CIMSEC: NEITHER SIDE APPEARS READY FOR WAR: FALKLANDS/MALVINAS ISLANDS ANALYSIS

"Neither Side Appears Ready for War: Falklands/Malvinas Islands"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Center for International Maritime Security
Analysis
January 19, 2016
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/neither-side-appears-ready-for-war-falklandsmalvinas-islands-analysis/21163

Argentina has requested that the United Kingdom engage indiplomatic talks regarding control of the Falkland Islands, or Islas Malvinas, depending on which side you support. As the islands will not change hands anytime soon, with London citing a2013 referendum as proof of the Falklanders’ desire to remain in the UK, the dispute will continue. Nevertheless, in spite of occasional aggressive statements or alarmist media reports from either London or Buenos Aires, it is important to highlight that neither side has significantly increased their defense spending vis-à-vis the islands.

The War

In 1982, Argentina launched an invasion of the islands, as the military government in Buenos Aires wanted to distract the Argentine population from the country’s crumbling economy and unite the citizenry behind the junta. The Falklands War has been extensively analyzed (see such essays as “Delayed Reaction: UK Maritime Expeditionary Capabilities and the Lessons of the Falklands Conflict,” and “Facts Influencing the Defeat of the Argentine Air Power in the Falklands War”) but a word must still be said about the conflict. The war is significant because, as Dr. Ian Speller explains, it “was the first time since 1945 that a major western navy had come under sustained air attack at sea [and] it was the first time that a nuclear-powered hunter killer submarine conducted a successful attack on enemy surface units.”

The navies and air forces from both sides were actively engaged in the battle to control the Falklands. As for successful attacks, aircraft from the Argentine Air Force and Navy managed to sink British vessels like the warships HMS Sheffield and HMS Ardent, and the supply ship MV Atlantic Conveyor, among others. Meanwhile, a British nuclear submarine, the HMS Conqueror, sank the Argentine Navy’s flagship, the ARA General Belgrano.

Official Statements

To this day, Argentina continues to claim ownership of the islands. Case in point, now former-President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, declared this past April that she foresaw that one day the islands would be under Argentine control. A month earlier, UK Defence Secretary Michael Fallon announced that “we are going to beef up the defence of Falkland Islands,” the obvious assumption being that the islands need protection from a possible Argentine attack. These statements come to no surprise, as over the past years Buenos Aires and London claim that the “other side” is taking aggressive steps regarding the islands.

The islands, particularly after the war, are a key part of Argentine nationalism, hence it should not be surprising that Argentina’s new head of state, President Mauricio Macri, will give the occasional nationalistic statement over the islands or call for negotiations. Nevertheless he also wants U.S. and European investment to jump start the country’s economy, so he may not be overly aggressive (after his electoral victory in November,Macri and Prime Minister David Cameron held a telephone discussion in which they agreed on forging closer commercial ties). I would argue that nationalistic statements or calls for dialogue with London from Buenos Aires are mostly for internal consumption, as a way for President Macri to show his people that he has not forgotten about the islands. After all, it would be political suicide for any Argentine president to not make the occasional patriotic declaration regarding the Falklands.

Defense Realities

Provocative calls for negotiations aside, the Argentine Navy is in no particular shape to engage in a new conflict over the islands. The Navy’s biggest acquisition in recent years was that of four Russian multipurpose ships (Aviso/Neftegaz-class), which will be utilized for search and rescue operations and scientific projects around the Antarctic. The vessels arrived to the South American nation this past December. Theoretically, the Navy could install weapons systems aboard the vessels, but it is unlikely that this will happen due to budgetary limitations. Regarding submarines the only new development is that in 2014 the ARA San Juan (a diesel TR-1700-class) was finally returned to the Navy after it underwent repairs that had taken several years to complete.

As for the Air Force, which was a critical factor in Argentina’s victories at sea during the Falklands War, just this past November it decommissioned its aging Mirage warplane fleet.The problem is that the Air Force does not have a new warplane to replace the Mirage. Over the past years there were rumors that Buenos Aires would acquire Russian Sukhoi warplanes (hence the need for London to “beef up” the defense of the islands) but this deal never materialized. Similarly, a recent deal for Israeli Kfir warplanes has been put on hold. For the time being, Argentina will have to rely on trainers, such as the Pampa III,and various, also aging, aircraft to protect its airspace.

The Air Force’s situation is so dismal that during the December 2015 inauguration ceremony of President Macri, Argentina requested that Uruguay have three of its own Cessna Dragonfly planes on alert, ready to support Buenos Aires if some crisis occurred. While this request speaks well of Argentina-Uruguay defense relations, it highlights that the Argentine military is hardly in any shape to attempt a renewed operation to take over the Falklands.

As for the UK Navy, the big news is that it is constructing two new carriers, one of which, the HMS Queen Elizabeth, should be operational by 2020. The new vessels are part of a push for greater defense spending by London. Just this past December,Secretary Fallon declared that “we have said we will maintain a minimum fleet of 19 destroyers and frigates, but as the older frigates are retired we also hope to add a lighter frigate between the offshore patrol vessel and Type 26 and to build more of those as well.” Additionally, the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy will benefit from having the new F-35 warplanes in their inventory, as “the Lightning II will be the backbone of Britain’s future carrier operations.” (Of course, how long it will take for the F-35 to be delivered is another question).

Regarding the Falklands themselves, the Royal Navy maintains the HMS Clyde stationed there as part of its South Atlantic Patrol program (in November 2015, the HMS Clyde assisted in rescuing tourists trapped in a sinking cruise ship close to the Falklands). Additionally, the British daily Express reported that this past April British troops carried out exercises in the Falklands which simulated an invasion of the islands. As for new equipment, the only major ongoing acquisition program seems to be additionalGiraffe AMB radars, manufactured by Saab.

One could argue that the British military is suffering from exhaustion due to the multiple operations it carries out around the world, from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to security operations in the Mediterranean and the Horn of Africa. Just this past December, the destroyer HMS Defender was deployed to the Mediterranean to support the French carrier Charles de Gaulle. Given its multiple ongoing operations, it’s difficult to say how long it would take London to organize a new expeditionary force that would be sent to the Falklands, should another conflict occur. (Daniel Gibran’s The Falklands War, 1998, provides a great summary of the logistical success of deploying over 50 warships, over 50 support vessels, aircraft, troops, ammo and other supplies to the South Atlantic – p. 80-83).

Conspiracy Theories/Exaggerations

Finally, a word must be said about accusations originating in both London and Buenos Aires concerning the other’s intentions regarding the Falklands. As previously mentioned, while there has not been another war over the islands since the early 1980s, just about every year there are accusations that either the Argentine or British government are behaving in an aggressive manner. For example, in 2012 Argentina accused the UK of “militarizing” the South Atlantic. Moreover, the Argentine mediawidely reproduced the March 2015 comments by Secretary Fallon about “beefing up” of the defenses in the Falklands. In particular the Argentine media quoted and discussed a March 23, 2015, report by the British tabloid The Sun that London feared an imminent attack by Argentina, with Russian support. At the time, the ongoing theory in the British media was that, due to the close relations between Moscow and Buenos Aires (largely due to the friendship between President Vladimir Putin with then-President Kirchner), Russia would somehow support Argentina’s military in the islands.

