Shephard Media: "Uruguay's African peacekeepers to receive new support helicopter"

 "Uruguay's African peacekeepers to receive new support helicopter"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Defence Helicopter

Shephard Media

12 May, 2023

Originally published: https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/defence-helicopter/uruguays-african-peacekeepers-to-receive-new-support-helicopter/

The donation of a utility helicopter by the UA will increase the Uruguayan peacekeeping deployment’s air support capabilities in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

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Miltant Wire: Alleged Links Between Rwanda and DRC Militant Group: Who Dictates the Next Steps?

 

 

"Alleged Links Between Rwanda and DRC Militant Group: Who Dictates the Next Steps"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Militant Wire

 6 December, 2022

Originally published: https://www.militantwire.com/p/alleged-links-between-rwanda-and

The conflict in the Eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has entered a new phase as negotiations in Kenya resulted in a cease-fire in late November. However, the longevity of this peace is likely dependent on decisions made in neighboring Rwanda. Moreover, it appears that international support for Rwanda’s longstanding Kagame regime may be waning as a result of its alleged actions as a critical actor in this conflict.

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IPD: The Unknown Congolese Heroes – Book Review: ‘Spies in the Congo: America’s Atomic Mission in World War II’

"The Unknown Congolese Heroes – Book Review: ‘Spies in the Congo: America’s Atomic Mission in World War II’"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez and Yves Bashonga
Book Review & Analysis
24 August 2018
International Policy Digest

Spies in the Congo by Dr. Susan Williams discusses U.S. intelligence operations in the Belgian Congo (now the Democratic Republic of Congo: DRC), to secure uranium during World War II while also preventing Nazi Germany from obtaining said mineral for its own nuclear weapons program. This is a very well-written book that effectively narrates the activities that members of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS, the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency) carried out in the Belgian Congo. Without a doubt, Williams’ book combines both a deep discussion about World War II geopolitics while also bringing these individuals, too many of whom died at a young age, to life.

Moreover, Spies in the Congo discusses the other unknown heroes of this massive operation, the people of the Congo itself, who suffered then and continue to suffer, because of the richness of their country.

An Ideal Movie Plot

What transpired in the Belgian Congo during World War II is a plot worthy of a movie or a Netflix miniseries. On 2 August 1939, Albert Einstein wrote a letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, explaining that uranium reserves in the U.S. were very poor and in moderate quantities. He added that some good ore may be found in Canada and the former Czechoslovakia, while the most important source of uranium is in the Belgian Congo. As war in Europe was looming – Nazi Germany invaded Czechoslovakia in March of that year and invaded Poland only a month later following Einstein’s letter in September. As a consequence, it was important for the U.S. to push forward with its own nuclear program which required rich ore.

The book discusses in great detail the activities of OSS members in the Belgian Congo as they attempted to procure all uranium out of the Shinkolobwe mine in Katanga, and how it was transported from there to the coast: first to Lobito in Angola, a Portuguese colony at the time, and later through Matadi in the Congo and from there to the U.S. As the OSS members set up and monitored this massive operation, we learn more about them, as well as other individuals and entities that were involved in the uranium game: the sometimes unhelpful US consuls in the Congo, the British intelligence officers; Belgian officials, like the governor general of the Congo, the Belgian state police and intelligence agency Sûreté de l’État, which operated in the Congo; Belgian companies like Union Minière du Haut Katanga (which operated the Shinkolobwe mine) and Société Générale (which controlled the UMHK) not to mention the several often-unreliable individuals that the OSS had to work with. Everyone had his own interests and objectives.

Williams does an excellent job at explaining how Washington and the OSS in the Belgian Congo, successfully managed to keep its operations regarding the Shinkolobwe mine a secret, not to mention the overall objective of the Manhattan Project. The OSS team in the Belgian Congo, led by the book’s protagonist, Wilbur Owings “Dock” Hogue (Codename Teton), managed to successfully maintain a cover to combat the illegal diamond trade, rather than uranium. There was a constant fear that the Nazis would somehow figure out the US operations in the Belgian Congo and attempt to smuggle uranium via Nazi-friendly smugglers and Belgian officials. The Allies were also unclear about how developed Nazi Germany’s nuclear program was. In the end, to the Allies’ surprise, said program was not very developed at all.

