Diplomatic Courier: The Rise of the Tech Ambassador

" The Rise of the Tech Ambassador"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Diplomatic Courier: A Global Affairs Media Network
23 March, 2018
Originally published: https://www.diplomaticourier.com/2018/03/23/the-rise-of-the-tech-ambassador/

The government of Denmark has sent Casper Klynge, a career diplomat who previously served as the Danish ambassador to Indonesia, to Silicon Valley to strengthen ties between the IT industry and Copenhagen. A Wired Magazine published an article last year, described this initiative with a provocative title: The first Silicon Valley ambassador is out to make nice with tech giants.

Denmark’s Consulate General in Palo Alto is part of Copenhagen’s strategy to approach global technological hubs via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Innovation Centre, which also has offices in New Delhi, Seoul, and Shanghai. Ambassador Klynge’s tasks as tech ambassador are  similar of any other diplomat: “he’s trying to encourage investment into Denmark from the West Coast tech companies, and to promote Danish exports to Silicon Valley StartUps. Along the way, he’s also hoping to push brand Denmark on to the world, convincing them there’s more to his home country than bacon, LEGO and Hans Christian Andersen,” the article explains.

Ambassador Klynge’s deployment could be the trend-setter, as other governments could choose to follow this initiative. On March 1, the Center for International and Strategic Studies in Washington DC organized an event titled “A National Machine Intelligence Strategy for the United States.” During the Q&A section, I asked if other governments could similarly deploy tech ambassadors to IT hubs like Silicon Valley, New Delhi, Shenzhen, among others, in the near future, to establish more direct government-industry relations. One panelist responded that it is important to have “direct outreach from governments around the world to the tech industry because there is a recognition that this technology has so much potential but poorly crafted policy could be detrimental to the development of the technology and to all of its benefits.”

Ambassador Klynge’s new post is a preview of the future of diplomacy. Government-to-government relations will generally continue as normal, with diplomats posted in capitals, trying to cultivate relations with the hosting government and promote their own country’s interests. Nevertheless, technological advances are affecting how diplomacy is conducted, as now diplomats can chat with their home governments instantaneously via text messages or WhatsApp, and foreign policy decisions can be made through the small screen of a smartphone—though of course, ostentatious ceremonies in which heads of state meet to sign major agreements will continue to take place.

Additionally, there is the issue of the rising importance of information and communication technologies (ICTs) as part of a government’s foreign policy strategy. There is growing academic literature dedicated to science diplomacy or innovation diplomacy, like, for example, the 2017 essay Exploring the future of innovation diplomacy by Jos Leijten of the Joint Institute for Innovation Policy. Leijten explains how “many, if not all, developed nations have special offices in their foreign services, which are responsible for science diplomacy actions,” because, as the author aptly argues, “with the rise of the knowledge economy or, to put it differently, with the growth of the role of knowledge as a factor in economic prosperity of countries, knowledge has become an increasingly important issue in the relations between nations.”

Diplomacy is an ever-morphing organism and governments need to adapt constantly in a changing world, especially nowadays. Hence, it is no surprise that commentaries about the future of diplomacy published in recent years stress the need for diplomatic officers to be open to new ideas.
Case in point, some governments may now wish to focus on improving relations with a specific industry situated in another country; hence a local diplomatic office, like a consulate, in situ will be necessary. After all, Washington DC is geographically distant from California, no matter the size of an embassy’s trade and IT offices in the U.S. capital.

The deployment of the Danish tech ambassador offers one additional positive option: Copenhagen can now communicate directly with Silicon Valley companies without having to go through Washington, at a time when U.S.-Europe government relations are at a low point.

Information Technology is a multibillion-dollar industry with hubs around the world. The government of Denmark’s decision to have a tech ambassador directly aimed at improving relations between Copenhagen and the world of IT in the U.S. is an intriguing initiative that could prove to be very (financially) successful. Copenhagen’s move also supports the argument that diplomacy is an evolving field as governments come up with new initiatives to both protect and promote their national interests.

About the author: W. Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.  

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

 The author would like to thank Brittney J. Figueroa for editorial assistance.

