Blouin Beat: World: Latin America tries out the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty

Latin America tries out the U.N. Arms Treaty
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: World
October 3, 2013
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatworld/2013/10/03/latin-america-tries-out-the-u-n-arms-trade-treaty/
 

Good news for arms regulators and for the U.N.: as of the most recent General Assembly, over 20 more governments had signed the body’s Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Said treaty is an ambitious attempt to regulate “the international trade in conventional arms, from small arms to battle tanks, combat aircraft and warships,” as explained in the website of the U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs.

Since the U.S. is the world’s biggest exporter of weapons, much hype and media attention was given to Secretary of State John Kerry, who signed the treaty in the name of the U.S. government. However, it is important to highlight that an increasing number of Latin American and Caribbean nations have also signed this treaty — and some have also ratified it.

The ATT has been open for signing since June 3, and so far, 113 U.N. member states have signed it. Many of these nations come from Latin America or the Caribbean. For example, Brazil signed the treaty on June 3 –an important development considering that Brazil has a growing and vibrant military industry (via Brazilian companies like EMBRAER, which produces the renowned Super Tucano military aircraft). The governments of Peru and Colombia signed the treaty during the UN General Assembly, while the small Caribbean island of Dominica is the newest signatory as it signed on October 1.

However, signing this arms treaty is only half of the job, as 50 U.N. member states have to ratify it before ATT’s provisions can be implemented. According to the U.N., only seven nations have so far ratified the ATT: Antigua & Barbuda, Costa Rica, Guyana, Iceland, Mexico, Nigeria and Trinidad & Tobago – in other words, a solid majority come from the Americas.

Guyana, Trinidad & Tobago and Antigua & Barbuda are not known for being military powerhouses. Costa Rica lacks a military (though it does have well-trained police forces) and has shaped its foreign policy and international image to become a continental “champion of the peace.” Mexico, however, is a Latin American military powerhouse, with a robust defense budget and a military which has been used for internal security in the past and it is a significant development that Mexico City has ratified the ATT.

But the treaty evoked some big-name “nays”, as well. The three countries that voted against it are Iran, North Korea, and Syria, with 23 other countries abstaining (tacitly implying that they have some reservations, to put it mildly, about the treaty). And Latin America had some prominent abstentions as well: Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador and Venezuela. These countries have protested the treaty, stating that it aids nations that export weapons (i.e. the U.S., various European states, Russia or China) and that the ATT could be “politically manipulated.”

The acquisition of 113 signatures and seven ratifications in less than six months is a promising start for the ATT, but the ratification of treaties is a slow and potentially divisive process, and we will not see the 50 required ratifications achieved anytime soon. The negotiations of what to put in the ATT took several years, and the result was still not regarded as satisfactory by several nations, best exemplified by the number of abstentions and “no” votes.

Nevertheless, it is worth noting the general support from Latin America and the Caribbean for this treaty. Even more so, given that most Latin American states have growing defense budgets and have been carrying out major military purchases in recent years thanks to a regional economic boom. Recent signatories Peru and Colombia are also carrying out important acquisitions of military hardware, ranging from Colombia’s purchase of drones from Israel to Peru currently testing theRussian T-90S tank (Lima has been trying to select a tank to modernize its tank fleet for years).

It is encouraging to see that nations of the Western Hemisphere recognize the necessity for a global treaty regulating the sale of conventional weapons. While Latin America has not sufferedmajor inter-state wars in over close to a century, the concern that inter-state tensions and random incidents could spark an arms race is alive and well among for Latinamericanists. The ATT, even in its embryonic phase, serves as a potential damper there.

VOXXI: Mexico’s people call for action and peacekeeping

Mexico's people call for action and peacekeeping
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
July 23, 2013
Originally published: http://www.voxxi.com/mexico-call-for-action-and-peacekeeping/

Mexico’s people have spoken. On June 24, 2013, the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented the findings of a major survey compiled by the Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas (CIDE), a well-regarded Mexican research center. The survey collects the opinions of Mexican citizens and policymakers regarding various foreign policy issues, including whether Mexican security forces should participate in the United Nations’ peacekeeping operations (PKO). In general, most of the nearly 3,000 respondents expressed their support for a greater Mexican involvement in the UN ’s operations.

Allowing the Mexican military or police to take part in PKOs is more complicated than writing a presidential executive order; the country’s constitution will need to be amended. Nevertheless, the results of the CIDE survey, along with recent declarations by Mexican policymakers demonstrate that the public would likely welcome significant policy changes. The international community would also benefit from this development given the numerous conflict zones that exist across the globe.

Evolving Views

The Mexican constitution states that the government must maintain a policy of non-interference with regards to the affairs of other nations. Namely, Article 89, Section X, describes that it is the duty of the president to uphold the principle of non-intervention, while Article 76, Section III, explains that the legislature must authorize the deployment of troops abroad. This means that Mexico, while an active participant in the international community, has only seldom participated in peacekeeping operations, and even then its role has been very limited.

However, the recent CIDE survey makes apparent the shift in popular opinion of both Mexican citizens and policymakers in favor of a growing Mexican role in peacekeeping operations. The CIDE explains that between 2004 and 2012, popular support grew from 48% to 58%.

However, it is worth noting that support for this initiative among policymakers, who were also interviewed for the survey, is lower, at 52%, although several prominent Mexican officials have publically declared their support. For example, Ambassador Juan Manuel Gomez Robledo, deputy secretary for multilateral affairs at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, has declared that “it is necessary to have a debate” regarding Mexico’s role in PKOs. The goal of this proposal would to promote greater governmental support for this to happen.

Despite the inability of the Mexican government to reach a consensus on the issue regardless of the political party in power, the country’s military is already preparing itself for this eventuality. For example, a Mexican army general has been assigned to the Mexican mission to the UN to learn more about current peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, the Secretaria de Defensa Nacional has begun carrying out civic projects to gain further civilian and governmental support for Mexican participation in peacekeeping operations. Such initiatives hint that there’s a desire by some Mexican military officers to participate in them.

Reasons To Serve

Certainly, a decision to deploy a country’s armed forces to a UN peacekeeping operation should be made only after a healthy debate among the government, military, scholars and civic society. There are potential threats to consider when negotiating the possibility of contributing to these operations, including the likelihood that deployed soldiers could lose their lives on foreign soil. As recently as mid-July, seven UN peacekeepers were killed by rebels in the UN-African Union peacekeeping mission in Sudan’s Darfur.

The concern for deploying soldiers to war zones is expressed in the CIDE poll. While Mexicans are generally in favor of PKOs, support varies depending on the type of UN mission Mexican soldiers could be deployed to. Only 37 percent support the deployment of soldiers to conflict zones (with 46 percent against). On the other hand, 89 percent of the polled citizens were in favor of sending troops to other countries to help with relief operations after natural disasters.

But even with significantly positive numbers, we will not see an increased Mexican involvement in peacekeeping operations anytime soon. Constitutional reform will require an amendment (or re-interpretation) of the concept of non-intervention. In Mexico, one of the congressional chambers will have to first propose a constitutional amendment. After it is passed, it will be sent to the 31 state governments, plus Mexico City, for approval. Only when 17 out of the 32 states have approved the motion, the President will receive it for final approval. In other words, this process can take years.

In a February VOXXI commentary, I discussed the future of Mexican foreign policy under President Enrique Peña Nieto. Specifically, I assessed the tools the Mexican government has at its disposal to increase its leadership role in Latin America. A greater role in peacekeeping operations will have the positive effect of aiding people in conflict zones.