Congolese uranium will be eventually used for the U.S. nuclear bombs (“Little Boy” and “Fat Man”) that were dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

Unknown Heroes
Thanks to declassified documents and other research, we know more about OSS operations in the Belgian Congo, as well as the divided interests of the Belgian government and business community both in Brussels and Léopoldville (now Kinshasa, the capital of the DRC). Some were determined to fight the Nazis, while others were sympathetic. There was also a faction that behaved pragmatically supporting whichever side was winning the war.

But what about the Congolese themselves? While Spies in the Congo focuses on the OSS and World War II, Williams does a great job telling us about the people who actually worked at the Shinkolobwe mine and helped win the war.

Williams is blunt about the treatment of the Congolese by the Belgians. Both before and during the war, they were exploited, and the eventual victory of the Allies did nothing to improve their conditions until the Belgian Congo’s eventual independence in 1960. She discusses the role of King Leopold II of Belgium, which transformed the territory into the Congo Free State in the 19th century.

Leopold’s harsh rule has been well examined, including the use of the infamous chicotte “which at the time was made from hippopotamus hide with razor-sharp edges,” to punish the Congolese. How many Congolese died during Leopold’s rule is anyone’s guess. Williams cites the number at 10 million “as result of the routine brutality and executions,” but other authors cite different numbers, also in the millions; hence the genocide during the Congo Free State should be more well-known than it is today. (For more information about Leopold’s rule and Congo, see Adam Hochschild’s King Leopold’s Ghost.)

During World War II, the Allies’ need for Africa’s raw resources, such as uranium, rubber, cotton among others, dramatically increased. Williams explains how “between 1938 and 1944, the Union Minière workforce almost doubled from 25,000 to 49,000; so did the number of fatal accidents at Union Minière plants.” Even more, Congolese soldiers were also conscripted into the Force Publique, the Belgian Colonial Army, which fought in Ethiopia (then Abyssinia), Nigeria, Egypt and Palestine. The 11th battalion of the Force Publique included 3,000 Congolese soldiers and 2,000 bearers who fought valiantly in Ethiopia.

Unsurprisingly, Congolese soldiers were badly treated by white officers, and they were told that, if they fled, their families would be punished. This mirrored the situation of the Congolese in the civilian world under Belgian rule, as they were treated as second class citizens, underpaid and segregated from white-neighborhoods in Leopoldville or Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi).

As a final point, it is important to highlight that the radioactivity of uranium does not care about skin color. Several OSS personnel would become sick and die at early ages, partially weakened by diseases like malaria, but their continuous exposure to uranium certainly did not help their health. The same can be said about the Congolese workers who worked at the Shinkolobwe mine without protective equipment. Williams correctly concludes that the Congolese “were simply used as workers, as if they had no rights as equal human beings. This was a process for which the US, the UK and Belgium bear a heavy responsibility.”

Analysis: Who Benefits from Congo’s riches?
In her conclusions, Dr. Williams discusses how, when Congo achieved independence, it attempted to remain neutral in the emerging Cold War, “but it was unavoidable: the Congo’s resources, including its uranium, put the newly independent nation at the very heart of Cold War concerns.”

This seems to be part of a pattern when it comes to the Congo; over the centuries, different outside actors have arrived to plunder and steal (for there is no other term to describe this process) its natural resources: during World War II, it was the U.S. to defeat the Nazi empire; today they are transnational companies, rebel movements, not to mention certain governments. Whether it is diamonds, uranium, copper, cobalt or coffee, it seems that the entire world benefits from the Congo, except for the Congolese themselves.

A lot has changed in the past 70 plus years since the end of the War: the DRC is now an independent nation, but Congolese villagers continue to work for transnational companies in atrocious circumstances, with said companies giving little back to local communities in exchange for what they extract.
In early June 2018, the DRC signed into law a revised version of the 2002 mining code, which will hopefully mean more tax revenue for the government from transnational companies that operate in the country. “The DRC does not have a strong history of obtaining taxes from the general population, so taxes from these companies are vital for our development,” explains one of the authors of this commentary. Unsurprisingly, this move has prompted criticism by mining companies like Glencore and Randgold, which argue that “the tax hikes and the removal of exemptions for pre-existing operations are a breach of their agreements with the government,” explains Reuters.

As for Congolese-Belgian relations, the legacy of the Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo remains in the minds of the Congolese who have learned their nation’s history, not to mention the role that the Belgian government played in the assassination of the Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba (a renowned supporter of Pan-Africanism) via Katangan separatists in 1961.