Entrevista: Sputnik Mundo - ¿Continuarán Argentina y Rusia sus relaciones cordiales tras la reelección de Putin?

"¿Continuarán Argentina y Rusia sus relaciones cordiales tras la reelección de Putin?"
Sputnik Mundo
19 Marzo, 2018
Publicado en: https://mundo.sputniknews.com/russia-elections-2018-news/201803191077120633-politica-america-latina-buenos-aires-moscu-relaciones/

BUENOS AIRES (Sputnik) — La permanencia de Vladímir Putin en la presidencia de Rusia tras las elecciones del 18 de marzo permitirá mantener en un rumbo positivo las relaciones entre su país y Argentina, dijo a Sputnik el analista en geopolítica y seguridad internacional W. Alejandro Sánchez.

Con el 95% de las papeletas escrutadas Putin reúne el 76% de los apoyos, según los últimos datos de la Comisión Electoral Central rusa.

"La reelección del presidente Putin no afectará las relaciones con Argentina, que hoy en día son buenas y cordiales", dijo Sánchez, columnista del Centro para la Seguridad Marítima Internacional (Cimsec, por sus siglas en inglés).

La evolución de las relaciones diplomáticas entre los dos países se mantuvo estable bajo la presidencia de Mauricio Macri, observó.

"No son tan cercanas como durante la presidencia de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015), pero no son malas desde ningún punto de vista", abundó.
De hecho, la visita oficial de Macri a su homólogo ruso en enero pasado "es una muestra de lo cordiales que son las relaciones diplomáticas entre los dos Gobiernos hoy en día", dijo.

Por eso el desafío se centra en cómo hacer que esa amistad se transforme en proyectos e inversión, indicó el experto en geopolítica.

Comercio y defensa
El intercambio comercial con Rusia fue positivo para Argentina en 2017.

Las exportaciones argentinas en los 11 primeros meses del año pasado llegaron a 480 millones de dólares, y los rubros principales fueron peras frescas y limones, mientras que las importaciones desde Rusia sumaron 326 millones de dólares.

"El desafío para Rusia es que el Gobierno de Macri ve a la República Popular de China, la Unión Europea, Estados Unidos y los países del Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur, que integran además Brasil, Paraguay y Uruguay) como sus principales socios comerciales, cosa que son", reflexionó el analista.
Cuando en Argentina es verano en Rusia es invierno, así que "el país sudamericano podría ser un exportador fundamental de otros productos agrícolas a Rusia, pero eso depende mucho de la producción argentina y la demanda", continuó.


Ambos países tienen por reto el impulso de otras iniciativas, "como proyectos de construcción o minería, el intento de doblar el volumen de su comercio antes del fin de la década, o la puesta en marcha de ejercicios militares conjuntos", detalló Sánchez.

En cuestiones de defensa, circularon rumores sobre la posibilidad de que el Gobierno de Fernández comprara armamento ruso, como los aviones de combate MiG-35.

"Esto no ocurrió, con excepción de los cuatro buques clase Neftegaz, en gran parte por el limitado presupuesto de defensa argentino", recordó el especialista en seguridad internacional.

En cualquier caso, Sánchez destacó el papel de la participación del buque ruso Yantar, con un vehículo sumergible con capacidad para identificar objetos hundidos a 6.000 metros de profundidad, en la búsqueda del submarino argentino San Juan, desaparecido el 15 de noviembre de 2017.

"Desafortunadamente hasta ahora dicho submarino no ha sido localizado, pero la ayuda rusa a esta operación ha sido bien vista por el Gobierno y la Fuerza Armada argentina", constató el experto.

Putin fue presidente de Rusia, primero de manera interina, y luego durante dos mandatos consecutivos, entre 1999 y 2008.


Dado que la Constitución rusa no permite ejercer ese cargo durante tres períodos consecutivos, ese último año se convirtió en primer ministro del Gobierno de Dmitri Medvédev.

En 2012, Putin volvió al Kremlin para un mandato de seis años tras ganar las presidenciales.

CIMSEC: Tropical Currents: SOUTHCOM’s 2018 Posture Statement

"Tropical Currents: SOUTHCOM’s 2018 Posture Statement"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
"The Southern Tide"
Center for International Maritime Security
21 March, 2018
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/tropical-currents-southcoms-2018-posture-statement/35714


The Southern Tide

Written by W. Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114^th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.