What’s more, from a more real politik perspective, participation will increase the international pedigree of the Mexican government and military. Mexican military personnel themselves would also benefit from gaining more battlefield experience as well as monetarily, as soldiers are generally well-paid by participating in peacekeeping operations. As a point of comparison, Brazil has certainly profited diplomatically from its proactive role in the UN, including PKOs like in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

With that said, Mexican troops should not be put needlessly at risk simply for diplomatic gains considering the threats that peacekeeping troops are exposed to. But greater Mexican involvement in UN peacekeeping operations would likely result in overarching benefits for global security and Mexican standing in the international community. Especially considering the recent evolution in public opinion, President Peña Nieto should waste no time in pushing this initiative.

Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/mexico-call-for-action-and-peacekeeping/#ixzz2ZugShlpP

Mention: Latin America and UN Peacekeeping

Latin America and UN Peacekeeping
by Sabrina Karim Americas Quarterly - blog
August 20, 2012
Available: http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3913

 Karim mentions a January 2010 report I did for the Council on Hemispheric Affairs entitled "Peacekeeping and Military Operations by Latin American Militaries: Between Being a Good Samaritan and Servicing the National Interest."

I expanded a section of the report regarding Brazil's role in peacekeeping operations for: "Brazil's Grand Design for Combining Global South Solidarity and National Interests: A Discussion of Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti and Timor." Globalizations. Volume 9, Issue 1, 2012. Special Issue. Pages 161-178 http://bit.ly/wj1bTI

Operaciones Militares y de Paz por Ejércitos Latinoamericanos: Entre ser un Buen Samaritano y el Interés Nacional

Operaciones Militares y de Paz por Ejércitos Latinoamericanos: Entre ser un Buen Samaritano y el Interés Nacional
Por Alex Sánchez, Analista en el Consejo de Asuntos Hemisféricos (COHA)
Enero 2, 2012
Washington DC
Versión en ingles publicada en la página web del COHA – Enero 22, 2010 (http://www.coha.org/peacekeeping-and-military-operations/ )

Un reporte de la agencia de noticias de seguridad española Infodefensa.com publicado el 14 de diciembre 2009, menciona que Colombia está dispuesta a enviar a Afganistán un batallón compuesto por miembros de las fuerzas especiales y de la fuerza aérea. La participación de Colombia está siendo patrocinada por España para entrenar fuerzas locales afganas de seguridad y ayudar a las fuerzas de la coalición actualmente en operaciones. Esta iniciativa expone un tema relativamente desconocido, es decir, operaciones de paz y otras operaciones militares en el extranjero, en las que unidades de las fuerzas armadas de los estados de América Latina participan o pueden participar en un futuro próximo. Si bien es encomiable que los gobiernos regionales deseen enviar tropas para ayudar a estabilizar países distantes, así como cooperar en la lucha contra el terrorismo, como puede ser la intención de Colombia, usualmente también hay otros motivos más altruistas que apoyan este tipo de operaciones.

Operaciones de Paz 101: MINSUTAH y el futuro
En el caso de Bogotá, la participación en Afganistán traería un beneficio político importante en el fortalecimiento de las relaciones de seguridad con Washington, Colombia sería el único país latinoamericano con tropas desplegadas en Afganistán. Los colombianos deben ser conscientes que el gobierno de Álvaro Uribe está ansioso por atraer decisivamente el apoyo de Washington en vista de las futuras negociaciones para el tratado de libre comercio entre los dos países. Mientras tanto Brasil, la potencia regional, es el líder de la controversial Misión de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas en Haití (MINUSTAH). La decisión de Brasilia de jugar un rol tan destacado en Haití es probablemente una calculada decisión para avanzar su influencia diplomática en la región y no tanto un acto de buen samaritano. Probablemente Brasil usará su trabajo en la MINUSTAH (ahora mucho mas importante por el devastador terremoto que azotó a Haití el 12 de enero) para mostrarse como un poder mundial en crecimiento y para demostrar que merece un asiento permanente en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. Sin embargo, los controversiales eventos alrededor de la creación de la MINUSTAH, como la expulsión forzada del Presidente Constitucional Jean-Bertrand Aristide en el 2004, han manchado considerablemente las buenas intenciones de Lula y sus iniciativas.
El terrible terremoto que virtualmente destruyó gran parte de Haití, país que ahora se ha vuelto un Estado fallido devastado, es el último desafío para una misión de mantenimiento de la paz que continuamente ha estado rodeada de momentos embarazosos y reveladores. La MINUSTAH probablemente tendrá que asumir responsabilidades adicionales – algunas de ellas serán controversiales como en el pasado cercano – para poder mantener a la población haitiana bajo control y llevar a cabo operaciones de ayuda.

Esto presupone que las fuerzas de seguridad haitianas estarán en condiciones de eficacia para reafirmarse como una fuerza viable, necesaria para reconstruir al país, algo que no han logrado hacer en el pasado. Por ende, los ojos del mundo están en el liderazgo de la MINUSTAH. Se necesita con urgencia una temporada exitosa en el manejo de la situación sobre el terreno para ayudar, al menos parcialmente, a olvidar tanto sus polémicos antecedentes como su sesgo anti-Aristide y su tendencia a la violencia.
Desde la Republica Democrática del Congo a las fronteras de Israel, Irak y Afganistán, los militares latinoamericanos han participado en operaciones en el extranjero desde hace décadas. Casi siempre han actuado bajo la bandera de la ONU, o en relación con Afganistán e Irak, como parte de una coalición de fuerzas internacionales. No es sorprendente que en Latinoamérica (al igual que en otras partes del mundo) la falta de guerras entre Estados, por décadas, significa que las fuerzas militares tienen que buscar nuevas razones para existir. Las misiones de paz y la coalición de tipo arreglos militares se basan en sentimientos de “Buen Samaritano” y una fuerte dosis de real politik.

MINUSTAH: Idealismo se une con Intereses Nacionales
La historia de la Misión de la ONU en Haití ha sido polémica desde sus inicios. La caída del Presidente Jean-Bertrand Aristide en el 2004, aparentemente planeada por EEUU, Canadá y Francia, junto con el entonces Secretario General de la ONU Kofi Annan, llevó al poder a un discutible gobierno del Primer Ministro interino, Gerard Latortue. Como parte de la intervención de la comunidad internacional, la ONU en vez de trabajar para restablercer el orden constitucional en Haití, actuó como una fuerza militar que apoyó el nuevo orden político preocupante en la isla.

La Misión de las Naciones Unidas, dominada por Brasil, está formada por fuerzas de paz internacionales, en su mayoría procedentes de países de América como Perú, Chile, Uruguay y Argentina, así como de otras fuerzas militares de fuera de la región como China, India y Jordania. En una entrevista del autor con Michael J. Snell, coronel canadiense retirado, que ahora trabaja en el Centro Pearson para las Misiones de Paz en Canadá, explicó que “desde el comienzo hubo una sensación muy clara de que los latinos controlarían la misión. MINUSTAH iba a ser una misión latina, ejemplificada por una iniciativa chilena para entrenar a la policía haitiana en el Centro de Operaciones de Paz en Santiago.” Un punto que se debe mencionar es que históricamente la intervención extranjera en Haití por lo general llegó de Washington, como por ejemplo el envio de soldados a la isla en 1994 por la administración Clinton para monitorear el retorno al poder de Aristide, que había sido derrocado por los militares en 1991. El interés de América Latina en tener una participación mayor en las operaciones de paz en Haití solo comenzó alrededor del año 2000 cuando Washington y Europa centraron su atención en los Balcanes y de ahí el Medio Oriente y Asia Central.
Las razones del interés brasileño en estar a la cabeza de la MINUSTAH caen en dos categorías.

