"Kazakhstan Should Have a Bigger Role in UN Peace Operations"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
International Policy Digest
25 February 2018
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/02/25/kazakhstan-should-have-a-bigger-role-in-un-peace-operations/
Kazakhstan held the rotating presidency of the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) throughout January 2018, a significant
accomplishment for the Central Asian country, which has also chaired the
Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
in recent years. While Astana’s seat in the UNSC is certainly
commendable as it is the first Central Asian nation to join this body,
the Kazakh government should take a further step forward as it strives
to promote global stability by having a larger role in United Nations
peacekeeping operations (PKO).
To be clear, Kazakhstan has participated in peace operations and has
carried out non-military operations in other missions, but the author
argues that this presence should be increased. The Central Asian state
first announced that its armed forces would participate in PKOs in 2013. According to January 2018 official data by the UN’s Peacekeeping Operations website, there are currently five Kazakh experts on mission serving in the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).
Apart from the UN, Kazakhstan deployed Army engineers to Iraq after
the 2003 war to provide humanitarian assistance, including carrying out mine-clearing operations.
“In 2003, Kazakhstan sent 27 military engineers to assist operations of
the coalition in Iraq. Over five years, nine contingents totaling 290
Kazakh peacekeeping troops were rotated through Iraq,” the Kazakh government reports. Finally, Kazakh troops have been involved in training foreign troops, such as Afghan border security forces, to help improve internal security in the fellow Central Asia state.
While Kazakhstan’s role in peace operations is praiseworthy, more can, and should,
be done. It is worth remembering that, upon joining the UNSC in 2017,
Kazakhstan stated its priorities, which ranged from “eliminating the
threat of a global war” to “bringing peace to the African continent.”
Tragically, eight of the UN’s 15 PKOs are located precisely in Africa,
such as the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) or the UN Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which
have well over ten thousand peacekeepers each, in an attempt to
strengthen security and the rule of law. In order to keep up with its
noble intentions, the Kazakh government should consider sending
additional troops to more UN peace missions.
Training foreign security forces and sending engineers is an
important component of promoting security and state-building, however,
it has to go hand in hand with improving the security situation on the
ground. Sadly, there are plenty of hot spots of violence that warrant
attention and active participation from the international community,
particularly from capable armed forces. In other words, the UN could use
well-trained Kazakh troops on the ground in countries like the DRC, CAR
among several others. As a final point, it is important to stress that
saying that Central Asian armed forces as “well-trained” is not an
overstatement, as Kazakh defense personnel regularly train with military
powers such as the U.S. Case in point, in September 2017, 35 troops of the country’s peacekeeping battalion
carried out a three-day training course with instructors from the U.S.
Defence Institute for Medical Operations. Also last year British, Kazakh
and U.S. troops carried out Exercise Steppe Eagle – Spring 2017 at the Iliyskiy training centre.
The decision to deploy more troops to UN peace missions should not be
taken lightly, as there is an ever-present possibility for violence
and, sadly, casualties – like the tragic deaths of 15 Tanzanian peacekeepers,
assigned to MONUSCO, in December 2017. Thus, the Kazakh regime should
not commit to deploying additional troops to UN peace missions without a
careful consideration of the potential risks that such a deployment
entails. With that said, instability and violence in the world
continues, and nations like Kazakhstan, which have pledged to promote
global peace, must have a bigger role in helping bring stability to
troubled areas.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone
and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the
author is associated.
Sunday, February 25, 2018
Tuesday, February 20, 2018
Presentation: The Moscow Connection: Latin America's relations with Russia
"The Moscow Connection: Latin America's relations with Russia"
W. Alejandro Sanchez & Nathan Davis
Forum on International Affairs
11 January, 2018
Washington, DC
Prezi publication available: http://prezi.com/kf7jhphzheaw/?utm_campaign=share&utm_medium=copy&rc=ex0share
Details
• What we'll do: Explore Latin America's relationships with Russia• What to bring: A form of identification (driver's license, passport, student ID, government ID, etc.)
• Summary: During the Cold War, the principle and overriding concern for the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) was the perceived threat of communist, and therefore Russian, influence in the region. America's "backyard" was a geopolitical and actual battlefield between the world's two superpowers and their proxies. Recently, Russia has found common cause with countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela and others that desire to offset US domination both within their own countries and the region at large. Economically, Russian firms such as Rosneft and Gasprom have made inroads in the Brazilian, Argentine, and Venezuelan oil and gas markets. Politically, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his LAC counterparts have made a series of high profile state visits in recent years. After a retreat from LAC following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it now appears that Russia is again looking to spread its influence in the region. Join the Forum on International Affairs (FIA) as we dig deeper into the foreign affairs of Latin American states, and their strategies for engaging with Russia.