By W. Alejandro Sanchez

U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which oversees most of Latin America and the Caribbean, has released its 2018 Posture Statement as its commander, Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, testified before the Senate Armed Forces Committee of the 115^th U.S. Congress on 15 February. In this commentary, we will discuss some of the major points brought up by the Statement regarding maritime security issues in the Western Hemisphere.

SOUTHCOM as a Low Priority

• “… the combined impacts of defense spending caps, nine years of continuing resolutions, and insufficient spending in the diplomacy and development arenas make it increasingly difficult to sustain this regional network. Because our global security responsibilities outpace the resources available to meet them, we have had to make a series of tough choices, resulting in compounding second and third order effects. The net result is the perception among our friends—and the palpable anticipation among our competitors—that we no longer stand by our commitments, that we are relinquishing our strategic position, and that we don’t take the challenges in this region seriously.” –Admiral Kurt Tidd

Past Posture Statements have, in very straightforward manners, declared that SOUTHCOM is the lowest priority of the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) (see the 2015 Posture Statement), thus it receives limited resources. Part of the reason for this situation is that most Latin American and Caribbean nations that fall under SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility have close and cordial diplomatic relations with the U.S. Moreover, the countries that are at odds with Washington do not pose a traditional military threat to U.S. national security.
In other words, since most governments have good relations with Washington, and the few countries that do not are not going attack the U.S. anytime soon (if ever at all), then there is little reason to assign significant numbers of assets and platforms to SOUTHCOM. Thus, the concern is that, regional allies may interpret this situation as Washington no longer being interested in supporting their own security problems, which include transnational challenges like drug trafficking. SOUTHCOM’s lack of naval platforms is an example of this situation and potential perception.

It will be interesting to see if the Fiscal 2019 defense budget proposed by the Trump administration, which requests USD$686.1 billion, will trickle down to SOUTHCOM, though this seems unlikely given other U.S. military operations elsewhere on the globe. Nevertheless, a 12 December, 2017 story in the Navy Times reports that SOUTHCOM will receive “Littoral Combat Ship and Spearhead-class expeditionary fast transport vessels,” which will be of great help for counter-narcotics and assistance operations.
The USCG

• “I’d like to go on record to express my strong support for the U.S. Coast Guard’s efforts to recapitalize its fleet, especially its medium endurance cutters, which directly support JIATF South-led interdiction operations. As I have stated repeatedly, without U.S. Coast Guard cutters, USSOUTHCOM would have virtually no afloat maritime forces.” –Admiral Kurt Tidd

SOUTHCOM’s naval component, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/Fourth Fleet, relies on platforms that are temporarily assigned. For example, aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN-73) participated in the 2015 UNITAS exercises, while USS Somerset (LPD 25), USS Chafee (DDG 90) and USCGC Escanaba (WMEC 907) participated in 2017 UNITAS. SOUTHCOM does occasionally get assigned surface platforms, especially Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates prior to their decommissioning, which are deployed to patrol Caribbean waters to combat maritime crimes, particularly drug trafficking, as well as the hospital ship USNS Comfort.

With that said, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is arguably the cornerstone enabler of SOUTHCOM maritime operations, particularly as employed by Joint Inter Agency Task Force South (JIATF-S) in the Greater Caribbean region. Indeed, there is a regular stream of reports about drug smuggling vessels being successfully interdicted by USCG platforms, like USCGC Tahoma (WMEC 908), which successfully interdicted over 1,800 kilograms of cocaine during a two-month tour in 2017. USCG platforms have also carried out humanitarian assistance in the Caribbean region, including, interestingly, in Nicaragua – via USCGC Northland (WMEC-904) in early 2018.

