IPD: Happy Anniversary Kazakhstan: What Will the New Year Bring?

"Happy Anniversary Kazakhstan: What Will the New Year Bring?"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
25 December, 2018
International Policy Digest
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/12/25/happy-anniversary-kazakhstan-what-will-the-new-year-bring/


The Republic of Kazakhstan celebrated its 27th independence anniversary on December 16th. This past year has brought a number of significant foreign policy-related successes for the Central Asian state. Hence, it is mandatory for those of us that work on international affairs to monitor Astana in 2019 as it approaches three decades of independence.

Achievements GaloreSince the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Kazakh government has carried out an ambitious policy not only to promote internal development and expand its international presence. Astana’s modus operandi is to achieve short-term goals and also carry out long-term strategies; this way of thinking has, without a doubt, helped the country gain a prominent status as a Central Asian regional power and an actor in its own right in global affairs. Case in point, the current goal is for Kazakhstan to become one of the world’s 30 most developed nations by 2050, which would help it gain membership to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The country is also seeking to attract more extra-regional investors via the partial privatization of some of its more valuable state-run enterprises. For example, in mid-November, as many as 15 percent of shares belonging to Kazatomprom, the world’s biggest producer of uranium, were open for trade at the London Stock Exchange and the Astana International Financial Centre’s Astana Stock Exchange.

Trade with other nations reached interesting levels in recent years. For example, according to the US Trade Representative, “the U.S. trade balance with Kazakhstan shifted from a goods trade surplus of $380 million in 2016 to a goods trade deficit of $239 million in 2017.” Due to space considerations, we will not analyze this dramatic shift, but simply highlight this discrepancy and stress that bilateral trade relations should be closely monitored. On the other hand, trade with South Korea appears to be gaining momentum, as Kazakh Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, Bakyt Dyussenbayev, has declared that “we expect that the final figures for 12 months [for 2018] will approach $3 billion.” Similarly, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), of which Kazakhstan is a member, finalized in December a temporary agreement on the formation of a free trade zone between the EUAU and Iran, which could help promote Kazakh trade with its Caspian Sea neighbor.

Finally, it is worth noting that Kazakhstan is the first ever Central Asian state to hold a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council (2017-2018) and was the rotating president in January 2018. The country also holds important positions in other organizations, like for example the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States, where Kazakh national Baghdad Amreyev is the current secretary general.

How will Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy Look at 28?
As the Central Asian state begins its journey towards turning 28 years of age, there are a few initiatives to look forward to. One important development is that Kazakhstan has deployed 120 peacekeepers to the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL), after receiving training via the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The Kazakhstan Peacekeeping Company will operate under the command of the Indian Army’s JAT Infantry Battalion stationed there. Kazakhstan already participates in other UN missions but at a much lower scale, for example, it currently has deployed four experts on a mission to the UN mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

The UNIFIL deployment is a significant development as Kazakhstan has already made a name for itself in the mediation of conflicts – for example Kazakhstan held a round of peace talks over Iran’s nuclear program back in 2013; moreover, an agreement that may put an end to the Caspian Sea dispute was signed in the Kazakh city of Aktau this past August. Hence, Astana can now proclaim that it is not only trying to bring peace via negotiations but also by actively participating in UN peace missions. Should the Kazakh Peacekeeping Company perform professionally in Lebanon, this may set the tone for future Kazakh participation in other UN missions.

Additionally, while this is still a couple of years away, Kazakhstan will host the WTO’s Ministerial Conference from 8-11 June 2020. This is significant given the ongoing shifts in global commerce, such as the trade wars between global powers; the appearance of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP-11 – the successor to the TPP sans the U.S.); the USMCA (the new NAFTA); figuring what European trade will look like if Brexit occurs; not to mention China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which will continue to expand in 2019. Given all these issues, the 2020 WTO meeting in Astana will be a forum where changing global trade will be discussed.

Education: Always a Pillar for Development
As mentioned in this author’s 8 October commentary, “Reforming Kazakhstan’s Education System and its Foreign Policy Implications,” the October 5th speech by President Nursultan Nazarbayev is a milestone in Kazakhstan’s educational sector. During his remarks, the Kazakh leader proclaimed that the Central Asian nation’s education system will be reformed, and “expenditures on education, science and healthcare [will be increased] from all sources up to 10% from the GDP within 5 years.” The country has a fairly good higher education system, including Nazarbayev University and the “Bolashak” program –which provides scholarships for Kazakh students to study abroad and then return to work in the country, like the Fulbright Program– however greater financial resources are always welcome. Around 11 thousand specialists have been educated in Western universities via Bolashak, including several senior Kazakh policymakers.

Adding to these programs is the goal of making the country a trilingual state: Kazakh, Russian and now English. During an December 11th speech at Georgetown University’s Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies, for an event titled “Future Calling: Infrastructure Development in Central Asia” the Kazakhstan ambassador to the US, Erzhan Kazykhanov, explained that the Kazakh government has changed the national alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin in order to facilitate learning computer science, and is also fomenting the teaching of English by training Kazakh teachers in rural areas and also bringing English-speakers to temporarily teach in Kazakh schools as well.


Increasing the budget of the education system, supporting the Bolashak program and furiously supporting English-education will be the pillars for the future of Kazakhstan, whether it plans to celebrate 27, 28 or 100-years of independence.

Final Thoughts: From Concerns to Promise
Kazakhstan, like the other post-Soviet republics, was in a complicated situation when it achieved independence back in the early 1990s when there was a general sense of pessimism towards the future. Even more, there was an ever-present possibility that the country could disintegrate even more à la USSR – there were precedents for this hypothesis, as a short-lived separatist war took place in Moldova in 1992, while Nagorno-Karabakh saw full-fledged violence that same year until 1994.

