Showing posts with label belarus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label belarus. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 26, 2022

Journal: Latin America and the Caribbean Meet the Post-Soviet World: Can Pro Forma Diplomacy Evolve?

 

 

"Latin America and the Caribbean Meet the Post-Soviet World: Can Pro Forma Diplomacy Evolve?"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Research Essay

Journal of International Analytics

Vol. 12, No. 3, 2021

Originally published: https://www.interanalytics.org/jour/article/view/389

Abstract

The 33 countries that constitute Latin America and the Caribbean and the 11 countries of the former Soviet Union (not counting the Russian Federation and the three Baltic nations) conform 44 states which are, with a few exceptions, on the periphery of global geopolitical aff airs, with limited international influence or at the mercy of conflicts that have disrupted their internal balance and international image in the past decade. While the topic of how peripheral nations and regions interact with each other has been analyzed in academia, in-depth studies about relations between these specific regions are very limited and scarce. This paper seeks to fi ll in that gap by providing recent examples on issues like trade and high-profile diplomatic visits between Latin American and Caribbean governments with their post-Soviet counterparts. Moreover, I will discuss the issue of the location (or lack thereof) of embassies, a topic not discussed in the consulted literature, as an example of how governments from peripheral states and limited budgets decide where to open an embassy. It is proposed here that the 44 states that make up Latin America, the Caribbean, and the post-Soviet world will remain cordial and friendly strangers for the foreseeable future. A lack of grand-strategy vision, with a few exceptions, is a major hindrance to stronger relations between these states. The most plausible scenario is bloc-to-bloc trade agreements; however, the COVID-19 pandemic and more pressing issues that these countries face mean that treaties with geographically distant states that are not trading partners or potential sources of financial aid are not regarded as priorities.

 Sanchez W.A. Latin America and the Caribbean Meet the Post-Soviet World: Can Pro Forma Diplomacy Evolve? Journal of International Analytics. 2021;12(3):154–172. https://doi.org/10.46272/2587-8476-2021-12-3-154-172

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Friday, December 15, 2017

IPD: The Eurasian Economic Union and Latin America: What could 2018 Bring?

"The Eurasian Economic Union and Latin America: What could 2018 bring?"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
International Policy Digest
11 December 2017
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2017/12/11/the-eurasian-economic-union-and-latin-america-what-could-2018-bring/

