COHA Espanol: La Tierra de lo Bizarro: El Cartel Del Golfo Ayuda A Damnificados De Tamaulipas

La Tierra de lo Bizarro: El Cartel Del Golfo Ayuda A Damnificados De Tamaulipas
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Council on Hemispheric Affairs - Espanol
September 30, 2013
Originally published: http://cohistas.wordpress.com/2013/09/30/la-tierra-de-lo-bizarro-el-cartel-del-golfo-ayuda-a-damnificados-de-tamaulipas/

El Huracán Ingrid, que azotó a varias comunidades del noreste mexicano particularmente en la región de Tamaulipas, ha pasado a segundo plano. Lo bizarro, a falta de una mejor palabra, es quienes han prestado ayuda a los damnificados de esa región. Usualmente cuando hay un desastre natural, los primeros en responder son las agencias de un gobierno: por ejemplo en Estados Unidos las agencias federales y la sociedad civil prestaron ayuda a los miles de damnificados luego del Huracán Katrina de 2005 y en Perú, el gobierno se movilizó luego que un gran terremoto destruyera extensas áreas en la Región Ica en el 2007. Sin embargo en el antes mencionado estado de México, los primeros en ayudar a varias comunidades han sido bandas criminales. Específicamente, el Cartel del Golfo (CDG) ha dado víveres y medicamentos a los damnificados   en esta región a causa de Ingrid. Esta iniciativa no hace sino incrementar la popularidad y legitimidad de este cartel entre la sociedad civil mexicana, algo que debería ser visto como muy alarmante para el futuro del gobierno de ese país.

Ingrid y el CDG

El Huracán Ingrid, de Categoría 1, golpeó al Valle del Rio Grande a mediados del mes de Septiembre, seguido por la Tormenta Tropical Manuel. Varias comunidades de la región, tanto de Tamaulipas como del Estado de Texas en Estados Unidos, han sido particularmente afectadas. Se han perdido alrededor de 100 vidas en México y hay más de 60 desaparecidos de acuerdo a los últimos reportes.[1]

La devastación fue tan masiva que varias comunidades quedaron muy golpeadas, con efectos poco predecibles. Por ejemplo, las fuertes tormentas provocaron la inundación de pantanos cerca a las comunidades urbanas de Tampico, Madero y Altamira. El resultado del paso de los fenómenos naturales es que los cocodrilos de pantano que habitan las zonas antes mencionadas fueron desplazados de su ecosistema por las lluvias, que los empujaron a zonas urbanas. Entre los tres municipios antes mencionados, ya se han capturado 25 cocodrilos, de 0.5 a 3 metros de longitud.[2]

Sin embargo no ha sido la devastación de esta región (que en algunos medios periodísticos abrió un debate del cambio climático y el calentamiento global y como afectan a Latino América) ni los cocodrilos, los que han hecho noticia.[3] Ni siquiera la falta de ayuda inmediata de parte del gobierno mexicano y las fuerzas de seguridad es lo más saltante de esta trágica historia. Más bien, lo más destacado de Ingrid y Manuel es que el Cartel del Golfo ha dado víveres y medicinas a los ciudadanos mexicanos afectados en Tamaulipas. Según se ha reportado en varios medios periodísticos, “varias toneladas de víveres a cientos de habitantes de Aldama y municipios del sur del Estado.”[4] De acuerdo a las imágenes del video en YouTube y reportes periodísticos, varias camionetas entraron al centro comercial de Andama y repartieron víveres necesarios como agua, arroz, harina de maíz, leche, jugos y galletas.[5]

Es más, el Cartel del Golfo está usando como un medio publicitario, tanto la devastación como la ayuda que ha proporcionado a los afectados en la región. Específicamente un video ha aparecido en YouTube, aparentemente creado por miembros del CDG, en donde se muestra “el lado humano” de la organización, que ayuda a los pobladores de Tamaulipas. Es más, los famosos memes (fotos con una leyenda pequeña), no se han hecho esperar. En uno, se aprecia una foto de miembros del CDG repartiendo víveres a personas que usan paraguas para protegerse de la lluvia – la leyenda de la foto dice “Si ayudan es porque tienen corazón.”[6]

El hecho que un grupo criminal como el CDG pueda llevar a cabo este tipo de iniciativas es preocupante. Algunas de las varias preguntas que uno se tiene que hacer incluyen: ¿En donde estaban las autoridades estatales y federales? ¿Es que conocían de esta iniciativa y la aprobaron o es que ocurrió sin su conocimiento? ¿Cómo adquirió el CDG los víveres que repartió?

