"Colombia and the FARC: Problems with Creating Peace"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Providence Magazine: A Journal of Christianity and American Foreign Policy
18 December 2017
Originally published:
https://providencemag.com/2017/12/colombia-and-the-farc-problems-with-creating-peace/
The peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia:
FARC) is slightly over a year old, and while the peace is holding and
violence has dramatically decreased, there are a number of issues that
will continue to be a concern from a practical and moral perspective.
This commentary will briefly discuss some of them.
The “Missing” Insurgents
Any peace agreement that includes full demobilization must ensure
that all insurgents lay down their weapons and return to civilian life.
The first part of demobilization appears to have been achieved, as the
United Nations mission in Colombia has overseen the FARC’s disarmament:
7,132 weapons have been retrieved from the insurgents.
The outstanding issue is the fate of the insurgents themselves. The
number of FARC insurgents who surrendered via the peace deal and are now
in camps is reportedly
around 6,900.
One major concern, obviously, is that if the demobilized insurgents are
not reintegrated fast enough into civilian life, they may feel inclined
to return to criminal activities. In fact, according to late-October
reports by the Colombian media,
some 800 fighters
have not agreed to the peace deal and continue their illegal, violent
activities (the number may actually be higher depending on what
Colombian news outlets are consulted).
This situation is not new: last decade Bogota brokered a peace
agreement with the paramilitary movement United Self-Defense Forces of
Colombia (
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia: AUC). In a scenario
similar to what is occurring today, many paramilitaries demobilized, but
a number went on to create narco-criminal gangs (commonly known as
Bandas Criminales: BACRIM), like the
dreaded Aguilas Negras. The obvious fear is that the situation could repeat itself once again with the FARC.
Peace Over Victory
Another issue with the peace agreement is an ethical one: if the
Colombian government was able to successfully bring an end to a
five-decade war via peaceful means, did it not have the moral obligation
to do so and prevent further loss of life?
At this point, it is worth mentioning a couple of facts about the
FARC: its number of fighters has drastically diminished, from a high of
an estimated 16,000 in the late 1990s to around 7,000 today (not
counting those in prison). Nevertheless, in recent years the group
maintained its fighting power, regularly attacked security units (
11 soldiers were killed in an ambush in 2015), and protected its territory while profiting from drug trafficking and
“taxing” mining companies, among other activities.
Certainly, an argument could be made that, since the FARC leadership
was open to dialogue, this probably meant that they saw themselves on
the losing side of the war. Thus, the Colombian military could argue
that the agreement was unnecessary as they could have defeated the FARC
militarily if the war had continued. With that said, there was no real
indication, at least from the author’s perspective, that the Colombian
security and defense forces were close to dealing a devastating blow to
the FARC when negotiations commenced in 2012. If anything, the FARC
proved to be adaptable, able to overcome the loss of its leadership
(e.g. the controversial
2008 airstrike in Ecuador
that killed FARC leader Raul Reyes) and to continue fighting. The
Colombian defense forces could have, probably, militarily defeated the
FARC, but it would have certainly taken years with further loss of life
for both sides as well as civilians—the conflict has already cost an
estimated
220,000 deaths between 1958-2012, according to Colombian statistics.
Since a government’s primary duty is to protect its citizens, and
there was no clear indication that the FARC could be militarily defeated
in the near future without further significant loss of life (including
civilian), there is a moral argument to be made in favor of the peace
agreement.
Peace Over Justice?
Colombians have also had to deal with whether the peace agreement
signifies amnesty for the insurgents. According to media reports citing
Colombian government data, Bogota has granted amnesty to so some
6,000 FARC fighters
as of July 2017, while 1,400 have been released from prison and granted
conditional liberty. As part of the peace process, the FARC fighters
were (only?) accused of crimes such as illegally carrying weapons and
military uniforms, not actually taking part in attacks or murders, and
they had to sign documents stating that they will not carry out any
criminal activities again.
Understandably, there is debate about whether individuals accused of
murder or drug trafficking have been given amnesty too as part of the
peace agreement. For example, there are conflicting reports about
whether a
FARC leader, known as Jesús Santrich, has been granted amnesty.
Certainly, the fact that most insurgents will not serve jail time (or
be released from it) is a bitter development to those who fought the
FARC or suffered due to it. On the other hand, it would be absurd to
believe that any insurgent movement would have agreed to demobilize in
exchange for its members serving (lengthy) prison sentences.
The amnesty, a
minimum government salary for a number of months, and representation in congress with
10 guaranteed seats—the
FARC is now a political party—is
the price the Colombian government had to pay for the peace. An
insurgent movement like the FARC had to have some “wins” in order to be
convinced to be demobilized, and the government’s challenge has been to
find a balance between how much the FARC could get in exchange for peace
and how much was ethically (and politically) acceptable to grant.
Final Thoughts
The issues discussed here are some of the most problematic Colombia
faces regarding the post-conflict era. Certainly, there are others, such
as the fate of land controlled by the FARC and if it will be returned
to its previous owners, and financial retributions to the victims of the
conflict.
However, the author chose the aforementioned three issues because
they provide a good overview of the challenges to peace that Colombia
faces. Full demobilization is a utopia, and it was to be expected that
some insurgents would continue their activities. The challenge now is to
bring them to justice while preventing more demobilized fighters from
taking up arms again. Additionally, we have discussed the morality of
making peace with an insurgent movement. This is a controversial
initiative, but if there is a reason to believe the insurgents will
respect the deal, isn’t it necessary in order to save lives?
—
W. Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on
geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues in the Western
Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter:
@W_Alex_Sanchez
The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the
author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with
which the author is associated.