Final Thoughts

As a reminder, Argentina did not purchase the Russian or Israeli planes while, apart from one military exercise and new radars, the British have yet to significantly beef up their security of the islands. Thus, I would argue that currently the possibility of a renewed war remains extremely low, particularly now that the new Argentine President Macri is actually trying to approach the West (meaning the U.S. and Europe) for investment in order to improve the country’s economy. The British government seems to have a similar assessment of the situation as the Strategic Defense and Security Review 2015 explains that “we judge the risk of a military attack [against the Falklands] to be low, but we will retain a deterrence posture, with sufficient military forces in the region, including Royal Navy warships, Army units and RAF Typhoon aircraft.”

The information presented in this analysis argues that in spite of the occasional alarmist report, neither side has actually carried out major military-related initiatives that could be labeled as aggressive. Argentina has not acquired significant military equipment aside from four Russian research vessels and its repaired old submarine, while the UK, apart from one military exercise, does not seem to have sent additional troops or vessels to the islands. While diplomatic tensions will remain for the immediate future, as Buenos Aires will not give up its claim to the islands and London will not negotiate their fate, hopefully we will not witness another war over the Falklands. Then again, as Gibran states “predicting state behavior is not an exact science, especially in conflict situations. The assumption of a rational behavior on the part of a country, however desirable this idea may appear, is not a given state of affairs” (The Falklands War, p. 89).

As a corollary to this analysis, in early January the oil and gas company Rockhopper announced that it had discovered oil in its Isobel Deep well in the Falklands. The potential of big oil reserves is another reason for Argentina’s claim on the islands, and the recent discovery will give new impetus for calling for negotiations. If nothing else, we can be thankful that both militaries, particularly their navies, are hardly in a position to participate in another war just yet.

W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto is a researcher who focuses on geopolitics, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. His research interests include inter-state tensions, narco-insurgent movements and drug cartels, arms sales, the development of Latin American military industries, UN peacekeeping operations, as well as the rising use of drones in Latin America. The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated. Follow him on Twitter @W_Alex_Sanchez

Quoted in: The scary history and future of Brazil’s booming drone market

"The Scary History and Future of Brazil's Booming Drone Market"
By: Lorien Olive & Orlando de Guzman
Fusion
August 24, 2015
Originally published: http://fusion.net/story/187490/brazil-drone-laad-conference/

Felipe Castro da Silva, an engineer and UAV coordinator with AEL Sistemas, slipped on a black sports jacket as we began our interview. He was talking about the Hermes 900 unmanned aerial vehicle—a UAV or, in more common terminology, drone. A young man with salt and pepper hair, Castro was in Rio de Janeiro’s sprawling RioCentro Mall to dazzle the 40,000 of attendees of the Latin American Aero and Defense Exhibition with details of of Brazil’s newest medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) drone. We were next.

“This UAV,” he said, “patrolled the Maracanã Stadium during the 2014 World Cup and will be used again during the 2016 Olympics.” Able to fly for 30 hours uninterrupted, the Hermes 900 can reach altitudes of up to 30,000 feet and is used mainly for surveillance, reconnaissance, and communications relay. From the ground, it is nearly undetectable, he said.

During the World Cup, Castro added, the drone was fitted with a Sky Eye sensor, whose 17 cameras allow security personnel on the ground to track activity in an area of 100 square kilometers. It also has high resolution sensors, able to identify license plates and even faces at 30,000 feet. In terms of its capabilities, the Hermes 900 is comparable to its more notorious American counterpart, the MQ-1 Predator drone.

AEL Sistemas, based in Porto Alegre, became a subsidiary of the Israeli company Elbit in 2001, at which time it began developing a new generation of Brazilian surveillance drones using Israeli technology. But the Hermes 900 was just one example of Brazil’s growing role in the booming global market for unmanned aerial systems. The LAAD expo’s interior was filled with them.

While the U.S. military’s use of deadly Predator and Reaper drones has dominated headlines, the popularity of UAVs among developing countries has gone largely unreported beyond the pages of defense trade publications. However, Alejandro Sánchez, research fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs and one of a handful of researchers tracking the region’s drone boom, said in a recent phone interview that the relative low cost of UAV technology has put drones within reach of even the poorest countries in the Latin America. Indeed, several governments are already developing home-grown UAVs, including Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Mexico, which boasts the most affordable surveillance drone priced at a mere $600. Or, as Sánchez put it: “The era of the UAV in Latin America has arrived.”

How Mexico is becoming the drone capital of Latin America

Brazil leads the pack in attracting foreign technology and investment in unmanned aerial vehicles and systems. Its booming defense budget, forecasted to expand by US$10 billion to US$41.1 billion in 2020, has brought leading aeronautics companies to see Brazil as a growth engine for the industry.

In June 2014, Brazil also became the first Latin American country to export home-grown UAVs, when São Paulo-based Flight Tech announced that they won a contract with two undisclosed African countries for a fleet of FT-100 Horus Mini-UAVs.

Sánchez says one reason for Brazil’s rapid ascension in the drone revolution can be found in the history of the military dictatorship. Military rulers built on Brazil’s already formidable industrial prowess by nationalizing key sectors and investing significant state resources toward the development of a military industrial complex. Thus, the dictatorship of Brazil stood out from contemporaries in Chile and Argentina, by cultivating an international reputation as an exporter of quality weapons and aircraft. Embraer (Brazil’s state-owned aeronautics company), established by General Emilio Medici in the 1980s, is currently the 4th largest aircraft manufacturer in the world, after Airbus, Boeing, and the Canadian company, Bombadier. The Brazilian military’s also began its precocious experiments in drone technology in the 1980’s, more than a decade before any other Latin American country.

For many UAV companies, including American ones, the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) are appealing sites for research, development, and production: Brazil and its counterparts offer a highly unregulated airspace to companies fleeing the strict regulations of the American FAA. Brazil’s deregulated airspace, the absence of a rigorous permit system, significantly lowers research and development costs for foreign UAV producers. By investing in homegrown industry, licensing technology, and establishing local subsidiaries, foreign manufacturers are transforming the Brazil into a regional base of drone production for the world market.

According to AI Online, an aerospace and defense magazine, the sales contracts resulting from the 2015 LAAD show that U.S. companies were losing significant ground to international competitors. Despite the fact that the U.S. is home to 86 drone companies (more than double that of any other country), Israeli companies are currently dominating the global market for UAV technology. According to a 2013 Frost & Sullivan report Israeli companies are cornering sales in the developing regions, such as Africa and Asia-Pacific, with a particularly strong presence in Latin American markets due a legacy of robust arms trade between Israel and regional governments throughout the turbulent 1980’s. The U.S. government, meanwhile, continues to heavily regulate the sale of weapons to foreign buyers, especially those considered enemies or otherwise untrustworthy.

Embraer’s capacity to build more highly-sophisticated drone prototypes has greatly expanded in recent years due to healthy infusions of technology and capital. AEL Sistemas, Embraer’s joint venture with Avibras and Elbit, has rolled out not only the Hermes drones, but also the Harpia UAV, a surveillance drone designed to compete with the popular Heron model made by Elbit’s Israeli rival, IAI.