Latino América: Entre El Terror y Ganar Adeptos

Sería erróneo declarar que este tipo de iniciativas son nuevas en la realidad Latino Americana. La verdad es que, a la par que existen grupos violentos en la región, también hay otros grupos que son violentos, pero que llevan a cabo obras e iniciativas para ganar el apoyo de la población local donde operan.

Ejemplos de movimientos armados y extremamente violentos en Latino América abundan, uno de ellos es el grupo insurgente Maoísta-Socialista del Perú, llamado Sendero Luminoso. Este movimiento terrorista sembró el terror en el país andino durante la década de los ochenta y principios de los noventa, con el objetivo de traer abajo al gobierno y crear uno nuevo con su líder, Abimael Guzmán, como nuevo jefe de estado (el nombre de guerra de Guzmán era Presidente Gonzalo). Varios especialistas y académicos peruanos que han estudiado a Sendero lo describen como un grupo “mesiánico.” Es decir, Sendero vio a cualquier individuo o entidad como el enemigo, si es que este no aceptada la ideología senderista/maoísta. No es sorpresa cuando se lee reportes de como Sendero llevó a cabo una guerra contra el gobierno peruano y las fuerzas del orden. Pero estos insurgentes también atacaron repetidamente a entidades civiles, como federaciones de trabajadores. Además, Sendero fue particularmente brutal contra los miembros de la Iglesia Cristiana (sin importar su denominación) ya que el mando senderista veía a la religión como el enemigo. Dado estos actos de extrema violencia, Sendero perdió adeptos y seguidores entre la población peruana, lo que ayudó a que se debilite militarmente.

Por otro lado, han habido entidades criminales cuyos líderes han querido mantener un apoyo entre una población, ya sea por razones personales (por ejemplo, el ego de un líder) o por razones operacionales (para tener seguidores que sirvan como informantes o que den ayuda a miembros de una organización criminal). Un ejemplo de un líder criminal que quería ser adorado es Pablo Escobar, líder del Cartel de Medellín en Colombia hasta que fue eliminado por agentes de seguridad en 1993. Como bien lo describió Mark Bowden en su famoso libro “Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw,” Escobar no quería ser simplemente poderoso y rico, quería ser amado por el pueblo como un “Robin Hood” colombiano. Esta ambición se evidencia en  todas las obras sociales que el colombiano llevó a cabo en su natal Antioquia para ganar el apoyo de la población local, como la construcción de campos de futbol, torres eléctricas y  donaciones a las parroquias locales, entre otras.

Hasta el Sendero Luminoso del 2013, aun debilitado, está intentando ganar seguidores y simpatía entre las nuevas generaciones ya sea vía la palabra o el dólar, en vez de la violencia. Por ejemplo, una ONG peruana llamada MOVADEF (Movimiento por Aministia y Derechos Fundamentales) tiene como secretario general a Alfredo Crespo, el abogado de Abimael Guzmán.[7] El objetivo de esta organización es enseñar a las nuevas generaciones de peruanos una versión distorsionada de la historia del Perú, donde Abimael Guzmán y sus seguidores son perseguidos políticos, no terroristas, y los crímenes que se les imputan (como las masacres en los Andes peruanos) son o invenciones del Estado o crímenes llevados a cabo por el Estado pero que fueron atribuidos a Sendero. En la Amazonía peruana, es sabido que el nuevo Sendero paga en dólares a los campesinos pobres a cambio de víveres, el cultivo de coca (la base de la cocaína) y otros tipos de ayudas.

