Showing posts with label military operations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label military operations. Show all posts

Thursday, December 8, 2016

E-IR: Pop Culture and Latin America’s Conflicts



"Pop Culture and Latin America's Conflicts"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
E-International Relations
Article
December 3, 2016
Originally published: http://www.e-ir.info/2016/12/03/pop-culture-and-latin-americas-conflicts/

Latin America has been plagued with internal conflicts for decades, be them against left-wing insurgencies or narco-cartels. Naturally, regional film and television industries have utilized them as sources of inspiration for the plots of films and soap operas (the famous Latin American telenovelas). How Latin American security forces are portrayed in these productions is controversial, as there seems to be a bias towards portraying them in a negative way. Whether this is done on purpose or not is debatable, however it appears that regional defense officers believe that entertainment industries deliberately critique them while glorifying criminals. This is an important issue to keep in mind as the entertainment industry has an important effect on how the civilian population views its government and security forces.
Which Wars to Portray?
Prior to beginning our discussion on how conflicts are portrayed by Latin American entertainment industries, we first need to clarify what types of conflicts are depicted. For example, Hollywood producers have the dubious luxury of being able to make a film inspired by one of the many military operations that the US has carried out throughout the world, as portrayed in films like American SniperBlack Hawk Down, Lone SurvivorPlatoonZero Dark Thirty, to name a few.
On the other hand, it is important to note that as violent as Latin America is perceived to be, inter-state conflict in the region is actually scarce. Case in point, the last inter-state war in the region occurred in 1995: a short-lived, non-declared war between Ecuador and Peru. The most recent conflict prior to that one was the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982 between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Rather, Latin American militaries and police forces have been deployed internally to combat insurgencies in various countries, between the 1960s to mid-1990s, as well as drug trafficking entities nowadays, like Mexico’s war against narco-cartels, and transnational gangs like the Maras that operate in El Salvador and Honduras.
In other words, while Hollywood can produce a film that depicts a real U.S. military operation abroad, Latin American producers wishing to tell stories about recent real world Latin American military operations have to, by default, focus on internal conflicts.
How Are They Portrayed?
Due to space issues, we cannot discuss every Latin American production, whether a film or telenovela, that addresses some regional internal conflict, whether it be against left-leaning insurgents or a narco-cartel. The list below includes films that, in the author’s opinion, provide a particularly harsh portrayal of regional defense forces.
At a personal level, one of the earliest TV portrayals of the Peruvian military that the author watched was the Peruvian telenovela Los De Arriba y Los De Abajo (The Elite and Lower Ones) in the early-mid 1990s. One of the telenovela’s subplots revolved around an army commander who accidentally orders his troops to fire upon a group of civilians in an Andean town while they were searching for terrorists. The commander and the widow of one of the men killed meet again decades later after their children fall in love. The inspiration for this plot comes from the real-life conflict between the Peruvian military and two terrorist movements, the Shining Path (SenderoLuminoso, SL) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru, MRTA). The military has been accused of carrying out massacres against civilians throughout the 1980s and early 1990s during the internal war against said movements (e.g. the 1985 Accomarca massacre). Another controversial soap opera is Brazil’s Amor e Revolução (Love and Revolution), which has been critiqued for focusing on human rights abuses committed by the Brazilian military government (1964-1985).
As for movies, most critique regional militaries. For example, the 2006 Colombian-Argentine film Soñar No Cuesta Nada (Dreaming Is Free) focuses on a group of Colombian soldiers who discover a cache of money belonging to the insurgent movement Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC); rather than reporting the find, they keep the money and spend it amongst themselves. The film was inspired by a similar real-life 2003 incident. Similarly, the 2003 Argentine drama Captive discusses the fate of children who were adopted by families connected to the military after their parents were disappeared by the Argentine military government (1976-1983). Decades later, these individuals have begun to find out their true identities. Like the aforementionedSoñar No Cuesta Nada, the film is inspired by real events. For instance, in 2015 the Argentine media reported that a man called Mario Bravo discovered his true identity: as a child he was taken away from his mother who was arrested by the military government in the 1970s.
Another example is the 2009 Peruvian film La Teta Asustada (The Milk of Sorrow)  which discusses the fate of Peruvians that were affected by the massacres committed by Peruvian insurgents and the security forces during the country’s internal war (early 1980s to mid-1990s). The movie’s IMDB webpagesummarizes the plot: “Fausta is suffering from a rare disease called the Milk of Sorrow, which is transmitted through the breast milk of pregnant women who were abused or raped during or soon after pregnancy.” A scene from the movie, in which the main character hyperventilates after seeing a photo of a military officer, implies that the Peruvian armed forces in some way abused her or her family.
A final example is the 2004 Mexican film Voces Inocentes (Innocent Voices) which focuses on El Salvador’s civil war (1980-1992).  The movie tells the story of children and teenagers that were forced to join the Salvadoran military to combat the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, FMLN).  The role of child soldiers in this Central American nation’s civil war has also been well recorded.
It is the opinion of this author, which also appears to be the opinion of some Latin American defense officers, that the aforementioned movies address specific incidents or scandals, all of them unfortunately true, which give the viewer a negative opinion about armed forces. The problem may be that such productions lack a degree of balance, like for example some statement that not all military officers and troops behaved in such despicable manner during these periods of internal warfare or military rule.
Liberation Wars and Inter-State Conflict
To be fair, there have been films which portray Latin American militaries in a positive light, however they tend to focus on 19th century conflicts, namely the region’s independence wars. For example, the 2013 film The Liberator is a Venezuelan-Spanish historical movie which centers on the life of revered South American liberator Simón Bolívar. Similarly, there have been several movies about the Argentine José de San Martín, the region’s other liberator. Moreover, Gloria del Pacífico named the best Peruvian film in 2014, is about the 19th century War of the Pacific (between Peru and Bolivia against Chile, supported by the British Empire). The movie focuses on Peruvian Army hero Francisco Bolognesi.
It is worth noting that Argentina has produced movies about the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War, which, as previously mentioned, was an inter-state conflict. Such films include 2005’s Iluminados Por El Fuego or1984’s Los Chicos de la Guerra (The Boys of War)
A Sensitive Issue
Cinematographic and television portrayals of militaries and real world security operations are a sensitive issue. For example the film Zero Dark Thirty was critiqued as it showcased US intelligence officers (repeatedly) torturing prisoners to gather intelligence during the hunt for Osama bin Laden. This is even more controversial in Latin America as the conflicts portrayed in most films address civil wars and other internal conflicts, rather than operations on the other side of the globe. Another problem is that these films are about recent conflicts, some of which are still ongoing (e.g. Colombia). In other words, they will be even more relatable to viewers.
