Thursday, February 28, 2019

The Diplomat: The Significance of Kazakhstan’s Growing Role in Peacekeeping Operations


"The Significance of Kazakhstan’s Growing Role in Peacekeeping Operations"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
The Diplomat
Crossroads Asia
1 March, 2019
Originally published: https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/the-significance-of-kazakhstans-growing-role-in-peacekeeping-operations/

The government of Kazakhstan has announced that Kazakh peacekeepers will be deployed to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) by the end of April; the troops will replace the first-ever major contingent of Kazakh peacekeepers deployed this past October. This is an important development as the Central Asian state firmly joins the ranks of contributors to UN peace missions.
 
Kazakhstan has participated in UN peace missions for several years, but it has been at a very low scale. Until last year’s deployment to Lebanon, Kazakh participation exclusively consisted of a small number of either experts on mission or police officers, particularly to the UN mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO). The October 2018 arrival of 120 Kazakh troops to UNIFIL, thus, was the country’s first ever significant contingent of troops to UN missions. 

This growing role in UN peace operations is part of Astana’s objective to increase its international image. For example, Kazakhstan held one of the rotating seats of the UN Security Council in 2017-2018, the first Central Asian nation to do so. It held the UNSC’s rotating presidency in January 2018.

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Friday, February 22, 2019

Providence: Venezuela: How Far Will Nicolás Maduro Go to Stay in Power?


"Venezuela: How Far Will Nicolás Maduro Go to Stay in Power?"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Providence Magazine
22 February 2019
Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2019/02/venezuela-how-far-will-nicolas-maduro-go-to-stay-in-power/


The date February 23 will be remembered as the showdown between Venezuelan interim President Juan Guaidó against de facto President Nicolás Maduro, as the latter seeks to remain in power at all costs.

President Guaidó has announced that on that day, humanitarian aid will enter the country and be distributed among citizens in need; meanwhile, Maduro has labeled this aid as a “show” and “breadcrumbs,” since accepting it would hurt his grip on power. Controlling access to food and other basic necessities has become the Maduro regime’s ultimate tactic to retain control of the South American nation.

Guaidó’s Pledge
The political crisis in Venezuela is overshadowed by its socioeconomic crisis. Between three and four million Venezuelans have fled the country already, while those who remain have had to adapt to a shortage of food, medicine, and other basic necessities—hospitals are also suffering a lack of staff, equipment, and medical supplies. Interim President Guaidó has sought to remedy this turning to the international community for assistance. In a January 24 letter to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the interim head of state asked the US to send “food, medicine, and medical supplies, and perhaps…a hospital ship [presumably the USS Comfort]” to Venezuela.

At the time of this writing, various US Air Force C-17 aircraft have transported humanitarian aid from Homestead Air Reserve Base, Florida, to Cúcuta, Colombia. According to a statement by USAID, the first wave of deliveries has food kits that include oil, flour, lentils, and rice; hygiene kits; nutritional supplements, known as Ready-toUse Supplementary Food; energy cookies and medicine.

Cúcuta is right next to the border with Venezuela, where Maduro infamously ordered to block with trucks and containers an international bridge (Puente Internacional Tienditas) that crosses the Tachira River to prevent any type of crossing. It appears that on February 23, trucks carrying the humanitarian aid will attempt to cross this bridge.

How Far Will Maduro Go to Stay in Power
The Maduro regime has realized that they need to do something to help the Venezuelan people, given how the government has driven the economy to the ground. Hence, the Venezuelan government has reportedly acquired medicine from its few remaining allies, like Cuba, China, and Russia. However, for the population to acquire these goods the price to pay, apart from money, is loyalty. Namely, the Venezuelan government has issued a special ID, known as “homeland card” (Carnet de la Patria in Spanish). The card is used as a type of population control, as it is required to vote and access “food, hygiene items, and subsidized school scholarships,” as well as gasoline.

Even more, the Maduro regime is also resorting to scare tactics so that the population looks at Guaidó and his international supporters with fear, if not hate. Recently, (de facto) Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez declared via state TV that the food the US is trying to deliver to Venezuelans is contaminated, poisoned, and even cancerous. She went on to declare that the food could be regarded as “biological weapons.” Ridiculous statements like these demonstrate that the Maduro regime has thrown logic out the window and is focused on staying in power via fear and control.

