COHA: Lula and the Cesare Battisti Affair in the Context of Rome-Latin American Relations

Lula and the Cesare Battisti Affair in the Context of Rome-Latin American Relations
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
May 23, 2013
Originally published: http://www.coha.org/22734/

Cesare Battisti, a member of Italy’s Armed Proletarians for Communism (PAC), lives comfortably in Brazil, thanks to former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.  The iconic former head of state signed a decree on his last day as president in December 2010, which stated that Battisti could not be extradited to Italy, where he would face life imprisonment. Battisti was convicted of committing four murders throughout Italy’s anni di piombo (years of the lead), a period of almost unexampled criminal violence in the country that lasted from the late 1960s to early 1980s.The Battisti affair has since become an episodic thorn in Rome’s side with respect to its relations with Brasilia; yet this debacle has far from ended the Italian government and business community from increasing their ties with the Western Hemisphere, especially the Portuguese-speaking giant.

Whether Dilma Rousseff’s presidency or the next Brazilian head of state will (or should) extradite Battisti to Italy remains to be seen, though it is doubtful. This means that Battisti, a convicted murderer, may live out the rest of his days in a cushy exile in Brazil, instead of serving hard time for the crimes he committed.

A Brief Background

Plenty has been written about Battisti’s life, his outrageous delinquencies, his literary career (he is the author of over a dozen books), and his trials. After his murder convictions, Battisti escaped from an Italian prison and ended up in Mexico, where he founded the magazine, Via Libre. Eventually Battisti made his way to France but then fled to Brazil in 2004 after French institutions conceded the prospect of extradition to Rome. In 2007, he was arrested by Brazilian authorities, and he was later tried and convicted of entering the country illegally. On December 31, 2010, the final day of the Lula presidency, the outgoing president signed a decree that prohibited Battisti from being extradited.

Battisti has not denied being a member of the PAC, but he maintains his innocence regarding the four assassinations. He has argued that “in my case, there was a sort of artificial operation that created, from one day to another, the monster Cesare Battisti.” [1]

The 2009 and 2011 Flare Ups

Lula’s decision not to extradite Battisti to Italy provoked two minor international incidents between Rome and Brasilia in 2009 and again in 2011. Tensions escalated in 2009 when former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi recalled the Italian ambassador to Brazil after negotiations failed to have Battisti extradited. At the time, then-Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini criticized Brazil’s decision to provide a safe haven for Battisti, stating that, “Battisti is a terrorist who does not deserve at all the status of political refugee.” [2] On the other hand, then-Brazilian President Lula da Silva declared that his ruling to allow Battisti to stay in his country “was a sovereign choice that states can make. Italian authorities may like it or not, but they will have to respect it.” [3]

The situation further became a judicial and diplomatic imbroglio when, in 2009, Battisti was granted the status of political refugee by Brazilian Minister of Justice, Tarso Genro. This development occurred after his initial request for asylum was denied by the National Committee for Refugees on the grounds that Battisti had been convicted in his absence. Genro declared Battisti a political refugee based on the use of unreliable evidence in his trial. [4]

In June 2011, the diplomatic row between the two countries escalated when Battisti was freed from his Brazilian cell where he had spent four years. The Brazilian Supreme Court (voting six in favor and three against) decided that Italy did not have any legitimacy in its claims to have him extradited to Rome and that these demands could not overrule Lula’s previous decree. [5] At the time, then-Italian President Giorgio Napolitano declared that, “I do not understand Lula,” while other high-ranking Italian government officials also argued that this move would hurt bilateral relations. [6]

It is worth noting that when the non-extradition decision was made, posters appeared throughout Italy urging the government to boycott the 2014 FIFA World Cup, which will be held in Brazil. [7] But it is impossible to think that, given the importance of soccer in Italy, the government and national team will decide to boycott a trip to soccer’s most important tournament because of Battisti. [8] Currently, Italy is ranked first in Group B of the European qualifiers, and it is likely that they will participate in the World Cup.

As for Battisti, he is enjoying the “good life”. He apparently lives in an exclusive residential area in Sao Paulo and in early 2012 he published a new book, Ao Pe do Muro (issued by the Brazilian publishing house Martins Fontes). [9] In early January 2013, there were rumors that Battisti was hired as an advisor for Central Unica dos Trabalhadores (CUT), a Brazilian labor union, but CUT officials have been quick to deny these allegations. [10]

Why Didn’t Brazil Extradite Battisti?

It is unclear why Lula became obsessed with Battisti and refused to send him to Italy – after all, not only was Battisti found guilty of his crimes, but the diplomatic incident also temporarily affected relations between Rome and Brasilia. A December 31, 2010 article by the British daily The Guardian, argued that, “while Lula was not particularly sympathetic to Battisti, he had been irritated by Italian demands […] The move had spared his successor, Dilma Rousseff, any political fallout early in her government.” [11]

Another reason for Lula’s support for Battisti may have to do with the former president’s political party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers Party – PT). Scholars have mused that the PT may have some members sympathetic to the Italian and ultimately convinced Lula that he should come to his aid. This argument is supported by a Brazilian scholar very knowledgeable on the Battisti affair, who explained to the author of this COHA analysis that “I do not believe that Dilma or another PT president will deport Battisti. The party has many leaders who were members of armed left-wing groups which fought against the military dictatorship, and they see similar movements in Latin America and Europe as allies, even when the historical context was very different.” [12] Moreover, Rousseff, also belongs to the PT, so Lula may have decided to deal with Battisti so his successor would not have to address a potentially embarrassing situation at the dawn of her presidency.

Finally, Gabriel Elizondo, Al Jazeera staff correspondent based in Sao Paulo, also wrote on the Battisti affair for his publication’s blog post in June 2011. The reporter explained that another reason why high Brazilian policymakers chose not to extradite Battisti was because they “saw no legal premise to extradite him and the government felt no international laws or norms were broken or jeopardized. So in this sense, it was very much a Brazilian decision. Sovereignty is a word used a lot to describe it here.” [13] Finally, Elizondo argues that “there is nothing Italy can do to substantially punish Brazil either economically or diplomatically. Already Italy has said they won’t break off economic ties with Brazil.” [14] Indeed, as we will see in a later section of this research paper, the Italian government and private companies are actually trying to increase ties with Brazil, rather than attempting to use “soft power,” (i.e. a commercial embargo) to get Battisti back to Italy.

Italy and The Western Hemisphere

Battisti’s status in Brazil has not affected Italy’s foreign policy towards the Western Hemisphere. Although not as extensive as Latin America’s relationships with other extra-hemispheric nations (such as Russia, China or the United Kingdom), Italy’s relations with the region are noteworthy. For example, Argentine President Christina Fernandez de Kirchner traveled to Rome in mid-2011 and met with then-Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Italy and Argentina have a long history, particularly due to the overwhelming migration of Italian nationals to Argentina during the first half of the 20th century. However, relations between the two governments reached a low point after the 2001 Argentine debt crisis. Hence, Kirchner’s trip was important as it was a symbolic way strengthen relations once again—the last time an Argentine president went to Italy was President Eduardo Duhalde in 2002. [15] Just prior to Kirchner’s trip to Rome, then-Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco Frattini visited Buenos Aires and met with his Argentine counterpart, Hector Timerman. In a joint press conference, the high-level officials praised bilateral relations, including 12 agreements signed during Frattini’s trip, which addressed issues concerning cooperation on energy and technology, among other issues. [16] Thanks to soccer diplomacy, Buenos Aires-Rome relations may receive a boost in morale and image, as the national soccer teams of both states are planning to play a friendly match in the near future in Italy. [17]The match is meant to celebrate the election of the Argentine Jorge Bergoglio as the new Pope.

