Friday, June 22, 2018

Providence: The Latin American Good Samaritan and the Venezuelan Exodus



"The Latin American Good Samaritan and the Venezuelan Exodus"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Providence: A Journal of Christianity & American Foreign Policy

22 June 2018

Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2018/06/latin-american-good-samaritan-venezuelan-exodus-refugees/

“For I was hungry, and you fed me. I was thirsty, and you gave me a drink. I was a stranger, and you invited me into your home.” (Matt. 25:35)

The humanitarian crisis in Venezuela continues, and it is estimated that between three and four million Venezuelans have left the country to seek a better life elsewhere since their homeland continues to face a political and socio-economic crisis. Since the situation will not improve anytime soon, we can expect more Venezuelans to migrate to other Western Hemisphere nations.

This crisis is putting additional stress on regional governments since, in spite of significant economic growth and development in recent years, these nations still have their own challenges, such as poverty, natural disasters, and security problems. Thus, while Latin American governments and societies are behaving like the proverbial Good Samaritan toward their Venezuelan neighbors, more extra-regional support is necessary.

The Region Helps
Due to space issues, we cannot provide an in-depth analysis of the status of the Venezuelan migrants in each Latin American state, but some general examples help provide a good overview of the situation.

Two of Venezuela’s immediate neighbors, Brazil and Colombia, are bearing the brunt of the Venezuelan exodus. Many Venezuelans cross into Colombia en route to Ecuador or other places, but hundreds of thousands stay in the country (particularly in the northeastern states that border Venezuela, like La Guajira, Cesar, Norte de Santander, Santander, and Arauca). In Brazil, there is a sizable population of Venezuelans living on the border, namely in the state of Roraima. The Brazilian military, particularly the air force, is helping the migrants by cooking meals and transporting Venezuelans to different Brazilian cities in an effort to relocate them. For example, the Brazilian daily newspaper O Globo has reported that Venezuelans transported to Manaus state are being kept at three shelters operated by the Catholic Church.

Meanwhile, Argentina, Chile, and Peru have provided temporary work permits to Venezuelans so that they can look for work. According to Peru’s daily newspaper La Republica, there are almost 300,000 Venezuelans in the Andean country, out of which 253,000 currently possess tourist visas and 45,000 have received temporary residency permits. These governments are also validating diplomas (high school, university, and other advanced degrees) so that the newly arrived migrants can apply for better jobs and children can enter schools.

Generally speaking, the Venezuelan migrants appear to be hopeful about their new, and possibly permanent, homes. For example, an article in Peru’s El Comercio quotes a Venezuelan migrant who said that “arriving to Peru is like reaching heaven” after an odyssey of 15 bus rides that took him from the Portuguesa state in Venezuela, through Colombia, Ecuador, and then to the Peruvian capital.

The Limits of Good Samaritanism in Latin America
In spite of these good intentions, it is important to stress that Latin American and Caribbean states are still developing nations, so there are limits to how many Venezuelans they can accept and for how long they can help.

For example, the Caribbean islands of Aruba and Curacao, which are part of the Netherlands, have declared that they need help from The Hague to process and provide financial aid to the Venezuelans currently in their islands. Aruba’s prime minister claims that there are as many as five thousand Venezuelans on the island, though sources that this author trusts say that this number is exaggerated.

Unfortunately, these states cannot help everyone, so some Venezuelans have turned to begging in order to survive. Even more, xenophobic, anti-Venezuelan sentiments are slowly spreading. In Colombia, there are already reports of Venezuelans being threatened and harassed, as well as being denied employment or housing due to their nationality. Similarly, in early March xenophobic signs appeared in the streets of Lima, Peru, which read “#PeruSinVenezolanos—Basta ya!” (#PeruwithoutVenezuelans, enough!).

Good Samaritans
The Bible has much to say about the importance of being a Good Samaritan, such as in Matthew 25:35, quoted at the beginning of this essay, or Proverbs 19:17, which says that “one who is gracious to a poor man lends to the Lord, and He will repay him for his good deed.” For a region like Latin America that identifies itself with Catholic beliefs, though the overall percentage appears to be dropping, these teachings resonate on daily life.

So far, Latin American governments have maintained an open-border policy regarding Venezuelans, even if certain local officials and politicians are requesting an end to this policy. Moreover, there are a plethora of news articles about how citizens of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and others have opened their homes and wallets to help Venezuelans who attempt to get their lives in order in a new land. This demonstrates that there are many people in the region who understand what being a Good Samaritan really means.

With that said, the international community cannot assume that Latin American governments and societies can handle the Venezuelan exodus alone, particularly if the political and socio-economic crisis in their homeland continues as President Nicolas Maduro remains determined to stay in power—Venezuela has a population of about 30 million, and it is estimated that some 10 percent of the population has left in recent years.