Not to be outdone, following this year’s LAAD, IAI acquired minority holding in the Avionics Services in 2014, as part of its strategic investment in the Brazilian defense market. Together, the two companies are developing the Caçador (Portuguese for hunter), a long endurance UAV designed for the rigors of patrolling Brazil’s vast Amazon rain forest.

Mega-events like the World Cup and Olympics have also been a bonanza for Israeli UAV makers and their Brazilian partners. All told, Brazil spent between US$850 and US$900 billion on high-tech security equipment for the 2014 World Cup, and at least US$350 million went toward a multi-stage contract to purchase fourteen IAI drones and accompanying equipment. And last October, IAI announced that it had won a $2.2 billion contract for security at the 2016 Rio Olympics.

Not everyone is happy, however, with the increasingly cozy relationship between Israeli and Brazilian UAV companies. Only last month, the Rousseff administration publicly denied the existence of the Olympics security contract with IAI after labor and left-wing social movements raised complaints about the company’s troubling history of dealing arms to Central American paramilitary and counterinsurgency groups, including IAI’s founder Al Schwimmer’s role as middleman in the infamous Iran-Contra Affair. If the contract does materialize, however, IAI would join other major private-sector telecom and security companies that make up the Consorcio Brasil Seguro– the consortium responsible for security at mega events—in their effort to maximize the surveillance capacity of the existing drone fleet.

The possible uses of UAVs are endless, Alejandro Sánchez reminded us during our phone interview. Indeed, drones are already being put to use for many civilian purposes, including scouting for archaeological remains in the Amazon, irrigating crops in the arid northeast region, and surveying infrastructure in far-flung Brazilian states.

The Brazilian military and law enforcement have also embraced UAVs as versatile and cost-efficient mechanisms for surveillance. The use of drones for patrolling the country’s border, which spans nearly 10,500 miles and touches every South American country except Chile and Ecuador, has received massive national media attention. And Rousseff’s government has repeatedly held up UAVs as critical for national security, as well as Brazil’s growing aspirations to regional military dominance. Thus far, Brazil has tread lightly with its use of drones in surveillance, anti-smuggling, and counter-terrorism missions that cross its borders, especially for missions that involve the sensitive tri-border region where Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay meet. As a gesture of transparency and good will, Rousseff has insisted on adding code-of-conduct provisos to any bilateral agreement for drone surveillance. These agreements set basic standards for prior notification of cross-border flights, types of surveillance carried out, and data-sharing between Brazil and the neighboring country in question.

Such gestures seem to be paying off. Following the 2008 expulsion of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency from Bolivia’s coca-growing regions under allegations of espionage, Bolivian President inked an agreement with the Brazilian Air Force to begin cross-border UAV patrols. Hailed by both governments as a victory in regional cooperation in the on-going war on drugs, Bolivian law enforcement credited Brazil’s Heron I drones with spotting 240 jungle cocaine labs which narcotics agents were able to later destroy during a single month in 2012.

While the use of drones for border security and regional surveillance is a cause celebre for the Brazilian government, information about the use of UAVs in urban areas is much harder to come by. It is difficult to tell whether this is because the military is reluctant to use potentially invasive surveillance technology in densely populated areas or whether they are concealing the activities of urban UAV programs.

Nonetheless, there is some evidence that the use of drones is gaining traction among law enforcement agencies responsible for urban security. As early as 2012, Rio’s elite military police force, known by the acronym BOPE, began using UAVs for surveillance, according to the online trade magazine Piloto Policial. In the days before the World Cup opening in June 2014, Bloomberg News also reported the first confirmed instance of a UAV used in urban special operations, when the Israeli-made Heron drone’s heat sensors helped the federal police track a top drug kingpin, Little P, into the heart of Rio’s Complexo da Mare favela.

To find out more about the urban applications of UAVs, we caught up with Maurílio Nunes, a Major in Rio’s military police (BOPE) following his energetic presentation to fellow Rio law enforcement officers in attendance at LAAD. Nunes wore the all-black uniform of the military police, his shoulder emblazoned with the ominous BOPE emblem—a grimacing skull pierced by a dagger and two pistols crossed behind it. When we asked him about the use of drones for urban security operations, he responded that BOPE is committed to finding cost-effective ways to combat urban crime and civil unrest, and that drones would be a cheaper and safer alternative to helicopter surveillance of urban “conflict areas.” Despite indications to the contrary, however, he claimed that BOPE was not currently using or testing drones in urban areas. He cited legal restrictions on martial use of UAVs in populated areas. However, our research revealed that under current Brazilian law (AIC N 21/10, September 23, 2010) no such restrictions on UAVs exist, a conclusion confirmed by Alejandro Sánchez. Brazil’s National Civil Aviation Authority is racing to propose regulations ahead of the 2016 Olympics, but these new restrictions will apply to only commercial drones, and not police or military UAVs.

Standing in front of a large yellow sign that prominently displayed Rio’s iconic statue of Christ the Redeemer alongside the Hermes 900 as it glided over Maracanã Stadium during the 2014 World Cup, Felipe Castro concluded the list of the UAVs benefits by noting its substantial 350 kilogram payload. When asked, he acknowledged that the drone could theoretically be equipped with arms, but quickly followed up by saying that the Brazilian Air Force currently has no plans to weaponize UAVs.

Nevertheless, the very same tight-knit bond among military, research institutions, and private industry that makes Brazil so enticing to foreign UAV companies, is also the product of a violent legacy of military authoritarianism. In particular, the secrecy surrounding past military aggressions against freedom of press and expression fuels concerns about the potential abuse of drone technology in Brazil.

In an historic hearing before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 2013, Santiago Cantón, Argentine lawyer and executive director of Robert F. Kennedy Partners for Human Rights, testified that Latin American governments, and Brazil in particular, are being disproportionately targeted for the development and testing of drones for martial (rather than commercial) use. Cantón, and other experts on the human rights implications of UAVs, argued that the Brazilian military’s abysmal track record for transparency and accountability made the intensive development of drones for martial use a matter of great concern for the average citizen.

For his part, Alejandro Sánchez says that regulation, especially in terms of government accountability and the privacy of civilians, is one of the biggest uncertainties in the future of drones in Latin America. This is especially critical, he added, when Latin American governments make the leap toward weaponized UAVs. Presently, there are no international laws or treaties that govern the use or proliferation of armed drones. Only the broad terms of the Geneva Convention offer some guidance, but its language does not reflect advances in technology. Sánchez points out that groups such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots are pursuing an international convention that would place pre-emptive restrictions on lethal UAV technologies, especially those with autonomous capabilities.

Ultimately, he predicts that “it’s likely not a matter of if, but when Latin American militaries will begin arming drones.”