1. Idealismo: El gobierno brasileño quiere promover la paz mundial y ve a Haití como un buen lugar para empezar.

2. Pragmatismo: Brasilia quiere consolidar su status como un poder mundial en crecimiento y ve a la misión de la ONU en Haití como una oportunidad para cimentar su posición. Además, mientras el país sigue ejerciendo presión para obtener un sitio permanente en el consejo de seguridad de la ONU, considera también que el estar al mando de una misión de la ONU es una manera prudente para cimentar su nombre. Snell explica que “parece claro que Haití se ha convertido en parte del nacionalismo brasileño; que ha sido utilizada, a falta de mejor palabra, para mostrar a Brasil como un poder mundial en crecimiento.”

Trabajando al costado de Brasil como segundo al mando de la MINUSTAH, Chile también ha tenido su cuota de problemas. El mas notable fue el de nombrar al General Eduardo Aldunate como segundo al mando de la MINUSTAH. Aldunate, quien asistió a la Escuela de las Américas/WHINSEC, ha sido cuestionado por lo menos de ser consciente (sino participante) de abusos de derechos humanos cuando era un oficial de inteligencia en el periodo de la dictadura del General Augusto Pinochet. Snell, quien nunca ha conocido a Aldunate, manifiesta que “no está claro porqué algunos funcionarios son elegidos para una misión determinada, a veces uno se desliza a través de grietas o en ocasiones un Estado miembro lleva a cabo negociaciones a puerta cerrada para que alguien sea elegido”. El oficial retirado eligió utilizar como ejemplo el extraño caso de un Teniente General retirado de la India, Dewan Prem Chad, quien fue elegido, cuando tenia 76 años, como jefe de la misión de la ONU en Namibia en 1989 aun cuando su edad era claramente un factor en contra para ser seleccionado.

MINUSTAH: Viejos y Nuevos Desafíos después del Terremoto del 2010
Haití es la nación mas pobre del hemisferio, una triste distinción para una nación que fue la segunda república del continente en conseguir su independencia después de Estados Unidos. Algunos apoyarían a la MINUSTAH argumentando que la misión trató de poner orden en el país en conflicto. Por ejemplo, en setiembre de 2008, la MINUSTAH distribuyó alimentos y agua a los haitianos que quedaron varados a raiz de la tormenta tropical Hanna. Adicionalmente, un reporte de enero de 2010 por la Caribbean Media Corporation dice que la misión de la ONU iba a asumir algunas responsabilidades de seguridad en la isla para las próximas elecciones legislativas del 28 de febrero, aunque es dudoso que éstas se lleven a cabo en vista del terremoto.

Refiriéndose al rol de Brasil en la MINUSTAH, el Presidente brasileño Lula ha declarado lo siguiente: “Pienso que nuestra presencia en Haití puede ser comparada con un partido de futbol. En el 2004, estábamos en el primer tiempo. Ahora, estamos comenzando el segundo tiempo del juego. El primero fue complicado, teníamos que conocer al adversario poco a poco, organizando una defensa sólida, sin permitir algún gol y no dejando ningún objetivo por conseguir. En el segundo tiempo, es hora que tomemos la iniciativa y la táctica del juego es fortalecer nuestra presencia solidaria más y más” (Agencia Brasileña de noticias Estado, Mayo 29, 2008)

La analogía sugiere que en los ojos del líder brasileño, la misión de la ONU en Haití no terminará hasta que el metafórico “partido” haya terminado. Sin embargo, las declaraciones de Lula no explican porque Brasil esta “jugando” este “partido.”
Existen opiniones opuestas acerca de si las autoridades haitianas y las fuerzas policiales locales están listas para funcionar sin la MINUSTAH. En junio del 2009, Gilda Motta Santos Neves, jefe de la oficina de la ONU en Itamaraty (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores brasileño) expresó que “el compromiso brasileño es a largo plazo. No existe ningún calendario fijado porque la situación se debe evaluar a la par de lo que suceda con los temas de desarrollo y seguridad. El desarrollo es lo único que puede mantener la seguridad a largo plazo”. Ciertamente, el terremoto se traduce en el sentido de que la MINSUTAH tendrá que permanecer en Haití tal vez incluso más de lo previsto inicialmente. Michael J. Snell comentó al autor que los operativos de la MINUSTAH “están enfrentando desafíos que ninguna otra misión de la ONU ha tenido que enfrentar. No pueden rotar a las tropas y no está claro aún qué responsabilidades adicionales tendrán que tomar en este momento las nuevas tropas que lleguen”

En el presente, la MINSUTAH muestra dos ejemplos de lo difícil que es controlar al país sin la ayuda necesaria de la policía local. En abril de 2008 la protesta en varios vecindarios contra el costo de vida, terminó en los barrios populares de Les Cayes, con los cascos azules disparando e hiriendo seriamente a tres personas luego de que los protestantes lanzaran piedras a los soldados de la ONU. Los protestantes cubrieron el área con llantas en llamas y armazones de carros, haciendo imposible que tropas oficiales entren al área afectada. Las protestas por la falta de alimentos y precios altos son comunes y probablemente aumentarán en vista del impacto del terremoto de enero en todos los aspectos de vida de la isla. Numerosos países y organizaciones donantes envían suministros pero no está claro si todas las aéreas afectadas han recibido la ayuda.

Adicionalmente, el terremoto ha causado que una prisión en Puerto Príncipe colapsara, permitiendo que varios prisioneros escapen. Considerando que la policía haitiana ya tiene grandes problemas y deberes, a lo que se suma la falta de material humano, ya que sus miembros están en operaciones de socorro y protegiendo a sus propias familias, es claro que los cascos azules tendrán que adquirir, incluso, mayores actividades de policías que antes.

Como se mencionó antes, ademas de Brasil, varios países Latinoamericanos son parte de la MINUSTAH, entre ellos Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Perú y Uruguay. El mandato de la MINUSTAH fue renovado en octubre del 2009 por un año más y sus contingentes representan alrededor de 9,000 soldados de los cuales aproximadamente 2,000 están siendo utilizados para conformar misiones de policías no muy bien definidas.

Operaciones de la ONU en el Presente

Un número de países Latino Americanos están involucrados en diversas operaciones de la ONU por todo el mundo. Por ejemplo Colombia ha desplegado al “Batallón Colombia” al Medio Oriente. Algo que se debe mencionar es la diferencia entre una misión de operaciones de paz, que incluye tropas regulares que realmente llevan a cabo misiones de patrullaje, entre otras, y el despliegue de observadores militares, que no necesariamente trabajan bajo la bandera de la ONU. La siguiente sección no pretende proporcionar una lista completa de todas las misiones de paz en las que países latinos han participado ya sea para la ONU o como observadores militares, pero más bien sirve para dar una idea sobre los países de la región que están envueltos en este tipo de operaciones:

Uruguay: En octubre 2008, tropas rebeldes de la República Democrática del Congo usaron fuego de artillería para atacar a 300 cascos azules del Uruguay, la India y personal civil de la ONU en una base en Rutshuru. Un mes antes del incidente, se celebró una ceremonia en Kinshasa, capital del Congo, para felicitar a los cascos azules por su trabajo en el país. Entre los asistentes a la ceremonia estuvo Ross Stewart Mountain, un Representante Especial del Secretario General de la ONU en el Congo, quien habló del trabajo de las tropas de paz uruguayas en diferentes crisis, en localidades como Bunia, Bukavu y Kinshasa entre otros. Uruguay aporta anualmente alrededor de 1,300 soldados a la misión de la ONU en el Congo, cuyo total es de más de 20,000 efectivos, es la operación de paz más grande del mundo. Uruguay sirve como un ejemplo de una fuerza militar que está intentando re-inventarse. Al no tener problemas de seguridad externa (no están en cuestión, guerras con sus vecinos Brasil y Argentina) y con una generación nueva de oficiales que buscan separarse de la época en que una junta militar dictatorial gobernó al país; las Fuerzas Armadas uruguayas consideran las operaciones de paz como una forma de transformarse en una institución relevante en su país.