Kazakhstan has certainly bounced back from that troubling period. There are several outstanding issues that need to be addressed. However, this country has managed in record time to become Central Asia’s leader and is making a name for itself in global affairs.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

CIMSEC: USNS Comfort’s Latest Humanitarian Mission Throughout Latin America

"USNS Comfort’s Latest Humanitarian Mission Throughout Latin America"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
The Southern Tide
Center for International Maritime Security
17 December 2018
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/usns-comforts-latest-humanitarian-mission-throughout-latin-america/39234

The Southern Tide
Written by W. Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“My plain and simple message to our friends in the region is ‘the United States is a reliable and trustworthy security partner….Latin America and the Caribbean are not our backyard. It’s our shared neighborhood… And like the neighborhood … where I grew up, good neighbors respect each other’s sovereignty, treat each other as equal partners with respect, and commit to a strong neighborhood watch.”  –Vice Admiral Craig Faller, USN,  before the Senate Armed Forces Committee, Sep. 25, 2018. 

By W. Alejandro Sanchez

Introduction
USNS Comfort (T-AH-20) has finished another deployment to the Western Hemisphere as part of the Enduring Promise initiative. The U.S. hospital ship’s latest tour took it to Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Peru where it provided free medical assistance to thousands of individuals in need. This is an example of medical diplomacy at work and a great initiative to improve U.S.-Latin American relations at a time when more cohesion among governments in the Western Hemisphere is needed.

Current Deployment
Comfort is a large vessel, with a length of 894 feet and a beam of 105 feet, the same as its sister ship, USNS Mercy (T-AH-19) – the two are converted San Clemente-class super tankers. According to the U.S. Navy, each platform “contain[s] 12 fully-equipped operating rooms, a 1,000 bed hospital facility, digital radiological services, a medical laboratory, a pharmacy, an optometry lab, a CAT-scan and two oxygen producing plants,” along with helicopter decks. Hence, the vessel is able to provide for vast numbers of patients simultaneously with different services. The vessel’s most recent tour, the sixth time that it has been deployed to the region, lasted 11 weeks.

Comfort was well-received by the local populations. For example, the vessel was in the city of Esmeraldas, Ecuador, from 22-26 October. According to the Ecuadorian Ministry of Defense the medical staff attended between 500-750 per day, while a Southern Command press release stated that “Comfort has treated more than 4,000 patients, including nearly 2,500 medical patients, 1,100 optometry patients, 450 dental patients, and performed 81 surgeries.” An Ecuadorian ministry press release explained “The arrival of the vessel is part of the strengthening of defense relations between Ecuador and the USA.”
Comfort then traveled to Paita, in northern Peru, where it treated over 5,000 patients, according to the Peruvian government. The U.S. hospital ship also donated wheelchairs and medical supplies. The Peruvian government noted that this is the third time that Comfort has visited Peru, in 2011 it provided medical assistance to 7,352 patients, and in 2007, it aided 9,223 Peruvian citizens.

The vessel’s stops in Colombia and Honduras had similarly positive results. In Colombia, the U.S. hospital ship docked in Turbo (Antioquia) and then Riohacha (La Guajira), with the local government estimating that some 7,400 patients were treated by Comfort’s medical staff. As a final point, it is worth noting that the citizens of these nations were not the only ones to receive treatment aboard Comfort. Case in point, while in Colombia medical personnel also helped Venezuelan migrants who have settled in Riohacha as they flee the political and socio-economic crisis in their homeland.

Discussion 
Enduring Promise is an example of a medical diplomacy initiative that helps promote a positive image of the U.S. In this case, the people that were helped by Comfort, along with their families and other loved ones, will likely now have a more positive view of the U.S. and its military due to the free and professional medical services they received. An indigenous person from the Wayuu ethnic community in Colombia described Comfort’s visit as a “blessing from God” as it helped vulnerable communities, peasants, and Venezuelan migrants, according to Colombia’s daily El Nacional. Even more, governments also get a load taken off their shoulders, as Comfort provided services that local medical services could not offer, or were too financially costly for families to afford. For the U.S. and its partners, this was a win-win situation.

One important fact to mention is that Comfort visited Ecuador. A few years ago, when former President Rafael Correa was in power, this trip would have been unthinkable, as the former South American leader was known for his anti-U.S. sentiments. He famously expelled the U.S. military from its base in Manta, in 2009, and he was a close ally of the late-Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez.
Nevertheless, President Lenin Moreno has carried out a complete turnaround to Ecuador’s foreign policy by rapproaching the U.S. In recent months, the Ecuadorian Esmeraldas-class corvette BAE Los Ríos (CM 13) participated in the U.S.-sponsored UNITAS multinational exercise in Colombia, personnel from the U.S. Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School visited the South American country, and Defense Minister Oswaldo Jarrin has visited the headquarters of U.S. Southern Command. Comfort’s visit, thus, is the proverbial cherry on top of the cake of improving bilateral relations.

As for Honduras, the visit is likewise significant as a caravan of Central American migrants, mostly Hondurans, is attempting to enter the U.S. as they escape poverty and violence in their homeland. Comfort’s visit to the Central American state is an example of SOUTHCOM and the U.S. Navy providing humanitarian aid to Hondurans in need, irrespective of the rhetoric coming out of Washington lately. Hence, it is refreshing to read SOUTHCOM’s 25 October communique, which explains that “the embarked medical team will provide care on board and at land-based medical sites, helping to relieve pressure on national medical systems caused partly by an increase in cross-border migrants. The deployment reflects the United States’ enduring promise of friendship, partnership and solidarity with the Americas.”

China’s Peace Ark 
As a caveat to this analysis, it is necessary to mention China’s hospital ship, Peace Ark. In a previous CIMSEC commentary, “The Significance of U.S. and Chinese Hospital Ship Deployments to Latin America,” the author discussed how both Washington and Beijing utilize their hospital vessels as diplomatic tools in order to improve their image in countries that said ships visit during their humanitarian tours. As it turns out, both ships would be deployed simultaneously to the Western Hemisphere. While Comfort visited the aforementioned nations, Peace Ark visited Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Venezuela. Even more, on 15 November the Ecuadorian Ministry of Defense announced that the vessel had docked in Guayaquil to provide medical assistance to as many as 3,200 patients.

While governments are free to decide which vessels from foreign powers can enter their ports, it is impossible to avoid the irony that the hospital vessels of two nations that continue to be at odds with each other, from trade wars to incidents in Asian waters, are back-to-back welcomed in the territory of third-party states. As a result, Ecuadorians living in the Esmeraldas and Guayaquil regions enjoyed free medical services from two rival powers, while Quito maintains good relations with both nations.