One sign that weaponized UAVs may soon be a reality is an April article by Defense Web that South African drone company Desert Wolf would be courting Brazilian manufacturers at the 2015 LAAD in order to secure a regional base for production of their SKUNK riot control copter. As Tim Pool reported, the SKUNK UAV is equipped with non-lethal weapons such as pepper balls, paintballs, blinding lasers, and rubber bullets, and is touted by Desert Wolf’s managing director, Hennie Kieser, as a humane alternative to riot police because it removes human risk factors like error, fear, and anger from high-pressure scenes of civil unrest.

In an email exchange following the 2015 LAAD, Kieser told us that the SKUNK generated “huge excitement” among conference attendees. He added that while Desert Wolf continues to look for the best fit for its Brazilian manufacturing facility, they did receive an order for a fleet of ten SKUNK riot control copters, which will be delivered to their client in Rio once one additional feature has been installed. Kieser did not respond to follow-up requests for the name of the client and the additional feature.

Kieser has cited the 2012 Marikana massacre, a bloody clash between South African riot police and union members over labor conditions in a platinum mine, as inspiration for the creation of the SKUNK. Desert Wolf provided surveillance UAVs to the mining company during a chaotic confrontation that left 41 mine workers dead at the hands of security forces. Survivors of the Marikana massacre, along with international labor organizations and Noel Sharkey of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control campaign group, have publicly rejected Desert Wolf’s claim that the SKUNK drone would lead to more humane outcomes in the future.

Video credits:

Camera/Producer: Orlando de Guzman

Editor: Lorien Olive

Reporter: Tim Pool

Researcher: Lorien Olive

Music: Warner Library

Looking Ahead: Latin America and the Caribbean shaping the future of the ATT

"Latin America and the Caribbean shaping the future of the ATT"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Looking Ahead-blog
Forum on the Arms Trade
June 8, 2015
Originally published: http://www.forumarmstrade.org/looking-ahead-blog/latin-american-and-the-caribbean-shaping-the-future-of-the-att


On August 24-27, Mexico will host the First Conference of the State Parties (CSP) to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). This is an important high-profile meeting aimed at establishing the permanent headquarters and a secretariat for the ATT. It is noteworthy that a Latin American nation will host the event. While not major weapons expenders a la the United States or Russia, in recent years Latin American and Caribbean nations have earmarked significant portions of their defense budgets for new acquisitions. Hence, it is important that these two regions are taking a pro-active stance on the future of the global arms trade by helping to shape the ATT’s future.

Just this past February, Trinidad and Tobago hosted the First Preparatory Meeting Towards The First Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty. According to a press release by Mexico’s Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, the meeting in Port of Spain addressed issues like “the format, mandate and configuration of the future Secretariat,” as well as financial regulations.  Security expert Rachel Stohl from the Stimson Center noted, however, that the “only matter of substance agreed to … was that the first annual report on authorized arms exports and imports will cover calendar year 2015 with a submission deadline of May 31, 2016.” More meetings have since occurred and others are scheduled with the goal of seeing the August meeting bring momentum to the process.

For the time being, Mexico City has praised itself for having been chosen to host the CSP. In December, Mexican Ambassador Jorge Lomónaco declared that “[Mexico’s election] is, without a doubt, an example of trust and a form of recognizing our country as an important player of the international community; [we are] reliable [and] neutral.” Such self-praise is understandable, and it will hopefully be validated in a few months.

Apart from hosting major meetings, the Caribbean states are a major pillar of the ATT, Europe’s support notwithstanding. Several countries in that region have ratified it, like Dominica, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Meanwhile, Latin American states that have also ratified it include Argentina, El Salvador, Panama, Paraguay, and the CSP’s hosting nation, Mexico. In fact, Costa Rica, known for being a military-less nation in a violence-prone Central America, has not only ratified the ATT but was one of its original sponsors. Meanwhile, Brazil, with its strong military industry (i.e. EMBRAER), and other significant spenders like Chile, Colombia and Peru have only signed the treaty.

At this point, it is necessary to stress that Latin America is by no means undergoing a disarmament process. In recent years, we have seen a variety of major weapons sales by countries that have ratified or signed the ATT. For example, in 2013 Brazil signed a multi-billion deal for Swedish Gripen warplanes. Meanwhile, Peru has purchased FN Scar rifles and Gatling M-134D machine guns for its armed forces to crack down on narco-insurgency in the Peruvian Andes. As for Mexico, the U.S. has authorized the sale of Blackhawk helicopters to its southern partner. In addition, the region’s military industries remain vibrant and are looking to export their domestically made weapons. The prime example is Brazil, as it sold unarmed drones to an unnamed African nation in 2014.

Hence, it will be interesting to hear more detailed information about the concerns, priorities, and interests of Latin American states when they present at the CSP, as they will essentially be supporting an ATT regime, while also trying not to affect weapons sales sought by Latin American governments. Although support for the ATT is strong among these governments, national security threats, particularly drug trafficking and narco-insurgency, remain priorities for these regions and will continue to influence future arms procurement strategies.

The selection of Trinidad and Tobago as well as Mexico to host conferences that determine the future for this vital piece of global legislation is a big honor that stresses the nations’ support for the ATT’s success. Certainly, there are many challenges that the ATT must address before it becomes a relevant regime that regulates the arms trade. Hence, it is important that the ATT enjoys the support of violence-prone regions like Latin America and the Caribbean. Hopefully this momentum will translate into positive news out of Mexico City.


Alejandro Sanchez is Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.

Blouin Beat: Mexico buoyed by U.S. weapon sales

"Mexico buoyed by U.S. weapon sales"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: World
April 13, 2015
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatworld/2015/04/13/mexico-buoyed-by-u-s-weapon-sales/

Since the internal war in Mexico began almost a decade ago, pinning the Mexican government and its security agencies against the country’s numerous drug cartels, there have been several incidents that make analysts wonder whether the situation is improving — or if things are getting worse.

For example, the February 2014 arrest of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, the legendary leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, is an ideal example of Mexican forces (with U.S. intelligence support) successfully cutting off the head of one of the country’s most dreaded and omnipotent cartels. However, if Guzman’s arrest brought about local (and international) support for Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto, this positive development quickly came crashing down with the September 2014 disappearance of 43 students from Ayotzinapa. It is believed that local authorities were behind the disappearance of the students, widely presumed dead (the remains of at least one victim have been identified). Their disappearance became a rallying cry for the general population, which has protested governmental corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency and abuses for months.

Moreover, in spite of the capture of high-profile cartel leaders, cartel members have shown little, if any, concern when it comes to attacking the country’s security forces. Case in point: A few weeks ago 15 Mexican police officers were killed and five were injured in an ambush in Jalisco. The Jalisco-New Generation Cartel is believed to have orchestrated the attack to avenge the recent death of one of their own, Heriberto Acevedo (AKA “El Gringo”), who was targeted by police.

In other words, it is hard to determine if the situation in Mexico is improving, deteriorating, or morphing into a bizarre (and deadly) status quo.

