Geopolitics: kyrgyzstan

Showing posts with label kyrgyzstan. Show all posts

Sunday, June 29, 2025

The Diplomat: " Washington Discusses the Future of Central Asia-US Relations, While Beijing Takes Concrete Action"

"Washington Discusses the Future of Central Asia-US Relations, While Beijing Takes Concrete Action"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Crossroads Asia

The Diplomat

28 June 2025

Published: https://thediplomat.com/2025/06/washington-discusses-the-future-of-central-asia-us-relations-while-beijing-takes-concrete-action/

Thursday, June 5, 2025

The Diplomat: " PACE Issues Declaration on Afghan Women in Central Asia "

"PACE Issues Declaration on Afghan Women in Central Asia"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Crossroads Asia

The Diplomat

9 May 2025

Published: https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/pace-issues-declaration-on-afghan-women-in-central-asia/

Members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recently signed a declaration noting the dire situation of Afghan women and girls, some of whom are in Central Asia receiving education.

Monday, February 10, 2025

Atlantic Council: "Central Asia needs regional and international cooperation to bolster water security"

"Central Asia needs regional and international cooperation to bolster water security"

By Ariel Cohen, Wesley Alexander Hill, Wilder Alejandro Sánchez

Report

Atlantic Council

7 February 2025

Published: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/central-asia-needs-regional-and-international-cooperation-to-bolster-water-security/

Executive summary

Water security is an urgent issue that demands immediate attention from Central Asian governments, businesses, civil society, and their international partners. Climate change, population growth, infrastructure problems, a lack of government foresight, and the unequal distribution of precious water resources between the upstream countries (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and the downstream nations (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) have created a “perfect storm” of pressing water insecurity. The 2021 Central Asia drought, the loss of the Aral Sea, the evaporation of glaciers in the Tian Shan mountains, and the alarming shrinking of the Caspian Sea are reminders of how natural and man-made disasters have destructive consequences on Central Asia’s strained water resources.

This report addresses the status of water security across the five Central Asian countries, outlining recent developments, ongoing challenges, and opportunities for improvement. Geopolitically, interstate tensions and the role of international politics—e.g., influence from the West, Russia, and China and tensions with Afghanistan—all will continue to affect the region’s water security. This report will address international cooperation in projects for water sharing, including the current and future role of agencies like the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea and partners like the United States Agency for International Development, the World Bank, and extraregional governments. The report concludes with a holistic set of policy recommendations to help improve water security in Central Asia.

Event: "Report launch: Water insecurity in Central Asia"

7 February 2025

Atlantic Council

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/report-launch-water-insecurity-in-central-asia/

Thursday, December 5, 2024

New Atlanticist: "The West’s role in solving Central Asia’s water crisis"

"The West’s role in solving Central Asia’s water crisis"

The Caspian Sea, vital to Eurasia’s economy and environment, is shrinking at an alarming rate. The declining water level in the sea is one visible consequence of a larger regional water crisis faced by the C5 nations of Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This water crisis threatens the more than 82 million people who call the largely arid region home.

A forthcoming Atlantic Council report written by the authors, “Water insecurity in Central Asia: The need for collective action,” explores the global resources that can be mobilized and to what ends they can be quickly directed. This report will provide a practical roadmap that regional and international actors can employ to solve problems in the near and medium terms without massively increasing investments.

Sunday, December 1, 2024

The Diplomat: " Can the US Be a Weapons Supplier to Central Asia?"

"Can Central Asia escape China’s debt trap?"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

NE Global

August 20, 2023

Originally published: https://www.neglobal.eu/can-central-asia-escape-chinas-debt-trap/

While Washington focuses on the war in Ukraine, Russia and China seek to expand their influence in regions where the US is not sufficiently engaged.

Tuesday, August 7, 2018

Geopolitical Monitor: Central Asia and Afghanistan: Helping Your Neighbor

"Central Asia and Afghanistan: Helping Your Neighbor"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Opinion

Geopolitical Monitor

7 August 2018

Originally published:

https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/central-asia-and-afghanistan-helping-your-neighbor/

The vast majority of literature since the 2001 US-led multinational military operation has focused on the role of the global powers in Afghanistan. However, it is important to also discuss what interests Central Asian states have in the country, since the view from Astana or Tashkent is not that of a far-away government, but a neighbor with which Afghanistan has strong cultural, geographic (it borders Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), and political ties.