Tragically, Latin America is known for migratory waves that occurred due to violence (like during the Cold War-era internal wars) or political and economic crises, as Venezuela is currently experiencing. For every disaster, there is also the opportunity to do good, and by and large, Latin American governments and societies have demonstrated that, in spite of their domestic problems and limitations, they are willing to give their Venezuelan neighbors a helping hand.


Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues in the Western Hemisphere. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Diplomatic Courier: The Evolution of a Country’s Name in the 21st Century


"The Evolution of a Country's Name in the 21st Century"'

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Diplomatic Courier: A Global Affairs Media Network
19 June 2018
Originally published: https://www.diplomaticourier.com/2018/06/21/the-evolution-of-a-countrys-name-in-the-21st-century/

On 12 June, the governments of Macedonia and Greece announced that they reached an agreement to change the former’s name. This decision comes months after King Mswati III of Swaziland changed his African nation’s name to eSwatini. A nation’s name, like a flag or a national anthem, is part of a country’s identity; thus, changes to any of them are momentous occasions.

Recent Changes to Country Names
Due to space issues, we will briefly, and solely, list changes to nations’ names that have taken place during the past few decades. (In other words we will not discuss changes to flags, as New Zealand almost did in 2016, or the Czech Republic’s adoption of “Czechia” as a moniker, also in 2016).

For example, the late President Laurent-Desire Kabila changed Zaire’s name to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) after coming to power in 1997. Two years later, in 1999, the late President Hugo Chavez renamed the Republic of Venezuela to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. A decade later, in 2009, President Evo Morales changed his landlocked nation’s name, from the Republic of Bolivia to the Plurinational State of Bolivia.

More recently, in 2012, the Republic of Hungary became simply Hungary. A year later, in 2013, Cape Verde became the Republic of Cabo Verde. Finally, as previously noted, Swaziland is now the Kingdom of eSwatini, while the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) will now be known as the Republic of North Macedonia, assuming that the June 2018 agreement with Athens is approved by both parliaments.

Finally, it is worth noting that one more nation, Kazakhstan, may change its name. There have been discussions about renaming it Kazakh Yeli,” which means Land of the Kazakhs.

Why Change?
There are several reasons why a government may decide to change the country’s name. For example, Macedonia is changing its name in order to put to rest a decades-old dispute with Greece, which will hopefully mean that Athens will stop blocking Skopje’s attempts to join blocs like NATO and the European Union.

Other changes have more to do with new leaders deciding to break away from previous regimes and start “fresh.” This is the case of the DRC, as President Kabila changed the country’s name after the dictator Joseph Mobutu was overthrown (for a good book about Congolese history, see: Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa).

Other reasons may have to do with a leader’s political ideology, for example, the late President Chavez added the word “Bolivarian” to Venezuela’s name in honor of his hero, the 19th century South American liberator Simon Bolivar. Similarly, President Morales of Bolivia added the term “Plurinational” to celebrate the nation’s linguistic and cultural diversity—he is Bolivia’s first indigenous head of state, which likely influenced his decision.

In Kazakhstan’s case, the Kazakh government aims to distance itself from the other “stans,” through its potential name change. A 2014 article in The Economist explains that the Kazakh leadership “puts itself in a different league from its neighbours. ”

A Name, An Identity
As previously mentioned, a country’s name is part of its national identity, and it is important for any government to keep in mind how its population will react to such changes; there have been mixed reactions to these initiatives. For example, there have already been protests in Macedonia due to the government’s decision, and there was also popular unrest in Hungary when its name change occurred.
Conversely, the international media has not reported major unrest in eSwatini surrounding its new name, perhaps because, as a BBC report argued, the population has other, bigger concerns, like poverty and high HIV levels.

Similarly, the Venezuelan government’s addition of an adjective to the country’s name, rather than fully changing it, explains the little opposition regarding this decision—in any case, Venezuela’s political and economic meltdown are the population’s main concerns nowadays, and outweigh the praising (or not) of a 19th century liberator.

As the aforementioned examples have demonstrated, the very name of a country, the building block of a person’s national identity and sense of patriotism, continues to evolve in the 21st century. Such a change not only has bureaucratic implications—updating passports, driving licenses, maps, anthems, state-owned companies and a plethora of official documents—but also affects a person’s national identity, which can result in negative reactions, as is currently happening in Macedonia.

A country’s name tells the history of its people, and in the age of the “global everything,” it is important to understand how these new names came to be and what do they mean, as this will influence how the rest of the world will interact with these newly named nations.

About the author: Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Wednesday, June 20, 2018

Mexico-Russia Relations: Fútbol and Much More


Mexico-Russia Relations: Fútbol and Much More
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Geopolitics
20 June 2018

Mexico is one of the 32 nations that will participate in the 2018 FIFA World Cup that the Russian Federation will host from 14 June to 15 July. To prepare for the expected influx of Mexican tourists traveling, the Mexican government is increasing its diplomatic presence in Russia (like mobile consulates). While this sudden flow of Mexican citizens will be short lived, Mexico City-Moscow relations are gaining momentum.