Perú: Las Fuerzas Armadas del país andino han servido en varias misiones de la ONU, según el website de las Fuerzas Armadas peruanas, las tropas del país han servido en el Sahara Occidental (1991-1992), Sierra Leona (2000), Chipre (2002-2006), Burundi (2004-2006) y Sudan (2005-2006) entre otros. Perú usualmente envía un número pequeño de tropas a las misiones africanas, incluyendo 3 a Costa de Marfil y 17 a Sudán. En el 2008, Perú recibió la distinción de tener a uno de sus oficiales el Almirante Mario Cesar Sanchez Debemardi (quien ya había servido como monitor militar en la misión de la ONU en Namibia, UNTAG, entre 1989-1990) como jefe de la misión de la ONU en Chipre (UNFICYP). Mientras tanto, un nuevo contingente de tropas peruanas, denominado “Compañía Perú,” incluyendo 204 soldados y oficiales, salió de Lima hacia Haití en junio del 2009.




Argentina: Unidades Argentinas han servido en la misión de la ONU en Chipre desde 1993. De acuerdo a reportes, expertos forenses argentinos han trabajado como parte de un equipo de la isla para identificar los restos de chipriotas griegos desaparecidos desde la invasión turca a la isla en 1974 así como para identificar chipriotas turcos que han permanecido desaparecidos desde la década de los sesenta. Las tropas de paz argentinas también han servido en misiones de la ONU en Sudán, Costa de Marfil, Cambodia, Sahara Occidental, entre otros.

Colombia: Aparte de la preparación por el posible despliegue de sus tropas para operar en Afganistán como miembro de una coalición militar, Bogotá también ha enviado tropas para formar parte de la MINUSTAH. Además de las tropas colombianas, también forman parte de la agencia independiente denominada Fuerza de Observadores Multinacionales (MOF) que se desplegaron a la frontera entre Israel y Egipto después que ambos países firmaran un tratado de paz en 1979. El MOF cuenta con alrededor de 2,000 soldados procedentes de 11 países.

AP


El Salvador: Otro país involucrado en operaciones de paz, aunque en una menor escala es El Salvador. En junio del 2008 San Salvador envió 52 cascos azules para ayudar a la misión de la ONU en el Líbano y en febrero del 2009 envió a cinco policías de la Policía Civil Nacional a Haití. Por otro lado el país centroamericano desplegó tropas a Irak para ayudar a su aliado, Estados Unidos.

Iniciativas de Paz y Entrenamiento
Lo Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA), ha participado en una serie de iniciativas de paz, ejemplificadas por el entrenamiento de fuerzas de paz uruguayas y argentinas que iban a ser destinadas a misiones para combatir el tráfico de seres humanos. Según reportes, este tipo de ejercicios de paz también se han realizado con países como Perú, Bolivia, Ecuador y Honduras.

Adicionalmente, varios países latinoamericanos se han unido para crear ALCOPAZ – Asociación Latinoamericana de Centros de Entrenamientos para Operaciones de Paz - con sede en Rio de Janeiro. Debe observarse que ALCOPAZ es una organización nueva y queda por ver cómo va a trabajar con la plétora de organizaciones regionales nuevas que hay en el hemisferio, desde la OEA con su brazo militar, la Junta Interamericana de Defensa, hasta organizaciones regionales como UNASUR y su Consejo de Defensa.
Hasta ahora, el rol que la Asociación ha tenido en respuesta al terremoto en Haití no es evidente. Hablando de la estructura de ALCOPAZ, Michael J. Snell observó que “a los canadienses nos gusta unir diferentes organizaciones y agencias para promover la cooperación interinstitucional, es confuso para nosotros ver cuantas organizaciones hay en latinoamérica y por que no están mas interconectadas”.

Presencia Latina en Irak y Afganistán
El posible viaje de tropas colombianas a Afganistán es un notable evento por un número de razones. Como ya se mencionó, España esta sirviendo como un tipo de sponsor de la misión colombiana. De acuerdo a Infodefensa.com, Colombia ha manifestado que enviará entre 80 y 200 soldados al país de Asia Central. En agosto 2009 la vice presidente española Maria Teresa Fernandez de la Vega declaró que España sería el sponsor de la unidad colombiana para servir en la Fuerza de Asistencia de Seguridad Internacional en Afganistán. La misión de las tropas latinas será entrenar al ejército afgano y llevar a cabo operaciones de remoción de minas y operaciones anti-narcóticos. Respecto a la posibilidad de que las tropas desplegadas podrían estar involucradas en el combate contra los insurgentes talibanes, el Ministro de Defensa colombiano Gabriel Silva Lujan informó al público que “debido a que (las tropas colombianas) estarán en una zona de combate, sería difícil que no tengan que combatir en algún momento”.

Algo que debe ser mencionado, es que enviar tropas latinas a coaliciones militares no solo embarca a Colombia. Países como El Salvador, la Republica Dominicana, Nicaragua y otros de la región han desplegado tropas a Irak luego de que EEUU invadió el país en el 2003. El Salvador envió 380 soldados a la región, pero desde entonces gradualmente ha reducido su número. En Agosto del 2008, 200 soldados fueron enviados a Irak para reemplazar a los 280 que ya estaban allí. En Febrero del 2009 el país centroamericano retiró a sus últimas tropas del país. Las fuerzas salvadoreñas fueron las últimas fuerzas latinas en Irak. El ex presidente Salvadoreño Tony Saca fue el encargado de enviar tropas, ya que era un amigo cercano de la administración de George W. Bush y quería mantenerse en buenos términos.

Al igual que El Salvador, Colombia es un país cercano a Washington en Latino América. Por ende, el enviar tropas a Afganistán puede ser visto como una forma para que Bogotá mantenga sus relaciones estrechas con Washington.

Una Historia de Operaciones de Paz y Operaciones Militares
Algo que debe ser mencionado es que los países latinoamericanos han incrementado su rol en operaciones de paz y militares en los últimos años. Sin embargo estos países tienen una larga historia de tomar parte en este tipo de operaciones. Por ejemplo el rol de fuerzas latinas en operaciones militares tiene como uno de sus orígenes el rol de Brasil con los Aliados en la Segunda Guerra Mundial. La Fuerza Expedicionaria Brasileña compuesta de 25,000 soldados luchó en Italia y en el sector del Océano Atlántico Sur. Además el ejército de Colombia envió a cuatro de sus batallones para la Guerra de Corea entre 1951-1954. La fuerza perdió 146 soldados de más de 4,000 que fueron enviados allí. Los colombianos lucharon como parte de las unidades de Estados Unidos, principalmente como ayuda para compensar en la 7ª División de Infantería.

Uno de los ejemplos más antiguos de una participación importante de un país latino en una misión de paz de la ONU fue el “Batallón Perú” enviado por el ejército peruano, bajo el gobierno del General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) a la frontera entre Israel y Egipto. El batallón estuvo involucrado en operaciones de paz, asociadas con la Guerra del Yom Kippur de 1973 y dejó la región en 1974. En una entrevista con COHA, un coronel retirado peruano que formó parte del batallón, declaró que el ejército “buscaba oficiales en forma, solteros, que hablaran ingles y que tuvieran una hoja profesional sin problemas”. El oficial mencionó que “todos querían ir a este tipo de misiones a pesar de los peligros, había un limite de 20 tenientes para el batallón y más de 100 postularon.” El oficial explico que la razón para enviar tropas al Medio Oriente se basó en que, en ese tiempo el Perú era miembro del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU y por ende era cuestión de orgullo nacional que Lima enviara tropas. “El Presidente Velasco estaba muy orgulloso de que íbamos a ir. Antes de viajar, él se reunió con el batallón y marchamos en frente de él” finalizó el oficial.