As part of the research for this analysis, the author carried out off-the-record interviews with members of Latin American security and defense agencies. The overall consensus, albeit from a miniscule pool of interviewees, is that regional television and cinematographic industries portray a skewed version of reality when it comes to the activities carried out by these agencies to protect the homeland. Namely, security forces are portrayed as “los malos,” (the bad ones) meaning that they are consistently showcased carrying out human rights abuses whether they be disappearances, rape, summary execution of civilians, or other abuses of power.
On the other hand, as one Colombian security officer explained to the author, there is a reversal of values, as narco lords like the infamous Pablo Escobar appear as a charismatic individual with altruistic goals, for example in series like Narcos; Pablo Escobar: El Patron del Mal (Pablo Escobar: The Lord of Evil); La Reina del Sur (The Queen of the South); El Señor de Los Cielos (The Lord of Heaven), among others. The officer explained that this portrayal does not allow the viewer to properly understand the duties and sacrifices of the members of the security and defense forces to protect the homeland.
At this point, it is worth remembering that in the US, Hollywood (broadly speaking) is often critiqued by conservative media outlets of having a “liberal agenda” which aims at vilifying the U.S. military. We will not delve into conspiracy theories regarding whether there is some “agenda” behind Latin American cinematographic and television productions and the negative way they portray security forces. Nevertheless, the author would like to highlight a comment by a retired Peruvian army officer about the way the country’s military has been portrayed in the aforementioned films and telenovelas. The officer explained “these people [meaning the producers and directors] have disliked the military since the time when it was in control of the country, this [the movies and telenovelas] is their revenge.” Meanwhile, a retired Colombian military officer explained that the country’s narco-related telenovelas are “apologists of crime.”
The issue, thus, may be one of perception. Are Latin American producers and filmmakers purposely trying to make security forces look “bad,” because of personal biasness? Additionally, do narco-novelas aim at glorifying narco lords and the narco life, or is this for dramatic effect in order to attract viewers?  No Latin American filmmakers, producers or script writers were consulted by the author, but the perception from interviewed Latin American defense and security officers (again from a very small number, but the author will cautiously generalize it) is that regional films and telenovelas focus on humanizing and even praising insurgents and criminals, while critiquing militaries and police forces. As a retired Colombian defense officer explained, this issue is part of a wider problem of civil military relations at a time of internal conflict. The officer explained, “in Latin America, certain social organizations consider themselves the exclusive owners of issues like the protection of minorities and human rights in general … they maximize any error or criminal act, done purposely or by accident, committed by defense forces while minimizing the atrocities committed by terrorists.”
One example of a positive portrayal of modern Latin American forces could be the Colombian television series Comando Elite, produced by RCN, which focuses on a police unit that combats crime, taking down real-life Colombian narco-lords and insurgent leaders. However, the overall pattern appears to be that portraying defense forces by default requires a negative portrayal, rather than a positive one. It is certainly possible to make a film that positively showcases the bravery of specific units in the field of battle, like for example the Mexican military’s operations against narco-cartels, or the Peruvian Army’s successes against Shining Path and the MRTA, however they may be critiqued for appearing as government-propaganda and not showcasing abuses committed by security forces, which have been well-recorded.
Due to space limitations we have not discussed the relationship between governments and entertainment industries, and the possibility of state-censorship of films or series critical of security forces. This author would argue that fact that these projects continue to be produced and broadcasted is an example of the general success of freedom of speech in Latin America (at least in this specific industry and in most countries, with some exceptions). If anything, regional film producers desire more state support for their movies to reach wider masses. For example, the film industry and the local governments in Colombia and Peru have attempted to design legislation to support their domestic cinematographic industry, while there are programs in countries like Argentina and Mexico where the state provides financial support, like subsidies, towards domestic television and film industries.
Concluding Thoughts
The influence of films on the views of populations is an issue that has been researched by academics. For example, Michelle Pautz, Associate Professor at the University of Dayton, has published an essay analyzing the influence of Argo and Zero Dark Thirty on how U.S. citizens view their government. In a 2015 blog commentary about her research, Professor Pautz states “films that have a more distinctive characterization of characters and institutions might foster a greater influence on viewers.  Put differently, if the “good guys” and “bad guys” are easier to determine, films might be able to influence their audiences.” Meanwhile, in a 2014 interview for the Peruvian daily Diario Correo, Peruvian actor Reynaldo Arenas, who had a role in Gloria del Pacifico, declared that “cinema teaches the youth to not forget history. This art must entertain, educate and inform.” Both Professor Pautz and Mr. Arenas touch on the issue of effects of movies in viewers, with the Peruvian actor taking the stance that movies have a sort of social duty.
Latin America is a region that has experienced major civil unrest over the past decades, morphing in type, from ideological-oriented uprisings to high levels of street violence and the so-called “war on drugs.” Naturally, regional television and film producers have plenty of material that can inspire them to write telenovelas and movies that discuss particular incidents or the consequences of abuses carried out by defense forces in the aforementioned internal conflicts. Hence, the reason why there’s a significant amount of productions about these internal conflicts may be simply because they are topical and it is something that viewers can relate to. Nevertheless, at least one of the aforementioned interviewed defense officers seems to believe that there is a resentment behind these films and telenovelas given how defense forces are portrayed while narco-criminals tend to be glorified.
It would certainly be a welcome development to have major productions that portray the efforts of modern military forces in a positive light, like what has been done with movies relating to the 19th century independence wars, but the problem is that they may in turn be dimissed as government propaganda. Nevertheless, as Professor Pautz and Mr. Arenas highlight, movies do have an influence on the perceptions of moviegoers and it would be a good method of improving popular opinion about security forces in the region since, while it is true that (many) human rights abuses have been unfortunately committed during internal security operations, Latin America is ripe with stories of heroes and heroines who gave their lives to protect their homeland from various internal threats. Militaries and police forces can win wars, but the television and cinematographic industries are critical components that will determine whether or not they will be remembered as heroes.
*The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Sunday, August 10, 2014