Brussels has recognized its role in Lumumba’s death: it apologized in 2002 and this past June it inaugurated the Patrice Lumumba square at the entrance to the Belgian capital’s largely Congolese Matonge area. In spite of the symbolic importance of this initiative, bilateral relations have continued to deteriorate and it will be important to monitor these to see if they improve in the future after the DRC’s upcoming elections, scheduled for December 2018.

Without a doubt, Spies in the Congo is a great book that tells a vital, though obscure story about World War II, namely the role the Congo had in helping the Allies win, and the U.S. development of its nuclear program in particular. Today Congo continues to supply the world with critically important resources, and sadly the vast majority of the Congolese people have yet to profit from them.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the authors are associated.

Diplomatic Courier: The Evolution of a Country’s Name in the 21st Century

"The Evolution of a Country's Name in the 21st Century"'

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Diplomatic Courier: A Global Affairs Media Network
19 June 2018
Originally published: https://www.diplomaticourier.com/2018/06/21/the-evolution-of-a-countrys-name-in-the-21st-century/

On 12 June, the governments of Macedonia and Greece announced that they reached an agreement to change the former’s name. This decision comes months after King Mswati III of Swaziland changed his African nation’s name to eSwatini. A nation’s name, like a flag or a national anthem, is part of a country’s identity; thus, changes to any of them are momentous occasions.

Recent Changes to Country Names
Due to space issues, we will briefly, and solely, list changes to nations’ names that have taken place during the past few decades. (In other words we will not discuss changes to flags, as New Zealand almost did in 2016, or the Czech Republic’s adoption of “Czechia” as a moniker, also in 2016).

For example, the late President Laurent-Desire Kabila changed Zaire’s name to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) after coming to power in 1997. Two years later, in 1999, the late President Hugo Chavez renamed the Republic of Venezuela to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. A decade later, in 2009, President Evo Morales changed his landlocked nation’s name, from the Republic of Bolivia to the Plurinational State of Bolivia.

More recently, in 2012, the Republic of Hungary became simply Hungary. A year later, in 2013, Cape Verde became the Republic of Cabo Verde. Finally, as previously noted, Swaziland is now the Kingdom of eSwatini, while the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) will now be known as the Republic of North Macedonia, assuming that the June 2018 agreement with Athens is approved by both parliaments.

Finally, it is worth noting that one more nation, Kazakhstan, may change its name. There have been discussions about renaming it “Kazakh Yeli,” which means Land of the Kazakhs.

Why Change?
There are several reasons why a government may decide to change the country’s name. For example, Macedonia is changing its name in order to put to rest a decades-old dispute with Greece, which will hopefully mean that Athens will stop blocking Skopje’s attempts to join blocs like NATO and the European Union.

Other changes have more to do with new leaders deciding to break away from previous regimes and start “fresh.” This is the case of the DRC, as President Kabila changed the country’s name after the dictator Joseph Mobutu was overthrown (for a good book about Congolese history, see: Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa).

Other reasons may have to do with a leader’s political ideology, for example, the late President Chavez added the word “Bolivarian” to Venezuela’s name in honor of his hero, the 19^th century South American liberator Simon Bolivar. Similarly, President Morales of Bolivia added the term “Plurinational” to celebrate the nation’s linguistic and cultural diversity—he is Bolivia’s first indigenous head of state, which likely influenced his decision.

In Kazakhstan’s case, the Kazakh government aims to distance itself from the other “stans,” through its potential name change. A 2014 article in The Economist explains that the Kazakh leadership “puts itself in a different league from its neighbours. ”

A Name, An Identity
As previously mentioned, a country’s name is part of its national identity, and it is important for any government to keep in mind how its population will react to such changes; there have been mixed reactions to these initiatives. For example, there have already been protests in Macedonia due to the government’s decision, and there was also popular unrest in Hungary when its name change occurred.
Conversely, the international media has not reported major unrest in eSwatini surrounding its new name, perhaps because, as a BBC report argued, the population has other, bigger concerns, like poverty and high HIV levels.

Similarly, the Venezuelan government’s addition of an adjective to the country’s name, rather than fully changing it, explains the little opposition regarding this decision—in any case, Venezuela’s political and economic meltdown are the population’s main concerns nowadays, and outweigh the praising (or not) of a 19^th century liberator.

