Showing posts with label dictatorship. Show all posts
Showing posts with label dictatorship. Show all posts

Thursday, November 9, 2023

Geopolitical Monitor: "China’s Win-Win in Zimbabwe: Lithium for Regime Legitimacy"

 

"China’s Win-Win in Zimbabwe: Lithium for Regime Legitimacy"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Situation Report

Geopolitical Monitor

9 November, 2023

Originally published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/chinas-win-win-in-zimbabwe-lithium-for-regime-legitimacy/

The People’s Republic of China has announced a massive USD 2.79 billion investment in its lithium mining operations in Zimbabwe. Mining in the African nation will help placate Beijing’s growing hunger for critical minerals; however, as a dictatorial government, we cannot expect this financial influx to help Zimbabweans other than the country’s rulers.

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Thursday, December 8, 2022

Miltant Wire: Alleged Links Between Rwanda and DRC Militant Group: Who Dictates the Next Steps?

 

 


"Alleged Links Between Rwanda and DRC Militant Group: Who Dictates the Next Steps"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Militant Wire

 6 December, 2022

Originally published: https://www.militantwire.com/p/alleged-links-between-rwanda-and

The conflict in the Eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has entered a new phase as negotiations in Kenya resulted in a cease-fire in late November. However, the longevity of this peace is likely dependent on decisions made in neighboring Rwanda. Moreover, it appears that international support for Rwanda’s longstanding Kagame regime may be waning as a result of its alleged actions as a critical actor in this conflict.

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Friday, February 22, 2019

Providence: Venezuela: How Far Will Nicolás Maduro Go to Stay in Power?


"Venezuela: How Far Will Nicolás Maduro Go to Stay in Power?"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Providence Magazine
22 February 2019
Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2019/02/venezuela-how-far-will-nicolas-maduro-go-to-stay-in-power/


The date February 23 will be remembered as the showdown between Venezuelan interim President Juan Guaidó against de facto President Nicolás Maduro, as the latter seeks to remain in power at all costs.

President Guaidó has announced that on that day, humanitarian aid will enter the country and be distributed among citizens in need; meanwhile, Maduro has labeled this aid as a “show” and “breadcrumbs,” since accepting it would hurt his grip on power. Controlling access to food and other basic necessities has become the Maduro regime’s ultimate tactic to retain control of the South American nation.

Guaidó’s Pledge
The political crisis in Venezuela is overshadowed by its socioeconomic crisis. Between three and four million Venezuelans have fled the country already, while those who remain have had to adapt to a shortage of food, medicine, and other basic necessities—hospitals are also suffering a lack of staff, equipment, and medical supplies. Interim President Guaidó has sought to remedy this turning to the international community for assistance. In a January 24 letter to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the interim head of state asked the US to send “food, medicine, and medical supplies, and perhaps…a hospital ship [presumably the USS Comfort]” to Venezuela.

At the time of this writing, various US Air Force C-17 aircraft have transported humanitarian aid from Homestead Air Reserve Base, Florida, to Cúcuta, Colombia. According to a statement by USAID, the first wave of deliveries has food kits that include oil, flour, lentils, and rice; hygiene kits; nutritional supplements, known as Ready-to–Use Supplementary Food; energy cookies and medicine.

Cúcuta is right next to the border with Venezuela, where Maduro infamously ordered to block with trucks and containers an international bridge (Puente Internacional Tienditas) that crosses the Tachira River to prevent any type of crossing. It appears that on February 23, trucks carrying the humanitarian aid will attempt to cross this bridge.

How Far Will Maduro Go to Stay in Power
The Maduro regime has realized that they need to do something to help the Venezuelan people, given how the government has driven the economy to the ground. Hence, the Venezuelan government has reportedly acquired medicine from its few remaining allies, like Cuba, China, and Russia. However, for the population to acquire these goods the price to pay, apart from money, is loyalty. Namely, the Venezuelan government has issued a special ID, known as “homeland card” (Carnet de la Patria in Spanish). The card is used as a type of population control, as it is required to vote and access “food, hygiene items, and subsidized school scholarships,” as well as gasoline.

