Showing posts with label migration. Show all posts
Showing posts with label migration. Show all posts

Friday, February 17, 2023

IPD: "Curacao to Reopen its Borders with Venezuela"

 

"Curacao to Reopen its Borders with Venezuela"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

World News

International Policy Digest

17 February, 2023

Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/curacao-to-reopen-its-borders-with-venezuela/

Curacao has announced plans to reopen its borders with neighboring Venezuela in April. The Caribbean island, an autonomous country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, has a complex relationship with Venezuela, which includes trade, the migration of Venezuelans, and the future of Curacao’s vital Isla refinery. Hence, this decision will significantly affect the future relations between Curacao and Venezuela.

Relations between Venezuela and the Dutch Caribbean are not straightforward. It is essential to remember that Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao (the ABC islands) are autonomous nations within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. While the three islands can create their own domestic policies, The Hague remains in charge of defense and foreign policy. With that said, reopening the borders is a significant development and will have wider ramifications.

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Friday, November 9, 2018

Providence: US-Central America Relations: Using Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool Will Backfire


"US-Central America Relations: Using Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool Will Backfire"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Providence
2 November 2018
Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2018/11/us-central-america-relations-using-aid-as-a-foreign-policy-tool-will-backfire/

A caravan of thousands of people, mostly Hondurans, is currently in southern Mexico as it attempts to reach the US in search of a better life. This situation has prompted harsh criticism from President Donald Trump, who has threatened to cut financial aid to Honduras and the other Central American nations where the migrants originate from. This is a bad idea that will backfire rather than help the situation.

Caravans and Statements
The caravan originated in San Pedro Sula, a Honduran city well known for high levels of gang-related crime and violence. This mass of human beings has already walked through Honduras and Guatemala and has entered Mexico. While most of these individuals are Hondurans, others have joined as it made its way north, from neighboring countries like El Salvador and Guatemala—these three nations are known as the “Northern Triangle.” How many migrants constitute the caravan is unclear; estimates put the number at between 4,500 and 7,000.

At the time of this writing, thousands of caravan members have entered Mexico, and many have others have applied for temporary visas or refugee status. Nevertheless, many have entered without proper documentation by crossing the Suchiate River or turning to human traffickers. According to CNN En Espanol, some 3,000 Hondurans are returning home rather than facing additional risks to reach the US President Trump, who campaigned on an anti-immigration platform, has demanded that the caravan not reach the US. On October 22 he tweeted, “Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador were not able to do the job of stopping people from leaving their country and coming illegally to the US. We will now begin cutting off, or substantially reducing, the massive foreign aid routinely given to them.” In a separate tweet, he declared that “criminals and unknown Middle Easterners are mixed in” the caravan.

President Trump has often accused undocumented Latin American migrants of being violent criminals. Furthermore, there is no evidence that “Middle Easterners” are part of said caravan.

Discussion
In short, blackmailing the three Northern Triangle governments into stopping their citizens from migrating is a bad foreign policy strategy.

First of all, these three nations have historically been faithful US allies; in fact, the US military has facilities at the Palmerola base in Honduras, home of Joint Task Force Bravo; and the Cooperative Security Location in Comalapa, El Salvador. Moreover, in an example of desiring to support its ally, Salvadoran troops fought in Iraq as part of the US-led coalition. Hence, it makes little geopolitical sense to alienate reliable US partners in the region, particularly at a time when Washington requires regional support and cohesion to deal with hemispheric problems, such as Venezuela—in fact, Guatemala and Honduras voted in favor of a US-backed resolution in the Organization of American States that attempted to suspend Venezuela earlier this year.