As the world becomes more interconnected, regions that are geographically distant are now becoming closer as diplomatic and trade ties develop. For example, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is approaching Latin America both as individual members and collectively.
Growing Relations: The members of the EAEU are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. Relations between Moscow and Latin America have been well covered – for example, the author has recently reviewed Russia’s relations with Bolivia andNicaragua – hence we will focus on the other EAEU members.
The Central Asian nation of Kazakhstan is an interesting case study as it has approached several Latin American states, particularly Brazil, which is one of the few Latin America countries where Astana has an embassy. For example, this year Kazakhstan’s Air Astana acquired five E190-E2 aircraft, produced by Brazil’s aerospace conglomerate EMBRAER, and deliveries are scheduled to begin in 2018. Air Astana did not purchase the planes directly from the Brazilian company, but rather signed a long-term lease agreement with AerCap; nevertheless, the decision to utilize EMBRAER platforms could help bring about future deals. Furthermore, the Kazakh company TetraTech, via its partnership with the US Agency for International Development, has been involved in projects among Latin American countries like Mexico(providing clean water) and Peru (supporting good governance).
Moreover, Astana has expanded its diplomatic presence in South America by opening a consulate in the Argentine city of Rosario, apart from already having a cultural center in said city. Additionally, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro visited Astana in September to take part in a meeting of the Islamic Cooperation Organization. As for positive publicity, the Mexican daily El Universal published a flattering piece about Kazakhstan’s interests in Latin America on 1 November, which includes an interview with Kazakh deputy foreign affairs minister, Yerzhan Ashikbayev. The article stresses that Mexican citizens do not need visas to travel to the Central Asian nation and the potential for future bilateral energy-related projects.
Meanwhile, Belarus has developed close ties with Venezuela; case in point: President Alexander Lukashenko met with President Maduro in Minsk just this past October. The meeting between the two leaders was followed by a round of a bi-national high-level commission, which occurred in late November, and the two sides discussed cooperation on issues like energy, agriculture and military strategy. Additionally, Mexico opened an honorary consulate in Minsk in 2016 while in early December 2017, Belarusian Ambassador to Ecuador and concurrently to Colombia, Igor Poluyan, made a working trip to Bogota, to promote bilateral relations, Belarus News reported.
As for Armenia, it is worth noting the migration of Armenians to Latin America, particularly after the Armenian Genocide. A 2016 article bySputnik Mundo discusses Armenia migration to Argentina and Uruguay in particular, though Armenians have migrated to other regional states. Nevertheless, the author has not been able to find recent diplomatic initiatives between the Caucasus nation and Latin America in spite of the Armenian Diaspora in the Western Hemisphere. Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister Aloysio Nunes Ferreria did write an op-ed praising Brazil-Armenia relations prior to his mid-November visit to Yerevan, however no major agreements have been reported as part of this visit. A similar situation occurs with Kyrgyzstan’s stance towards Latin America. Apart from a statement by the Brazilian foreign affairs ministry that in 2013 Brasilia “donated $50 thousand to the Kyrgyz Government through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for supporting activities in favor of refugees,” there have been no significant initiatives.
Finally trade appears to be minimal. For example, the Mexican daily Milenio, reported in March 2017 that trade between Mexico and Belarus centered on Mexican exports of steel, materials for tires and cleaning machines. Meanwhile, Brazil has reported that its bilateral trade with Armenia reached USD$38.4 million in 2016.
Thus, bilateral relations between individual EAEU members, apart from Russia, and Latin America should not be overhyped. Bilateral relations are generally positive, but sporadic. Moreover the scarce trade between the aforementioned EAEU nations and Latin America stresses that there is much to be done still to bring both sides further together.
Mexico’s Faux Pas over Nagorno-Karabakh: There has been one recent diplomatic incident between the two distant regions worth mentioning. Namely, Mexican government officials apparently made a diplomatic statement in favor of Armenia’s territorial dispute with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. In late October, three members of the Mexican Congress – identified as Margarita Blanca Cuata Domínguez, Carlos Hernández Mirón, de Morena, and María Cristina Teresa García Bravo – travelled to Armenia as part of their work for the Mexico-Armenia Friendship Group. The problem is that they also travelled to Nagorno-Karabakh, without authorization from the Azerbaijani government and apparently ignoring orders from the Mexican Secretariat of Foreign Affairs.
The Azerbaijani government has vehemently protested the Mexican officials’ visit to the disputed territory.
EAEU-Latin America Deals: Limited bilateral relations notwithstanding, there is optimism regarding the future of relations between the EAEU (as a bloc) and Latin America. Case in point, on 4 December, the author attended a conference organized by the Eurasia Center at the Russian Cultural Center in Washington DC, entitled “4th Annual Conference: Doing Business with the Eurasian Economic Union: Improving East-West Relations.” The speakers included government and diplomatic officials of the five member states, who praised current levels of integration, the new Customs Code that will enter into force in 2018, and ties with countries like South Korea,Singapore and Vietnam.
The author inquired about EAEU-Latin America relations, and the speakers were optimistic about these initiatives and singled out relations with Chile, Mexico and Peru in particular. In fact, Chile and the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) have a joint commission aimed at promoting ties, which held its third round of meetings this past March. An EEC press release mentions that the recent round included lists by both Chile and EEC members of products that they would like to export. Similarly, in 2016 Peru noted that 99% of its exports to the EAEU currently go to Russia and the goal is to approach other states. Finally, Mexico’s Foreign Minister Luis Videgaray Caso has declared his country’s interest in looking for new markets. “We would like to establish stable relations with EAEU,” the diplomat has stated.
As a final point, it is worth highlighting the meetings between the EAEU and the South American bloc MERCOSUR – its member states: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela (which has been suspended since December 2016). In late November, Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov declared that Latin American nations, including MERCOSUR, are interested in close cooperation with the EAEU. While there have been important meetings between the two blocs in the recent past, MERCOSUR currently is at a standstill due to internal problems, such as the problematic situation in Venezuela. Additionally, regional powerhouse Brazil is under stress due to its ongoing economic woes, while its foreign policy is essentially on hold until the October 2018 elections when a new administration will take over. We will probably have to wait until then to see what direction MERCOSUR takes and if rapprochement with the EAEU continues.
Final Thoughts: It will be important to monitor what 2018 brings for the EAEU-Latin American relations. Russia already has a hefty presence in Latin America, and the key will be to see if the Union’s other members can begin to establish a foothold in this vast area. So far, initiatives by Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been scarce and, given the geographic distance between these nations and Latin America, in addition to other foreign policy priorities, we will likely not see major bilateral initiatives in the near future. Thus, the EAEU, as a bloc, led by Russia, would be the key to bring these nations and Latin America closer together.
The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Monday, March 7, 2011