The LCS and SOUTHCOM

• “I’d also like to express my unqualified support for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), which we can leverage for multiple mission sets, including D&M, SOF support, partner nation capacity building, and potentially HA/DR response and medical engagements…My view is that the sooner we can deploy these ships in theater, the greater the impact we can have on interdicting the flow of illicit drugs into our country.”–Admiral Kurt Tidd

Admiral Tidd’s support for the LCS program is not surprising since, as previously mentioned, a number of them will hopefully be deployed to SOUTHCOM this year to help combat maritime crimes. The US Navy has reportedly decided not to re-activate its Perry-class frigates to support SOUTHCOM operations, thus all eyes are on the LCS and the Spearhead-class vessels for these operations.

Medical Diplomacy and HA/DR

• “From a goodwill and engagement perspective, operational funding for the Navy’s hospital ship COMFORT has been a proven game-changer for USSOUTHCOM. We ask for the COMFORT every other year, but the Navy has been unable to source its employment due to the ship’s maintenance challenges.”
• “We are working to transition future iterations of UNITAS from a traditional scripted exercise to an actual humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) capable force that can exercise at sea against real world, unscripted missions.” –Admiral Kurt Tidd

As previously mentioned, USNS Comfort (T-AH-20) has participated in several HA/DR operations in the Western Hemisphere in recent years. As the author explains in a 16 January commentary for CIMSEC, “Comfort was deployed to Puerto Rico to assist those in need after Hurricane Maria hit the island. The vessel also traveled to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake to assist with the relief and support efforts as part of Operation Unified Response.” The platform has also operated in initiatives like Partnership for the Americas and Operation Continuing Promise.

It could be argued that Comfort should be permanently assigned to Fourth Fleet so that it could be deployed more regularly to the region, but logistics, the ship’s age, and the fact that there is only one other hospital ship in the fleet, USNS Mercy (T-AH-19), make this highly unlikely.

It is worth noting that after Hurricane Matthew hit Haiti in 2016, Comfort was not deployed to the Caribbean island, but rather USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7) and USS Mesa Verde (LPD-19), which provided humanitarian relief. Given recurring natural disasters, the general lack of inter-state warfare (maritime or not) in the region, and not being able to deploy the Comfort with much regularity, it makes sense that future multinational naval exercises, such as UNITAS, focus on disaster response so that regional countries can also provide relief services quickly when the next disaster occurs.
China and Russia

• “China, Russia, and Iran are courting some of our most strategically important Latin American and Caribbean partners and supporting authoritarian, anti-American regimes.”
• “Expanded port and logistics access in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela provide Russia with persistent, pernicious presence, including more frequent maritime intelligence collection and visible force projection in the Western Hemisphere.”
  
• “China’s commercial and diplomatic advances move it closer to its larger strategic goal of reshaping global economic and governance architectures… Increased reach to key global access points like Panama create commercial and security vulnerabilities for the United States…”–Admiral Kurt Tidd

China and Russia’s presence in Latin American and Caribbean waters is quite limited. The most significant deployment, in terms of numbers, occurred in 2008, when a small Russian fleet traveled to Caribbean waters to carry out military exercises with Venezuela – some of the vessels included “nuclear-powered Peter the Great cruiser and anti-submarine warship Admiral Chebanenko.” Nevertheless there have been some recent incidents, like in 2017, when intelligence ship Viktor Leonov docked in Havana, Cuba, and also traversed international waters off the East Coast of the U.S.

Meanwhile, China is known in the region for the 2011 and 2015 deployment of its hospital ship Peace Ark (866 Daishan Dao), a Type 920 hospital vessel. There have also been sporadic visits of Chinese warships to the region, like the 2013 visit to Argentina, Brazil and Chile of destroyer Lanzhou, frigate Liuzhou and supply ship Boyanghu.

It is conceivable that, in a more challenging scenario, Chinese warships could be invited by Latin American and Caribbean states to participate in naval exercises in the region, particularly as most of them have diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, not the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan). The Posture Statement’s reference to the Panama Canal is likely tied to the fact that the government of Panama switched from having relations with Taiwan to China in 2017.