Final Thoughts 
Medical diplomacy is an effective way to improve bilateral ties between the U.S. and its Latin American allies. Comfort’s visit to four Latin American nations, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Peru will improve the U.S. image at the grassroot level, as the citizens of these nations that received free and professional medical service will know that, irrespective of the current rhetoric coming out of Washington, U.S. medical personnel are still there to help those in need.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Geopolitical Monitor: Kazakhstan’s AIFC: Off to a Promising Start?

"Kazakhstan's AIFC: Off to a Promising Start?
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Geopololitical Monitor
Opinion
13 December, 2018
Originally Published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/kazakhstans-aifc-off-to-a-promising-start/


The Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) has taken the next step in its quest to become a Central Asian investment hub by opening the first session of the Astana International Exchange (AIX) in mid-November. Considering that the AIFC only officially commenced its operations in July, it is too early to predict whether it will be successful or not, but, for the time being, Astana can be pleased with the AIFC’s promising first steps.

The author of this report has previously discussed the AIFC for Geopolitical Monitor (“The Astana International Financial Centre: Kazakhstan’s Ambitious Step Forward”), hence we will solely focus on recent developments.
The first session of the AIX included the trading of shares for Kazatomprom, the world’s largest producer of uranium. “We have executed a successful IPO [initial public offering], proving the status of the world uranium industry leader, and have become the first company listed on the Astana International Exchange,” said Galymzhan Pirmatov, CEO of Kazatomprom National Company.

Unconditional trading in Kazatomprom’s global depositary receipts began on November 19, KazInform reported. Additionally, some 49 foreign and 16 Kazakh companies, as well as some 2,700 Kazakh citizens presented their shares on the stock exchange on opening day, according to other reports.
Another important development is that Goldman Sachs has acquired 108,480 ordinary shares. These represent a “4.1 per cent of the total issued share capital (post-money) of AIX while simultaneously entering into a 5 year put option with AIFC to protect Goldman Sachs against a decline in the value of the shares below the purchase price,” the AIFC explained.

In the near future, there are plans for the the AIX to trade shares of other state-run companies such as Kazakhtelecom, Air Astana, KazMunaiGas, among others. The obvious objective, other than to cement AIX as the country’s premier stock exchange, is to convince foreign investors that they too should utilize this new agency. Adding to the enticement is the fact that the AIFC’s International Arbitration Centre is based on English Common law.  Moreover, if the AIFC is trying to attract Western investment it helps to have a brand name like Goldman Sachs attached – not to mention NASDAQ and the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Curiously,  coinciding with the AIX’s first trading session, a delegation from Slovakia, headed by Prime Minister Peter Pellegrini, visited the AIFC’s facilities, hinting that the Central European government may be interested in the new initiative.

Dr. Ariel Cohen, a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, praised the AIFC at a 4 December conference in Washington DC titled “Future Calling: Infrastructure Development in Central Asia” for what it could mean for Kazakhstan. He explained that the AIFC “is a transition from a 20th century natural resources-based proposition to a 21st century investment and financial services added value proposition.”  Meanwhile, another panelist, Catullus Helmer, Co-Founder and Partner at Enovid LLP, argued that “the AIFC and the AIX have already been a success” if we regard these newborn initiatives not as the next London Stock Exchange, but rather as “a haven, bellwether, and a benchmark for the rule of law, institutions, and the business environment.”

Kazatomprom: Up for (Partial) Auction
As previously mentioned, Kazakh heavyweight Kazatomprom which, by the company’s own estimates is valued at between USD$3-4 billion, was the first company to be traded at AIX. Apart from producing uranium, the company also “manufactures and sells beryllium and tantalum products; produces, transfers, and sells electric and heat energy; produces and sells potable, technical, and distilled water; among other services, according to Bloomberg.  “Kazatomprom also traded at the London Stock Exchange, raising $451 million. 5.5 million shares were sold in Astana, including 3.93 million actual shares and 1.6 million of Global Depositary Receipts,” reported Forbes.

The selling of Kazatomprom shares is important, but should not be overestimated. As the Jamestown Foundation explains, Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund Samruk Kazyna “will remain the majority shareholder and will continue to exert effective control over company operations;” hence it comes as no surprise that the plan is to sell no more than 15 percent of shares to outside investors. Then again, as the article also notes, “if Kazatomprom becomes a public company, it will be only the second major uranium miner in the world, after Canada’s Cameco, to obtain such a status.”  The partial privatization of this company is a good example of Astana giving up (partial) control of its profitable state-run enterprises, beginning with the crown jewel,  Kazatomprom, in order to attrack a more global clientele.

Ambitious Goals
The AIFC’s raison d’être is ambitious: to become the country’s main financial hub and one of the leading financial centers of Asia in the shortest possible time, which will help the Central Asian state become one of the top 30 most developed nations by 2050. The Centre was launched this past January, though it only started operating in July; and in November the AIX opened.

The role of Goldman Sachs and the partial privatization of an important company like Kazatomprom are attractive first steps. Another factor that could also attract investors is the Central Asian state’s ranking in the “Doing Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs” report by the World Bank. In the latest report, Kazakhstan ranks number 36 in the “Ease of Doing Business Ranking” section,  with Switzerland at 33, Japan at 34, Russia at 35 and Slovenia at 37, out of 190 states that were analyzed. The next Central Asian state is Uzbekistan at number 74.  Even more, the report notes that “thirteen economies [including Kazakhstan] passed legislation in 2016/17 that increased corporate transparency requirements,” in addition to strengthening minority investor protections by increasing shareholder rights and their role in major corporate decisions. Thus, Kazakhstan is in an expectant place and we will have to see if the AIFC manages to increase the country’s position further in the coming years.

Of course, the future of the AIFC is not free of challenges. One obvious issue is that the Kazakh market and capital alone are not big enough to remain constantly active, and attractive. At the Atlantic Council event, Dr. Cohen explained that the AIFC can succeed “provided it is not limited just to Kazakhstan.” Hence, AIFC’s priority is to present itself as the natural conduit though which investors can make business with other Central Asian nations.

