Peru is no stranger to the UNSC, as it has served as a member on four occasions so far: 1955-1956, 1973-1974, 1985-1986, and 2006-2007. In other words, the country is part of one of the most important bodies of the United Nationsalmost once a decade, a significant accomplishment of the Peruvian diplomatic corps over the years.
The timing of Peru’s election could hardly be more relevant, as the global body is facing a number of security-related crises and issues which will require all 15 members to work in harmony to achieve long lasting solutions. At the global level, crises like the wars in Iraq and Syria and their repercussions, particularly the immense number of internally displaced people as well as refugees seeking a better life in Europe, means that the UNSC will have to work in coordination with regional governments, international agencies, and other UN bodies.
In addition, the UNSC may have to adapt to doing more, or the same, with less, as US President Donald Trump’s 2018 Budget Plan proposes to reduce the funds Washington pays to the UN.
The US is the UN’s top contributor, providing 22% of the core budget and 28.5% of the peacekeeping budget, hence the diminution of financial support of the organization could make its current and future operations that much harder. In fact, the US government has already commenced a reviewto decide whether or not to continue funding each of the UN’s 16 current peacekeeping missions. Should cuts take place, it will be up to the UN Secretary General, the UNSC, and the General Assembly to address this troubling scenario in order to continue the good work the UN carries out around the world.
Presently, Peru has deployed military personnel to eight peacekeeping missions.
t is important to note that at the hemispheric level, the UN will have two new peace missions, the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), which will replace the current MINUSTAH mission in Haiti beginning this October, as well as a political mission that will oversee the peace and reintegration process in Colombia now that the conflict with the FARC insurgents has ended.
Most notably, the Andean nations’ military just withdrew the last of its troops that were part of the mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH. Currently, the country’s largest contribution is a company of engineers in the UN mission in the Central African Republic, MINUSCA, which constructs and maintains roads and airfields.
Even at the individual level, it is worth noting that Peruvians have made valuable contributions to the UN’s bureaucracy.
The most well know example is prominent Peruvian Javier Perez de Cuellar who served as the UN Secretary General (1982-1991). During his tenure, Perez de Cuellar was very involved in the Contadora Peace Process in Central America, among other initiatives. As for other notable Peruvians in the UN Tarcila Rivera an indigenous leader, was elected as a representative to the UN’s Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2016. Another noteworthy individual is Gladys Acosta Vargas, who has collaborated with the UN Research Institute for Social Development and is currently a member of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2015-2018).
This initiative probably played an influential role in the transcendental 2015 COP climate change conference in Paris.
As for participation in other UN agencies, Peru is one of the 54 current members of the UNECOSOC(UN Economic and Social Council), which focuses onissues such as health, poverty, food security, and humanitarian aid to refugees. Additionally, in 2015, the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA), a joint effort by the two nations to bring together state and non-state actors to work in cooperation against climate change, launched a website in anticipation of the then-upcoming 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21).
Peru’s membership in the UNSC during the 2018-2020 period means that Lima will be a kite in a metaphorical storm, as the UN faces a number of troubling challenges, particularly the anticipated drastic budget constraint proposed by the US. In spite of the UN’s uncertain future, this new term at the UNSC nomination should make Peruvians proud and will offer the Andean country an ideal stage to demonstrate its commitment to global progress and how Peru can be a positive actor at the global level.
Also read Alejandro Sanchez, “Pax Inca: Why is Peru Not a Regional Powerhouse in Latin America?” Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales. 2013. (PDF Available here)
Alejandro Sanchez Nieto is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.
Brittney J. Figueroa is a recent graduate of the University of California, Santa Barbara with a Bachelors degree in Global Studies, and a Minor in Latin American Iberian Studies.
The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the authors are associated.
Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.
“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.
By Alejandro Sanchez
In the past year a number of narco submarines have been seized in several Latin American states. Narco submarines continue to be a problem as hemispheric security forces combat drug trafficking. Unfortunately for every narco sub that is seized, another is under construction. While recent successful operations should be applauded, combating narco subs needs a regional strategy of its own.