Trade And Investment Grows

An important development in bilateral commercial relations occurred earlier this year, when a consortium between Russian oil company Lukoil and the Italian company ENI won a bid to explore for oil in the Gulf of Mexico. This is actually the second contract that Lukoil has gained in Mexico as it won a different bid last year. These type of commercial transactions are standard, but since Mexico is a close ally of the U.S., the fact that a Russian oil company will now operate (or at least search for oil) in Mexico is a significant development.

In fact, Mexican-Russian trade has slowly grown in the past years – according to media reports, it reached USD$1.4 billion in 2016 and USD$1.6 billion in 2017 (though Mexico’s two main trading partners remain the U.S. and China). Additionally, a note by the Mexican daily El Universal explains that ProMexico – part of the Secretariat of Economy, aimed at promoting international trade and investment – will reportedly attempt to promote “seafood, meats, and dairy products” in the Russian market during the World Cup.

Even more, in spite of the ongoing Moscow-Washington tensions, Moscow-Mexico City diplomatic relations remain quite amicable. For example, in mid-May, the President of the Mexican Senate, Ernesto Cordero Arroyo, traveled to Moscow and met with Chairman of the Federation Council Valentina Matviyenko. Mr. Cordero declared that bilateral relations are passing through a very good phase (“un muy buen momento”) and they will continue, regardless of who is elected president of Mexico in the 1 July general elections. Even more, a press release published by the Mexican Senate as part of the visit highlights how Mr. Cordero mentioned that both Mexico and Russia support a “multipolar world.”

The Mexico-Russia-USA Triangle

The main issue to keep in mind is the geopolitical context of this apparent rapprochement. Diplomatic relations between Washington and Mexico City have reached a low point due to President Donald Trump’s inflammatory comments regarding immigration, the controversial border wall and the renegotiation of NAFTA.

Without a doubt, there are still plenty of positive initiatives, like for example high-level military meetings, and the apparent sale of eight MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopters helicopters as well as a number of missiles (type RGM-84L Harpoon Block II, among others ) to the Mexican Navy. However such developments are overshadowed by executive-level statements. It is in this new reality that Mexico City appears to be looking to strengthen trade relations with other partners.

Even more, the Mexican and international media have published a number of articles over the past year that discuss this complex geopolitical situation. For example, a 27 January 2018 commentary in Univision.com was bluntly titled “Russia quadruples its investment in Mexico while the US thinks about building walls.” Similarly, a 20 November 2017 article in El Cronista is titled “Mexico approaches Russia to make business as NAFTA stalls.”

Final Thoughts

While Russia cannot realistically replace the profits Mexico obtains from the U.S. market and NAFTA, the Russian market and potential investments are lucrative alternatives. We will have to wait until Mexico’s July elections, which will curiously occur in the middle of the World Cup, to have a better idea of the next Mexican president’s priorities and foreign policy objectives. It will be interesting to see how much Mexico can achieve in Russia, both regarding fútbol and everything else.

W. Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Sunday, June 17, 2018

IPD: The Situation in Nicaragua Deteriorates

"The Situation in Nicaragua Deteriorates"
W. Alejandro Sanchez & Scott Morgan
International Policy Digest
17 June 2018
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/06/17/the-situation-in-nicaragua-deteriorates/


Once again there is a political crisis in Central America. Although there has been some justified criticism towards the government of Guatemala and how it has responded to Fuego volcano’s eruption, that is not the focal point of this commentary.

Since April 2018 there have been a series of protests that have taken place in Nicaragua, which have fallen outside the purview of most media reports as other more compelling stories, such as Syria, the G-7 summit and the North Korea-US meeting dominate the news cycles. Most of the protests have taken place outside the capital of Managua as well.

The death toll right now is reported to be at least 139 people, according to the Centro Nicaragüense de Derechos Humanos, a Nicaraguan human rights organization. What could cause such an uprising? The root cause is a decision that was made by President Daniel Ortega to amend social security benefits has morphed from student led protests into a movement bent on driving the president from office before the next scheduled elections in 2021.

To put it mildly Nicaragua is at an impasse. President Ortega is currently in his second phase of being president of the country after leading the victorious Sandinista forces in ousting the Somoza dynasty back in 1979. He ruled the country from 1979 until 1990, and returned to power in 2007; he has ruled since then after winning re-elections in 2011 and 2016. Meanwhile, his spouse, First Lady Rosario Murillo Zambrana, became Vice President of the country in the 2016 elections, bringing back memories of Somoza-style nepotism. So if there is actually a change of government in the Central American country, will it also include asking the Ortega family to kindly step away? Or will they be forced to leave via a popular revolution? In most instances those who gain power by violent moves will not always leave via the ballot box.