Blouin News: Will SOUTHCOM aid Honduras in combating drug trafficking?


"Will SOUTHCOM aid Honduras in combating drug trafficking?"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: World
August 8, 2014
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatworld/2014/08/08/will-southcom-aid-honduras-in-combating-drug-trafficking/

On August 6, Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández visited Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the branch of the U.S. military that oversees most of Latin America and the Caribbean. While U.S.-Central America relations are currently focused on immigration issues, security affairs remain critically important.
During his visit to SOUTHCOM headquarters in Miami, the Honduran president met with SOUTHCOM commander General John Kelly (Marine Corps) as well as with representatives from the State Department and from the U.S. Agency for International Development. The Honduran leader also met with representatives from the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATFS), a branch of SOUTHCOM. The leaders did not make any major agreements concerning arms sales or new joint security operations. A brief SOUTHCOM press release simply stated that the parties discussed “how U.S. security assistance can help Central American nations strengthen their security capacity, disrupt transnational organized crime and improve citizen security.”
Since President Hernández came to power in January, his main security-related objective has been to crack down on violence, as Honduras is known to be the “murder capital of the world.” Drug trafficking is the cornerstone of Honduras’ internal security woes, because the country marks a transit point for cocaine flows from South America to Mexico and the United States. Naturally, it is in the U.S. national interest to stop the flow of drugs by increasing the defense capabilities of its Latin American partners.
However, President Hernández also argues that there is a “double morality” regarding drug trafficking. He explains that, while the consumption of drugs in the United States “is a health problem, [in Honduras] it is about lives.” He has also stated that “approximately seven out of tenmurders [in Honduras] are drug-related. If Honduras did not have a drug problem, [it] would not be amongst the most violent countries in the world.”
The president’s visit to SOUTHCOM’s headquarters was an important step to help the countries maintain positive security relations. Certainly, the U.S. wants to see the Honduran security forces stop the drug trafficking that passes through its territory. In fact, the U.S. armed forces have a military base in Honduras known as the Joint Task Force Bravo at the Soto Cano Air Base. Moreover, Honduras is participating in an ongoing multinational operation led by JIATFS called “Operation Martillo.” The goal of this operation is to target “illicit trafficking routes in coastal waters along the Central American isthmus.”
Though Washington and Tegucigalpa work towards similar objectives, they have not always agreed upon specific strategies for military cooperation. For example, in an April 2014 commentary for Blouin News I explained how Washington recently suspended data sharing with Tegucigalpa “due to a controversial decision passed by the Honduran government to shoot down aircraft that are suspected of transporting drugs over Honduran airspace.”
I have not been able to confirm whether President Hernández discussed the possibility of reestablishing the transfer of radar information with General Kelly or President Obama. However, the topic probably came up during their conversations about drug trafficking issues.
Apparently, President Hernández’ recent trip to Miami to visit SOUTHCOM headquarters did not end in any major defense-related agreements between Washington and Tegucigalpa. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the U.S. government and military are not willing to cooperate with Central America. While U.S. immigration reform may not occur any time soon, the countries may still be able to increase binational cooperation to combat common security threats.