Central Asia-Afghanistan relations is a fairly complex topic, and fortunately new analyses have been published in recent years that discuss this issue in greater detail. Hence, for the sake of brevity, we will focus on recent developments.
Generally speaking, all Central Asian states have carried out some type of initiative to aid the development of Afghanistan. Some recent examples include:

Kazakhstan. Astana is very interested in educating Afghan youths so they can return to their homeland and help their nation develop. According to The Astana Times: “since 2010, Kazakhstan has implemented a $50 million educational program for Afghan citizens. Under the program, about 1,000 Afghan citizens will receive professional training from 2010 to 2021.” In July of this year, 53 Afghan students graduated, including surgeons, obstetricians, and pediatricians, from a Kazakh university. Astana has also separately called for a peace process in Afghanistan.

Kyrgyzstan. A considerable amount of ethnic Kyrgyz live in Afghanistan, particularly in the mountainous Wakhan Corridor, and there have been meetings recently between the two governments regarding their protection. Additionally, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan are two of the four countries that form the joint Central Asia-South Asia energy project commonly known as CASA-1000.

Tajikistan. In mid-June, Dushanbe pledged to increase power exports to Afghanistan. According to Azernews, “in 2017 Tajikistan supplied about 1.4 billion kWh of electricity to Afghanistan. This year it plans to increase this figure to 1.5 billion kWh.” Tajikistan is also part of the CASA-1000 project. Even more, in a sign of Kabul’s willingness to further improve relations with its direct neighbor, the Afghan government has extradited four supporters of the late Tajik rebel general Abduhalim Nazarzoda.

Turkmenistan. The two countries are part of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, which would provide Ashgabat a corridor to increase its exports. The first three aforementioned countries are also part of a different energy project, TAP, which will “transmit 500 kilovolts of power from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan.” Finally, in December 2017, a MoU was signed to improve railway infrastructure between the two countries in order to help Afghan products reach new markets.

Uzbekistan. Tashkent is attempting to mediate between the Afghan government and the Taliban. In December 2017, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani visited Tashkent; months later, in March, Uzbekistan held a peace conference (which the Taliban skipped), and offered its services to mediate between the Taliban and Kabul once again in June. Additionally, Tashkent appears to be committed to promoting Afghan development: in early July, Uzbekistan pledged to “invest $500 million into the construction of railway tracks from Mazar-i-Sharif city to Herat province.” Finally, there have been talks recently about creating a free trade zone between the two states to promote trade and development (bilateral trade in 2017 reached US$ 350 million).

The common denominators among Central Asian interests regarding Afghanistan are stability and prosperity. By this we mean that regional governments do not want the Taliban to return to power – a worrisome possibility as the group has regained control of several provinces – since this might contribute to radicalism spreading throughout the region.

For the sake of argument, it is important to note that Central Asia analysts have somewhat differing positions regarding how much of a threat the Taliban and/or the so-called Islamic State present to the region. For example, a 2014 report by the AAN argues that “security risks that link Afghanistan to the former Soviet republics of Central Asia are often highly exaggerated” as “in Central Asia the main players in narcotics trafficking are government employees, security officers, and mafia figures,” while insurgents tend to be more often local rather than originating in Afghanistan.

This is a fairly controversial statement that clashes with more recent analyses, like “Central Asia’s Anxious Watch On The Afghan Border” by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and “Why Central Asia is increasingly worried about Afghanistan” by DW. Even more, recent incidents indicate that Taliban forces are operating dangerously close to Afghanistan’s neighbors. For example, a June 2018 Taliban attack that killed 16 Afghan troops occurred in Takhar province bordering Tajikistan. Moreover, four foreign cyclists were murdered in Southern Tajikistan in late July, a crime that Islamic State has since claimed responsibility for.

Thus, the activities of Afghanistan-based violent extremists continue to get closer to the three bordering Central Asian states, making a spread of violence a valid possibility. Central Asia has already seen its share of conflict since gaining independence from the Soviet Union, such as the Tajik civil war (1992-1997) and Uzbekistan’s clashes with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, whose remaining fighters have sworn loyalty to the Taliban (though some other Uzbek nationals have joined the IS branch in Khorasan province). Thus, it is a national security interest for Central Asian governments to not only help Afghanistan defeat the Taliban and other insurgent movements, but also to promote the country’s development and prosperity in order to prevent new groups from appearing.