Nevertheless, in recent years one aspect of Mexico’s internal strife has remained generally constant — U.S. support for its neighbor’s security agencies. As previously mentioned, Washington has cooperated with Mexico to crack down on narco cartels. Some of the most-well known initiatives include intelligence aid. Mexican media has reported that unmanned aerial vehicles (commonly known as drones) were utilized to tap into the telephone calls of the aforementioned “Chapo” Guzman, which helped locate him for his eventual capture. Another example occurred in 2012, when there was a bizarre incident in which two CIA agents were shotat by the Mexican federal police in Mexico City, making many wonder how much of an intelligence presence the U.S. has in Mexico. Certainly it would not be surprising if agents from institutions like the Drug Enforcement Administration currently operate on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border, in bordering states like Baja California, Chihuahua or the restive Tamaulipas.

However, one important initiative regarding U.S.-Mexico cooperation that often goes underreported is weapons sales. This past year, the U.S. sold 18 Black Hawk helicopters to its Mexican partners for internal security operations. Additionally, on March 17, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced that the State Department had approved the sale of three additional UH-60M Black Hawks along with “associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $110 million.” The DSCA’s press release goes on to explain that this sale supports the “foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a strategic partner [as] Mexico has been a strong partner in combating organized crime and drug trafficking organizations.”

It is worth noting that the second Black Hawks deal is not the only recent weapons deal between Washington and Mexico City. Also in March, the U.S. donated three X-ray units, type Z Backscatter Van, which will be utilized by the Mexican Navy to crack down on drugs and weapons smuggling. Finally, also in March, the Mexican Air Force reported the purchase of 15 light Bell helicopters, type 407GX, from Bell Helicopter, a subsidiary of Textron (headquartered in Rhode Island). The new units will be deployed to Jalisco, in Mexico’s Pacific Coast.

The aforementioned arms sales and others, which this commentary will not address in the interest of brevity, highlight the fact that the Mexican armed forces are undergoing a renovation process, in which new equipment is being acquired. Fortunately for the Latin American nation, the U.S. has proved to be a reliable weapons merchant as various types of high-tech military equipment have made their way from the U.S. to Mexico, with the goal of cracking down on narco cartels. Then again, how well this new military equipment has been utilized to defeat cartels is debatable. There have certainly been major successes, but for every capture (or elimination) of a drug lord, comes news about bold and deadly attacks against Mexican security forces, such as the recent murder of 15 police officers in Jalisco.

Even with modern military equipment and ongoing U.S. support at various levels, the battle for Mexico is nowhere close to being won.

New Title: Forum on the Arms Trade - Expert

March 25, 2015

Very honored to have been accepted as an Expert at the Forum on the Arms Trade.

"The Forum on the Arms Trade is a cooperative project of arms trade experts, currently managed by Jeff Abramson.

The Forum partners to host an array of events, as well as promote arms trade-related gatherings in Washington DC, including quarterly public events, a yearly Arms Trade Summit, and informal monthly conventional brown bag lunches where experts share their work in off-the-record discussions—an opportunity for ongoing professional development. Related, the Forum maintains a closed listserv for its members and interested individuals to communicate and discuss arms trade issues, built upon a pre-existing list that remained active after the hibernation of the Arms Transfers Working Group."

http://www.forumarmstrade.org/alejandro-sanchez.html

Alejandro Sanchez

Senior Research Fellow, Council on Hemispheric Affairs (website)
twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez     web: wasanchez.blogspot.com
email: wilder.a.sanchez [at] gmail [dot] com 

Latin America | defense industry | drones 

COHA: Research - Brazil's Weapons Industry

"Brazil's Weapons Industry"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Research
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
March 20, 2015
Originally published: http://www.coha.org/brazil-weapons-industry/

Latin America does not depend solely on exports from extra-regional powers for military equipment. On the contrary, the region boasts its own thriving domestic weapons industry. The crown jewel of Latin America’s defense industries is arguably Brazil’s, which has made a name for itself by domestically producing military equipment for export. Case in point is the Super Tucano, a light military aircraft that can be utilized for either training or combat operations, which is produced by the Brazilian aerospace conglomerate Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica (EMBRAER) and enjoys significant prominence in the field. According to the latest headlines, the Portuguese-speaking nation is predicted to have a good year in weapon sales, bolstering Brazil and Latin America in terms of capital and relevancy in the global arms market.

Recent Transactions

Over the years, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) has monitored Brazil’s budding military industry. This includes a report published in 2009, entitled: “EMBRAER: Brazilian Weapons Industry becoming a Global Arms Merchant?” The report discusses the history and recent activities of EMBRAER, the aforementioned Brazilian aerospace conglomerate. The company’s origins can be traced back to the Brazilian military junta that ruled the country from 1964 to1985. General Emilio Medici was head of the military junta in 1969 when EMBRAER was initially founded. Medici wanted the country to have its own self-contained aircraft-manufacturing company, with the state in control of 51% of the shares. COHA’s 2009 report features an interview with Dr. Thomaz Costa, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. Costa explains, “[Embraer’s] business philosophy seems to reflect a market position defined by producing platforms with technology, electronic components, and had a large array of private stock of parts available in its on-site global market. Its products directed to civilian markets are based in cost-effectiveness of product life cycle.”[i]

Since the release of COHA’s “Global Arms Merchant” report, EMBRAER and Brazil’s arms industry have accomplished some significant achievements.

One interesting development occurred in mid-2014, when the Brazilian media reported that Brazil had sold its first batch of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), commonly known as drones, to an African nation. It remains unclear which African nation bought the drones, though it is known that three FT-1000 Horus were sold, produced by the Brazilian company FT Sistemas S.A.[ii] Drones for military use are becoming increasingly popular among defense forces across the world, presenting an opportunity for Brazil to make a name for itself as a producer of reliable and efficient UAVs.

In addition to military aircraft, Brazil also produces and exports land equipment. In early February, the Italian-based Industrial Vehicles Corporation (IVECO) signed an agreement with Lebanon to sell that nation around 80 military and police vehicles. It is important to note that ten of these armored vehicles will be manufactured in Brazil.[iii]Specifically, the vehicles that will be produced in the South American state are the Guarani (VBTP-MR), a 6×6 armored personnel carrier that can carry up to eleven troops.[iv] They will be assembled in IVECO’s plant in Sete Lagoas, located in Brazil’s Minas Gerais state, which will boost the local workforce.[v]

Moreover, in November 2014, the Brazilian company AGRALE reached a deal with the government of Namibia for the sale of 141 Marrua, four-by-four wheeled transport and utility vehicles.[vi]/The African defense news website DefenceWeb explains that AGRALE has had a foothold in Namibia’s defense forces since 2011, when Namibia’s state owned Windhoeker Maschinenfabrik (WMF) company partnered with the Brazilian company to assemble its vehicles, including tractors.[vii]

Furthermore, in late-2014 the Angolan Navy ordered seven Macae-class patrol boats from Brazil. This came about via an agreement between the defense ministries of the two countries, with four of the vessels to be constructed in Rio de Janeiro by Brazil’s Empresa Generencial de Projectos Navais (EMGEPRON).[viii]

Finally, in response to an e-mail query by COHA, DefenceWeb also mentioned the A-Darter missile project between South Africa and Brazil. Just this past February, the Brazilian Air Force reported the successful firing of an air-to-air A-Darter missile. The defense news portal Defense Industry Daily has generally praised this partnership, explaining that “there’s a new advanced dogfighting missile coming to town, and it won’t be coming from any of the standard players.”[ix] The missile is a partnership between the Brazilian Air Force, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense and the South African-based Denel Dynamics (a subsidiary of Denel SOC Ltd) which dates back to 2006.[x]