This will be achieved if the AIFC’s agencies are successful. For example, if the International Arbitration Centre successfully manages a dispute between Western company “X” and Central Asian country “Y” in a manner which both sides regard as professional and whose outcome is regarded as acceptable, this will  increase the AIFC’s international pedigree. We will have to wait and see how the Arbitration Centre deals with cases once they start coming in, but at least the IAC seems to be well staffed, as it is chaired by Barbara Dohmann QC, a well-known UK commercial barrister. The Kazakhs have imported “high quality expertise” to the IAC, remarked Dr. Cohen at the Atlantic Council event.
There is also a foreign policy aspect to the AIFC’s success, as the Kazakh government will have to maintain cordial and friendly relations with the other Central Asian states (relations with Uzbekistan have steadily improved since the new president came to power) in order to maintain borders open in order to promote freedom of movement and trade.

The AIFC and Kazakhstan
If the AIFC works as expected, and greater investment and industries come from Europe, Japan, South Korea and the United States, this will also help diversify Kazakhstan’s economy. An October 2018 report by the Project on Prosperity and Development, part of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, entitled “The Future of Global Stability The World of Work in Developing Countries Kazakhstan Case Study,” explains this situation well. “Kazakhstan was one of the fastest-growing economies in the world during the natural resources boom of the 1990s,” the report explains, adding that it “has shown great progress in formal job creation. Between 2003 and 2013, annual employment growth was 2.1 percent, compared to the total labor force growth of 1.7 percent. During this period, a total 1.5 million jobs were created.”

However, there is government-acknowledged over-reliance on natural resource extraction, namely oil and gas. The CSIS report argues that, “construction, mining, and agribusiness are among the sectors projected to be the most promising for economic growth in the next 10 to 15 years, but challenges to the labor market remain,” including a large informal job sector. If oriented correctly, the AIFC could bring companies and externally-backed projects that would help diversify the Kazakh economy: e.g. constructing roads to help the agricultural sector.

Conclusion
There is an understandable degree of international skepticism about the AIFC’s ambitious objectives. Plenty of projects around the world begin with great fanfare only to collapse. However, what the AIFC has achieved in its firsts months of operations is commendable, which should help convince the international financial community to look at the AIFC as viable conduit for investment in Kazakhstan, and potentially the rest of Central Asia.


Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com or any institutions with which the author is associated.

Providence: Tensions along the US-Mexico Border: Using “Lethal Force” against Migrants

"Tensions along the US-Mexico Border: Using 'Lethal Force' against Migrants"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Providence
4 December 2018
Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2018/12/tensions-us-mexico-border-lethal-force-migrants/

But if anyone has the world’s goods and sees his brother in need, yet closes his heart against him, how does God’s love abide in him?” 1 John 3:17
 
On November 25, some 500 migrants, including women and children, attempted to cross the Mexico-US border near the Mexican city of Tijuana. They were repelled by US border patrol agents using tear gas. The Mexican government has declared that those involved in the incident will be deported.

This incident comes at the heels of the Trump administration’s controversial authorization of lethal force, if necessary, by US troops stationed on the border with Mexico. He has similarly increased his rhetoric when referring to the migrants, whom he has labeled as “criminals,” and characterized the caravan as an “invasion.” Such statements do no help defuse the tense situation at the border.

Migrants and Troops
At the time of this writing, reports from the border say that between five and nine thousand migrants from Central America, particularly Honduras, are in Tijuana, camping by the border and at a sports complex. The November 25 incident demonstrates that these people are not willing to wait long until their case is heard by US immigration authorities. (Certain media reports say some migrants are returning to their homeland.)

In response, President Donald Trump deployed over five thousand troops to the border—the mission was originally called Operation Faithful Patriot, but later the Department of Defense labeled it as simply border support. Additionally, military police officers from the port of entry in Texas have been deployed to support Border Patrol agents in the San Ysidro Land Port of Entry in San Diego.
According to CNN, the Pentagon has explained that “the $72 million price tag covers the cost of deploying the approximately 5,900 active duty troops until December 15 and will increase the longer the troops are deployed.” This is quite the price tag to deal with unarmed men, women, and children.

“Rocks as Rifles”
President Trump has shown no reservation regarding how the migrants should be treated. He declared:

Anybody throwing stones, rocks, like they did to Mexico and the Mexican military, Mexican police, where they badly hurt police and soldiers of Mexico, we will consider that a firearm… We’re not going to put up with that. They want to throw rocks at our military, our military fights back. I told them to consider it a rifle.

This statement was probably a reaction to a photo that has been circulating online which shows a bloody Mexican police officer; violent migrants allegedly injured him. That story has been exposed as a lie as the photo was actually taken in 2012.

Moreover, Newsweek has published a decision memorandum, dated November 20 and signed by President Trump, which states that the deployed military personnel to the border “may perform those military protective activities that are reasonably necessary to ensure the protection and safety of Federal personnel, including a show of force (including lethal force, where necessary), crowd control, temporary detention, and cursory search” (click here for the entire document). The incident last month is an example of US security personnel taking non-lethal actions in response to an attempted stampede by the migrants to cross the border.

Discussion
The caravan coincided with the US midterm elections; hence, President Trump made it an electoral issue. The US president has characterized the caravan members as “young men, strong men,” many of whom are criminals, according to him. He once stated that there were individuals from the Middle East in the caravan—he would later acknowledge that there was no proof for this accusation.

To be fair, the US Department of Homeland Security reportedly has informants in the caravan, and DHS officials have worked with Mexican authorities to identify them and figure out if any of them have criminal pasts. Authorities should treat such individuals appropriately (including deportation), but President Trump’s stereotypes and lies are a major problem. Similarly, individuals interviewed by Fox News have also said that the migrants have diseases like smallpox, tuberculosis, and even leprosy. In other words, the men, women, and children of this caravan are evil-incarnated, and they are coming to “invade,” as President Trump tweeted on October 29, the US and spread violence and leprosy. (Did Jesus not treat a leper with kindness rather than hate?)