Questions to Consider:
1) What do LAC countries gain from closer relationships with Russia?
2) How does Russian involvement in LAC differ between countries based on country size, political regime, incumbent political party, and geographic location?
3) Given the size of its economy can Russia sustain involvement within LAC outside of the energy sector?
4) Is Russian strategy in LAC characterized by long- or short-term considerations?
5) Can Russia play a meaningful role in LAC given its power vis-a-vis the United States, China, and the European Union?
Interviewed / entrevista: EEUU compra gas a Rusia: "Es una de las grandes ironías de la geopolítica mundial"
"EEUU compra gas a Rusia: "Es una de las grandes ironías de la geopolítica mundial"
Sputnik Mundo
¿Por
qué, a pesar de las sanciones, Estados Unidos mantiene los lazos
comerciales con los gobiernos de Nicolás Maduro en Venezuela o Vladimir
Putin en Rusia? La pregunta alude a la reciente compra de gas ruso
ordenada por la administración Trump para paliar la ola de frío en su
país. El analista Alejandro Sánchez nos explica por qué.
"Es
una de las grandes ironías de la geopolítica mundial que Estados Unidos
siga comprando gas ruso, a pesar de las tensiones y de las
investigaciones que el Gobierno estadounidense lleva a cabo con respecto
a (NdR: la supuesta injerencia rusa) las elecciones de 2016, a pesar de
los conflictos por Siria y Ucrania, y de las sanciones que impuso a
oficiales del Gobierno ruso", apuntó el analista internacional Alejandro
Sánchez.
Se refería a la primera de dos compras de gas ruso por parte de la
administración de Donald Trump, con el objetivo de mantener el flujo del
producto ante una ola de frío que ha llevado las temperaturas por
debajo de los 20 grados centígrados en algunas zonas del país. La compra
se realizó mediante triangulaciones de barcos y de empresas de terceros
países para evitar la relación directa con el país sancionado, además
de tocar varios puertos antes que el de Boston.
"Se vería muy mal para el gobierno de Trump que un buque con bandera
rusa atraque en la ciudad de Boston trayendo gas licuado", señaló
Sánchez y agregó: "Por eso tuvo que haber triangulación por Europa…
hubiera sido un arma política para los demócratas, que sostienen que su
Gobierno está en colusión con el de Rusia", señaló Sánchez.
"Hay algo de falta de concordancia con las sanciones que Europa y EEUU han impuesto a Rusia y la propia política energética europea, porque tanto Europa como Alemania necesitan del gas ruso para satisfacer el creciente consumo de energía. Mas ahora que Europa está dejando de usar el carbón y en 2022 Alemania cerrará su última central nuclear".
Cited in / Citado en: "China, eyeing Bolivia's lithium riches, helps country into space "
By Andrew Wright
21 February, 2018
The Sydney Morning Herald
Originally published: http://www.smh.com.au/world/china-eyeing-bolivia-s-lithium-riches-helps-country-into-space-20180220-p4z0yz.html
Bogota: A space program for Bolivia might seem a low priority given the South American nation's internal challanges of poverty, inequality and lack of infrastructure.
Enter China, with the know-how, launch facilities and an established hunger for Latin American raw materials.
Australia boasts five Optus communications satellites (comsats) and recently launched three other satellites, but Central and South American countries have traditionally lagged behind in this area.
China has been busy building up space contracts with nations in the region. Venezuela launched its third satellite from Chinese soil in October and Bolivia is expected to get a second comsat from China by 2022.
In fact, in recent years, China has started to compete with US and European satellite companies globally. Satellite communications technology makes a lot of sense for a country like Bolivia, a mountainous, landlocked nation of 10.9 million people, Lluc Palerm, a senior analyst at space industry consultancy Northern Sky Research (NSR), told Fairfax Media.
The first satellite, launched from China in 2013, was named Túpac Katari 1 after a Bolivian who led an uprising against the Spanish. The Bolivian Space Agency (Agencia Boliviana Espacial or ABE), said it cost cost $US302 million, with 85 per cent of that financed with a Development Bank of China loan.
The Bolivian media have questioned how long it will take for one of South America’s poorest countries to pay back the loan, W. Alejandro Sanchez, a geopolitics/defence analyst and Latin America specialist said.