The aforementioned examples of confirmed orders highlight the growing presence of Brazil as a global arms merchant not only when it comes to warplanes, but also manufactures land and sea equipment. The independent geopolitical risk consultant Milena Rodban explained to COHA that “Brazil’s defense industry is protected as part of the country’s National Defense Strategy, which stresses the need for an autonomous national defense industry to keep Brazil from becoming reliant on other countries to equip its armed forces.”[xi]

The U.S.-Super Tucano Deal

The sale of Super Tucano planes to the U.S. deserves an in-depth discussion in itself. In recent years, Washington-Brazil relations have been at times tense, particularly due to the 2013 discovery that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) had spied on President Dilma Rousseff’s telephone and e-mail accounts. But prior to the diplomatic tensions, the two countries had reached an agreement over the transaction of 20 Super Tucanos. According to a September 2014 article in AviationWeek.com, the U.S. Air Force has begun receiving the first of the A-29 Super Tucanos purchased by the U.S. government.[xii] EMBRAER has teamed up with Sierra Nevada Corp., an electronic systems provider and systems integrator headquartered in Nevada. This was a very important order as it was EMBRAER’s first successful venture in the U.S. defense market.”[xiii]

It is worth noting that the U.S. is merely a stopover for the Super Tucanos, as they will be eventually taken to Afghanistan to be flown by the local Air Force. In fact, renownedJane’s Defense Weekly reports that as early as this January, the U.S. Air Force has “begun training Afghan pilots and maintainers on the Embraer A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft at Moody Air Force Base (AFB) in Georgia.”[xiv] It is certainly a great honor for EMBRAER to have its flagship aircraft chosen by the U.S. Air Force, and even more so that it will be utilized by the Afghanistan military to bring security and order back to the troubled Central Asian state.

Nevertheless, the question remains whether current chilly Washington-Brasilia relations will affect future deals. Geopolitical risk consultant Milena Rodban argues that “Embraer’s plans to sell more planes to the U.S., for use in border surveillance and counter-narcotics missions, may be affected. I personally think that the likelihood of chilly relations resulting in fewer sales remains low. If Embraer loses out on bids, it’ll be because other companies are in a better position to provide adequate equipment, and not because of the fallout from the NSA scandal.”[xv] The opinion is shared by Inigo Guevara, a specialist in Latin American defense affairs. In an interview with COHA, Guevara explained that “the first Super Tucano deal was agreed upon before the NSA scandal. The question now is whether the U.S. government will want a second batch of these planes.”[xvi]

Sales Speculation

As is generally the case with the global arms trade, there is plenty of speculation regarding future prospects for Brazil’s weapons industry. For the sake of the argument, we will mention the most prominent rumors.

One possible future for the Super Tucanos is Guatemala, as the country’s government has considered purchasing them for quite some time. In fact, Guatemala and EMBRAER signed an agreement in 2013 for a transaction including six Super Tucanos. Nevertheless, in 2013, Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina announced his decision to withdraw from the original order. The Guatemalan head of state argued at the time that the aircrafts were overpriced, hence his decision to cancel the deal.[xvii] As a penalty, Guatemala paid around 600 thousand USD dollars in fines.[xviii] It appears that Guatemala City still desires the planes, but only two instead of six. However, some concerns remain regarding the planes’ cost. Specifically, the Guatemalan Minister of Defense, General Manuel Lopez, has declared that purchasing the two Super Tucanos, along with three radars and two interceptor speed boats, will cost around $13 million USD. The highly regarded defense-news agency Infodefensa.com argues that even in the best of cases, this amount is too low, considering one new Super Tucano with basic-equipment costs around $10 million USD alone.[xix] The Guatemalan media has widely quoted Minister Lopez on the issue, who emphasizes that regardless of the cost, Guatemala is committed to obtaining several Super Tucanos this time around.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) are involved in rumors surrounding the notorious Super Tucanos. Senior military official Brigadier General Juniti Saito, Commander of the Brazilian Air Force, has declared that the UAE is interested in acquiring twenty-four A-29 Super Tucanos. This particular speculation may turn out to ring true in the near future, as the UAE government apparently aims to acquire some aircraft directly from the Brazilian Air Force’s inventory for a speedy delivery.[xx]

Another agreement over the Super Tucanos which is currently in the works is tied to Indonesia. The Asian nation originally wanted to purchase an aircraft, but relations between the two governments have soured since January when Indonesia executed Mario Archer, a Brazilian citizen who had been found guilty of smuggling 13.4 kilograms of cocaine into the country. Prior to the execution, President Rousseff herself called Indonesian President Joko Widodo, pleading for mercy on behalf of her citizen, but the Indonesian government continued with his execution and other prisoners, some of them also foreigners. In retaliation, Brazil called its ambassador back to the country for consultations and also did not recognize the credentials of the new Indonesian ambassador.[xxi] In response to this, Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla declared that his government was considering canceling the purchase of 16 EMB-314 Super Tucano warplanes for the Indonesian Air Force.[xxii] (For another perspective on this affair, it is worth noting that Indonesia is a long-time customer of EMBRAER, as it purchased 18 of their aircrafts in 2010.[xxiii])

It should be noted that there is another Brazilian citizen, Rodrigo Gularte, on death row in Indonesia. Like Archer, Gularte is also accused of smuggling cocaine.[xxiv] If Gularte is also executed, this could further tarnish relations, damaging any hope for the Super Tucano deal.

Analysis

In 2014, the major news regarding Brazilian arms sales was related to Brazil’s decision to purchase 36 Gryphen warplanes from the Swedish company Saab.[xxv] This decision was a shock formany because it was widely believed, that the Brazilian government would choose the Rafale warplanes, produced by the French company Dassault.[xxvi]But  while Brazil’s purchase of weapons from the exterior is certainly noteworthy – the Gryphen deal will cost some $4.5 billion USD – the Brazilian weapons complex has not fallen behind. Recent deals over Super Tucanos with the U.S. and Afghanistan, the sales of combat and armored vehicles to Lebanon and Namibia, and even the sale of a small quantity of drones to an unidentified African nation, highlight that several governments, even major military actors like the U.S. and UAE, are interested in Brazilian-made weapons. Should new deals occur in the coming months, like with the UAE, this will only strengthen Brazil’s pedigree when it comes to the manufacturing of reliable weaponry that nations across the world desire.