Finalmente, los carteles mexicanos no se quedan atrás en cuanto a ganar adeptos vía obras sociales, a mediados del 2012, hubo una controversia grande en México cuando se hizo conocido que una inmensa capilla en Pachuca, en el centro del país, había sido construida con dinero de sangre. Es decir, los fondos para construirla habían provenido del entonces líder del cartel de los Zetas, conocido como “El Lazca.” [8] Aunque la iglesia fue bautizada como el “Centro de Evangelización Juan Pablo II,” rápidamente se le re-bautizó popularmente como una “narcocapilla.”[9]

Un año después, en Julio del 2013, ha habido nuevas acusaciones de que la Iglesia católica en México está recibiendo donaciones de los carteles. Debido a esto, el Monseñor de Hermosillo, José Ulises Macías Salcedo, declaró a la prensa que “He sido cuidadoso en ese aspecto. Cuando alguien ofrece ciertas cantidades de dinero pregunto de donde proviene. Y si cuando reconocen con humildad, les digo que no puedo aceptárselo.”[10] Es difícil pensar que, dado las millonarias cantidades de dinero que los carteles mexicanos manejan hoy en día, los miembros de la Iglesia católica en México (o de cualquier otra fe) sean impunes a la corrupción y otros actos ilegales.

Conclusión

La destrucción en el Estado mexicano causada por el Huracán Ingrid es una gran tragedia, por el lado que se le vea. Pero más preocupante es que fue el Cartel del Golfo y no el gobierno mexicano quien  prestara ayuda el  a los damnificados de las comunidades de este estado. El mismo cartel al que se le acusa de haber botado 49 cuerpos mutilados por una carretera en Nuevo León en el 2012; es el mismo que ahora quiere demostrar que tiene un corazón y quiere ayudar a sus compatriotas de Tamaulipas.[11]

Esta una situación irónica, bizarra, pero no única. Grupos violentos como el Cartel de Medellín de Pablo Escobar durante la década de los ochenta, o el Cartel de los Zetas y Sendero Luminoso en años recientes, también han intentado ganar simpatía entre sus respectivas poblaciones. Esperaremos conocer la respuesta que llevará a cabo el gobierno mexicano.

W. Alejandro Sánchez, Analista de Seguridad y Research Fellow en el Consejo de Asuntos Hemisféricos

Ésta es una contribución gratuita producida por el Consejo de Asuntos Hemisféricos. Si desea republicarla, por favor ponga nuestra información institucional. Los derechos exclusivos pueden ser negociados.

Si desea obtener más información sobre los asuntos interamericanos, les sugerimos que visite la página de Latin News, haciendo un clic aquí.

Citaciones 

[1] “Ciclones ‘Ingrid’ y ‘Manuel’ dejan 101 muertos y 68 desaparecidos en Mexico.” El Comercio (Peru). September 21, 2012. Accessed September 27, 2013 http://elcomercio.pe/actualidad/1633984/noticia-ciclonesingrid-ymanuel-dejan-101-muertos-68-desaparecidos-mexico

[2] “Capturan 25 cocodrilos en Tamaulipas tras paso de ‘Ingrid.’” El Universal (Mexico). Estados. September 22, 2013. Accessed September 26, 2013   http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/2013/capturan-cocodrilos-tamaulipas-tras-paso-ingrid-952706.html

[3] Whitney Eulich. “Mexico’s Storms: Should governments put emphasis on climate change prevention?” The Christian Science Monitor. Latin America Monitor. September 24, 2013.  Accessed September 27, 2013  http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2013/0924/Mexico-s-storms-Should-governments-put-emphasis-on-climate-change-prevention

[4] “Cartel del Golfo repartee toneladas de despensas a afectador por ‘Ingrid’ en Tamaulipas.” Proceso (Mexico). September 22, 2013. Accessed September 26, 2013   http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=353468

[5] “Cartel del Golfo repartee toneladas de despensas a afectador por ‘Ingrid’ en Tamaulipas.” Proceso (Mexico). September 22, 2013. Accessed September 26, 2013   http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=353468 Also see: Ildefonso Ortiz. “Tamaulipas floods Twitter with Ingrid alerts; video appears to show Gulf Cartel dabbling in disaster relief.”The Monitor. September 23, 2013. Accessed September 27, 2013  http://www.themonitor.com/news/local/article_e18ec87e-24a8-11e3-8605-0019bb30f31a.html