What could happen on February 23?
As of this writing, Maduro has declared that he will not allow the border to be opened so that trucks with humanitarian aid can enter on February 23. After all, accepting this humanitarian aid would undermine his regime’s control of the country, as the assistance is coming from Guaidó and the US. Never mind that this assistance would help Venezuelans in dire need. Thus, it comes as no surprise that during a recent visit to Washington, DC, President Iván Duque Márquez of Colombia declared that “blockading international humanitarian aid, for me, is a crime against humanity.”

The key issue will be the behavior of two actors, the Venezuelan armed forces, and the general population. While many senior military leaders and troops continue to follow Maduro’s orders, there have been a plethora of defections as well as arrests of many military officers, which the regime accuses of being coup plotters. The great unknown is whether the border guards will defy Maduro, remove the blockade, and allow the trucks with humanitarian aid to enter, or follow Maduro’s ludicrous order.

As for the population, their anger against the Maduro regime is as palpable as ever. For example, on February 17 Pableysa Ostos, a journalist for Venezuelan daily El Nacional, uploaded a short video of a Venezuelan citizen arguing with a self-described “Chavista” who was in charge of delivering gas cylinders to a neighborhood. The individual proclaims, “Maduro is over, the hunger is over.”

Final Thoughts
In January, Nicolás Maduro lost the legal right to be called President of Venezuela, as his presidential term came to an end. The actions he is carrying out nowadays—the repression, his clinging to power, the socioeconomic mess that he prolongs by staying in the Palacio de Miraflores, and the food and health crisis that continues to affect the Venezuelan population—makes Nicolas Maduro morally unfit to be the president of Venezuela.


Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Wednesday, February 20, 2019

Monday, February 18, 2019

International Policy Digest: Burkina Faso and U.S. DC National Guard Sign Partnership

"Burkina Faso and U.S. DC National Guard Sign Partnership"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez and Scott Morgan
International Policy Digest
18 February, 2018
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2019/02/18/burkina-faso-and-u-s-dc-national-guard-sign-partnership/

The District of Columbia National Guard and the National Armed Forces of Burkina Faso signed a partnership agreement on 1 February. This initiative occurs under the Department of Defense’s State Partnership Program (SPP) which brings together different National Guards with U.S. partners around the world. The deal occurs at a critical moment as violence in the landlocked African state intensifies.

State Partnerships
“The SPP evolved from a 1991 U.S. European Command decision to set up the Joint Contact Team Program in the Baltic Region with Reserve component Soldiers and Airmen,” the National Guard’s website explains. It is aimed at providing “an equally beneficial relationship between armed forces of partnering U.S. National Guard states and foreign nations.”

According to a 4 February press release by the U.S. Army, Burkina Faso is the 76th nation to join this program, while the DC Guard now has partnerships with two nations, the Caribbean island of Jamaica, and the aforementioned African nation.

The U.S. Army’s press release added that the DC Guard-Burkina Faso partnership will cover areas such as “homeland defense and security, disaster mitigation and response, consequence and crisis management, inter-agency cooperation, border, port, and aviation security, fellowship-style internships, and combat medical events.” The first initiative between the two sides will be a trip by DC Guard soldiers and airmen who will participate in Exercise Flintlock, which is directed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and sponsored by U.S. Africa Command.

Nowadays there are partnerships between the Guard and U.S. allies around the world. A total of 14 African states have established partnerships with the U.S. National guard; for example, Benin teamed up North Dakota, Botswana teamed up with North Carolina, Djibouti teamed up with Kentucky, and Ghana teamed up with North Dakota. According to U.S. Africa Command, “in the fiscal year 2018, the National Guard conducted more than 100 State Partnership Program events in support of USAFRICOM’s security cooperation objectives. These events involved more than 3,000 partner nation personnel.”

Burkina Faso’s Growing Importance to the U.S.
In addition to the SPP, Burkina Faso is also partners with the United States under the Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Program. This program was launched in 2005 by the State Department to expand on the previously operational Pan Sahel Initiative that began shortly after the attacks of 9/11. The Sahel as a whole has presented unique challenges not only to the United States but also to its partners in the EU as well, the migrant crisis is a prime example of this complex situation. This has led to efforts by the Europeans to get involved with other states in the region such as Mali and Niger to undertake similar endeavors.

