Showing posts with label hugo chavez. Show all posts
Showing posts with label hugo chavez. Show all posts

Thursday, April 18, 2013

VOXXI: Nicolas Maduro must convince everyone that he won


Nicolas Maduro must convince everyone that he won
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
April 18, 2013
Originally published: http://www.voxxi.com/nicolas-maduro-must-convince-everyone/

Although it may seem that winning was the easy part, the next task for Nicolas Maduro is to prove both to Venezuelans and the international community that he rightfully emerged victorious in Venezuela’s recent presidential elections. As tensions continue, violence and loss of life have occurred this week during protests in the South American nation, demonstrating that the first phase of post-Hugo Chávez Venezuela has been anything but smooth.

Counting Votes and Making Enemies

At the time of this writing, the opposition candidate, Governor Henrique Capriles Radonski, and his followers are demanding a recount of all votes casted last Sunday. The reason for this is due to the tiny 1.8% difference between the two contenders: Maduro won with a reported 50.8% of the votewhile Capriles obtained just over 49%, which translates to a difference of around 235,000 votes. Another reason that Capriles is arguing for a recount is the thousands of reported irregularities that occurred on election day. These include the infamous voto asistido, namely Maduro supporterswere inside voting stations coaxing citizens to vote for the acting president. (For more information on the concerns of Capriles and his supporters, I recommend reading the recent report-from-the-field by my colleague Manuel Rueda, Latin America Correspondent for the ABC/Univision in Caracas).
So far, the interim government has refused a full audit of the votes, arguing that the National Electoral Council (CNE) has already declared Maduro as the winner. This stance has prompted protests by Capriles and his supporters, including the famous cacerolazos (citizens banging pots and pans). Nevertheless, Capriles called off a major rally that was scheduled for Wednesday, April 17.
A full recount makes sense, even if the CNE already named Maduro the winner. Nevertheless, the interim government and his chavista supporters (it sounds a little bizarre to call them Maduro-supporters) want to put this crisis behind them as quickly as possible and a full recount could take days, some say weeks. Even more, there are different scenarios if a recount does happen. If, after a recount, it is shown that Maduro won with an even smaller margin, or maybe even that Capriles actually won, the whole country could be thrown into turmoil. Maduro and his government would almost literally be between a rock and a hard place on what to do next. If, on the other hand, the recount shows again that Maduro did win, it is debatable what steps, if any, Capriles may take. He could call for fraud and demand a new election, but it is unlikely that this would occur.

The world’s awkward position

So far, there have been mixed responses to the Venezuelan elections by the international community, but it is clear that support for Maduro or for a recount is based around whether a head of state was a Chávez ally or not. For example, the governments of Cuba and Bolivia have already congratulated Maduro. Meanwhile, Argentina’s President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner has recognized Maduro and also called for “democracy and peace” in the country. Kirchner can probably relate to what Maduro is going through; even though she was re-elected in 2011, Kirchner’s popularity has struggled in the past year. Argentines took to the streets in their own cacerolazo protests last September 2012 to protest the possibility of an amendment to the Argentine constitution so that Kirchner could run for a third presidential term.
Meanwhile, Spain has called for a recount, which prompted Maduro to recall the Venezuelan ambassador from Madrid. Relations between Spain and Venezuela were confusing during Chávez’s presidency. The Spanish king, Juan Carlos I, memorably told Chávez in 2007 to shut up during a press conference. Nevertheless, Madrid has commercial interests in Venezuela, as exemplified by the Spanish company Navantia, which has constructed vessels for the Venezuelan navy.
Meanwhile, the Organization of American States, a punching bag for Chávez’s criticisms, originally called for a recount. Interestingly, the Western Hemispheric agency has backtracked on its request and Secretary General Insulza has congratulated Maduro as the winner.
Finally, it is unsurprising that Washington would prefer if there was a change of the guard in Caracas and Capriles emerged victorious, bringing the decade-long anti-Washington government in Venezuela to an end. So far Secretary of State John Kerry has not publicly recognized Maduro as the winner, which has unsurprisingly provoked harsh statements. For example, Bolivian President Evo Morales has declared that he is convinced that the U.S. wants to stage a coup in Venezuela.
At this point, there are two levels to the debacle of the Venezuelan elections. Within Venezuela, protests continue and we will have to wait and see if a recount will be called for, and what will occur after it takes place, depending on who wins. While Maduro probably did win, it is clear that he did not do so with the ample margin that he was hoping for that would have bolstered his status as Chávez’s successor. The recent decision by National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello to not allow opposition congressmen to take their posts unless they recognize Maduro as the winner is a particularly troubling development.
Outside of Venezuela’s borders, we find nations and agencies figuring out how to approach the election results. Chávez’s friends quickly supported the results and Maduro’s victory, while governments that were not keen on him will probably keep on waiting until a recount takes place or Capriles concedes. As for Washington’s ambivalence, it is obvious that this stems from almost a decade and a half of tensions with Chávez, and an undeclared hope that Capriles would emerge victorious.
Maduro’s presidential inauguration ceremony is set to take place this Friday April 19, with several pro-Chávez regional heads of state already declaring that they will attend. It will be interesting to see how Capriles and his supporters will react to this ceremony as this will give a clearer picture on the opposition’s next steps. I do not believe Venezuela will become another Syria – Venezuelan government officials have already accused Capriles of wanting to promote a civil war – but instability and protests will inevitably lead to more internal turmoil, a worsening economy and unnecessary loss of life.


Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/nicolas-maduro-must-convince-everyone/#ixzz2Qrke6DsY

Monday, April 15, 2013

VOXXI: How can Nicolas Maduro truly govern Venezuela with so little support?



 How can Nicolas Maduro truly govern Venezuela with so little support?
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
April 15, 2013
Originally published:  http://www.voxxi.com/nicolas-maduro-govern-little-support/
With over 99 percent of the votes tallied, it would appear that Vice President Nicolas Maduro has become the new president of Venezuela. And the big question mark is, how will he govern Venezuela with so little support? Although Maduro and his PSUV party have declared victory, the opposition candidate, Governor Henrique Capriles Radonski, has not conceded defeat as he is arguing that major voting irregularities took place and is demanding a recount. If Maduro does emerge victorious, he can hardly brag about having won a landslide victory like his mentor used to do.

The election

In spite of recent polls that gave Capriles hope for a possible upset, Maduro was able to emerge as the winner. Nevertheless, it is debatable as to what extent Venezuelans voted for Maduro, because of his own platform and his promise to follow in Chavez’s footsteps. It is more likely that his election was made possible by the so-called “sympathy votes” created by Chavez’s open endorsement of Maduro as his successor. Moreover, when Chavez defeated Capriles in the October 2012 elections, Chavez received around 54 percent of the votes. This time, Maduro only leads by about 1 percentage point (less than 235,000 votes).
It is important to highlight that, despite a few unfounded conspiracy myths, the election happened without any major incidents; this has been a welcome development, as there was concern for violence possibly erupting between pro-Maduro/PSUV supporters against Capriles’ team. While no physical violence occurred on Sunday’s Election Day, Maduro’s Twitter account was apparently hacked by a branch of Anonymous, which posted several explicit tweets.
Capriles and his supporters are calling for a recount based on election fraud, citing over 3,000 voting irregularities. Meanwhile, Venezuela’s National Electoral Council (CNE in Spanish), has already declared Maduro as the winner. Chavez’s regional allies, such as Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner and Cuba’s Raul Castro, have already congratulated Nicolas Maduro. (Kirchner’s fast congratulatory message can be contrasted to the Argentine government’s uncomfortable silence regarding the recent passing of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher).