[6] “Cartel del Golfo repartee toneladas de despensas a afectador por ‘Ingrid’ en Tamaulipas.” Proceso (Mexico). September 22, 2013. Accessed September 26, 2013   http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=353468

[7] “Denuncian a dirigente del MOVADEF Alfredo Crespo.” La Republica (Peru). Politica. January 2, 2013. Accessed September 25, 2013  http://www.larepublica.pe/02-01-2013/denuncian-dirigente-del-movadef-alfredo-crespo

[8] Ignacio de los Reyes. “Iglesia y narco en Mexico: entre la amenaza y la complicidad.” BBC Mundo. March 22, 2013. Accessed September 27, 2013  http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/noticias/2012/03/120322_mexico_iglesia_narco_visita_papa_aw.shtml

[9] Ignacio de los Reyes. “Iglesia y narco en Mexico: entre la amenaza y la complicidad.” BBC Mundo. March 22, 2013. Accessed September 27, 2013  http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/noticias/2012/03/120322_mexico_iglesia_narco_visita_papa_aw.shtml

[10] Jose Trinidad Mendez. “Iglesia niega dadivas de carteles.” Periodico AM (Mexico). Local. July 17, 2013.  Accessed September 26, 2013 http://www.am.com.mx/leon/local/iglesia-niega-recibir-dadivas-de-carteles-32630.html

[11] Geoffrey Ramsey. “Mexico arrests 8 ‘Gulf Cartel Members’ over Nuevo Leon Massacre.” InSight Crime. May 18, 2012. Accessed September 27, 2013   http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/mexico-arrests-8-gulf-cartel-members-over-nuevo-leon-massacre

VOXXI: Colombian government to begin talks with ELN guerrillas?

Colombian government to begin talks with ELN guerrillas?
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
September 26, 2013
Originally published: http://www.voxxi.com/colombia-government-talks-eln-guerrillas/

The Colombian government has made headlines once again regarding potential peace negotiations with guerrilla movements. However, the news does not concern any kind of breakthrough between Bogota and FARC insurgents, as negotiations have stalled for weeks.

Rather, the newest development is that the Colombian government has announced that it is ready to begin negotiations with Colombia’s other rebel movement, the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN – National Liberation Army).

A short history of the ELN

The smaller of the two current Colombian left-wing insurgent organizations, the ELN has had a violent history since its creation in 1962 when six Colombian students created a movement called the “Brigada Jose Antonio Galan” – in 1964 the group began training in Santander and 1965 it carried out its first operation.

Characterized by a Marxist-Leninist ideology inspired by the 1959 Cuban Revolution, the ELN aspires to create a Marxist government in the country.

The ELN is concentrated in the Norte de Santander, Arauca, Cauca and Valle del Cauca regions and, according to estimates, the group has less than 3,000 fighters (significantly less than the FARC’s estimated 8,000 fighters).

Nevertheless, one important factor to keep in mind is that while the FARC has lost several senior commanders over the years, the ELN has largely maintained its leadership structure—since 1998 its leader has been Nicolas Rodriguez (alias Gabino).

Likewise, it is worth noting that while the ELN has lost a lot of its fighting force over the past years, this was not simply due to successful operations by Colombian security forces, but also because of voluntary demobilizations. For example, this past July, 30 ELN fighters of the “Compañia Lucho Quintero Giraldo” laid down their weapons in a ceremony in which President Juan Manuel Santos was in attendance.

However, even with a reduced strength, the ELN remains an impressive foe, and has continued to launch high-profile attacks and kidnappings. For example, in January 2013, five civilians that worked for the Canadian company Braeval Mining were kidnapped by ELN fighters while they were in a mining site in the Bolivar department.

The incident made international headlines as the victims included two Peruvian citizens as well as one Canadian.

The ELN negotiations: A wider geopolitical context

In a September 6 commentary for VOXXI, I discussed whether President Santos deserved a 21% approval rating, according to the latest polls. In the article, I explained the reasons and setbacks that Santos has faced over the past year that have prompted this sharp decline in his popularity.