What is the current remedy? There is a call for an advancement of the electoral calendar – the next presidential elections are scheduled to take place in 2021 but President Ortega has apparently suggested that they could take place in 2019. It is unclear so far if this offer means that Ortega will not run then, or if he intends to run again. The obvious risk being that if somehow he wins again he will cement his grip on power, and maintain the status quo. That will not be an adequate solution for one segment of the population that is currently suffering.

The Catholic Bishops in the Country have sent letters to both President Ortega and to the political opposition and leaders of these protests offering to mediate the crisis and come up with their own proposals for how to solve it. While there has been an affirmative answer from the opposition there has yet to be a decision made by President Ortega. Some Evangelical groups have criticized the Catholics for offering to facilitate talks to end the current impasse. Nevertheless, at the time of this writing, international media has reported that the Nicaraguan government has freed around 17 young protesters thanks to mediation by the Catholic Church.

Has Nicaragua reached the breaking point where an all-out civil war erupts? It is clear that it is not at that stage yet. There is discontent with the current regime but most indications report that the situation is just at the demonstration phase. With that said, the anti-Ortega sentiment is gaining momentum. A clear example took place at an event at the Inter-American Dialogue, a well-known think tank in Washington DC, on June 4. This on-the-record meeting discussed the situation in Nicaragua, and the Nicaraguan community in the U.S. capital clearly stated their message: they want Ortega and Murillo gone (“de que se van, se van” which roughly translates “they will leave, yes or yes,” was the chant).

A resumption of hostilities could result in a new wave of refugees fleeing north towards the United States. Refugees from Central America has been a wedge issue during the last two election cycles in the United States. Unfortunately, violence is not unknown to Nicaragua, as President Ortega came to power when his Sandinista National Liberation Front overthrew President Somoza. Afterwards, the U.S., during the Reagan administration, led a not-so covert war to overthrow him. We know now well how the hearings in the U.S. Congress went during that debacle.

Could the Trump administration be forced to revisit the history of the 1980s by returning to the scene of a Cold War battlefield? Washington has other security priorities elsewhere in the world right now so it is difficult to imagine that this could happen. With that said, if the violence and repression continues, it will be important to monitor how the international community, including Washington, reacts.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the authors are associated.

Monday, June 11, 2018

Small Wars Journal: Installations of the Future: A Soldier’s Letter from the Garrison




Installations of the Future: A Soldier’s Letter from the Garrison

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez and Samuel Casey

This “letter home” is presented as part of the TRADOC G2's "Soldier 2050" Call for Ideas. This material will form a compendium of thoughts and ideas that will support the exploration of future bio-convergence implications on the Army of 2050.
Dear Mom,

I really appreciate the whole care package, but next time could you perhaps send a few more cans of power drinks and sweets?

 I really miss those from back home.

For the most part the food is alright, a bit bland but my metabolism has really kicked up a notch. You remember how I was a bit chunky in grade 10, well now I have a six pack! The training has gradually increased in difficulty, but thanks to the Flathat I’m now hitting all my marks a few weeks ahead of schedule. Man, if my old futbol coach could see me now, he would really be blown away. Oh, and using that X-1 smart helmet doesn’t give me headaches anymore. I can finally see in front of me while properly requesting the eagle’s eye view from my unit’s Hummingbird drone. I’m quite proud of it! It still is an odd feeling but seems like my brain has finally adapted to having so much info in front of my face.

The tactics and maneuvers training is fascinating, Uncle Kayce was saying back in the old days they used a lot of vehicles and artillery, you can tell him we bring a lot of portable heavy artillery with us now. Unfortunately, that’s all I can really say about that, after the ruckus with Russia in ’39, they don’t allow us to talk about classified operations.

I can tell you that I got my orders for my unit and it’s going to be the “Unlucky” 13th Lightfighter Regiment under the 201st. This means I am learning Spanish and Portuguese now, so that’s interesting. We have a couple Puerto Rican chaps here that are helping the rest of us along so it is going awesomely. 

The 201st gets around a lot, they were deployed as part of that United Nations peacekeeping mission in Guyana and Haiti (didn’t grandpa go to Haiti back in the ‘10s?) and they do a lot of training abroad. Hopefully they send us to Trinidad so I can work on my tan, and snorkel!

I miss grandma’s chicken and dumplings by the by. The biggest complaint I have is the needles, we are tested daily for vitamin deficiencies and they tailor our food and workouts to weekly assessments. The Drill Sergeants are telling us that we should be grateful, as when they were coming up they fed everyone the same regardless of bloodwork.  I can’t complain about that, but I just wish the food were tastier. Two years ago, someone in the Army’s Special Health Services Command… or Washington… it was someplace… hired an army of nutritionists (get it?!?) to come up with healthier food for us. From what I understand, they want soldiers, even rank-and-file infantry like me, to maximize our gains and recover faster, even while packing us chock full of muscles. And for that, our diets are under the microscope. Instead of power bars, when we are camping out in the field, we eat some toothpaste-like substance out of these tubes. It tastes horrible, but it’s full of proteins, minerals, vitamin C, and whatever else they can cram in there.  I definitely feel very full and replenished afterwards. Tip top. The problem is that it is destroying my stomach! Whatever mad scientist came up with this stuff forgot about flavor! What I wouldn’t give for a pinch of salt to add to it. Or pepper. Or paprika.