Ruling in Chavez’s shadow

Assuming that the results hold, the question now becomes what kind of president Nicolas Maduro will be. There are several factors that should help his presidency. Namely, the Venezuelan governmental apparatus is overwhelmingly controlled by the PSUV and which had declared its loyalty to Chavez – a loyalty that is expected to be transferred to his political heir, Maduro. This includes the country’s judiciary and legislative systems. In addition, the ruling party controls 20 of Venezuela’s 23 governorships. Finally, in spite of having declared its nonpartisanship, the Venezuelan military (the FANB) is generally believed to have preferred Nicolas Maduro’s candidacy. All these factors, in theory, this should help Maduro carry out his agenda as his initiatives won’t face much opposition in the National Assembly or the threat of a military coup (which was a concern among analysts if Capriles had won).
It is a staple of politics, not just in Latin America but also around the world, for a new government to blame its country’s problems on previous governments and opposing political parties. Nevertheless, Maduro doesn’t have that option given all the factors that are in his favor.
His party has been in power for over a decade, and he could not in good conscience blame Venezuelan woes, for example problems such as an increasingly volatile economy, on Chavez; this move not only would enrage Chavista supporters, but also make him look hypocritical given the numerous praises and references to Chavez he made during his presidential campaign. The website Madurodice.com has been tracking the number of times Maduro has mentioned Chavez’s name in his speeches and declarations, so far the tally is over 7,000. Furthermore, Nicolas Maduro was part of Chavez’s government for years – he was the minister of foreign affairs prior to becoming the vice president. Thus, he would essentially be blaming himself if he tries to attribute any new crisis that appears within the first months in power on the old regime. He could try blaming el imperio (“the empire,” meaning Washington), or Colombia (he accused Bogota of trying to “poison the electoral climate,” prior to the elections), but shifting the blame to outside powers may eventually turn ambivalent supporters against him.
As for the opposition, they will have to wait until 2018 to challenge Maduro and the PSUV party. As has often been mentioned, Maduro lacks the charisma and popularity that Chavez cultivated. This means that an unsuccessful Maduro presidency may turn away his supporters, losing the “sympathy vote.” The 2018 elections may see the Venezuelan opposition make significant gains, maybe not in the presidency, but certainly in the governorships and in the legislature. Capriles won the majority of votes in eight states (such as Anzoategui, Bolivar, Miranda, Tachira, Merida y Zulia) in the recent elections, which signals that these could be sources of support for opposition candidates in the near future.
Maduro may very well prove himself to be a capable and worthy successor to Chavez, who will be able to solve the country’s problems during his presidency. He may even choose and be successful at running for re-election in 2018. But for right now, Maduro owes his victory to the “sympathy vote.” Nicolas Maduro won, but until he proves himself as a leader in his own right, Venezuelan citizens can keep on saying: long live President Chavez.


Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/nicolas-maduro-govern-little-support/#ixzz2QYpHo0z1

Friday, April 12, 2013

VOXXI: Venezuela: No more Hugo Chavez in the electoral ballot


Venezuela: No More Hugo Chavez in the Electoral Ballot
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
April 12, 2013
Originally published: http://www.voxxi.com/venezuela-no-chavez-electoral-ballot/


With only days left before Venezuelans go to the polls to elect their first president in the post-Hugo Chavez era, the two contenders, interim Vice President Nicolas Maduro and the opposition leader Governor Henrique Capriles Radonski, are carrying out their final rallies, declarations and mandatory campaign promises to clinch vital supporters. While Maduro seems to have a comfortable lead, some polls give Capriles a glimmer of hope that victory is possible. Regardless who wins on Sunday, this may be the time to step back and simply reflect on the fact that this is the first time Venezuelans will not see Chavez on an electoral ballot since 1998.

Hugo Chavez at the Micro Level

Over the past weeks, there has been an abundance of analyses that have been published about the legacy of Hugo Chavez and his chavista vision for the hemisphere. Much has been written about how he changed Latin American politics, as he was a fierce opponent of Washington’s influence in the Western Hemisphere. This is best exemplified by his support for the creation of multinational organizations, which did not have the U.S. or Canada as members, such as ALBA, CELAC and UNASUR.
At the domestic level, Chavez’s election signaled a change of the guard regarding the political parties that had ruled Venezuela for decades before him. His support base depended on the masses of lower-class Venezuelan citizens who constantly voted for him, allowing him to re-write the constitution and permitting him to be re-elected. Meanwhile, his party, the PSUV, lost legislative elections in 2010, arguably exemplifying that chavismo, contrary to what Chavez and his supporters said, revolved more around Chavez’s persona rather than the party’s ideology or other party leaders. And in spite of the numerous criticisms directed against Chavez throughout his tenure (the author of this commentary has previously critiqued the Venezuelan leader’s friendship with Peruvian dictator Alberto Fujimori), the truth is that the majority of Venezuelans voted for him again and again. If he was alive and ran for a new presidential term in 2018, he probably would have been elected.
I am reminded of the Federalist Papers, which said in #51, “if a majority [is] united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.” Was it democratic and fair for the Venezuelan minorities (in this case the middle/upper socioeconomic classes), that one individual remained in power for over a decade because he was popular with the poorer masses? Perhaps not, but then again, for decades the majority of the Venezuelan population had its fate decided by the upper classes who controlled the political parties and government.