The protests by Colombian peasants that started in June and which quickly expanded throughout major cities are a major reason for this decline.Moreover, after much optimism, the ongoing peace negotiations with the FARC, which are taking place in Cuba, have stalled.

Only one partial agreement has been reached from a five-point peace plan, and it is highly unlikely that a full agreement can be reached before the end of the year.

Moreover, in the international arena, Santos received another blow when the International Court of Justice passed its 2012 ruling over a maritime dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua regarding an archipelago in the Caribbean.

The ruling was bizarre as Colombia maintained control of the islands, but Nicaragua obtained control of some of the Caribbean waters around them. The Santos presidency is crying foul over the ruling and has protested plans by Nicaragua to explore for oil in the disputed waters.

If the Colombian head of state hopes to be re-elected in the upcoming May 2014 elections, he needs a fast win. Santos’ September 24 speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations was riddled with references to peace.

For example, he stated that the Colombian guerrilla must understand that “it is time to exchange bullets for votes […] that the time has come to continue its struggle but via democracy.” (It is worth noting that Santos gave UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon a letter during the UN meeting to protest Nicaragua’s “expansionist” plans).

Hence, it comes at little surprise that he seems to have accepted a proposal by Uruguayan President Jose Mujica to have Montevideo host a potential round of negotiations between the ELN and the Colombian government.

If the (very unpopular) Colombian president wants to rebrand himself as a “champion of Colombian peace” by managing peace negotiations with both the FARC and ELN at the same time, this is certainly an ambitiously strategic endeavor.

But whether any of them will be successful is an entirely different matter. Peace agreements are possible, as exemplified by agreements with the M19 insurgent movement in 1990, and the demobilization of AUC paramilitaries between 2003 and 2006. Nevertheless, negotiations with the ELN were unsuccessful as recently as 2002 and 2007.

While seeking to end warfare and achieve peace via negotiations is certainly commendable, history and security analyses do not count towards Santos’ favor. For the time being, it is difficult for Colombian society to be optimistic that negotiations with the ELN may be more successful than they have been with the FARC.

Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/colombia-government-talks-eln-guerrillas/#ixzz2g3CfXD8v 

Interview: Voice of Russia: A look back into Peru's internal conflict

"A Look Back Into Peru's Internal Conflict"
Voice of Russia - American Edition
September 24, 2013
Originally published: http://voiceofrussia.com/us/2013_09_25/A-look-back-into-Perus-internal-conflict-5612/ ( Audio File Available)

History often has a way of haunting the present. In June, families buried the exhumed remains of loved ones from a mass grave was discovered in the Ayacucho region of Peru last year, revealing more evidence of the disappeared. Twenty-one bodies were found, all victims of the Sendero Luminoso, or the Shining Path, guerrilla insurgent group.

There were three main actors in the internal conflict, each fought for control over the same territories. The Shining Path is a paramilitary Maoist group that aimed to form a utopian communist society by creating a peasant uprising. They tried to control the country, region-by-region, killing opposing forces or those who refused to become allies. The Marxist-Leninist Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, or the MRTA, was a Marxist guerilla organization less violent than the Shining Path. They often took responsibility for their actions, which involved kidnapping, taking hostages, and directed assassinations. As a response, the military formed a counterinsurgency that was brutal and indiscriminate in its tactics to dismantle both organizations.

Alejandro Sanchez, a researcher with the Council on Hemispheric Affairs in Washington, D.C., was born in Peru at the start of the conflict in 1981. This is Sanchez:

“At the beginning of the conflict, Shining Path and MRTA were regarded as criminals, they were not regarded as terrorist organizations that wanted to overthrow the government. The Shining Path and MRTA were severely underestimated. So at the beginning of the conflict in the first couple of years, it was the police that actually took the brunt of the operations against these insurgent movements. And it was only after ’83, ’84, after the Lucanamarca massacre, that they realized that these groups were actually for real. They really want to overthrow the government, they are killing civilians left and right, they have the car bombs they are utilizing now, so then the military was deployed to support the police. The Peruvian army was not trained to fight this kind of counterinsurgency guerrilla movements, so it took them years and years to figure out how to do it. And unfortunately some human rights abuses were committed by them as well.