Secondly, these three nations are poor, and they rely on foreign assistance. Should the US cut off aid, the situation would get worse, not better. For example, ForeignAssistance.gov explains that in 2019 Washington plans to provide $65.75 million to Honduras; these funds will be utilized to (hopefully) improve democracy, human rights, and governance, as well as economic development and education. Meanwhile, USAID reports that in 2016 a total of $127 million was donated to Honduras across all US agencies, with the main targets being programs on violence prevention, counter-narcotics, and strengthening justice and human rights. In other words, the money will be used precisely to improve the situation that prompted the caravan to leave its homeland in the first place.

Additionally, there is the obvious question of how exactly these Northern Triangle governments could stop their citizens from leaving. None of these countries have particularly large militaries or police forces—which contributes to the ongoing wave of violence in the region, which in turn prompts migration—that can be deployed along their common borders. Moreover, the region’s geography does not help the situation, as it is a dense jungle with several rivers, not to mention the Sierra Madre de Chiapas mountain range. In other words, a border wall across these countries is not a possibility.

Without a doubt, there is a valid concern of whether US economic aid to the Northern Triangle nations is having a positive effect nowadays. For example, in 2019 Washington plans to provide $69.41 million to Guatemala in foreign assistance, with $20 million going to the rule of law, civil society and good governance. This is ironic as Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales is behaving in an increasingly dictatorial manner, exemplified best by his refusal to allow the head of Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), Iván Velásquez, into the country. The reason for this is CICIG’s work on cracking down on corruption in Guatemala, which includes the president himself.

Final Thoughts
Violence, poverty, and lack of opportunities for a good life prompted a new caravan of thousands of people to leave Honduras en route to the US, where they hope to have a good life. Mass migration is certainly a problem that governments need to deal with, but punishing the countries where these migrants come from is not a solution, particularly given that these nations are reliable US allies. Cutting economic aid will make the situation worse, not better, because such a policy won’t address the causes of why this migration occurred in the first place.

As a corollary to this analysis, it is important to point out that on October 23 Infobae.com reported that a new caravan is being organized, this one out of El Salvador. If President Trump cuts foreign assistance to these nations, what leverage will he have left to influence them?


Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues in the Western Hemisphere. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Friday, June 1, 2018

IPD: Curacao’s Other Problem (And an Opportunity for Development)

"Curacao’s Other Problem (And an Opportunity for Development)"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
2 June 2018
International Policy Digest
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/06/02/curacao-s-other-problem-and-an-opportunity-for-development/

The Caribbean island of Curacao made international headlines in May due to the situation of its oil refinery, Isla Curaçao B.V., which is operated by the Venezuelan state-run oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela SA ( PDVSA). PDVSA has a contract to operate the refinery until 2019 and unfortunately Venezuela’s crisis has hit PDVSA and, naturally, Isla. The situation reached a boiling point in May when ConocoPhillips “seized products” that belonged to PDVSA after the company (Conoco) won court orders allowing it to do so.

Isla is critically important to Curacao’s economy and population, however, there are two ongoing developments that also deserve greater analysis, both for positive and negative reasons. Namely, the well-known international shipyard group Damen Group is currently upgrading and expanding the island’s shipyard. That’s the good news. On the other hand, Curacao, like the rest of the region, is receiving a steady influx of Venezuelan citizens, which is upsetting the very delicate socio-economic balance of an island with around 160 thousand citizens.

While it is part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Curacao enjoys a high degree of autonomy over its domestic politics, and the leadership in Willemstad will need plenty of statesmanship and forward thinking to successfully address the island’s mounting challenges.

The Good News: An Expanding Port

Damen took control of Curacao’s port in September 2016 via a concession agreement with Curaçaose Dok Maatschappij N.V. (C.D.M.). The facilities, renamed Damen Shiprepair Curaçao (DSCu) on February 2017, are currently able to repair and provide maintenance to vessels, but Damen wants to further improve and develop the infrastructure to become a default stop for vessels traveling the Caribbean Sea and also for regional navies and coast guards. The island’s location is helpful towards achieving this goal as it is located just north of Venezuela and not far from Panama – then again, even an upgraded DSCu will have to compete with other more established port facilities in the region, particularly the Cartagena port in Colombia.