The United States has had a history of warm relations with Burkina Faso since they gained independence from France under the name of Upper Volta in 1960. The role of the US during the crucial transitional period during 2014-15 after the overthrow of the Compare Presidency has been regarded as a positive influence by the Burkinbe as a whole when viewing the reliability of the United States as a partner.

The recent spike of insurgent attacks in the region over the last few years has caused great concern over regional stability. So far efforts to restore democratic ideals in Mali and the focus to support the Government in Niger seems to have created some thought that Burkina Faso was being ignored by AFRICOM and other major decision makers.

This relationship can actually put to rest three key criticisms that have been levied against previous administrations. First that the approach by the United States towards certain partners can be seen as heavy-handed. Secondly, it also disproves the notion that for the most part the United States is only concerned with access to natural resources as has been seen in other parts of the world and finally this is not a ‘democracy building operation.”

Final Thoughts
The State Partnership with the DC National Guard and growing relations with AFRICOM cannot come too soon as violence in the West African state continues. In January there were a series of attacks attacking the Gold Industry. In these series of incidents foreign nationals were targeted and appeared to be an omen of future events. Moreover, in mid-February, the AFP reported that a doctor was killed and two police officers were wounded in the northern part of the country when a “ bomb hidden in a corpse dressed in military uniform,” exploded. Prime Minister Paul Kaba Thieba and other ministers resigned in January, apparently in response to their inability to deal with violence and kidnappings.

Right now, the government and the armed forces of Burkina Faso can use all the international aid they can get to bring peace to the landlocked country.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not reflect those of any institutions with which the author are associated.

Friday, February 8, 2019

Defence iQ: Is heavy armour obsolete? The view from Latin America


"Is heavy armour obsolete? The view from Latin America"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez and Samuel Casey
Defence iQ
7 February, 2019
 Originally published: https://www.defenceiq.com/armoured-vehicles/articles/is-heavy-armour-obsolete-the-view-from-latin-america


Defence iQ has recently hosted the International Armored Vehicle event and one of the big takeaways was the focus on mobility and modularity for tomorrows armoured vehicles. So, we ask: “Is the tank becoming obsolete for today's battlefields?”

For the U.S, military planners will have to reconsider their procurement needs in the near future in the context of U.S. security concerns and the likelihood that urban warfare will become more common over the next decade. However, what is the view from the Latin American perspective?

Latin American nations are decommissioning outdated models and replacing them with more modern machines. For example, Brazil is undergoing a modernisation program, which includes the revitalization of M60 combat vehicles, Leopard 1A1 and M113 armoured vehicles, greatly enhancing the effectiveness of its two tank battalions. 

Furthermore, Brazil recently donated a number of tanks to Uruguay.  Future acquisitions also need to take into account regional geopolitics, the likelihood of war and the technology of armoured vehicles itself. What is the future of heavy armour in Latin America?

Lessons from recent conflicts in Latin America

The last inter-state war between two Latin American states was the short 1995 border conflict between Ecuador and Peru. Other regional conflicts in the post-World War II era were the Falklands/Malvinas war between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982; the 1981 border conflict between Ecuador and Peru; and the 1969 Soccer War between El Salvador and Honduras.

Meanwhile, the U.S. military’s most recent interventions in the region were in Haiti in 1994 (Operation Uphold Democracy) and in Panama in 1989 (Operation Just Cause).

While there are ongoing border disputes (e.g. Bolivia and Chile or Guyana and Venezuela) and tensions (mostly coming out of Venezuela these days), security threats in the region are generally insurgent in nature. For example, terrorist movements like Colombia’s ELN and EPL, Peru’s Shining Path, or Paraguay’s EPP; narco-cartels in Mexico; or organised gangs such as the Maras in Central America or the Primero Comando da Capital in Brazil. These entities are highly mobile and operate in isolated regions or in urban areas.