Projects like CASA-1000, TAPI and TAP are good examples of Central Asia providing Afghanistan with much needed energy, and we will have to monitor whether any of these projects become operational in the near future. On the other hand, it is debatable how much Central Asia can actually profit from the Afghan market, as China, Europe, and Russia are more desirable and lucrative targets. Afghanistan could serve as a corridor for Uzbek, Tajik, and/or Turkmen products to reach India and Pakistan, but this will depend on the construction of better roads and railways in Afghanistan, not to mention the resolution of lingering security issues.

Additionally, Central Asian states have much to gain from peace in Afghanistan because it will mean the protection of ethnic minorities who live there (and who in turn may become – or already are – influential players in Afghan politics). For example, a July commentary in The Diplomat explains, “if Tashkent can play a role in convincing some members of the Taliban to come to the bargaining table, Uzbekistan’s status as a regional mediator will increase greatly.” Astana has similarly attempted to promote dialogue, but it seems that the Afghan conflict is so complex, given the various players and interests involved, that it’s unlikely that any peace process will bear fruit anytime soon.

Final Thoughts
Rather than a top-down or bottom-up approach, Central Asian initiatives towards Afghanistan are all over the place, hinting at a lack of coordination among these governments regarding how to handle their neighbor. The lack of a regional blueprint (the Istanbul Process notwithstanding) and the lack of any desire among the governments to work together (e.g. Turkmenistan’s historic isolationism) are two possible explanations of the current situation.

This does not mean that there have not been successes. The education of Afghan doctors in Kazakhstan will hopefully pay off in the long-term, and energy-related projects among the other states will hopefully provide Afghanistan with development, jobs, and revenue – assuming that Kabul manages to address corruption in the country, particularly in its fuel sector.

While the U.S. and its allies have generally focused on a military approach to dealing with Afghanistan, Central Asian states have approached the nation primarily via non-violent routes (mediation attempts; nurturing investment and construction; and educating the Afghan youth). But the overriding question is: How long can this strategy last if Afghan-based insurgent groups carry out more attacks in Central Asian regions bordering Afghanistan?

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated, and don’t reflect any official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

Friday, December 15, 2017

IPD: The Eurasian Economic Union and Latin America: What could 2018 Bring?

"The Eurasian Economic Union and Latin America: What could 2018 bring?"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
International Policy Digest
11 December 2017
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2017/12/11/the-eurasian-economic-union-and-latin-america-what-could-2018-bring/

As the world becomes more interconnected, regions that are geographically distant are now becoming closer as diplomatic and trade ties develop. For example, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is approaching Latin America both as individual members and collectively.

Growing Relations: The members of the EAEU are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. Relations between Moscow and Latin America have been well covered – for example, the author has recently reviewed Russia’s relations with Bolivia andNicaragua – hence we will focus on the other EAEU members.

The Central Asian nation of Kazakhstan is an interesting case study as it has approached several Latin American states, particularly Brazil, which is one of the few Latin America countries where Astana has an embassy. For example, this year Kazakhstan’s Air Astana acquired five E190-E2 aircraft, produced by Brazil’s aerospace conglomerate EMBRAER, and deliveries are scheduled to begin in 2018. Air Astana did not purchase the planes directly from the Brazilian company, but rather signed a long-term lease agreement with AerCap; nevertheless, the decision to utilize EMBRAER platforms could help bring about future deals. Furthermore, the Kazakh company TetraTech, via its partnership with the US Agency for International Development, has been involved in projects among Latin American countries like Mexico(providing clean water) and Peru (supporting good governance).

Moreover, Astana has expanded its diplomatic presence in South America by opening a consulate in the Argentine city of Rosario, apart from already having a cultural center in said city. Additionally, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro visited Astana in September to take part in a meeting of the Islamic Cooperation Organization. As for positive publicity, the Mexican daily El Universal published a flattering piece about Kazakhstan’s interests in Latin America on 1 November, which includes an interview with Kazakh deputy foreign affairs minister, Yerzhan Ashikbayev. The article stresses that Mexican citizens do not need visas to travel to the Central Asian nation and the potential for future bilateral energy-related projects.

Meanwhile, Belarus has developed close ties with Venezuela; case in point: President Alexander Lukashenko met with President Maduro in Minsk just this past October. The meeting between the two leaders was followed by a round of a bi-national high-level commission, which occurred in late November, and the two sides discussed cooperation on issues like energy, agriculture and military strategy. Additionally, Mexico opened an honorary consulate in Minsk in 2016 while in early December 2017, Belarusian Ambassador to Ecuador and concurrently to Colombia, Igor Poluyan, made a working trip to Bogota, to promote bilateral relations, Belarus News reported.