In order to expand the DSCu’s capabilities, Damen sent two floating docks that arrived to the island in late April. According to Maritime Executive, “the larger of the two is a Panamax-class dock measuring 230 meters by 45 meters for tankers, box ships and other large vessels, while the smaller dock measures 108 meters by 23 meters and is ideal for all kinds of tugs, work boats and offshore support and anchor handling vessels.” The article also quotes DSCu’s managing director, who explained that “even now our sales team is in discussions with a number of companies regarding a wide variety of vessels ranging from a local research vessel to tugs, small cruise ships and OSVs. We also plan to support regional naval vessels including those of the Royal Dutch Navy and with the support of a Damen Services team the yard will provide maintenance and repair services to Damen-built tugs and workboats operating in the region.”

Indeed, several Greater Caribbean states utilize Damen naval platforms, like The Bahamas, which purchased a number of Damen vessels as part of Nassau’s Sandy Bottom Project to improve the capabilities of the Royal Bahamas Defence Force. Additionally, regional shipyards have constructed vessels based on Damen models, like Mexico’s ASTIMAR for the Mexican Navy. Hence, DSCu could very well become a major maintenance and repair shipyard for regional warships, coast guard boats, not to mention civilian vessels that cross the Caribbean on any given day.

The Bad News: A Growing Migration of Venezuelans
An ever-growing number of Venezuelan citizens have migrated to countries like Brazil, Colombia, Peru and the U.S., in the past couple of years as the situation in their country worsens, and the Caribbean island has also received a number of them.

Unfortunately, there is no exact number of how many Venezuelans have arrived on the island, as the Curacao government has not issued statistics to give an idea of how big (or small) the problem is. An article in a Dutch newspaper stated that “between five and ten thousand Venezuelans” may be on the island, but a reliable source in Curacao explained to the author that this estimation sounds exaggerated. (Then again, according to a 19 May article by the Curacao Chronicle, Aruban Prime Minister Evelyn Wever-Croes similarly said that “there are already about 5,000 refugees who reached the island [Aruba] via plane or boat.”) Thus a problem that hinders this analysis is understanding how many Venezuelans are on the island nowadays, though it is safe to argue that just a few thousand individuals can drastically alter the social and economic fabric given Curacao’s small area (171 square miles) and its population of around 159 thousand as of 2016, according to the World Bank.

A major concern is how will Curacao bear the cost for providing refugees and migrants with basic assistance. According to Lesley Fer, Risk Management & Disaster Policy Director for Curaçao, “the government will have to pay about 250 guilders per day per refugee. This is for basic costs such as food and housing, which also includes medical care, education and employment.” Willemstad is looking to external donors, namely The Hague, for financial support to expand infrastructure and be able to help the accepted refugees – this will probably strain relations between the island and the kingdom.

Unfortunately, people have perished as they tried to reach Curacao, as a boat carrying refugees capsized in January, killing at least four. Since they do not have legal documentation to stay on the island, Venezuelans could also be abused, and there are many reports that Venezuelan women are working in the island’s brothels. Finally, as we have witnessed in Europe with the flow of North African and Middle Eastern refugees, this sudden influx of Venezuelans may promote hate crimes in the island.


As the economic and political crisis in Venezuela continues, we can expect more Venezuelans to go abroad in search of a better life. Curacao will likely remain an objective, thus it is critically important for Willemstad and The Hague to come up with a humane and comprehensive immigration policy.

Final Thoughts
While the international media focus is, understandably, on the future of PDVSA and its impact on the Isla Refinery, the two other issues discussed in this commentary are important because of their potential consequences, both positive and negative.