Recent Tank Acquisitions in Latin America

Latin American governments continue to acquire new (or used) platforms for their armed forces, but heavy armour is not purchased particularly often.  Some recent deals worth noting are:
  • In December 2018, the Brazilian Army completed the transfer of 25 M41C light tanks to the Uruguayan army. “Of the 25 vehicles, 15 were completely refurbished by Brazil while the remaining 10 will be used for parts. Those that will remain intact will be assigned to armoured infantry units, which currently use M24 light tanks,” Jane’s explains.
  • In 2016, Russia delivered 50 T-72B1 tanks to Nicaragua. The platforms are “an upgrade of the 1970s-era main battle tank and feature explosive reactive armour and thermal weapon sights, among other improvements.”
  • Venezuela has received a plethora of Russian weaponry over the past couple of decades, though these deals have been quite scarce in recent years due to Caracas’ financial crisis. Amongst the acquisitions are T-72 tanks, as well as infantry fighting vehicles like the BMP-3M, and an array of transport vehicles.

"Latin American governments continue to acquire new (or used) platforms for their armed forces, but heavy armour is not purchased particularly often"

As for other nations, while no other major sales have occurred, there are ongoing reports about armoured vehicles in need of modernization or replacement. For example, Chile possesses Leopard 2A4 tanks, and it will be interesting if they will be upgraded anytime soon, given that the Chilean government is replacing the famous Copper Law, which helps fund the Ministry of Defence. Meanwhile, Peru has yet to find a replacement for its old T-55 tanks, while Ecuador recently upgraded several AML and M113 A2 Plus armoured vehicles, as the country does not possess heavy armour.

As for Mexico, its fleet consists of light and medium armoured vehicles. Finally, Colombia also possesses light armoured vehicles; for example, media reports published in late January show vehicles that appear to be the EE-09 Cascavel, a 6x6 light tank, on patrol in urban areas close to the border with Venezuela.

Latin American Armoured Vehicle Requirements 

The intrastate conflict that has plagued many Latin American countries is one of the strongest drivers for defence spending.  Many countries continue to acquire new (or refurbished) platforms, such as Brazil’s new carrier Atlantico, Chile’s new Sikorsky S-70i Blackhawk helicopters, Argentina’s used AB-206 helicopters, or Mexico’s new patrol vessel Reformador. As for Peru, the Andean state has commenced the construction of a second landing platform vessel, BAP Paita. However, when it comes to heavy armour (or even medium armour) new contracts have been quite scarce in recent years.

One argument in favour of procuring heavy armour is so that nations can maintain minimal deterrence capabilities. While interstate warfare is very unlikely, it does not mean that the scenario is impossible. The Venezuelan government’s behaviour, particularly during the 2008 crisis in the Andes is an example of this ever-present possibility. Nevertheless, given the region’s current peaceful status, limited defence budgets and other security threats, it is understandable that regional governments have other priorities. Moreover, the focus for Latin American governments is the acquisition of multipurpose platforms, which can be utilized not solely for war.

This is exemplified by the new vessels the region is acquiring (or domestically manufacturing) which can be utilized for military and peaceful operations, such as combating maritime crimes (like illegal fishing) and transporting supplies to areas affected by natural disasters. Helicopters can similarly be utilized to transport medical personnel and supplies to remote areas after disasters occur, not just troops.

As for armour, personnel carriers have been recently utilized in Brazil and Peru as part of emergency and support operations to help civilian populations. It is their flexibility to have multiple uses that makes them attractive to civilian and military leaders alike. The problem with heavy armour is that it is difficult for the main battle tank to have another use other than what it was designed for. “A tank cannot carry humanitarian assistance, so it is difficult for us to convince our civilian leaders of the need to buy new ones in times of peace,” explained a Latin American military officer interviewed by the authors.

Nevertheless, when it comes to armoured vehicles, just like any other system, it is important to have a vision of the future and to carry out a cost-benefit analysis regarding weapons acquisition. In terms of life-cycle cost, it is more expensive and difficult to maintain heavy tanks that were designed in the 1950s-1970s, than to repair more modern equipment. Purchasing a tank is not a one-time payment, as this platform demands continual upgrades of its systems, armour, chassis, and weapons. This can often spiral and stakeholders become politically and financially tethered to projects making them hard to abandon. 

A great example of this is the modernization process of the M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks for the US and the Challenger 2 for the UK.  However, vehicles that were designed in the 1950s and 1960s have incredibly low survivability compared to modern assets. Even though Latin American governments may not want to upgrade their heavy armour, it may be financially advisable.