Maritime Crime

• “Criminal networks move drugs and engage in a wide array of illegal activity, including weapons trafficking, chemical importation, poppy and coca cultivation, fentanyl smuggling, and illegal mining.”
• “Naval Special Operations Forces in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Panama are now among the most competent and responsive counternarcotic (CN) units in Central America, integrating with air assets, effectively responding to JIATF South “cues,” and executing numerous joint and individual interdiction operations”
  
• “We also supported our partners in the Dominican Republic to improve maritime interdiction in the Caribbean through the establishment of a Joint Task Force that combined SOF-trained CN units with Dominican naval aircraft.”
• “We see great opportunity to build on the multinational cooperation that characterizes these international interdiction efforts, especially the successful inter-institutional coordination of last year’s Operation KRAKEN, in which the United States, Colombia, Panama, and Costa Rica targeted illicit maritime pathways in the Central American littorals.”–Admiral Kurt Tidd

Over the past year, U.S. platforms, whether from the Navy or Coast Guard, have successfully interdicted several vessels in Caribbean waters carrying narcotics. Additionally, U.S. allies in Central America and the Caribbean are modernizing and expanding their naval forces. Fortunately, they have also enjoyed successes, for example the naval force of El Salvador’s seizure of over 700kg of cocaine aboard a suspicious vessel in January 2018.

Certainly, and tragically, these accomplishments are only slowing down the flow of drugs from south to north, as production continues in the former and there is still a market for drugs in the latter. The successes of SOUTHCOM and its regional allies against drug trafficking must go hand-in-hand with more comprehensive strategies to address this problem.
Final Thoughts

• “We seek to mobilize and organize the unique strengths of each of our partners and Allies, to expand information sharing and collaboration, and to align security, development, and capacity building activities that allow us to translate short-term successes into long-term gains, sustained by an adaptive and inclusive regional security network.”–Admiral Kurt Tidd

In spite of being the lowest priority COCOM, SOUTHCOM has achieved various successes in maritime security in recent years, including a plethora of successful interdictions of suspicious vessels that were transporting contraband, particularly drugs. Humanitarian missions via USNS Comfort and other vessels are also a great achievement toward strengthening relations with regional states and exercising soft power.

SOUTHCOM benefits from the fact that most Latin American and Caribbean nations have cordial relations with the U.S. and would actually welcome greater U.S. defense assistance. Obviously, SOUTHCOM cannot do everything itself, hence it is important for it to promote the professionalism and modernization of the naval forces of partner nations. (While this commentary has focused on SOUTHCOM’s operations, other branches of the U.S. government, namely the State Department, should continue to work together with this COCOM to promote U.S. national interests in a region full of U.S. partners.)

SOUTHCOM’s 2018 Posture Statement demonstrates that while the U.S. continues to enjoy a network of allies in the Western Hemisphere, there are plenty of clear and present dangers and concerns that warrant greater support from Washington for this region.

W. Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.
The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Providence: Paraguay’s EPP Insurgency Frees Mennonite Hostages: An Analysis

"Paraguay’s EPP Insurgency Frees Mennonite Hostages: An Analysis"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Providence: A Journal of Christianity and American Foreign Policy
1 March, 2018
Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2018/03/paraguays-epp-insurgency-frees-mennonite-hostages-analysis/

On February 5, Bernhard Blatz and Franz Hiebert, two Mennonites kidnapped by the Ejercito del Pueblo Paraguayo (Paraguayan People’s Army, or EPP), were finally freed. The EPP, a Paraguayan terrorist organization, is well known for its operations against Paraguay’s civilians and security forces, and the country’s Mennonite community has become a particular target of its violence, adding a new dimension to the internal conflict of this land-locked South American nation.
This development raises an important question: how should the Paraguayan government address the EPP’s threat to security?

A Brief History of the EPP
The violent movement adopted the name EPP in 2008, though in reality its origins trace back to the early 1990s when it was a splinter group of the Paraguayan Marxist organization Partido Patria Libre (Free Fatherland Party, or PPL).

The EPP claims to have a Marxist Leninist ideology and also glorifies Paraguayan heroes like José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia and Francisco Solano Lopez. Estimates of the movement’s strength vary greatly, though it probably has only a few dozen fighters who operate in the northern regions of the country close to the border with Brazil—i.e., Amambay, Concepción, and San Pedro departments.