Operaciones Militares y Operaciones de Paz para todo momento
La base humana para las operaciones de paz de la ONU se origina en países del Tercer Mundo, mientras que los países más industrializados proporcionan recursos financieros y logísticos. Para países como Uruguay y Brasil, ésta es una manera de incrementar su status y su imagen internacional. Ya que las guerras entre países no son una opción para gobiernos como Montevideo, las Fuerzas Armadas del país, por razones pragmáticas, se han centrado en operaciones de paz. Mientras que Brasilia, con Lula y sus sucesores, consideran que el trabajo que realizan en las operaciones de paz ayuda a cimentar el status de Brasil como un nuevo poder global en crecimiento, especialmente porque Brasilia quiere una silla permanente en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. Sin embargo, hay peligro de que en este afán, Brasil se comprometa en misiones de paz controversiales como la MINUSTAH. Los eventos que llevaron a la creación de la misión de la ONU a Haití, además de reportes de abusos por parte de los cascos azules, podrían poner el buen nombre de Brasil en problemas al igual que poner en problemas sus ambiciosos planes diplomáticos.



El uso brasileño de la ONU y el rol que tiene en Haití, encaminados a que Brasilia gane prestigio internacional, es comprensible. Lo mismo pasa con Colombia que planea en enviar tropas a Afganistán y países centroamericanos que se han involucrado en Irak, más que nada para victorias políticas con relación a Washington. Aun, si por un lado, cosas buenas saldrán de estas operaciones, está claro que estos viajes al servicio de operaciones de paz y operaciones militares representan el futuro de las Fuerzas Armadas latinoamericanas y serán parte de su futura razón para existir, particularmente si las guerras entre Estados en Latinoamérica continúan siendo, afortunadamente, escasas.

Para más información visitar
Latin American Association of Training Centres for Peace ALCOPAZ. http://www.alcopaz.org/es_index.htm

Argentine Centre for Joint Training for Peace Operations. http://www.caecopaz.mil.ar/index1.html

Peruvian Centre for Joint Training for Peace Operations
http://www.ccffaa.mil.pe/cecopaz/cecopaz.htm

Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
http://www.peaceoperations.org/

Peruvian Armed Forces in UN Peace Operations.
http://www.ccffaa.mil.pe/cecopaz/misiones.htm

Global Peace Operations Initiative
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/

The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress. Serafino, Nina. Congressional Research Service. June 11, 2009.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32773.pdf


Please accept this article as a free contribution from this author, but if re-posting, please afford authorial and institutional attribution. Exclusive rights can be negotiated.

Endgame for Brazil’s role in MINUSTAH?

This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sanchez
Report - Council on Hemispheric Affairs
Original post http://bit.ly/nPtQSc
August 29, 2011

Brazil’s leadership in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) may be coming to its end. The newly-appointed defense minister, Celso Amorin (most recently he served as foreign affairs minister from 2003 to 2011) recently declared to the Brazilian media that he “supports the withdrawal of Brazilian troops from Haiti.”[1] Should this happen, it would be a major departure from the status quo, and would greatly affect MINUSTAH’s operations, as well as jolt Brazil’s role as the Caribbean’s major arbiter of security. Furthermore, Brasilia’s quest for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been partially based on its role in MINUSTAH as an example of its readiness for a UN seat, which may now be called into question.

Brazil’s role in Haiti
Brasilia racked up a huge leadership role in MINUSTAH, which had as its mission to aid the transitional government that gained control of Haiti (via the UNSC’s resolution 1542) after President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted in early 2004. The mission was controversial at the time and drew heavy criticism from its inception as it was regarded as a type of colonial government by the UN in the wake of Aristide’s abrupt forced departure from power, following major national protests and violence. At the time, there were persistent accusations that the U.S., Canada and France had a role in the Haitian head of state’s ouster.

Brazil has provided the military commanders for MINUSTAH along with a significant number of its forces over the past seven years. Brasilia has reportedly deployed 1,266 army and navy troops to MINUSTAH,[2] but, in the aftermath of the massive January 2010 earthquake that struck Haiti, the Brazilian Congress approved a request to send 1,300 additional troops to the Caribbean country to help with relief operations.[3]
In January 2006, there was a bizarre incident in which MINUSTAH’s commander, Lieutenant General Urano Teixeira da Matta, committed suicide while in his hotel room in Port-au-Prince. In cables published by Wikileaks, Dominican President Leonel Fernandez told State Department Assistant Secretary Patrick Duddy that he suspected that Teixeira had been assassinated by a paramilitary group, possibly led by Guy Philippe, a renowned Haitian cutpurse and rebel leader with a good deal of political clout.[4] MINUSTAH’s current commander is Major General Luiz Eduardo Ramos Pereira, also from Brazil.[5]

According to MINUSTAH’s official website, the mission’s current strength (as of June 30, 2011) totals 12,261 uniformed personnel, not including volunteers as well as international and local civilian personnel. Since its inception, the mission has suffered 164 fatalities, 66 of which were military personnel. Twenty UN Brazilian soldiers were killed in the January 2010 earthquake.[6]

Brazil Inside and Out
Dilma Rousseff’s first year as president of Brazil has been far from ideal as a number of senior and high-profile members of her cabinet have resigned. The list includes: Agriculture Minister Wagner Rossi, Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, Transportation Minister Alfredo Nascimento, as well as President Rousseff’s chief of staff, Antonio Palocci.[7] Should the Brazilian head of state decide to maintain her troops in Haiti despite the defense minister’s opinion to the contrary, this may put Rousseff at odds with other key members of her cabinet, as well as with the military’s leadership. Furthermore, a recent letter to the Brazilian President was signed by a number of legislators, like Markus Sokol of the PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores – Worker’s Party) National Directorate, representatives of the CUT (Central Única dos Trabalhadores – Unified Worker’s Central) and the MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra – Landless Workers’ Movement) , as well as others. The open letter states: “we must end Brazil’s participation in a military operation that is repudiated by the vast majority of the Haitian people … this occupation has only deepened the plight of the people and has denied them their sovereignty.”[8]

It is worth noting that some influential Brazilians do support a continued presence in Haiti. Geraldo Cavagnari, member of the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Campinas (Unicamp) has declared that “the troops should stay put because there is no risk, and there are many things in play.”[9] The other “many things” most likely include Brazil’s hardly concealed quest for a permanent UNSC seat.

Another factor that may influence the future role of Brazil in Haiti may be budgetary issues. An August 15, 2011 article entitled “Bye Bye MINUSTAH” published by the Canada Haiti Action Network,[10] explains that since 2004, Brazil’s taxpayers have spent over R$ 1 billion on MINUSTAH. Last year alone, maintenance of the Brazilian troops in Haiti cost R$ 426 million: R$ 140 million for annual costs and other expenditures, plus R$ 286 million for humanitarian aid sent after the 2010 earthquake. The analysis goes on to argue that in principle, the UN should reimburse these expenses, but in recent years the reimbursements have amounted to only 16% of the payments made by the Brazilian government. The article finally adds that, in addition, the salaries of Brazil’s MINUSTAH troops have, in fact, exceeded R$ 41 million per year, but these costs are excluded from Brazil’s expenses on the mission because these individuals would be entitled to their pay even if they were in Brazil. The Portuguese-speaking nation is currently enjoying an economic boom, but this will most likely not last, in part because the Brazilian currency, the real, is showing signs of being overvalued. If a period of economic austerity appears, the Brazilian government may be forced to rethink some of its peacekeeping operations and other major military commitments.
An official interviewed by the author, who wished to remain anonymous, explained that Brazil as well as several other states have desired to leave Haiti for some time and they argue that there is already some kind of, at least superficial, political stability in the Caribbean state. It would seem that the recent Haitian presidential elections, as dubious and controversial as they were, may serve as part of Brazil’s “exit strategy” for leaving MINUSTAH.