In recent months, several narco submarines have been seized in various Latin American states. For example, on 5 August, Ecuadoran marines located one in the Las Delicias area, close to the border with Colombia. For Colombia, a narco sub was seized in an operation by army and naval personnel in the San Juan and Baudó Rivers in the Choco department in late July. The platform, which was carrying approximately four tons of cocaine, was apparently manufactured by ELN rebels. The Colombian Navy explained that this was the first time a narco sub was operating in a river, and that it probably took some five to six months to be constructed. Not long after, in mid-August, the Colombian Navy located yet another narco sub, this time in the Nariño department and with the capacity to transport up to four tons of drugs. This one measured 14 meters, with a diesel motor and propellers, the Navy explained in a communiqué.
Narco subs have also been located in Central America. For example, a narco sub, reportedly 16 meters in length and capable of transporting up to five tons of drugs, was found inGuatemala in mid-April. Months later, in late July, the Costa Rican Coast Guard found a similar illegal platform on a beach. Local authorities believe that the vessel, with the capacity to transport up to four tons of drugs, had a motor problem and was discarded by the crew, until it washed ashore and got stuck in the sand.
Catching Them At Sea
The aforementioned examples highlight one fact. So far, the vast majority of narco-platforms are captured in the mainland (meaning either on dry land or “docked” in some body of water), either before they depart or upon arriving to their destination.
As far as the author has been able to find, in the past couple of years, there have only been a couple of narco subs intercepted in open waters. One was in July 2015, when during a “joint operation, the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and assets from the Customs and Border Protection Office of Air and Marine, intercepted a “narco submarine” off the coast of El Salvador,”Business Insider explains. The platform was carrying over 16,000 pounds of cocaine.
More recently, in early September 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Waesche intercepted a narco sub in the Pacific Ocean off the Central American coast. The Cutter reportedly launched two vessels and an armed helicopter in pursuit. U.S. personnel caught up with the sub, apprehended five suspects, and thwarted a scuttling attempt by pumping water out of the interior of the sub.” By preventing the sinking of the sub, the USCG seized more than 5,600 pounds of cocaine, with an estimated value of USD$73 million.
Who Finds The Narco Subs?
Nowadays, several Latin American and Caribbean navies and coast guards are undergoing a modernization process, which includes the acquisition of new platforms. For example,Colombia and Mexico are domestically manufacturing new fleets of patrol vessels. Christian Ehrlich, a director of intelligence for Riskop, a Mexican Strategic intelligence and risk control company explained to the author that the Mexican Navy is in the process of adding Damen Sigma 10514 frigates to its fleet, “this will provide a decisive boost to Mexico’s Maritime Domain Awareness but unfortunately it will be some time before this system has an acceptable operational level” (construction for the first of the new frigates commenced in mid-August). Meanwhile The Bahamas is in the final stretch of its ambitious Sandy Bottom Project, via which it is obtaining a fleet of different patrol boats from Damen Group. Similarly, in late June IHS Jane’s reported that Louisiana-based shipbuilder Metal Shark and Damen will construct near coastal patrol vessels (NCPVs) for regional U.S. partners like “the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala.” It is worth noting that Mr. Ehrlich, remarked how Mexico possesses aircraft like CASA CN—235 and Beechcraft King Air 350ER for ISR; Colombia also possesses similar assets.
Nevertheless, in spite of more modern navies and coast guards, locating narco subs at sea continues to be a problem. In an interview with the author, Gustavo Fallas, a journalist for the Costa Rican daily La Nacion, explained that “[Costa Rica] depends on the Americans to combat [narco submarines]. In 2006 we detained a submersible with three tons [of drugs] and it was thanks to an American frigate. In 2012 we chased another one in the Caribbean, and it was also after the Americans alerted us. For those reasons it is vital to have U.S. aid to locate these platforms.” Mr. Fallas added that Costa Rica must create a shield (meaning more vessels, radars, personnel) to prevent drug traffickers from using the country as a warehouse or transit path for drugs.