While the group is not strong enough to carry out a successful regime change, over the past decade the EPP has carried out robberies, attacks on property, and other attacks against security forces and civilians alike. The most high-profile murder attributed to the group is that of Cecilia Cubas, daughter of former Paraguayan President Raul Cubas. She was kidnapped in late 2004, and her body was found in early 2005, even after a ransom was paid. While the EPP did not officially exist at the time as an organization, the crime is attributed to individuals who would later form the terrorist movement. More recently, the EPP ambushed a military patrol in August 2016, killing eight troops. Furthermore, in August 2015 it kidnapped Abraham Fehr, who died in captivity—his remains were located earlier this year. According to a January 2018 article by the news agency Infobae.com, since 2008 the EPP is accused of the deaths of 21 armed forces personnel, 13 police officers, and 27 civilians.

Such violence has prompted the Paraguayan government to implement an increasingly larger response. Now a joint task force (Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta, or FTC), a combination of units from the police and military, has been deployed to combat the EPP. Paraguayan media has been fairly critical of the FTC, as it has been unable to defeat the insurgents. For instance, in 2015, before the 2016 ambush, the Paraguayan daily ABC published an article boldly titled “The EPP is no longer afraid of the FTC.”

This development deserves more discussion. Is it desirable or even ethical for Asuncion to continue deploying the country’s armed forces for internal security operations? After all, Latin America has a troubling record, to put it mildly, when it comes to security forces, particularly armies, committing human rights abuses when deployed to crack down on insurgent movements or respond to other domestic security threats. The Central American wars during the Cold War are a prime example of this problem.

The conundrum that the Paraguayan government faces is choosing one of two evils. Either it lets the police handle the EPP, which has not worked so far as evidenced by ongoing attacks and violence, or Asuncion deploys the armed forces, which could risk greater human rights abuses and repression. A government’s duty is to protect the nation’s population, but is the risk of inevitable added violence, even if meant to stop the EPP, in the best interest of Paraguay’s population?

The Mennonites as a Target
It is important to highlight that EPP insurgents have particularly targeted Paraguay’s Mennonite community, as the 2017 kidnappings (in separate incidents) of Franz Hiebert and Father Bernard Blatz and the 2015 kidnapping of the late Abraham Fehr exemplify.

Additionally, Mennonite communities in Paraguay have reported to local media that they are forced to pay EPP insurgents a “revolutionary tax” (in other words, they are the victims of extortion) and follow their orders. For example, the Paraguayan news agency Ultima Hora reported in mid-December 2017 that Mennonite communities gave food to local non-Mennonite towns as part of the negotiations to free Hiebert and Blatz. Moreover, the two individuals’ families reportedly paid USD$750,000 and USD$500,000 in ransoms. This development calls into question, once again, the FTC’s effectiveness as it was unable to locate and free the hostages.

It is unclear to me if the Mennonites are being specifically targeted because of their religious beliefs or because they are civilians living in areas where the EPP operates and security forces do not have a strong presence. I would cautiously theorize that this situation may be a combination of both theories. After all, other Latin American insurgent groups routinely exploit defenseless and isolated populations to utilize them as slave labor or fighters.

Additionally, the insurgents’ extreme ideologies put them in direct confrontation with religious beliefs. This was perhaps best exemplified in Peru during the 1980s and 1990s when the terrorist movement Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, or SL) targeted religious leaders. Deaths caused by SL include the 1991 murders of Franciscan priests Miguel Tomaszek and Zbigniew Strzalkowski from Poland and Alessandro Dordi from Italy. Sendero also targeted Peru’s Evangelical community—as the 1991 massacre of 36 Evangelicals in Ccano, Ayacucho, horrifically demonstrated.

Final Thoughts
In the past decade, the Paraguayan People’s Army has carried out several operations that range from destroying property and conducting robberies, to attacking Paraguay’s defense and security forces. While this group is not strong enough for a successful regime-change operation against Asuncion, recent developments, like the 2016 ambush of a military patrol and Abraham Fehr’s death in captivity, raise the question of whether the internal deployment of Paraguay’s military is morally advisable, in spite of the potential for further human rights abuses.