“I think Tupac Katari was less of a gamble for China and more of another way to strengthen ties with the Evo Morales administration in the landlocked country,” Sanchez said.
In early February 2018, Liang Yu, the Chinese Ambassador to Bolivia was frank about China’s interest in Bolivia, a country with one of the world’s biggest and more accessible reserves of lithium.
“China is the country with the largest number of vehicles in the world and, therefore, it will be the largest market for the use of lithium batteries. One of the four consortia that presented their technical and economic proposals for the assembly and commissioning of the plant to industrialise lithium is Chinese,” he told Bolivia’s La Razon newspaper.
China is Bolivia’s second largest trading partner and Sanchez says there are some 60 Chinese companies there, some of which have built over 1300 kilometres of roads across the country.
Bolivia may just be the tip of the iceberg. A February 2018 report from NSR found the Chinese satellite industry was primed to take a larger share of the global satcom market “through attractive one-stop-shop offerings, aggressive growth plans and enhanced exports”.
Chinese influence has recently entered into Australia’s national discourse, after Labor Senator Sam Dastyari was eventually forced to resigned for supporting Beijing's position on the South China Sea after receiving political donation from a donor linked to the Chinese Communist party.
Bolivia has also seen its share of political scandals relating to Chinese companies.
Gabriela Zapata, the alleged ex-lover of Bolivian President of Bolivia Evo Morales was arrested in February of 2016, when she was the commercial manager of the Chinese engineering and infrastructure giant China CAMC Engineering, which had been awarded millions of dollars worth of contracts with the Bolivian state. She was sentenced to 10 years in prison in May 2017 for crimes including money laundering, illegitimate contributions and inappropriate use of public goods and services.
There is another angle to China's softpower push.
According to Sanchez that many of the countries that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan (the Republic of China) are located in Central America and the Caribbean.
“Last year, Panama switched recognition from Taiwan to Beijing, and it is likely that other countries will follow this year as Beijing ‘purchases’ recognition via investments, financial aid and trade agreements,” Sanchez said.
Analysts told Fairfax Media Nicaragua was both a potential “Taiwan swing” and posible Chinese satellite customer.
Federatsia: Federación Rusa: Resumen del año y Proyecciones para el 2018
Federatsia
"Federación Rusa: Resumen del año y Proyecciones para el 2018"
Documento escrito por todos los miembros del Observatorio.
Disponible: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1p0_Iax4dIWUw5CEG19NGsxvkn8yh_DFN/view
1. "Balance positivo para Moscú en 2017 y perspectivas 2018"
por el Lic. Nicolás Blanco
2. "Putin pone en vidriera a Rusia"
por el Lic. Guillermo Galea
3. "Tiempo de Consolidar"
por el Lic. Martín Rodríguez Ossés
4. "Rusia en el 2018"
por el analista W. Alejandro Sánchez
"Federación Rusa: Resumen del año y Proyecciones para el 2018"
Documento escrito por todos los miembros del Observatorio.
Disponible: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1p0_Iax4dIWUw5CEG19NGsxvkn8yh_DFN/view
1. "Balance positivo para Moscú en 2017 y perspectivas 2018"
por el Lic. Nicolás Blanco
2. "Putin pone en vidriera a Rusia"
por el Lic. Guillermo Galea
3. "Tiempo de Consolidar"
por el Lic. Martín Rodríguez Ossés
4. "Rusia en el 2018"
por el analista W. Alejandro Sánchez
The Space Review: Latin America’s space programs: an update
"Latin America’s space programs: an update"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
22 January, 2018
The Space Review
Originally published: http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3413/1
Latin American space programs have continued to develop and expand in recent years, with countries like Bolivia and Peru achieving major victories after the successful launches of new satellites. While there has been the occasional loss, like the 2015 destruction of a Mexican satellite aboard a Russian rocket, regional space programs have in general continued to grow, with additional launches planned for the near future.
This commentary is an update to the author’s 2012 article on the subject (see “Latin America’s space programs in 2012”, The Space Review, August 27, 2012), aimed at discussing new developments among Latin America’s programs and what they signal for the future.