Monday, April 28, 2014

VOXXI: SecDef Chuck Hagel visits Mexico & Guatemala


"SecDef Chuck Hagel visits Mexico & Guatemala"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
April 28, 2014
Originally published: http://voxxi.com/2014/04/28/chuck-hagel-visits-mexico-guatemala/


U.S. Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Chuck Hagel recently carried out a three-day visit to Mexico and Guatemala (April 23-26); this was his first visit to Latin America as SecDef since he assumed office. The objective of Hagel’s mini trip was to “affirm America’s commitment” to the region, as a Pentagon spokesman phrased it.
While no groundbreaking agreements were reached, Hagel’s visit comes at a time when U.S. allies in Latin America are feeling forgotten by Washington.

The trips

The first leg of Hagel’s tour was a trip to Mexico. The visit was fairly important as it highlights Washington’s approval of ongoing discussions regarding Mexico’s intention to buy U.S. weaponry. Specifically, the Mexican government is negotiating with Washington the purchase of 18 Black Hawk helicopters in a deal reportedly worth $680 million USD.
It is worth noting that Hagel’s visit to Mexico is the third trip by a senior U.S. official in recent months.President Barack Obama traveled to the Mexican city of Toluca in late February where he met with Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper to pursue greater integration between the three North American nations and to praise NAFTA, which celebrates its 20th anniversary this year.
Moreover, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson visited Mexico City in late March, where he met with President Peña Nieto and other Mexican officials. The goal of the visit was to discuss cooperation so both governments can continue “to ensure a safe and secure border region.”
In other words, while the U.S. government may have been focused on the events unfolding in Ukraine in recent months, support for the Mexican government and military remains a part of U.S. foreign policy.
The second part of Hagel’s trip was a visit to Guatemala. At first, the trip to Guatemala may seem to be an odd choice. It would have made more sense, for example, for the SecDef to travel to Colombia, Washington’s other major military ally in the region. In fact, Hagel’s visit to Guatemala is the first one by a SecDef since 2005. Nevertheless, Guatemala’s government has been proactive in recent months as it upgrades its military (there are rumors that it will buy Israeli drones) in order to crack down on drug trafficking and other transnational crimes.
Moreover, Hagel’s visit to the Central American nation coincided with an ongoing humanitarian operation by the U.S. military, organized by Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).
The initiative is called “Beyond the Horizon” and it constitutes various civic projects. For example, the U.S. military personnel will construct seven new classrooms at three schools in Guatemala’s Zacapa and Chiquimula departments as well as a three-room clinic in Zacapa. Tragically, a U.S. serviceman, Specialist Hernaldo Beltran Jr. of the 56th Signal Battalion, recently perished during this operation due to a freak accident.

Hagel’s trip in context

During his flight to Mexico City, Hagel declared to the journalists “I don’t think over the years we’ve probably ever done enough to reach out to our Latin American partners.”
That statement is true. Over the past decade, Latin America and the Caribbean have generally enjoyed little priority from Washington as compared to Europe and the Asia Pacific (in part due to the ongoing crises in Ukraine and the South China Sea).
SOUTCHOM, the branch of the U.S. military that oversees most of Latin America and the Caribbean, acknowledged this reality in its 2014 Posture Statement. While discussing sequestration and a limited defense budget, General John Kelly, SOUTHCOM’s commander, states,
“Over the next ten years, the Services are reducing deployments of personnel, ships, and aircraft in the context of tightening fiscal constraints … As the lowest priority Geographic Combatant Command, [SOUTHCOM] will likely receive little, if any, ‘trickle down’ of restored funding. “ (click here for the full Posture Statement)
Hagel’s aforementioned quote and General Kelly’s Posture Statement say a lot of Washington’s military priorities in 2014 and for the immediate future.
Certainly, it would be wrong to assume that the U.S. military has completely forgotten the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. continues to have numerous bases in Latin America, including major bases inHonduras and El Salvador. Moreover, the “Beyond the Horizon” humanitarian mission, demonstrates that the U.S. armed forces continue to be actively involved in the region as an outgrowth of military diplomacy.
SOUTHCOM’s Posture Statement as well as the topics that SecDef discussed in Mexico and Guatemala revolved around both military cooperation and how these countries, with U.S. aid, can successfully address challenges to the continent, particularly drug trafficking.
In addition, I would add that while SOUTHCOM may be receiving fewer resources, the quality of the military personnel assigned to it has remained high. As I noted in a 2013 profile for VOXXI, General Kelly is a highly efficient commander with a strong career record and a clear sense of his priorities and challenges.
Ultimately, Secretary Hagel’s trip to Mexico and Guatemala did not accomplish anything particularly noteworthy. Nevertheless, the trip in itself, along with the ongoing humanitarian exercises in Central America and the Caribbean, may bring a much-needed boost to cementing a new era of positive defense-oriented relations between Washington and its Latin American partners.