This type of inflammatory language is not helpful. Rather than engaging with the governments of Central America or the new administration in Mexico, or with the caravan leaders themselves, President Trump has focused on militarizing the border, vilifying the migrants, and threatening US allies—he has threatened to cut financial aid to the Central American nations where the migrants come from.

Final Thoughts
It is understandable that any nation should refrain from having an open-door migration policy, and should the situation turn more violent at the border, it is correct for military personnel to defend themselves. However, it is certainly not acceptable for any government to spread hate and lies while dealing with a defenseless migrant population.

—
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues in the Western Hemisphere. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Journal Essay: The Polar Journal: An overview of Colombia’s Antarctic programme

"An overview of Colombia’s Antarctic programme"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
The Polar Journal
Opinion
Published Online: 28 November 2018

(Please contact me if you'd like a free PDF copy: 
 wilder.a.sanchez at gmaill.com)

ABSTRACT

This paper provides an overview of the history and growth of Colombia’s Antarctic programme and how it has rapidly progressed in recent years. The country carried out its first Antarctic expedition with a domestically manufactured vessel during the 2014–2015 austral summer. Annual expeditions have continued since then, and in early 2018 the government announced its intention to acquire a new vessel and establish a seasonal base by 2025 at the latest in a location yet to be determined. This rapid succession of achievements demonstrates Colombia’s seriousness about its Antarctic programme. Nevertheless, a major challenge will be to secure funding for its Antarctic programme, thus 2018 will be a critical year as the country will hold general elections, and it will be imperative for the next administration to consider the programme a priority in order to maintain its momentum. It is important to understand the intention and objectives of non-claimant nations with growing Antarctic programmes and for the international community to harness this interest so that they can carry out meaningful contributions in order to protect Antarctica.

KEYWORDS: Colombia, navy, Antarctica, Latin America, 20 de Julio

Providence: The US and Latin America’s “Troika of Tyrann

"The US and Latin America’s “Troika of Tyranny""
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Providence
28 November 2018
Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2018/11/us-latin-america-troika-of-tyranny-john-bolton/

 
“For God will bring every deed into judgment, with every secret thing, whether good or evil.” Ecclesiastes 12:14

National Security Advisor John Bolton gave a speech in Miami in early November in which he labeled the governments of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as Latin America’s “Troika of Tyranny.” This statement is not particularly shocking as the Trump administration has routinely criticized all three governments. Tense relations with Managua and Caracas are to be expected, but utilizing this label for Havana exemplifies the Trump White House’s freeze of the Washington-Havana rapprochement that started during the Obama presidency.

The question that emerges now is: does Bolton’s speech signal a drastic change in US foreign policy toward Latin America? Or can we expect more of the same?

The Miami Speech
Bolton gave his speech at the Miami Dade College’s Freedom Tower on November 1, during which he labeled the three aforementioned states as the “troika of tyranny” of the Western Hemisphere. Followers of international affairs will make parallels between this label and the “axis of evil” term President George W. Bush utilized during his 2002 State of the Union address to describe the governments of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.

The national security advisor stated that “this Troika of Tyranny, this triangle of terror stretching from Havana to Caracas to Managua, is the cause of immense human suffering, the impetus of enormous regional instability, and the genesis of a sordid cradle of communism in the Western Hemisphere.” He added that “we will no longer appease dictators and despots near our shores.”

As for country-specific remarks, when it comes to Venezuela Bolton demanded that the regime release political prisoners, and he called for new elections. The US official also supported new sanctions against the government, arguing that “the United States is acting against the dictator Maduro, who uses the same repressive tactics that have been employed in Cuba for decades.”

Regarding Nicaragua, the country became an international pariah due to repressive measures the Daniel Ortega administration carried out after major protests exploded in April. Hence, it comes as no surprise that Bolton demanded elections, or “the Nicaraguan regime, like Venezuela and Cuba, will feel the full weight of America’s robust sanctions regime.”

Finally, Washington aims to minimize contacts with the Cuban regime and “will only engage with the Cuban government that is willing to undertake necessary and tangible reforms.” Even more, Vox reported the US won’t allow American cash to reach Cuba’s military, security, or intelligence services.

What Is the Significance of Bolton’s Speech?
There are a number of issues worth mentioning regarding Bolton’s speech. The most important is that Bolton stopped short of openly advocating for some type of US intervention in Venezuela. As the Miami Herald reports, “Bolton said in response to questions after the speech that he doesn’t expect the US military would intervene in Venezuela. ‘I don’t see that happening,’ he said.” US politicians at all levels regularly attack the Nicolás Maduro regime and call for drastic changes. For example, on February 9 Senator Marco Rubio tweeted, “The world would support the Armed Forces in #Venezuela if they decide to protect the people & restore democracy by removing a dictator.” Hence, Bolton’s statements are not surprising. Nevertheless, it is unclear how effective additional sanctions would be given that the Maduro regime is firmly entrenched. The restraint on talking about military intervention exemplifies how undecided Washington is about how far it is willing to go to get rid of Maduro.

As for Nicaragua, the hundreds of dead civilians, with even more injured and arrested, have made the Ortega regime an international pariah. Hence, it comes as no surprise that Bolton critiqued Managua as well. Sanctions or further diplomatic pressure on Nicaragua is a valid strategy, and at one point back in June, President Ortega did flirt with the idea of calling for early elections in order to appease protesters. Nevertheless, the Nicaraguan government seems to be back in control of the country as the protests have dissipated due to the Managua’s repressive tactics. The anti-Ortega sentiment remains strong in Managua and in Washington, but it is debatable how effective sanctions would be (particularly given the fact that they have been ineffective in toppling the Maduro regime in Venezuela).

Bolton’s comments about Cuba are also noteworthy because they effectively put an end to whatever attempt at a rapprochement had commenced during the Obama presidency. Embassies in both countries reopened in 2015, and then-President Obama even met with then-President Raul Castro in 2016. But when President Trump came to power, he made it clear very quickly that he was not interested in continuing to improve bilateral ties. The mysterious attacks in 2017 that sickened US diplomas in Cuba were the perfect reason for the Trump White House to switch to a more aggressive stance vis-à-vis Cuba. Shortly after this event, The US expelled a total of 15 Cuban diplomats. If there was any hope that dialogue between the two governments could commence once again, Bolton’s speech effectively ended it.