Recent successes
This article will not attempt to enumerate every single test and initiative that Latin American space programs have carried out in the past five years. Rather, this will focus on highlighting particular accomplishments by different nations to provide a broad overview of recent developments.As mentioned in the introduction, two successful launches that occurred in recent years were part of Peru’s and Bolivia’s growing programs. In the case of Peru, its high-resolution Earth observation satellite, Peru-Sat1, was constructed by Airbus Defense and Space and launched from French Guiana in September 2016. The Airbus-Peru deal included the construction of a center (Centro Nacional de Operaciones de Imágenes Satelitales: CNOIS) outside Lima so the Peruvians can control their satellite. The project has generally been regarded as a success, as the Peruvian government has declared that “the investment it has made into the satellite programme has already been recouped,” according to a December 2017 Airbus press statement that also explained that in its first year of operations, the satellite has delivered more than 71,000 images. Peru-Sat1 was also praised for helping monitor the damage caused by floods that affected the country’s northern regions in early 2017.
Meanwhile, Bolivia’s new telecommunications satellite, Tupac Katari (TK-1), was constructed by China and launched in 2013. Bolivia’s space agency (Agencia Boliviana Espacial: ABE) manages the satellite, which is aimed at improving access of Bolivian citizens to telecommunications and media services. It is worth noting that the project has not been without criticism, as an August 20, 2017, article by the Bolivian daily El Deber explained that ABE’s high prices deter some Bolivian telecommunications companies from utilizing the satellite’s broadband services. In spite of price issues, agencies like Bolivia’s customs service (Aduana Nacional) and the state-owned oil company (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos: YPFB) already utilize the satellite, in addition to numerous radio and television stations. The telecommunication company Viva has stated that thanks to the satellite, it can provide better broadband services to customers in rural and isolated areas.
As for Colombia, the country’s domestically-manufactured satellite UAPSAT was put into orbit in January 2014 after being launched from Wallops Island, Virginia. The Colombian daily El Colombiano has described UAPSAT as the “first satellite manufactured with Colombian parts and systems,” albeit with support from the Peruvian university Alas Peruanas.
These examples highlight the different types of services new satellites are rendering for Latin American countries, ranging from better access to communication services to helping monitor their territories, particularly after extreme weather events. Colombia’s UAPSAT satellite is also worth noting, as this was a domestically manufactured platform, demonstrating how more countries want to develop their own satellite-building capabilities (more on this later).
In spite of these recent successes, there has been one loss, though not a direct cause of Latin American programs themselves: in May 2015, a Russian Proton-M rocket launched from the Baikonur space center (Kazakhstan) failed, causing the loss of a Mexican telecommunications satellite called Centenario.
The Latin American-Kazakh connection
One aspect to keep in mind is the different launch centers that Latin American countries utilize to deploy their new satellites, such as include China, French Guiana, and the United States. It is also noteworthy that Kazakhstan’s Baikonur Cosmodrome has been utilized by several Latin American nations for launches in recent years.For example, back in 2007, Colombia’s Libertad 1 cubesat was launched from Baikonur. Four years later, in 2011, a Russian-built Proton rocket launched Mexico’s QuetzSat-1. More recently, in 2014, Chasqui-1, a nanosatellite constructed by a Peruvian state university (Universidad Nacional de Ingenieria: UNI), was launched aboard a Russian rocket. Finally, in July 2017, a Russian Soyuz rocket left Baikonur with a payload of dozens of satellites, including a nanosatellite manufactured by an Ecuadorian university (Universidad Tecnológica Equinoccial) with Russian assistance. A June 15, 2017, article by Russian government news service Sputnik Mundo highlighted that this successful launch meant that for the first time Ecuador had a satellite in orbit that was constructed by one of its universities.
The reason why Kazakhstan is singled out as a launch center is because Kazakh-Latin American relations are fairly limited (see the author’s December 2017 commentary, “The Eurasian Economic Union and Latin America: What could 2018 Bring?”). Hence one strategy that Astana could utilize to approach Latin America is to provide potential customers from the region more cost-efficient launch services.
What will the future bring?