Sunday, February 2, 2014

COHA: Brazil Upgrades its Sao Paulo Carrier


Brazil Upgrades its Sao Paulo Carrier
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Research
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
January 31, 2014
Originally published: http://www.coha.org/coha-research-brazil-upgrades-its-sao-paulo-carrier/


An obscure fact of Latin American military affairs is that the Brazilian Navy possesses its own aircraft carrier. The vessel, now five decades old, is currently undergoing repairs so that it can serve for at least a decade more. Nevertheless, given the fast pace of South American geopolitics and geosecurity affairs, serious questions should be raised whether or not Brazil actually needs a carrier in its fleet.
 The Carrier
Brazil acquired its carrier from France in November 2000: the vessel is a non-nuclear, 36,000 ton, Clemenceau-type carrier, which was constructed in the early 1960s.The carrier, originally known as the Foch while it flew the French flag, “entered the dry-dock stage in Saint-Nazaire in 1957 and was launched three years later. It was towed to the Brest arsenal for completion. It entered active service in 1963 and ceased to be armed by the French Navy in 2000, when the Charles de Gaulle CVN came into service.” [1]
When it was sold to Brazil, the Foch was renamed as Sao Paulo. It is worth noting that the Sao Paulo replaced Brazil’s other carrier, the Minas Gerais, which was launched by England during World War II (then known as the HMS Vengeance). The Minas Gerais served for 41 years in the Brazilian Navy starting in 1960 until it was decommissioned in 2001. [2]
The website MilitaryFactory.com provides some additional details about the Sao Paulo, explaining that it “showcases a typical Western aircraft profile with a flat, unobstructed flight deck and starboard, …  her deck allows for the launching of two fixed-wing aircraft simultaneously.” [3] The massive vessel has an overall length of 869 feet and is able to make headway at a top speed of 32 knots. According to details that have been released, the carrier has a crew of over 1,900 sailors. [4] As for the aircraft that it transports, a December 2013 press release by the French shipbuilder DCNS, which is currently upgrading the Sao Paulo, says that the Brazilian warship has 18 Douglas A-4 Sky Hawk warplanes. [5] Meanwhile, a December 2012 note in Brazilian news agency R7 explains that the carrier also has Super Puma transport helicopters and Esquilo light helicopters. [6] Tragically, the Sao Paulo has not served in the Brazilian Navy without incidents, as on-board fires in 2005 and 2012 killed and injured a number of sailors. [7]
 The Sao Paulo is the only carrier currently in use by a Latin American Navy. Nevertheless, COHA has been unable to unearth information on the types of operations this carrier has been involved in during the decade that it has been flying the Brazilian flag.  An analysis in the website WarisBoring.com explains that the Sao Paulo has participated in naval exercises, such as sailing with a U.S. carrier, the USS Ronald Reagan. [8] Additionally Argentine warplanes have occasionally landed on the Brazilian carrier, which serves as a confidence-building initiative between the naval forces of the two neighboring states. [9]
 Upgrade
It would appear that the Brazilian Navy has plans for the aging Sao Paulo. In early January 2014, the Spanish news agency Infodefensa.com reported that the French shipbuilding company DCNS had been asked by the Brazilian Navy to inspect the Sao Paulo’s forward catapult. The repairs to the Sao Paulo began in November 2013 at a naval base in Rio de Janeiro. [10]
Regarding the rehabilitation of the Brazilian warship, a December 2013 press release by DCNS explains that “the steam catapult, which already performed over 5000 launches, is a key element for the aircraft carrier capability.” [11] The French company has praised itself for its work on modernizing the Sao Paulo as it also reported that “after the team’s intervention, the catapult was dry-fired twice, demonstrating the expected performance. The Brazilian authorities expressed satisfaction.” [12]
 Brazil’s Evolving Military and Geopolitics
Thanks to its strong economy over the past decade, the Brazilian armed forces are carrying out important arms purchases which will help the Portuguese-speaking giant consolidate itself as Latin America’s foremost military power.
Throughout the past decades, COHA has written several comprehensive reports on Brazil’s military and its arms acquisitions – we will enumerate just a few of the more prominent examples here. Apart from the Sao Paulo’s upgrades, the Brazilian Navy is constructing a nuclear-powered submarine, with French aid. The submarine has been a dream of the Navy since the country’s 1964-1985 military regime. [13] Paris is also helping Brazil to build four diesel-electric submarines, variants of the French Scorpene design. [14]