Now and then the regiment’s nutritionists give us cheat meals with all the goodies, triple stuffed pizza and burgers with what I hope is animal meat, but otherwise everyone in my unit is shaving off fat very fast and getting muscular and lean.

I suppose I shouldn’t complain, since the gear we are using is pretty heavy so we might as well have more muscles so as to not get tired carrying it around. Grandpa Sebastian told me that back in his days, an M16 rifle weighed 8 pounds with the ammo clip locked in. I think the M35 is 12 pounds. It’s funny that those DARPA techs made the armor lighter, the helmet smarter... but the rifles just got heavier. 

“We want our soldiers to have a rifle that is suitable for any situation… a true Swiss-army-knife-rifle” General McLovin said a few months ago when the new rifle started rolling out of production. The rumors are true, by the way (and no, I won’t get in trouble for telling you this!), the rifle carries different kinds of ammo and it has a button by the trigger that lets us select which type of round we want. 30 bullets for armor piercing, 20 of another for thick-structure piercing, and 30 for long distance. Switching correctly between types of bullet takes practice, but I think I got it. This one kid, McGuiver, nice kid but doesn’t follow directions, used the wrong kind of caliber during one VR target-shooting class, and the Sergeant smoked him until he puked, made him rehydrate, and then did it again!

Between you and me, I don’t get the point of having so many kinds of ammo in one magazine, when sometimes I just need more of one specific kind. I wonder if this rifle will go the way of the Air Force’s old F-35s… they tried to develop a multipurpose warplane and it didn’t work… I think Aunt Christine told me that the Navy also tried constructing these multipurpose ships and the tech wasn’t there yet... and now the Army gives us a multipurpose rifle. I don’t think they’ve been used in live combat yet so we’ll have to see if they work out well.

The thing looks like a rifle with a toolkit box beneath and a mini computer screen on top that shows you how many bullets you have left and it is attached to the infrared scope. It’s not exactly a “smart-rifle” but it’s certainly more advanced than what dad and grandpa used. I guess that’s why those special “brain drill sergeants” we have that constantly have us lay in the VR room, just practicing how to switch ammo clips and how to check the screen as well. Sometimes I feel I spend as much time running and doing pushups as I do just laying or sitting down trying to get my brain to soak up more info without delay.

And speaking of things working out… that guy Ian from DC is still here! I don’t get it. He’s not part of the “family” you know? Like, barely one of his uncles served, and a cousin or something, but neither of his parents or siblings did... or his grandparents as far as I can tell. They’re all civs. Why is he here then? He said that he wants to serve, do his duty and all that… but he’s pretty much a 100% legacy-civilian, not like us, so why is he here? I don’t think he’ll manage to keep himself together once the bullets start flying, you know? He doesn’t have the blood of a warrior. Anyways the platoon sergeant seems amused by him, and so do the trainers. I suppose he is a good guy, but I think he should transfer to something that is not front-line infantry type stuff… put him in the back with the logistics or planning people…. Leave the fighting to those who come from families that know how to fight.

OK, OK, OK, I’ll be nice to him. I promise. Maybe he’ll surprise me, and the rest of the unit too. Maybe non-family civs can actually fight. That would be quite the shock honestly.

Oh and I got my new armor finally!  A shiny and comfortable Interceptor MIII.  I can’t imagine what it was like for dad and the rest of the old guard of the family, carrying around 60 pounds of armor…  and they were just big planks of metal in your front and back. Thankfully our unit finally got one of those 3D printers that can fabricate armor that is more fitting to each soldier’s body. It almost feels like I’m just wearing a slightly heavy t-shirt of sorts.

It’s funny, back in the day, them special forces guys would get all the state-of-the-art gadgets, the fancy multipurpose weapons and multipurpose uniforms etc. But now Washington keeps using those guys for clandestine-type work… I guess Grandpa Humberto was right and all those elite operators are now used for covert, hit-jobs more than the “usual” operations against the enemy.  I don’t mind really, it means rank-and-file infantry people like me get some of the fancier, more high-tech equipment for our missions.

Honestly, don’t worry about me Mom, I’m doing well! It’s been a year already and, apart from the food, I’m enjoying myself! I really don't mind doing a full 10-year training-plus cycle here! I actually think the Army had a good idea, you know? Or maybe it wasn’t the Army, maybe it was one of those consulting companies or think tanks in DC that came up with it. Offering extra- training and family perks if you accept to longer services is actually a good idea now that they finally got the VA to work properly. I think after I finish the long cycle, I’ll get a position in the civilian world.