Unfortunately, Randy Pestana, a policy analyst at Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, has a gloomy assessment about regional naval forces vis-à-vis narco subs. Mr. Pestana explained to the author how “relying on partner nations to stop, slow, or detain these shipments is difficult in itself as they do not have the necessary tools to do so unless provided by the U.S.” Of a similar opinion is Mr. Ehrlich, who stated to the author that “there isn’t a navy or coast guard in Central America with the [necessary platforms] to detect, follow and interdict [narco submarines].”
In other words, Central American navies will continue to rely on the U.S. (be it SOUTCHOM or the Coast Guard) to monitor maritime areas in order to combat, among other threats, narco submarines. This is problematic, since, as Mr. Pestana remarked, even U.S. security agencies have limits to their abilities, particularly nowadays when the U.S. has other security operations and geopolitical concerns around the globe. Furthermore, there is the problematic and ever-present red tape, namely, “the inability of the U.S. to respond to an identified narco submarine without permission from higher leadership. This often led to the narco submarine to either get away, or move out of the U.S. areas of operation,” the FIU expert explained.
How To Find A Narco Sub
Locating a narco submarine at sea is a tricky business. In an interview with the author, Mario Pedreros, a retired Chilean Naval officer and an expert in airborne maritime patrol, provided an excellent analysis on this problem.
As previously mentioned, the term narco submarine is commonly utilized for these vessels, however they are not really submarines. As Mr. Pedreros explains, these platforms are semi-submersibles, meaning that they cannot go completely underwater, and if they can do so, it is for brief periods of time. (“Narco submarine” is still a catchier name than “narco-semi-submersible” though). However, even if these vessels cannot fully dive, they are nonetheless difficult to locate at sea. Mr. Pedreros explained how some of these platforms have electronic motors, which makes them more silent than diesel engines, making them harder to find with passive sonar. “When it comes to semi-submersibles, utilizing sonar is not very efficient,” Mr. Pedreros concludes. Adding to the problem is that the vessel is pretty small, and “once at sea, the submersibles have 20 percent of their structure above the surface,” making them hard to pinpoint by radar.
Mr. Pedreros recommended maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) as an ideal tool to combat narco submarines at sea, as these aircraft possess superior sensors and radars for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Obviously, locating the target is only part of the solution, because then it has to be intercepted. “The aircraft must work with together with a vessel to capture the submersible. In other words, there are three components in this process: an aircraft (MPA), a vessel, and a light boat that can board the submersible and detain the crew,” the retired Chilean Naval officer explained. As previously discussed, various Latin American and Caribbean navies are acquiring OPVs with attached light boats, while Colombia and Mexico have platforms for maritime patrol, fulfilling the requirements by Mr. Pedreros; what is needed is greater multinational support, apart from additional platforms.
The Future of the Narco Sub
It would be naïve to assume that recent successful operations by regional security forces will convince drug traffickers to stop investing in narco submarines. There is simply too much money to be made in drugs, and the subs cost only around USD$1 million to manufacture. Even if five narco subs are stopped, drug traffickers only need one or two successful deliveries to make up for their losses.
Moreover, recently seized narco subs show they are becoming more technologically advanced, including bigger in size so they can transport greater quantities of contraband. The narco sub seized in mid-July in Choco had space for a crew of four, measured 9 meters in length by 4 wide, had radars, stabilizers, ballast weights and was powered by over 100 batteries, according to the Colombian daily El Colombiano.
Indeed, the (brief) history of narco subs shows a trend towards modernization, particularly as drug lords are always looking for new methods to transport drugs, from Cessna aircraft and go-fast boats during the Pablo Escobar era to drones and narco subs nowadays (though of course, narcos continue to utilize the former as well). Mr. Pestana drives this home remarking how “top drug traffickers are relatively smart and have a good grasp on technology and history.” Moreover, the attractive wages narco-organizations can afford to pay means that they can hire “former engineers or other trade workers,” as Mr. Pestana explains, to continuously improve previous designs.