The Democratic Caudillo

In a previous commentary for VOXXI, I discussed continuismo in Latin America. This term refers to hemispheric heads of state remaining in power for long periods of times, often by changing their countries constitution and rigging elections, whether they were popular among the masses or not. In the past couple of decades, a new type of caudillos emerged in the region. Besides Chavez, we saw the rise of popular leaders like Colombia’s Alvaro Uribe (a fierce Chavez opponent), Brazil’s Lula da Silva and Argentina’s Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Their popularities allowed them to modify their national constitutions and also win re-elections. Arguably, Uribe could still be in power today; he was certainly popular enough in Colombia to have won a third presidential term, if he had been constitutionally allowed to run. It is ironic that even though Uribe and Chavez did not particularly like each other, as the two countries came close to war in a 2008 incident, Uribe could have followed Chavez’s footsteps to remain in power, riding on his popularity. The term “democratic caudillo” probably sounds like an oxymoron, but then again, Latin America tends to be the land of the politically bizarre.

Growing up in Venezuela sans Chavez

At the beginning of this article, I mentioned how this will be the first time since 1998 that Chavez is not on a presidential electoral ballot in the Venezuela. When scholars, academics and journalists write an article, which mentions the years that a head of state was in power, the reader may just take this as a fact. However, let us reiterate that we are talking about a head of state that ruled from 1999 to 2013. A whole generation of Venezuelan children have grown up only seeing Chavez as president, but this will change beginning Sunday. Of course, other presidents have ruled their countries for much longer (i.e. the recently deposed leaders in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya), and the change of the guard from Chavez to the next president (most likely Maduro) may not provoke any Venezuelan to have a nervous breakdown. Nevertheless, this is still an important psychological milestone.
While I was writing this commentary, I spoke to my Venezuelan friends, and I asked them if it feels weird that they will go to the polls very soon and will not see Chavez’s name for the first time in their adult life. One noted that she has voted six times since she was 18, and that today Venezuelans have adjusted not only to voting quite frequently but also to the constant confrontation and discrimination in her country’s national politics.
The overwhelmingly response to my query was that “Chavez aún está en todas partes” (Chavez is still everywhere). They were referring to not only Chavez’s legacy regarding leaving behind him a polarized military or the fact that the country’s governorships and the National Assembly are still overwhelmingly chavistas. My friends also referred to the simple fact that Chavez’s image is indeed everywhere throughout Venezuela, for example, due to the plethora of graffiti made of Chavez’s image that decorates the facades of walls. Furthermore, another friend argued that there is now not just a power vacuum but also a social one, as people will inevitably compare future leaders with how Chavez would have done things – Chavez supporters tend to say “Maduro no es Chavez” (Maduro isn’t Chavez) or “en nombre de nuestro comandante” (in the name of our commander). A simple sign of how Venezuela, particularly its citizens, will move into a post-Chavez future may be exemplified if the numerous Chavez murals are ever painted over.


Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/venezuela-no-chavez-electoral-ballot/#ixzz2QGLFpMGi

Wednesday, March 6, 2013

VOXXI: The future of post-Hugo Chavez Venezuela in the hands of the military


The Future of Post-Hugo Chavez Venezuela in the hands of the Military
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
March 6, 2013
Originally published: http://www.voxxi.com/post-hugo-chavez-venezuela-military/


Hours after the Venezuelan government announced the death of President Hugo Chavez, Rocio San Miguel, the director of the Venezuelan think tank Asociacion Civil Control Ciudadano, tweeted: “Mi mensaje a la FANB: el retorno al carril constitucional,” (“My message to the [Bolivarian Armed Forces]: Return to the constitutional road”). In the coming days and weeks, we will see a plethora of articles and commentaries discussing Chavez’s legacy for both his country and Latin America, since he first came to power in 1999. In addition, we will also undoubtedly read about the options that the transitional government, led by the National Assembly president Diosdado Cabello, has in front of it. The crucial issue now becomes whether new presidential elections will be called for and who will be the winner. Nevertheless, apart from Cabello’s decisions regarding elections, the country’s future will be decided by the actions of the post-Chavez Venezuelan armed forces.