As the aforementioned examples have demonstrated, the very name of a country, the building block of a person’s national identity and sense of patriotism, continues to evolve in the 21^st century. Such a change not only has bureaucratic implications—updating passports, driving licenses, maps, anthems, state-owned companies and a plethora of official documents—but also affects a person’s national identity, which can result in negative reactions, as is currently happening in Macedonia.

A country’s name tells the history of its people, and in the age of the “global everything,” it is important to understand how these new names came to be and what do they mean, as this will influence how the rest of the world will interact with these newly named nations.

About the author: Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

IPD: Kazakhstan Should Have a Bigger Role In UN Peace Operations

"Kazakhstan Should Have a Bigger Role in UN Peace Operations"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
International Policy Digest
25 February 2018
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/02/25/kazakhstan-should-have-a-bigger-role-in-un-peace-operations/

Kazakhstan held the rotating presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) throughout January 2018, a significant accomplishment for the Central Asian country, which has also chaired the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in recent years. While Astana’s seat in the UNSC is certainly commendable as it is the first Central Asian nation to join this body, the Kazakh government should take a further step forward as it strives to promote global stability by having a larger role in United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKO).

To be clear, Kazakhstan has participated in peace operations and has carried out non-military operations in other missions, but the author argues that this presence should be increased. The Central Asian state first announced that its armed forces would participate in PKOs in 2013. According to January 2018 official data by the UN’s Peacekeeping Operations website, there are currently five Kazakh experts on mission serving in the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

Apart from the UN, Kazakhstan deployed Army engineers to Iraq after the 2003 war to provide humanitarian assistance, including carrying out mine-clearing operations. “In 2003, Kazakhstan sent 27 military engineers to assist operations of the coalition in Iraq. Over five years, nine contingents totaling 290 Kazakh peacekeeping troops were rotated through Iraq,” the Kazakh government reports. Finally, Kazakh troops have been involved in training foreign troops, such as Afghan border security forces, to help improve internal security in the fellow Central Asia state.

While Kazakhstan’s role in peace operations is praiseworthy, more can, and should, be done. It is worth remembering that, upon joining the UNSC in 2017, Kazakhstan stated its priorities, which ranged from “eliminating the threat of a global war” to “bringing peace to the African continent.” Tragically, eight of the UN’s 15 PKOs are located precisely in Africa, such as the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) or the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which have well over ten thousand peacekeepers each, in an attempt to strengthen security and the rule of law. In order to keep up with its noble intentions, the Kazakh government should consider sending additional troops to more UN peace missions.

Training foreign security forces and sending engineers is an important component of promoting security and state-building, however, it has to go hand in hand with improving the security situation on the ground. Sadly, there are plenty of hot spots of violence that warrant attention and active participation from the international community, particularly from capable armed forces. In other words, the UN could use well-trained Kazakh troops on the ground in countries like the DRC, CAR among several others. As a final point, it is important to stress that saying that Central Asian armed forces as “well-trained” is not an overstatement, as Kazakh defense personnel regularly train with military powers such as the U.S. Case in point, in September 2017, 35 troops of the country’s peacekeeping battalion carried out a three-day training course with instructors from the U.S. Defence Institute for Medical Operations. Also last year British, Kazakh and U.S. troops carried out Exercise Steppe Eagle – Spring 2017 at the Iliyskiy training centre.

The decision to deploy more troops to UN peace missions should not be taken lightly, as there is an ever-present possibility for violence and, sadly, casualties – like the tragic deaths of 15 Tanzanian peacekeepers, assigned to MONUSCO, in December 2017. Thus, the Kazakh regime should not commit to deploying additional troops to UN peace missions without a careful consideration of the potential risks that such a deployment entails. With that said, instability and violence in the world continues, and nations like Kazakhstan, which have pledged to promote global peace, must have a bigger role in helping bring stability to troubled areas.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Providing for Peacekeeping Project: Peru Profile (Update)

"Peru Profile"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Updated version, January 2017
Providing for Peacekeeping Project

Part 1: Recent Trends

As a founding member of the UN, the Republic of Peru has maintained a continuous interest in contributing to UN peacekeeping operations. For decades, Peru has deployed personnel from its security agencies (Army, Navy, Air Force and the Police) to over 20 UN missions. The three major Peruvian deployments have been to the UN missions in Israel (after the 1973 conflict) and the ongoing operations in Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where Peru has deployed hundreds of military personnel. Peru has also recently contributed to the UN mission in Central African Republic, MINUSCA. Peruvian contributions to other operations have been generally small, mostly military observers and small numbers of troops.