Meanwhile, Mexico is also attempting to strengthen its ties with Italy. For example, in May 2012, then-Mexican Foreign Affairs Minister Patricia Espinosa traveled to Rome and met with her Italian counterpart, Giulio Terzi. The two officials signed agreements to strengthen political, economic, cultural, and security relations, while declaring their joint support for a reform of the U.N. Security Council. [18] During the visit, Terzi declared that trade between the two countries had reached $500 million USD in 2011. For its part, the Mexican Agency PROMexico, which aims to attract foreign direct investment to Mexico as well as the internationalization of Mexican companies, explains on its official website that Italy ranks as Mexico’s 12th largest trading partner worldwide. [19]

Military cooperation, including arms sales, is a particular area where cooperation has increased between Italy and Latin American governments. For example, in 2004, Italy sold four Lupo-type frigates to Peru. [20] Then in mid-2011, the Mexican government bought four C27J transport planes from Alenia Aeronautica (a branch of Finmeccanica). [21] Also in 2011, Panama received two Agusta Westland AW139 helicopters, also constructed by Finmeccanica. [22] More recently, in February 2013, the Italian weapons manufacturing company Beretta donated an ARX-160 rifle and a GLX-160 grenade launcher to the Argentine army. The goal is that the Argentine Special Forces will test and evaluate these weapons and see if they fulfill their operational requirements, which could lead to an eventual weapons order. [23] The Argentine military also recently agreed to acquire 20 helicopters, type AB 206, from Italy. [24]

Moreover, the Peruvian government signed a memorandum of understanding to promote military cooperation between Peru and Italy in 2011. [25] A new rapprochement occurred last September 2012, when the Italian ambassador to Peru, Guglielmo Ardizzone, and the Peruvian Defense Minister, Pedro Cateriano, met in the headquarters of the Peruvian army. [26] For some time, the Peruvian government has declared its intention to obtain new military hardware, which may include purchasing Italian frigates (Maestrale-type). [27] While no decision has been made thus far, high-profile meetings are ongoing and hint at the possibility of closer military ties, particularly via arms sales, between Lima and Rome.

Finally, it is important to highlight that there have been some political crises between Rome and Latin America. Namely, in April 2012, Valter Lavitola, entrepreneur and former editor of the online daily Avanti, was arrested on charges of offering bribes to the president of Panama for construction contracts. The development proved to be an embarrassment for the Italian government as Lavitola was a close associate of former Prime Minister Berlusconi.

Italy and Brazil

Italian companies have been trying to enter the Brazilian market in recent years, due to the South American country’s economic growth. For example, Franco Bernabè, the president of Telecom Italia, declared in 2011 that he wanted his telecommunications company to expand relations with Brazil and Argentina. [28] He explained that both countries “are the most important in Latin America,” and that both have a plethora of resources that “if they are properly managed” can be very useful to economic development. In addition, an Italian trade mission travelled to Brazil in May 2012. The delegation included members of the regional government of Regione Liguria—a region in the northwest of Italy. During the trip, the association Ligurian Ports signed an agreement with the Brazilian Santos Port Authority to improve cooperation between these trans-Atlantic port regions. [29]

It is worth adding that Italian-Brazilian military cooperation has not fundamentally suffered because of the Battisti affair. For instance, in July 2012, then-Italian Defense Minister Giampaolo Di Paola traveled to Brasilia and met with his Brazilian counterpart, Celso Amorin. During the goodwill visit, Di Paola expressed his country’s interest in embarking on joint ventures with the Brazilian navy to construct warships and other vessels in Brazil (as compared to Rome selling Italian warships to Brazil). [30] Brazil and Italy have already established a generally successful record of military partnerships. A prime example was the AMX project, a joint Italian-Brazilian program to create a lead-in fighter trainer and light attack category aircraft. The project was carried out by Brazil’s lead military industry, Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica SA (Embraer) and Italy’s Aermacchi in the late 1980s. [31]

Whether Brazil’s ongoing weapons purchases are part of a South American arms race, or if they are even appropriate given Brazil’s security situation will not be discussed here. Nevertheless, it is worthy to highlight that the country enjoys close relations with its neighbors and its security concerns are arguably more internal-security related than the possibility of inter-state warfare breaking with another country. [32] In any case, the arms sales industry is potentially worth millions of dollars and the Brazilian government and military will certainly want to acquire more high-tech weapons to cement the country’s status as a military power (i.e the country is building four diesel-electric submarines in cooperation with France) as well as to evolve into a major weapons supplier. [33] Hence, it is no great surprise that the Battisti affair is intentionally being brushed overby both Brasilia and Rome in order not to affect military relations and the potential of huge profits for Italian companies in future weapons sales to the South American powerhouse.

Battisti’s (Comfortable) Future

It is highly debatable if Battisti will ever be extradited back to Italy to pay for the crimes for which he has been found guilty. Rouseff has not addressed his guest’s fate and will probably stay away from discussing it. Meanwhile, the Battisti affair has become more of an episodic rallying cry for successive Italian governments, but this has not affected daily relations between Italy and Brazil, much less with the rest of the Western Hemisphere. The Battisti crisis may certainly flare up again in the following years but it is hardly a contemporary pressing issue for either Brasilia or Rome.

Nevertheless the Battisti affair could become a diplomatic obstacle in further joint projects and agreements between Brazil and the European Union, of which Italy is a member. Moreover, the Battisti affair could come back to haunt Brazil if the government is perceived by the international community of not cooperating to combat international criminal organizations, particularly that originate from Italy and operate in Latin America (i.e. Italian mafia members have been recently arrested in Colombia). [34]

In any case, if Italy does qualify for the 2014 FIFA World Cup, Battisti would be well advised to avioid going to any of Italy’s matches.

 W. Alejandro Sánchez is a Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.

The author would like to thank Filippo Ponz de Leon, COHA Research Associate, for his assistance in fact-checking earlier drafts of this report.