At the time, the Shining Path and the MRTA infiltrated most echelons of Peruvian society. They were pressing universities in downtown Lima. They were pressing all over the highlands in the Amazon, so they didn’t know who was an enemy and who was a civilian. Unfortunately, because of this, a lot of human rights violations were committed.”

By the end of the conflict, many of the guerrilla leaders were killed or imprisoned, yet very few military officers were brought to justice. By 2001, the conflict had finally ended, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru was formed to analyze the human rights abuses committed during the conflict. Dr. Salomon Lerner Febres, former director of the Commission, co-authored a report that suggested steps for seeing justice upheld after the conflict. This is Febres:

“We created an anthropological forensic plan that named two to three thousand burial sites where 1 or 2 bodies were hidden, or even up to scores of bodies. When the plan was released, the sites were investigated, and since then, we have learned that there are six or eight thousand sites where victims were buried to cover up evidence, especially by the armed forces.”

Many of the families whose loved ones died in the conflict, may never see justice upheld. The conflict occurred in times of democracy and many of those same political actors or parties are actively involved in Peruvian politics today and do not want to mar their image by assuming responsibility. Some closure was finally brought to survivors when former President Alberto Fujimori was sentenced in 2009 to 25 years in prison for having ordered the killings of 25 people by death squad.

This is Febres:

“Peru requires institutional reforms, such as education, which should be accessible across the country. It requires job opportunities, for justice to be accessible to all Peruvians, that all Peruvians can be citizens that fully exercise their rights—those reforms have not been fulfilled, and that is a problem.

A political renovation is needed. There are no serious political frameworks or ideas in my country, so there is a big task ahead for young people.”

The Shining Path maintains about 300 fighters today, divided into two factions in the Peruvian highlands. Mass killings are over, but they still say they fight for their Maoist goals and claim they will control Peru in 2050. However, their meager public support and transition to a narcotrafficking group challenges the validity of those statements.

In addition to drug trafficking, the biggest threat they pose today is delegitimizing other popular movements in Peru. According to Alejandro Sanchez of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, the government perceives no serious threat of a resurgence of a new guerrilla movement. However, they fear movement infiltration by Shining Path militants. Security forces often use this suspicion as a reason to crack down on major protests, despite lacking evidence of infiltration, as seen at the recent protests surrounding Peru’s Independence Day in July.

In another emblematic case in 2009, police fired on a roadblock by indigenous protesters at Bagua, and the ensuing confrontation left 34 dead, with deaths on both sides. The indigenous activists were initially set to face trial in a special terrorist court established to try drug lords and Shining Path militants. Although the terrorism court eventually deferred on hearing the case, 54 activists await possible life sentences, while only one police officer is behind bars.

 Thirteen years have passed since the Shining Path ruthlessly pursued Maoist communism and threatened daily life in Peru. Yet their legacy haunts movements today, as does the government’s free pass to suppress possible “subversive” ideas as they see fit.

Blouin Beat: World: Rousseff’s U.S. visit postponement savvy move

Rousseff's U.S.visit postponement savvy move
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: World
September 18, 2013
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatworld/2013/09/18/rousseffs-u-s-visit-postponement-savvy-move/

The NSA revelations continue to roil global affairs. News that the agency had carried out espionage operations against Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff (as well as her aides and Brazil’s biggest company, energy giant Petrobras) has prompted the South American head of state to announce that she will postpone her visit to Washington, originally scheduled for October 23.

As much the event may resemble an act of petulance or retribution, it is not — and it does not mean that the U.S. and Brazil are now on the outs for good. Postponing the trip to Washington was the best option in a bad scenario. Had the Brazilian leader travelled to the U.S. capital, met with President Obama and attended the planned state dinner, the NSA program would have been a massive elephant in the room. She would have faced lacerating public scrutiny when she returned if she had met with the U.S. leader and not raised (and protested) the NSA issue, as she would not have been able to do with any effectiveness unless she had gone to D.C. and thrown the oil deals and arms sales the visit was expected to center on back in Obama’s face — an impossibility.