Moreover, the EPP appears to have singled out the country’s Mennonite community for abuses. While a direct link between this group’s religious beliefs with the insurgents’ ideology is not clear, it is very likely the case.
Without a doubt, the rise of the EPP is a major security problem for Paraguay, and it must be defeated with a strategy that includes foresight, knowledge, and wisdom.
—
W. Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.
The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

IPD: Kazakhstan Expands its Role in Nuclear Security Issues

"Kazakhstan Expands its Role in Nuclear Security Issues"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
International Policy Digest
17 March, 2018
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/03/17/kazakhstan-expands-its-role-in-nuclear-security-issues/

On 2 March, Kazakhstan signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), becoming the 57th state to do so. This move completes a first quarter of 2018 which has been very important for Kazakh foreign policy, as in January the country held the rotating presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the first Central Asian state to achieve this. Also in January, President Nursultan Nazarbayev met with President Donald Trump in Washington DC to promote U.S.-Kazakh relations.

While global nuclear disarmament remains a utopia, Astana’s signature of the TPNW is an important development and should be put in the context of said country’s nuclear security initiatives and its nuclear energy industry.

Promoting Nuclear Security

It is well known that the Central Asian nation inherited nuclear-tipped missiles after the collapse of the Soviet Union; Astana would go on to dismantle said weapons systems and facilities and joined agreements like the TPNW. The other post-Soviet Central Asian states carried out similar policies and nowadays there is a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaty.

What is also worth highlighting is Kazakhstan’s interest in promoting nuclear security past its borders. President Nazarbayev has declared, “Kazakhstan’s non-nuclear status can serve as a guiding example for other states. I’m speaking from my personal experience. We created and strengthened our independent country, achieved high international authority, namely, by renouncing nuclear weapons and receiving guarantees of non-aggression from nuclear powers. We urge all countries to follow our example. We urged Iran at the time, now we call on North Korea. Nuclear bombs and missiles is not power.”

While it is unlikely that North Korea (the upcoming meeting between the North Korean and U.S. leaders notwithstanding), and other nuclear states, will give up their nuclear armament anytime soon, Astana’s interest in promoting nuclear security, as well as the recent signing of the TPNW, are commendable initiatives.

Astana, Washington and Nuclear Issues
Interestingly, there has been one development in Astana-Washington relations that deals with nuclear security: on May 2017, a Nuclear Security Training Center (NSTC) opened in the Central Asian state, a joint initiative between Astana and the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. A 15 May 2017 press release by the NNSA explains that the center will be utilized to “train nuclear facility personnel in security disciplines, including physical protection systems, nuclear material accounting and control systems, response forces, and secure transportation.”

The two governments also signed a nuclear energy cooperation agreement in August. Additionally, Presidents Trump and Nazarbayev praised the 2017 inauguration of a reserve bank for low enriched uranium in the Central Asian state. This initiative “seeks to decrease the risk of nuclear enrichment technology proliferation,” said a White House statement.

Meanwhile, Dr. Richard Weitz from the Hudson Institute in Washington DC explains that “the hope is that countries pursuing peaceful nuclear energy programs will borrow LEU fuel from banks to avoid the ecological and economic expense of manufacturing their own nuclear fuel through uranium enrichment, a technology that can be misused to make nuclear weapons.” In other words, Kazakhstan’s LEU bank could become a centerpiece in the quest for nuclear non-proliferation.

In spite of the current positive momentum after several high-profile visits, it is important to note that U.S.-Kazakh relations over nuclear energy are not free of tensions. Namely, U.S.-based uranium producing companies Energy Fuels and Ur-Energy have petitioned Washington “to look into whether imports from dominant uranium producers, like Russia [and Kazakhstan] pose a national security risk.” In reality, this request has less to do with “national security” in the traditional sense of the term and has to do more with the fact that the U.S. imports large quantities of uranium, from producers like Kazakhstan, for domestic consumption, which limits the profits of U.S.-based companies. It will be interesting to see if this request, which falls under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, progresses and if it affects U.S. imports of Kazakh uranium, and what effect, if any, could this have on bilateral relations.