As for Armenia, it is worth noting the migration of Armenians to Latin America, particularly after the Armenian Genocide. A 2016 article bySputnik Mundo discusses Armenia migration to Argentina and Uruguay in particular, though Armenians have migrated to other regional states. Nevertheless, the author has not been able to find recent diplomatic initiatives between the Caucasus nation and Latin America in spite of the Armenian Diaspora in the Western Hemisphere. Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister Aloysio Nunes Ferreria did write an op-ed praising Brazil-Armenia relations prior to his mid-November visit to Yerevan, however no major agreements have been reported as part of this visit. A similar situation occurs with Kyrgyzstan’s stance towards Latin America. Apart from a statement by the Brazilian foreign affairs ministry that in 2013 Brasilia “donated $50 thousand to the Kyrgyz Government through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for supporting activities in favor of refugees,” there have been no significant initiatives.

Finally trade appears to be minimal. For example, the Mexican daily Milenio, reported in March 2017 that trade between Mexico and Belarus centered on Mexican exports of steel, materials for tires and cleaning machines. Meanwhile, Brazil has reported that its bilateral trade with Armenia reached USD$38.4 million in 2016.

Thus, bilateral relations between individual EAEU members, apart from Russia, and Latin America should not be overhyped. Bilateral relations are generally positive, but sporadic. Moreover the scarce trade between the aforementioned EAEU nations and Latin America stresses that there is much to be done still to bring both sides further together.

Mexico’s Faux Pas over Nagorno-Karabakh: There has been one recent diplomatic incident between the two distant regions worth mentioning. Namely, Mexican government officials apparently made a diplomatic statement in favor of Armenia’s territorial dispute with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. In late October, three members of the Mexican Congress – identified as Margarita Blanca Cuata Domínguez, Carlos Hernández Mirón, de Morena, and María Cristina Teresa García Bravo – travelled to Armenia as part of their work for the Mexico-Armenia Friendship Group. The problem is that they also travelled to Nagorno-Karabakh, without authorization from the Azerbaijani government and apparently ignoring orders from the Mexican Secretariat of Foreign Affairs.

The Azerbaijani government has vehemently protested the Mexican officials’ visit to the disputed territory.

EAEU-Latin America Deals: Limited bilateral relations notwithstanding, there is optimism regarding the future of relations between the EAEU (as a bloc) and Latin America. Case in point, on 4 December, the author attended a conference organized by the Eurasia Center at the Russian Cultural Center in Washington DC, entitled “4th Annual Conference: Doing Business with the Eurasian Economic Union: Improving East-West Relations.” The speakers included government and diplomatic officials of the five member states, who praised current levels of integration, the new Customs Code that will enter into force in 2018, and ties with countries like South Korea,Singapore and Vietnam.

The author inquired about EAEU-Latin America relations, and the speakers were optimistic about these initiatives and singled out relations with Chile, Mexico and Peru in particular. In fact, Chile and the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) have a joint commission aimed at promoting ties, which held its third round of meetings this past March. An EEC press release mentions that the recent round included lists by both Chile and EEC members of products that they would like to export. Similarly, in 2016 Peru noted that 99% of its exports to the EAEU currently go to Russia and the goal is to approach other states. Finally, Mexico’s Foreign Minister Luis Videgaray Caso has declared his country’s interest in looking for new markets. “We would like to establish stable relations with EAEU,” the diplomat has stated.

As a final point, it is worth highlighting the meetings between the EAEU and the South American bloc MERCOSUR – its member states: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela (which has been suspended since December 2016). In late November, Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov declared that Latin American nations, including MERCOSUR, are interested in close cooperation with the EAEU. While there have been important meetings between the two blocs in the recent past, MERCOSUR currently is at a standstill due to internal problems, such as the problematic situation in Venezuela. Additionally, regional powerhouse Brazil is under stress due to its ongoing economic woes, while its foreign policy is essentially on hold until the October 2018 elections when a new administration will take over. We will probably have to wait until then to see what direction MERCOSUR takes and if rapprochement with the EAEU continues.

Final Thoughts: It will be important to monitor what 2018 brings for the EAEU-Latin American relations. Russia already has a hefty presence in Latin America, and the key will be to see if the Union’s other members can begin to establish a foothold in this vast area. So far, initiatives by Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been scarce and, given the geographic distance between these nations and Latin America, in addition to other foreign policy priorities, we will likely not see major bilateral initiatives in the near future. Thus, the EAEU, as a bloc, led by Russia, would be the key to bring these nations and Latin America closer together.

The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.