is needed in order to make up for a limited number of platforms and personnel, and in order to decrease the region’s dependence on SOUTHCOM and the U.S. Coast Guard. The Mexican Navy could step up its presence in the Caribbean to help its partners with maritime security, but unfortunately the Mexican Navy seems to be more focused on its Pacific territory.
As a final point, it is important to highlight the troubling scandals regarding regional defense officers that are caught in cahoots with criminals. For example, Colonel Rafael Collado Ureña of the Dominican Republic’s Army, was arrested in mid-2017 in Puerto Rico as he was about to carry out a sale of 12.9 kilograms of cocaine. Around the same time, a member of the Jamaican Defense Force was arrested at Kingston airport as he tried to board a flight to Toronto with 2.8 kilograms of cocaine.
Final Thoughts
Exercise Tradewinds 2018 recently concluded, and hopefully the maneuvers and training exercises that Caribbean forces carried out with counterparts such as those from Canada, Mexico, the UK, and the U.S, will be helpful for their future patrol and interdiction operations in their respective EEZs. We can also hope that these ongoing exercises, as well as generally cordial regional diplomatic, trade and defense relations, will lead to greater interoperability between regional forces.
While Tradewinds 2018 can be regarded as a success, these maneuvers will have limited positive impact if Caribbean defense forces do not obtain additional funding for new aerial and naval platforms given the size of the Caribbean Sea. Even more, scandals among security personnel, namely their involvement in criminal activities, stain the reputation of regional defense forces and limit the success of any training operations.
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.
Geopolitical Monitor: Central Asia and Afghanistan: Helping Your Neighbor
"Central Asia and Afghanistan: Helping Your Neighbor"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Opinion
Geopolitical Monitor
7 August 2018
Originally published:
Central Asia-Afghanistan relations is a fairly complex topic, and fortunately new analyses have been published in recent years that discuss this issue in greater detail. Hence, for the sake of brevity, we will focus on recent developments.
Generally speaking, all Central Asian states have carried out some type of initiative to aid the development of Afghanistan. Some recent examples include:
Kazakhstan. Astana is very interested in educating Afghan youths so they can return to their homeland and help their nation develop. According to The Astana Times: “since 2010, Kazakhstan has implemented a $50 million educational program for Afghan citizens. Under the program, about 1,000 Afghan citizens will receive professional training from 2010 to 2021.” In July of this year, 53 Afghan students graduated, including surgeons, obstetricians, and pediatricians, from a Kazakh university. Astana has also separately called for a peace process in Afghanistan.
Kyrgyzstan. A considerable amount of ethnic Kyrgyz live in Afghanistan, particularly in the mountainous Wakhan Corridor, and there have been meetings recently between the two governments regarding their protection. Additionally, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan are two of the four countries that form the joint Central Asia-South Asia energy project commonly known as CASA-1000.
Tajikistan. In mid-June, Dushanbe pledged to increase power exports to Afghanistan. According to Azernews, “in 2017 Tajikistan supplied about 1.4 billion kWh of electricity to Afghanistan. This year it plans to increase this figure to 1.5 billion kWh.” Tajikistan is also part of the CASA-1000 project. Even more, in a sign of Kabul’s willingness to further improve relations with its direct neighbor, the Afghan government has extradited four supporters of the late Tajik rebel general Abduhalim Nazarzoda.
Turkmenistan. The two countries are part of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, which would provide Ashgabat a corridor to increase its exports. The first three aforementioned countries are also part of a different energy project, TAP, which will “transmit 500 kilovolts of power from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan.” Finally, in December 2017, a MoU was signed to improve railway infrastructure between the two countries in order to help Afghan products reach new markets.
Uzbekistan. Tashkent is attempting to mediate between the Afghan government and the Taliban. In December 2017, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani visited Tashkent; months later, in March, Uzbekistan held a peace conference (which the Taliban skipped), and offered its services to mediate between the Taliban and Kabul once again in June. Additionally, Tashkent appears to be committed to promoting Afghan development: in early July, Uzbekistan pledged to “invest $500 million into the construction of railway tracks from Mazar-i-Sharif city to Herat province.” Finally, there have been talks recently about creating a free trade zone between the two states to promote trade and development (bilateral trade in 2017 reached US$ 350 million).