Nevertheless, a word of caution is necessary. Although arms sales continue, they have fallen beneath the projections of what Brazilian weapons companies desire. Furthermore, not all aspects within these companies are ideal. Specifically, Sami Hassuani, CEO of Avibras Aeroespacial, a producer of military equipment, acknowledges that some 1,500 employees were not promptly paid this past December.[xxvii]

COHA interviewed Mauricio Santoro, a professor of International Relations at Candido Mendes University. Professor Santoro explained to COHA that during the Rousseff presidency, there have been “many cuts in the federal budget, and these companies experienced serious setbacks. Avibras´ situation is controversial. The Minister of Defense [Jacques Wagner] says that the problem is its management, and not lack of contracts.”[xxviii] As a way to assure its customers and employees of its current situation, Avibras released a press release just this past March 11, explaining that it is paying its collaborators and missing salaries.[xxix] It is a positive development that the company is paying its dues, but it is troubling that the company felt the need to publish a communiqué arguing that its management is in control of the company. While sharing his thoughts with COHA, independent analyst Inigo Guevara highlighted that “in the 1990s, ENGESA produced and exported armored vehicles and it went bankrupt,” highlighting how companies that are having successful sales can undergo major turmoil.[xxx]

Ultimately, there is the obvious concern of whether Brazilian arms manufacturers will be able to maintain their momentum regarding exports. The aforementioned sales exemplify that various countries desire to purchase Brazilian military technology. However, the global arms trade has a plethora of suppliers. Apart from the usual suspects like the U.S., Russia, and China, various other nations also produce high-tech weaponry. Sweden, for example, which is not usually regarded as a European military powerhouse, produces the Gryphen warplanes that Brazil recently purchased. Even Peru, which houses a smaller industry than Brazil, jumpstarted its weapons industry in recent years with positive results. For example, Servicios Industriales de la Marina (SIMA), a state-owned Peruvian company with multiple shipyards, produces vessels for the Peruvian Navy, including a new training vessel, the BAP Union.[xxxi] Furthermore, SIMA recently reached an agreement with Panama to open a SIMA subsidiary shipyard in the strategic Central American nation.[xxxii]

Geopolitical risk consultant Milena Rodban explained to COHA that one crucial factor that makes Brazilian weapons, and those produced by other Latin American countries, attractive, is the “willingness” of these governments “to sell to customers without imposing rules on resale, use, etc. This latter point is very important, since it greatly expanded the pool of potential customers, allowing Brazil to sell to countries including Libya and Saudi Arabia, which were willing to buy, but only if there were no strings attached to the sale.”[xxxiii] Professor Santoro adds that “Brazil has been trying hard to build an arms industry since the 1960s, but this project only advances when the State has enough resources to support the companies in a very competitive international market.”[xxxiv]

Ultimately, there is the question of how much of a “splash” is Brazil making in the global weapons market. The renowned Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has released a new report with updated data on the arms trade. A March 2015 SIPRI Fact Sheet, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2014,” states that the top 10 largest exporters of weapons nowadays are the U.S., Russia, China, German, France, the UK, Spain, Italy, Ukraine and Israel.[xxxv] In other words, even with the Super Tucano sale to the U.S. and sales to Namibia and Lebanon, Brazil is not considered within the top 10 of global weapons exporters.

On March 16, the Stimson Center, a Washington DC-think tank, hosted an event to celebrate the SIPRI report, which included speakers from SIPRI, the Forum on the Arms Trade and an expert from Stimson.[xxxvi] During the Q&A section, a COHA military analyst asked the speakers for their thoughts on Latin America as an emerging exporter of weapons, with Brazil as the crown jewel. The SIPRI expert, Dr. Aude Fleurant, spoke about South-South cooperation, while Jeff Abramson, from the Forum on the Arms Trade, spoke about countries having “niche markets” for their products. Moreover, it was highlighted that emerging powers with strong militaries are having troubles placing their domestically-made products in the global market, like for example India.

It seems that experts in general agree that several Brazilian companies, EMBRAER chief among them, are going to continue their weapons exports abroad; with the no-strings-attached sale certainly helping. Nevertheless, even the major sale of 20 Super Tucanos to the U.S. Air Force is not enough to break Brazil into the Top-10 list of major weapons exporters in the world. With that said, smaller sales to other developing nations will continue to enrich these companies’ coffers.

Conclusions

The early months of 2015 put the Brazilian weapons industry in an interesting situation. Several deals have transpired that should qualify the country as an admired and respected global arms merchant, best exemplified by its deals with Lebanon, Namibia, and even the U.S. and Afghanistan as a final destination for the planes. Nevertheless, there are obstacles. The issue of unpaid salaries is a troubling matter that may indicate managerial problems in some of these companies. Moreover, the 2013 annulment of the Guatemala deal and inter-governmental tensions that threaten the deal with Indonesia stress the subjectivity of speculation over agreements; even finalized agreements are at risk for cancellation. Professor Mauricio Santoro concludes that in Brazil, “there are some very dynamic companies, such as Embraer and Condor (which produces less-lethal weapons) and good perspectives for firms engaged in the Navy expansion program. But the future of many other companies, including Avibras, is still a difficult question to answer.”[xxxvii]

Finally, as Brazil’s weapons industry grows, the question becomes to which countries it is willing to sell weapons. The obvious concern is that Brazilian weapons may be acquired by governments that are accused of human rights abuses, such as genocide, or engaged in illicit activities. As a signatory of the UN Arms Trade Treaty, the Brazilian government has the duty not just to its domestic companies to ensure that they flourish, but also to humanity to ensure that Brazilian weapons are not used for evil.

With that said, Brazil continues to grow as a major weapons supplier to nations across the world. The country’s Super Tucano cannot be compared to the highly-advanced, and very costly, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter warplane (constructed by Lockheed Martin and funded by the U.S. and several of its allies), nor can the Horus UAV be compared to an armed Predator, but Brazil is also capable of meeting the demand for cheap and effective weapons on a global scale.

By: W. Alejandro Sanchez, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Please accept this article as a free contribution from COHA, but if re-posting, please afford authorial and institutional attribution. Exclusive rights can be negotiated. For additional news and analysis on Latin America, please go to: LatinNews.com and Rights Action.

Featured Photo: : Chris Carlson, a Sierra Nevada Corporation senior pilot, taxis an A-29 Super Tucano on the flightline during its first arrival, Sept. 26, 2014, at Moody Air Force Base, Ga. The Afghan Air Force will implement the A-29 as their current air-to-ground aircraft, the Mi-35 attack helicopter, reaches its end of service life in January 2016. (U.S. Air Force photo/Airman 1st Class Dillian Bamman) –  http://www.af.mil/News/Photos/tabid/129/igphoto/2000945465/Default.aspx

References

[i] W. Alejandro Sanchez. “EMBRAER: Brazilian Weapons Industry Becoming a Global Arms Merchant?” Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Report. September 1, 2009.http://www.coha.org/embraer-brazilian-military-industry-becoming-a-global-arms-merchant/

[ii] Angelo Young. “Brazil exports first military drone: Flight technologies FT-100 hours heads to unnamed African country.” International Business Times. August 4, 2014.http://www.ibtimes.com/brazil-exports-first-military-drone-flight-technologies-ft-100-horus-heads-unnamed-african-1647774 Also see: “Brazil sells UAV to Africa.” DefenceWeb. August 1, 2014. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35695:brazil-sells-uav-to-africa&catid=35:Aerospace&Itemid=107

[iii]“Brazil logra en Libano el primer contrado de exportacion del blindado Guarani.” Infodefensa.com. January 30, 2015.http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2015/01/30/noticia-brasil-logra-libano-primer-contrato-exportacion-blindado-guarani.html