A decade of spending

As a former military officer himself, Hugo Chavez became known for indulging his armed forces, namely through purchasing large quantities of military equipment, particularly from Russia, over several years. For example, the Chavez government purchased Russian tanks, Sukhoi warplanes, AK-103 assault rifles and Dragunov sniper rifles. In January 2013, the Spanish defense news website Infodefensa.com reported the arrival of Russian howitzers to Venezuela. In addition, the country also purchased military aircraft from China and vessels from Spain for coastal patrolling.
Chavez’s goal of beefing up his armed forces seems to have been two-fold. On the one hand, such grandiose expenditures were a quick and easy way to ensure the loyalty of the military’s leadership. In addition, Hugo Chavez appeared to have an obsession with preparing his country for war, specifically a military operation initiated by the U.S., which the late Venezuelan president often referred to as “the empire.” The tense relations between Hugo Chavez and Washington were not his only security-related worry. In March 2008, Venezuela came close to an armed conflict with Colombia, then under the presidency of Alvaro Uribe. The polemic situation emerged after Colombian security forces carried out a military raid in Ecuador against a camp of FARC guerrillas, where some high level rebel leaders (including FARC chief Raul Reyes) were hiding. The problem was that Bogota did not inform Quito of this raid, which left Ecuador’s government to interpret the act as a violation of territorial sovereignty. In response to this situation, Hugo Chavez deployed his military to the border with Colombia as an indicator that he was ready to declare war on Bogota to protect his ally, Rafael Correa. Fortunately, the incident managed to diffuse itself and war was avoided.
Nevertheless, the possibility of a potential conflict with the U.S. either directly or via a proxy, such as Washington ally’s Bogota, seems to have been constantly in Hugo Chavez’s mind. He also created a national militia, with the goal of carrying out a guerrilla-style war against invading troops, should some inter-state conflict erupt. It seems clear that the Venezuelan military was the branch of the country’s government and society in general , which benefited the most from Hugo Chavez’s lengthy rule.

The April 2002 coup and beyond

The aforementioned precedent of Chavez’s generally favorable relationship with the army does not necessarily mean that he enjoyed the support and loyalty of all of his military. During the April 2002 coup that briefly overthrew Chavez from power, a number of dissident military officers were revealed to have supported the coup plotters and swore allegiance to the new government of President Pedro Carmona. Examples of these individuals included National Guard General Carlos Alfonso Martinez, fellow National Guard General Luis Alberto Camacho and Navy Rear Admiral Daniel Comisso Urdaneta. In the years that followed, fallouts and growing discontent with Chavez and his policies increased the number of high ranking military officials that defected and joined the ranks of the country’s opposition. An individual close to the president, General Raul Baduel, who supported Chavez during the April 2002 coup, was sent to a military prison for allegedly stealing government funds. Baduel argues that he was jailed for protesting against some of Hugo Chavez’s decisions.
Nevertheless, in spite of what could be argued were isolated cases, Hugo Chavez seems to have been generally well liked by his armed forces. In past months, while Chavez was ailing in Cuba (after being reelected in the October 2012 elections), the country’s armed forces publicly declared their loyalty to him. Shortly after the president’s death was announced, Venezuelan military chiefs appeared on TV, swearing their loyalty to Vice President Nicolas Maduro, who Chavez had named as his successor when he traveled to Cuba in December.
As part of the research for this commentary, this VOXXI contributor talked with a retired Peruvian army officer about the future of Venezuela and of their armed forces. Like Rocio San Miguel mentions in her tweet, the military officer agreed that the Venezuelan military must respect the constitutional order and remain apolitical, meaning not getting involved in the country’s political system. Unfortunately, as the aforesaid examples demonstrate, the Venezuelan military may have lost its vision of impartiality.

Conclusions

It is assumed that when new elections occur, Maduro would be the Chavista candidate. However, if a non-Chavez figure, such as the opposition leader Henrique Capriles Radonski, is elected as Venezuela’s new president, the country’s military should respect these results and swear their loyalty to the new head of state. Hence, it is a troubling development that the military seems to have already chosen a preferetti (meaning Maduro), and so the question has been raised of how the armed forces would react if an opposition individual emerges victorious.
An apolitical and impartial Venezuelan military may be too much to ask for, since, after over a decade of Chavista rule, the armed forces got used to having a loud and dominating voice in the government. In addition, the military personnel probably have developed an affinity to Hugo Chavez the man, not just the president. Even more, retired military officials currently occupy important civilian posts, such as several governorships of the nation’s regions. Hopefully, this developing situation will not deteriorate into tense civil-military relations in the country; Latin America as a whole has seen enough of those. Like the rest of Latin America, the Venezuelan military will have to learn to live in a post-Hugo Chavez world.


Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/post-hugo-chavez-venezuela-military/#ixzz2Mo8D88BL

COHA: Venezuela’s Foreign Policy Without Chávez: Is this the end of ALBA?