Even more, the Maduro regime is also resorting to scare tactics so that the population looks at Guaidó and his international supporters with fear, if not hate. Recently, (de facto) Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez declared via state TV that the food the US is trying to deliver to Venezuelans is contaminated, poisoned, and even cancerous. She went on to declare that the food could be regarded as “biological weapons.” Ridiculous statements like these demonstrate that the Maduro regime has thrown logic out the window and is focused on staying in power via fear and control.

What could happen on February 23?
As of this writing, Maduro has declared that he will not allow the border to be opened so that trucks with humanitarian aid can enter on February 23. After all, accepting this humanitarian aid would undermine his regime’s control of the country, as the assistance is coming from Guaidó and the US. Never mind that this assistance would help Venezuelans in dire need. Thus, it comes as no surprise that during a recent visit to Washington, DC, President Iván Duque Márquez of Colombia declared that “blockading international humanitarian aid, for me, is a crime against humanity.”

The key issue will be the behavior of two actors, the Venezuelan armed forces, and the general population. While many senior military leaders and troops continue to follow Maduro’s orders, there have been a plethora of defections as well as arrests of many military officers, which the regime accuses of being coup plotters. The great unknown is whether the border guards will defy Maduro, remove the blockade, and allow the trucks with humanitarian aid to enter, or follow Maduro’s ludicrous order.

As for the population, their anger against the Maduro regime is as palpable as ever. For example, on February 17 Pableysa Ostos, a journalist for Venezuelan daily El Nacional, uploaded a short video of a Venezuelan citizen arguing with a self-described “Chavista” who was in charge of delivering gas cylinders to a neighborhood. The individual proclaims, “Maduro is over, the hunger is over.”

Final Thoughts
In January, Nicolás Maduro lost the legal right to be called President of Venezuela, as his presidential term came to an end. The actions he is carrying out nowadays—the repression, his clinging to power, the socioeconomic mess that he prolongs by staying in the Palacio de Miraflores, and the food and health crisis that continues to affect the Venezuelan population—makes Nicolas Maduro morally unfit to be the president of Venezuela.


Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Tuesday, April 19, 2016

Interview: Peru’s election shake-up

"Peru's Election Shake-Up"
The Stream - Al Jazeera
March 14, 2016
Originally published: http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/201603111507-0025170





On Monday, March 14 at 19:30 GMT:

Julio Guzman and Cesar Acuna, two of Peru’s main presidential candidates, have been barred from participating in next month’s election after weeks of back and forth between various electoral boards. Guzman’s candidacy has been ruled ‘inadmissible’ because it was not registered in accordance with electoral procedures, while Acuna has been banned because of vote buying.

But it is the ruling on Guzman that is particularly controversial. Guzman, a relatively unknown economist until recently, emerged as the main challenger to frontrunner Keiko Fujimori in past few months. Many feel his removal from the race was political. Guzman himself slammed the decision, calling it “flagrantly illegal and unconstitutional.” But the National Jury of Elections struck down his candidacy on the grounds that he was not selected by his party, Everyone for Peru, through a legitimate internal election. Guzman plans to launch one last “extraordinary” appeal, but few expect it to be successful.

For Peruvians, this is the latest twist in an election where around 70 percent of voters were already dissatisfied with the candidates running. Guzman, on the other hand, appealed to 63 percent of voters who wanted a new figure, having cast himself as an outsider in a race full of familiar faces. Despite leading in the polls, Fujimori is opposed by many others who associate her with her father, a former president found guilty of human rights abuses in 2009. She has also been accused of vote buying. Other remaining candidates face controversies ranging from plagiarism to being on trial for murder.

So what’s next for Peru’s election, and how will the shake-up affect the race?

Joining this conversation:

Alejandro Sanchez @W_Alex_Sanchez
International Security Expert
wasanchez.blogspot.com

Francisco Sagasti @FSagasti
Everyone For Peru Party (Todos Por El Peru)
franciscosagasti.com

Raul Benavides @DiarioAltavoz
Co-Director, Diario Altavoz
altavoz.pe

Miklos Lukacs @mlukacs
Professor, Esan Graduate School of Business 
en.esan.edu.pe

Wednesday, December 11, 2013

Blouin Beat: Politics - Argentina marks 30 years since junta’s end


Argentina marks 30 years since junta's end
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: Politics
December 10, 2013
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatpolitics/2013/12/10/argentina-marks-30-years-since-juntas-end/