Geography is also an issue that influences the procurement of heavy weaponry. In spite of technological advances that make modern tanks able to operate in harsher conditions, it is difficult to justify the use of the main battle tank in insurgency operations. Brazilian, Colombian or Peruvian policymakers would traditionally use a combined force of infantry, light armoured vehicles and helicopters. 

As for urban warfare, light armour seems to be the norm, and, as previously mentioned, the Colombian army sent 6x6 light armoured vehicles in a routine operation through a Colombian town in late January. Light 8x8 armoured personnel carriers were also utilized in Rio de Janeiro as part of the Brazilian armed forces’ operations to combat criminal gangs in the city’s shantytowns (known as favelas). In these instances, The authors have been unable to find any incidents of explosives, such as rocket-propelled grenades, that were utilized against these platforms, however, this is an obvious concern. Theoretically heavy armoured could have been utilized in some of the wider streets though.

Lastly, we must remember that mobility has become a key requirement. If a tank is utilized in a cavalry role, it must be fast to deploy and able to pry open the enemy lines.

However, in a "rapid action response" scenarios that often faces many Latin American states, the main battle tank is unable to give commanders the ability to react to crises in remote areas with a flexible set of capabilities that can be tailored to the situation.

Similarly,  a command vehicle must be able to move about relatively unnoticed so as to not draw fire. Finally,  if a tank is used to strengthen a position, it must be tough enough and hit hard enough to win the fight. If a vehicle can’t manoeuvre because it is highly visible, or too slow to break contact then the effect is the same: your opponents locate you and bad things happen. Designing your system to be mobile enough to accomplish your mission is an absolute necessity.

Final Thoughts

Armour can be versatile, but going forward in the Latin American theatre, given the region’s clear-and-present dangers, it is difficult to make case for the acquisition of heavy armour in comparison to light platforms. Platforms with higher tactical and strategic mobility can be deployed in constrictive urban areas, or other assets that have multipurpose uses, such as personnel carriers, helicopters or ships.

Latin American countries need armoured vehicles that fit their own unique requirements. As financial and political will is often scarce, investing in new main battle tanks can be hard to justify as a more pop allocation of resources on a system that is singular in use and cannot adequately combat the most pressing threats.

While military cautions about being prepared to protect sovereignty against a country or group of countries, it rightfully remains primarily focused on more realistic security challenges, and to meet these challenges a mobile that is able to engage in non-traditional conflicts is needed.

About the Authors:
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military and cybersecurity issues. 

Samuel Casey has been an enlisted soldier in the South Carolina Army National Guard for eight years. He has his undergraduate degree in Intelligence and National Security Studies from Coastal Carolina University and works as a Contractor in Charleston, SC.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not reflect those of any institutions with which the author are associated.





Thursday, February 7, 2019

Providence: Don’t Call it a Coup: Venezuela, Maduro, and the Crisis of Legitimacy


"Don’t Call it a Coup: Venezuela, Maduro, and the Crisis of Legitimacy"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Providence Magazine
5 February, 2019
Originally published:  https://providencemag.com/2019/02/dont-call-it-a-coup-venezuela-maduro-and-the-crisis-of-legitimacy/


The international community is picking sides in the ongoing governmental crisis in Venezuela, a South American nation that currently has two presidents: interim President Juan Guaidó, who is recognized by several Latin American nations, Australia, Georgia, and the US to name a few; and President Nicolás Maduro, who is supported by the governments of Bolivia, China, Cuba, Russia, among others.

Washington’s support for interim President Guaidó has prompted accusations that the US government is, once again, supporting a coup in a Latin American state. For example, at a January 29 event with Guaidó’s special representative to the Organization of American States (OAS), Gustavo Tarre at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, three Code Pink protesters interrupted the conference, shouting that the US was orchestrating a coup in Caracas. Hence, it is important to clarify that what is happening in Venezuela is not a coup.