A Brief History

Peruvian military personnel have been deployed to 20 UN operations. The first mission in which Peru participated was the UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958. It also had a large contribution to the Second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II) and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Middle East after the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict. The Peruvian military contingent was deployed both in the Sinai Peninsula between Israeli and Egyptian forces, and then to the Golan Heights between Israeli and Syrian forces. The Peruvian deployment lasted two years and totaled 497 troops (with occasional troop rotations).

In recent years, its largest deployment has been to the to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) since its creation in 2004. The deployment, known as Compañia Peru, has some 200 troops. According to official data, over 5,000 troops have been deployed to MINUSTAH over the course of over 20 rotations. In January 2016, Peru sent a first deployment of 250 troops, known as the Compañia de Ingeniería Peru (an engineer company), to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). A second deployment, this time of 205 troops, occurred in January 2017.

Peruvian officers have also achieved senior command status within UN operations. For example, Brigadier General Gastón Ibáñez O’Bríen of the Peruvian Army served as commander of the Brigada Norte of UNEF II, placing him in charge of the Peruvian contingent as well troops from other nations. Moreover, in 1992 Brigadier General Luis Block Urban became commander of the UN forces in MINURSO. Additionally, in 2008 Rear Admiral Mario César Sánchez Debenardi was appointed as Force Commander of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

Official publications like Peru’s 2005 White Book, published by the Ministry of Defense, as well as the ongoing major deployment of troops to MINUSTAH, which now include female military personnel, and MINUSCA demonstrate a current interest from both the Peruvian government and armed forces in being part of the UN peacekeeping operations. In fact, Chapter VII of the 2005 White Book encourages Peruvian participation in these operations, as it is regarded as a way for the South American nation to promote its international presence, while at the same time providing real-life training for its security personnel.

Peru has participated in peace operations almost exclusively through the UN. The one exception is Peru’s participation in the Military Observer Mission Peru-Ecuador (MOMEP). The mission was created after a brief conflict in 1995 between Lima and Quito over a territorial dispute between the two South American states. MOMEP’s goal was to observe the ceasefire between the two countries leading up to a final demarcation of the disputed border.

A Peruvian peacekeeping training center was created in 2003, known as Centro de Entrenamiento y Capacitación para Operaciones de Paz  (CECOPAZ). Located in Ancón, north of Lima, this training center prepares Peruvian military, police and civilian personnel for deployment to UN missions, as well as the training of senior officers to become military observers. CECOPAZ courses are not just for Peruvian personnel; the center regularly carries out courses to train military observers from regional states (i.e. a 2012 course included officers from Argentina, Colombia and Ecuador).

Part 2: Decision-Making Process

Decisions for military deployment abroad are fundamentally political, originating from the President of the Republic of Peru in his capacity as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The Peruvian president is the policymaker responsible for signing the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Peru and the United Nations through which Lima agrees to deploy troops to a UN peacekeeping operation. This pledge is then approved by the Peruvian Congress via legislative resolutions and ratified by Supreme Decrees. The Peruvian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Joint Command of the Armed Forces are then tasked with organizing the personnel that will be deployed (i.e. choosing the most-qualified troops) and any necessary logistics (i.e. transportation and determining the necessary military equipment). The Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Economy and Finance provide support as needed.

Legislation that addresses Peru’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions includes the Decreto Legislativo N°1134 of the Ministry of Defense as well as Decreto Legislativo N° 1136 of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces. The MoD’s Directive is important as it explains the duties of the Peruvian Ministry of Defense, which prominently feature peacekeeping operations. For example, Article 5, section 25, explains that the MoD has the duty of consolidating and maintaining international peace. Meanwhile, Article 10, section 15, explains that the MoD and the MFA will supervise and foment the participation of Peruvian security personnel in peace operations. Likewise, Article 4.7 of the Joint Command’s directive explains that it is tasked with “planning, coordinating and carrying out the participation of the armed forces in peace operations.”

Furthermore, a significant development was the 2005 publication of Peru’s White Book of National Defense, which described the Andean nation’s defense priorities and objectives. The book was published during the presidency of Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) and is an important achievement as it is the first time Peru has published a White Book. Moreover, Chapter VII of this document addresses Peru’s advocacy regarding participation in peace operations (see Part 3).