An Unsuccessful Departure?
Brazil’s military has been involved in Haiti since 2004 but, unfortunately, few positive developments have stemmed from Brazil’s limited interactions in the small Caribbean nation. MINUSTAH operations managed to pacify most violent neighborhoods, like Cite Soleil in 2005, but they also were responsible for carrying out human rights abuses that have been well- documented, which gained further criticism of the UN operation.

A critical moment occurred on January 12, 2010, when a 7.0 magnitude earthquake destroyed most infrastructure in Port- au-Prince as well as other Haitian towns across the country. A recent report by the U.S. Agency for International Development, obtained by the Miami Herald, states that between 46,190 and 86,961 people died and less than 66,625 quake victims are living in hundreds of camps scattered around the capital.[11] In the aftermath of the disaster, dozens of international governments agencies and relief organizations have poured into the country to help with search operations and to take care of the thousands of Haitians that were left homeless and with very little food and shelter. MINUSTAH was not spared of some of these losses. This was particularly the case as the mission’s headquarters in Haiti collapsed killing several UN employees;[12] however the body did continue to carry out relief operations. A February 2010 UN report praised MINUSTAH’s emergency response, explaining that “MINUSTAH, despite its own losses, acted as a crucial first responder, opening the major arterial road from the Port-au-Prince airport to the town centre, re-establishing communications and opening its medical facilities to victims.”[13] The Security Reform Resource Centre adds that:

“In the months following the earthquake, MINUSTAH made significant contributions providing logistical and administrative support to relief efforts. MINUSTAH supplied security assistance for humanitarian operations, operational support to the Haitian National Police (HNP), provided technical advice and support to state institutions at the sub-national level, assisted in repairing the damage to critical infrastructure of the judiciary, and coordinated a large-scale public information campaign.”[14]

In any case, the praise MINUSTAH received for its operations in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake proved to be short-lived. In October 2010, MINUSTAH troops apparently introduced a cholera epidemic in Haiti by dumping fecal matter into the country’s rivers. Over 5,000 individuals have died due to the cholera outbreak and thousands more are infected. A March 2011 report by the BBC highlights the variety of estimates of how many Haitians currently are, and could possibly become, infected, with numbers ranging from 400,000 to a possible 779,000 by November of this year.[15] A July 2011 article in the Los Angeles Times reported that “the [Haitian] Health Ministry reported more than 1,000 new cholera cases a day last month [June].”[16] There were several protests against MINUSTAH when the local population realized how the epidemic started.[17] It is important to clarify that it seems that UN peacekeepers from Nepal most likely started the cholera epidemic, not personnel coming from Brazil.

Furthermore, it is necessary to note that a possible Brazilian withdrawal from MINUSTAH is just an option for the moment, and it would take time for the minister Amorin’s proposal to become an official government-sanctioned plan, if it does at all. Even more time would be needed to arrange the logistics for the Brazilian troops to actually leave Haiti; hence any Brazilian departure will not likely occur anytime soon.

MINUSTAH without Brazil?
Should Brasilia decide to pull all of its troops from the Caribbean nation, the future of MINUSTAH may be called into question. Can the mission survive without the major donor of its troops, and the one with the most zeal to do so? Possibly yes, but the UN will face several new problems, like finding replacement troops from other nations to make up for the departure of the Brazilians. In addition, if Brazil does depart, other states that supply troops to MINUSTAH, may decide to leave the operation as well. As previously mentioned, some states, besides Haiti, may already be looking for an exit strategy to leave that country. In an extreme scenario, MINUSTAH may end up with a reduced force and a more limited ability to carry out its operations.

A final critical factor that may affect MINUSTAH’s future will be the Haitian government, which now has a new president, if highly problematic, former singer Michel Martelly. As part of his campaign promises, the new head of state has declared his interest in reforming the controversial Haitian army to help improve internal security. The country’s military was disbanded in 1995 by President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, after he was deposed in a coup and then restored to power with the help of U.N. forces.[18] Historically the Haitian army has been known for its violent acts and lack of political neutrality, particularly under the Duvalier dictatorships. An April 2011 article in the Washington Post quotes Martelly as saying that “the new armed forces wouldn’t be known for brutality, as their predecessors were.”[19] The Haitian leader may be looking to replace MINUSTAH, which it cannot control, with local security forces sworn to comply with his orders.

If Brazil leaves, what role should the US play?
A 2008 State Department document made public by Wikileaks, explains that “the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti is an indispensable tool in realizing core USG [U.S. government] policy interests in [that country].”[20] The disclosed report then adds “paying one-quarter of MINUSTAH’s budget through our DPKO [department of peace keeping operations] assessment, the U.S. reaps the security and stabilization benefits of a 9,000-person international military and civilian stabilization mission in the hemisphere’s most troubled country. […] in the current context of our military commitments elsewhere, the U.S. alone could not replace this mission.” With military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and, for the time being, in Libya, embarking on a series of new military challenges, even if it’s under an UN-peacekeeping mantle, may prove too costly for Washington and particularly the Barack Obama administration, which will have to face re-elections in 2012.

MINUSTAH has been controversial since its origins, and a more visible U.S. involvement in Haiti would be cumbersome and would add to a long list of lamentable military involvement in that country. U.S.-Haitian relations have been historically problematic, as they mostly revolve around American military operations in that island, including from 1914-1934, in 1994 and, most recently, in 2004 when Aristide was ousted. It is necessary to note that Washington did deploy the carrier USS Carl Vinson [21] along with the USNS Comfort and thousands of military personnel[22] to provide help in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake.

Deploying American troops in Haitian territory is a questionable practice, and it’s highly unlikely that it will happen; nevertheless it would be helpful for Washington’s national interests to continue working with the UN and the Haitian government so that the Caribbean nation avoids becoming a failed state.

Regarding Brazil, one can see the reasons for leaving the mission, including its unpopularity, lack of major successes and financial costs. With that said, it is illogical to think that any departure would occur quickly. If Brasilia does decide to leave MINUSTAH, at the very least it should have a responsible exchange of power and responsibilities to other UN personnel or Haitian security forces. As a recommendation, we can observe that while most of Brazilian military personnel will ultimately leave Haiti, some senior officers should stay in a consultancy basis, particularly in order to keep training the Haitian police. In spite of MINUSTAH’s controversial origins, we cannot forget Haiti’s internal problems (some of which were collectively caused by foreign powers); the international community hopefully should leave the country in better shape than when it entered it.

Alex Sanchez, a COHA research fellow, recently published an article discussing Brazil’s UN ambitions and its role in MINUSTAH: W. Alex Sanchez, “An Easy Way to Improve U.S.-Latin American Relations” (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, July 28, 2011). Available: http://bit.ly/qXB41y. In addition, an article that discusses Brazil’s role in MINUSTAH and the UN mission in East Timor will appear in an upcoming issue of the journal Globalizations. His personal blog can be found by clicking here.