Ok I gotta cut this short, besides training and language classes, we take courses to learn more about our area of responsibilities. I guess enough mistakes have been made due to lack of cultural understanding and now we gotta be History majors apart from Soldiers. I actually kinda enjoy those interactive maps we get, click on a place and you get all sorts of historical and present-day info.

Next time I’ll send a video if I can find someplace quiet where to talk.

Love,
Me

The authors would like to thank Brittney J. Figueroa for editorial assistance.

Samuel Casey
Samuel Casey is an enlisted soldier in the South Carolina Army National Guard and has been in for eight years. He has his undergraduate degree in Intelligence and National Security Studies from Coastal Carolina University and works as a Contractor in Charleston, SC. All views expressed or implied here belong to the author and do not reflect his affiliation with the US Army.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez. This essay solely expresses the author's views and does not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Wednesday, June 6, 2018

Geopolitical Monitor: Will an Ascendant Uzbekistan Challenge Kazakhstan’s Leadership in Central Asia?

"Will an Ascendant Uzbekistan Challenge Kazakhstan's Leadership in Central Asia?"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
4 June 2018
Geopolitical Monitor
Opinion
Originally published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/will-an-ascendant-uzbekistan-challenge-kazakhstans-leadership-in-central-asia/

President Donald Trump met with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan on 16 May, an important breakthrough after the isolationism of the Karimov regime. What is noteworthy about the meeting is that President Mirziyoyev is the second Central Asian leader that President Trump has met so far this year, after a meeting with President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan which took place in January.

Kazakhstan is generally regarded as the leader of Central Asian countries, given its level of development and proactive foreign policy. However, Uzbekistan’s President Mirziyoyev is keen on improving his country’s ties with the rest of the world. While the international community wants to see two Central Asian success stories, governmental ambitions and competitiveness may mean that Astana and Tashkent will eventually clash —though hopefully through non-violent means— for regional hegemony.

Kazakhstan: Central Asia’s De Facto Leader
Much has been written about Kazakhstan’s accomplishments (as well as the country’s ongoing problems), so for the sake of brevity, we will provide a cursory list in order to focus more on analysis.

Kazakhstan is Central Asia’s geographically largest country, with a population of 18 million. The Kazakh government has supported a liberalized and open market structure as it attempts to attract investors and diversify its pool of trade partners. Apart from its significant trade relations with direct neighbors like China (which are being intensified due to the Belt and Road project) and Russia, the Central Asian country recently began exporting uranium to Brazil and, according to the Wall Street Journal, also plans to sell shares of the state-owned large uranium mining company KazAtomProm this year. Kazakhstan relies heavily on its significant oil, gas. and mineral resources, particularly its uranium. According to the World Bank, Kazakhstan’s GDP  in 2016 was USD$137 billion, making it the highest in the region.

Additionally, the government has invested heavily in education in recent years. According to the 2016 UN Human Development Report, Kazakhstan ranks 56th spot in educational achievements, at the top of the “high human development section” between Bulgaria and the Bahamas. One important initiative carried out by the Ministry of Education is the Bolashak scholarship program, which has brought thousands of young Kazakhs to study in U.S. and Canadian universities since the late 1990s (afterwards the students return to Kazakhstan to work there for a number of years).

Finally, Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is well known for its global aspirations. It was the first Central Asian country to serve on the United Nations Security Council (2017-2018), and has played a mediating role (albeit unsuccessfully) in Syria, and may attempt to do so in Ukraine as well.

President Mirziyoyev Opens Uzbekistan to the World
As for Uzbekistan, it has yet to achieve its full potential since becoming independent after the fall of the Soviet Union, due to the corrupt and authoritarian regime of Islam Karimov. The late dictator focused less on developing the country and more on enriching family and allies, like his daughter Gulnara Karimova.

Uzbekistan has a large population, around 32 million people, and its main industries include gold, oil and gas, not to mention cotton (a controversial industry due to forced and child labor). The country’s GPD in 2016 was USD$67 billion. As for its location in the Human Development Report, the country ranks in the 105th spot, at the bottom of the “high human development section,” between Maldives and Moldova.

Unfortunately for Uzbekistan, Karimov pursued isolationist policies, shying away from regional integration. For example, he withdrew Uzbekistan from GUUAM and expelled various NGOs operating in the country. The 2005 Andijan Massacre made Uzbekistan an international pariah. The incident led to the U.S. military closing its military base in Khanabad, as per order of the Uzbek government following Washington’s criticism of the Karimov regime after Andijan.
President Mirziyoyev served as Karimov’s Prime Minister since 2003. He became interim leader in September 2016 upon the longtime ruler’s demise, and was officially elected president in December 2017. His main rival, Rustam Inoyatov, head of the National Security Service, was dismissed in January 2018, which helped secure the president’s control over the government.

Over the past year, the Uzbek leader has focused on changing the perception of the international community (specifically the U.S. and Europe) regarding his country in order to create new partnerships and attract foreign investment and technology to promote development. Political prisoners have been freed, and there will apparently be more tolerance towards freedom of expression as, in a significant move, Voice of America journalist Navbahor Imamova has been granted accreditation to work in Uzbekistan. Additionally, Tashkent has promised to do away with controversial programs like child labor in cotton fields.