How We Ended Up Here
Venezuela held elections in 2013 following the death of then-President Hugo Chávez. Maduro, acting president at the time, was elected for a full presidential term. Then, in 2015, the country held parliamentary elections in which, for the first time in over a decade, the anti-Maduro opposition gained control of this legislative body. Maduro and his allies would then attempt to discredit or limit the National Assembly’s powers. For example, in 2017 the Venezuelan Supreme Court, made up of pro-Maduro judges, stripped the Assembly of its powers, though it eventually reversed its decision. The regime would then create a National Constituent Assembly (NCA)—based on Articles 347-349 of the 1999 constitution—filled with Maduro supporters to draft a new constitution and to, by default, replace the National Assembly. This is an important fact as there are now two legislative bodies, as well as two presidents, in Venezuela.

Fast forward to May 2018, when Venezuela held presidential elections once again as Maduro’s 2013–18 term was coming to an end. This electoral process has been heavily critiqued by the international community due to the lack of international observers and the fact that opposition parties, except for one candidate, boycotted the elections. Voter turnout was similarly low. Maduro won these elections, and on January 10 he was inaugurated for a presidential term, from 2019–23.

Here is where things get complicated: the opposition-led National Assembly continued to exist, even though Maduro favored the National Constituent Assembly. Decisions made by the Constituent Assembly are regarded as illegitimate by the opposition and by the anti-Maduro international community. For example, in late-May 2018, Maduro took the oath of office in front of the National Constituent Assembly and was inaugurated this past January in front of the NCA as well, not the National Assembly, as stated in Article 231 of the constitution.

Because the opposition-controlled National Assembly does not recognize the elections and the NCA, Juan Guaidó, as president of the National Assembly, was named interim president on January 23. This move is supported by Article 233 of the Venezuelan constitution, which states that “pending election and inauguration of the new President, the President of the National Assembly shall take charge of the Presidency of the Republic.”

Discussion
The main issues here are whether the May 2018 elections can be considered democratic and which legislative organism has validity, the National Assembly or the National Constituent Assembly. Pro-Maduro supporters recognize the elections as fair; hence, he is the rightful president of the country. Anti-Maduro supporters, obviously, state that this is not the case.

As with any crisis, an important fact to keep in mind is whether there is a foreign power involved. In Venezuela’s case, the Maduro regime and its supporters argue that they are the victims of an economic war orchestrated by Washington and that the US and Colombia are trying to overthrow Maduro. Case in point, the two governments were accused of organizing a bizarre August 2018 incident in which an explosion was labeled by Caracas as an assassination attempt against Maduro via a drone attack.

To be fair, the US, just like other global powers, has a long history of involvement in the domestic affairs of other nations to protect its interests, including regime change. Moreover, US media reports have mentioned that Washington officials have met with anti-Maduro Venezuelan military officers to discuss possible coups.

With that said, the government of interim President Guaidó in Venezuela is not a coup, but rather the result of following the law as stated by Venezuela’s 1999 constitution, which ironically was drafted by Hugo Chávez upon taking power. It is ludicrous to regard the 2018 elections as free, fair, or democratic, and the swear-in ceremony did not occur in front of the National Assembly, as stated by the constitution, but rather in front of the National Constituent Assembly. Hence, Maduro’s term ended on January 9, and Guaidó became interim president.

Final Thoughts
Venezuela currently has two heads of state: President Maduro is the de facto leader, as his allies continue to control the armed forces, supreme court, the National Constituent Assembly, the electoral commission, among other state agencies. Meanwhile, interim President Guaidó is the de jure leader but controls no territory or institutions other than the National Assembly.
A plethora of nouns can be utilized to describe the situation in Venezuela, but “coup” is not one of them.
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues. He tweets at @W_Alex_Sanchez.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Tuesday, February 5, 2019

Interviewed in: The buckle on the Belt and Road

"The buckle on the Belt and Road"



https://www.asianaffairs.in/magazine/the-buckle-on-the-belt-and-road/

Kazakhstan’s friendship with China has been rewarded with massive investment, and the Central Asian nation now regards itself as the buckle on the Belt and Road trade route connecting China with its lucrative European market. As trade flows Kazakhstan’s economy is growing but, contend Duncan Bartlett and Alice Jackson, there’s a long way to go before it achieves its goal of becoming a modern, middle-income country

Kazakhstan’s railways are a proud symbol of its ambition to be at the centre of international trade. One could, if one wished, travel by train from the Dzungarian Gate on its Eastern border, all the way down south to China’s prosperous Yangtze region. Or one could go several thousand kilometres westwards to the German city of Duisburg, the world’s largest inland port.