The common denominators among Central Asian interests regarding Afghanistan are stability and prosperity. By this we mean that regional governments do not want the Taliban to return to power – a worrisome possibility as the group has regained control of several provinces – since this might contribute to radicalism spreading throughout the region.
For the sake of argument, it is important to note that Central Asia analysts have somewhat differing positions regarding how much of a threat the Taliban and/or the so-called Islamic State present to the region. For example, a 2014 report by the AAN argues that “security risks that link Afghanistan to the former Soviet republics of Central Asia are often highly exaggerated” as “in Central Asia the main players in narcotics trafficking are government employees, security officers, and mafia figures,” while insurgents tend to be more often local rather than originating in Afghanistan.
This is a fairly controversial statement that clashes with more recent analyses, like “Central Asia’s Anxious Watch On The Afghan Border” by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and “Why Central Asia is increasingly worried about Afghanistan” by DW. Even more, recent incidents indicate that Taliban forces are operating dangerously close to Afghanistan’s neighbors. For example, a June 2018 Taliban attack that killed 16 Afghan troops occurred in Takhar province bordering Tajikistan. Moreover, four foreign cyclists were murdered in Southern Tajikistan in late July, a crime that Islamic State has since claimed responsibility for.
Thus, the activities of Afghanistan-based violent extremists continue to get closer to the three bordering Central Asian states, making a spread of violence a valid possibility. Central Asia has already seen its share of conflict since gaining independence from the Soviet Union, such as the Tajik civil war (1992-1997) and Uzbekistan’s clashes with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, whose remaining fighters have sworn loyalty to the Taliban (though some other Uzbek nationals have joined the IS branch in Khorasan province). Thus, it is a national security interest for Central Asian governments to not only help Afghanistan defeat the Taliban and other insurgent movements, but also to promote the country’s development and prosperity in order to prevent new groups from appearing.
Projects like CASA-1000, TAPI and TAP are good examples of Central Asia providing Afghanistan with much needed energy, and we will have to monitor whether any of these projects become operational in the near future. On the other hand, it is debatable how much Central Asia can actually profit from the Afghan market, as China, Europe, and Russia are more desirable and lucrative targets. Afghanistan could serve as a corridor for Uzbek, Tajik, and/or Turkmen products to reach India and Pakistan, but this will depend on the construction of better roads and railways in Afghanistan, not to mention the resolution of lingering security issues.
Additionally, Central Asian states have much to gain from peace in Afghanistan because it will mean the protection of ethnic minorities who live there (and who in turn may become – or already are – influential players in Afghan politics). For example, a July commentary in The Diplomat explains, “if Tashkent can play a role in convincing some members of the Taliban to come to the bargaining table, Uzbekistan’s status as a regional mediator will increase greatly.” Astana has similarly attempted to promote dialogue, but it seems that the Afghan conflict is so complex, given the various players and interests involved, that it’s unlikely that any peace process will bear fruit anytime soon.
Final Thoughts
Rather than a top-down or bottom-up approach, Central Asian initiatives towards Afghanistan are all over the place, hinting at a lack of coordination among these governments regarding how to handle their neighbor. The lack of a regional blueprint (the Istanbul Process notwithstanding) and the lack of any desire among the governments to work together (e.g. Turkmenistan’s historic isolationism) are two possible explanations of the current situation.
This does not mean that there have not been successes. The education of Afghan doctors in Kazakhstan will hopefully pay off in the long-term, and energy-related projects among the other states will hopefully provide Afghanistan with development, jobs, and revenue – assuming that Kabul manages to address corruption in the country, particularly in its fuel sector.
While the U.S. and its allies have generally focused on a military approach to dealing with Afghanistan, Central Asian states have approached the nation primarily via non-violent routes (mediation attempts; nurturing investment and construction; and educating the Afghan youth). But the overriding question is: How long can this strategy last if Afghan-based insurgent groups carry out more attacks in Central Asian regions bordering Afghanistan?
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated, and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.
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