Which is on the ascent as Central Asia’s regional hegemon: Uzbekistan or Kazahkstan?
Trying to define a “power” in international affairs is complicated, just as it is difficult to quantify “influence.” It is somewhat easy to do so for global powers (such as China, Russia, or the U.S.) as one can look at the size of armed forces, nuclear arsenals, GDP and support from allied nations in fora like the United Nations. On the other hand, understanding what constitutes a “regional power” is more complicated (see academic literature on the subject: here, here and here).

As previously mentioned, Kazakhstan is generally viewed as Central Asia’s leader in recent years particularly due to its foreign policy achievements, such as joining the UNSC and its role in peace negotiations. Should Uzbekistan under President Mirziyoyev want to achieve a “regional power” status, we would expect Tashkent to have an ambitious foreign policy akin to Astana. For example, Uzbekistan could attempt to join the WTO (it currently has observer status while Kazakhstan joined in 2015), or try to mediate a conflict. Tashkent is already pursuing this route, as a major peace conference on Afghanistan was held in Tashkent in March 2018; that same month a gathering of Central Asian heads of state took place in Astana, at the initiative of President Mirziyoyev.

The author would argue that in the short run, Kazakhstan’s prominent role is secure. For example, Kazakhstan’s GDP is twice that of Uzbekistan, and it would take years for industries to be developed, production to improve, and new investment-friendly laws to be put into place in order to raise the Uzbek GDP. As one Central Asia expert explained to the author: “What the Uzbeks are doing now, Kazakhstan started doing two decades ago; Astana started earlier so they are ahead.”  Another Central Asia expert stressed how “Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are members of regional organizations, but Kazakhstan is in the lead (Eurasian Economic Union, Collective Security Treaty Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Commonwealth of Independent States) whereas Uzbekistan is only a full member of SCO and CIS and either not a member or a passive member of other organizations.” Even more, Uzbekistan has outstanding border issues with some of its neighbors, not to mention water-related issues. In other words, Uzbekistan still has a lot of catching up to do in the diplomatic arena.

With that said, a particular concern for Astana is that Uzbekistan’s population is almost twice that of Kazakhstan. Thus, should Tashkent manage to capitalize on its massive population (by Central Asian standards), this human resource could shift the regional geopolitical and economic balance.

There is an important question that will be answered in the coming years, which is: If Uzbekistan’s star rises, will Kazakhstan’s prominent role evaporate? Central Asia is a small region in terms of area, market, and number of countries (six, if you count Afghanistan). The region is bordered by global powers like the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, with India, Iran, and Pakistan not that far away. There’s also Turkey, whose goal is to be leader of the pan-Turkish world. In other words, there is not much metaphorical and literal space for two Central Asian regional powers to share.

Uzbek-Kazakh Relations
As a final point in this discussion, it will be important to monitor Kazakh-Uzbek relations. So far bilateral relations seem to be improving as the leaders of both countries met in late 2017. Even more there have been people-related initiatives like the resumption of a bus service between the two countries and there was even a Kazakh educational event in Samarkand in late May 2018.
With that said, international relations is the study of changes, and while bilateral relations are enjoying a honeymoon phase, it is reasonable to assume that this may not last. For example, should Uzbekistan start receiving more investment in the coming years, threatening Kazakh industries, or should regional governments support Uzbek membership to the UNSC, Astana may start behaving in a more competitive manner towards its neighbor.

Final Thoughts
The rise of President Mirziyoyev to power in Uzbekistan, a country rich with untapped potential, could signal a shift in Central Asian geopolitics, including changes to Kazakhstan’s current status as the region’s powerhouse.


The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated, and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

The author would like to thank the various Central Asia experts consulted as part of this analysis.

Friday, June 1, 2018

IPD: Curacao’s Other Problem (And an Opportunity for Development)

"Curacao’s Other Problem (And an Opportunity for Development)"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
2 June 2018
International Policy Digest
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/06/02/curacao-s-other-problem-and-an-opportunity-for-development/

The Caribbean island of Curacao made international headlines in May due to the situation of its oil refinery, Isla Curaçao B.V., which is operated by the Venezuelan state-run oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela SA ( PDVSA). PDVSA has a contract to operate the refinery until 2019 and unfortunately Venezuela’s crisis has hit PDVSA and, naturally, Isla. The situation reached a boiling point in May when ConocoPhillips “seized products” that belonged to PDVSA after the company (Conoco) won court orders allowing it to do so.

Isla is critically important to Curacao’s economy and population, however, there are two ongoing developments that also deserve greater analysis, both for positive and negative reasons. Namely, the well-known international shipyard group Damen Group is currently upgrading and expanding the island’s shipyard. That’s the good news. On the other hand, Curacao, like the rest of the region, is receiving a steady influx of Venezuelan citizens, which is upsetting the very delicate socio-economic balance of an island with around 160 thousand citizens.