As for future initiatives, Chile is arguably the nation is most need to launch a new satellite, as Fasat Charlie has been in orbit since 2011. Back in 2016, the Chilean media was already discussing when will the government order a replacement for the satellite, but so far no new project has been announced. Even more, a January 2 op-ed in the Chilean daily El Mostrador, which discussed the country’s natural security challenges, called out the lack of progress regarding a replacement for Fasat Charlie. The argues that “so far there is no new information regarding a final decision, even though Chile requires satellites to strengthen its telecommunications industry and to monitor its territory in order anticipate possible natural disasters.” It will be interesting to see if president-elect Sebastian Piñera will make the acquisition of a new satellite a priority when he returns to power this March (he was previously president from 2010 to 2014.)As for Brazil, in October, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense announced the drafting of a new blueprint to revamp the country’s space program. This proposal includes establishing a national council for space affairs (Conselho Nacional do Espaço: CNE) and an executive committee for space (Comitê Executivo do Espaço: CEE). It is unclear if current President Michel Temer will be able to make this proposal become law, given the year he has left in office, or if a decision will be made by the next president: Brazil will carry out general elections this October and the next head of state takes office on January 1, 2019. The South American giant is well known for its ambitious space program, exemplified by the Alcântara center (Centro de Lançamento de Alcântara: CLA), so hopefully the blueprint helps create a new momentum so it continues to grow. It is also worth noting that there are also plans to expand the CLA’s facilities, but this goal has encountered resistance from the communities that live in the area. Coincidentally, also in October, Paraguay held its first ever conference on space issues at the country’s Central Bank. The landlocked nation’s space agency (Agencia Especial del Paraguay: AEP) organized the event, and brought renowned special guests like Brazilian astronaut Marcos Pontes, to develop interest among the audience members to support AEP.
As for upcoming launches, one country that will have a new satellite in orbit this year is Argentina, as the country’s space commission (Comision Nacional de Actividades Espaciales: CONAE) is finishing the construction of its SAOCOM 1A satellite. The platform is part of an ambitious project between Argentina and Italy to establish a satellite network (Sistema Italo-Argentino de Satelites para la Gestion de Emergencias: SIASGE), and will reportedly be launched out of Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, in August. Similarly, in October, Costa Rica announced the successful construction of Proyecto Irazú, Central America’s first domestically-manufactured satellite. The satellite, a joint project by Central America’s aerospace association (Asociación Centroamericana de Aeronáutica y del Espacio: ACAE) and a Costa Rican university (Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica: TEC), is a cubesat that will be utilized to measure carbon gas emissions. The satellite will now be sent to Japan for final tests before it is launched.
Brazil’s blueprint, as well as Costa Rica’s and Argentina’s new satellites, demonstrate the ongoing interest of Latin American nations to develop their space programs. While these countries do not yet have the capability to launch crewed spacecraft, the fact that several countries are domestically manufacturing satellites is a promising step that should be praised, and also deserves the support of the international community.
Final thoughts
Latin American space programs have enjoyed significant accomplishments in recent years as countries like Bolivia and Peru have modern new satellites in orbit that support telecommunications and surveillance projects, while Argentina, Central America, Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico have domestically constructed their own platforms. There have even been bureaucratic developments, as Brazil is looking to revamp its new space program while Paraguay is attempting to jumpstart its own. Recent years have brought more successes than failures, notwithstanding the loss of a Mexican satellite and the delay in replacing Chile’s Fasat Charlie.Earth’s orbit is increasingly cluttered with space debris, but hopefully there is still space for Latin America’s ambitious programs.
CIMSEC: The Significance of U.S. and Chinese Hospital Ship Deployments to Latin America
"The Significance of U.S. and Chinese Hospital Ship Deployments to Latin America"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
The Southern Tide
Center for International Maritime Security
16 January 2018
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/significance-u-s-chinese-hospital-ship-deployments-latin-america/35232
Written by W. Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.
“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.
By W. Alejandro Sanchez
USNS Comfort (T-AH-20) has become a regular visitor of Latin American and Caribbean waters as it often carries out humanitarian operations in those regions. Mostly recently, it was deployed to Puerto Rico to assist those affected by Hurricane Maria. Furthermore, there is now an extra-regional hospital ship which is also traveling to these areas, namely China’s Peace Ark (866 Daishan Dao), a Type 920 hospital ship that is operated by the People’s Liberation Army Navy. Given that the governments these two platforms belong to are experiencing growing national security tensions it is necessary to discuss their activities and put this medical diplomacy in its proper geopolitical context.
This commentary is a continuation of an essay that the author drafted for CIMSEC titled “The uses of the U.S. Navy’s Fourth Fleet;” and draws from an analysis by CAPT John C. Devlin (ret.) and CDR John J. Devlin titled “Aligning HA/DR Mission Parameters with U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy.”
USNS Comfort
We will not supply an exhaustive list of Comfort’s operations throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, but will rather provide some highlights. Most recently, as previously mentioned, Comfort was deployed to Puerto Rico to assist those in need after Hurricane Maria hit the island. The vessel also traveled to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake to assist with the relief and support efforts as part of Operation Unified Response.
Additionally, Comfort has been deployed to the region as part of initiatives like the Partnership for the Americas and Operation Continuing Promise. Countries that were visited during these voyages include Colombia, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Peru, among others.