Meanwhile, the Brazilian Air Force is getting a revamp as Brasilia has already selected, after several years of negotiations, the Gripen (produced by the Swedish company Saab) as its new warplane. For years, analysts such as those posted at COHA believed that the Brazilian government would choose the Rafale warplane produced by the Swedish Dassault. But in December 2013 Brasilia ultimately chose the Swedish model. [15] Brazil will purchase 36 Gripen warplanes in a deal reported to be worth around $4.5 billion USD. As for the Brazilian Army, it has purchased Shorad missiles to upgrade its arsenal. The missiles will be used to protect the skies of the cities that will host the upcoming 2014 FIFA World Cup. [16]
It is worth noting that defense-related foreign dignitaries regularly travel to Brazil to lobby the Dilma Rousseff government in an effort to persuade it to buy more weaponry. For example, the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu travelled to Brasilia in October 2013 to discuss the sales of the Pantsir-S1 and Igla missile system, a deal which if agreed upon in the coming months, could be worth up to $1 billion. [17] Meanwhile, French President Francois Hollande visited Brazil this past December 2013 to convince the Brazilian government to purchase the Dassault warplanes – an unsuccessful visit as Brasilia chose the Swedish Gripen.
 This is not to say that other nations in the Western Hemisphere have not also acquired new military equipment over the past decade. For example, the Venezuelan military has also spent billions of dollars to upgrade its own military, mostly by turning to Russia as a major weapons supplier. [18] Nevertheless, as the Russian media even admits, Russia-Venezuela military relations in the post-Hugo Chávez have not been particularly ideal for business. An October 2013 commentary in the Russian news agency Pravda explains, “All major contracts were tied to late president Hugo Chávez . After his death, against the backdrop of complications of the socio-economic situation in the country, defense cooperation with Russia actually came to a standstill … new Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro is not ready to agree on new [contracts].” [19]
 Threats?
The aforementioned article by MilitaryFactory.com concludes, “the Sao Paulo remains a critical cog to Brazilian Navy operations in the region, both for stability and in power across Atlantic-facing South American and Latin American waters. For any modern naval power, the aircraft carrier is the heart and soul of the fleet.” [20]
But does Brazil actually need a carrier? Certainly such a vessel is an example of a naval power as it helps Brazil’s Navy increase its power projection or powers. Rising global powers such as China acquire carriers in order to assert themselves as global naval powers. [21] On the other hand, other nations that already possess these gigantic warships are suffering from an economic crunch and are re-organizing their armed forces. An example of this is the British military, which plans to eliminate some 20 thousand military personnel across the three branches over the next years, including 6,000 sailors. [22] The British Navy is developing two new carriers, the HMS Queen Elizabeth and the HMS Prince of Wales, but they have stirred controversy because of high costs and the reduction of naval personnel.
As for Brazil, the country is largely devoid of any major security threats that would make a compelling case for its Navy to have a carrier (or plan for a new one within the coming decade). Relations between Brazil and Venezuela during the Hugo Chávez presidency were rarely troubling and commerce was a strong confidence building mechanism to prevent tensions from escalating. [23] Furthermore, in late 2013, there was a major air force exercise in northern Brazil in which several Western Hemisphere air forces participated, including the U.S. and Venezuela. [24]
 Moreover, it would be bizarre to believe that a carrier is needed for protection against some of Brazil’s smaller neighbors like Guyana, Suriname or Uruguay. Likewise, relations with Peru and Colombia are generally cordial, with this being reflected in the inter-agency cooperation against transnational criminal activity like drug trafficking. [25] Furthermore, while Argentina was once a serious contender to Brazil’s military role in Latin America, today the Argentine armed forces is a fragment of what it once was. (We do not count Bolivia and Paraguay in this analysis since, even though both nations border Brazil, neither possesses sea access).