Press Release: A Suggestion to President Hugo Chávez–Reevaluate Your Alliances by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sanchez

Press Release: A Suggestion to President Hugo Chávez–Reevaluate Your Alliances

by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sanchez
http://bit.ly/gXAhvl

March 7, 2011

As strife heated up in Libya by the end of February, rumors surfaced that long-time leader Muammar Gaddafi had fled to Venezuela. While this development later proved to be inaccurate, it is worth mentioning that one of Gaddafi’s former cabinet ministers (now part of the opposition) suggested that the Libyan head of state should leave the country for Caracas in search of asylum. As the situation in Libya deteriorates and the opposition’s military deployment seems to be foundering, Latin American scholars have openly wondered whether Hugo Chávez will offer asylum to his close Saharan ally, and if so, whether the latter will accept.




Although Caracas was unusually quiet during the early phases of Libya’s rapidly growing anti-Gaddafi manifestations, Chávez eventually declared his full support for his embattled ally. Chávez’ loyalty to Gaddafi and his rejection of calls for intervention against the Libyan leader by the U.S. may be commendable. However, the Venezuelan leader would be wise to reevaluate the basis and quality of his friendships given the recent bloodshed visited upon Libyan civilians, Gaddafi’s poor human rights record, and his bleak long-term prospects of survival.

On March 3, Chávez made a minor departure from his earlier support for Gaddafi when he expressed interest in helping mediate the conflict between the Libyan government and the insurgent regions of the country. Chávez’ vacillation between a hard and soft stance on the justice of Gaddafi’s cause can be interpreted as a turn from a pragmatic to an ideological position. However, the offer to mediate has been rejected by the Libyan opposition as well as members of NATO. The Arab League is still considering the proposal. On March 5, Venezuela’s allies in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) expressed support for a peace mission, which Chávez now suggests might be led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter or former Cuban President Fidel Castro. Brazil, while not explicitly endorsing the ALBA proposal, has said that it favors a “negotiated solution” over the prospective military action under consideration by the U.S. and its NATO allies.

The diplomatic and military situation regarding Libya is becoming more complex by the day. But regardless of the outcome, Chávez’ early comments in support of Gaddafi served to remind the international community that—while he is the author of social visions and some beneficial programs that have served his people well—the Venezuelan leader has a history of joining up with unsavory allies who do not share his humanitarian concerns.