Peace Ark
As for Peace Ark, the Chinese vessel is newer than Comfort, as the former was commissioned in 2008 while the latter was commissioned in 1987 – a two decade difference. The newer vessel reportedly measures 583 feet in length and displaces 10,000 tons fully loaded, and fields a Z-9 helicopter. It also has 300 beds for patients, eight operating rooms and 20 intensive care units. When deployed, its crew is made up of up to 328 plus 100 medical personnel.
In a 2014 article by USNI News, Peace Ark’s Senior Captain Sun Tao declared, “other than internal organ transplant …or any kind of heart disease treatment, [Peace Ark] can pretty much do any kind of treatment.” The article goes on to note that “This includes, perhaps not surprisingly, traditional Chinese medicine. A room onboard Peace Ark is specifically reserved for the ancient therapies of cupping, massage, and acupuncture.”
Significance
At a local level, the arrivals of these vessels are a welcomed development as they provide medical services that local populations may not be able to obtain otherwise from their local governments. Thus, it probably matters very little to the inhabitants of these areas whether a hospital ship flies either a U.S. or Chinese flag, as long as they provide health services that are needed. Indeed, articles published by Latin American and Caribbean media outlets that reported visits by either Comfort or Peace Ark included generally positive statements by local authorities and patients.
At a geopolitical level, these hospital ships carry out humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations (HA/DR) that are in line with their respective navy’s overall strategies of aiding populations in need. Moreover, and unsurprisingly, these visits help to boost up the image of the nation deploying the platform in the eyes of the hosting government and population. For example, a 2011 article by Mercopress that discussed Peace Ark’s arrival to Jamaica had the following statement “the mission is part of a global campaign by Beijing to portray its rapidly growing military as a responsible power.” Similarly, the aforementioned CIMSEC article states that HA/DR operations “are a vital part of U.S. Navy maritime strategy by ensuring regional stability through building partner nation capacity and expanding our sphere of influence.”
While an exhaustive analysis of each nation that Comfort visits is beyond the objectives of this commentary, it is worth noting that the countries it regularly visits are those that the U.S. has good relations with, though there has been one notable exception. In 2011 Comfort docked in Manta, Ecuador: this is was a significant visit as then-President Rafael Correa was known for his anti-Washington rhetoric and for having ordered the shutdown of the U.S. military facilities in Ecuador in 2009. Thus, it is somewhat bizarre that President Correa would authorize a (unarmed) U.S. ship to enter his country’s territorial waters. It would be interesting if the government of Venezuela would similarly allow Comfort to dock in Venezuela’s coast, given the problematic situation of the country’s health system. Nevertheless, the tense bilateral relations make it highly unlikely that Caracas would authorize such a visit, or that Washington would offer it in the first place.
Moreover, as far as the author can determine, Peace Ark has only visited countries whose governments recognize the People’s Republic of China and not the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan). It will important to monitor if future Peace Ark deployments include countries that still maintain relations with Taipei, as Beijing may be looking to obtain the recognition of Taiwan’s last remaining allies in the region – the latest nation to switch sides was Panama in mid-2017.
Ultimately, setting aside the geopolitical motivations for the deployment of these vessels, the humanitarian activities that they carry out ensures that both Comfort and Peace Ark will continue to be welcomed across the Latin America and the Caribbean as future harsh climate events will require greater humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.
In 2017 alone, regional navies had to carry out major relief operations. Case in point, the Peruvian Navy (Marina de Guerra del Peru) deployed several platforms to the country’s northern regions to provide assistance after torrential rains hit many areas. Similarly, the Colombian Navy (Armada de Colombia) has deployed offshore patrol vessels to transport humanitarian aid to areas hit by floods. Even more, the Honduran Navy (Fuerza Naval) has acquired a multipurpose vessel, Gracias a Dios, to combat maritime drug trafficking and to provide assistance to coastal communities. In other words, humanitarian assistance has been a key component of naval strategies, and its importance will only increase in the near future, meaning that support from allies will remain a necessity for many Latin American and Caribbean states.
Final Thoughts
USNS Comfort and China’s Peace Ark have carried out commendable humanitarian work throughout many coastal communities in Latin America and the Caribbean as their tours in these regions have helped individuals who would otherwise have trouble accessing medical services. These humanitarian assistance deployments will continue to be necessary in both the short- and long-term. As for the geopolitical value of such deployments, they are a non-dangerous and effective example of “soft power” via which both Beijing and Washington utilize to maintain and improve their image in these regions.
Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez
The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.
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