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References

[1] Lissardy, Gerardo, “Cesare Battisti, el escritor que escapo de la cadena perpetua,” BBC Mundo, March 12, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/noticias/2012/03/120312_entrevista_battisti_italia_brasil_aw.shtml

[2] “Brasil e Italia, cerca de la ruptura de relaciones diplomáticas por la extradicion de un terrorista,” Perfil.com. Internacional, Polemica Judicial, January 28, 2009,http://www.perfil.com/contenidos/2009/01/28/noticia_0006.html

[3] “Brasil e Italia, cerca de la ruptura de relacionesdiplomaticaspor la extradicion de un terrorista,” Perfil.com. Internacional, Polemica Judicial, January 28, 2009,http://www.perfil.com/contenidos/2009/01/28/noticia_0006.html

[4] Goes, Paula,  “Brazil: Extradition refusal threatens relations with Italy,”  Global Voices – English, January 29, 2009, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2009/01/27/brazil-extradition-refusal-threatens-relations-with-italy/

[5] Geffroy, Lucie, “Battisti Libere, l’Italie degoutee,” Courrier International, Italie, June 9, 2011,http://www.courrierinternational.com/revue-de-presse/2011/06/09/battisti-libere-l-italie-degoutee

[6] Geffroy, Lucie, “Battisti Libere, l’Italie degoutee,” Courrier International, Italie, June 9, 2011,http://www.courrierinternational.com/revue-de-presse/2011/06/09/battisti-libere-l-italie-degoutee

[7] “Italianospedemqueselecaoboicote Copa de 2014,” Veja (Brazil), Esportes, Copa 2014, July 29, 2011,http://veja.abril.com.br/noticia/esporte/italianos-pedem-que-selecao-boicote-copa-de-2014

[8] “Qualifiers – Europe,” FIFA.com, 2014 Fifa World Cup Brazil,http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/preliminaries/europe/standings/index.html

[9] “Ao Pe do Muro,” Livraria da Folha, http://livraria.folha.com.br/catalogo/1177996/ao-pe-do-muro , Also see “Cesare Battisti lanca no Rio livro baseado em sua experiencia na prisao,” Folha de Sao Paulo, April 12, 2012,http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/1075378-cesare-battisti-lanca-no-rio-livro-baseado-em-sua-experiencia-na-prisao.shtml

[10] “CUT nega contratacao de Cesare Battisti,” Brasil247, January 11, 2013,http://www.brasil247.com/pt/247/brasil/90319/

[11] Hooper, John and Tom Philipps, “Lula sparks diplomatic spat with Italy over refusal to extradite killer,”  The Guardian (UK), December 31, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/31/brazil-lula-berlusconi-battisti-italy

[12] Brazilian scholar. E-mail interview with the author.” May 18, 2013.

[13] Elizondo, Gabriel, “Brazil and Battisti,” Al Jazeera, Blogs, June 10, 2011,http://blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/americas/brazil-and-battisti

[14] Elizondo, Gabriel, “Brazil and Battisti,” Al Jazeera, Blogs, June 10, 2011,http://blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/americas/brazil-and-battisti

[15] “Argentina e Italia relanzanrelacionesbilaterales,” El Pais (Uruguay), Ultimo Momento, June 1, 2011,http://historico.elpais.com.uy/110601/ultmo-570224/ultimomomento/Argentina-e-Italia-relanzan-relaciones-bilaterales/

[16] “Conferencia de prensa de los cancilleres de Argentina e Italia,” Casa Rosada/ Presidencia de la Nacion Argentina, Official Transcript, http://www.presidencia.gov.ar/informacion/conferencias/23184

[17] “Italia invito a Argentina a jugar un amistoso en honor al Papa,” El Clarin (Argentina), Deportes, April 2, 2013,http://www.clarin.com/deportes/Italia-Argentina-amistoso-homenaje-Papa_0_893910769.html

[18] Araujo, Estefany, “Italia y Mexico fortalecenrelacionesbilaterales,” Sexenio.Mx (Mexico), May 24, 2012,http://www.sexenio.com.mx/articulo.php?id=15509

[19] “Sintesis de la RelacionComercial Mexico – Italia,” PROMexico,  Unidad de Inteligencia y Negocios, March 8, 2010, http://www.promexico.gob.mx/work/models/promexico/Resource/102/1/images/Italia.pdf

[20] “Compra de fragatasLupo mantendrá equilibriodisuasivo regional,” Peru 21, October 3, 2004,http://peru21.pe/noticia/40343/compra-fragatas-lupo-mantendra-equilibrio-disuasivo-regional

[21] “Mexico adquiere a la italianaAleniaAeronauticacuatroaviones de transportetactico C-27J,” Infodefensa.com, July 7, 2011, http://www.infodefensa.com/?noticia=mexico-adquiere-a-la-italiana-alenia-aeronautica-cuatro-aviones-de-transporte-tactico-c-27j

[22] “El ServicioNacionalAeronaval de Panama recibe dos nuevos helicópteros AgustaWestland AW139,”Infodefensa.com, April 25, 2013, http://www.infodefensa.com/?noticia=el-servicio-nacional-aeronaval-de-panama-recibe-dos-nuevos-helicopteros-agustawestland-aw139

[23] “El EjercitoArgentinoevaluafusiles GLX 160 y lanzagranadas ARX 160 de Beretta,” Infodefensa.com, February 4, 2013, http://www.infodefensa.com/?noticia=el-ejercito-argentino-evalua-fusiles-glx-160-y-lanzagranadas-arx-160-de-beretta

[24] “Italia cede 20 helicopteros AB206 al Ejercito  de Argentina,” Infodefensa.com, May 20, 2013,http://www.infodefensa.com/?noticia=italia-cede-20-helicopteros-ab206-al-ejercito-de-argentina&categoria=&pais=Argentina

[25] “El poderEjecutivoperuanoenvia al Congreso un acuerdo de Cooperacion en Defensa con Italia ,”Infodefensa.com, October 11, 2011, http://www.infodefensa.com/?noticia=el-poder-ejecutivo-peruano-envia-al-congreso-un-acuerdo-de-cooperacion-en-defensa-con-italia

[26] Italia y Perufortalecenrelacionesbilaterales en materia de Seguridad y Defensa,” Infodefensa.com, September 13, 2012, http://www.infodefensa.com/?noticia=italia-y-peru-fortalecen-relaciones-bilaterales-en-materia-de-seguridad-y-defensa

[27] “Peru invertira 800 millones de dólares adicionales en la compra de equipos militares,” Infodefensa.com, July 10, 2012, http://www.infodefensa.com/?noticia=peru-invertira-800-millones-de-dolares-adicionales-en-la-compra-de-equipos-militares

[28] “Telecom Italia busca ‘relaciones mas intensas’ con Argentina y Brasil,” ElEconomista.ES (Spain), May 10, 2011, http://ecodiario.eleconomista.es/interstitial/volver/canguroa13/flash/noticias/3056368/05/11/Telecom-Italia-busca-relaciones-mas-intensas-con-Argentina-y-Brasil-.html

[29] “Trade Mission to Brazil – Government, Regions and Chambers’ System,” Liguria International,http://www.liguriainternational.it/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=224%3Amissione-di-sistema-in-brasile&catid=1%3Ain-evidenza&lang=en

[30] “Italia ofrece a Brasilacuerdos de cooperacion en el Area de construccion naval military,” Infodefensa.com, July 3, 2012, http://www.infodefensa.com/?noticia=italia-ofrece-a-brasil-acuerdos-de-cooperacion-en-el-area-de-construccion-naval-militar