Only a few privileged people undertake such epic journeys. They are usually seated in the cabin of locomotives, which pull lengthy goods trains from China to Europe. About 40 such trains pass through Kazakhstan each week, a halfway point on a journey which takes about a fortnight to complete. A similar trip by sea takes more than a month. That places Kazakhstan in a strategic position, at the centre of one of the world’s most important trade routes.

Chinese money

As a result, Chinese investment has flowed into Kazakhstan, funding railway tracks, stations, landports and depots. At the same time, people-to-people relations have deepened: many ethnic Chinese have moved to Kazakhstan and many Kazakhs live in China.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military and cybersecurity issues, says: ‘Because of its unique geographical position, Kazakhstan has to conduct a careful foreign policy. It is far from Europe and far from the United States. It has a border with China on one side and a border with Russia on the other, so it must balance relations with Beijing and Moscow carefully. It cannot afford to antagonise either global power.’

Power broker

Kazakhstan is the world’s biggest producer of uranium, the key component of nuclear power generators and nuclear weapons. That provides plenty of customers but it is the Chinese who offer the prized investment money.

The country’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev makes frequent visits to Beijing to meet with his counterpart Xi Jinping. With the aim of Kazakhstan being among the world’s 30 most developed countries by 2050, he hopes that the Chinese investment will help boost the economy and lift the income of his citizens to similar levels enjoyed by people living in central Europe.

It is predicted that Kazakh GDP will grow by around 4 percent this year. While the poverty level is low, income inequality is marked, particularly between the wealthy urban elite and the rural poor.

Learning opportunity

The President has pledged to raise spending on healthcare, science and education, and there will be a particular focus on learning English. Schools are now teaching children to write using Latin letters as well as the Cyrillic alphabet, which should make life easier for users of computers, particularly people who write code.

Alongside greater educational achievement comes greater aspiration. The country is trying to avoid a brain drain. Its Vice Minister for Labour and Social Protection, Nurzhan Altayev, has said that although migration is not a major problem, in a nation of 18 million citizens– and with global aspirations – it is important to encourage people, particularly the young,to commit to life in their home country.

The government has established a scholarship programme, called Bolashak, which enables bright students to travel abroad to study for four years – after which they must promise to return home and use their talents to serve the country.

The Russian factor

Kazakhstan’s rich natural resources include not just uranium but also considerable reserves of oil, coal and natural gas, alongside significant deposits of zinc and lead. As it has limited capacity to process any of these materials domestically it relies on other countries to buy the commodities and refine them. Russia has long been a key economic partner in this process and the Russian language is widely understood.

Yet Kazakhstan is keen to diversify beyond the extractive industries. As former Foreign Minister Roman Vassilenko noted: ‘As we seek to further modernise, we naturally need to strengthen our efforts to attract a diversified range of foreign investments and technologies as part of mutually beneficial partnerships.’

President Nazarbayev encourages further market-oriented reforms. He also tries to balance the quest for modernisation with his effort to maintain warm relations with both the Russians and the Chinese. Domestically, he faces no significant political opposition and his autocratic approach constrains press criticism. However, at 78 years of age, he may not be able to maintain complete control for much longer.

According to Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, ‘It is widely speculated that this could be President Nazarbayev’s last term in power and there is even talk of early elections. The question is whether his successor will be handpicked, and how this future leader will shape Kazakhstan’s domestic and foreign policies and priorities.’

Mr Sanchez also asks whether the next President will be as committed to reform as Mr Nazarbayev. ‘Will the person who follows him stick to the modernisation goals, or will they take a 180-degree turn and follow a completely different approach?’

The most likely outcome is that whoever takes power after President Nazarbayev will pledge to spur further economic development, as well as to burnish the country’s internal image.

‘In a sense the country has been very successful,’ says Mr Sanchez,‘considering where it came from following independence in the early 1990s. There’s a great deal of stability and there is also patriotic pride in being Kazakhstani. Whenever I talk to my friends, they are always keen to point to their homeland’s numerous achievements in the past couple of decades.’


The researcher on this article was Alice Jackson, an MA graduate from the University of Sussex, specialising in geopolitics and grand strategy, East Asian economic development, and postcolonial critical theory. She also holds a BA in Geography from the University of Leicester, with specific focus on identity theory and the production of culture within space. 