One argument for a naval build up could be that the carrier and nuclear-powered submarine will help safeguard Brazil’s coast, specially its off-shore oil platforms. The government has sold oil blocs to international oil companies, a move that Brazilian oil workers protested against in 2013. [26] It should be noted that also in 2013 the Brazilian Navy has also acquired three Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) for protecting its ports and oil platforms from the British manufacturing giant BAE Systems. [27] Certainly, an argument can be made that the Brazilian Navy needs even more vessels to protect its coastal and off-shore installations; but which country or criminal network will want to attack them is far from clear.
As a final point, it is true that a carrier helps a nation’s naval stature, but the vessel also needs to take part in some kind of naval maneuver in order to showcase that it is operational and helpful. Military exercises with other navies are a good example of this. But one could wonder if the Sao Paulo, once it is operational again and before it is retired, could end up being used as a support vessel for some multinational security operation, either as part of the United Nations or some international coalition combating piracy off the coast of Somalia.
Conclusions
Reporting on the Gripen warplane deal this past December 19, 2013 the defense news website Defense Industry Daily explained that the Brazilian Navy “intends to buy 24 fighters of its own, to operate from the carrier that replaces Nae Sao Paulo beginning in 2025.” [28] Both an April 29, 2013 article in Defense Industry Daily as well as an April 2013 article a Brazilian website called Defesa Aerea & Naval also mention rumors that a new aircraft carrier currently being developed by the aforementioned DCNS (the project is called PA 2) may be sold to Brazil as France is no longer interested in acquiring it. [29]
It is likely that the Sao Paulo will retire within the next decade. This is logical since the vessel is already over 50 years old and it may prove to be more costly to constantly upgrade and repair it instead of buying a new one. Whether Brazil actually needs a carrier, be it the Sao Paulo or a new one ten years from now, remains a highly debatable issue. A case can be made that the carrier can help protect Brazil’s extensive maritime interests, but it is doubtful that the country will face any conceivable major security threats, i.e. a war with another nation, in the near future. Brazil’s carrier may be one of the least well known and used strategic assets in Latin American military history and in the future.
W. Alejandro Sanchez, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.
Please accept this article as a free contribution from COHA, but if re-posting, please afford authorial and institutional attribution. Exclusive rights can be negotiated.
For additional news and analysis on Latin America, please go to: LatinNews.com and Rights Action
References
[1] “Sao Paulo catapult: A DCNS team on the bridge of the Brazilian aircraft carrier.” DCNS Group. Press Release. December 20, 2013.http://en.dcnsgroup.com/2013/12/20/catapulte-du-porte-avions-s%C3%A3o-paulo-les-%C3%A9quipes-de-dcns-sur-le-pont-du-porte-avions-br%C3%A9silien/
[2] Rob Schleiffert and CorneRodenburg. “Sao Paulo rules the Waves.” Naval AviationNews. September-October 2003. P. 14 -19.http://www.history.Navy.mil/nan/backissues/2000s/2003/so03/brazil.pdf
[3] “NAe Sao Paulo (A12) Conventionally-Powered Aircraft Carrier.”MilitaryFactory.com. January 15, 2014. http://www.militaryfactory.com/ships/detail.asp?ship_id=NAe-Sao-Paulo
[4] “NAe Sao Paulo (A12) Conventionally-Powered Aircraft Carrier.”MilitaryFactory.com. January 15, 2014. http://www.militaryfactory.com/ships/detail.asp?ship_id=NAe-Sao-Paulo
[5] “Sao Paulo catapult: A DCNS team on the bridge of the Brazilian aircraft carrier.” DCNS Group. Press Release. December 20, 2013.http://en.dcnsgroup.com/2013/12/20/catapulte-du-porte-avions-s%C3%A3o-paulo-les-%C3%A9quipes-de-dcns-sur-le-pont-du-porte-avions-br%C3%A9silien/ Also see: Alexandre Galante. “DCNS realize verificacao da catapulta de vante do porta-avioes ‘Sao Paulo.’” Poder Naval. December 26, 2013.http://www.naval.com.br/blog/2013/12/26/dcns-realiza-verificacao-da-catapulta-de-vante-do-porta-avioes-sao-paulo/
[6] “Marinha do Brasil tem porta-avioes, submarino e ate tanque de guerra que vira barco.” R7 Noticias. Forcas Armadas. September 5, 2012.http://noticias.r7.com/brasil/fotos/marinha-do-brasil-tem-porta-avioes-submarino-e-ate-tanque-de-guerra-que-vira-barco-20120905-14.html#fotos
[7]“Explosion kills one in Brazilian aircraft carrier.” Xinhua.net. May 18, 2005. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-05/18/content_2968613.htm  Also see: Michael Hone. “Aircraft Sao Paulo hit by Fire.” BrazilDispatch.com. February 22, 2012.http://www.brazildispatch.com/2012/02/aircraft-carrier-sao-paulo-hit-by-fire.html
[8]David Axe. “Your Aircraft is a piece of Crap.” WarIsBoring.com (Medium.org). October 24, 2013. https://medium.com/war-is-boring/f3f52d299588