Chávez and Gaddafi

Chávez has maintained a strong relationship with Gaddafi both personally and at the inter-governmental level for over a decade, and has made numerous diplomatic visits to his counterpart in Tripoli. In 2004, Libya awarded Chávez with its annual Gaddafi International Human Rights Prize for “resisting imperialism.” In addition, Gaddafi named a new soccer stadium near the city of Benghazi after Chávez in 2006. In return, the Venezuelan leader presented Gaddafi with a replica of the sword of South American independence hero Simón Bolivar following the 2009 Africa-South America Summit.
Analysts have compared both Chávez and Gaddafi’s attempts to exert greater influence over their respective continents. In December 2004, Christian Science Monitor journalist Mike Ceaser argued that “Chávez’ regional push is similar to an effort by Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi in the late 1990s in Africa. The Libyan leader had visions of creating a sort of United States of Africa and spent billions of dollars in oil money to garner the support of African nations. But while the governments gladly received his cash infusions and cheap oil, his vision was never realized.” There is an undeniable parallel between the two leaders’ use of oil profits to achieve greater regional authority.

During this period of great popular upheaval throughout North Africa, Chávez is one of few heads of state, joined by Cuba’s Raúl Castro and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega, to take the controversial position of backing Gaddafi. The Venezuelan leader has been quoted in the Latin News as stating “[W]e do support the government of Libya, the independence of Libya…we want peace in Libya and we are against the possibility of [foreign] intervention.” Rather than addressing the mounting bloodshed inflicted by pro-Gaddafi forces, Chávez has resorted to his usual rhetoric of criticizing “Yankee hegemony” and its ongoing military involvement in foreign states’ domestic affairs.
Chávez’s offer to assemble a so-called “Committee of Peace” to mediate the Libyan crisis has been declined by the Arab League, the international community, and the opposition forces in Libya. Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, former Libyan justice minister and head of the opposition based in Benghazi, argued that he had not been consulted regarding the initiative. Both the U.S. and France rejected the proposal due to their unwillingness to accept any diplomatic accord that leaves Gaddafi in power. It seems Gaddafi may grow more inclined to engage in negations as the looming threat of civil war eats further into oil revenues.

Chávez’ Other Controversial Friends

Gaddafi is one among several controversial heads of state who enjoys friendly ties with Chávez—Iran, Syria, and Belarus are all close Venezuelan allies. Chávez’ avowed support for these nations is often couched in language declaring a right to political self-determination, and a desire to stand together in resistance to Western dominance. The Venezuelan president opposes any and all economic sanctions levied against Iran to curb its nuclear aspirations.

Statements made on all sides show an overall air of bonhomie and Western defiance among the heads of these nations—all which have questionable human rights records. In an October 2010 visit to Venezuela, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad made his admiration for Chávez known when he noted that “there are few politicians who are courageous to speak out when it’s necessary…Chávez has projected the image of a resistant Venezuela.” Chávez reinforced the mutual goodwill, stating that the “Arab civilization and our [Latin American] civilization…are being summoned in this new century to play the fundamental role of liberating the world, saving the world from the imperialism and capitalist hegemony that threaten the human species…Syria and Venezuela are at the vanguard of this struggle.” Aside of shared political support, Venezuela and Syria have joined forces in a number of joint oil-related ventures, including the Petrolera BeloVenezolana partnership under which the two nations will develop two new oilfields in Venezuela.




In addition, Chávez enjoys a vibrant friendship with Alexander Lukashenko, the Belarusian president popularly known as “Europe’s last dictator.” Over the years, Lukashenko has succeeded in crushing opposition groups and remained in power through questionable landslide reelections. In a 2006 visit to Belarus, Chávez clearly liked what he saw in Lukashenko’s government, proclaiming that “we see here a model social state like the one we are beginning to create.” After the heavily disputed December 2010 Belarusian presidential election where Lukashenko won with a dubious 79% of the vote, protests broke out and resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of over 580 individuals. Chávez declared his support for the reelected Lukashenko, describing the electoral victory as “[an] an extraordinary day for democracy…Lukashenko knows how to lead the glorious motherland to independence, putting the sacred interests of his people ahead of the narrow-minded intentions of the world powers.”