For example, if Damen can upgrade and expand the infrastructure of DSCu, the shipyard could become a new source of income for the island. On the other hand, we can expect a greater number of Venezuelans risking their lives to reach the island in the near future as the situation in their homeland continues to deteriorate. These individuals must be treated in a humane and respectful manner while also taking into account Curacao’s limitations.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Tuesday, January 15, 2013

El Nuevo Dia: Flexibiliza Cuba los viajes al exterior






"Flexibiliza Cuba los viajes al exterior"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
El Nuevo Dia
Jose. A Delgado
Originally published:
http://www.elnuevodia.com/flexibilizacubalosviajesalexterior-1426772.html



WASHINGTON– La nueva ley migratoria de Cuba, que entró ayer en vigor, flexibiliza tremendamente la posibilidad de los cubanos salir de su país, pero para tener un impacto significativo en viajes a Puerto Rico y Estados Unidos se requieren cambios en las normas estadounidenses.
A través del nuevo marco legal, salvo excepciones de “seguridad nacional” e “interés público”, los cubanos tienen ahora la opción de viajar fuera de su país una vez tengan su pasaporte.
Pero, en términos de los viajes a Puerto Rico y Estados Unidos, el efecto principal puede ser “abaratar costos y reducir el tiempo de las gestiones”, según el presidente de la agencia de viajes Varadero, Raúl Alzaga Manresa.
“Aún van a tener el problema de conseguir una cita con la Sección de Intereses de EE.UU. en La Habana, que todavía puede tomarles de uno a dos años”, señaló Alzaga, pionero de los viajes de Puerto Rico a Cuba.
Bajo la nueva ley, los cubanos de la isla pueden estar hasta 24 meses fuera de Cuba sin perder su residencia oficial, aunque Estados Unidos todavía limita a seis meses el máximo de tiempo en las visas de turista que otorga.
Atrás ha quedado el requisito de obtener también un permiso oficial del Gobierno cubano, una carta de invitación de un familiar, cumplir con un formulario y penalidades de $100 mensuales por cada mes adicional que quisiera estar fuera de Cuba.
Alzaga Manresa considera que con la nueva ley el cubano promedio que visita familiares en Puerto Rico o Estados Unidos puede ahorrarse sobre $1,000 si ha querido permanecer varios meses fuera de su país.
Pero pueden necesitarse cambios en Estados Unidos –que mantiene un embargo económico en contra de Cuba– para que desde la isla se pueda viajar con mayor libertad a territorio estadounidense.
El Gobierno federal, que restringe los viajes a La Habana, permite que anualmente unos 20,000 cubanos puedan entrar a su país con la idea de quedarse a vivir en EE.UU. y concede muy pocas visas de turista. “El Gobierno cubano puede relajar todas las reglas que quiera, pero otros gobiernos pueden instalar las reglas que quieran para otorgar una visa”, indicó Alejandro Sánchez, experto del Concilio de Asuntos Hemisféricos (COHA, por sus siglas en inglés).
De acuerdo a la ley federal de “ajuste cubano”, el inmigrante cubano - por considerarse un refugiado político- puede obtener la residencia permanente en Estados Unidos después de un año y un día de haber tocado suelo estadounidense. Pero, la normativa cubana permitiría que un inmigrante adquiera su residencia en Estados Unidos sin perderla en Cuba.
Eso, advirtió Alzaga Manresa, cambia todo el concepto de las normas estadounidenses, que están basadas en que el cubano que llega a Estados Unidos es un refugiado politico. Ahora, dijo, el Gobierno federal pudiera tener que lidiar con cubanos que quieren mudarse a Estados Unidos por razones económicas, pero que están interesados en viajar frecuentemente o retornar a su país.
En su primer cuatrienio, el presidente Barack Obama suavizó las restricciones que existen en torno a los viajes a Cuba y elevó a $500 por trimestre la cantidad de dinero que los cubanos pueden enviar a sus familiares.
Aunque se reautorizaron los vuelos directos entre San Juan y La Habana, el proyecto no ha despegado pues no hay suficiente volumen de pasajeros en este momento para hacer rentable esa iniciativa.