[9] David Axe. “Your Aircraft is a piece of Crap.” WarIsBoring.com (Medium.org). October 24, 2013. https://medium.com/war-is-boring/f3f52d299588
[10]“DCNS prueba el estado de la catapulta del portaaviones brasileno Sao Paulo.”Infodefensa.com. January 2, 2014.http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2014/01/02/noticia-prueba-estado-catapulta-portaaviones-brasileno-paulo.html
[11]“Sao Paulo catapult: A DCNS team on the bridge of the Brazilian aircraft carrier.” DCNS Group. Press Release. December 20, 2013.http://en.dcnsgroup.com/2013/12/20/catapulte-du-porte-avions-s%C3%A3o-paulo-les-%C3%A9quipes-de-dcns-sur-le-pont-du-porte-avions-br%C3%A9silien/
[12] “Sao Paulo catapult: A DCNS team on the bridge of the Brazilian aircraft carrier.” DCNS Group. Press Release. December 20, 2013.http://en.dcnsgroup.com/2013/12/20/catapulte-du-porte-avions-s%C3%A3o-paulo-les-%C3%A9quipes-de-dcns-sur-le-pont-du-porte-avions-br%C3%A9silien/
[13]W. Alejandro Sanchez. “Lula wants his yellow submarine.” Report. Council on Hemispheric Affairs. October 26, 2007. http://www.coha.org/lula-wants-his-yellow-submarine/
[14] “Brazil & France in Deal for SSKs, SSN.” Defense Industry Daily. April 11, 2013.http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/brazil-france-in-deal-for-ssks-ssn-05217/
[15] W. Alejandro Sanchez. “Brazil’s warplane of choice not a Saab story for France.”Blouin Beat: Politics. December 19, 2013.
[16] “Brasil compra sistemas antiaereos Shorad para proteger el Mundial de Futbol.”Infodefensa.com. January 3, 2014.http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2014/01/03/noticia-brasil-compra-sistemas-antiaereos-shorad-proteger-mundial-futbol.html
[17] W. Alejandro Sanchez and Ian Kowalski. “Weapons Diplomacy: Russian Defense Minister skips Venezuela during Latin American tour.” Research. Council on Hemispheric Affairs. November 11, 2013. http://www.coha.org/weapons-diplomacy-russian-defense-minister-skips-venezuela-during-latin-american-tour/
[18] “Venezuela ranked top importer of Russian arms.” RIA Novosti. December 27, 2011. http://en.ria.ru/world/20111227/170519145.html
[19] “Russia continues to conquer arms market of South America.” Pravda. October 9, 2013. http://english.pravda.ru/business/companies/09-10-2013/125848-russia_south_america-0/
[20] “NAe Sao Paulo (A12) Conventionally-Powered Aircraft Carrier.”MilitaryFactory.com. January 15, 2014. http://www.militaryfactory.com/ships/detail.asp?ship_id=NAe-Sao-Paulo
[21] “China building second aircraft carrier: reports.” Reuters. January 18, 2014.http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/19/us-china-carrier-idUSBREA0I02C20140119
[22] Patrick Wintour. “Defense cuts ‘threaten UK military partnership with the U.S.’” Defense Policy. The Guardian (UK). January 16, 2014.http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jan/16/defence-cuts-uk-military-partnership-us-robert-gates  Also see: Nick Hopkins. “Royal Navy says huge size of its new aircraft carrier will be a deterrent.” Royal Navy. The Guardian (UK). September 19, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/sep/19/royal-Navy-aircraft-carrier-deterrent
[23]  “Global Insider: Brazil-Venezuela relations.” World Politics Review. March 9, 2011.http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/8135/global-insider-brazil-venezuela-relations
[24] “South America’s major military air exercise takes off in north Brazil.”Mercopress.com. November 5, 2013. http://en.mercopress.com/2013/11/05/south-america-s-major-military-air-exercise-takes-off-in-the-north-of-brazil
[25] “Peru, Bolivia y Brazil reforzaran cooperacion anti-drogas.” Andina (Peru). November 14, 2012. http://www.andina.com.pe/espanol/noticia-peru-bolivia-y-brasil-reforzaran-cooperacion-antidrogas-435912.aspx#.Ut6b9c4o5QI
[26] Jeb Blount. “Protests, strike against big Brazil oil auction expand.” Reuters. October 18, 2013. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/18/brazil-oil-protests-idUKL1N0I80V620131018
[27] Grant Turnbull. “Rethinking Defense: Naval modernization in Latin America.”Naval-Technology.com. October 28, 2013. http://www.naval-technology.com/features/feature-rethinking-defence-naval-modernisation-south-america/
[28]  “F-X2: Brazil Picks Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen-NG over Rafale, Super Hornet.”Defense Industry Daily. December 19, 2013.http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/brazil-embarking-upon-f-x2-fighter-program-04179/
[29] “France’s PA2/CVF Carrier Project: Stalled in the Water.” Defense Industry Daily. April 29, 2013. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/france-steaming-ahead-on-pa2cvf-carrier-project-01621/ . Also see: Luiz Padilha. “PA2: Projeto de porta avioes frances parado na Agua.” Defesa Aerea & Naval. April 30, 2013.http://www.defesaaereanaval.com.br/?p=18863