Rousseff cannot, at now of all times, afford to look weak or to be perceived as not having defended Brazilian sovereignty sufficiently. She faces challenges on several fronts. In June, protests broke out across major cities in Brazil, fueled by popular rage over a spike in public transportation prices as well as massive expenditures for the upcoming 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Rio Summer Olympics — all of which helped ignite a simmering and widespread discontent about Brazil’s limping economy. Meanwhile, Rousseff’s cabinet was hit by the resignation in late August of Foreign Affairs Minister Antonio Patriota, after a bizarre incident involving a Bolivian senator who escaped to Brazil to avoid prosecution in La Paz with the aid of Brazilian diplomatic personnel.

All grim news for Rousseff as Brazil is facing general elections scheduled for October 2014, elections in which she will be running for a new presidential term. Now, it’s true that her approval ratings have started to recover from the dive they took after the protests started. A recent pollreported that 38% of Brazilians consider her tenure either “excellent” or “good,” up from 31% in July, when the protests were still ongoing. A September 12 analysis from Brazil’s Estadao showcases the hardening consensus among the nation’s political observers that this climb-back in popularity gives Rousseff a solid(ish) footing with which to face the elections — but also that it’s unlikely for her ever to recapture her previous levels of support. Hence every opportunity to look strong on behalf of her aggrieved constituents counts, and her now-kiboshed trip looks to have been an ideal opportunity there.

But, according to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Brazil and the U.S. countries had bilateral trade flows of $103 billion in 2011; as of 2012, the export of U.S. goods to Brazil totaled $43.7 billion and the import of goods from Brazil totaled $32.1 billion. Unsurprisingly, products of particular interest that were imported from Brazil to the U.S. were mineral fuels and crude oil. Data from Brazil’s Ministry of Development, Industry and External Commerce for the January-August 2013 period also shows a year-on-year increase in trade. Neither Rousseff, whose country needs all the trade revenue it can muster, nor Obama, stinging from the international rejection of his proposed Syria strike and doubtless looking for some good global-harmony news, will make a serious move to jeopardize that trade. Which likely makes the recent speculation on whether, as a way to “punish” the U.S. for the espionage operation, Brazil might chose not to purchase  36 type F-18 fighter jets from Boeing — reportedly worth $4 billion — just that: speculation. (Although it is important to stress here that other companies are competing for the coveted contract, like France’s Dassault Aviation and Sweden’s Saab.) Rousseff’s statement that she wants Brazilian internet access to be less dependent on U.S. servers — bold but murky in its technical specifics and expensive if implemented — is another gesture on her part aimed at helping her approval numbers in their incremental climb. As Mauricio Cantoro, a Brazilian professor of international affairs, tweeted on September 17, “Interesting decision by Dilma to postpone (but not cancel). It gives time for the crisis to calm down and leaves a door open for dialogue.” That “dialogue” will, it seems hard to deny, focus on energy deals and F-18s. So look for the realities of the marketplace to prevail here.

Reporte: Rusia - Integracion Regional - CAEI Observatorio de Rusia No. 5

Observatorio de Rusia No. 5
Invierno Sur 2013, Año IV
Junio, Julio y Agosto 2013
Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales

Integracion Regional
Cronología & Fenomenología - Pág. 28
Resignificación & Sentido   Moscú quiere expandir su influencia al  Asia Pacífico  -  Pág. 32

Por, W. Alejandro Sanchez


Observatorio disponible: http://www.caei.com.ar/observatorio/observatorio-de-Rusia

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VOXXI: Guatemala plays a key role on the Syria crisis

Guatemala plays a key role on the Syria Crisis
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
September 13, 2013
Originally published: http://www.voxxi.com/guatemala-key-role-syria-crisis/

As the possibility of a military intervention by the U.S. against the Assad regime in Syria seems to have been put on hold, the Syrian civil war has entered a bizarre status quo.

The conflict within Syria continues, but the international community is generally opposed to a (U.S-led) military operation against Assad’s forces.

One of the few countries in the Western Hemisphere that has declared its support for this option is Guatemala, one of two rotating members representing Latin America and the Caribbean (the other being Argentina) at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The Eternal U.S. Ally?