[iv]“Brazil logra en Libano el primer contrado de exportacion del blindado Guarani.” Infodefensa.com. January 30, 2015.http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2015/01/30/noticia-brasil-logra-libano-primer-contrato-exportacion-blindado-guarani.html

[v] “Lebanon orders armored vehicles from Brazi.” Defense-Update. January 1, 2015.http://defense-update.com/20150101_lebanon-orders-armored-vehicles-from-italy-and-brazil.html#.VQLyCI54otc

[vi]Roberto Caiafa. “La empresa brasileña Agrale exporta a Namibia vehiculos militares Marrua.” Infodefensa.com. November 28, 2014.http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2014/11/28/noticia-empresa-brasilena-agrale-exporta-namibia-vehiculos-militares-marrua.html

[vii] “Namibia Defense Force orders Marrua vehicles.” DefenceWeb. December 11, 2014. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=37339:namibia-defence-force-orders-marrua-vehicles&catid=50:Land&Itemid=105

[viii] “Angolan Navy acquiring seven patrol vessels from Brazil.” DefenceWeb. September 9, 2014. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36188:angolan-navy-acquiring-seven-patrol-vessels-from-brazil&catid=51:Sea&Itemid=106

[ix] “South Africa, Brazil’s A-Darter SRAAM Hits Target.” Defense Industry Daily. February 13, 2015. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/south-africa-brazil-to-develop-adarter-sraam-03286/

[x] “South Africa, Brazil’s A-Darter SRAAM Hits Target.” Defense Industry Daily. February 13, 2015. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/south-africa-brazil-to-develop-adarter-sraam-03286/

[xi] Milena Rodban. Geopolitical risk consultant. Interview with the author. March 2015.

[xii] Amy Butler. “First Tucano Accepted into U.S. Air Force.” Aviation Week. September 25, 2014. http://aviationweek.com/defense/first-super-tucano-accepted-us-air-force

[xiii] Amy Butler. “First Tucano Accepted into U.S. Air Force.” Aviation Week. September 25, 2014.  http://aviationweek.com/defense/first-super-tucano-accepted-us-air-force

[xiv] Gareth Jennings.” USAF begins Afghan Super Tucano training.” HIS Jane’s Defense Weekly. January 11, 2015. http://www.janes.com/article/47801/usaf-begins-afghan-super-tucano-training

[xv] Milena Rodban. Geopolitical risk consultant. Interview with the author. March 2015.

[xvi] Inigo Guevara. Latin American defense affairs specialist. Interview with the author. March 2015.

[xvii]“Guatemala da marcha atras en la compra a Embraer de aviones SuperTucano.” Infodefensa.com. November 19, 2013.http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2013/11/19/noticia-guatemala-marcha-atras-compra-embraer-aviones-super-tucano.html

[xviii]“Guatemala insiste en comprar aviones SuperTucano a Brasil.” La Nacion (Guatemala). January 23, 2015. http://www.lanacion.com.gt/guatemala-insiste-en-comprar-aviones-super-tucano-a-brasil/

[xix]Alberto Lopez. “ Guatemala insiste en comprar dos aviones SuperTucano tras cancelar un contrato de seis.” Infodefensa.com. January 27, 2015.http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2015/01/27/noticia-guatemala-insiste-comprar-menos-aviones-super-tucano-cancelar-contrato.html

[xx]“Emiratos Arabes Unidos quiere comprar 24 cazas SuperTucano a Embraer.” Infodefensa.com. January 22, 2015.http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2015/01/22/noticia-emiratos-arabes-unidos-quiere-comprar-cazas-super-tucano-embraer.html

[xxi] “Brazil ‘outraged’ by Indonesia drug trafficking execution.” BBC. Latin America & Caribbean. January 17, 2015.http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-30866752

[xxii]Paula Ferreira. “AposRetaliacao de Dilma, Indonesia pode cancelar compra de avioes de Embraer.” Oglobo. February 24, 2015.http://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/apos-retaliacao-de-dilma-indonesia-pode-cancelar-compra-de-avioes-da-embraer-15420471

[xxiii] No title. EMBRAER. Press Release. August 6, 2012. http://www.embraer.com/en-us/imprensaeventos/press-releases/noticias/pages/embraer-entrega-os-quatro-primeiros-a29-super-tucanos-para-a-forca-aerea-da-indonesia.aspx

[xxiv] Hugo Bachega. “Brazilian family’s fight to stop execution of Rodrigo Gularte.” BBC. Latin America & Caribbean. March 11, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-31831000

[xxv] W. Alejandro Sanchez. “Brazil’s warplane choice not a Saab story for France.” Blouin News. Blouin Beat: Politics. December 19, 2013.http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatpolitics/2013/12/19/brazils-warplane-choice-not-a-saab-story-for-france/

[xxvi] W. Alejandro Sanchez. “Brazil’s warplane choice not a Saab story for France.” Blouin News. Blouin Beat: Politics. December 19, 2013http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatpolitics/2013/12/19/brazils-warplane-choice-not-a-saab-story-for-france/

[xxvii]Roberto Caiafa. “El turbulento inicio de ano para las empresas de defensa de Brasil.” Infodefensa.com. Perspectivas. January 21, 2015.http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2015/01/21/opinion-turbulento-inicio-empresas-defensa-brasil.php

[xxviii] Mauricio Santoro. Professor of International Relations at Candido Mendes University. Interview with the author. March 2015.

[xxix] Avibras. Press Release. March 11, 2014. Republished by Defesanet.com.br.http://www.defesanet.com.br/bid/noticia/18391/AVIBRAS—Nota-Oficial/

[xxx] Inigo Guevara. Latin American defense affairs specialist. Interview with the author. March 2015.

[xxxi]“SIMA botara el nuevo buque escuela a vela BAP ‘Union’ el 22 de diciembre.” Defensa.com. December 4, 2014. http://www.defensa.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14065:sima-botara-el-buque-escuela-a-vela-bap-union-el-22-de-diciembre&catid=203:fidae-news&Itemid=691

[xxxii]“SIMA Peru instalara un astillero subsidiario en Panama. Infodefensa.com. April 24, 2014. http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2014/04/24/noticia-instalara-subsidiaria-panama.htmlAlsosee: “SIMA instalara filial en Panama para desarrollar proyectos navales.” Andina – Agencia Peruana de Noticias. April 16, 2014.http://www.andina.com.pe/agencia/noticia-sima-instalara-filial-panama-para-desarrollar-proyectos-navales-502498.aspx

[xxxiii] Milena Rodban. Geopolitical risk consultant. Interview with the author. March 2015.

[xxxiv] Mauricio Santoro. Professor of International Relations at Candido Mendes University. Interview with the author. March 2015.

[xxxv] Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman. “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2014.” SIPRI Fact Sheet. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. March 2015.

[xxxvi] “Global Arms Trade, Recent Trends & Looking Ahead.” The Stimson Center. Event. March 16, 2015. Held at the Stimson Center, Washington DC.http://www.stimson.org/events/global-arms-trade-recent-trends-looking-ahead/

[xxxvii] Mauricio Santoro. Professor of International Relations at Candido Mendes University. Interview with the author. March 2015.