On December 10, 1983, Raul Alfonsin assumed the presidency of Argentina. This marked the end of the military junta which had ruled the country since March 1976. At the time of this writing, ceremonies are taking place in Argentina and abroad to commemorate this important occasion (the Argentine embassy in Washington will hold an event in the headquarters of the Organization of American States), not so much to celebrate Alfonsin’s rule per se, but rather to commemorate the end of a particularly dark period of Argentine history.
The Argentina junta was called the “National Reorganization Process” (Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional). While its intended goal was bring back stability to the country after the death of the popular leader Juan Peron in 1974, the military regime will be remembered in perpetuity for the human rights violations that it carried out.
Between the 1960s to 1980s, Latin America (including Argentina) was a boiling pot of armed movements that sought regime change. In Argentina, the military was especially concerned about the Montoneros, far left-wing radicals expelled from Peron’s Justicialist Party in 1974. To what extent the Montoneros were a credible insurrectionist threat is debatable. The insurgents did carry out some high-profile assassinations, including the killing of military officers like Navy captain Jose Guillermo Burgos in 1976 and army corporal Osvaldo Ramon Rios, which prompted the wrath of the Argentina junta.
But the Montoneros were effectively destroyed by the late 1970s, so they were certainly no longer a credible threat to the regime by the 1980s. Regardless, the junta used the threat of insurgency as justification to carry out a repressive crackdown on individuals they saw as potential enemies of the state, real or imagined. This period would be known as the Dirty War (Guerra Sucia), and is remembered for the approximately 30,000 individuals (though this estimation varies) that are believed to have disappeared (the desaparecidos).
The junta’s end was accelerated by an ill-fated invasion in 1982 of the Falklands Islands (or Islas Malvinas) which Argentina claims are part of its territory and not the United Kingdom, which London controls. After the attack, the late Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher deployed the British military, which quickly defeated the Argentines. One notable event of the war’s naval campaign was the sinking of the ARA Belgrano, the flagship of the Argentine navy, by the HMS Conqueror, a British submarine. The combination of a lost war, the aforementioned repression and a troubled economy fomented protests, which forced the military junta to step down and return the country to civilian rule.
A major breakthrough in bringing to justice the Argentina security forces that carried out major human rights violations during the junta occurred under the presidency of the late Nestor Kirchner. In 2003, The Argentine congress (both the Senate and House of Deputies) nullified the laws knownas “Obediencia Debida” and “Punto Final,” which were approved in the 1980s to give amnesty to Argentine security forces so that they could not be prosecuted for human rights violations committed during the military regime. In 2005, Argentina’s Supreme Court of Justice also ruled that the aforementioned laws were unconstitutional, effectively opening the flood gates for a number of long-delayed prosecutions against human rights offenders. Jorge Rafael Videla, who sat at the junta’s head from 1976-1981, died this past May 2013 in a jail cell while serving a life sentence.
Three decades after the end of the military junta, Argentina is in better shape than it was in 1983. The 2001-2002 meltdown crippled the Argentine economy throughout the last decade, and it prompted a series of protectionist economic policies by recent heads of state, such as current President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. The 2012 nationalization of the oil company YPF from the Spanish company Repsol is an example of the Argentina government’s current lack of support for privatization initiatives.
As for political stability, concerns about which prompted the takeover by the military in 1976, there’s no question the nation enjoys it. Modern Argentina has seen a series of democratically elected presidents – though it should be noted that when the 2001 economic meltdown occurred, a series of interim presidents took control of the country (Adolfo Rodriguez Saa was president for roughly seven days before quitting). And that Nestor Kirchner, who ruled from 2003 to 2007, was followed to the presidency by his wife, Cristina de Kirchner, who was elected in 2007 and re-elected in 2011. Nepotism – certainly. Preferable to an army backed-coup? Very likely. Though at the time of this writing, Argentina has been hit by a new series of protests. But instead of left-wing radicals protesting in favor of a political ideology, the current protests have been staged by the country’s police force – who are demanding higher wages.