[1] De Carvalho, Jailton. “Novo ministro da Defesa, Celso Amorim e a favor da volta de tropas brasileiras do Haiti.” O Globo. August 8, 2011. Available <http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/2011/08/07/novo-ministro-da-defesa-celso-amorim-a-favor-da-volta-de-tropas-brasileiras-do-haiti-925080565.asp >
[2] “Eleven Brazil soldiers killed in Haiti quake, many missing.” Reuters. January 13, 2011. Available <http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/news/world/01/13/eleven-brazil-soldiers-killed-in-haiti-quake-many-missing/ >
[3] “Brazil oks doubling its Haiti force to 2,600, troops.” Reuters. January 25, 2010. Available <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/25/idUSN25183943 >
[4] >Wikileaks: DR President believes Brazilian MINUSTAH commander assassinated, suspects cover up.” Mediahacker.org Wikileaks. January, 18, 2011. Available <http://www.mediahacker.org/2011/01/wikileaks-dr-president-believes-brazilian-minustah-commander-assassinated-suspects-cover-up/ >
[5] “Secretary-General appoints Major General Luiz Eduardo Ramos Pereira of Brazil as force commander of United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.” UN.org SG/A/1287. March 25, 2011. Available < http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/sga1287.doc.htm >
[6] MINUSTAH official website. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/memoriam.shtml >
[7] Lima, Mario Sergio and Ragir, Alexander. “Rousseff sees fourth Brazil minister resign on allegations.” Bloomberg Businessweek. August 18, 2011. Available <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-08-18/rousseff-sees-fourth-brazil-minister-resign-on-allegations.html > Also see “Brazil corruption: President loses fourth minister.” BBC – Latin America & Caribbean. August 17, 2011. Available < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-14569168 >
[8] Weisbrot, Mark. “Brazilian Defense Minister Amorim supports withdrawal of troops from Haiti – but when?”Center for Economic and Policy Research (originally published in Folha de Sao Paulo – Brazil, August 17, 2011). Available < http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/defense-minister-amorim-supports-withdrawal-of-troops-from-haiti-but-when >
[9] Chery, Dady. “Brazilian discuss Haiti and MINUSTAH: The case for leaving.” Canada Haiti Action Network. August 15, 2011. Available < http://www.canadahaitiaction.ca/content/brazilians-discuss-haiti-and-minustah-case-leaving >
[10] Chery, Dady. “Brazilian discuss Haiti and MINUSTAH: The case for leaving.” Canada Haiti Action Network. August 15, 2011. Available < http://www.canadahaitiaction.ca/content/brazilians-discuss-haiti-and-minustah-case-leaving >
[11] Charles, Jacqueline. “A new report disputes the number of Haiti dead and displaced from the 2010 earthquake.” Miami Herald. May 31, 2011. Available <http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/05/31/2244322/a-new-report-disputes-the-number.html >
[12] MacFarquhar, Neil. “UN workers struggle as co-workers are unaccounted for.” New York Times. Americas. January 13, 2010.Available <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/14/world/americas/14nations.html >
[13] “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.” UN Security Council. S/2010/200. February 22, 2010. P. 2. Available <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Haiti%20S2010%20200.pdf >
[14] McManamen, Keith. “UN to revise mandate in earthquake aftermath.” Security Sector Reform Resource Centre. May 20, 2010. Available <http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2010/05/20/un-to-revise-minustah-mandate-in-earthquake-aftermath/ >
[15] Roberts, Michelle. “Haiti cholera ‘far worse than expected,’ experts fear.” BBC. March 15, 2011. Available < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-12744929 >
[16] Gaestel, Amy. “Haiti again caught in cholera’s grip.” Los Angeles Times. July 24, 2011. Available <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-haiti-cholera-20110724,0,4930249.story>
[17]“Protests in Haiti against MINUSTAH for cholera.” Diario Libre. November 16, 2010. Available <http://www.diariolibre.com/noticias_det.php?id=268501 >
[18] Fox, Ben. “Would-be soldiers hope for revival of Haitian army.” Washington Post. March 9, 2011. Available < http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/09/AR2011030902957.html >
[19] Sheridan, Mary Beth. “Haitian President-elect Martelly pledges to speed up post-earthquake recovery.” Washington Post. April 20, 2011. Available <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/haitian-president-elect-martelly-pledges-to-speed-up-post-earthquake-recovery/2011/04/20/AFj2lKEE_story.html >
[20] “Secret: Why we need continuing MINUSTAH presence in Haiti.” Undisclosed document by Wikileaks. Berndpulch.org. August 22, 2011. Available <http://berndpulch.org/2011/08/22/secret-why-we-need-continuing-minustah-presence-in-haiti/ >
[21] “Massive US ship nears Haiti to join relief effort.” AFP. January 15, 2010. Available <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i2OoezeOmcN_BD3hRwMa1w0qAPtw >
[22] Pessin, Al. “US maries join relief effort in Haiti, Hospital ship to arrive Wednesdday.” Voice of America. January 19, 2010. Available <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/US-Marines-Join-Relief-Effort-in-Haiti-Hospital-Ship-to-Arrive-Wednesday-82090202.html >

An Easy Way to Improve U.S.-Latin American Relations

W. Alex Sanchez, "An Easy Way to Improve U.S.-Latin American Relations" (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, July 28, 2011)
Available: http://bit.ly/qXB41y


During his attendance at a recent African Union summit, former Brazilian president Lula da Silva critiqued the structure of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC): “it isn't possible that Latin America, with its 400 million inhabitants, does not have permanent representation. Five countries decide what to do and how to do it, regardless of the rest of the humans living on this planet.”

Such statements are nothing new. The UNSC’s structure has come under heavy criticism in recent years, with repeated calls for its expansion. Countries like India, South Africa, and Brazil have become the usual suspects as possible new permanent members. And the Portuguese-speaking giant has emerged as the de facto representative for Latin America and the Caribbean to the UNSC.

If the United States backs Brazil's bid, it will gain considerable political capital in Latin America.

Brazil’s UN Qualifications

Brazil has been a rising star in Latin America and the world for several decades and boasts a number of successes that supports its quest for becoming a permanent representative to the UNSC. For starters the country has a history of involvement in UN missions: one of the first Brazilian UN deployments occurred in 1956 when Brasilia, under President Juscelino Kubitschek, sent peacekeepers to the Sinai. Brazilians have also served in the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador and the UN Mission in Angola. More recently, Brasilia took a leadership role in the UN Stabilization Mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH) to aid the transitional government that took control of Haiti after President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s ouster. Brazil has provided the military commanders for MINUSTAH along with a significant number of troops.

In addition, Brasilia has also provided personnel for the UN peace mission efforts in East Timor, which separated from Indonesia in 2002. Leading up to East Timor’s independence, Brazilian diplomat Sérgio Vieira de Mello served as the special representative of the UN secretary general and as UN transitional administrator (a sort of de facto governor) from December 1999 to May 2002. De Mello spent most of his career working for the UN instead of the Brazilian diplomatic corps and he was even thought to have been a likely candidate for the position of UN secretary general, which would have been a great honor for him and his country. He was tragically killed in the Canal Hotel bombing in Iraq on August 2003 while working as the secretary general’s special representative to Iraq.

In addition, Brazil already appears to be a de facto semi-permanent member of the UNSC, without the crucial veto power, due to the number of times it has held a temporary seat. Brasilia had a seat in 1946-1947, 1951-1953, 1954-1956, 1963-1965, and 1967-1968. Because the country had a military government from 1964 to 1985, it would not return to the UNSC until 1988-1989. Since returning to democratic rule, Brazil has had a seat almost non-stop: in 1993-1995; 1998-2000; 2004-2006; and currently in 2010 until the end of 2011. Furthermore, in another diplomatic victory, former minister José Graziano da Silvahas has been elected to be the next director general of the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization.