Final Thoughts
From a scholarly point of view, the appearance of the narco sub is a fascinating development as it highlights drug traffickers’ ingenuity as they continuously think of new ways of transporting their contraband. Unfortunately, this represents an ongoing problem for regional security forces, as new narco subs become more technologically advanced. Unfortunately, even though many narco subs have been stopped, it only takes one successful trip to make a large profit.
In spite of several successful operations, combating narco submarines requires both a multiagency and multinational strategy of its own. Mr. Ehlrich stresses the necessity to disrupt the construction of these platforms (which requires cooperation between police and military units). As for when narco submarines are at sea, the Greater Central American region requires united front, such as a regional anti-narco submarine task force. By combining resources, in which member states can contribute platforms to create the three-platform interception teams that Mr. Pedreros described, this unit would ideally be more successful at locating narco subs at sea, and not just in inland waterways. This will decrease the region’s dependency on the U.S., which Mr. Pestana and Mr. Fallas highlighted.
Unfortunately, narco submarines are a problem that will not sink, hence new strategies are needed in order to combat them more efficiently.
Alejandro Sanchez Nieto is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez
The author would like to thank the various experts that contributed to this commentary:
Christian J. Ehrlich, Director of Intelligence, Riskop; External Analyst, Mexican Navy
Gustavo Fallas, Journalist, La Nacion (Costa Rica)
Mario Pedreros, a retired Chilean Navy Officer, expert in aero-maritime patrol. He participated as a Tactical Coordinator Officer (TACCO) in different missions overseas onboard Chilean Navy P-3 Orion aircrafts. Missions include Anti Submarine Warfare, Anti Surface Warfare, Anti Terrorism missions and Search and Rescue operations. He is currently based in Washington, DC. doing consulting for several Defense and Security companies.
Randy Pestana, Policy Analyst, Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, Florida International University
The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.
The People’s Republic of China has inaugurated its first
military base overseas in the Republic of Djibouti. The project further cements
Beijing’s interest in the African continent, and exemplifies how the latter
continues to be utilized as part of a geopolitical game of influences by global
military powers.
China’s Base
Beijing has stated that the base will be utilized to monitor
maritime commerce that crosses the Suez Canal and passes through the Red Sea
and Gulf of Aden into the Indian Ocean. A July 11 article by Xinhua explains
that “the base will ensure China’s performance of missions, such as escorting,
peace-keeping and humanitarian aid in Africa and west Asia” and also it will
“be conducive to overseas tasks including military cooperation, joint
exercises, evacuating and protecting overseas Chinese and emergency rescue, as
well as jointly maintaining security of international strategic seaways.” The
base was inaugurated on 1 August and the Beijing – Djibouti deal will
reportedly last until 2026.
There are certainly valid reasons for the project, as
pirates off the coast of Somalia have targeted civilian vessels for years. As a
response, the Europe Union created the Naval Force Operation Atalanta, to
combat piracy in the Horn of Africa. Apart from European navies, countries like
Colombia and China have also provided vessels to protect this important
maritime route. China is particularly at risk of suffering if maritime trade
through the Indian Ocean suffers, as the Asian giant imports much of its
resources.
As for the facilities, they are supposed to be a port for Chinese
naval platforms to dock, resupply and continue their patrolling operations.
Nevertheless, the complex appears to be suited for other tasks. The renowned
company Stratfor published on 26 July an assessment of the base, which included
aerial photos of the facilities. The article explains how the base has an
“extensive security perimeter, which features three layers of defense,” as well
as “a large underground component [which] measures approximately 23,000 square
meters.” Stratfor also explains that there is a “tarmac and a row of eight
hangars which suggest that aircraft such as helicopters could be based there
someday. However, it is unlikely that the facility will host fixed-wing
aircraft because at 400 meters the tarmac is much too short to accommodate
fighter jets or even larger drones.”