Wednesday, October 2, 2013

VOXXI: Chile closes the “Golden Prison” of Penal Cordillera


Chile closes the "Golden Prison" of Penal Cordillera
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
October 2, 2013
Originally published: http://www.voxxi.com/chile-closes-golden-prison/

The Chilean government will close a detention center called Penal Cordillera, known for being a “golden prison” for Pinochet-era military officers who were jailed for human rights abuses during the military regime.
This important development has occurred  less than a month after the 40th anniversary of the military coup that brought General Augusto Pinochet to power (September 11, 1973).
The closure of the Penal Cordillera is a positive step in bringing more just punishments to individuals that committed human rights abuses during the Pinochet era. Hopefully this model will be followed by other Latin American nations that have their own “golden prisoners.”

Life in a “Golden Prison”

For years, human rights organizations have complained that Chilean military officers imprisoned for having committed abuses were receiving a golden treatment at Penal Cordillera (full name: Centro de Cumplimiento Penitenciario Cordillera).
The center only has ten inmates, which  include: Marcelo Moren Brito, a retired army Colonel and member of the DINA (Pinochet’s dreaded intelligence service), José Zara (accused of killing General Carlos Prats and his wife in 1974) and Pedro Espinoza (a DINA agent accused of being part of a death squad that killed dissidents such as Orlando Letelier).
These high-level members of Pinochet’s military all hold senior rank, which include eight generals and two colonels.
It has been widely reported that the ten inmates enjoyed a lavish lifestyle during their stay in Penal Cordillera. Media reports reveal that the inmates had 35 guards that took care of the center’s security, as well as an assistant, three paramedics, two cuisine teachers, and a nutritionist to supervise their meals.
The one recent incident that appears to have been the boiling point for Chilean society was a proposed dinner in honor of General Miguel Krassnoff, another inmate of Penal Cordillera.
Namely, Chileans were outraged that prison inmates were planning to organize a dinner (a barbeque, to be specific), in honor of another inmate, particularly someone like Krassnoff, who was a member of DINA and is serving a 120-year prison sentence.
It has been reported that these inmates will be moved from the Penal Cordillera to a detention center called Punta Peuco, which also harbors Pinochet-era officers.
As journalist Jorge Molina Sanhueza explains, “At the Cordillera prison, there weren’t cells, there were cabins that held 1 or 2 people each. At the Peuco prison, each will have his own room in a cell. Peuco is actually a prison […] and it’s also further from Santiago rather than right inside it.”
After news became public of the government’s intention of closing down Penal Cordillera, a bizarre event happened: one of the inmates, General Odlanier Mena, committed suicide on September 28th. Preliminary assumptions hint that Mena took his own life upon learning that the Penal Cordillera will close and its inmates will be transferred to another detention center.
The officer was the director of the National Information Center (the successor of the DINA) from 1977 to 1980 and was sentenced in 2008 to six years in jail for the murder of three socialist militants.
Contrary to orthodox prison protocol, Mena was allowed to leave the detention center on weekends, and he used this opportunity to kill himself in his own apartment in Los Condes district of Santiago this past weekend.

And Justice for All?

The decision to close Penal Cordillera and end the luxurious lifestyle that its inmates have been enjoying will give some popularity points to the outgoing Sebastian Piñera presidency (and which may help him win the presidency again in 2017).
But this development should also be placed in a more regional context, namely that other Latin American nations have their own “golden prisons” for high-profile individuals.
One prominent example is former Peruvian dictator Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). The former head of state is the sole prisoner of a detention center on the outskirts of Lima, which also serves as the headquarters of the Peruvian police’s special forces (DIROES).
According to reports, which embarrassed the Peruvian government when they became known worldwide, Fujmori has three nurses who take care of his health, as well as a hospital-style bed and a telephone.
But perhaps the most shocking aspect of Fujimori’s prison lifestyle is that he owns a private 375 square meter garden, in which he grows roses and other plants. As means of comparison, the capacity of Peru’s overcrowded prisons is around 28,900 inmates, but they currently have about 64 thousand prisoners.
Even more shocking, in the past months, Fujimori and his supporters have been lobbying so that the government will allow the former head of state to leave his “golden prison” and fulfill the rest of his 25-year sentence under house arrest.
This initiative has sparked wide outrage among Peruvian policymakers and society in general, and so far it seems that (hopefully), the former dictator will remain behind his golden bars.