Final Thoughts
Will Bolton’s speech have some long-term repercussions? The remarks were inflammatory and included plenty of quotable phrases and statements, but it did not represent a change of US foreign policy objectives. New sanctions are only to be expected regarding Nicaragua and Venezuela; as for Cuba, improved bilateral relations seem utopian once again.

The 2002 “Axis of Evil” speech will be forever linked to the US invasion of Iraq that took place a year later. How will the “Troika of Tyranny” remark be remembered a year from now?

—
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues in the Western Hemisphere. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

IPD: Brazil-Africa Relations during the Bolsonaro Presidency

"Brazil-Africa Relations during the Bolsonaro Presidency"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez and Scott Morgan
International Policy Digest
21 November 2018
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/11/21/brazil-africa-relations-during-the-bolsonaro-presidency/

Incoming Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro, has been labeled by the global media as the South American version of President Donald Trump. One more reason to add to the list of resemblances between the two may be a potential disengagement with Africa once the Brazilian politician assumes the presidency in January.

How has the dream of former President Lula da Silva (2003-2011) for South-South cooperation soured? He was in power when the concept known as the BRICS was first coined by Jim O’Neill. This term evolved into an initiative in which Brazil joined the Russian Federation, India and China (South Africa joined later) to form a new bloc that would provide investment opportunities to emerging economies without some of the conditions that other donors such as the United States and the European Union often add. The leaders of these five states, including Brazilian President Michel Temer, most recently met in South Africa for their annual summit.

Alas, Bolsonaro’s interest in strengthening ties with the U.S. and Europe may put in jeopardy Brazil’s participation in the BRICS initiative, as well as Brasilia’s engagement with Africa.

Brazil and Africa have a long history, dating back to the era of slavery. As a 2016 report by the German Marshall Fund explains, “around 11 million black Africans were forcibly brought to the American continents during the slave trade period. Brazil received approximately 4 million, making it the country with the most slaves in the world.” Brazil opened embassies and consulates in various African states in the 1960s as Brasilia supported self-determination and the end of colonization.

When Lula came to power, he wanted to make Brazil a global leader, and he also encouraged South-South cooperation. At first it was the five Portuguese speaking countries (Sao Tome and Principe, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Mozambique) that were the initial points of contact as Brasilia sought to step out onto the World State under the tenure of the Worker’s Party. Lula was also a frequent visitor to Africa: a 2010 BBC article about Lula’s final trip to Africa as head of state explains how he visited “27 African countries on 12 different occasions, more than all his predecessors combined.” But under the term of Dilma Rousseff the government considered closing some embassies in Africa.

As for what can we expect once Bolsonaro comes to power? A 26 October article in Quartz Africa suggests that, “if little is known about Bolsonaro’s views on foreign policy in relation to Africa, his running mate, General Hamilton Mourão, has been very clear. During a recent speech he criticised Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff’s South-South diplomacy claiming that it had resulted in costly association with “dirtbag scum” countries (African) that did not yield any ‘returns.’” Scholarships that help African Students travel to Brazil to study could also be in jeopardy. This is problematic, as a relatively cheap and very effective way to promote cultural ties is to have such exchanges take place at the educational level.

Nevertheless it is assumed that the military initiatives and commercial contracts between Brazil and some of its African contacts will continue. For example, in July, the Brazilian aerospace company EMBRAER and Sahara Africa Aviation “signed a multi-year Pool Program Agreement for spare parts and support covering more than 500 components for their two recently acquired Embraer ERJ 145 jets.” Similarly, Denel Dynamics of South Africa and Brazil’s Mectron, Avibras, and Opto Eletrônica are jointly developing the A-Darter short-range imaging infrared (IIR) air-to-air missile (AAM) system. In other words, there are valid and practical reasons for Brasilia to continue its engagement with Africa.

Moreover, there is the question of Brazilian participation in UN peace missions on the African continent, now that the UN mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH, in which Brazil had a prominent role, is over. For some time, there was the belief that the Temer presidency was going to deploy troops to the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), a crucial but struggling mission (the authors of this commentary published an article in IPD, titled “Brazil to Join UN Mission in Central African Republic, MINUSCA,” in December 2017 about that possibility) however this has yet to occur. Brazilian Air Force Colonel Alexandre Corrêa Lima has joined the international staff of the United Nations Integrated Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSMA, in French), arriving in early September, but no massive deployment has occurred.

There are plenty of questions about what can we expect once President Bolsonaro assumes power next year. The future of Brazil-Africa relations may not be at the top of anyone’s list of Brazilian foreign policy priorities right now, but given how Brazil’s history of South-South cooperation could abruptly come to an end in the near future, it should be.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the authors are associated.

Providence: Trump, Bolsonaro, and the Future of US-Brazil Relations

"Trump, Bolsonaro, and the Future of US-Brazil Relations"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Providence
20 October 2018
Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2018/11/trump-bolsonaro-future-us-brazil-relations/

“Do not be deceived: ‘Bad company ruins good morals.’” 1 Corinthians 15:33
Jair Bolsonaro will become Brazil’s next president after winning the South American nation’s October 28 runoff elections. The seasoned politician is well-known for a series of controversial and offensive statements, which include homophobic, sexist, and racist insults, as well as support for Brazil’s former military dictatorship. And yet, he emerged victorious with around 58 million votes.

Can the US government work with such a leader? Answering this question requires a discussion about the eternal conflict in international relations: choosing between national interests and morality.

(Some of) Bolsonaro’s Declarations
In spite of successfully campaigning as an “anti-establishment” candidate, Bolsonaro is anything but that. In 1991 he became a federal deputy for Rio de Janeiro to the lower chamber of Congress, and he has been reelected six times since then. He is also a retired army captain.

Throughout his tenure in Congress, he has often made extremely controversial and offensive remarks. For example, he stated in a 2011 interview with Playboy that he “would be incapable of loving a homosexual son… I would prefer my son to die in an accident than show up with a mustachioed man.” He also insulted female lawmaker Maria do Rosario in 2003, stating “I would not rape you, because you’re not worthy of it,” and then pushing her away (video in Portuguese). Similarly, he has critiqued quilombolas, individuals of African descent, declaring that “they don’t do anything. I don’t think they’re even good for procreation anymore.”