Indeed, China’s first base abroad should be regarded as a
major, well-defended complex.
Bases-A-Plenty
To be fair, China is not the sole hemispheric power to have
military facilities in the African continent. In fact, the U.S. already has a
base in Djibouti: the US Naval Expeditionary Base, situated at Djibouti’s
Djibouti–Ambouli International Airport, also known as Camp Lemonnier which is
shared with France. France also has access to naval base of Héron; Italy has
BMNS-Base Militare Nazionale di Supporto (National Support Military Base);
while Japan’s defense facilities are called Deployment Airforce for
Counter-Piracy Enforcement (DAPE). In other words, five nations, out of which
three are nuclear powers, with Tokyo and Washington having issues (to phrase it
mildly) with Beijing, have facilities in a country measuring approximately
23,200 km2.
While it is outside of this commentary’s analysis, one must
wonder what is the rationale of President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh (in power since
1999 and re-elected in 2016 for a fourth term) to allow five countries, to have
military deployments in his nation’s territory. One of the explanations has to
be financial as the leased military bases to the five nations will add funds to
the coffers of the country. Secondly these bases could discourage Eritrea from
any further adventures as border issues between the neighbors escalate. Of
course this also means that the quality of the Djiboutian military will improve
as well as the foreign powers will probably carry out training operations with
local forces.
Moreover it is worth noting, the U.S. has several other
bases across the continent, known as Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) and
Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs). As for France, the European nation has
become very involved in Mali to combat al-Qaeda linked groups. A May 19, 2012
report by Al Jazeera highlights how Paris has “1,600 French soldiers stationed
[in Mali], on the largest French military base outside of France.”
Additionally, France has a base in Gabon. India, another rising global power
like China, has the Indian Overseas Military Base at Assumption Island in the
Seychelles. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom has British Army Training Unit in
Kenya and the International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT) in Sierra
Leone. Similarly, recent reports hint at Turkey opening up training facilities
in Somalia with plans announced recently to open an additional facility in said
country.
Finally, it is important to note that the members of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are increasingly active in Africa as well. As
one of the co-authors has pointed out previously, the GCC “recognize[s] that
across Africa’s Muslim-majority countries a host of violent and extremist
Islamic groups pose a dire threat to Arabian Peninsula security and GCC
interests in Africa.” The UAE has already opened up a base in Somaliland
region, and it will be interesting to see if other GCC nations take similar
initiatives in the near future.
21st Century Military Geopolitics
Today, the Africa continent constitutes 54 independent
nations (depending on whether to count Somalia as a single state, which is
another issue). Nevertheless, while the era of colonialism is over,
neo-colonialism seems to be alive and well. There are a plethora of works in
recent years about how Africa continues to be taken advantage of, with very
little trickling down to benefit the masses. For example, Tom Burgis’ The
Looting Machine discusses the role of transnational companies that profit from
Africa’s natural resources.
Moreover, various extra-hemispheric governments have
increased their presence in Africa by establishing military facilities to
battle specific security threats (mostly rebels, pirates or terrorist
movements) but which have the added bonus of creating strong defense-related
bonds between the host country and the outside power. The United States, by
far, has the biggest military presence in Africa in terms of number of bases as
well as personnel (though figuring out an exact number is tricky given the
secrecy of these deployments). However former colonial powers like France,
Italy and the UK, as well as non-Western states like India, Japan, Turkey and
GCC states also have defense roles in the region. Hence, it should not be a
surprise that China is establishing a base in Africa, as Beijing is simply
following a pattern established by several other nations.
With that said, there is the obvious concern about how the
ongoing mistrust and animosity between Washington and Beijing will play out in
Djibouti. Will the facilities of both nations manage to co-exist peacefully as
they are there, at least theoretically, to face common security threats?
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors
alone and do not necessarily reflect any institutions with which the authors
are associated.