Besides its role in the UN, Brazil today has strong relations with different countries and regions of the world. For example, under former president Lula da Silva, Brazil became a major supporter for the creation of UNASUR (Union of South American Nations - Union de Naciones Suramericanas), a South American political bloc that has all 12 states as its members.

Regarding non-hemispheric inter-state relations, Brazil, along with Russia, China and India form the BRIC countries, regarded as rising, non-Western economic and political powerhouses. In addition, with India and South Africa, Brazil has formed a loose alliance known as IBSA; which aims to promote political and economical integration between its members. In September 2010 the three states carried out military maritime exercises in South Africa.

Furthermore, Brazil has historical ties with the Sub-Saharan Africa as well as fellow Portuguese-speaking countries. The African countries that Brazil has approached include Nigeria, Angola, and Mozambique though the agreements reached between them appear to be mostly focused around commerce and/or tourism. Only with South Africa has there been a special, more multi-dimensional relationship.

Likewise, Brazil has taken steps to promote the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), which Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and São Tomé and Príncipe established in 1996. Of primary importance to Brazil may be the fact that the CPLP countries, including East Timor now as an independent state, have supported Brazil’s candidacy for a UNSC permanent seat. Brazil's Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota has said that CPLP countries support each other in all their claims in international institutions like the United Nations, adding that “the idea is that we mutually support our bids. When a country from our family is a candidate for a position in an international organ, it will have our support.”

Finally, Brazil has a booming economy, with offshore oil fields recently discovered that will make the country’s maritime industry grow even more. This may actually turn out to be the decade of Brazil, as it will also host two major sporting events: the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro.

Drawbacks and Criticisms

Nevertheless, Brazil’s has drawn criticism for some of its foreign and domestic initiatives. Brazil has had a controversial role in MINUSTAH as the UN mission has been regarded as a type of colonial government by the UN in the wake of the ouster of former president Aristide. MINUSTAH troops have been accused of human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings during operations in areas like Cite Soleil while battling criminal gangs and rebels. Although Brazilian peacekeepers have not been singled out for responsibility for the violence, the country provides up to 1,300 troops to the mission, more than any other country, and a Brazilian commander has continuously led the effort. Ironically, during the 2005 riots in Cite Soleil and Bel Air, the Brazilians faced complaints that “[they] don't seem like they want to get too involved.”

In addition, Brazil’s domestic security policies have come under criticism for police crackdowns on gangs that operate in shantytowns in an effort to rid Brazil's major cities of crime in time for the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016. Local residents also fear that when the Rio Olympics are over, “the state will take less interest in the favelas, allowing the drug trafficking gangs to re-establish control.” Furthermore, groups like Amnesty International have expressed concern “as Rio de Janeiro carries forth large scale ‘urbanization’ plans in preparation for the sporting events.” These organizations argue that Olympic projects “ranging from the Trans Carioca to the Trans Olimpica and parking, have been blamed for the planned as well as already executed forced removal of partial or entire communities.”

Finally, as strong as the Brazilian economy is today, the country’s overvalued currency will eventually lead to some kind of correction. According to Bloomberg, the valuation of the real “is prompting analysts to predict the currency will tumble 10 percent by 2013, which would make it the worst performer in the world.”

How the Rest of America Feels

In recent years, besides Brazil, countries like Mexico and Venezuela have increased their regional influence. It is debatable, however, if either of them are possible candidates to be permanent representatives to the UNSC. Regarding Mexico, the country has strong influences in Central America, and it has an expanding economy. It also has a growing role in organizations like APEC (Asia Pacific Economic cooperation) and is host to a relatively unknown but important organization: OPANAL (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America). However, one of the concerns is that Mexico is regarded as too politically close to the United States due to close economic and security ties through Plan Merida and NAFTA. Hence Mexico would have difficulty being independent of Washington’s influence.

On the other hand, Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez has made it a foreign policy priority to distance his country from Washington, a 180 degree turn from Venezuela before Chavez, when the South American state was a reliable U.S. ally. Chavez certainly has some international support, but he has also been a divisive figure. It's not likely that Chavez could win sufficient international support for Venezuela's bid for a seat.

In general, most Latin American states have expressed their support for Brazil’s UN bid. In May 2011, President Chavez met with Brazil’s new president, Dilma Rouseff, and expressed his support for his Portuguese neighbor’s UNSC quest. Other countries like Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile have also voiced their support. “So far Brazil's claim has gone largely uncontested, except for minor murmurings of dissent,” according to the UPI. A May/June 2011 article in Foreign Affairs adds that “many Latin American officials quietly reveal that they are not eager to see Brazil replace the United States as the hemisphere’s hegemon. As one diplomat recently put it, ‘The new imperialists have arrived, and they speak Portuguese.’” It would seem that Latin American support for Brazil to the UNSC is not simply due to good relations between regional governments and Brasilia but also due to the lack of any other regional candidate to counterbalance Brasilia’s ambition.

Regarding Washington, President Barack Obama has not carried out a concrete policy toward Latin America. He has occasionally travelled to the region, and he visited Brazil this past March. But his priorities are someplace else (i.e. the American economy and U.S. military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya). During his recent trip to Brazil, he recognized “Brazil's extraordinary rise” and he “expressed appreciation for Brazil's aspiration,” to have a permanent seat at the UNSC, nevertheless he stopped short of openly supporting Brasilia’s bid.

Improving Washington's Relations with Latin America

The United Nations Security Council is long overdue for a general restructuring, and controversial decisions like the authorization to begin a military operation in Libya (officially to protect civilians but it’s widely understood that the coalition of warships in the Mediterranean is indirectly aiding the rebels against Muammar Gaddafi) have brought about accusations that the Libya mission is just another example of how UNSC permanent members use the UN to project and protect their national interests. An expansion of the UNSC is an obvious recommendation and several of the permanent UN members have expressed support for powerhouses that aspire for a seat: Britain, for instance, supports Brazil while China and Russia support India. Nevertheless, according to several specialists, the major issue with UNSC reform is not a lack of potential models, but a lack of political will. None of the permanent members has prioritized a change the UNSC structure in the immediate future.

Regarding Brazil, the country does have most of the basic requirements, including backing by several states, to be a UNSC permanent member, making it the self-evident representative of Latin America and Caribbean. This doesn’t mean that Brazil is the perfect candidate to represent the region, but so far it is the only real option. The country should continue its version of good neighbor diplomacy and for that it might want to respect decisions by international bodies even if its government does not agree with them.

One perfect example of this is Brasilia’s challenge and rejection of a report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, part of the Organization of American States, which had asked Brazil to stop the construction of the Belo Monte dam, as it hadn’t taken into the account the opinions and needs of local indigenous groups. The world already has too many powerhouses doing what they want, irrespective of the wishes by weaker states or international bodies. If Brazil really wants to be a representative powerhouse with a seat at the UNSC, it would help if it became the exception to the rule and actually respected decisions by the international organizations that it belongs to, instead of making claims that the OAS suggestions were “precipitated and unjustifiable.”

Finally, more open Washington support for Brazil’s UN aspirations would certainly help improve relations between the United States and Latin America. The election of Barack Obama was very well received by the Global South in general but, at least regarding the Western Hemisphere, not much has happened during his tenure. A stronger endorsement by the White House stating that Latin America does deserve a permanent member at the UNSC table would be a very important positive step in making the Washington-Latin American relationship a partnership of equals.

W. Alejandro Sánchez is a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus and a research fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs where he focuses on international security and geopolitical issues.


recommended citation:
W. Alex Sanchez, "An Easy Way to Improve U.S.-Latin American Relations" (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, July 28, 2011)