Nevertheless, his ideological stances have also earned him support from certain segments. For example, his constant praise of the Brazilian military, even his controversial support of the 1964–85 military regime (he has said that “the dictatorship’s mistake was to torture and not kill”), has earned him support from the armed forces. It certainly helps that he is a retired officer himself, while his vice president, Hamilton Mourão, is a retired army general.

President-elect Bolsonaro will take power on January 1, 2019, and his main priorities will likely be domestic, such as improving citizens’ security, improving the economy, and battling corruption. This last issue was a pillar of his presidential campaign, as he profited from the population’s anger at the never-ending series of corruption scandals, such as Operation Car Wash (Lava Jato), which led to the impeachment of former President Dilma Rousseff in 2016.

Can the US Government Work with President Bolsonaro?
The short answer is yes. Leaving his offensive remarks aside, President-elect Bolsonaro has said what that the Trump White House wants to hear in terms of foreign policy. For example, he has repeatedly criticized Venezuela. Likewise, there are ongoing discussions about whether Brazil may move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, following the US example, in order to improve bilateral ties with Israel (particularly regarding defense issues).

Trade between the two countries is high and benefits the US (which President Trump will like). According to the US Trade Representative, “the US goods trade surplus with Brazil was $7.8 billion in 2017, a 93.6% increase ($3.8 billion) over 2016 [and it] has a services trade surplus of an estimated $19 billion with Brazil in 2017, up 9.6% from 2016.” Even more, there is also the multibillion-dollar deal between Boeing and EMBRAER (a powerful Brazilian aerospace company), which could be extremely lucrative for both sides. Even more, Paulo Guedes will be the new super minister of the economy, a move that has increased confidence from international investors, as he is regarded as one of the “Chicago Boys.”

Washington-Brasilia relations soured during the Obama-Dilma Rousseff era when Edward Snowden revealed that US intelligence agencies were monitoring foreign leaders, including the Brazilian president at the time. Bilateral relations have improved since then, but they could always be better, particularly at a time when the US needs strong allies in Latin America as the socio-economic and political crisis in Venezuela worsens. In other words, the pieces are in place for a Washington-Brasilia rapprochement. Trump and Bolsonaro’s similar attitudes and ideologies bolster this theory, and some specialists to argue that they would get along quite well should they ever meet.

With that said, from a moral point of view, Washington should not work with Bolsonaro. His aforementioned statements mean that state protection and support for minorities and the LGBTQ community in Brazil will be at risk once he assumes office. There is also concern about the future of Brazil’s indigenous communities and Amazonian environment, given Bolsonaro’s support of agro-businesses.

Similarly, the president-elect’s repeated praise for the 1964–85 military regime, which is known for torture, disappearances, and executions, is also concerning. He appears to plan to take strong measures to combat crime and lawlessness. However, one of Brazil’s (many) problems is its history of law enforcement officers who carry out human rights abuses, including extrajudicial executions. Latin America does not need another leader who supports draconian measures in the name of public safety.

Final Thoughts
There are plenty of common objectives at the foreign policy and trade levels that could ensure the US and Brazil under Presidents Trump and Bolsonaro could have a mutually beneficial relationship. Even an alliance could be in the making. Nevertheless, Bolsonaro’s lengthy history of racist, sexist, homophobic, and violent statements makes him the type of leader that the White House should stay away from.

Alas, geopolitics tends to favor national interests and the personal preferences of those in power, rather than morality and respect for human rights. In short, sadly, national interests tend to trump human rights.

—
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues in the Western Hemisphere. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Presentation: Hudson Institute: Cybersecurity Threats in Latin America

"Cybersecurity Threats in Latin America"
 Hudson Institute
12 November 2018
Originally published: https://www.hudson.org/events/1627-cybersecurity-threats-in-latin-america112018

On November 12, Hudson Institute hosted a panel to discuss cybersecurity concerns present in Latin America. Threats range from hacking, identity theft, and criminal dark web activities to the exploitation of online services by insurgent groups for propaganda purposes. These concerns have prompted a number of government initiatives to crack down on cybercrime including the creation of cyber-security agencies within police and armed forces and improved citizen awareness initiatives. However, more should be done in order to deter attackers and minimize consequences of these threats.

Panelists included Analyst and Jane’s Defence Weekly Contributor Wilder Alejandro Sanchez; author Richard Stiennon; and Organization of American States Cyber Security Programme Manager Belisario Contreras. The discussion was moderated by Hudson Senior Fellow Ambassador Jaime Daremblum.

Speakers

Belisario Contreras Speaker

Manager, Cyber Security Programme, Organization of American States (OAS)

Richard Stiennon Speaker

Author, There Will Be Cyberwar: How The Move To Network-Centric War Fighting Has Set The Stage For Cyberwar (IT-Harvest Press 2015)

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez Speaker

Analyst and Jane's Defence Weekly Contributor

Amb. Jaime Daremblum Speaker

Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Latin American Studies, Hudson Institute

Defence IQ: The future of drone and counter-drone technology

"The future of drone and counter-drone technology"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Defence IQ

8 November 2018

Originally published: https://www.defenceiq.com/defence-technology/news/new-drone-and-counter-drone-technology

As drones become smaller and faster, new solutions will be required to disable them. Here are a few handheld counter-drone systems that may end up in the hands of armed forces around the world

 How will drones shape future warfare?

The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) held its annual exposition of military technology from 8-10 October in Washington DC. The meeting brought together some of the largest and most well-known firms of the military industrial complex from the US and abroad. Two particularly interesting technologies that were showcased at AUSA were unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as well as the latest anti-drone systems.

AUSA 2018: New UAVs

There were several UAVs that were showcased at the AUSA expo.  Here is a rundown of some of the most promising platforms.