So far, the Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Guatemalan delegation to the United Nations have made standard diplomatic statements, though they have come out in favor of sanctions and a possible military intervention spearheaded by Washington.

For example, back in July 2012, Guatemala voted in favor of a UNSC resolution that would have imposed sanctions on Syria. Moreover, an undated press release by the Guatemalan delegation to the United Nations highlights how it has voted in favor of resolutions in the UN’s General Assembly (A/66/253A, A/66/253B, A/66/176 and A/67/183) lamenting the loss of life and calling for negotiations.

The Guatemalan government took a stronger stance after August 21, following revelations that the Syrian government had utilized chemical weapons, namely sarin gas, against civilians. Some 1,500 individuals were killed in a Damascus suburb as a result of this attack.

After the alleged chemical attack took place, the Guatemalan Foreign Affairs Ministry released a statement calling for an investigation of the incident.

 Syria crisis

In traditional diplomatic parlance, the Ministry explained that: “Guatemala calls for all sides involved in the conflict in Syria to facilitate and guarantee the access of UN investigators to the area where events took place […]” More controversially, the Guatemalan government declared its support for a possible U.S. military intervention in the country.

A late August statement explains that “the government of Guatemala fully supports the call [by the U.S.] for the international community to not cross its arms in the face of these deplorable events.”

Shortly after, on September 1^st, President Otto Pérez Molina expressed his support for President Obama’s intention to carry out a military operation in Syria.

According to media reports, the Guatemalan leader stated that “we [Guatemala] clearly and definitely support the decision that the U.S. President has taken so that chemical weapons will not be utilized again, which cause mass deaths. That is Guatemala’s position.”

A Brief Overview of U.S. – Guatemala Relations

Arguably, Guatemala’s stance supporting a U.S. military initiative in the UNSC stems from the country’s desire to remain on good terms with Washington.

Exemplifying this is a June 2013 meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, in which Guatemalan President Perez Molina met with Secretary John Kerry.

During the high-level assembly, the Guatemalan leader expressed to the senior U.S. official his aspiration to see his Central American nation join the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Moreover, a May 2013 report by the Congressional Research Service entitled Guatemala: Political, Security, and Socio-Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations discusses U.S. aid to Guatemala.

The report explains that the Central American state received $110 millionin the Fiscal Year 2011, which decreased to an estimated $95 million in the FY2012.

The report adds that, “The Perez Molina Administration, like previous Guatemalan administration, has been pressing the United States to drop those conditions and provide increased military aid to the army.”Current U.S. military aid is centered on counternarcotics programs.

It is important to explain how a diplomatic stance regarding a military intervention in Syria is perceived through geopolitical eyes. Does the fact that Guatemala’s President Perez Molina is in favor of a U.S. military strike signify that the country remains under Washington’s sphere of influence?

Furthermore, to what extent has the Guatemalan government considered the unforeseen effects of a military strike against the Syrian government before its declarations supporting intervention?

The call to arms against the Syrian government by the Guatemalan government should be placed in a historical context. Namely, the situation in Syria can be compared to that Central American country’s own bloody civil war (1960-1966), between the government and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URGN).

The Guatemalan internal conflict was particularly violent, claiming over 200,000 lives, and became known for crimes such as the 1978 Panzos massacre. Given this recent history, a pro-military stance in Syria goes along quite well with Guatemala’s tendency to resort to violence to solve security problems.

Representing Who?

Agreeing to a military intervention is not an easy thing for any government to do. And of course, there is a difference between a country having the right to declare that an intervention is necessary and actually voting in favor one of in a forum like the UNSC, as well as participating in it.

The Guatemalan government has a right to declare that a military intervention in Syria (against the Assad regime) is necessary.

Nevertheless, it should be stressed that Guatemala’s stance in the UNSC goes against the positions vis-à-vis Syria of most of the Western Hemisphere.

Recent declarations by the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) highlight that most Western Hemisphere governments are against a new U.S.-led military operation.

One can only hope that Guatemala’s diplomatic stances in the UNSC regarding Syria has been reached after a lengthy and rational debate regarding moral obligations and national interests in Guatemala City.

Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/guatemala-key-role-syria-crisis/#ixzz2eoGUm0PO