[31] “A-1M: Enhancing Brazil’s AMX Light Attack Fighters,” Defense Industry Daily, January 13, 2013,http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/elbit-enhancing-amx-aircraft-avionics-for-brazil-05151/

[32] For more information on Brazil’s inter-state relations, security issues and foreign policy goals, see: Sanchez, W. Alejandro, “”Brazil’s Grand Design for Combining Global South Solidarity and National Interests: A Discussion of Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti and Timor,” Globalizations, Volume 9, Issue 1, 2012 Special Issue, Pages 161-178 http://bit.ly/wj1bTI and Sanchez, W. Alejandro, “Whatever happened to South America’s splendid little wars?” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Volume 22, Issue 2. 2011, Pages 322 – 351, http://bit.ly/jVA8GK

[33] “Brazil & France in Deal for SSKs, SSN,” Defense Industry Daily, April 11, 2013,http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/brazil-france-in-deal-for-ssks-ssn-05217/

[34] Bargent, James, “Why has the Italian Mafia Returned to Colombia?” InsightCrime, May 16, 2013,http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/why-has-the-italian-mafia-returned-to-colombia

Gradual Resurgence of France as a Strategic Presence in Latin America and the Caribbean

by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sánchez and Research Associate Annie Hamel
03 May 2006
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
http://www.coha.org/gradual-resurgence-of-france-as-a-strategic-presence-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/

Announcement: President Morales Detonates a Bomb, with Repercussions that Reach Far Beyond Bolivia COHA will shortly be issuing an analysis of President Evo Morales’ May 1 announcement that all Bolivian natural gas and hydrocarbons will be nationalized. The report will examine the pluses and minuses of Morales’ action, and pay particular attention to the importance of the nationalization as a tool for regional integration. Themes will include the world’s reaction to the decree; geopolitical factors including proposed pipeline projects; and the impact of the Bolivian nationalization on relations between Brasilia and La Paz. COHA will also discuss the question of whether the State Department will now throw aside its nascent policy of cautious respect for Morales and add him to its hate list. Additionally, the release will examine the nationalization through the lens of the recently signed tri-partite ALBA trade pact between Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia, which may mark the beginning of a developing world call for a more socially conscious and humanistic system of development and trade. This would thus represent the opening chapter of a philosophical assault on the tenets of the Washington Consensus, which asserted the supremacy of market accessibility and the superiority of the private over the public sector.

• Chirac’s visit to Brazil confirms the South American nation’s rising global status

• Increased French influence goes hand in hand with a decline of Washington’s leverage in its own hemisphere

French President Jacques Chirac will be visiting Brazil on May 25, which has the potential of becoming a watershed meeting in the furtherance of enhanced relations between the two major regional powers as well as France’s emergent presence in the area. France, which for years has lacked a significant imprint on the hemisphere, now appears to be gradually returning and expanding its influence by improving its ties with Brazil and giving some priority to its own Caribbean basin territories. Chirac’s visit to Brazil comes after last October’s Paris meeting between French Prime Minister Dominique De Villepin and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. In the De Villepin-Chavez encounter, the two countries came forth with declarations about their countries’ blossoming relationship and their desire to seek even further cooperation “on all levels.” Since both Paris and Caracas have had strained links in the recent past to Washington (and regarding Venezuela, very contemporaneously), any increased cordiality between them could prove mettlesome for White House policymakers. According to Latin America specialist Jean-Jacques Kourliandsky, of the Paris-based Institute of International and Strategic Relations (IRIS), France, for the most part, has only had marginal diplomatic connections to Latin America, as the was region no longer considered a “priority continent.” Chirac’s visit to Brazil and De Villepin’s meeting with Chávez are obvious signals of a renewed French interest in a constructive relationship with the Western Hemisphere, notwithstanding the duplicitous role played by De Villepin in facilitating the extra-constitutional ouster of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in February of 2004 – an event that was engineered by Roger Noriega, formerly of the State Department, and which included the French foreign minister, the U.N.’s Secretary General Kofi Annan and the Canadians.

One can be excused for minimizing the potential importance of France’s presence in the region. Although much of its newfound visibility in recent years occurred without fanfare, Paris, in fact, has been quietly strengthening its presence across the hemisphere, from its Caribbean islands of Martinique and Guadalupe to Colombia and Brazil. Chirac’s Brasilia trip is likely to lay the foundations for greater French investment and diplomatic involvement in the area. The prospects for a greater French role will heavily depend on the result of the country’s presidential elections next year. It will also depend if De Villepin manages to win and continue his own as well as President Chirac’s controversial legacy, and whether he will not be too burdened by the former’s rather shameful relationship with Haiti as its Judas, at the time that President Aristide was using up his remaining hours on the island.

France & Latin America-Brazil, the Major Interest

The foundation of the new ties between France and Latin America is a growing commercial exchange. According to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after the 1980s economic slowdown, French exports to Latin America increased from 16.7 billion Francs in 1990 (1.5% of the country’s total exports) to 45 billion in 1998 (2.6% of the total exports). In 2001, Mexico occupied 15% of total trade between France and Latin America, while half of total trade was between France and MERCOSUR nations.

The Quai d’Orsay (France’s foreign relations ministry) has amply displayed its growing interest in emerging Latin American economies, offering new investment opportunities for Paris, with Brazil attracting particular attention. Today, the Portuguese-speaking giant is regarded as a rising power, comparable to India, hence Paris’ great interest to cultivate its interest. In an interview with COHA, M. Amblard, an official on Brazilian affairs at France’s ministry of foreign affairs, highlighted the historical ties between France and Brazil, referring to the Brazilians that sought refuge in France in 1964 in order to escape the (Marshall Humberto de Alencar Castelo) Branco military junta, as one component of the two countries’ bilateral ties. Mr. Kouliansky of IRIS described how, in order to improve relations between France and Brazil, the French government made 2005 the “year of Brazil,” in which 15 million people participated in widely attended national festivals. Brazilian President Lula even participated in the July 14 French national parade, an honor which is not lightly bestowed. In addition, several cooperative agreements between the two countries on different issues like commerce, education, and culture. As part of this renewed push, France corporations became the fourth largest investor in Brazil in 2005, and were responsible for the creation of 230.000 jobs. France’s international support for Brazil’s Zero Hunger Project, which Brasilia had presented to the United Nations as an example of how to bring development to a country strongly needing reform, shows that Paris’ commitment is stronger than simply self-gratifying rhetoric. France’s initiatives and support for Brazil have made Chirac’s upcoming visit an event which is being warmly awaited by Lula and his government as part of its political and economic diversification theme which the Palácio do Planalto means to stress.

On a business level, many French multinational enterprises have invested in Brazil among them Renault-Nissan and Casino-Carrefour. In a December 1997 Billboard magazine article, the CEO of French mega department store FNAC, Francois-Henri Pineault, announced his company’s plans for Latin America and Asia, noting “we already have teams in action and we plan to open stores in the next 12-18 months.” He went on to explain that “Europe will become our domestic market, but our international development will cover other continents.” Pinault was speaking almost prophetically since FNAC opened a store in Sao Paulo in 1999, providing just one illustration of how French companies are penetrating Latin American markets. An April 25 article in Brazil’s Investnews celebrates the country’s exports to France in the past year, which include Havaianas flip flops, chemicals, prepared foods, turbines, auto tires and leather shoes.