While it is part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Curacao enjoys a high degree of autonomy over its domestic politics, and the leadership in Willemstad will need plenty of statesmanship and forward thinking to successfully address the island’s mounting challenges.

The Good News: An Expanding Port

Damen took control of Curacao’s port in September 2016 via a concession agreement with Curaçaose Dok Maatschappij N.V. (C.D.M.). The facilities, renamed Damen Shiprepair Curaçao (DSCu) on February 2017, are currently able to repair and provide maintenance to vessels, but Damen wants to further improve and develop the infrastructure to become a default stop for vessels traveling the Caribbean Sea and also for regional navies and coast guards. The island’s location is helpful towards achieving this goal as it is located just north of Venezuela and not far from Panama – then again, even an upgraded DSCu will have to compete with other more established port facilities in the region, particularly the Cartagena port in Colombia.

In order to expand the DSCu’s capabilities, Damen sent two floating docks that arrived to the island in late April. According to Maritime Executive, “the larger of the two is a Panamax-class dock measuring 230 meters by 45 meters for tankers, box ships and other large vessels, while the smaller dock measures 108 meters by 23 meters and is ideal for all kinds of tugs, work boats and offshore support and anchor handling vessels.” The article also quotes DSCu’s managing director, who explained that “even now our sales team is in discussions with a number of companies regarding a wide variety of vessels ranging from a local research vessel to tugs, small cruise ships and OSVs. We also plan to support regional naval vessels including those of the Royal Dutch Navy and with the support of a Damen Services team the yard will provide maintenance and repair services to Damen-built tugs and workboats operating in the region.”

Indeed, several Greater Caribbean states utilize Damen naval platforms, like The Bahamas, which purchased a number of Damen vessels as part of Nassau’s Sandy Bottom Project to improve the capabilities of the Royal Bahamas Defence Force. Additionally, regional shipyards have constructed vessels based on Damen models, like Mexico’s ASTIMAR for the Mexican Navy. Hence, DSCu could very well become a major maintenance and repair shipyard for regional warships, coast guard boats, not to mention civilian vessels that cross the Caribbean on any given day.

The Bad News: A Growing Migration of Venezuelans
An ever-growing number of Venezuelan citizens have migrated to countries like Brazil, Colombia, Peru and the U.S., in the past couple of years as the situation in their country worsens, and the Caribbean island has also received a number of them.

Unfortunately, there is no exact number of how many Venezuelans have arrived on the island, as the Curacao government has not issued statistics to give an idea of how big (or small) the problem is. An article in a Dutch newspaper stated that “between five and ten thousand Venezuelans” may be on the island, but a reliable source in Curacao explained to the author that this estimation sounds exaggerated. (Then again, according to a 19 May article by the Curacao Chronicle, Aruban Prime Minister Evelyn Wever-Croes similarly said that “there are already about 5,000 refugees who reached the island [Aruba] via plane or boat.”) Thus a problem that hinders this analysis is understanding how many Venezuelans are on the island nowadays, though it is safe to argue that just a few thousand individuals can drastically alter the social and economic fabric given Curacao’s small area (171 square miles) and its population of around 159 thousand as of 2016, according to the World Bank.

A major concern is how will Curacao bear the cost for providing refugees and migrants with basic assistance. According to Lesley Fer, Risk Management & Disaster Policy Director for Curaçao, “the government will have to pay about 250 guilders per day per refugee. This is for basic costs such as food and housing, which also includes medical care, education and employment.” Willemstad is looking to external donors, namely The Hague, for financial support to expand infrastructure and be able to help the accepted refugees – this will probably strain relations between the island and the kingdom.

Unfortunately, people have perished as they tried to reach Curacao, as a boat carrying refugees capsized in January, killing at least four. Since they do not have legal documentation to stay on the island, Venezuelans could also be abused, and there are many reports that Venezuelan women are working in the island’s brothels. Finally, as we have witnessed in Europe with the flow of North African and Middle Eastern refugees, this sudden influx of Venezuelans may promote hate crimes in the island.


As the economic and political crisis in Venezuela continues, we can expect more Venezuelans to go abroad in search of a better life. Curacao will likely remain an objective, thus it is critically important for Willemstad and The Hague to come up with a humane and comprehensive immigration policy.

Final Thoughts
While the international media focus is, understandably, on the future of PDVSA and its impact on the Isla Refinery, the two other issues discussed in this commentary are important because of their potential consequences, both positive and negative.

For example, if Damen can upgrade and expand the infrastructure of DSCu, the shipyard could become a new source of income for the island. On the other hand, we can expect a greater number of Venezuelans risking their lives to reach the island in the near future as the situation in their homeland continues to deteriorate. These individuals must be treated in a humane and respectful manner while also taking into account Curacao’s limitations.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.