Venezuela's Foreign Policy without Chavez: Is this the end of ALBA?
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
March 5, 2013
Originally published: http://www.coha.org/venezuelas-foreign-policy-without-chavez-is-this-the-end-of-alba/

Hugo Chávez Frias, President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, passed away on March 5, 2013, due to severe health complications. For at least the past year and half, the Venezuelan head of state had been battling cancer that continued to appear in spite of several surgeries. He traveled to Cuba for a new round of treatment this past December 2012, naming his vice president, Nicolas Maduro, as his successor, should the worst happen.
Now, the question is whether Maduro will respect the country’s constitution and call for new presidential elections within the constitutional period of 30 days. The Venezuelan opposition has not yet elected a candidate, though all eyes are on Henrique Capriles Radonski, who ran for and lost to Chávez the presidency in the October 7, 2012 elections. He was reelected as governor of the state of Miranda in the recent December 16 regional elections.
Venezuela has had the same president since 1999, with Chávez creating a very particular foreign policy. A critical question will be how the post-Chávez Venezuelan government will organize its relations and initiatives with other states, and how vastly will they differ from Chávez’s vision.
ALBA
Regarding foreign policy, a critical question is what will become of Chávez’s pet project, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA). This bloc is made up of nations, whose presidents were friendly to Chávez, such as Ecuador’s Rafael Correa and Bolivia’s Evo Morales. President Correa recently said that the revolution was larger than one man and would continue even in the event of Chavez’s death. Nevertheless, it is debatable whether any of ALBA’s heads of state, including Maduro, are charismatic enough and have the same interest in the alliance to keep it afloat. Correa was reelected last month, and Morales is scheduled to run for a new presidential term in 2014. It remains to be seen whether anyone will be able to carry out Chavez’s vision.
Oil and Petrocaribe
Chávez used oil recourses to not only improve the quality of life of poor Venezuelans, but also as an integral part of his foreign policy. After coming to power, he expelled Western oil companies operating in the country and replaced them with Chinese and Russian based companies. In addition, Venezuela donated millions of barrels of oil to needy Caribbean states, particularly Cuba, but also countries like Trinidad and Tobago.
Without Chávez, it is questionable how Venezuela’s oil will be extracted. Should elections be called for and Capriles Radonski comes to power, would he accept, once again, Western oil companies? Furthermore, even if Maduro continues to govern, will Venezuela continue to provide such high quantities of oil, essentially as gifts, to Cuba and other regional states?

The United States
Finally, an important consideration will be the Caracas-Washington relationship in the coming years, having been shaped mainly around the personalities of their leadership in the past decade. For example, U.S.-Venezuela relations were fairly strained, while Chávez and George W. Bush were in power. Chávez went as far as memorably calling Bush “the devil” during a United Nations conference in New York. When Barack Obama was elected president, there was a general feeling that relations would improve. Indeed, Obama and Chávez met during a Summit of the Americas, with both leaders shaking hands and Chávez giving the U.S. head of state a book as a gift. While relations during Chávez and Obama’s first presidential term did not worsen, neither did they improve as desired. One complicated factor was the U.S. maintenance of the Cuban embargo. Chávez regarded Fidel Castro as his mentor. The U.S. also prevented Cuba from attending the April 2012 Summit of the Americas in Colombia, with Cuba’s allies protesting the decision.
Without Chávez, how will Washington-Caracas relations be affected? Obviously, much will have to do with whether Maduro remains in power or Capriles enters the presidency. Maduro may end up not being as hardlined as Chávez, while Capriles may seek improved relations with Washington for economic reasons.
Conclusions
While Venezuela in the post Chávez era will certainly look different than when he was alive, the question is how different. Will Maduro, who rose up the ranks from bus driver to become foreign minister and vice president, remain faithful to his mentor’s socialist vision? Or will Capriles, or another opposition candidate, win the presidency and take the country in a different direction, potentially making it resemble Venezuela’s pre Chávez era?
A critical aspect of Venezuela’s post Chávez government is how its foreign policy will be structured. During his tenure, Chávez determined much of Venezuela’s foreign policies in accordance with his ideologies. It will be of interest to see whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its diplomatic corps will have more impact on future policies.
W. Alejandro Sanchez,  Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs
Please accept this article as a free contribution from COHA, but if re-posting, please afford authorial and institutional attribution. Exclusive rights can be negotiated.
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