Duncan Bartlett is the Editor of Asian Affairs and a former BBC correspondent



Friday, February 1, 2019

Providence: How Should the US Deal with the Congo’s President Tshisekedi?

"How Should the US Deal with the Congo’s President Tshisekedi?"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Providence Magazine
1 February, 2019
Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2019/02/how-should-the-us-deal-with-the-congos-president-tshisekedi/


President Félix Tshisekedi was sworn in as the new president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on January 24, days after the country’s Constitutional Court rejected an appeal against the results of the controversial December 30 elections. Though not free of controversy, this marks the first peaceful transfer of power in the DRC and should also mark the end of the Kabila dynasty.

While originally silent about the electoral results, the US government ultimately congratulated the new Congolese government. It will be important to monitor the future of Kinshasa-Washington relations in the post-Kabila era.

Results and Responses
After many delays, the DRC held elections on December 30—they were originally supposed to occur in 2016 and most recently on December 23, 2018. According to the Independent National Election Commission, Tshisekedi received 38.5 percent of the vote, compared with Martin Fayulu’s 34.7 percent and ruling coalition candidate Emmanuel Shadary’s 23.8 percent, the BBC explains. Fayulu protested the results, stating that he is the rightful winner and that President Tshisekedi’s victory was the result of an agreement between him and now former-President Joseph Kabila so that the latter can maintain his influence over the Congolese government.

Fayulu appealed against the election’s results, claiming that they were rigged, while the influential Catholic Church in the DRC stated that its own electoral observers made it clear that Tshisekedi was not the winner. There were also protests against President Tshisekedi’s victory, though not as widespread and violent as in previous years. In any case, the protests, accusations, and allegations did not stop the swear-in ceremony, and President Tshisekedi is now in control of the massive and resource-rich African nation.

What Should Washington Do Now?
A US State Department press release published on January 23 congratulated President Tshisekedi’s victory, saluting a peaceful and democratic transfer of power and even congratulated former-President Kabila for ceding power. Nevertheless, there was a small caveat to the statement, as the communiqué encouraged “the government to include a broad representation of Congo’s political stakeholders and to address reports of electoral irregularities.” This sentence can be regarded as a continuation of a January 16 press release, which declared that “the United States will hold accountable those who perpetrate election violence or undermine democratic processes.” It goes without saying that the government has little interest to review the results of the elections.

With President Tshisekedi now in power, the question is what will Washington’s policy be toward the new regime. Trade between the two countries is quite limited: according to the US Office of the Trade Representative, US goods exports to the DRC in 2017 were $76 million, while US goods imports from the country totaled $86 million. Foreign direct investment is similarly low, at around $76 million.

The real problem was that the lengthy Kabila regime was well known for its corrupt practices. This prompted the US Department of the Treasury and its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to impose sanctions on various Congolese individuals, ranging from policymakers to senior security officers. Of course, these sanctions did not deter the Kabila regime from staying in power for over a decade and a half.

Thus, the election of a new president gives Washington and Kinshasa an opportunity to restart. The Congolese leader has promised to release all political prisoners, which would be a positive first step at improving relations. Also important is that any cabinet members in the Tshisekedi administration are not under OFAC sanctions. Experts on the DRC whom the author interviewed highlighted that they are hopeful Washington will get along well with the new government, particularly as the new president is from the opposition and was not the Kabila-supported candidate. While this is true, we will have to see how President Tshisekedi deals with the former regime, particularly as Kabila’s Common Front for Congo (FCC) coalition has a parliamentary majority, meaning the next prime minister will come from the pro-Kabila coalition, as AfricaNews explains.

Final Thoughts
The Democratic Republic of Congo is a complicated country, not just because of the recent elections but also due to the nation’s other challenges, such as violence in the eastern provinces and a deadly outbreak of Ebola, not to mention the ever-present poverty and corruption.

After delayed and controversial elections and a less than ideal inauguration ceremony, there is a head of state in the DRC whose last name is not Kabila. This is a historic milestone in itself. The international community, in particular the US government, which has placed many sanctions on Congolese officials, will be closely monitoring whether this change of the guard in the African nation is anything to be hopeful about.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military. and cybersecurity issues. @W_Alex_Sanchez. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.