Colombia

France has sought active engagement in Colombia, but more on the basis of political rather than economic motives. Several French citizens are currently held by Colombian rebel groups, a situation which has prompted Paris to seek the role of a mediator in order to expedite the release of the French nationals. It is unclear if French negotiators are currently involved in the present discussions between the Colombian government and the major rebel movement in the country, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), for the release of some of the latter’s victims.

Among the hostages that Paris is determined to liberate is the former Colombian presidential candidate and former congresswoman, Ingrid Betancourt, who has been held hostage since February 2002. Betancourt, a French-Colombian citizen, is the daughter of a former Colombian diplomat. Prime Minister De Villepin was Betancourt’s political science professor, and has made obtaining her release a pillar of his country’s Colombian policy as well as a matter of his personal dedication. In an April 21 press release, France’s foreign minister, M. Philippe Douste-Blaze, expressed France’s determination to secure her release. Earlier, in an 2006 interview, Douste-Blaze explained how, in coordination with Spain and Switzerland, Paris is trying to organize a round of negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC. He explained that France is committed to the respect of human rights and Colombia’s sovereignty, but has only one central objective: the liberation of all the hostages, particularly Ingrid Betancourt.

However, Quai d’Orsay seems to have maneuvered less than adeptly in seeking its goals, and Colombian officials are becoming agitated over Paris’ heavy handedness. An article in the French daily Le Figaro quotes a Colombian official as saying: “the French government has multiplied its errors in the Betancourt affair.” The official goes on to say “if [Paris] had reacted as it did for the French hostage in Iraq, [Betancourt] would already be freed.” Critiques of the French government’s approach seemed somewhat justified, especially after the body of Aida Duvalier, a Colombian-French hostage, was recovered in February in the town of Quinchia, west of Bogot. Duvalier had been kidnapped by the relatively unknown Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) in March 2001.

The Caribbean

French Overseas Territories

France’s historic ties to the Western Hemisphere are bolstered by the country’s numerous possessions in the greater Caribbean region, known as “Departement d’Outre-Mer” (DOM or Overseas Departments). These include the islands of Guadelupe and Martinique, as well as French Guyana. These are not simply French territories, but since the 1980s have held the same legal standing as any other French mainland department like Loire or Manche, with their citizens having the same rights as other French citizens. Unlike British-controlled Bermuda, there is hardly any discussion about moving towards full independence in the French DOM. The inhabitants seem to enjoy the benefits of being legal French citizens, which – like Puerto Rico’s links to the U.S. – are not insubstantial. They enjoy unrestricted migration to France and the rest of Europe, as well as a steady flow of economic aid and subsidies from Paris and the European Union. However, not everything is made of gold; the lack of vital independence movements can also be partially explained by the well-grounded fear that would-be self determinants have of Paris’ traditionally repressive policies toward pro-independence civic movements. A 1997 Round Table journal article by Dr. Helen Hinjens, explains that Paris’ overall approach (particularly in the 1960s) towards pro-independence parties and movements in the DOM was repressive. Most were banned outright and, like their Algerian counterparts, their leaders were deported to mainland France under “special security circumstances.”

French Guyana and its neighbors

French Guyana, with its small population of 157.213 – according to a 1999 national census – holds particular importance for several reasons, principally its 673 km common border with Brazil. Currently, both French and Brazilian legislators are debating the construction of a 300-meter bridge over the Oyapock River, which separates the two territories, as well as giving permanent circulation entrance cards to the residents on both river banks, permitting them to cross freely. Associated migratory issues weigh heavily on relations between French Guyana and Brazil. In addition, the “gareimperos” (illegal Brazilian gold seekers) have begun prospecting mining operations in the rivers of French Guyana. Such incursions are envenomed by the gareimperos’ use of mercury in their refining efforts, which has a widespread baleful ecological impact. Among the most affected groups have been local indigenous communities, who not only experience health problems as a result of the exposure to the lethal metal, but are often subjected to threats of violence from criminal groups who run protection operations for the gareimperos. Moreover, according to the French organization Reporteurs sans frontières, journalists attempting to expose the region’s combative atmosphere have repeatedly faced deaths threats from illegal groups’ leaders.

Authorities in French Guyana have struggled to control the unlawful activities of these prospectors, particularly because of tremendous difficulties posed by the dense Amazonian forest. Last February, Brazil and Venezuela signed an accord to explore and exploit their quadrants of the border area, which covers more than 2,000 km. A January article in Mining Journal by Dominic Mercer explains that the propellant behind the accord includes the pollution brought about by the garimpeiros and the yet-to-be-determined quantity and quality of contraband diamonds and gold they have gathered. It is unclear if Chirac and Lula will get around to discussing this issue when they meet.

The multilateral facet

Elsewhere in the region, Paris has actively pursued multilateral engagement as an associate member of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), representing the DOM. The ACS, which was founded on July 24, 1994, has a broad membership including 25 full members, from both island and mainland Caribbean nations as well as three associate members (France, Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles). The United States and the United Kingdom have observer status. France’s associate membership in the ACS might offer a privileged path towards displaying an enhanced presence in the region. Caribbean governments have been trying to lure Martinique and Guadalupe into playing a role in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), knowing full well that an opened French purse and a flow of investments would likely follow.

Several steps have already been taken to boost this incipient relationship. Last March, Dominica’s Prime Minister Roosevelt Skerritt met with French DOM officials; the discussions ended in an agreement establishing that Dominica’s citizens would no longer require visas to travel to French Caribbean territories. Another significant development is Paris’ decision to donate a total of $126,000 to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in support of the Commission’s efforts in Haiti.

On the subject of the region’s persistent crime problems, France has even opened a crime center in Martinique, the Centre interministériel de formation anti-drogues (CIFAD), in order to train regional police officers to combat drug trafficking. Another example is the recent 3-day March meeting in Paramaribo between Surinamese and French judicial authorities. According to the CMC news agency, the conference’s purpose was to “strengthen cooperation to deal with a wide range of cross – border criminal activities between Suriname and French Guyana.” The crimes brought up in the discussion included illegal immigration, auto theft, human trafficking, smuggled fuel as well as illegal small scale gold mining by the Brazilian garempeiros.

A Question of Interest

Links to Brazil, Colombia and the Caribbean typify France’s new engagement with Latin America; a policy which does not operate on a macro-scale, but rather by carefully selecting a sharp-shooter’s target, emphasizing a partnership based on particular circumstances. Often, the motivation is commercial; however in Colombia, it has been more political and humanitarian. A possible victory by Prime Minister De Villepin in the 2007 presidential race will likely mark a continuation of France’s current policy of strategic friendships throughout the Caribbean, with perhaps a greater French presence in Colombia in order to obtain Ingrid Betancourt’s freedom. Until then, President Chirac’s visit to Brazil constitutes an example that Latin America and the Caribbean can no longer be dismissed as being situated in Washington’s “sphere of influence.” After China, France is yet another country that, for strategic and financial reasons, and because of the region’s abundance of resources, is turning to Latin America and the Caribbean, regions that have opened their doors and are seeking to gain new friends and diversified trade partners.