Part 3: Rationales for Contributing

National prestige: The Peruvian government and military regard participation in UN peacekeeping operations as a way to promote the country’s image abroad and to increase its international pedigree. Chapter VII of Peru’s White Book explains that participation in UN peacekeeping missions:

“Constitutes one of the objectives of our foreign policy and is of national interest, as it also provides an opportunity for the Peruvian government to have a relevant role in the international arena. Furthermore, [participation in UN peacekeeping missions] increases the high level of professionalism of the personnel of the defense sector. This participation in peace operations promotes international cooperation and confidence building mechanisms.” [Translation by the author.]

In addition, the Peruvian government and military are interested in providing UN peacekeepers to showcase the training and professionalism of their armed forces to the rest of the world. This is best exemplified by the events and ceremonies that are regularly organized by the Peruvian government and armed forces, in which the military’s participation in UN peace missions is highly praised. For example, senior Peruvian military officers gave a speech in during the 2009 ceremony in Lima to celebrate the UN Peacekeeper Day (May 29). Then-commander of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, Army General Francisco Javier Contreras Rivas explained that “because of [the] capacity of the Peruvian soldier, the United Nations looks to … our country … because our soldiers of peace are men [and women] that work for a better world.” In May 2013, the Peruvian Ministry of Defense carried out a ceremony in CECOPAZ to honor soldiers that have participated in UN peacekeeping missions. Deputy Minister of Defense and Rear Admiral Sánchez Debernardi, who was the force commander to UNFICYP, highlighted the “professionalism” of the Peruvian troops. Such praise has been echoed by UN officials.

In other words, the leadership of the Peruvian military sees its participation in peace operations as a source of national prestige.

Economic rationales: The Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Economy and Finance are in charge of working out budgetary details regarding the international deployment of Peruvian troops. The allowances received by security personnel deployed in UN missions are significantly higher than the regular wages they would receive in Peru. Hence, the possibility of an additional salary via the UN serves as an incentive for Peruvian military personnel to apply to UN peace missions. The Peruvian government does not keep a portion of the money paid to its troops by the UN.

Security Rationales: These are not relevant as there are no UN peacekeeping missions near the country (the closest being MINUSTAH in Haiti).

Institutional rationales: These operations are regarded as an effective way to train Peruvian troops in different environments that they may not necessarily encounter at home. These institutional interests are exemplified by the creation of CECOPAZ to prepare troops for these missions (i.e. MINUSTAH and MINUSCA). According to its website, CECOPAZ’s mission is to train military, police and civilian personnel, as well as providing advice to the Joint Command of the Armed Forces in the realm of peace operations.

Participation in UN missions is also regarded as a confidence-building mechanism, as Peruvian troops form friendships and close relations with soldiers from other countries, both during deployments and during the pre-deployment training sessions. For example, Peru has built military relationships with Argentina and Chile on this basis. In October 2008, Peru and Argentina created a binational company of engineers, known as “Libertador Don Jose de San Martin,” aimed at carrying out operations in MINUSTAH. A December 2011 directive (called a Resolución Suprema) by the Peruvian MoD authorized a trip by a military delegation from Lima to Buenos Aires to take part in further negotiations regarding the future of the company, but this author has been unable to find more recent information regarding this initiative.

In addition, during a May 2013 meeting in Lima, the ministers of defense and foreign affairs of Peru and Chile, known as the Reunión 2+2, discussed the possibility of creating a binational unit of military personnel for UN peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, as of early 2017, this unit has yet to be formed, most likely due to recent diplomatic tensions between the two governments over a maritime border dispute that was judged by the International Court of Justice (a ruling was made in January 2014).

Part 4: Barriers to Contributing

Strategic Priorities: This is best exemplified by ongoing rotations of military personnel to MINUSTAH since 2004 and MINUSCA since 2016. A critical factor that may affect current and future deployments is the internal security situation in Peru. The country is still battling a narco-terrorist movement called the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso). The insurgent group has weakened and fractured compared to its heyday in the 1980s. Currently, Sendero is split into two factions and has suffered several major losses in recent years, including the capture of its last remaining leaders.Sendero is believed to have only a few hundred fighters left, nevertheless, the narco-movement remains active and occasionally carries out attacks against Peruvian security forces (an April 2016 ambush by Sendero resulted in the deaths of 10 Peruvian soldiers).