Having Friends in Low Places—Not the Change that Chávez Foreign Policy Needs
Chávez has made a career of critiquing Washington, which he defines as “imperialistic and interventionist.” While Chávez’ critiques are often unwelcome in the international community, the targets of his comments are not entirely beyond reproach when it comes to supporting foreign nations with poor human rights records. The U.S. and the EU maintain close ties with several states that can be labeled as repressive—enormous trade exists with China despite the country’s repressive internal policies. Another example would be Washington’s decades-old friendship with the recently-deposed Hosni Mubarak, an alliance based on mutual interests despite a sad history of repression in Egypt.

Yet, in the end Washington often makes good on its avowed commitment to human rights throughout the world—the U.S. ultimately changed its policy toward Egypt and called for Mubarak to step down. While a certain level of hypocrisy can undeniably be attached to the U.S. or Venezuela in lauding democracy while maintaining unsavory friendships, Chávez seems to be particularly bold in his support of nations that have been brutally repressive with their populaces—Libya, Iran, and Belarus serving as prime examples. Friends of the Bolivarian revolution have tirelessly urged Chávez to focus more on domestic affairs and tone down his attempts to play a greater role on the world stage. Such requests seem to go unheard as the Venezuelan leader continues to exert greater influence in international affairs and foster alliances against the perceived Western hegemony.

It is hard to believe that Chávez could be so blind as to truly believe that an individual like Belarus’ Lukashenko could possibly win with 79% of the popular vote, despite the ensuing nationwide protests. Perhaps Chávez is comparing other such heads of state to himself; the Venezuelan leader remains very popular in his country and may be naïve enough to believe Lukashenko enjoys such a wide margin of political support. Perhaps it could be argued that Chavez is turning a blind eye to the grave human rights concerns in his allies’ countries in order to pursue important geopolitical influence. The U.S. has certainly done the same throughout history by propping up despotic leaders who were sympathetic to U.S. interests.

Currently, an opposition in Venezuela is mobilizing to protest Chávez’ support for Gaddafi despite the brutal repression in Libya. Factions of the Venezuelan opposition have cautioned that Chávez is putting Venezuela in the uncomfortable position of being an apologist for governments repudiated by the international community.

Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics

The suggestion that Gaddafi might choose to flee to Venezuela to seek asylum is not particularly far-fetched, considering Venezuela’s history of harboring ousted politicians. Vladimiro Montesinos, former Peruvian intelligence chief under the Alberto Fujimori, fled to Venezuela when Fujimori’s government was crumbling. Chávez publicly claimed ignorance to Montesinos’ whereabouts until international pressure forced the Venezuelan leader to extradite him after hiding for eight months in that country.

Although extending asylum to his international brothers-in-arms may sound like a good idea, Chávez’ government will find itself progressively more isolated if it continues down this path. Venezuela’s oil reserves will guarantee business ties with a multitude of nations in need of oil, but Chávez may end up in a scenario of dwindling political allies. Chávez’ offer to play mediator is an interesting sidestep after his initial comments of seemingly unconditional support for Gaddafi. Nevertheless, his diplomatic capital seems to be low considering the rejection of his offer.

For a leader like Chávez, whose political career has featured a valid emphasis on South-South cooperation, his choice of allies, and his willingness to defend even those currently committing human rights violations like Libya’s Gaddafi, show a dubious commitment to basic human rights standards. Despite some episodes of blatant authoritarianism in Venezuela, such as censorship of independent TV stations, Chávez has not become the full-scale, oppressive dictator that his foes often characterize him to be. Nevertheless, continued ties with the likes of Belarus’ Lukashenko and Libya’s Gaddafi will inevitably curtail any expansion of Venezuelan diplomatic influence.

This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sanchez
Posted 07 Mar 2011
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