Lula Wants His Yellow Submarine

by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sánchez
26 Oct 2007
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
http://www.coha.org/lula-wants-his-yellow-submarine/
Nuclear-R-Us:
Is Brazil's proposed construction of a nuclear submarine the result of imperial ambitions
or a matter of diving to the depths of pandering politics on Lula's part?

• Lula reignites the dream of the military junta: a Brazilian nuclear submarine.
• Washington derides Iran's and North Korea's nuclear plans but mums the word when it comes to Brazil.
• Is the Brazilian navy expecting to be attacked on the high seas by some far off land, or, is a new militarized geopolitical strategy being evolved by Brasilia, or, is Lula merely being pressured by his military to acquire this trophy weapons system which could cost the nation upwards of a billion dollars, yet do little to augment Brazilian security?
• If Brazil goes ahead with its nuclear project, it may violate the spirit of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
• Who is going to provide Brazil with the necessary technology and advice it needs in order to successfully develop a nuclear submarine? Russia or China? Or will it be Brasilia's new sister pact members India and South Africa, or perhaps Iran with which it has had a decade-long nuclear relationship. What will be the roles of the UN, IAEA and OPANAL?

On July 10, Brazilian President Inácio Lula da Silva announced his intention to fulfill one of the Brazilian Navy's ultimate dreams: to launch a nuclear-powered submarine. This idea was originally hatched during the era of military rule from the 1960s to 1980s but floundered due to a lack of funds and priority status. It has resurfaced at a time when there are disturbing signs that much of the subcontinent may be falling into an unintentional arms race. Criticism is mounting both within and outside of Brazil regarding whether it would be wise for the nation to go ahead with this plan, and what does this say about the Lula presidency. Will it deed itself over to engaging in rhetorical vertigo about the need to become one of the world's dominant sea powers, rather than come forth with a sober naval expansion programthat will not break the bank and nor ignite an arms race.
As the international community tries to blunt North Korea's and Iran's nuclear ambitions, Brazil (long rumored to be readying a campaign to launch an all-embracing effort to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nations' Security Council), has put forth a plan to construct a nuclear-powered submarine by 2015. What is alarming about this situation is that Brazil's decision could risk having a destabilizing impact on the hemisphere because it doesn't factor in the grave consequences it could possibly generate.
Brazil's Nuclear History
The genesis of Brazil's nuclear ambitions can be traced back to the 1960s, a time when military governments were a plague on the hemisphere, with the South American giant being, if anything, a pathfinder for this process. Nevertheless, the Brazilian military junta that ruled from 1964-1985 never managed to come up with concrete plans to construct such a super-sophisticated weapon as a nuclear-powered submarine. According to an AP story, the navy's nuclear program, which actually had begun in 1979, already had mastered part of the uranium enrichment process, but it had lagged in developing and constructing a reactor entirely from Brazilian technology, according to Navy Admiral Julio Soares de Moura Neto. A July filing by Deutsch Presse-Agenteur revealed that the nuclear submarine project was part of a 1975 agreement between Brasilia and the then-Western German government in Bonn.
Meanwhile, it should be noted that in a recent article, in the Latin American Weekly Report, Brazil was found to be far behind other regional countries in terms of its budgetary support for its armed forces: "Brazil's armed forces are now far behind, by any aspect of comparison apart from troop numbers, the armed forces of Chile, Peru, and Venezuela." This obviously begs the question regarding what will happen to the country's security if Lula decides to allocate the country's scant economic resources not to a balanced force but for an expensive and glamorous weapon, which will further neglect the people's direct social welfare needs.
During the period of military rule, Brazil's neighbor Argentina (if anything, was under a far more draconic military regime), was also heatedly developing a comparable nuclear program at its remote facility near Bariloche, Argentina. A Spring 1981 Foreign Affairs article by Gerard Smith (Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks [SALT] from 1969 to 1972) and George Rathjens (a Professor of Political Science at MIT) discussed nuclear non-proliferation, touching on Latin America. The article mentions the Brazilian-Argentine nuclear arms race which thought to exist at the time, explaining that "despite U.S. pressures and the expenditure of considerable political capital, the Federal Republic of Germany insisted on going ahead with its previous commitments to assist Brazil in acquiring reprocessing and enrichment facilities. And the FRG and Switzerland have recently agreed to provide Argentina with a power reactor and a heavy-water plant."
Ironically, Lula protested the construction of the nuclear submarine during the military regime, at a time when he was a fiery union leader with solid leftist credentials, protesting that the country had more important needs for its citizens than something so expensive. It seems that Lula, along with new obsessions, has had a dramatic change of heart.
Lula Revives Nuclear Plans
To the surprise of many, whose knowledge of Lula's value system was formed in the past and who now have come to see him as a parody of the ethical code to which he once so passionately subscribed, the Brazilian leader now emphasizes his intention to pursue his military predecessors' nuclear ambitions. He plans to have the submarine operating by 2015. A July 11 wire story by Agence France Presse quotes the Brazilian president as saying during a visit to the Brazilian navy's Technological Center in Sao Paulo, "Brazil could rank among those few nations in the world with a command of uranium enrichment technology, and I think we will be more highly valued as a nation -- as the power we wish to be." There in essence, is the new Brazil that Lula ululates over; he has been transformed into a different kind of author with a vastly different script than the one he once daily honored as the leader of the metallurgical union in the Sao Paulo industrial belt.
Lula's references raise several very revealing insights into the nuclear submarine project. Among them are: will it be constructed solely by Brazilian scientists and technicians? Or will scientists by recruited from abroad as consultants? Does the Brazilian navy possess the necessary skill to design, construct, test and operate a vessel which goes far beyond the admirable design and construction technological capacity it has evinced up to now, even after factoring in all of Brazil's engineering successes and its commercial triumphs in the fields of aircraft and weaponry fabrication? Will the crew be sent abroad to gain training on how to operate this kind of super-sophisticated equipment? What kind of design principles will the submarine feature? Will it be a replication of another country's nuclear submarines or will it be a totally new concept?
While Lula appears to be particularly jaunty when it comes to referring to the submarine, other Brazilians tend to be desperate, according to O Estado, as cited by the Latin American Weekly Report: "'For a long time the government has abandoned the armed forces to its own luck, in a display of disinterest in national defense and the way of life of Brazilians.' The newspaper goes on to say that the pitiable situation of Brazil's armed forces 'does not match the ambitions' of President Lula da Silva to lead South America in an 'increasingly instable regional strategic environment.'"
O Estado zeroes in on the restless musings now taking place in the Brazilian armed forces: "Two-thirds of the air force's planes are grounded due to lack of replacement parts. The air force does not have any medium-range-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, attack helicopters or the so-called 'intelligent bombs' which are part of the equiptment of its Chilean, Peruvian and Venezuelan counterparts. Furthermore, only half of the navy's combat ships are fit for their intended purpose. In the army the situation is no different. There is no money for ammunition, Brazilian tanks are all secondhand and most over 30 years old." Does this sound like a country that could spend almost a billion dollars on nuclear submarine project, which will do nothing to upgrade or modernize the rest of the fleet?