In general, there is a lack of sufficient security personnel, both for the armed forces and police, to carry out their duties (i.e. internal security and to serve as a deterrent force). This is a source of concern for the population as the country still has to tackle internal security threats such as Sendero Luminoso and drug-trafficking criminal syndicates. While Peru does not possess drug-trafficking entities as widespread and powerful as those in Mexico, it is now regarded as the largest producer of cocaine in the world, making operations to combat cocaine production and smuggling a high priority. The country is also experiencing an increase in street crime (i.e. robberies and kidnappings).

Hence, it is a priority of the Peruvian government to increase its security forces to tackle the aforementioned domestic threats. This is best exemplified by a law that the Peruvian government tried to enact to create a military lottery, essentially a draft to increase the size of the armed forces. In June 2013, the Peruvian Supreme Court of Justice suspended the proposed law after complaints by the Public Defender and protests by civil society and opposition politicians who argued that the law is discriminatory. In addition, former President Humala has declared that the Peruvian police, which numbers about 106,000, has a deficit of around 30,000 officers. In other words, a major caveat to greater participation in UN peacekeeping is the current lack of sufficient security personnel that can adequately address Peru’s internal security challenges.

Resistance in the military: This is not relevant. Several senior military officers have declared themselves in favor of Peru’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions.

One major reason for this sentiment is that, in spite of operating in conflict zones, there have been no significant losses among Peruvian peacekeepers. Three soldiers lost their lives in 1974 during the deployment to UNEF II due to an antipersonnel mine while another soldier was lost during the UN mission in Mozambique, ONUMOZ. Most recently, a peacekeeper in MINUSTAH perished due to health issues in 2016. The minimal fatalities suffered in peace operations to date helps maintain support among the military leadership.

Damage to national reputation: This is also not relevant. Even though MINUSTAH had controversial origins, namely the overthrow of Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide in 2004, there has not been particular concern that Peru’s reputation will be damaged by participation in this mission. In addition, Peruvian peacekeepers have not been involved in human rights violations or other crimes during their deployment. The Peruvian media regularly publishes articles praising the participation of Peruvian personnel in UN peace missions (i.e. in the 1970s in the Middle East and currently in MINUSTAH and MINUSCA).

Difficult domestic politics: There has never been a national debate, either among the general public or among policymakers in the Peruvian Congress, regarding the country’s role in UN peacekeeping missions.

Absence of pressure: There has not been any pressure by international organizations or governments or the Peruvian military directed at the Peruvian government to either participate, or avoid participation, in UN peace missions.

Part 5: Current Challenges and Issues

The Peruvian government maintains a positive disposition towards providing peacekeepers. Nevertheless, security barriers remain a critical issue that arguably prevents a greater deployment of Peruvian troops to UN peace missions. As mentioned in Part 4, internal security remains a concern, given the ongoing operations of Sendero Luminoso and other drug trafficking syndicates (Peru is currently regarded as the world’s biggest producer of cocaine).

Regionally, Peru maintains generally good relations with four out of its five neighbors: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador. Tensions remain, however, with its southern neighbor, Chile, which date back to the 19th century War of the Pacific. In 2014, the International Court of Justice helped resolve a maritime border dispute between the countries. It is also important to highlight that tension between Peru and Chile cannot be overstated. While the two countries have generally strong trade relations and have carried out confidence-building mechanisms such as the attempts to create a binational military unit, distrust between the two governments, militaries and societies remains. Media articles and analytical reports were regularly published discussing whether one country could go to war with the other over maritime claims, while arms acquisitions by either side are viewed with concern.

With regard to the economy, Peru has enjoyed a positive decade, which supports the deployment of troops to UN missions. In addition, as noted above, military officers are interested in participating in UN missions, in part, for the additional UN allowances. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that Peru’s financial good fortunes are very recent. Factors like the Peruvian financial crisis of the 1980s and the slow economic jumpstart in the 1990s undermined Peru’s ability to produce military hardware, provide training and even the appropriate number of personnel. In recent years, there has been a program to acquire new platforms (including a new satellite, PeruSat-1, for its space program and a new training vessel for the Navy) but this has occurred at a slow pace. Moreover, the country still has internal security threats and, from the Peruvian perspective, an external one. Hence, the defense mindset among Peruvian policymakers and security officers is that additional personnel are needed first and foremost to safeguard the homeland.