Final Thoughts
Kazakhstan’s decision to sign the TPNW is a commendable initiative towards global nonproliferation although, sadly, countries that possess nuclear weapons are in no hurry to get rid of them. More important though is Astana’s growing role in nuclear affairs and its rapprochement with Washington on nuclear security and energy issues.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

IPD: Venezuela’s Elections Re-scheduled, but Maduro To Remain in Power

"Venezuela’s Elections Re-scheduled, but Maduro To Remain in Power"
W. Alejandro Sanchez and Scott Morgan
International Policy Digest
4 March, 2018
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/03/04/venezuela-s-elections-re-scheduled-but-maduro-to-remain-in-power/


Venezuela’s national electoral commission, surprisingly announced on 1 March that the country’s general elections will now take place on 20 May, a month after their controversial original date: 22 April.

The original date had been critiqued for its alarmingly short 90-day window for participating political parties to prepare, which bore the hallmarks of an attempt to cement power by the Nicolas Maduro regime and a continuation of the “chavista” ideology that has been in power for almost two decades.

The decision to delay the elections was due to an agreement, between the Venezuelan government and a number of opposition parties, but not the main one – Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD), which had already declared that it would not participate. While in theory the extra month gives the participating opposition, parties-broadly speaking, more time to organize, the reality of the situation is that this development demonstrates the fractured Venezuelan opposition coalition.

According to El Mundo, there are right now six presidential candidates: President Maduro, four candidates that have ties with the government and the only true “opposition” candidate. Henri Falcon, of Unidad Democrática who has been shunned by other opposition parties for breaking rank. Thus, the affirming the overall consensus is that President Maduro will “win” another six-year term as President of Venezuela.

So one key question to be determined is: what happens on 21 May? Will President Maduro be emboldened to further consolidate power or will he make a gesture of conciliation to the opposition? And how will the international community, especially Venezuela’s neighbors, react?

Since he ascended to the Presidency after the passing of former President Hugo Chavez (March 2013), President Maduro has made several moves to consolidate power among his loyalists. These include eroding the power of the Congress not only so that he couldn’t be removed from office, and create a National Constituent Assembly to act as a Rubber Stamp for his policy initiatives. which body was installed to replace the opposition-controlled National Assembly. The Venezuelan government is also accused of forcing Opposition Mayors and Governors out of office (or coming up with reasons to prevent them from taking office).

Using this as some criteria there is no logical reason to expect any new round of talks that have taken place in the Dominican Republic will bear fruit. The postponement of the elections is a major development, no doubt, and Caracas has reportedly requested that the United Nations send a team of observers to monitor the elections. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that under current conditions any opposition presidential candidate has a real chance of emerging victorious. Likewise the President currently feels that he is in no position to formally make a gesture (i.e. dissolving the controversial National Constituent Assembly) that could end the impasse and begin the process of restoring Venezuela to political and economic stability.

Latin American and Caribbean countries remain somewhat split regarding what to do with Venezuela. On the one hand, Caracas does enjoy allies among the governments of Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua. On the other, the Lima Group (Grupo de Lima) is a loose union of several regional states that have met to consistently condemn the Maduro regime. In mid-February, the foreign affairs ministers of the Lima Group decided to withdraw president Maduro’s invitation to attend the VIII Summit of the Americas, which will take place in Lima in mid-April (a month before the elections in Venezuela, one may note).

US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visited several Latin American nations in early February in order to gather hemispheric support against Venezuela, but the tour did not yield the desired outcome. Withdrawing President Maduro’s invitation to the Summit is an important diplomatic move, but the region in general does not want to see another war – for example a U.S. military intervention in Venezuela, a subject of a plethora of rumors in the region. It’s similarly unclear if regional states would want to also carry out some kind of sanctions against Venezuela. Colombia has closed its border with Venezuela in the past, only to reopen it.

Amid this internal and hemispheric catastrophe is a growing humanitarian one. As previously mentioned, the number of Venezuelan citizens (whether they should be called migrants or refugees is still up for debate) that are fleeing to Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Spain or the U.S. is now well over a million. Countries like Peru are giving temporary residency cards and validating university degrees so these individual can get jobs, but what of Venezuelans living in isolated border areas in Brazil and Colombia? If the exodus of Venezuelans continues, this will create a massive diaspora as well as a humanitarian crisis.

It has become virtually impossible to be optimistic about the future of Venezuela.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the authors are associated.