The Brazilian president also is saying that his government will complete the long-suspended Angra III nuclear plant in Rio de Janeiro state. "We will complete Angra III, and if necessary, we'll go on to build more (nuclear plants) because it is clean energy and now proven to be safe," Lula went on to note that the plant will cost 3.5 billion dollars over five and a half years. But he did not mention the nuclear waste disposal issue which has been bedeviling Washington in recent years and still defies easy solution, as seen in the feral Yucca Mountain dispute.
Going Nuclear All the Way
A June article by Nuclear Engineering International explains that Brazil has always strived for self-sufficiency in nuclear power, but the ambitious plans of the 1970s were never fully realized, leaving Brazil with just Angra I & II and the equipment and technical skills required for a third, all to be sited at Angra Dos Reis in Rio de Janeiro state. The construction of Angra III was originally contracted out to the German firm KraftwerkUnion (KWU), now part of Siemens, which was taken over by Framatome ANP (now Areva). At the end of 2001, Brazil's National Energy Policy Council (CNPE) was asked to make recommendations on Angra III and was authorized to take the preliminary steps to restart the project, with Lula ultimately deciding to go ahead with it. Brazil's two operating nuclear plants, Angra I and Angra II, have an installed capacity of about 2,000 megawatts. Angra III would raise its capacity to 3,300 megawatts, at an estimated cost of about US$3.6 billion (euro2.6 billion). According to several costing engineers, they would be surprised if the plant construction didn't come in at least 50 percent higher than the current estimated figure, with the same being true of the projected costs for the submarine.
An October 2004 article in Science by Liz Palmer, entitled "Brazil's Nuclear Puzzle" reported that in 2004 Brazil had plans for a uranium enrichment plant, which, it if configured to do so, could fuel several nuclear weapons annually. It went on to explain that "Brazil has pledged to enrich its uranium to only 3.5% 235U, the concentration required by its two power reactors. This would be too weak to fuel a bomb, which typically requires a concentration of 90% or above. If Brazil should, however, change its mind, its stockpile of uranium already enriched to 3.5 or 5% will have received more than half the work needed to bring it to weapon grade. This would confer what is known as "breakout capability" — the power to make nuclear weapons before the world can react, rendering it a fait accompli. Such a capacity is what the United States and some European countries fear Iran is aiming at."
While it is true that Brazil wants to build a nuclear submarine, not a nuclear weapon, the feeling remains that Brazil has the potential to become a global nuclear power incrementally rather than spontaneously, if it chose to do so at all. It certainly has the resources and the personnel to carry out nuclear projects, and if you take Lula's words to heart, he also seems to have the will. But the greatest source of energy currently fueling Brazil's nuclear dream does not derive from nuclear fission as much as it comes from Brazil's growing sense of ultimate grandeur—that it is destined to be a superpower this century, as well as belonge to the nuclear club, which could help the country's image.
And who is the amiable Jingoist stoking the line of Brazil über alles—well, no other than Lula. Yet there is still another chapter to the Brazilian story, and that consists of the megalithic corruption that infuses every cranny of the nation's public life, the inefficiency, the hypocrisy, the environment chicanery and the unspeakable violence of both the common street crime and their prosecutors, and the drug-trafficking mafia that renders Brazil a hellish state in which to reside, if you are not well to do and strategically positioned.
Interestingly, on June 8 there was an article in the International Herald Tribune about the Russian nuclear power company, Atomstroyexport (a former branch of the Soviet atomic energy ministry) and how Russia is becoming an important exporter of nuclear energy and engineering skills. The article explains how the company is currently constructing reactors in countries like China, India and Bulgaria. The core of the article is based on declarations by Sergei Shmatko, chief executive of Atomstroyexport. The business executive speaks of a "nuclear renaissance, with Moscow emerging as a global exporter of nuclear technology for developing nations. He added that his company is already producing a new design for emerging markets; it has a line of mini-reactors more typical of the power plants required for nuclear submarines or ice breakers, then ostensibly for nuclear power plants. Moscow already has proven that it has very few qualms about exporting military technology, as exemplified by the multi-billion dollar deals with Venezuela over the past couple of years, even though it hasn't quite overtaken the U.S. as a world leader in the export of weaponry. It is only logical to assume that the Kremlin would be more than willing to provide a nuclear reactor to Brazil for its nuclear submarine if Brasilia has the money for it. And, as Lula boasts, Brazil has the cash, even though his admirers and generals claim that only penury is to be found in the Palácio da Alvorada.
A Nuclear Brazil: Is this Wise?
Lula appears to be resorting to the traditional waving of the "bloody flag of nationalism" in order to increase his personal popularity and confirm the support of the nation's powerful military establishment, although all is not sound here, and his efforts at placating it are probably doomed to not be enough. This call to arms comes at a time when his administration has been sent reeling by almost daily corruption scandals in his political party and administration. In the latest round of nationwide discontent, landless workers blocked an iron ore railway (with ore being a key ingredient for the production of steel) owned by Companhia Vale do Rio Doce SA. The company claims only 300 individuals protested, while the Landless Workers Movement insists they were as many as 2,600, according to the Associated Press.
Lula's critics insist that, instead of allocating hundreds of millions of dollars to a nuclear submarine program, why not address the multiple social problems pressing Brazil? These include environmental and anti-poverty initiatives to constructively impact Brazil's current social ills. Instead, Lula has decided to turn to acquiring a trophy military weapon that couldn't be less relevant to Brazil's immediate future as a great nation and Latin America's current concerns. But this could be unwise and will only further provoke regional tensions. Among others, one must wonder what will be the reaction in Buenos Aires, with an Argentine military still nursing its wounds over its defeat in the Falklands. If Brazil's nuclear submarine actually becomes operational, might this immediately invoke the concerns of the Argentine navy? One might reply that during that conflict with Britain, the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano was doomed by the U.K.'s nuclear-powered submarine, HMS Conqueror. The Belgrano was the second largest ship in the Argentine navy at the time and was sunk by two Tigerfish torpedoes from the Conqueror, killing 323 sailors. This was a critical point in the war as it proved to the Argentine navy that it could not compete against a modern British fleet, including its nuclear submarine. What will the Argentine navy have to say about Brazil obtaining a nuclear submarine of its own?
Finally, it is still illogical that Brazil's decision-makers even think for a moment that the nation must have its submarine. The sub-continent, in spite of the arms race it has experience in recent years, has not had an major inter-state war since the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border conflict in 1941. The only other recent war was the Falklands War but this was between Argentina and Great Britain, a non-Western Hemispheric power.
Brazil fought a war against Argentina in the 1820s when Argentina was known as the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata. The last armed conflict (not counting its involvement in World War II) in which Brazil fought was the War of the Triple Alliance when it allied itself with Uruguay and Argentina against Paraguay from 1864 to 1870. If anything, Brazil's security threats today come more from drug cartels, the possible infiltration of the Colombian guerrillas known as the FARC into its territory, and the widespread occurrence of gang violence, than from Argentina or Paraguay (a landlocked border country)
Military Politics