Part 6: Key Champions and Opponents

There are no major policymakers or military officers who are particularly supportive or opposed to Peruvian participation in UN peacekeeping missions. Former President Ollanta Humala (2011-2016), a former military officer, has praised the participation of Peruvian security personnel in UN missions. The current head of state, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski has not reportedly made any major declaration for or against participating in UN missions. As previously mentioned, General Block, a former MINURSO force commander, has written articles in favor of Peruvian participation. Nevertheless, it would be an overstatement to label Presidents Kuczynski, Humala, or General Block as “champions” of Peru’s participation in UN peace operations.

Other senior policymakers occasionally visit Peruvian deployments to UN missions. For example Peru’s Defense Minister, Pedro Cateriano, visited the Compañia Peru in Haiti in December 2012, and expressed his support for Peruvian participation in the operation.

No Peruvian policymakers or military officers have made public declarations against Peruvian participation in UN peacekeeping missions. Apart from occasional mentions in talk shows and other discussion panels by security experts, Peru’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions has never been a controversial topic. This issue was not addressed in the debates over foreign policy and defense during the recent 2016 elections where President Kuczynski was elected. It is worth noting that in spite of the tragic loss of a number of Peruvian peacekeepers, a debate has not materialized within the Peruvian government or the general public to reconsider the country’s provision of UN peacekeepers.

The lack of a discussion regarding Peru’s role in peace operations exemplifies not only the lack of an opposition to these missions, but also the lack of interest or knowledge about them by the government and the citizenry in general. Events like the 2010 earthquake in Haiti raised the profile of Peru’s contribution to MINUSTAH, and, as mentioned before, the Peruvian media regularly publishes (brief) reports about Peru’s participation in UN peace missions. But increasing the country’s role in UN peace missions does not seem to be a priority for policymakers or military leaders in Lima.

Part 7: Capabilities and Caveats

Peru’s contributions to UN peacekeeping have increased in the past years, with a particular focus in MINUSTAH and, as of 2016, MINUSCA. At the time of writing, overall contributions close to 400 personnel are large for Peru. Nevertheless, MINUSTAH’s mandate is scheduled to finish on 15 April 2017. It is unclear if the Peruvian government will offer to join another mission with a large deployment of contingent troops, or if MINUSCA will remain the sole peace operation in which Peru will have a major participation.

It is worth noting that female Peruvian military personnel have also been deployed to MINUSTAH. This development was featured in a January 2011 article in Diálogo magazine, published by the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

As a final point, it should be clarified that while Peru has a substantial number of helicopters, they have not been deployed to UN peace missions. The one exception occurred during the Alberto Fujimori regime, but this transaction was marred by money laundering allegations. Russia recently concluded the delivery of a new fleet of 24 Mi-171Sh helicopters, however the platforms will probably be utilized for internal security operations rather than to be deployed to the UN. Peru has sent construction equipment to MINUSCA, as the engineer company is in charge of the construction and maintenance of roads and landing strips for planes and helicopters.

Part 8: Further Reading

Comando Conjunto de lasFuerzas Armadas. 50 Años al Servicio del País: 1057-2007. El Comercio (Peru). Suplemento Contratado. May 10, 2007.

Diálogo. Capacitación en Derechos Humanos. January 1, 2012. http://dialogo-americas.com/es/articles/rmisa/features/security_technology/2012/01/01/feature-pr-15

Gaetano Guevara Bergna, “Observador Peruano en Sudan,” Revista del Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas (Peru), Año 2, No. 2 (Sept. 2008): 43-47.

Christian Sánchez Campos,Batallón Especial “Peru:” Una Misión Singular, Actualidad Militar, Ejército del Peru, Ministerio de Guerra (Peru), No.219, Separata, April 1976.

1. Alejandro Sánchez,Peacekeeping and Military operations by Latin American militaries: Between being a good Samaritan and servicing the national interest (Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Report, January 22, 2010).
2. Alejandro Sanchez, Misiones Singularmente Complicadas: El Rol de Peru en las Operaciones de Paz de las Naciones Unidas, Perspectivas, Vol.2 (July 2014): 7-19.

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Notes

[1] Unless otherwise stated, data is drawn from IISS, The Military Balance 2016 (London: IISS/Routledge, 2016).

[2] The IISS figure of 114 helicopters likely includes a sizeable number of helicopters that are no longer operational or are limited to training uses. A more accurate estimate of helicopters currently in operation by all three branches of the armed forces is 47.

[3]Armed Forces Spending is a country’s annual total defense budget (in US dollars) divided by the total number of active armed forces. Using figures from IISS, The Military Balance 2016.