RECOMMENDED: Small is beautiful: Nano drone tech is advancing

• InstantEye MK-3 Gen-4-D1/D2 sUAS, produced by Instant Eye Robotics. This is a small UAV (sUAV) that weighs 3lbs, has a maximum payload of around 3lbs, and an endurance of up to 30 minutes. Its major appeal is that it requires a single operator and can go from stowed to operational in around one minute. In addition, it is EUD/tablet compatible and has integral gimbaled EO/IR cameras. On February 2018, the company announced that it had sold 800 InstantEye Mk-2 GEN3-A0 sUAS systems to the US Marine, on top of a previous order.
  
• Orion UAS, produced by Elistair. This platform has an operating altitude of 80m/262ft, a data rate of up to 200mbps, a GPS system, a HD 1080p daylight camera, an optical x30 zoom and a black box. What makes this UAV so interesting is that it is tethered, which means it can fly continuously for hours on end, making it perfect for protecting sensitive areas. This will be particularly useful for law enforcement operations, and for setting up quick telecommunication systems in disaster areas.
  
• SkyRanger R60 and SkyRaider R80D, produced by Aeryon Defense USA. The SkyRaider has an endurance of 30-50min, and a max ground speed of 31mph, with payloads of up to 4.4 lbs. Meanwhile, the SkyRanger has similar characteristics but a payload of 1.5.lbs. Both systems have tablet-based controls and are equipped with HDZoom 30. They are suitable for search and rescue operations and reconnaissance.

 

Anti-drone technology

Drone legislation is still scarce and differs from country to country. General laws relating to privacy, aviation, data protection and the like are applicable to drones, but it could be questioned whether the industry can provide sufficient safeguards to deal with new challenges and threats.

Unsurprisingly, drones can be utilized for nefarious activities like illegal surveillance of sensitive infrastructure. ISIS has also manufactured rudimentary drones as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Syria. Similarly, they have been flown by criminals to transport drugs or to smuggle contraband into prisons. In symmetrical war, countering drone swarms will be a top priority for armed forces.

Be sure to check out our guide to countering drones: This is how militaries can defend against drones
As a result, a diverging market has also emerged from this booming industry, the market for disabling drones. Some unconventional solutions have already emerged, for example, in Holland, local police forces have joined forces with Guard From Above, a raptor-training security firm based in the Hague that trains eagles to grab drones mid-air. However, there are other gadgets to keep in mind.

The Smart Shooter

One solution demonstrated at AUSA 2018 was the from Israeli company Smart Shooter. They have two systems, one called SMASH 2000, and a more advanced iteration called SMASH 2000 Plus. SMASH is an advanced optical sight that can be attached to small arms. The system utilises look and track and target detection technology, to substantially increase precision aiming and reduce time-to-hit.

The SMASH 2000 Plus variant has a “drone mode” that allows the operator to target a UAV in flight both during day and night time. The company’s website explains that “the SMASH fire control system puts a precision anti-drone capability at the fingertips of its users, featuring built-in targeting algorithms that can track and hit even very small drones skimming along at high speed, at ranges of up to 120 meters, with the first shot.”

Depending on the version of the system, its options also include, counter-drone/UAS mode, recording and debriefing, among others. Many in attendance at AUSA, including myself, can testify to how easy it is to master the system. The international media has provided has also responded positively to the technology on offer.

At AUSA 2018, one US army personnel member with combat experience noted, “I like the Smart Shooter idea, especially if the sight also works on individuals and armoured targets. It seems to enhance our capability to put targets down without adding too much weight.”

The DroneKiller

Another anti-drone product showcased at AUSA 2018 is aptly named DroneKiller, produced by IXI EW. This system is a standalone handheld device that employs software-defined radio technology to disable drones. There are two versions of this device, a handheld “rifle” and a system that can be attached to a rifle. It has a range of up to 1,000 meters, operates on seven frequency bands and can be in an active mode for up to two hours, with eight hours in standby. It weighs 7.5lbs and is surprisingly comfortable to carry.
The market potential for this product is strong, in fact, Japan has bought over 100 units of the DroneKiller in preparation for the Summer 2020 Olympics in Tokyo.

How will drones affect the equipment carried by future infantry?

For anti-drone technology in conflict zones, the main goal is to equip soldiers with anti-drone capabilities while keeping their equipment weight to a minimum. In the context of defence, the DroneKiller “rifle” iteration may struggle to find buyers as it is effectively another weapon that a soldier will have to carry on the field. A system that can be attached or detached, like the Smart Shooter or the smaller variant of DroneKiller, may have better prospects

It is equally important for anti-drone technology to be relatively future-proof, as Drones in the future will maintain higher altitudes, be equipped with advanced cameras with improved zooming systems, and they will be far smaller. Many commentators at the conference lamented that we may get to a stage where drones become invisible to the naked eye, highlighting the need for indeification systems.

Indeed, the future of drone/anti-drone technology for combat operations will also have repercussions for composition and organisation of the typical infantry squad. Let’s take a quick look at a US Army infantry rifle squad, which consists of nine soldiers. There have been plenty of discussions and reports about how the squad of the future should be organized, for example, see: US Army Major Hassan Kamara’s commentary “Rethinking the U.S. Army Infantry Rifle Squad,” published by Military Review.
In his essay, Major Kamara explains how “technology and automation seem to have increased the workload of the squad on contemporary battlefields, with more equipment for the same nine people to manage and operate in addition to legacy warfighting functions. With regards to technology and the infantry squad of the future is, Kamara concludes, “emerging military technology that will grow to enhance the capability of the squad, like armed drones and other robotics, make a strong case for increasing the number of soldiers in the infantry squad with another team of riflemen.”

This is a very interesting prospect to consider. Will future capabilities require one member of an infantry squad to be solely responsible for counter-drone activity? In conjunction, will one operator carry a sUAV, a DroneKiller for example, and be the main individual tasked with dealing with enemy drones? Will more police forces utilise systems Smart Shooter-like systems with drone locks?

The infantry rifle squad of the future, be it from the US army or any other, may very well need a “drone-only” operator, which may mean adding one more member to the squad or replacing someone that has other tasks.

Final Thoughts

Drone and anti-drone technology will continue to evolve simultaneously. The next generation of UAVs will be lighter, smaller, more complex and able to multi-task, depending on the client’s need. And with that will come the necessity for the industry to figure out new, more effective ways of shooting these platforms down.