By deciding to build a nuclear submarine, Lula is reviving the old dreams of the Brazilian military. At the same time, he has certainly given reason to the Argentine navy to push for even a bigger defense budget at a time when the country is still recuperating from the 2001 economic meltdown. Both the Brazilian and Argentine security forces have dark pasts that have sullied their countries' good names. The possession of a nuclear submarine might provide both militaries with an increased status that would be prejudicial to the two countries' still not completely stabilized democracies, but might equip them with a sense of arrogance to question their subordination to civilian rule.
It is ironic that Lula has declared his intention to build a nuclear submarine. While he was a union leader before becoming president, Lula had protested against such nuclear aspirations, but it seems he has now had a change of heart. Why has this occurred? Can this be explained by the growing pressure being mounted against Lula from the country's military, which never has quite regained the self-esteem it had when it ruled the country with an absolutist style? According to a report by the Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Lula has emphasized repeatedly that he sees the use of nuclear power as a source of energy as a bread and butter issue for his administration, and that down the road such addicting power will be essential to meet the country's energy requirements; according to estimates, building the nuclear submarine will cost an annual disbursement of $68 million dollars per year over eight years, so it will be ready (ideally) not before 2015. But officials close to the defense establishment claim that any figure less than $1 billion dollars would be falsely optimistic.
Curiously, the aspiration to acquire a nuclear submarine comes at a time when the Brazilian military is going through a process of upgrading its conventional equipment. During a September trip to Spain, in spite of the obvious disenchantment felt by many of Lula's senior military colleagues over the poor state of affairs of Brazil's Armed Forces, Lula told the Spanish daily El País "in the 1970s, we had modern factories that built tanks […] But they have been dismantled. Brazil must return to what it had. To rebuild our weaponry factories, we must buy." According to various reports, Brazil plans to raise military spending by 50 percent next year and is planning to modernize its conventional submarines, build missiles in cooperation with South Africa and purchase second-hand aircraft.
The Armed Forces View of the Project
Logically, it would seem that Lula should have the enthusiastic backing of the Brazilian military establishment for his drive to acquire the submarine. But this is not necessarily the case. On October 13, an article in the Brazilian daily Correio Braziliense focused on declarations by General Barros Moreira, a former commander of the War College (Brazil's military intelligence service) who currently serves as head of the Political, Strategic and International Relations Secretariat at the Defense Ministry. On the question of the nuclear submarine, General Moreira declared: "What is going to happen to a country where 95 percent of international trade takes place by sea? And our oil, where is it? If we had a nuclear submarine, we would be more secure. If the Argentine navy had had a nuclear submarine, England would not have attacked during the Falklands conflict. A peaceful country such as ours, that has no intention of attacking anyone, has every right to defend itself, because it is growing increasingly richer and more tempting" Of course, it remains somewhat obscure as to which country, if any, would be inclined to attack Brazil, no matter how tempting its resources may be.
Opponents of the nuclear submarine and the nuclear plant programs include Lula's Environment Minister Marina Silva. The minister declared that "in the last 15 years, no country has built nuclear power plants because of the problems with the waste […] We have other sources of power: a great potential in hydroelectric, and clean energies in which we should invest." In addition, the construction of the Angra 3 power plant is potentially dangerous because it is located in the state of Rio de Janeiro, near a natural reserve, where the soil is unstable and has included a history of landslides. Angra already was a subject of considerable controversy because of a flawed geological survey which was originally done on the site, which did not include problems with existing faults that should have been ventilated in public discussion. Lula has ruled out solar or wind plants, arguing that they are more expensive than a nuclear plant.
Taking the Arms Race to the Next Level
Brazil's renewed coveting of a nuclear submarine comes at a time when the sub-region is already moving towards an arms race. Among other regional countries, Venezuela and Chile are engaged in major military purchases. Most recently, Venezuela has ordered the purchase of five Kilo-636 submarines from Russia. Peru has contracted a number of naval purchases a couple of years ago during the Alejandro Toledo administration, including the purchase of four Lupo-class frigates from Italy. Last year, Bolivian president Evo Morales declared his plans to build a number of military outposts, with Venezuela's help to parallel Bolivia's borders, including installations facing its border with Brazil. It is unlikely that other countries, including Argentina, will not feel compelled to follow suit at some point in the near future, as a result of pressure coming from its own armed forces
With Brazil's neighbors now interested in increasing their own military capability, Brasilia arms specialists claim that the country has adopted a specific posture on its prospective acquisition of a nuclear submarine that, from a strategic point of view, would give it a definite advantage over potential attackers when it comes to naval warfare, even though the strategy could be seen as being somewhat provocative.
An additional issue regarding Brazil's nuclear submarine has to do with the de facto violation of the spirit, or even the letter of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Signed in 1967 and entered into force in 1969, the Treaty was drafted in Mexico City to make Latin America and the Caribbean into a nuclear-free zone. Brazil is also a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It seems clear that obligations to these treaty regimes would seem to present some problems for Lula's ambitious plans to have his submarine fleet go nuclear.
And Washington's Reaction is….
At a time when the drums of war are beating regarding Washington's tough stand against Iran's nuclear ambitions, and while negotiations continue with North Korea on comparable subjects, how will Washington policy makers react to Brazil possessing a nuclear-powered submarine?
In 1991, Presidents Fernando Collor of Brazil and Carlos Menem of Argentina signed an accord with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna that provided for IAEA inspection of their respective nuclear programs. At the time, the U.S. State Department praised the decision by both leaders, by issuing a statement issued on December 13, 1991 saying that: "The two South American Presidents have demonstrated exceptional statesmanship in moving to free their continent from the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation." What will the State Department say now?
Other institutions that have yet to declare themselves about Brazil's plans include the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), based in Mexico City. Also of note, the other members of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), who have or have had nuclear ambitions of their own in the past and present, might come to Brazil's defense in terms of justifying its acquisition, even though as one of the newest cross-continental alliances, it has yet to play a large role in the process or come out conclusively for or against Brazil's nuclear plans.
The Nuclear Nightmare
It could be persuasively argued that Brazil's proposed nuclear submarine is an imprudent foreign policy move for Brazil to take. Conventional weaponry, in addition to the country's geography, which features broad land buffers, should serve, as they have in the past, as a sufficient deterrent to dissuade other countries from attacking Brazil under any conceivable scenario. Some unkind soul might even accuse Lula of engaging in a good deal of hypocrisy for considering to carry out the plans that basically echo the aspirations of the military junta which was responsible for numerous human rights abuses when it held power and which Lula himself once fiercely opposed. Brazil is regionally and globally respected and would be the natural Latin America representative in the UN Security Council should it ever be reformed and expanded. In addition the country is presently besieged by a host of domestic problems, including widespread criminal violence and drug trafficking, aside from increasing gang warfare. With all of this on its plate, does it really need a submarine?